MEMO RE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Created: 4/23/1955

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

approved for release hate: 5

April m$

i'JH THE IHR'XTORTWitfL TKT.'JUJO! MCE

lbs thruet of General Colli re' reworks given in two tvc-bour sessions* It, the Statean be briefly suararlsed

SB follows i

stink*.

'ihe situation in South Vletnaa is entlrtly asorlbable to Wen's failures. My end the Prenoh can in no sens* be heldsible for lt.

XT cnaoe i* Tn be averted. Dies eust go.

U. uccessor government, either one established along lines ef the rolllns-Tlwai pattern or along tha lines of the baoplan, should be establiebed,

J, Diea would be povarloca b> offer the successor fpvern-aant notable dlf.'tcvltico.

6. s successor* would work.

furrsidia. co.aist* of twoh* first an elaboration of tue outline above, and the second so-'e ezanples of discrepancies in .tor.oraleetinony a* 't was spun out In tbe two parts.

Assistant Director 3iUonal fstl-ates

J'AiiT I

ffl-.Sff stinks. Aside froi, his personality, upon uiiieh eneral Collins did'not cowsent. Chore ia no good that can beoi Dicetilef ofnd edaiaistrator. He has no sense of the task ahead, no vestige of sda&nlstrattve ability, lie shuts his eyes to problaaa that confront hla,to make eppointiatints that, cry to be aade. (Hisess toinister of the interior is peculiarly galling to Collins.) tie goes over the beads of bis own officials wittiout consulting than. (Re has ordered VKA forces without consulting hisof defence or his chief of staff.) he eannet tet along with people of ability and insists on having about hla only like-4oindad aen. Collins stated that ia the five on the of hie acquaintance he knows of no single original constructive idee which has emanated froa Dien. Collins doea not see the situation quite as irrdnently black as Kly, but he is entirely despairing of any solution so long as Dien stays in office.

2. The situationyt Vietoar* is entirely aserlbaolo to lUea's failures. We*'* rolo boo beenolenaction. tfWi'he has takenr threatened to take action, it is the wrong thing, witness hie ehow-doim with By 'ten on the question of the "Orand loode". Tide pleerurs dow was precipitately shut down two waks before the local New year's celebrations, thus disappointing "any persons ard eareinjr By Vien to lose face. v> Collins theremay other and wiser ;jcthods by which the earc result could have been achieved. an to assault frontalis the Binh Tuyen-flcntrc^ledeodrnisrtere in Saigon0 in the afternoon when one side and the rear of this building were protected and the front and other side guardedoaon strong points defendedchlne runners. Witness his refusal toiialstar of the interiorirst step towardssoioe sort of security body, witness his rowing with every intelligent mcaberis cabinet and eveklnc their tola kind of nan and this kind of action account for the present aituation.

Ely is completely honest, he has contributed nothing to the deterioration of tbe situation. As to hie switch from optinlaa to peseioian after Ms last trip to raria, his pessimistic view emerged from his realisation that the situation was further deteriorating aid hot froa instructionshe l'rench Oovorrmont.

3. If chaos la to bogo. In tho light

of the above this *'uld see to"need no elaboration, however, it iethot Collins fools that Dion is incapable hi-waif of even taking these eleaentery actions which vould result la tha electionrovisional as pop*It. Dion has spoken of hie villing-itoss to havo such elections and to abide by tha decisionsrovisional aosvrobly, even If one decision war* te oust Diem aa chief of gaianvaont. Collins gives ve lRpreosion that Dies is as stuck on high center thot he osnrtot -ske dec! eV>ns even In directions which are acceptable to bin. Kosnwhllo. tho contlnusnoe of the Ulen reginwt aakes dvil warnevitable. Oallins has cotics of probable outbreak bat feels It could be started st any tlae. Who will kick: It off? Ms answer Is either party nay kick it off. The sects are increasingly restive, and ths public now fool that the Binh Xuyen control of the pelIre function ls intolerable. The eareh of events Is eianlynt where swathing aunt be done.

either one^efrtabllaned along

lines ofgSOSSSi SE BfiB afl flpM ofpffi.%rioaI* "ST es^lUnSse.

Coiilno noted' tnaCnext tc hie own It wast acceptable solution ho had hoard of. do also, under questioning, agreed that the plan was almost oerteinly Fresch-licpired. 1'he fact tost tbal plan provided forirr.he aatter of ain Cannes, ths prospective rale ofll point to French Influence, deneral Collins felt that ths Bao Dal plan ass ln foot the French Foreign Office's answer to the Kcpartnsnt'c pointed questionseek or oo ess. On the question of what fen ofould bestjflh Tlctraw, General Collins was vahcasnt in bis assertionepublic was out of tne question. Ths only fore of rsvernnsnt toss ibis would have to be anonsrehy. His attention was called to the role of bao Dal. Should bao Dai re torn to Vietesa new? bo, he said,id net. S'ould ha ever return? las, under ths proper sibiatlon, oral he should c-ack with his own wife, not sonsboly else's. Ho ehould live in the palsoe. He should give up run-ing around. Ho should assume rscoonstblll ty for the government. General Collins did not describe the correct situation, cor did hs give en estimate ef the likelihood of those particular reforms occurring in Bao Dsl 'e say of life. While General Collins did say tact Oust had do groat following, at no time did he develop the difficulties which Oust eight encounternief of governesnt. ass Is that la the light of Bis rcnarks about "no crganiBOd public opinion is Vietnam" he doss not fedopular following ie importantlotncjaece government st tic stage of the game.

no pot-ular tniWliiK except possibly tn f* mrthernof id* origin. e and bis brother* ensht mas eone trouble fare, n. *lrntoltsdsr.nl nc tiw French swi Vis OS* Toe, be would rise fusl to ths Core-unlets, bat as natter shats thssill flial fuel. opeaker andprobebl* retire to aafter an initial flare-op.

6. csocoorould work aeeaussi

are eenaetent ass avsllabla fortThe*i, et els, end hovela requiredellowing|

sect* sen as broughts end thslrlnteerated lata ths fUtnaasse Amy.noted test Sty *ion had en Inclination torespectable end In OoUins* vloir vould five op

tbe cUsarsdng of ths east seldlers on0 of thaa Into ths TU success. hat the

vpoUeo ooassjsioa if vrgod by *ao tel. Tbs

aests vill asospt iU CeUlne -ads no eetlsate but eld not boob peesisdstls}

c. If tided be put Into sffoot and tbs plan for the training of ths ass TM laplarentod, laear the THA will be able to maintain internal ardor. Until sucha the vna asrueas thlo fans tine, tba ICC sad the no are the essentialpreserving Internal order.

herewith aersj abort ouwauvs peripheral to Colli ra' rsaarsl tosses. Tbs freneh would probably as viUlng to see an indefinite partition of ths sevntry. The frsach alaaet oartataly continue to thl* ofutcsk* in eolndsl Ursa. Uy free ths bsginnlBg has sonaiatsntly op, ceed any eoiutls, to ths ox-thaeathat vould oaks th* Shief ofrench steers. Taasjad, he has been insistent that ths leader cannott.

Original document.

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