NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NUMBER
COMMUNIST COURSES OF ACTION IN ASIA
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.
Concurred in by the
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
on Concurring were the
Intelligence, Department of State; the Assistantepartment of the Army; the Director ofthe Director of Intelligence, OSAF; thefor Intelligence, The Joint Staff. The AtomicRepresentative to the 1AC, and the AssistantDirector, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained,
subject being outside of their
MEMORANDUM TO ALL HOLDERS OF. "COMMUNIST COURSES OF ACTION IN ASIA
SUBJECT: Errata Sheet
Please make corrections ln your copies ofs follows;
footnote at bottom of pageecond line of text:read "probably".
portion of paragraphhich is printed on theat the top of pagehould read as follows:
They probably believe that such actions would lead to war with the US, possiblynuclear weapon attacks on mainland China. If the Chinese Communists should come to believe that US determination toTaiwan had markedly decreased, the likelihoodommunist assault on Taiwan would be greatly increased. Finally, if the Chinese Communists should come to believe in the course of their tests of US intentions or otherwise that the US would not in factTaiwan and tlie Pescadores, they would probably attempt to take over Taiwan by force.
COMMUNIST COURSES OF ACTION IN ASIA'7
To estimate Communist, particularly Chinese Communist, courses of action in Asia
the USSR possessesinfluence in the Sino-Sovietthe main outlines of Communist policy in Asia are almost certainlyjointly by consultation between Moscow and Peiping, not by the dictation of Moscow. Chinese Communist influence in the Sino-Sovict alliance will probably continue to grow. We believe that such frictions as may exist betweenChina and the USSR will not impair the effectiveness of their alliance during the period of this estimate.
The current tactic of the Communists in Asia appears toariant of their familiar policy of combining professions Ol peaceful intent with continued efforts at subversion and continued expansion of the Communist capability for war. The chief new clement in this policy, evident since the death of Stalin and particularly since the calling of the Genevaineightened effort
1 AiU, a* here used, includes Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines. Indonesia, Ceylon, and all ofAsia east of <but not including) Iran and Afghanistan.
to convince non-Communist countries that Moscow and Peiping desire "peacefulhat reasonable andarrangements with the Communist Bloc are possible, and that US policy is the only obstacleew era of peace In Asia. This new element conforms with present world-wide Communist tactics of minimizing tensions and of exploiting methods to divide the free world, andto detach the US from its allies,eriod in which the significance of US nuclear superiority is being(The professed Communist desire for "lessened tensions" in Asia appears in fact, however, to be markedesire to lessen the dangers of full-scale USaction against mainland China and to dull the vigilance of non-Communist Asia, while at the same time continuing Communist expansion by means short of open war. Within this framework, the Communists are prepared totate of extreme tension with the US and Nationalist China, acceptingn brief, Communist China and the USSR will continue their present
policy of wooing Asia with protestations of peace, while at the same timeto subvert Asia, in the expectation that this long-range "peacefulpolicy will with minimum riskin both the realization of theirmilitary and economic objectives and the eventual elimination of US influence from Asia.
The Chinese Communists will continue committed to the 'liberation" of Taiwan and the offshore islands, defining this issue as an internal affair in whichinterference will not be tolerated. Hence this issue will continue to present the greatest danger of large-scale warfare in Asia?}
We believe that as long as the USits firm support of the ChineseGovernment, remains committed to the defense of Taiwan, and continues to keep major air and naval unitsin the general area, the Chinesewill notull-scaleof Taiwan or the Pescadores. Short of invading Taiwan, thewill almost certainly concentrate on an interim policy of subversion and other means of softening up Taiwan fortakeover.
We believe that the Chinesewill almost certainly increase the scale of their present probing actions against the Nationalist-held offshoreand will probably attempt to seize some of the major offshore islands. They would almost certainly attempt to seize some of the major offshore islands if their probing actions were to provoke noUS counteraction^
We believe that the Viet Minh now feels that it can achieve control over all
Vietnam without initiating large-scale warfare. Accordingly, we believe that the Communists will exert every effort to attain power in South Vietnam through means short of war. Should Southappear to be gaining in strength or should elections be postponed overobjections, the Communistswould step up their subversive and guerrilla activities in the South and if necessary would infiltrate additional armed forces in an effort to gain control over the area. However, we believe that they would be unlikely openly to invade South Vietnam, at least prior tohe date set for national elections.
Elsewhere in Asia (the Nationalist-held offshore islands and South Vietnam excepted as perhe Communists will probably not, during the period of this estimate, initiate new local military actions with identifiable Soviet, Chinese Communist, North Korean, or Viet Minh forces.
The Asian non-Communist countries are dangerously vulnerable to theof Communist power and influence because of their military weaknesses and consequent fear of antagonizingChina, their political immaturity and instability, the social and economicthey face, and the prevalence of anti-Western natioralism. The effect of the Geneva Conference and subsequent events has been to increase this vulner-
JThe Assistant Chief of, believes that this paragraph should read: "We believe that the Chinese Communists will probablV Increase the scale of their present probing/ actions against the Nationalist-held offshore Islands and are likely to seize some of these Islands if such acUon appearsas part of their overall polltlcal-raill-tary-psychologtcal program."
ability. Accordingly, the Communist leaders almost certainly estimate that theyide area of maneuver open to them in Asia in which they can safely continue efforts at subversion andof armed insurrection withoutunacceptable US counteraction.
Communists will probablyto exercise considerable controlnorthern provinces of Laos anda capability for subversivethe Lao Government.believe that the Laotians canpolitical advances andanti-Communist government willin power providing it continuesoutside assistance and thedo not invade or instigateguerrilla warfare. We believenature of Communist aggressiveagainst Laos will be moderated bydesire to continuecoexistence" line in Asia,directed toward Indianandesser degree by theof US counteraction.
In the absencenilateral attack by ROK forces, resumption of hostilities by the Communists in Korea is unlikely.
Japan and India will becomeimportant targets for Communist "coexistence" policies and propaganda. We believe that the Communists willtheir efforts to undermine Japan's stability and present orientation and will seek an expansion of economic andrelations. They will make greater effort to create the impression that their termsesumption of diplomaticwith Japan arc flexible, and may offer toormal peaceduring the period of this estimate. We also believe that the Communists will focus increasing attention on India in an effort to insure at least its continuedand if possible to bring it closer to the Communist Bloc. However, even at the expense of friction with India, Communist China will seek to increase its influence in the Indo-Tibetan border area.
ommunist influence in Indonesia lias grown considerably since the present government took office inndesult of recent politicalthe government is increasinglyupon Communist parliamentary support for its continued existence. We believe the Indonesian Communists will probably continue to support the present government or, if it falls, to work for the establishment of another government in which they would participate or in which their influence would be strong. They will try, through both constitutional and illegal means, to expand their influence in the bureaucracy and the armed forces, and to prevent the formationnified and effective opposition. They willalso attempt to strengthen their capabilities by the organizationarty-controlled armed force. Inhowever, they will probably avoid highly aggressive tactics in the nearlest these provoke counteraction by the military or by domestic opposition groups before their own strength hasgreat enough to deal with it.present strengths and trends are suchommunist takeover inby subversion or force is possible during the period of this estimate.
net effect to date of the Genevaand of subsequent developmentsto advuncc tho Communist positionWestern prestige, in particular thatand the US, has suffered greatly.of North Vietnam hasCommunist strategic position inAsia, and has greatly Increasedca[>ablUties to subvert the remainderand Southeast Asia as well.China's claims to great powerbeen enhanced. Lastly, the"peace offensive" has had somefurther deceiving manyas to ultimate Communistconclusion of the eight-powerand the establishment of closer tiesPakistan and the US have somefor countering future Communistbut their effect to date has not offsetof the Communists.
Communist Objectives in Asia
The USSK und Communist China share the following long-range objectives in Asia: (a) augmentation of the military andstrength of Communist Asia;f US influence In Asia, and extension of the area of Communist political Influence; and (c) neutralization and eventualof non-Communist Asia.
We believe that Communist China seeks; primarily, to carry out rapid industrialization of its economy and modernization of itsestablishment and, for this purpose, to obtain greater Soviei assistance; to increase Chinese Communist influence overmovements in Asia; to guin anpositionorld power and as the leader of Asia; to gain control of Taiwan; and to eliniinute the Chinese NationalCommunist China considers Taiwan to be part of China, and looks upon itsas unfinished business of the Civil War. Apart from this, however, wc believe that the
Chinese Communists feel under no Immediate compulsion to expand China's present borders, but will continue to keep alive certain border demarcation disputes.
We believe that the USSR seeks; to make Communisttrong and reliable ally; to this end, to Increase Communist China's military and economic strength, but to keep China dependent upon the USSR; and toSoviet influence over Communistelsewhere in Asia.
Certain Communist leaders elsewhere In Asia probably entertain objectives for then* countries which do not coincide with the short-term aims of Moscow and/or Peiping. The objectives of tho local parties may bein the formulation of Communistbut over-all Bloc strategy will probably be formulated primarily on the basis of Sino-Soviet objectives, sacrificing if necessary the ambitions of local Communist parties.
Tbe USSR has never controlledChina as it has its European Satellites, but seems rather to have dealt with China as an ally. In this partnership Moscow possesses preponderant influence because of thepower of the USSR and because of Communist China's military and economic dependence on the USSR. The USSR Is acknowledged by Communist China as leader of the Bloc. Nevertheless, the main outlines of Communist policy in Asia are almostdetermined Jointly by consultationMoscow and Peiping, not by theof Moscow. Communist Chinacapability for some Independent action, even for action which Uie USSR mightbut which it would And difficult to repudiate. We believe, however, that the two countries are disposed to act in concert
The influence of Communist China in the Sino-Soviet alliance has been growinghis growth hus been accelerated since the death of Stalin, and has recently been made evident tn the Sino-Soviet accords of This process is likely to con-
tinuc during the period of this estimate.umber of questions frictions may existMoscow and Peiping: over the control of Asian Communist parties, the nature and timing of action against Chinese Nationalist territories, the amount and character ofaid to China, and perhaps other issues. We believe, however, that such frictions will not impair the effectiveness of the alliance during the period of this estimate.
Communist Strengths, Weaknesses, and Capabilities'
The Chinese Communist regime hasa virtually complete consolidation of control in continental China. There lspopular resentment of the central authority, but there is no indication of serious organized resistance.
On the basis of present evidence, wethat Chinese industrial expansion under Peiping's five-year plan will result in nearly doubling72 output of theindustrial sector. However, farm output has lagged during the last two years, andthe past year the regime has moved tomore rigorous controls over the economy in an attempt to maintain its industrial progress. To counteract increasingpressures, Peiping has monopolized the distribution of Important consumer goods and hasationing system for large segments of the population. To Increase Its controls over production, the Communist regime isrogram providing for compulsory sales of specified amounts of farm products to the state, and has speeded up socialization measures which7 aim to organize over half the nation's farmers and handicraft workers Into productionand to place virtually all industry and trade under state enterprises.
The Chinese Communists have certain capabilities for, and have demonstratedskill in, employing trade or trade overtures for political warfare purposes, even with the limited means at tholr disposal. Moreover, the regime has with some success sought to convey the impression thatof trade controls would open largefor Industrial products In Communist China and would develop sources of rawa development which would ease some of the problems now facing industrialsuch as Japan and certain Westernnations. In addition, the regime has impressed many non-Communist countries with its statements that trade controlsajor hindranceeneral reduction of political tensions in Asia. Actually, these claims of the possibility of greatly expanded trade appear to be largely propaganda. In time, with the development of Its industrial base. Communist China's capability forwarfare by economic means will beThe USSR's capability ln thisIn Asia Is far greater than that of China, but is still substantially limited by internal Soviet demands and other pressing needsthe Bloc.'
he Chinese Communist Army of over two million has been gradually improving Inand organizational effectiveness. The role of the Navy will be primarily limited toin coastal waters. Its capabilities may be increased by the addition of at least 0andotor torpedo boats. The Air Force, which hasircraft, of which more than half are jet-propelled, Is gradually improving In numbers of aircraft, quality of aircraft und equipment, and In combatIt Is limited primarily to operations under conditions of good visibility, and lstoubstantial all-weather capability during the period of this estimate. During the period of this estimate, the Chinese armed forces will remain critically dependent on the USSR for resupply of heavy equipment, spare parts, aircraft, and POL. However, the strategic position of China will be improved by the expected completion5ew Sino-Sovlct rail link through Mongolia.
Certain of these questions are discussed inCapabilities and Probable
Courses of AcUon throughated
' The problem ot trade controls Is being examined ln detail tnConsequences ofPossible courses of Action with Respect to non-Communist Controls over Tradeurrently in preparation.
Chinese Communist forces are capable of overrunning Thailand, Burma, and the free states of Indochina against theforces currently present In those areas, or against any indigenous forces likely to be developed tn the area during the period of this estimate. The Chinese Communists will have the capability throughout the period of this estimate lo seize Taiwan, the Pescadores, and the offshore Islands if opposed by Chineseforces alone. Communist China is capable of successfully defending Itself against any invasion effort by any non-Communist Asian jMiwer, despite China's logisticaland vulnerabilities to attack.
The demands of Communist China'sprograms, together with China'slo air attack, will probably tend to inhibit Chinese acceptance of major risks in the field of foreign affairs. If, aa we believe probable, these domestic programs go farward without major setbacks, this progress will augment China's capabilities for extending Communist influence in Asia. There might be some danger of foreign policy adventurism in the event of major setbacks In China's domestic programs. We believe, however, that on balance such setbacks would have the opposite effectof dictating abstention from military uggression.
The Communist regimes in North Korea and particularly In North Vietnam augment Chinese Communist and Soviet military and political strengths in Asia. These two areas will serve both as buffers protecting China and the USSR, and as bases for furtherpolitical or military expansion In Asia. The economics of both North Korea and North Vietnam will be closely coordinated with those of the Communist Bloc during the period of this estimate. Primarily because of Bloc aid, North Korea will probably effect substantial economic recoveryowever,evels of production in North Korea will probably not have been attained, and heavy demands on the populace will almost certainly detract from willing support ot the regime's programs.
The Viet Minh is consolidating andiU armed forces by groupingindependent regular and regional units to form new divisions with augmentedThis augmented firepower will result principallyigh level of Chinese aidncluding illegal aid since the cease-fire. By the endhe Viet Minh will probably have al leastrnfantry divisions, two artillery divisions, and one anti-aircraftThese developments would more than double the pre-Geneva combat effectiveness and capabilities of the Vict Minh regular army. It will exert an even greatereffect upon the Vietnamese than it has toiet Minh Air Force will probably be developed, covertly or otherwise, during the period of this estimate. The Viet Minhwill continue to require Bloc military, technical, and possibly economic assistance, and its policies will probably reflect aof Sino-Soviet views. The Vict Minh is expanding and Improving its transportation and communication facilities, including rail and highway links with South China.
he large overseas Chinese communities in many Southeast Asian countries provide the Chinese Communistsignificant potential channel of subversion. Suchas was given by these overseas Chinese to the Communist regime has0 under the Impact ofdomestic policies affecting the families and property of overseas Chinese, as wellonsequence of Communist efforts to extort remittances from overseas Chinese. Atthe great bulk of tbeillion overseas Chinese tend to be politically inactive and neutral, with the politically-minded minority split between allegiance to the Communists and the Chinese National Government.Communist influence among overseas Chinese youth has been Increasing, especially since the Geneva Conference. In sum, the subversive role of the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia generally Is limited by the apolllicul nature of must overseas Chinese, by their Isolation in the Southeast Asianand by the popular onus tliey tend to bring to any cause with which they arc too closely associated. However, these overseas Chinese communities maintaining numerous ties with the Chinese mainland will provide a
useful channel for Communist Infiltration, espionage, and propaganda activitiy, and would. In the event of war or insurrection,rave threat.
Within most of tlie countriestate of uneasy equilibrium exists. No Communist party outside ofand possibly Laos at presentilitary strength sufficient by itself toseriously the existence of the nationalFuthennore, no Communist party in the area, with the exception of that inhas the capability of significantlythe national government'sDespite these facts, the Asian non-Communist countries are dangerouslyto the expansion of Communist power and influence because of their militaryand consequent fear of antagonizing Communist China, their political Immaturity and instability, the social and economicthey face, and the prevalence of anti-Western nationalism. The effect of theConference and subsequent events has been to increase this vulnerability.
South Vietnam remains the mostto Communist subversion and expansion. Developments in Vietnam willirect bearing on non-Communist prospects in Laos and ln Cambodia, and ln turn Communist successes in South Vietnam, Laos, orwould markedly Increase theof other Southeast Asian states totactics.
Communist Estimate of tho Situation
has been no evidence of changebasic Communist view tliat the USthe center of opposition to theand extension of Communist powerWhile the Communists almostthat the ultimate US objective inthe overthrow of the Chinesethey Interpret present USforeign policies as Indicating that thethe foreseeable future does not intend,provoked by Communist action, towar or to run great risksAsia. Furthermore, they probably alsothese policies, especially US restraint in Korea and Indochina, as indicating that Immediate US policies in Asia go no further than opposing the further expansion ofpower and influence, building up the strength of non-Communist Asia, andachievement of Chinese Communistobjectives.
The Communists probably also believe that their capabilitiesong, primarily political struggle are greater than those of the US. The Communist leaders almostestimate that theyide area of maneuver open to them in Asia In which they can safely continue efforts at subversion and support of armed insurrection withoutunacceptable US counteraction. The Communists probably recognize lhatamong the non-Communist powers on many aspects of Asian policy make It difficult for the US to bring effective force to bear against Communist expansion throughshort of overt aggression.
The Communists almost certainly believe that recent events, whileS reluctance to become involved in major war in Asia, have delimited more clearly the area in which the US would take militaryto prevent Communist militaryIn particular, tho Communistsbelieve that open military aggression against Japan, Taiwan, the ROK, Thailand, the Philippines, or Malaya would lead to strong US counteraction, probably Including action against mainland China and possibly including the use of nuclear weapons. Tliey probably further estimate than an overtattack against Laos. Cambodia, or South Vietnam might result in at least local US military action, and that an overt attack on any other non-Communist Asian state would entail serious risk of US militaryMoreover, there is almost certainlyarge twilight area of possible courses in which the Communists are uncertain of US reactions Such courses probably include: attacks on the Nationalist offshore islands, greatly intensified paramilitary subversion in Indochina, or infiltration of armed groups into Thailand.
The Communists, particularly theCommunists, almost certainly regard the orientation of Japan and India as the key to the future balance ot power in Asia. The Communists probably believe that Japan's ties to the West can be weakenedolicyeconomic and political inducements. They probably consider that in the neara policy toward India which shows atuperficial respect for India's position in South and Southeast Asia will bestIndia's neutral position.
The Communist estimate of US actions and reactions in Asia will be the factor of paramount importance In theirof courses of action In Asia throughout the period of this estimate.
III. MAIN UNES OF COMMUNIST POLICY IN ASIA
current tactic of the Communistsappears toariant of theirof combining professions ofwith continued efforts atcontinued expansion of thefor war. The chief newthis policy, evident since the death ofparticularly since the calling ofConference ins aeffort to convince non-Communistthat Moscow and Peiplnghat reasonable andarrangements with the Communistpossible, and that US policy isew era of peace In Asia,element conforms with presentCommunist tactics of miriimizingand of exploiting methods to divideworld, and particularly to detach theits allies,eriod in whichof US nuclear superiority isreduced. The professed Communistfor "lessened tensions" in Asia appearshowever, to be markedesirethe dangers of full-scale USagainst mainland China and tovigilance of non-Communist Asia,the same time continuing Communistby means short of open war.framework, the Communiststate of extreme tensionUS and Nationalist China, accepting the attendant risks. In brief, Communist China and the USSR will continue their present policy of wooing Asia with protestations of peace, while at the same time continuing to subvert Asia, in the expectation that this long-range "peaceful coexistence" policy will with minimum risk result in both theof their present military and economic objectives and the eventual elimination of US influence from Asia.
The Communists will attempt to impress free-world countries, particularly Japan and the Asian neutrals, with their willingness to negotiate outstanding Issues. In so doing, they will probably make projwsals forwhich may be attractive to some non-Communist nations but contrary to USand, as at Geneva, may on occasion make significant procedural and tacticalCommunist China may attempt to negotiate, on the basis of the Chou-Nehru fiveeries of mutual nonaggresslon,understandings with most of its Asian neighbors. In these efforts, thewill continue to seek greaterand acceptance of the Peiplng regime, and to hold out the promise that Asian and world problems can be solved by Great Power deliberation if Peiplng is permitted totherein. In addition, the wisdom of closer diplomatic ties wilh Peiplng will beupon non-Communist Asia byexaggeration of Communist China's strength, progress, and peaceful Intent.
The Communists will almost certainly make every effort to publicize the attractive possibility for non-Communist nations oftrade with the Bloc, and to blame the trade control program, and the US as the chief supporter of that program, for theof International trade to reach higher levels. Communist China will also seek such trade to supplement Bloc assistance to China's industriall/ation program, to reduce suchon Bloc over-all economy as thismay now entail, to cany out politico-economic courses of action elsewhere In Asia, and to reduce the level of domestic political pressures required to support economic It Is probable that Communist China
will continue to exchange trade missions with many non-Communist countries and totrade agreements, both formal andwhich express hopesigh level of trade and disapproval of trade restrictions.'
Except as noted below with respect to the Chinese Nationalist-held offshore islands and South Vietnam, the Communists will probably not, during the period of this estimate, Initiate new local military actions in Asia withSoviet, Chinese Communist, North Korean, or Viet Minh forces- Communist courses of action will probably be designed to expand the area of political struggle while maintaining and increasing capabilities for future military action. The Communists will almost certainly attempt Increasingly toCommunist China's power and prestige in Asiapearhead for Bloc policy there.
Despite our estimate that new Communist military aggression In South and Southeast Asia Is unlikely, the Communists mightnew aggression in reaction to US policies,esult of miscalculation on their part of probable US reactions, or because of prospects of easy success In some area,If the strength and determination of tlie US and states cooperating with it seemed to be weakened. In particular, acute crises may arise out of the Geneva settlement or out of the Chinese Communist determination to gain possession of the Nationalist-heldislands and Taiwan. Thus, throughout the period of this estimate, the possibility of war remains.
The Chinese Communists will continue their efforts to subvert and exploit theChinese in Southeast Asia. They will attempt to gain control over schools and youth, commercial and other groups, and will exploit continuing ties between theseand mainland China for financial purposes, andhannel for Infiltration, espionage, and propaganda. The degree of Communist success in exploiting the overseas
The problem of trade controls is being examined in delall inConsequences OfPossible Courses of AcUon with Respect to non-Communist Controls over Tradeurrently in preparation.
Chinese will be strongly influenced by the over-all fortunes of Communist China.because the usefulness of most of these Chinese is limited (their members areculturally isolated, and disliked byhe Communists will probably concentrate their activities primarily on the governments and indigenousof Southeast Asian countries. TheCommunists may even makeon the nationality status of overseas Chinese, believing that such compromises would not greatly dimmish the subversive potential of the overseas Chinese communi-ties.
IV. SPECIFIC COURSES OF ACTION Nationalist China
he Issues between Nationalist andChina will continue to present the greatest danger of large-scale warfare in Asia. The Peiping regime will continue committed to the "liberation" of all Chinese Nationalist-held territory, defining this Issue as anaffair in which foreign interference will not be tolerated. The future course ofaction toward the offshore islands and Taiwan will be determined largely on the basis of the Communist estimate of US reactions.*
'The Assistant Chief of. believes that this paragraph should read as follows: "Chinese Communist acUvlty against Taiwan and the offshore Islands has fluctuated during the last four years from almost completeto recent heavy pressure against the Chlnmens and the Tach'cns. Current pressure appears to be part of an over-all pattern of Communist pollUco-mllitary acUon. Theregime Is committed to Uie "llbcraUon" of all Chinese Nationalist-held territory and has denned this Issue as an 'Internal affair" In which foreign interference will not beA successful assault against the offshore inlands is well within Communist capabilities, and it would be unreasonable to assume that they think otherwise. These Islands pose no particular military threat to the Chinese Cam-munlsts and are of only limited military,and psychological value to the Chinese Nationalists. However, the Chineseby continuing military pressure against the offshore Islands without direct assault, are Footnote continued on next page
) I! T"
believe that the Chinesecontinue to bomb and conductthe Nationalist-held offshoreoccupy undefended adjacent islands,increase air, naval, and artillerywill almost certainly increase thesuch probing attacks on theand will probably attempt toof the major offshore Islands duringof this estimate. They would almost
! certainly attempt to seize some of the major offshore islands if their probing actions were to provoke no appreciable US counteraction. On the other hand, as long as the US responds to these probing attacks with shows of force, the Communists may not attempt all-out assaults against the major offshore islands. In any event, the Chinese Communists may attempt to provoke local Incidents involving US forces which could then be put formally before the UNase of US aggression and of US interference in the internal affairs of China.'
believe that as long as the UStinues its firm support of the Nationalernment, remains committed to the defense of
Taiwan, and continues to keep major airaval units available in the general area, the ^Chinese Communists will not attempt ainvasion of Taiwan or the Pescadores.
Footnote continued from page 8
able to keep tbe Chinese NaUonalists and the US on the defensive wondering where thewill strike next. In addition,propaganda concerning Taiwan tends lo accentuatedivergence ol views between the US and her allies on the China question."
Assistant Chief othat this paragraph thou Id read as follows: "We believe the Chinese Communists willto bomb aud conduct raids against the Nationalist-held offshore Inlands, to occupy undefended adjacent Islands, and to Increase air. naval, and artillery activities. Peiplng probably estimates that efforts to take the NatlonaUst-hrld offshore Islands marisk of war with the US. However, In spite of their estimate that risk of war may bethe Chinese Communists are likely to attempt to sclae some of the NaUonallst-held islands if such arUon appears desirable as part of their over-all poll tical-mUsychological program."
They probably believe that such actions would lead to war with the US, possibly Including nuclear weapon attacks on mainland China. If the Chinese Communists should come to wise that the US would not in fact defendhad markedly decreased, the likelihoodommunist assault on Taiwan would be greatly increased. Finally, if the Chinese Communists should come to believe In the course of their tests of US intentions orthat the US would not in fact defendand the Pescadores, they would probably attempt to take over Taiwan by force.
of invading Taiwan, thewill almost certainly concentrate onpolicy of subversion and othersoftening up Taiwan for ultimatethis end, they will probably attemptthe International andof the Chinese Nationalto weaken its ties with the US.and diplomacy, they willembarrass and discredit the US andGovernment, to exacerbatebetween the US and its alliesnon-Communist powers on theto promote international favor fordisposition of Taiwan acceptableand to put pressure on the USits military protection andthrough continuingthe offshore Islands,subversion, and perhaps nuisanceagainst Taiwan, they will try toNationalist morale, increase theirand sabotage potential on Taiwan,defections, and promote politicalon Ihe island.
believe Ihat the Viet Minh willto gain in political strength andwilh Chinese aid. to increase lispower in North Vietnam. Theprobably now feels that it canover all Vietnam withoutwarfare. Accordingly, we believe
'See: "Probable Developments In South Vietnam. Laos, and Cambodia throughated
I that the Communist* will exert everyo accomplish their objectives throughhort of war. Viet Minh agents willo subvert all susceptible elements of thelatlon. to intrigue to prevent thef tlie various factions and the building oftrength in the South, and Vietshadow-governments" and politico-military networks will bo established wherever thefailure of the national government orrench to impose controls leaves theacuum in which to operate.esult of their activities and probable degreeof penetration In South Vietnam, it ishat the Communists will succeed inng most Vietnamese In the South of the ln-
of Communist control.
f, on the other hand. South Vietnam should appear to be gaining in strength orlections were postponed over Communistthe Communists probably would step up their subversive and guerrilla activities In the South and if necessary would infiltrate additional armed forces in an effort toontrol over the area. However, we believethat they would be unlikely openly toouth Vietnam at least prior toate set for national elections, because: (a) jthey would consider that their prospectsaining control over the area without reBort
Invasion continued lo be highlyb) they would be concerned over theof US military counteraction; and <c) they would probably fear that invasion would Induce the neutral nations in Asia to move toward open alignments with the West.
The Viet Minh isonciliatory line toward France, thus seeking to exploit French hopes of retaining their economic and cultural Interests in North Vietnam. It probably hopes that French susceptibility to an arrangement with the Viet Minh willand consequently reduce Frenchtotrongly nationalistic state in South Vietnam.
The Communists will probably continue to exercise considerable control in theprovincesos and will retain afor subversive activity against the Lao Government. However, we believe that the
Laotians can limit Communist politicaland that an anti-Communistwill remain in power providing itto receive outside assistance and the Viet Minh do not invade or instigateguerrilla warfare. Wo believe that the nature of Communist aggressive action against Laos will be moderated by thedesire to continue their "peacefulline In Asia, particularly directed toward Indian reactions andesser degree by the possibility ot US counteraction.
However, If South Vietnam should fall to the Vlot Minh during tho period of thisCommunLst capabilities for pressure against Laos would be substantially Increased, and the Laotian will and capability to resist these pressures would be correspondinglyThe extent to which the Communists chose to exploit this situation would depend almost entirely on their estimate of thereactions of the Manila Pact powers and of the neutral countries of South andAsia.
Although some Vietnamese Communist troops and their dependents have beenfrom Cambodia, we believe that aViet Minh cadre has been left behind. Moreover, the Cambodian Communist armed bands, although ending their guerrillahave failed to demobilize or to turn over their arms. Future events In Cambodia will be considerably affected by developments In Vietnam andommunist takeover in South Vietnam would increase Communist capabilities against Cambodia and wouldCambodian will to resist furtherpressures, though we estimate that the Cambodians would be more resolute than would the Laotians under similar
apan will become an increasinglytarget for Communist "coexlstcnco" policies and propaganda. The Bloc powers will continue to seek an expansion ofand cultural relations, playing upon exaggerated popular expectations in Japan of the potential benefits of trade with Commu-
I nlst China. Thoy will continue to holdhe possibility of negotiaUons leading toelations with the USSR andhinaeans of resolving economicecurity problems facing Japan. Theunlsts willreater effort tohe impression that their termson of diplomatic relations with Japanlexible, and may offer toormal ', peace settlement, possibly Involving theurn of some small Japanese Islands suchhe Habomals. and the conclusionggression pact. There arc no indicationsresent of any change in the basic Slno-Sovietrequirement that Japan terminate itsith the USrecondition forelationseace treaty, but it is possiblehat within the period of this estimateommunists may be willing to accepthing less.
he Communists will continue theirorts to undermine Japan's stabilityresent orientation through subversionhe Japanese Communist Party, andntensification of informal negotiations bc-Jtwccn nongovernmental groups. Thenesc CommunUts will continue tonate armed revolution to the "peaceful"ands of "united front" and "unifiedty" taetlcs. At the same time, theommunists will continue to develop theirorganizations and may, on occasion, resort to sabotage and limited acts of violence.
he USSR and Communist China will focus Increasing attention on India in anto insure at least its continuedand if possible to bring it closer to the Communist Bloc. Communist China may seek toormal non-aggression pact with India, and may even agree to an Informal delimitation of respective Sino-lndian spheres of Influence in Southeast Asia. Even at the expense of frictions with India, Peiping will probably establish diplomatic relations with Nepal, and seek to increase its now limited Influence there and in Bhutan. Sikkim. and elsewhere along India's borders.
ithin India, the native Communists will probably continue their efforts, largely through legal and constitutional procedures, tonited opposition against the ruling Congress Party. They will seek to exploitneutralist, and anti-Westernand probably to aggravate Indian-Pakistani differences. The Communists in India may Join in riots and employ othertacUcsmall scale, particularly where outbursts of violence have beenby non-Communist groups. Localwill try to enlarge their influence within the Kashmir government
policy during the period ofwill probably seek to continuesituation ln Korea. Wc believechief features of this policy will be:rom renewing hostilities into be militarily prepared for ahostilities; (b) to refuse to acceptIn Korea which eitherCommunist control of Northprecludes hope of eventual Communistof all Korea; (c) to rehabilitateand to strengthen its military andpower; and (d) to attempt toROK by Infiltration and subversion.
Communists probably willif not all Chinese troops fromthe period, claiming credit fortensions ln Korea and therebyon the US to effect further USfrom Korea. Dissolution ofNations Supervisory CommitteeKorea, if it takes place, willustained propagandaagainst the US. but probably willto renewal of hostilities or seriousin Korea. The Communistscontinue to urge that negotiations onof Korea, possibly In the formnew international conference, bewill continue to suggest that ifcannot Immediately be achieved,can. such as economic andintercourse between North and The Communists will almost certain-
ly not agree to unification based on frcounder UN supervision, but will probably be willing to make procedural concessions In negotiations and to enter into economic and cultural contacts with the ROK. Thenevertheless will continue efforts to Increase their now limited capabilities forwithin South Korea, and for exploiting political instablillty and grievances against the US and Japan.
ommunist forces In North Korea arecertainly capable of repelling aROK attack. The Communists wouldconsider such an attack as Justification for an attempt to conquer tlie entire country. We believe, however, that the Communists would wish to avoid becoming involved again in war with US/UN forces, and therefore that they would invade South Korea only if they estimated that the invasion would not lead to such Involvement.
ommunist influence In Indonesia has grown considerably since the presenttook office Inndesult of recent political developments theis Increasingly dependent uponparii men tary support for its continued existence. Communist influence has beenespecially through Communist activity in Indonesia's principal labor, veterans, Mod agricultural organizations, respectively, iSOBSI. PERBEPSI, and. At the .same time, Minister of Defense Iwu. who hasong history of Communist association,attempting to isolate anti-CommunistIn the security forces and to develop new military commands under his direct It Is possible that other individualsdirect Communist control will byparticipateovernment during the period of this estimate, and In this caseinfluence would probably rapidly If no prompt and determinedto this latter development were taken, the chancesompletetakeover would be high.*
e believe the Indonesian Communists will probably continue to support the present government or, if it falls, to work for theof another government In which they would participate or in which their Influence would be strong. They will try, through both constitutional and illegal means, to expand their influence in theand the armed forces, and totlie formationnified and effective opposition. They will probably also attempt to strengthen their capabilities byarty-con trolled armed force. In general, however, they will probably avoid highly aggressive tactics in the near future, lest these provoke counteraction by theor by domestic opposition groups before their own strength has become great enough to deal with it
he prospects of the Communists in the elections, now scheduled forreand may depend on election procedures which the Communists will attempt ton anti-Communist government
Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State. beUerea this paragraph should read as follows:
"Communist Influence in Indonesia has grown considerably since the present government took office Inndesult of recent political developments the government Isdependent upon Communistsupport for Its continued existence. Communist Influence has been exertedthrough Communist acUvlty Inprincipal labor, veterans' and peasant organizations, respeeUvely SOB8I, PERBEPSI. and. Minister of Defense Iwa, who hasong history of Communistis attemptng to isolate the more anti-Communist elements In the security forces and to develop new military commands under hla control. There Is no Indication, however, that Communism has made any extensive Inroads in the Indonesian army, and there have been reportsovement to heal factionalism within the army In order to resist the efforts of politicians to Influence that body. Direct Communist Parly participation In theU unlikely during the period of this It is possible, however, that Individuals who have Communist connections andsupport would be invited to participateovernment thus enabling theto coaUnue to Increase their Influence."
came to power tn the near future, with or without elections, we ix'llovc that thebecause of their present limitedprobably would not considerarge scale to be feasible. Their principal efforts Inase would beto the improvement of their localand of their capabilities for future action. On the other hand,overnment of the present character continues in power and if Communist strengths continue to grow as rapidly as in the periodhe chancesommunist take-over byor force during the period of this estimate will greatly increase.
he Communists probably consider that their prospects in Thailand depend chiefly upon the course of events In Indochina. They will continue subversive activities In Thailand, primarily among the Chinese and Vietnamese communities. However, the most significant Communist activities relating to Thailand will he conducted from outside the country. We believe that there will be Increasingactivity supported from southern Yunnan and Laos. In addition, Peiping will exert pressures on the Thai Government toeiping-organizcd "peaceo this end, former Thai Premier Prldl Phanomyong may become increasingly prominent in Peipingpokesman for suchethat these tactics will not haveeffects in Thailand as long as Western assistance and support to Thailand continue and the Thai are not faced with an imminent military threat from China or majorgains in Indochina.
"Sec, 'Trobablc Developments Into be published In
Chinese Communists face adifficult problem in determining whatto strike between soil and hardobvious support of the insurgentswould probably move Burma closerWest and arouse Indian apprehensionCommunist intentions.Moscow and Peiping probably dothe present Burmesewholly reliable. We believeChinese Communists will attempt toa middle course towardpeacehile fosteringactivities, particularly in the border areas.
the USSR and Communistcontinue to maintain correctwith the Government,will be weighted In favor ofoccasional terrorism. The alms ofwill be necessarily modest:their now limited strength inand toand in causing angovernment to be replaced by oneand antl-Communlst. TheyIn particular to exploitand religious differences, theproblem, and differences betweenand Pakistan.
Elsewhere in Asia
present policy of infiltratingmovements In Malaya willincrease Communist political potentialarea by the later period of thispolicy Involving theHong Kong, and Macau Is likelyalong present lines.Original document.