Created: 11/16/1954

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible





Tor arenaCESS
















-top sr.Ciir.t-




This Projeotistorical departure from the international tradition of tha United States Government and tha firat positive, successful neasure short of direct intervention, to thwart the aggressive actions of the Soviet Onion in this era known as the "Cold War."

Competent authority declared that the "Soviet Beachhead" in Guatemalahreat to the welfare of the United States. The CIA had been assigned the responsibility,op Operational Priority basis, to rerove the Comuniat-dorainated government and replace itriendly, pro-United States government. This mlosion was to be accomplished inanner aa to retain plausible denial of United States official participation.

The Guatemalan Government had been under Comnunlst influence in varying degrees for the past ten years and over thirty-three indigenous attempts had been made to overthrow ltj all were unsuccessful, Communist control hod advanced rapidly in the past year and was capable of converting the countryenied area almost at will. inority party, it manifested Itself so doninantly it was estimated that tha tint had passed when any opposition group could organize sufficient strength without considerable outside assistance to overthrow the Coaniniats.

CIA's task was to provide the naceaaary covert assistance to enable the anti-Communist elements to dispose of the Consauniatshorough manner. An unconventional Warfare operation was required and plannedop Operational Priority baais. rogram was established with set objectives to condition the target and the people, then bringing thornuild-up periodevolution, leadingrisis before the final showdown of strength and determination. This classical approach was executed generally as planned and anticipated, despite serious setbacks and disappointments. Ittrong will to do, and although soma faltered alongay, in the main it prevailed the end exceeded that of the enemy, thus raking for final victory and success.

The accompliahmsnt of this mission required an application of CIA techniques and proceduresoint, closely integrated manner, often in an unorthodox way. Tha objective dictated tho procedures. All operations were conducted to serve the ultimate end. It had toombination of internal and external mechanisms, directed and controlled outside the target country. peclal Regional Command was established and operations were conducted in and through six different countries. It was recognized that once an operation of this nature had been launohed and was known to the enemy, it soon wouldace with time. For this reason and the priority assigned to the Project, all operations were conducted under heavy pressure.

The vital but unseen role was that of comjtunications. ense the operationable operationonplax but highly effective system established by the Project. Froa the tin the Project had been approved for ^pxlernctation,ntil its conclusion ont, over _ Jcable messages had been transmitted. LINCOLN, theouches and0 dispatches. The budget allocationCO0 and tha actual cost, less recoverable assets, waa just under tha original allocation.

The mission aasigned to CIA had been accomplished and plausible denial retained.

Submitted by:

Approved byt

t. SLCfit-




FOR: Deputy Diroctor (Plane)

Acting Deputy Director (Administration)


1* ave approved Project PBSUCCESS and tha allocationto0 of funds available to the Agency forThe Controller,ifl directed to make the necessaryto chargerior or current expenditures for this Project this allocation and to credit back any vAthdrawslo made from-^tvuff ton .

nhe security aapeota of*'thtt'-'ftsaaot. Ithe Comptroller to make funds, within the aboveto the Chief, WH Division, at hie raqueat and with thawriting" of ther OOP, in ouch amounts and toas he may desire.The Chief, WHwill be the aOaofficer for all fund* "so advaa^.aad.Ktll boassuring that all expenditures arenecessary forsupport of tne^Proaect and for obtaining. Mwhdodutttationfor expenditures for these operations shell remain withDivision, AM'thd Certifying Officers may accept thetheevision, that he haa evidence to Buowsr, propriety And rikBohableneae of the expenditures and thatbeen made for th> offidalJmrpoBaa- '

3. TherAuditcr-in-Chlof anall provide for pariodie auditoi







MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Program for PBSUCCESS.

Folloving our briefing and conversation of thiaave read over tha attached program which has been prepared by | nd the others working on this project,ecommend that you" approve it for planning purposes and for the further purpose ofStage One at this time.

Actually tho plan is stated in such broad terms that it is not possible to know exactly what it contemplatee, particularly in the lattor phases. o not regard thisarticular drawbackastly-detailed plan prepared at thia tin* would have to be modified in any case. Moreover, the approach specified lr, this paper calls for the preparationetailed operational plan for top level approval at the Conclusion of Stage One (the ABflessment phase).

Regarding the "ultimatum'1 opacified under Stage Five, it was understood in our discussion that this was not agreed to and would be given further consideration.

lu Theoesrnot seem to me to be excessive, givenrtance of this project and the degree of priority attached tonderstanding thatoes not take into account the Headquarters personnel who will continue to be used to backstop the operation from Washington. It may even develop that somepersonnel will be required as events develop. (Foree no provision for the necessary cofsaunicatlons personnel and radio technicians,m sure will be needed.)

he concept of assigning to the operational field chief |_ Jthe central operational responsibility and I

Page kOm8nd the commanQ channel outlined inn

/s/ FrankRANKISHER Deputy Director (Plans)

f Memo for Record dtdgd by|_

J Subject! "Program for PBSUCCESS."





REFERENCES: aneral Plan ofS#


B. Project PBSUCCESS Status Report, dated3

A* Objectives ..

To remove covertly, and without bloodshed if posaible, the menace of the present Cc^iuUat^-controlled government of Guatemala*

To install and sustain,ro-US government in Guatemala.

of the Problem

The Coasunists hare become strongly entrenched in Guatemala and in the Guatemalan government, thushreat to United States welfare in the Western Hemisphere,.

The Guatemalan non-Communiat oppoaltion has become disillusioned and disunited. atent antt-Coowunist resistance potential is believed to exist.

.The resistance potential must be built up to the point where it can contribute materially to the accomplishment of the objectives of PBSUCCESS.

Ii. In view of growing Communist strength and declining non-Ccemuniat cohesion in Guatemala, the implementation and successful completion of tho objectives of PBSUCCESS must proceed without delay.

5* It cust be recognized that any major effort to dialodge tho Conauniat-controlled government of Guatemala will probably bo credited to tbe United States, and possibly on CIA. Covert accomplishment of the objectives of PBSUCCESS is thereforo defined as meaning accomplishment with plausible denial of United States or CIA participation.

of Operations

taffing and Assessoont -

of Project Personnel.

Survey by Communication* Adviser.

and despatch of Project field personnel.

and analysis of friendly assets.

and analysis of enemy assets.

t. Preparation of dotailed operational plans for Headquarters approval.

reliminary ConditioningHeadquarters novas to the field.

dissension and defection within the target.


target at homo and abroad,

inability of target regiae to representof the people.

hope and encourage patience among non-Communists.

military agreements with Nicaragua, Honduras and<vrcv

Withdraw US military personnel from target at appropriate


economic pressure.^.

formation and trainingara-military force in Assess accoff^lishttents.

k. Obtain Headquarters approval before proceeding to next stage.

3. Stageuild-up

maximum antagonism to target regime.

passive will to

ci Apply Internal and external economic pressure to create

serious difficulties, d. In concert with majority of OAS members, apply diplomatic

urgency by speeding military build-upcountries (not including Mexico).

para-railitary preparation.

passive sabotage program.


Headquarters approval before proceeding to next stage.

h. Stageritical Periodpply maximum economic pressure, b. Accentuate divialonist activity within target, o. 'Intensive rumor campaign stimulating fear of war for the purpose of drawing enemy forces away from capital.

revolutionary forces claim support of people.

force in readiness.

sabotage evident.


Headquartoracappfoval before proceeding to next staga.

5- Stagehowdown)

aggressive sabotage plan against key targets.

leader claims capability to seize powerand issues ultimatum to target regime toorder to avoid needless bloodshed.

is told to await target regime's reply andfrom constitutional leader.

ultimatum fails, popular uprising begins;enters target country, proclaims authority,regime null and void.

position and restore order.

6. Stageonsolidation

of Coanunlets and collaborators,

initial proclamations and edicts.

of government.

of long-range domestic and foreign policy.

countries announce immediate recognition and suoDortregime. .

States offers aid. ."




D. Organisation and Authority

has bean given Top Operational Priority"Agency.

and Responsibility

a* Primary field authority and responsibility la vested in the Officer in Charge, PBSUCC3SS.

officer la designated "Special Deputy for PBSUCCESS, The command channel will be direct fron Special Deputy to CWH.


* The following staff requirorients for PBSUCCESS are believed

be tha rHrHium for adequate inplenentation and control of tha Plan of Operations envisaged herein* Additional personnel may be required for varying periods of TDX.

utlined below is exclusive of WHD's*

1. Upon approval of this program, financial accountability will be vested in CWH, under whose direction CWH/AD will be the accountable disbursing officer for Headquarters expenditures. Under the general direction of the CWH, the Special Deputy for PBSUCCESS will be the accountable disbursing officer for Field expenditures.

Procedures for allocation, diaburoonent, and accounting of 'funds will beanner acceptable to the DD/A, and as shall be arranged between him and the CHH/AD.

C 3




/s/ J. C. PMB

* As to paragraph El subject to memo3 toD/A




REFERENCE: "Program foratod3

,1, Subaltted herewith is arreport on the work accomplished by Project personnel during Stage One of "Program forovering tha period, consisting of:

PART ONE-upported bynd B;

PARTProposed Projectupported by Annex Cj

PARTProposed Operational Plans for Stage Two."

on theelieve that CIA haa the capabilitythe objectives of this Project provided that theelements are recognized:

UrgencyJ Tho element of surprise having been lost and our intentions already partially compromised, the time factor becomes essential In this proposed operation.

Effort: The preponderance of target strength, numerically and

-organisationally, .dictates an appreciation of thisand necessitates eRployaent of appropriatein an intensive and sustained manner.

Thoroughness: The entrenchment of the target group is sufficiently serious to demand recognitionact that moreuperficial change in government is required. Themist be complete and the new,. government must be consolidated rapidly toesurgence of the target groupounter-revolution undoing thef this Project.

recommend this Report be approved and that PBSUCCESS boproceed without delay to irplcaent Stage Tvo operations.










II. Nature of the

HI. Friendly Assets and


PARTroposed Project Organisation



PARTroposed Operational Plan for Stage Tvo


II. Plan of Organisation, Stage

HI. Proposed, Specific KUFTRE Tasks

W. Proposed, Specific KTJGOWN

T. Proposed, Specific XUHOOX

J6P t-



ovember toroject officers thoroughly assessed all known enemy and friendly assets, utilising therefore field surveys, debriefings of field and Headquarters personnel and file searches. In numerous instances, tho time and information essentialompletely documented picture wereowever, while inadequate by meticulous standards of scholarship, information and tine, thesufficed to establish certain conclusions upon which action could be predicated.

II. Mature of the Eneny:

A. AesessKontt

1. Political:

Communism in Guatemala is neither an arbitrary nor an accidental phenomenon. Many features of national life, such as tho basic artificiality and-maladjustment of the social Structure, the draatic contrast between rich and poor,ictatorship in alliance with-powerful foreign commercial .interests, readily lent themselves to Marxistoung, rebellious lower-middle class intelligentsia, sparred BlBultaneoualy by personal discontent, observed circumstances and Soviet example, put first leftist Socialism and nowinto practice.

A leftist Socialist government, now effectively dominated by Communists, has baon in power in Guatemala for mora thanearn. Despite small, scattered revolts, the hold of thehas never been seriously shaken. This time in offico, with all its possibilities for entrenchment,and elimination of opposition,econd powerful enemy asset.

Nurtured by time and circumstance, the Communist POT (Partldo Ouateraalteoo de Trabajo) todayard core of well-indoctrinated, well-disciplined members variously estimated. Moreundred top leaders appear to have bean trained in the USSR. The POT has trained, exchangedwith and benefitted from the services of top-ranking Latin-American Cdamuniats'. Lacking oppositionountry where the level of political consciousness and participation is extremely low, the POT exercises an influence far beyond what its numbers, under other conditions, might indicate. President Jacobo ARBENZ Guzman is, by his own frequent admission, dependent on the Coneanists for his platform and his program. The other leftisthere they are not infiltrated by secret POT members, are intellectually overpowered by the Communists, as the Menshoviks in their day were overpowered by the Bolsheviks. In the Guatemalan Congress, although tho POT has only fourth) of theeputies, Communists control tho key aga-oeajew



Reform end Labor Commlttaes, end set the tone and paoe of legislative policyhole. Key posts throughout tho government, notably in such influential institutions as the Institute of Social Security, are effectively held by Coeninlsts. Several thousand Bore or lass influential government and political figures roost be rated as strong Coenunlet sympathizers.

ntelligence: '

Very little, and that little most imperfectly, la known. agencies of the Guatemalan government and Communist services. This American ignorance is Itself aasset. It must also bo presume1 that, given Soviet trainingecade to 'establish one, the Guatemalans possess arf intelligence service that is, by Central American atandards, superior. There is ample evidence that the government and the POT penetrated past unsuccessful anti-Cowainlat groups. and POT appear to be aware that American offorts are now, and have been for soma timetthroughnder way to overthrow them. Ambassador TORISLbO'sovember charges in tha On, plus personal remarks made by President ARBENZ to Ambassador SCH05NFELD, tend to confirm this assumption.

3* Propaganda:

Mass agitation assets at the disposal of the government and the Communists are substantial. The government controls aeveral nowapapers and tho leading radio station. The Agitprop Section of the POT la effective, andan like Carlos Manual PELLECER the CoaBunlata have perhaps tha fieriest speaker and writer in tha country. Of predominant Importance is the fact that the Cotomnlste have, for the past two years, ateadlly consolidated their control over urban and rural labor by aof demagoguery and sheer hard work. Through theirpropagandistlc assets, the government and the Communists may be presumed to have gained tens of thousands of, at the least, collaboratorB.

lw Military and Para-nllitary:

Throughout the lastears,an Ouateraalan Army,ew stirring but minor exceptions, has dutifully supported tha regime. Army loyalty has been maintainedombination of factors: the devotion of key army leadare to the RevolutionU, the personal leadership of President ARBSNZ, special apportionments of creature comforts, political passivity on tha part of snot officers and, recently, possible Cotnunlst infiltration of tha army. In addition to this regular military force, which is stronger than that of Guatemala's three Central American neighbors combined, para-nrtlltary forcae of undetermined aize and strength have bean organized by the government and tha Cosnnniats. Finally, thereuardia Civil ofan, whose loyalty has shown no appreciable signs of faltering.



Ths foregoing demonstrates the history, magnitude and cohealveness of enemy assets, and thereby demonstrates the urgency and the magnitude of the enterprise confronting PBSUCCESS. Since the present power structure of Guatemala rests on the three pillars ofisciplined minority to implement it, and pure physical force, it is' evident that PBSUCCESS must crack each of these columne, while simul-taneously building up anisciplined minority and aforce of its own.

III. Friendly Assets and, Assessment!

1. Political!

Against the approximately one hundrad(lOO)who have been in the Soviet Union, PBSUCCESStwo|eas, untested anti-Communistrespected in Guatemala,

has only limited political and aaministratlvs experience. Heatoving speaker, writer or thinkerj and heoldountry ten years accustomed to the ruleasn. RUFUS is of suitable age, appearance, and manneran effective leader. He, too, lacks political experiencein his specialty, military affairs, has moraecordand training work than actual field oommand. Neithereffectively controlled by PBSUCCESS to date, andcontrol nay be complicated by past financial largesse onof CIA. Past security practices of both men have beanthehand, recent conversations between PBSUCCESScotRUFUS suggest that they mayeal

capacity to learn, grow and aasums command.

The principal group of dedicated Guatemalan antl-Coamuniata appears to consist of perhapstudents organised in Guatemala as ths CEOA, and In Honduras and El Salvador as the CEUAGE. The energy and ardor of those students, if not their professional competence, is encouraging. Gf course, in numbers, they do not even remotely natchrained Comaunists.

In the category of strong sympathizers, the anti-Communist forces can number perhaps several hundred former officers, land-owrnrs, merchants, professional men, antl-Comruniat union leaders and devoutly religious layrent and priests. The municipal administration of Guatemala City, still in anti-Communist hands,eservoir of political and administrative talent. In Puerto Barrios, anti-Communists control the labor scene.

Presently lukewarm or potential antl-Commaniets, however, would appear to. Recent reports from Guatemala Station indicate widespread passive discontent, ranging all the way from the well-to-do who collaborate with Conmunism in order to protect their property to disgruntled workers who are forced to strike because they fear that otherwise Communist union


leadersdischarged. The population of Guatemala City, Judging* by Its voting record, la anti-Communist. Many segments'of the labor anions have anti-Coenunist nenbere. Throughout the land, thereatent anti-Comrunist ferment


In Guatemala, the KUFIRE assets of Guatemala Station consist of one agent taken over from, the FBI andormer Spanish Republican, both of whon have access to medium-level and high-level political and personality information. There are several informants who supply virtually overt psychological intelligence. The Station has limited surveillance assets. The Station has no penetrations of the POT, government agencies, armd forces or labor unions.

In Honduras, there la no CIA Station. RUPUS has anservice operating fron Honduras against Guatemala,Nicaragua and Honduras. His nets in Guatemalaone alleged medium-level Communist Party penetrationhigh-level Quote rial an Army informant) and anof loosely controlled agents and informantsAmad Forcee and government political groups. RUrUS'Honduras consist of one low-level Communist Partyapparent growth potentiali one informant in theand one Guatemalan government

In addition to this there are several informants In the Honouran government and police, and friends in the diplomatic corps end the Costa Rlcan emigren both Nicaragua and El Salvador RUTUS maintainss who have what appear to be fairly reliable Informants in diplomatic and government oirclee.



Irr Qua teamguides and supports, but does not

control, the CEDA group whiah distributes anti-Communist posters, stickers, handbills and flyleaves,and which has just begun the printingeekly paper called El Rebelde. 'Thia group la associated with RuTOS. In addition, the independent press, sometlsma with the assistance of USIA, publlshea anti-Cosrunist material of varying quantities and qualities. act of these activities" cannot now be treasured.

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In Honduras, the CEUAGB student group, also associated with TOeekly .bulletin, which has been snuggled over-land Into Guatemala. The impact of the bulletin cannot now be measured.-'i-

.v rSl3of

the CSDAGE group has recently begun the publicationeekly newspaper called Ej.hich is said to be smuggledInto Guatemala. The CEUAGE group also purchases time for anti-Communist broadcaats on Station TSI, but these programs can be heardew.miles acroaa the Guatemalan border and not at all in Ouatenal* City.

ulletin, a

publication of anti-Coramlet Guatemalan exiles living in Mexico City. Ths bulletin is mailed principally to recipients in the Hemisphere, and Guatemala Station has never noticed it in Guatemala, though It ia said that this is mailed to Ouatemala. The CIA contract agent formerly In contact with LIONTZER has recently become highly insecure and must be replaced.


At present, the only KUHOOK assetsownod foreign arms available for shipment to RUPUS when and if he and his potential followers require them.

RDFTJS himself does not appear to be versed In unconventional warfare. The number and quality of men he can recruit is no known.

RUFUS claims to have from President SCM3ZA of Nicaragua the premiseraining aito at Puerto Cabeaas, Nicaragua.


At present, KCTUS has no affective coreaanications assets The number of sen and qualit* of men that he can sake available for cocmunlcations training is not known.

The only KUCLUB assets of PBSUCCESS are those currently

0 rield atetlons and being installed at LINCOLN and SANiA 7E.

Potential Assets!

la Pollticalt

The primary potential asset of anti-Communist forces in Guatemala is the fact that Communism, as an ideologyractice, Is neither adequate nor natural for the country. It ia true that Communism haa real roots in the Guatemalan situation!


Mi1 'uLu

but, its deepest appeal is confinedmall, intellectual group. "'Communism, which, nowhere in the world has been able to cope lastingly with the agrarian question, does not fit the basically agricultural economy of Guatemala. Likewise,which nowhere in the world, least of all in the Soviet Onion, has been, able to cope lastingly with the problem of tribal groups, does not,ituation where 5uS6 of theis Indies, Asolgate University research projects pointed out the inapplicability of the Socialist-Coranunist ideology to Guatemala, The sane studies suggestedational, peasant ideology could be much more compelling. It appears.entirely possibleositive political ideology, 'far nore appropriate and appealing than Communism, can be developed to attract not only many of the Guatemalan leaders now subservient to Communism, but to vitalise many anti-Communist elements that are now' politically passive.

The time in office of the government, while currently an enery asset,!can potentially be convertedriently asset. Inears, any government commits many errors and arouses many grievances. The slogan that "it's timehange" can


sslbly be even rore congenial to the relatively volatile tin tempennent than to tha American.

proper indoctrination and specialised training, the poiltteal"leaders now available to PBSOCCSSS can be given much greater stature. The erall hard core of anti-Communists can not only "be mads mora vigorous, but can also be expanded byfrom,the pool of strong sympathizers and lukewarm sympathize! There Is evidence that the strong and lukewarm sympathizers, once true leadership and adequate means are provided, may furnish enough new adherents to an anti-Communist hard core to overmatch the Cocaunists.

' By'the same token, there is reason to believe that many presently lukewarm or potential anti-Communists can be upgraded to strong sympathizers with the anti-Commnist cause, once leadership and moans are furnished by PBSUCCESS. This group of future strong sympathizers can conceivably be augmented by both sincere and opportunistic defeoters from the Communist and pro-Coamunlst carps.

In turn, the possible pool of passive supporters of anti-CoEmunisn may, according to reports from Guatemala Station, be enlarged to includef the politically active



3, imoow/i

hMe<mouely developed with be taught better propagindu technique. ajor WOtm aaaat great impact that can be upgraded through skillful programing


1 PBSUCCESS personnel can unquestionably provide superior planning, tralrdng. end equipment 'for KUHOOK efforts. RQ7US,acked by ouchhould be able both to lead andn aa yet'Undetermined number of men. (Past CIA estimates, which the current assessment could' not verify, haveotential soldiersr, addition, It is believed that energetic KDFIRBn* uncover active KOHOOIC assets within QuatenaU. IR3 defection effort in Guatemala must be attempted to neutrallta much of tha present .armed; strength of the. Guatemalan government and Communlstsi there le recant evidence of widespread, if etilllatent, officerwith President AflBEKZ and the Communists,

lefrt'-ilitUie and is n't 1

osition to preride superior propaganda breadaaat facilities end is ourrantly engaged in doing so. In addition, OIA ia developing oapabilitiss for jaaning and interrupting enemy propaganda broadcast facilities.

CIA lataticna engagsd In PBSOOCESS will possess adainiatrative oecmunioaUone superior to those of tho enemy.

OIA can provide superior agent radio equipaant and training toorces. RUTUS has agreed to make available) nan for communications training.

C, Analysis"

It la.clear from the foregoingUCCSSS must proeeed prl* merily on the basis of potential assets, rather than from existing, real assets. This is normal for revolution, whloh always beginsew Benarret who. baft an idea, the will to work for It and the leader ship to recruit followers. PBSOCCSSS oan supply direction .and technique toanti-Communist forces, and the record of Quatamelan discontent with Communion suggests that sufficient India ganous human resources can be developed to achieve the project objao* tives.

IV. Conclusions:


_ o^letenMS of available Information, theis not'*at is known is formi-

dable. Additional strengths, or hidden weaknesses most beSn-tfiJJ?*' of PBSUCCESS. It is certainecomela:romptly and vigorously

Capabilities: -

than ILH ITS7 Jrtendly capabilities, wchdeteriorate even further unless they

are quickly and solidly bolstered by PBSUCCESS. CIA technical personnel and financial -support to Guatemalan enti-Conwsmlan. if


balance. PBSUCCESS.action will be the decisive factor in converting

into real


Tscaedln8 on the basis of potential assets, nther-than ott the basis of existing approved;

f fnd that. naUonal interest,asby the National Security Council,hange of eovern-ttnt inj^temla, the TOP Operational Priority of SsSccESS ds formalin assured for at least alx aontha;

flat definite, high-level, accord be maintained that anyor other charges. intervention will be met wSh Positive UA, denial based on factual or notional plausibility*

Si-^SSii"of theand magnitude of the problen.etrly

ant*d.f Options, lnolndlng the organisational concept and financial requirements.



Strategic/Tactlcali "'

The operations oftt-'ooiidaftted at two levels!


This Includes all policy wtie'rs above the level of WHD wlthiniCIA, and policy liaison and action between CIA and appro-priate^other government agencies. The responsible officers for strategic/policy coordination within CIA will be CWHhrough appropriate channels, tAev will saintain contact with the Department of State Working Oroup(0eneral SyjTH, Mr. Lampton BERRI, Mr.he Department of Defense and other agencies.

The tactical/field operations of PBSUCCESS fall within the purview of CVH.


befor the supervision and support of PBSUCCESS in the field and for reportingP/Ops tThigher CIA echelons. Within the WHD, the Chief of Dlvialcn willpecial Deputy to be directly responsible for the conduct of all field operations for thia project.

Deputy, WH for PBSUCCESSt


i;.Theoroiect head-qua rterfl at|_

as subordinate to this


egional Command Ml Be constituted within thero-vide appropriate priority precedence'to this Project. The Project Headquarters* being responsible to pffl. will-be authorised direot flCmmrdcatione within its Regional Corraaiid.All coirrunlcaticna to Other stations in WHD will boHD.'. InformaUon copies cf all, OomBunlnations onanatlng.within the Regional Command will be forwarded by originatorHD through normal channels.

Field Project location!

2v Covert:

will be known at the Q

lestabliehedhy the Department of Defensestudies and surysys"ighly sensitive nature,to specialhis cover is consistent withof several actual; such project?


^-JJnp "curity-officer, based in UNTOUJ has been

assigned to PBSUC1SSS by the Office of Special Security. This officer will supervise and service all security aspecte of Project Headquarters,-postal boxes, car rental, liaison with othor governs*)nt agencies, sensitive shipments, physical move-nents of project- personnel and equipment to LIHC0LN,otc.

C'^has. (threo million dollars) to PBSUCCESS,

Mjfci. Financialhe DCI has authorised the Comptroller to release funds toCWH at hie request and with the prior approval Inciting of ther COP, in such amounts and to such per-sons as he may desire for the Project. ADM/WHO ^en 3ppointed

itl uarters expenditures. Under CVJH, the Special Deputy, PBSUCCESS ia the accountable disbursing officer in the field. The Chief, Support at PBSUCCESS will coordinate and account for Project financial matters within the Regional Command to ADM/NHD, Disbursements made on this Project outside of the Regional Command within WHD will be made by and accounted for by the ADH/'fiD.

Budget. Expenditures under PBSUCCESSn unexpended balance

tures aur*fng Stage Two are estimatedoOO.CO, -J

d. Currency Procurement. as grantedDrocuran8ntmonth in local currencies,

subjectonthly review of requirements.

5* Special Services!

a. The Chief, RQK/OIS has undertaken to have collected and forwarded to Project Headquarters,egular basis, all pertinent information available to CIA in Washington.

onitor and transmit to Project Headquarters all pertinent programs broadcast by Guatemalan radio station.

6; Communications*


The Office of Communications will provide propaganda broadcast transmitting facilities, field tactical conmunicaMons services and administrative communications to Projectto and within the substations where necessary.


7." Administrative Support!

Aonintstrative support will be provided by CVH through ADH/UHD, Such eupport will Include cable..poach and registry services, office equipment asmonnel adminlstra-Arrangements,have been made withf" Jto have an officer sourier mail and collect at tho Department of State courier center pouched materials for Project HeadouartereV

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PflHT three



I. . General*!:

The foregoing assessment and analysis of friendly assets andrevealed their weakness and tha urgent need for their.Assets and potential assets mast be explored and probedprocess of deTelopaent. Accordingly, the general objective ofis to develop and construct required nechanisna to support the nary conditioning of the

lan of Operation, Stage Twoi

rojeot Headquarters noves to the fieldi

The approvsl of this report will constitate the authority to iapleaant the project organisation as described in Part Two. Upon approval, field personnel will nova to respective assignments, the safe houses and other ssrvicas.will be activated inanner as to place: the. projectull- operational statue

sty. Create .dissension and defection within the target:

Utilising available assets androgram of eppsing true and notional faete concerning target government and personalities wm be initiated in order to create diaaenaion within the target. An attempt will be mads through black psychological warfare toito-type faction to serveedge within the target. Character assassination of key target personalities will be undertaken. Defection of key personnel within, the target will be .undertaken rigorously in order to develop and sippprt KUHOOK operations in establishing resistance Mil* The purpose of.,these operations will be to weaken theand cohesion of the target.

D. Discredit target at hone and abroad!

Above operations will be expanded and exploited to discredit target within its hone area and abroad. KUOOWM feeilltlea of HKD will be utilised-to disseminate above materiel throughout WH with tha purpose of arousing Hemispheric sympathy for the people of target country and opposition to the Communist regime.

p. Demonstrate inability of target regime to represent bestof people:

All weaknesses and frictions, real or notional, will be exploited to support this theme. The theme will be presented inanner as to preclude any rash public outburst, bat it will be firmly fixod in the public mind for later exploitation. .

. E. Create hope and encourage patience among non-Communists:

Slnoe it will take time to establish requisite mechanisms and control before encouraging direct action, every effort ^'1 be exercised to counsel hope and patience. The failures of past, abortive


coups will be recalled and the Importance of organisationreparatione will beositive politicalhilosophy or"program will be evolved and disseminated in broadn-order to. provide 'something positive to be for, aso. simply being against Communism.

r'f^r- Complete military agreements with Nicaragua, Honduras and El


Caring Stage Two it ia highly desirable that the military pacts be negotiated in final form in order to exercise psychological pressure on thehe completion.of the pacta at this stage will sdd wtigot'hiseadquartors taak.

0, . Military personnel from target at appropriate time*.

'Coincident with "fn above,. Military should bo reduced to principal officers only. should be given! other men should si-ply be ordered back tounited States and no. replacements made. This action, however,take place until the latter phase of Stage Two in order toImpact with the operational development of PBSUCCESS This is JV

economic pressure:

Although efforts to Jato in organising effectivehas been relatively unauccessful,

it is believed that in Stage Two such pressure can besychological effect, if not an actual economicthe target country. Specific action in this regard willdaring this stage by the Project and Divisioneconomic sabotage would be undertaken in the field during

Begin formation and trainingara-military force In exilet

adre/Instructor class with) company grade officers will commence training in Nicaragua. This class will constitute the nucleus of the para-military force to be organised later in Honduras and El Salvador under RUFUS. An American instructor folly qualified will conduct the class. This training will continue through Stage Two. Meanwhile, the military plan will be developed for later implementation. During this trainingpotting and recruiting program will be undertaken to provide additional personnel required to meet the ultimate objective. In addition, training and staging areas will be selected and prepared during this period.

J. Assess accomplishmentsi

During Stage Two continuous probing will be conducted tothe rate of development of the machanisms, the condition of the enemy and the readiness of PBSUCCESS to move into Stage Three When Project Headquarters considers it advisable to advance

Into Stage Three operations, an aeaessment of the aituatlon, analogous to the Stage One report, will be prepared.

. Headquarters approval before proceeding to next stagei

The assessment prepared under the above will be forwarded to Headquarters together with the proposed operational plan for Stage Three, in the aare manner aa this Stage One report. The approval of the Stage Two report by Headquarters will constitute tho authority for the Project Headquartera to implsaent Stage Three operations.

in. Proposed, Specific KUPIRE Tasksi

A, Based in Guatemala t


Responsible, Guatemala City

o exploit capabilities of this project to provide psych/intelligence coverage of targetj (a) government officials, (b) high level military officials; (c) pro-governnont political groups and (d) to develop contacta within Communist circles: To probe all cortacts for potential resistance cadre leaders.

Estimated costt


Responsible Officer, Guatemala City

o ooncentrato his efforts within high level pro-government political circles and Communist heirarchy in order to provide psych/intelligence. .

Estimated costt


Responsible, Guatemala City

o concentrate her efforts among female organisations both pro and con the government to provide psych/intelllgenco in addition to economic Intelligence desired throush ES0TR0PE-2.

Estimated costt


, Quate.-ala City

ro-Comonlet labor

oircles in order to provide coverage of psych/intellleen-n

Estimated coati FT/5.


Responsible, Guatemala City

ps/ch/tactical intelligence coverage of target army- to developantl-CPfficers to serve^ real stance cells within the Army.

Estimated cost:

6. FT/6r


Responsible, Guatemala City

o develop agent to utilise past clandestine training to organise information net amongaUlJsnc. from thisUP^eTt*4'Vlthintelligence within Ma capabilities, to determine details regarding CP para-military preparations outside of Guatemala City*

Estimated costt* CbCO.OO

7.. FT/7:


Responsible, Guatemala City

o establish contactut-out to develop aTothatcoverage of Caribbean Jgicn and other CP para-nllltary preparations in target area.

Estimated cost: SSCO,00

8. FT/81

Identity -

Responsible, Ouatenala City



o develop these contacts to concentrate on fans defection ofC

reiationsniprovide peych/tactical intelligence. Estimated cost!


Responsible, Guatemala City

o acquire operational control over subject through secure cut-out, developing Dial to exploit C? labor contacts in order to provide psych/intelligencei toetails of CP para-nllitary preparations within labor groups.

Estimated cost: SliOO.OO


Responsible, OuatonaJa City

o develop subject to serve as principal agent and field case officer to handle covert agents.

Estimated cost:

B. Based in


Identity -

Responsible Officer

o develop subject as principal agent and field case officer with the objective of establishing bin with Col, Roberto BARRIOS Pena and General TC-'GORAS Fuentes; to explore the assets and capabilities of the latter persons to determine what course of action should be taken in restect to their position in PBSUCCESS; farther direction to be provided based upon these developments.

Estimated cost:

. 2,


Responsible Officer -

o develop relationship to serve as covertprotection PBSUCCESS operations

Estimated cost: SJ.CO.00


3* '"

ot available


o develop secure control over agentobtain evidence

% _ ctivities in El

Estimated costi k FT/lU i

UROR Responsible Officer

o develop agent to establish contacts In Santa Ana area to determine Guatemalan Communist activities

0 discre8tly determine suitable sites for basing KUHOOK teams in border areas.

Estimated cost:


Responsible Officer -

o provide intelligence coverage of Guatemalan Communist activities in El Salvador, to establish secure contacts among anti-Communist Salvadoran or Coateraalan residents of border area to provide information on border

nrB 1 OTH0OK

Estimated costs


Responsible Officer -

o beto provide Intelligence on border activities; to provide survey of likely KUHOOK sites along

border, to determine secure contacts in the border area to later aid KUHOOK teams.

Estimated cost:





' Identity -

Responsible Officer

o be developed througho defect brother-in-law, Guatemalan Army colonel and garrison coramandor; to develop tactical Intelligence coverage through the latter source.



Estimated coat: 8SCO.CO


actical Intelligence/SECJJIH

Responsibletephen R. lOOTCS

o ascertain identity and capabilities of all assets, organizing same into secure intelligence operational nets undern order to provide tactical intelligence from specifically directed targets; to utilize these assets to probe for potential resiatance material, organising same into cells; to screen and recruituitable candidates for clandestine radio intelligence training.

Estimated cost:


Responsible Officer -

elOD.aecure CUt-OUtS,to provide

protective intelligence for KUHOOK Ope rations inountry.

Estimated, Based

* 1.

P penetration


o exploit penetration of CP to provide coverage of Communist activities in Nicaragua in order to protect KUHOOK Operations In this country.






o develop and exploit ill sourcesC

Jin order to provide protective coverage of kuhuu* Operations in this country.

Estimated cost: 0


Identity -Pto, Cabezas

Responsible Officer

o develop subject as an agent in order to provide Intelligence coverage of activities In Pto. Cabezas concerning KUHOOK Operations therein* to develop subject to perform covert eervices on behalf of KUHOOK Operations. ,

Proposed SpecificJ Tasks:

A. Based in Guatemala:

1. PTA:


Responsible, Guatemala City

o develop secure principal agent to replace HEDIGER in the handling of ESSEX Ej to be credited to tha latter through RUFUS; to conduct operations Independently ofoordination to be handled by Projectj to develop ESSENCE'S capabilities to maximum in aupport of KUGOVN program; to develop compartcentatlon within this group endeavoring to establish direct relationsnd major elements.

Estimated cost: 0 2. PT/2:


Responsible, Guatemala City

hrough the assistance of the Ambassador,will arrant to utilize tho services anddisseminata overt Psych-war material

to anti-Conmunist press and radio outlets. Material for this purpose will be provided by Project Headquarters.

Estimate cost: No expense foreseeable at this time. .ft.


Based in El Salvador!

1. PT/31


Responsible Officer

o establish seoure cut-out to be creditedy RUFUS in order tond control this operation in Eloordlnatlcn vlth RUFUS to be effected through Project Headquarters)aterial and other services to be provided by Project Headquarters.

Estimated costi

o be determined

Responsible Officer

o establish securo cut-out to develop contacts in Sslvadoran press and radio facilities to carry anti-Com-nunist thomos and material provided by Project Headquarter!

Estimated coat: SLOO.OO

Identity -Salvador

Responsible Officer -

hrough the official position andevery effort will be made to utiliseanu facilities ofdisseminate

overt psych/war material tommunist press and radio outlota. Material for this purpose will be provided by Project Headquarters.

Estimated cost! No expenaosforeseeable at this time.



ResponsibleUOOVJN Case

o develop and conduct operations in support of KUGO'cW program under the direction and with the support of


Project Headquarters) to develop cor-$artTantatlon within this group, endeavoring;to establish direct relations between case officer and" hajcr elements through suitable cut-cute Khere required.

Estimated costi 0

0. Based in


ResponsibleUQOVN Officer,

o establishas out-out botwoen

nd LI0NI2ER in coordination with Projectwhloh would have hln accredited to this groupj to develop and exploit this medium as directed by Project , Headquarters for diversionary purposes,

'/ Estimated ccsti


ResponsibleOOOWN Officer,

o develop contacts in this organization with the objeotive ef utilising same as the medium for disseminating anti-Communist labor material concerning Guatemala which will be provided by Projeot Headquarters.


Estlratod cost!

uniet Press and Radio Contacts, Mexico

ResponsibleUOCWi Officer,

o utilize all available anti-Communist press and radio contacts for dissemination of themes and naterii Is provided it for this purpose by Project Headquarters.

Estimated cost!

E,. Based in Nlcaraguai


ntl-Communiot Press and Radio Contacts in Nicaragua.

Responsible Officer


available #nU-CoBBunist prose andhejnba and notarial provided

oyer* editorial staff

Responsibleenior XUGCWH Officer,-PBSUCCESS

o provide an editorial aiaffenior Advisor, in order io provide proper uniforalty of

Satiated cost T

Responsibleenior KUOOWN Officer, PBSUCCESS.overt rejftq staff

Responsibleenior njQCWH Off icon, PBSUCCESS-

o provide ecript natorial for clandestine broadcasts end overt broadcasts la toe field endertna dlyeeplon of toe edltdriel atiffw Safehdnse.

Estimated coatt pQ.OO .

lu PT/lu

landestine Radio(SANTA FE)

Estimatedo be provided by SDCLUB

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Responsibleenior KUGOWN Officer, PBSUCCESS




Qhootntrusion radio program

Reaponsibleenior KUGOW Officer, PBSUCCESS

o recruit and train suitable persons capable of conducting this program when so directed.

Estimatedo cost anticipated during thia staire aside from that of KUCLUB.

6.. Pf/io

ilitary Intrusion radio operation

Responsibleenior KUHOOK Officer, PBSUCCESS

o study anduitable program based upon the Information provided by KUCLUB to be held in readiness for Stage Four, to anticipate the requirements for either the voice or text which will be required in thia program.

Estimatedo cost anticipated during this stage aside from KUCLUB.

7. PTA?

sychological/eeonomic Pressure

Responsibleenior Economic Warfare Officer and Senior KUOOVN Officer, PBSUCCESS

o study the economic situation in the light ofoontacts in the United States with commercial companies In order torogram of psychologioal/economic harassment program for implementation during this stage.


Proposed, Specific KUHOOK Tasks:

A, -Based In Honduras:



Responsibleacob R. SEEKFORD

o complete the assessment assigned during Stage One in order to determine factually the resources and capability of RUFUS to fulfill the requirements of

this Project; ii" this assessment is satisfactory and warrants furtheradre class of military leaders will be selected and screened for KUHOOK training in Nicaragua; if warranted, such assets and capability which appear to be present will be developed and exploited in order to establish the basic requirements forUHOCK force as envisioned for this program; if warranted, necessary equipment for training and for preparing the training base will be moved to trainingeek training program will be implemented during this period.


B, Based in El Salvador:


UHOOK Staging Sites

Responsible Officer

tilising information and contacts from Kb'FIRE sources, to reconnoiter the border area on the El Salvador side in order to select suitable sites for basing future KUHOOK teams in the final stages of this program; to establish safe houses, safe routes and communications as well as transportation facilities once sites have been selected; toecure cut-out for this purpose who would eventually serveor KUHOOK operations based in El Salvador.

Estimated cost: * Based in Nicaragua:


UHOOK Training Base

ResponsibleUHOOK Training Officer, PBSUCCESS

tilizing facilities provided*^

through RUFUS, to establish and namvawicovert KUHOOK training school to accomodatetudents; to prepare training agenda to include field exercises; toecure maneuver area apart from the training site for night training and firing practice; to prepare toadio operator training class of about) students, providing full assistance to the KUCLUB instructor; to bo the responsible PBSUCCESS officer for the conduct and operation of this training school.

Estimated cost: 0


D, Basod In Colombiai

Identity -

Responsible Officer - C_

o establish,ecure cut-out, C

or tho covert selection and recruitaenton inactive duty; to

confine those activitiesaximum ofighly dedicated individuals in order tootential cadro for possible employment under the KUHOOK program, PBSUCCESS, to organize and vitalize this group under cover of militant anti-Coecunlsts prepared to undertake hazardous assignments within the Hemisphere without any reference whatover to target country


E. Based in Mexicoi

ilitant Guatemalan Exiles in C *J

oecure cut-out in readiness init becomes dosirable toecruitingMexico to form supporting teams for the KUHOCKprepare the cut-out to establish andn' Mexico to be designated by RUFUSaccredit hln to the cut-out; to utilizeexpedito this opera-

tion upon request* irom rroject Headquarters.


-It -




REFETCMCEi "Report on STAGE ORE,ated

Submitted herewith is an Interim Report on the oroffresa of

PBSUCCESS during Stage Two of "Program forovering the period3 toh. The report consists of:

PART ONEAssessment/Analysis"

PART TkO - "Project Organization1'

PART THREE- "Extension Operational Plans for Stage Two."

Stage One Report,hile setting tentative tire schedules for planning purposes, emphasized the need for flexibility and the importance of realistic assessment over adherence to arbitrary By such criteria, it is believed that sufficient progress has been made to justify the continuation of the project. It is also believed that experience thus far gained in Stage Two demonstrates clearly the soundness of the original appraisal as tot

the face of opposition, has made

noteworthy effort to strengthen his position, the time factor remains paramount if friendly forces are to overcome the enemy's advantages.

P^iatioft Sained of enemy capabilities makesessential that appropriate and intensive effort be employed

|_tghness! Further evidence of the deep entrenchment of the enemy in the target country, plus increasing indications of Soviet support, make it even more evidenthorough governmental change in the

of a

his report and that PBSUCCESS be

^^rlt tation of Stage Two operations in the manner contemplated herein,





I, -

II. Enemy

- lU

V. Proposed CourseU

PAR?roject Organization


II. Tactical

PARTxtension Operational Plans for Stage Two


II. Extension of Operational Plans,Stage Specific






Upon concurrence in the Stage One Report and its operational plana for Stage Two, implementation of these plans was begun, with thethat the objectives of Stage Two would be fulfilled on or aboutebruary However, for reasons defined herein, this time schedule has not been met. Accordingly, in order to obtain further concurrence for contemplated operations beyond this date, an interim assessment and analysis is provided herowith for this period.

II. ENEMY SITUATION* 5u) A. Assessment

It Political

In earlyU, the eneir/ showed signs of unusual sensitivity with regard to the internal and external opposition.

Onanuary Gulilermo OVANDO Arriola, President of tho Congress, was shot and wounded by an unidentified assailant. Shortly thereafter, onanuary the Ouardia Civil arrested approximately fifteen anti-ConanuniBts, conducted numerous house searches, and instituted temporary road blocks around Guatemala City. umber of these arrests were regarded by informed local observers as merely "fishinghis view wasertain extent substantiated by tbe rapid release of some of the arrestees and various indecisive Oovernment announcements that all was quiet and that no plots against the Government were in progress. Enemy action on. the arrests seemed to indicate considerable apprehension and nervcu-ress. udden departure of MARTINEZ, Chief of DAM, for Europe served to confirm this pattern. MARTINEZ was, on the one hand, reported as. fleeing for his safety because of conflicts with Communist rabble-rouser Carlos Manuelnd on the other, as going to Switzerland to engage in arms purchases and/or banking get-away money for Guatemalan leaders. Onanuary the enemyeven page "Whiteurporting tolot of traitorous Guatemalans supported by Nicaragua, Venezuela, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, and "the government of the North." This paper contained the followingpoints!

ictim of an internationalher national sovereignty- and territorial integrity.

plot was supported by the United Fruitand Colonel SOWZk and unidentified high U. S. officials.

e, Tho military leader was identified as Carlos CASTILLOand mention was madeASTILLO Armas-TDIOORAS Fuentes


top sccncT


Zkbe supplying arms to

the plottersanagua firm, A. SOMOZA andtd. Liaison between CASTILLO Armas and SOMOZA was effected by Jose Isaac DELGAEO. Commercial Attache of the Panamanian Embassy, Nicaragua.

e. hotostatic copyetter from CASTILLO Armas to President SCJDZA, datedtated that CASTILLO Armas' movement had the acquiescence of the "Northern Government" and the support of El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, and Venezuela,

_ , Armasicaraguan passport in the name of

Carlos CENTENO Aguilar.

Armas' military plan contemplatedthe Guatemalan Pacific coast by troops from Nicaraguanaerial bombardment of towns and airports on theland attack was to be launched fromChiquimula and Zacapa. There was to be ain the Guatemalan capital where arms were alreadywere also ready in Tiquisate.

Armas' plan included paramilitary trainingIsland (code nanaA's farm SI Tamarindo (with code name "Tap Tap"). base of operations was an unused airfield near

. ** as idBntm.edolonel released by. Army and placed at the disposal of the United Fruit CcBmany for training saboteurs and radio technicians. llegedly possessed an entry-exit visaDZA. hotograph ofnd of his passport appeared in the Guatemalan preBS.

j. Semi-clandestine radio station HR-IHF,ilocycles, was located in the home of H. FAITH, Tegucigalpa. Another, with call letters, was located in the Managua home of DELGADO and was allegedly used for CASTILLO Annas' Codes used were now being broken by Guatemalan technicians*

k. Archie BALDOCCHI allegedly offered the plotters "Sea Fire" planesach.

, 1( f CASTILLO Armas in Guatemala was Miguel CAMACHO Labboefugee in Salvador). Information requested by CASTILLO Armas on military Installations in Guatemala was now in the possession of the Guatemalan authorities. Also, Jose Maria TICAS hadeport on all government radio installations and had delivered lt to CASTILLO Armas. Horacio DE CORDOVA and Roberto VIZCAIMD Rubion were accused of paying0 for the information received,

Roberto CASTILLO Sinibaldi, Radio CIROS, had confessed that an unidentified Salvadoran requested him to obtainadio technicians to operate portable equipment for invasion use.


ho Government has claimed that it had, and would

iw.tatic proof of the accusations. Thestflfcon?nt additional

ePeJRyhreatened to bring


*condemnation of CASTILLO ArmaTand*P^thor, two American newsmanexpelled from the country, the Guatemala City police began to jam

SS^orS^rT"4^ veiled threats fgaintt She freedom of the independent Guatemalan press were made. In sum iL

ore severe^ternal repressionightening of internal


nMualava*Uble evidence indicates, however, that the


ess than the enemy expected. Numerous reports

Ir^nvT Public regarded the White Paper aidd0CUKentasenseless fabrications, 8 rosortin8 to them more thantherto the effect that

wereheartened by the newsthat foreign help was being made available to them.

fT0_ nternational front, the White Paper was intended

.nt*nded Action of the White Paper was buttressed

emisphere-wide Communiet propaganda campaign, spared oySe

uncertainty and hesitation. Foreign Minister Guillermo toSSjS hastened to announce that relations with Nicaragua^ wholly^riendlv.

ic*ragUan Ambassador chained to TORTELLOhat some of the photostated "proofs" attached to the White PaoeT clearly contained forgeries of Colonel SOTOZA's signature^th?

bru^ hastilyrromall available press media,

tiMtself "ncertainly on the propagandaensitivity to attack, as

ropiitcncT- .


2- Intelligence

rs^jg.'s's re th*t

SSiX. ttTSS^tS! ^poor "cumjr pr,ctlMS ta-

takenintelligence activities durint the period 3* Propaganda

mediaand manifold propaganda

^ral, and .oundITef

major Military andary

ComunlsM, .r.tibi. to dofsctloJSiStf^SSl


. u w. insufficient information available at this tine

to be able to determine the loyalties of the KCO'a and the EJPs

fthe Cosnunists have

teinrS^ er srades- themeime by the Communists is along the , JUie that, the soldiers should not obey the orders of their officers if called upon to fire upon the people.

? hMn.- lSixauitarieoiasly wi.tfa the attrition systememployed on the armed forces, the enemy hasthe Guardia Civil logistically andnumerouTi^dications of arms shipments being

nown to

tm'ft ofdelivered to the Guardia Civil -primarily for distribution in Guatemala City.

Jl^^on 23 as reli8blv

ation. baeRreport8 Ending to confirmlaborarm elements under

the information available is inadequate

rav Has app^oSSly

fw^tary forces. As in the case of ^

s either in or close to

Vldant that ^my does not


defection ott^ he OV0nt of oefection of the army, would be crated on to maintain the enemv in



(It will be noted that no information is available on the strength or mobilisation plan for reserve personal!)

B. Analysis


HX. Friendly Situation! Am Assessment 1. Political

During tho nonth of January, Luis ARE'AS and Joaquin OCAKA, prominent Guatemalan anti-Cormunists and members of the PUA (Partido Unificaclonisited the United States and solicited financial aid from members of Congress, tho Department of State and froo private American sources. They also contacted Colombian, Nicaraguan and Dominloan Ambassadors for the same purpose. Although they claimed to have received assurances0 from Senator MCCARTHY, they later reduced their claimed figure to , COD and, admittedly, even this figure was not confirmed. OCAHA remained in the United States while ARENAS returned to Guatemala where he proceeded to discuss loosely and in exaggerated terms the support which he had allegedly received in the United States toevolution. Although ARENAS is considered anti-Communist, his actions and Insistence that the revolt be staged prior toebruary or before the OAS Conference is believed to have contributed somewhat to the anxiety of the government and may have precipitated the arrests ofanuary.

Aside from the alleged support from tho outside obtainedthis period Is characterised by numerous spurious offersto anti-Communist elements and to the enemy. Most noteworthyfriendly offors was oneEuropean benefactor" throughYorkuatemalan in ICexico City

Secondly, CALDERON Guardia, ex-president of

Costa Rica,CALLIGERIS that President PEREZ Jimones

of Veneauelafinancial as well as air support. With tha

Venezuelan offer, all evidence to date indicates that the other offers were provocations for various purposes, undoubtedly instigated by the enemy.

. i-inrrTim poncy conference with CALLIOSil Onanuary,CALLIGERIS arrived at LINCOLN and was housed atf_ - -conferences took place under technical surveillance. oiefully prepared agenda had been arranged for this meeting, the first between the leaders inear, the advent of the Whiteay later dominated all discussions.

The early stages of 3'CALLIO'WIS conference were devoted to an analysia of the White raper ana its sources. Prior toof the White Paper, bothQ ALLIOERIS had shown considerable reservations about accepting the "GROUP'S" security, financial, and control procedures. Immediately afterTiite Paper came out, CALLIOERIS demonstrated great reluctance to admit that the compromise could be traced to his organization. Further study of the White Paper and its consequences, plusC J'CALLIOEaiS awareness thatOUP"ost serious view of aeveiopments and was in the process of making basic decisions regarding future operations, made botbC ALLIGERIS amenableundamental tlghtening-up of operations.

top sccnr-p


aafS8 QSt8bli<*ed. ritteneotlerwn'ehichofhend those of FAV'CLETT and CALLIOWS, as the These principles, although


dedicate each other to the ultimate liberation of Guatemala in order toovernment of the pecole.

JtPJTA agreed to recognizemport* ,ceoperationTThe oloSfagreed

GROUP assured the JUNTA that adequate funding would

dafWf fcbe ^rtaking and

Stol^rfifSr8 06 mentaUzed disbursement of


Definition of Responsibilities

6 responsibUity for providing

execution to and

responsibility for military

The GROUP would provide competent advisors to assist

or the forces at its disposal as agreed upon by both parties.

f coordination between both parties will be

* =r-


_ the JUNTA at various echelons and places agreed upon.

The group agreed to the junta's acceptance of outside

?cation, the document wasofcontracting parties,

greement" on mu&^cipation in pbsuccess. Upon the completion of this formalized agreement, intensive


J8 PeLUn!nt hat the foregoing represents the first cUarly defined relationship between CIA andC ALUGERIS

teaman for

C^lOERiS and CALLIGERIS as tne recognized nominee for the new 1


^ Congress in Miami, Florida,trong resolution to defend the free workmen of Ouatemala and tc protost against ;the Communist government in that country. This signalld the volunWySnrtry of American labor into the field.

government to.

2. Intelligence

KUFIHE ^temala assets were not formalized

U, trip to LINCOLN. These nets

SvenT?mTS?hTSi^,the information

given to LUGTON by SEQUIN, who was in direct contact and in charge of

bf inSout of Guatemala aS8will be in contact with LUOTON for direction of the nets.

The third or SSaot ST*are reported to still be InAh? Mtf Presently inactive due to SECANT'S incarccra-

tltt!SleErV9rrjnent' SSCmPleased asU, and plans are under way to get him out of Guatemala. SECANT waT^

fTu?ecessary to debrief hUn1 the extent of com^omX SS'

OnUCta^ be activated in

* hisai visit ff onsiuve Honduran and rCeS ingonfic>ntial basis, the sources look Poaaible with in^

The White Paper disclosed much of tbe old modus operandi.


top scene-*



jdlviduala involved, and such thing, as training

iMrvfi ,t0 aolidifv thesl"on with spect to the fcnportance of

a ^ iras

^ Bade GALLIC ESIS very aware of?and

to'Wtmentation and the need to tighten up the general security of the whole operation.

CALLIOERIS was fully briefed before his return to Honduras

terror 5

conference with the Station Chiefs from Guatemala,

tt. fielde

up-to-date on the assets-in the three differentlounlries?

lcara*ua E1 Salvador wiUrotect KUHOOK training

^coupted^tnC "f

aclose contact with the

provide adequate support in


Should be adequate protection of the KUHOOK efegWgountry.

n Hw^J? Oyetemala Station has nine tasks assigned: tho tenth has been dropped, since the source moved to Kexico. He will be oicksd

anto HondSSrS



frlewily and hostile individuals and social groups." The objectives of PI are to ascertain enemy psychological strengths andto ascertain specific means of attacking the enemy bywarfare; to ascertain friendly psychological strengths and vulnerabilities; to ascertain specific means of bolstering friendly forces by psychological means; to ascertain the effectiveness, or lack thereof, of PBSUCCESS KUGOWN activities; and to ascertain the psychological readiness of friendly and oneray forces for theof the successive stages of PBSUCCESS.PI coverage is to be directed at enumerated target groups in specific target areas of Guatemala. Reports are to be rendered daily and weekly. Based on PI reports from field stations, LINCOLN will,eekly basis, submit an Evaluated PI Estimate to Headquarters and to reporting field stations.

3. Propaganda

During the period, the KUGOWN assets reported in Stage One Report, PBSUCCESS (El Hobolde, CSUAQE, El Combato, and the LIONIZBRublished several issues, with no noticeable increase in the quality of content or efficiency of distribution. The ESSENCE group in Quatemala City also engaged in the pasting of stickers, in the spreading of anti-Coimnunist rumors, and in firming up its own organisations.

At LINCOLN three safahouses for KUOOWN personnel and operations were acquired. H ccupied byC nd by "Roberthe GROUP liaison officer with theha3 been in full operation sinceanuary. ase officer forr" Twas returned to Washington due to unauitability onanuary, ana no replacement has arrived during the period. ase officer foxj arrived at LINCOLN onanuary, but because of involvementccident and the necessity for resolving various personal dstails in Washington, he did not; occupy the site untilebruary.

Further delays on the implementation of the KUGOWN progrrm resultedhree-week holdover in Washington of the Deputy Chief, LINCOLNj arrival ofP only onanuary; delay in pouching procedures, which in turn delayed receipt of information from the field on prospective writers to work in the aboveour-week delay of one of the field KUGOWN case officers due to administrative cover problems; documentation and cover difficulties of the KUGOWN case officer in Guatemala.

Specific KUGOWN assignments carried out, apart from the contemplated continuous KUGOWN -program, consisted of preparation of guidance for KUGOWN exploitation of the arrests conducted by the Guatemalan Government and of the White Paper; assistance in the preparationAUJOERIS speechALLIGERIS press release (neither of which have found their way to thelanning for KUGGWi, action prior to and during the OASield survey of: potential PBSUCCESS KUGOWN assets in Mexico; an exploration of additional KUGOWN possibilities with the Chiefs of Station in the PBSUCCESS Regional Command. Considerable planning discussion was conducted nd CALLIGERIS on the future systems of communications, xunaing, and direction for the KUGOWN program.


During CALLIGERIS' stay at LINCGLri, tha military plan was thoroughly reviewed with him, and complete aocord was established. pon his departure from LINCOLNebruary, it was understood that he wouldx '

a. 'Undertake to re-establish his contacts inand

SARANAC^'Arrange for the movement of his leader candidates for

c, -Firm up detaila regarding the establishment of six staging sites, three in Honduras and three In Salvador;

0 cooperation of the Presidents site th* establishmentransmittal

e. Upon satisfactory conclusion of the foreeoinfi. to ^feasibility ofisit to Caracas; Veneauela, reporting back, however, to LINCOLN before makingrip.

It was the firm opinion of the CPM, PBSUCCESS, that the foregone conference with CALUOERIS firmly established for the first

undoratandin8hat constituted unconventional

to CSSS logistical plan was presented to Headquarters for concurrence and implementationhis program provided for the movement of appropriate amounts of arms and equipment to FJHOPEFUL byebruary thermit the preotreUon^ and Packing into kits which are to be cached within theecorri shipment was requested to arrive at FJHOPEFULarch for preparation of kits for staging sites.hird logistical requirement is to be established for the contingency reserve program. 'Satisfactory arranger-ents were cceyletod with Hoadquerters for the assignmentacking team at FJHOPEFUL to handle the foregoing reo^rironents. -

tocM^erable planning was devotedor Ule Port Plan necessary to fulfill the logistical requirements indicated in the above plan. uO black

j^t^siatlcal requirement in the military plan. "Onebruary Headquarters assigned an Air Operations Officer to LINCOLN to report there on IU FcbrW^ order MlH^ eX8CUtl0nthe Air SupportSaTLSd^


The SARAHAC camp was established onanuarv withiS" ^location cf the WhiS Paper,

aU PrinclP^ case office, thus suspending the training program. Plans are under way to find I

ess18for the latter officer, and itis contemplated thatontract civilian, would be sade available to


m for this purpose on or aboutebruary at which time the training would be resumed.

orat-LIftERIS bad been requested to expedite the recruitment of candidates for this school. It will be noted that in thia case also CALIIOERIS had only been asked, by SEEXFQRD, to provide experienced radio op orators and had not been informed that persons with some tochnical knowledge or simply aptitude would be acceptable. CALLIGERIS, upon clarification of the batter, offered to bring tbe quota of this training class up to fall strength during his present visit to the area.

On lit January, immediately prior to the shipment by black flight of the communications equipment, SEEKFORD cabled that (_

trofuaed to accept ShnaVOOD in Nicaragua. This,the unloading of all this equipment prior to thethe flight. In the meantime, CAXXIQ&IS has been requested, as abovepersonally endeavor to arrange for the location of BBMOOO inor Nicaragua. In addition to this effort. Headquartersths possibility of utilisingSanta Fe

as originally contemplated as well as the puao.iuixi.iyonducting this operationloating base.

B. Analysis

Owing to the administrative delays indicated in Part Two and estimated at0 days, and the arresting effect of the White Paper, the operational development of PBSUCCESS has been effectively retardedike mannor. Thus, despite the progress indicated in the foregoing, in general PBSUCCESS has not been able to fully prove thessets described in the Stage One Report nor clearly determine the extent of real assets. The greatest development during this period was the apparently firm establishment of guiding principles between PBSUCCESS and the JUNTA and the latter'a assurance of full acceptance of PBSUCCESS1 proposed procedures and techMques. With this common understanding and agreement it ia believed that considerable uncertainty haa been eliminated and that PBSUCCESS may now proceed to prove and develop the necessary nechaniaas originally contemplated fcr Stage Twei An extension of approximatelyays lo indicated for Stage Two.



1. Capabilities

Information remains inadequate to reliably determine the enemy's full capabilities. Available but incomplete information indicates enemy political and military strength is formidable, greatly excoodine present capabilities of friendly forces. The rate of encay build-up appears to be accelerated and expanded.

2. Intentions

Although inadequate information is available to determine anany intentions with any degree of reliance, the overt manifestation! of the enemy clearly Indicate that the Communist eneny of Guatemala is enjoying certain support of Ccammgrlam's international facilities and services. Therefore, it appears that substance has been added to the



heretofore metaphorical statementoviet "bridgehead" in Central

epulis dsl

rt no indications^

date of external material assistance by CWniat allies except in

conHneS to^pagand..

B. ii]


nd idaologicalWf

CIAsuperior technical and loglaUcal advanUgee over the enemy, the necessity -for covert employment of these

raln0dexploiting sisson to date. Within tha covert requirements of CIA's participation in this

eentowhich CIA will exercise

capabilities have deteriorated since

rfPorting period as to ooheslveness and unity. However, available information indicates that the enemy's White Panar while

bflaayM^iattrt heretofore unorganiiod and apatheticnous elements have received coneldarable encouragement iron JfiLjfi^stance end determination to overthrow the enemy.Friendly indigenous strength, although not organised nor prepared todata, remains considerably greater, potentially, than Sa^namy...

la,flretarded0 days owing

-^administrfttlve reasons. This has manifested itself in tha^eve^ deterioration of friendly Indigenous forcesntvt incraasad their capabilities during this period,

5U InplementjxUns toir^rh-

r>1 AJ AdmlnletraUve: Establish connunicatlons procedures.reo^iraments, logistical plan, separe


Pta-l. Sti^gtf

training program; prepare secure

sc^css6! progm



part two prcject' 'ahoajozaticfi

Strategic Levari

rind an operation- propreaa rAn-srequested toITRSP H. Tactical Lev*],

requirement, in ordl? tfS ^eslllreceiving oo.ncurror.cs on n

B* AdainiatrfltiTO Mtfterah'hel "

were ready forIKC0LN Heac^arters .until iS^oember^naot "viewed oonalatlngersona v2 lulcontingent of personnel,

and eundry.reasons, LlWjdld notin^Verivarioua 2il This delavainlaura complement until

acministrative5J* lagher p fav-aisorafl^^

ia still delayed due ht am^th*igh en board sinceVhitcf

; is bailable ftr field astlesntttskfora I* n" u Ql;' ^nererore, personnel--wise, during the


reporting period LINCOLN hao been adequately staffed onlyeriod

fC/CS reouiar4divhauu "ltt0ut

necessary operations^ orsr cent under-

The security aspects of PBSUCCESS at LINCOLN have been fully and adequately re allied in the nanner contemplated with one full-tine sprity officer based at LINCOLN and an order-cover agant residing in theL econd security officer arrived at LINCOLN inhe general security of LINCOLN and its related operations in the area is considered excellentesult of the efforts and the services rendered by tha security officers from SSD. (See ATTACHMENT CO


Allocation of funds. Stage TwoFebruary*

Total funds advanced or expendedFebruary

Total obligations outstanding asFebruary:

^_ d. To^al unexpended funds for reporting period:

requirements for secondTwo (ISarch):

Division, Headquarters, roportedof sufficient quantity of foreignto warrant continuation of theprogram. It Is therefore recosnended thatcancelled,

Foregoing expenditures are exclusivedisbursements and/or obligations incurredlogistical support for PBSUCCESS. This data iaavailable at LINCOLN, At the close of theLINCOLN had satisfactorily completed allfor field stations to Include thefor the JUNTA,

h. Pouch Facilities

a. Although the staff procedures neoessary topouching requirements by oourier for PBSUCCESS hadand presented for implementation Onecemberessentially required merely the formality of Statesignatureatter to authorize

to accept the pouches atf Jfor LINCOLN.

hia* theuntUanuary, Aside from the above

delays, the necessity of exchanging test pooches with the field



resulted in furtheror the foregoing reasons LINCGLNunable to utilise pouch-courier facilities with

ebruary, The unacconpanied air pouch or diplcnaticprocedure remirinir only the approval of the Stat*to permitto use p

Jfor we receipt of lnccalng"unaccorptnied air nail pouches has not been approved to date, which precludes the implementation of the Psychological Intelligence direotive and receipt of Embassy press digests*fron the fieldapid This delay in implementing pouching facilities has significantly delayed LINCOLN'S ability to properly and promptly Implement ita operational procedures in the field, thus reduolng all conwunications to cable form.





I* Generali

"Stage One Report clearly revealed the paucity of friendly indigenous real .assets and the dubiousness of-potential assets.' It also defined tho need for intensive operational developmsnt of these assets. The Operational Plan for Stageas prettcated^oft-the foregoing premiss in addition to the: supposition that the aoainlstrative aspects of PBSUCCESS would beas contemplated. Tho'inaMlity of LINCOLN to realize itsobjectives, as- defined in-'PART TWO, resulted in the retardation of thSvOperational Plan for Stage -Two'by corresponding period of abouti0ccordingly, the objective Established for* Stags Two proposed'thatthe operational Plans for Stage Two be extended for an additional thJrtyOo) day period or untilU.

Extension of Operational Plans. Stapa Twoi


operational plans to be implemented by and through LINCOLN, PBSUCCESS, Regional Command.


Create' dissension and defection within the target; Discredit target at home and abroad;

Demonstrate inability of target regina to represent best Interests of people;

Create hope and encourage patience among non-Ccmntunists; Begin economic pressure;

Begin formation and trainingaramilitary force In exile and in the interior of the target.

Assess progress of foregoing and prepare same with recommendations to headquarters for future action.

i* ;

IU. Specific KUFIRE Tasks.ased in Guatemala

has been no significant change in the ESCONSOH net. ESOTERIC-has no connection with the task as of thia date. ESCONSON II is handled directly by the case officer. Tbe task haseliable nature. It is contemplated to keep the task in full operation and attempt to extend


Estimated costi No additional funds required. 2. ft/2

ESCROW has beon introduced to, and will be handled by ArthurAIVADA. Because of ESCROW'S position among exiled Spanish Republicans, he has been able tonforaation fran his contacts with the hierarchy of the Communist party and from pro-government political circles. He obtains all of hie Information fcoa unwitting as no penetration as such of the Communist Party or any government organ. ESCEOV has produced information from the field of the Spanish Republic in exile in regard to all Spaniards in Guatemala. Now that VAIVADA will be in charge of ESCROW, it is planned to give him more direction to extend his coverage In the fields of priority interest. ESCROW will also bo used to spot potential penetratorshe Communist Party.

Estimated cost: No additional funds required* B. FT/3 *

ESOTRCPE obtains all of her information from To date she has produced, muchher unwitting aources in the aocial welfareprepares written articles

for KDwtol purposes and is very helpful in providingon most of the middle and upper class peopleCity. ESOTROPE will continue to prepare herandeports froojll of her Sinceclose to AREVALO,

she will cake extensive effort to obtain all Information possible from this unwitting source.

Estimated cost) No additional funds required.


It is reportedlob vitJi

. in Mexico City

He will be droppeduatemalan 'iask and turned over to KUOCWN for exploitation from Mexico.

r/5 _ :

ESODIC and ESCDTC/l, brothers, have provided lists and information on military personalities. This Information is from their personal knowledge and their extensive unwitting sources in military circles. It is proposed to give ESCDIC closer supervision, extend his field of unwitting sources and. If possible,well-placed Individualw*tratlon. ESODIC'S brother is presentl>r

3HI* position will be investigated for possible future use since CALLIGERIS has mentioned himesirableofficer to have working actively for the cause. ESCDIClose who Is tbe line crew chief for the Guatemalan Air Force. This contact will be further investigated.


It la proposed to use ESOOIC for information concerning the activities of the Base Milltar, inoluding activities of the Air Force operating out of La Aurora Airport.

Estimated costiNo addiUonal funds required.


ESKIMOID has provided information from unwitting sources on commercial and agricultural matters. It is planned to propose the idea of ESKIMOID making his hone available for meetings between the case officer and ESODIC. This wouldatural meeting place since ESODIC and ESKIMOID are neighbors and already visit each other.

Estimated costi NO additional funds required.

* ii ' '

ESLABON has not been contacted. ESLABON is aconsoirator and did sow*noH work in the nast

It is planned to recoTitact ESLABON in the near future.

Estimated cost. So additional funds required.



rom unwittingheir slseable"Tield on contacts. Tt. is uriHkfOvtask will be able to defectr*

jean be usedource of information in regard to La AuroraTir Field and the general activities of the Base Milltar.

Estimated cost: Mo additional funds required,

presently being checked by,

Herofessional informant who has foimerly workedo. and iaoaitjion bo furnish information on the GOTO and other labor groups. It la proposed to use him for contact with labor groups.

Estimated costi Bo additional funds required.

VAIVADA has been given the responsibility for handling ESCROW. It is proposed to use him toood penetration of the Communist Party,

B* Based


T tm svalting clearance. Meanwhile]! uthorised to explore tbe possibility of utilising JUBILIST for this task. See

Estimated coat: No additional funds required.

# rc/12

' JUOATION, whoormer employee of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has furnished reliable information on political matters whloh he obtains from unwitting informants. It is proposed to give him more direotion and guidance in the type of. Information we are presently interested in.

Estimatedo additional funds required. 3. FT/13

JUOATION Is still, atteapyng the penetration of the

here iswill

ance of aucceas. JUOATION will continue to attempt thia penetration.

Estimatedo additional funds required. II. FT/HI

The JUROR net Is presently headed by JURIST who throughas effected the defectionuatemalan border policeman. It Is proposed to exploit these sources for information on border activity.

Estimated coat: No additional funds required.

as not been successful in effecting hie penetration of the Communist Party. It is proposed to keepeneral leg-man to bo used to check car licenses and perform surveillance.

Estimated cost. No additional funds required.

JURATOR has been replaced by JUBATE in order to fulfill this task. It was felt that since JURATCR's wife is

would be best not to use him in vie manner proposed, but perhaps use him latereception channel if the nood arises, hold him in reserve for possible political action orhannel to ARBENZ. JUBATE recruited JUBILIST who has excellent contacts in all strata of social life. JUBILIST will conduct any. activities for the support of PBSUCCESS under this task, suchlr coverage and reporting of air facilities.

Eatin*ted costi No additional funds required.

Nothing has been done on this task pending the of

C. Baaed

1. FT/18

Because of pressure in Guatemala, SEQUIN was forced to tales refuge in tho Selvadoran Smbaasy and subsequently flee to El Salvador, Two of his three nets are believed to still be in operation, the third, or SECANT net, cametandstill after the imprisionaent of SECANT onU. SECANT has -been released ash and all effort is being made to get SECANT out of Guatemala and under the control of CALLIGERIS for full debriefing to ascertain the extent ofof SECANT'S net and contacts. During his January trip Stephen R.rovided Headquartersiagran and breakdown of the SEQUIN nets In Guatemala. It ia planned to have CALLIGERIS attempt to get SECANT out of Guatemala to aacertaln the extent of compromise, SEQUIN will continue to run his nets from Honduras, and further attempt to develop the Intelligence nets needed in the nine target areas.

Estimated cost:

2. FT/I?

During OALLIGERLS' Visit to LINCOLN it was possible to ascertain tbe identities-df: his sensitive Honduran and Selvadoran diplomatic and government sources. These sources are well placed and will be'exploited accordingly. All of these sources report directly to CA1LIQERIS, and it would be unwise to attempt to Install any other me*ns of contact.

Eetlmated cost:

D. Baaed

1. FT/20

ow level penetration of theand active in labor groups. ERGATES has reportedthe Communist Par^Lthrough EREPSIN who also doesforia proposed to follow up on this

a high level pentration of the PSN, has

been reporting for four years on government and Communist activities, It is proposed to continue exploiting this penetration with emphasis on information that is pertinent to PBSUCCESS.



2. FT/21

Estimated oosti No additional funds I .. j

- If"information ia needed in the Puerto Cabezas area,proposed to activatfC. JTng cut-outa required and SCRANTON have been provided and areo presently acting as cut-out for SARANAC 1the cut-out for SCRANTON.also

available as an alternate cut-out ana.jeans of informing the SARANAC end SCRANTON American advisors that theirhave messages for them.

Estimated ooati No additional funds required.

Specific KUOOWK Tasks.

A. Based in Guatemala

i. ptA

Several issues of "El Rebelde" have been published and distributed. The ESSENCE group has also printed and posted in Guatemala City and several rural areas, stickers bearing theymbol of the constitutional article violated by Communist rule of Guatemala. Toward the end of January, the ESSEISCE group diminished ita activities oving to the White Paper and more stringent government controls. However, the organization ia still functioning throughout the country. LINCOLN hasorward step by stopping the double flow of funds (from the Guatemala Station and from 0AILIOERIS) to ESSENCE; funda now -flow only through tha cut-out controlled by Guatemala Station. The cover of this cut-out, Eliot P. RAZMARA, has worn thin and he must shortly be replaced. During the next period it is proposed! to replace the American cut-out to the ESSENCE group; to bring ESSENCE under the Station oontrol; to check on and Improve ESSENCE distribution andto inject into the ESSENCE propaganda campaign themes and materials prepared by LINCOLN.

Estimated co3ti No additional funds required. 2. FT/2

ravelled to Mexico andinlavricated interview with

MARTINEZ, Chief of DAN, This interview received some republication in Central America, notably in El Salvador., Guatemala,f


-top slcnu-rar/PBsoccEss

, has been able to bring several spot Items into theClty, press by dropping leads to acquaintances in the proas. .wTDVard the end of the reporting period* friendly press 'toanabildties deteriorated somevhat due to veiled orovernment hints of core strict press control'. It isto introduce as nuch material as possible into tho independent Guatemalan press consistent with PaSUCCSSS, KUOCWN program and the capabilities of the independent prose.

Estimated costi Ho additional funds Based

The FAGS group, has published several issues of its Mv^aper "ElAGS alsoaily fifteen-minute radio program of Radio Crystal0 kilocyclea, Thesprdgria'is not(very effective bocouse of the station's lowt ih proposed to arrange an effective cut-out to the FAQS group for the purpose of giving guidance on themes and improving distributiono extend FAGS'a. work into1 the fields of handbills and "mobile billboards" campaignst.

Estimated costi %

printed spot items in the Salvadoran

press through JUBILIST. it Is proposed to increase tho republioation of.PBSUCCESS KUGCWN materials in the Salvadoran press) to secure'the" services of at least one additional out-oat for KQOOWNInitiate ifaily flfteen-ednute radio program attacking Guatemalan Corrrxiiam ^pver Stationew doverful radio station in El Salvador^

with funds supplied through JUBILIST andee providod by JUSTICE.

Estimated costi


Jhas introducedpropaganda mauu-xtila into the Salvadoran press. If it proves feasible to initiate tha radio prpgranv mentioned under Jviilasked to supply the guidance to T urely friendly basis.

-0tin-uiu ucsti No additional funds required. c Based

1. PT/6

Several issues of the CSUAQE bulletin have been published and smuggled in small numbers into Guatemala. It is proposed to



to Introduce IJWCOLN-preparea materials into the bulletin, to target tbe bulletin more. specifically at Guatemalan military personnel, to improve distribution.

Ko-additional funds required.

1. -'"

Several issues of the UOItlZER bulletin have been published during the period, but distribution insidehas been virtually negligible. An effort was made to clarify the extent of the reported compromise of ORRISON, the contract agent who manages the LIONIZER group, it now appears that CRRISON'e compromise has not beon asXli' indicated and that it.nay be possible to leave, him" in/'his present duties. .The possibility ofemispheric anti-Communist conference in MexiconApril* with special attention to the Guatemalan, problem, vafl thoroughly explored during .the period. An unsuccessful attempt was made to secure publicityALLIGSRI5 speech and press statement in Mexioo. It lato'-cifer^^nplete^OluUSOIi's status, to furnish closer guidance for the' content and distribution of the IICtflZER.bjinetirij to firm up plans for the anti-Comreunlstl>' *


'PUaarJev 11


sM-An, on-the-spot etudy of ORIT possibilities withinof PBSUCCESS was made.

agent .Msm/IOTER has established contact in Mexico withormer contact of Guatemala City Station. It is proposed to step up the tempo of ORIT propaganda aaalnstoAtemalAi to assist ESMERAXDITE in firming up for at"

iew to using it asPBSUCCESS KUOCWN and KUEOCK

Estimatedo additional funds required.

- .

printing MARTINEZ' story tnXhe iiexican press, it is pivposed to increase the flow of anti-Guatemalan materials to the Mexican press.

Estimated.cost* No additional funds'Based J

i. ptAo

ed some press materials in few Nlcafaguan papers. iCis proposed to increase the flow of


anttaGueteaalan materials to the Nicaraguan press,

^frimhiftrc-vO- r.

Estimated dost: No additional funds required,


Based inf. Jarea


Extensive briefing, 'debriefing and planningbeen conduoted withIt is proposed to utilise

preparationews releases and radio scriptai

to firm, up with him tneprospective.political program of the post-revolutionary government,Pr,v,

Estimated oobtiwd^op^rmW,


Donald C. HEDIGER occupied the premises at thethe reporting period,.vfieveral-.writers for thisnd cleared but none have as yet arrived It isprpposed'to spot, recruit, and moveGuatemalan- writers' who can prepare materialsmedia controlled: by PBSUCCESS and for thopressj- toleared housekeeper for this

Estimated cost:

i- .



After the departure ;of Maurice K. GUXQL onanuary, this house,has been occupiedegular basis onlyontmohe site was extensively used for audlo-surveill^ance ofrthsc ALLIQERIS meeting. Several radW^wrlters and areiouncera were spotted during the period, butrhono have as yet beosi cleared. It is proposed to increase, recruit and.brlng to LINCOLN necessary staff for the production of radio materials for both tbe SHERWOOD operation and for broadcast over such commercial radio stations asiare available in, Central America and audible in Guatemala^ "to install the assistant case.officer housekeeper who Is scheduled to arriveebruary; to secure the servicesase officer (LANtJEVINJj fco begin production of radio nateriale.

Eetlmated coat:

h. PT/iU

During tho period the Santa Fe location was temporarily abandoned. On lli JanuaryA refused to have the station, located on Nicaraguan soil. The possibility of installing- the radioaval vessel was explored but no definite decision reached, CALLIGERIS attempted to persuade SOHOZA to permit broadcasting from Nicaraguan territory, but was unsuccessful and r"

_ New study on the

feasibility of using the Santa Fo site was made with somewhat aore^ favorablet is proposed to secure either



^Wcfcraguan or tho Santa Pe, or both, sites for the clandestine raaldl to dispatch the eo^iipraent and operating personnel to .JtfeXfleld; -to Ijeginrbrotfddastlng to Guatemala.

Ba&nated costi To be provided by KUCLUB,

' progrees haa been made on this task

Bstteated costi To be provided by SUCLUB, *.


Ku"CtUB..conducting field work on this task* Estimated costi To be provided by KUCLUB*


T.*xhe combination of rising coffee prices andon. the United States' haveumber ofinto a- strong- :publicity campaign

Guatemala^ -Various etetenenta from official Aaeriean sources have contributed to the psychological harassment of Guatemala. The haa written an open letter to President ABBENZ calling oo-'hla to break off his ties with the Cconunists. It isto expand and intensify the ebove campaign.

stimatedo additional funds required.

V. Specific KUHCOS Taaksi

A. Based

i. mtA

A.reluctance on the part of CALLIGERIS to discloseof his key personnel ceased an unnecessary delayassessment. Recent exposures of the CALLIERISthe Guatemalan Government resulted in the recall

and CALLIGERIS" realisation, following the

GROUP conferences, that the .ORCUP offeredlreotionromise from CALLIGERIS to produce the necessary data on bis personnel byebruary. Therefore, it ia proposed to assess and obtain clearances on the personnel recommended by CALLIGERIS; to assign suitable personnel to the training class Ino plan further utilisation of trained personnel; to continue exploration of other CALLIGERIS personnel aseets.-

Eatlmatod costi- Ho additional funds required*

2i> .

Suitable sites for'three possible staging areas in El Salvador have beer, located. Onecsite is suitable for San Jose staging if deemed necessary and feasible; the owner of the site la in contact with JUBATE. The siteeserted



arei approximately two adlea fran tbe Guatemalan border andiles north of tbe Pacif io coast. The site can be used under'iha plausible cover story of clearing it for banananuitable Tor staging for Quesaltenango, Maaaten^MQ'and Oulcha, operatlons is located onwned

Jfl iniro staging sits is a


he owner, JUauA IX, haa been cleared ana ishrough JUROR I.

'- ^ reestablish his political rapport-with high'level-Salvador an officials, to re-survey his assets, and to re-examine hossible staging sites svailable to him. Such .sites to be. re-examinedALUOERISroperty nine kilometers north of Salvador where CALLIOcRlSruck park which maybe usable for storsge of equipment until just prtor_ to overt operations* Upon receipt of information frome info rued by LDrCOliJ which Selvadoransites are'^oafIn Italy to be selected. Inr^'has been alerted to extend an sir strip (owned by r rl est'longengthOO feet at an Mnaewfeto exceed olSD. The air strip is loeatedC

Estimated costi No additional funds required. 3. KP/3

The KUHOOK training site was established

in aid-January, end the KUCLUB training site wasFollowing the disclosures In the Guatemalan

White Paper, the KUHOOK site was movedointss. north of Manrtgua. Final relocation of the KUCLUB training site was determined'during the period, Twenty-Seven trainees arrived at the KUHOCK1 site and began training onanuary. In eon-vbrsatlons with CaLLXQZSIS at LINCOLN, it was discovered that the field case officer had requested CALLIGERIS to furnish low level sabotage personnel for this training-'site, Instead of his lead* Ihg personnel. It was also discovered' that CALLIOZRIS had assigned eolysix trainees to the KUCLUB site because the field case officer had requested him to furnieVpersonneT with prior training/ whereas It was LINCOLN's intention to accept personnel with minimum training or those possessing only aptitude,

he KUHOOK program presently in operation is tovo-week sabotage program^ and 'eight of the graduates, in turn, axi to be assigned to the training of other saboteurs. At the same time,f CAIXIOBRIS* leading peraonnel will cOmence seven weeks1 leadership training onarch.

Estimated costi No additional funds required, iu MT/li

has begun implementation of MT/Ji, but none of

the requesiea weesly progress reports bare thus far been received*

facilities for KUHCCS/KUOCKN training for PBSUCCESS. Thin possibility is being do to mined at present.

Estimated costi Ho additional funds required.

- New /f4

taging Site, FJHOPEFDL

Responsibleogistics Officer, LINCOLN

o assemble supplies and equipment provided for in Logistics Plan, to supervise the preparation, packing and loading aspsots of letter plan.

Estimated costi To be accounted fordm,

ir Support, PJHOPEFUL

Responsibleir Support Officer, LINCOLN

o prepare and implement Air Support Plan with AMD. Headquarters.

Estimated To be aooounted fordn, VH.




Terra of Agreement Definition of Partleai A. Party of the First Part.

To be known as the "JUNTA" and coneistlng

and Lt. Col. Carlos Castillo Armas.

E. Party of the Second Parti

To be known as then anonymous organisation headed by Mr. Joshua Smith and represented before the Junta by Mr. Robert Ford.

Relationship between Parties!

A. The Group, being composed of persons entirely dedicated to the cause of free nan everywhere and opposed to the dangera to such free men as represented in the form of Communism, have undertaken to assist Anonymously in every way poaaible the free mon of Guatemala who share the same beliefs and whoae leaderahlp la recognised In tbe Junta Tne compatibility and dedication rapreaented between the Group and the leaders of men who desire freedom in Guatemala ae to common objective'necessarily dictates that any and all problems arising between the two Parties should be resolved within the sphere of this understanding and common goal. Therefore, having cognitance that both Parties are dedicatedommon cause, all agreements and working principles established hereby are baaed upon mutual faith, confidence, and the ethics consistent with the loftiness of the motivation involved, thereby constituting in legalentlemen's Agreement.


In concert with the above, it is the objective ofto dedicate themselves to the ultimata liberation ofof Guatemala from the tentacles of Soviet-inspiredmeeting the situation as required, propaganda withconspiracy with conspiracy, intelligence withwith force, supplanting sameovernment of theby the people of Guatemala ensuring Justice for all.

Having suffered from the ingenuity and insidiousof the Communists, hereinafter referred to aa the enemy,resolve to mutually undertake all security measures,deemed necessary and appropriate to ensure the success of The Junta agrees to recognise the sariouaness ofproblem and cooperate fully throughoututualensure the aucceaaful implementation of precautionaryupon with the Group. The Group will providepereonnol and technical assistance for the foregoing.

Fundlngr The Group has assured the Junta that adequate funding will be made available to ensure the success of this undertaking. Fully reeognliing the Inability and the inadvisability of attainting to


trfcS ONLY


employ normal accounting procedures, tha Oro-jp requests only the following which tha Junta agreea to proridei

1) hirty-jay forecast of tha financial requirements broken down in general tanas, sufficient only to provide guidance on the nature of the anticipated expenditures.

ffotary forecaats for the Junta be proaentedGroupdaya in advance of the

period in question(when prscticTble).

3) The actual flow of such funda from the Group to thereasons of security, will beithinareas of activity for the specific purposesconsistent with the capabilities of the Group to

U) In view of the anticipated communications procedures to be implemented in the field, specific budgetary forecasts will be prepared by the respective Junta reprfaei.lahvaa.and the respective advisors will forward same ta

for review and approval by the

Communications! Tha transmittal of information, instructions, guidance, views, funds, codes,eing the cost sensitive and thereby the most vulnerable natter related to the Joint undertaking, tho Junta and the Group agree that secure channels be established Soonest fromallpoints of activity to other points of activity, utilizing both electrical and special courier communications facilities. Upon the implementation of these procedurea by the Group and consistent with the foregoing agreement on security, the Junta agreea to fully utilize such channels and tc eliminate is rapidly as possible all previous forme of communications considered Hazardous or unsafe.

Definition of Responsibility!

Haili^js" j! pr0Tlde mMsiatanca sfwithin its capabilitias, and consistent with the requirements of the undertaking.

2) Within the framework of the common ideals, policies, and purposes of the Junta and the Group, the Junta will undertake the responsibility for providing the leaderehip, inspiration,and execution to and of the forces at its disposal of all principles and procedures hereinafter agreed upon by both Parties.

3) The point of final coordim tlon of all activity will ba atupon siteuly appointed reoresentatlve .ofwill be in constant contact

represent Castillo Armaa in thebsence.

b) Tho military leadership, inspiration and responsibility will be rested in Lt. Col. Carloe Castillo Arsaa, vho will continue to assume such reaponalbillty upon the culmination of this undertaking inanner and form as hereinafter agreed upon.

The political, propaganda, and overall intelligence activities will be the responsibilitywho acting in olose harmony with Lt. Col. Carlos unewj to Armffs and the Qroup will provide thia counterpart to the military effort.

Specially selected, content advisors will be provided by the Croup to assist in the foregoing at the various echelons and places hereinafter agreed upon by both Parties.

?) Other Participantet The Group, being the principal supporter of the Junta, fully agrees to the acceptance of any additional offers of aid, financial or material, from any source whatsoever, providing any commitments so Involved are presented to the Group for review In concert with the overall policy agreements Indicated herein and heretofore.

IV. Finalei

3oth Parties, having carefully read tho foregoing, and having arrived at complete understanding in full realisation of the significance of thisbeing purely on coenon ideological grounds amongst truly dedicated Parties, hereby resolve to adhere to theae words with unequivocable fidelity, courage, and determination! to seek through these neans the bettenwnt of the peoples of Guatemala without thought or action of personal gain nor selfish interests. Kay these words, givenentlemen's Agreement, be as binding to one as to the other, as true and strong ae any words may be betweenand in keeping therewith, upon verbal agreement, thia document will be burned in the presence of the members of the Junta and ths representative of the Group, hereinafter to be carried only in the hearts and thehose concerned.



Signs d_



Both the Group and the Junta recognize the urgency of carrying out the proposed project within the shorteet possible time, promising to contribute with everything available to them in order that the operatlona nay be carried oat as soon as all preparations have been acconpliehedevel which will sufficiently guarantee auceeeeoof the operations. The atandard for this level will be -nade by common agreement between the Junta and the Oroup.





- for KUHOOK operations has advanced sufficiently as

of Jhlsthe foreseeable logistical requirements

ding ^ronligher Headquarters of this Logistical Plan, same will be considered as proposed by LINCOLN.

C. This Logistical Plan has been predicated uponal warfare operationa of PBSUCCJ =S.

^bsequent to this plan, an Operational Plan will be forwardedndi end/or operational deployment of the forces

that the logistical requirements be defined and provided for. orce becomes "inhe actual deployment, despite most careful planning, might well be altered considerably before committal, owing to the importance of remaining flexible as long as possible to meet the existing situation. Thia Logistical Plan baa been prepared to meet the foregoing concept of operations.

p. Codification: An effort has been made herein to providefor identification of epeciflc logistical requlremente infirst, provide rapid means of identification, thus afor security

loglstioal support plan proposed herein consists of the following!

Requirement No. One: The build-up period for Partisan

Forces prior to Implementation of Plan Able.

B. logistical Requirement No. Two: The build-up period for Shock Troops prior to implementation of Plan Able.

equirement No. Three: Preparations for reserve support of Plan Able or emergency support of either Baker or Charlie.

Requirement No. One: (LR/1code symbol)

. *' fl""1 Firat Priority, to be in readiness at DTROBALO not later than

B. Equipment Required:

Needed Total

On On

R03A .

oviet rifles Model

guns Model

(Radon, Luger,



pies miY

mmunition 9mm ammunition Oil

Piano wire. High C








0 0




On Hand





















b. 0.

(codeo. required! , packed in two units. Estimated weight! bs. each unit. Consisting of: rifles2



frag grenades8

cone grenades8



0leaning gearoil1 pt.

piano wire.rag.


Kit LR/ib(code symbol):

required: 50

weight: bs. each unit.

c Consisting of: 6arrying cases)ds. cleaning gearas Kit LR/lA above.




3. Kitode symbol):


weighti ackedeparate units,

each waterproofed, e. Consisting ofi .ach unit of whloh contalna:

napalm1 lb. block, mixed TNT3 lbs. ncn-electrio caps3 pocket knife (electrician's type)pliera, email1 friction tape1 rl. time fuae3 ft, matches, waterproof1 bx. In addition, one of the five units willhapednits of which will contain the same items as theits, includingfhaped charges. Tbe 5th unit varies, and will contain tha followingi

napalm1 lb. block, mixed TNT3 lbe. pocket knife

(eleotrlolan'aliers, amall1 friction tape1 rl, blasting machine1 firingt. electric caps5.

A. Kit LR/LD(code symbol)i

required! or RRO's.

weight! bs.

oft eparate units, each waterproofed

1st nnlti agentpare1 watch1 GI oompaaa1

2nd unit: 1 ammunition,ds. emergency ration kit2 (foraya) medical kit2 (forays)

Movement of equipment to DTROBAIO will probablyBlack Flight; however, this is the responsibility of Logistics.

ough estimate of the cost of equipment is Logistioal Requirement No. Twoi (LR/2code symbol)

A. Time Elementi Second priority, to be in readiness at DTROBALO not later than

B. Equipment


Soviet rifles. Model

30, 78


0 0



Frag 0 OO

Cone 0

B. Equipment Required (Cont'd);


arrylngrums each

m, anti-tank weapons

Mortar tubee

9nat20mm armor-piercing

ammunition, anti-tank

20mm high-exploaive ammunition, anti-tank

Mortar ammunition


Nbo-electrlc capa

Pocket knives

Shaped chargea

Time fuse

Matebea, waterproofed

RSVL (agentw/apare parte)

Ration kits

Medical kite

Compasaes (indigenous)



GI watchea

GI compaaaea

Napalm mix







3,CCO rds.





r. 5CO







Preparation: Thia equipaent la necessary to bring the atockplles at each staging area to euffloient atrength torm the shock troops with the equipment listed in LB/IB]quip the special sabotage teams; andquip the radio operators and transport/courier teams. reliminary inspection of DTROBALO lndicatee that tha condition of the equipment there ia such that only minor cleaning and rebundling of the exiating equipment ia necessary. Minor additions, as indicated above, should be shipped to ROBALO. Packing supplies are not neceasary, as kits, as such, will not bave to be made up.

Movement of equipment to DTRC3AL0 will probablyBlack Flight; however, this la the responsibility of loglatics.

ough estimate of the ooat of equipment Is Logistical Requirement No. Three 1 (LR/3code symbol)

a. Time Element: Third priority, to be in readiness at DTROBALO not later

Soviet rifles2

Submaebine guns0 Madaen

Pistols (Radom, Luger, Lahti)

arrylngrums each

3. Equipment Required:

Or, Hand ROBA



4 -





Itftna Reeded Total

0 rds 0 rds.










The forecast for thia requirement calls forequipment in sufficient time to enable packing of resupply^rtorne ^fP"^ "Pecial bundling equipmentSnC,lpa0ker- ory ^rk should be doneeqUlFmentDtion of

ode symbol):

required: 50

weight: bs. each unit

oft rifles10

submachine guns5agazines each)

arrying case1



Frag grenades20



Pliers, small2 pr.

Friction tape1 rl.


Non-eleotrie oapa5.

LR/3B (oede eyaboD.

required: 5

weight! less thanbs.

of: agentpare parts)



Ration kita2

Medical kits2

GI watch1

GI compass1

wntj tovenent of equipment to DTROBALO will probably be by Black Flight; however, this ia the responsibility of Logistics

E. Cost: ough estimate of the cost of equipment.


VI. Personnel:

Owing to the time element end the bulk of neterial Involved, lt is considered essential that properly qualified peraonnal be made available at the receiving end/or supply base, DTROBALO, to adequately prepare the aase for operational use. Accordingly, Irving G. CADICX will be prepared to dlsouse thia matter with the CWR on/or aboutanuary in order to establish this requirement.


A proposed air support plan will be prepared by AMD after consultation with CADICK.


Although the Logistical Requirements established above are broken down into specific categories and priorities, in order to emphasise the time factor involved, it may be within the capability of the Logistioa Division to consolidate tbe above for purposes of economy. However, it is urged that the time element be strictly observed in order to meet the forthcoming operational requirements of PBSUCCESS.




Security^ Security Regulations of UhfflUi were written,

implemented and personnel briefed, on security procedures. Rapport was established with appropriatoT Officials and Mutually acceptable arrangements facilitated for entry and departure of personnel to the area precluding usual burdensome, awkward and operationally insecure procedures. Arrangements also were made for the burning of classified trash, Janitorial service, parking facilities as well as the utilization of local labor force in making minimum amount of physical modifications necessary within the building assigned to LINCOLN.

Out of

tatotal of eleven Provisional Covert Security clearances requested, one has been granted, four are pending enu in six cases Provisional Operational Clearances were ^ranted. (to/l'i: Headquarters informed the Deputy Chief of Ll.tCCl* that Covert-Security Clearances were not necessary in the six cases no-ted above regardless of the fact that the Subjects of these six case were P? candidates whose utilization would be In the United States. Cn the basis of this information, LINCOLN will proceed on the assumption that Provisional Operational Clearancos granted byPB are valid clearances for this purpose.)

nor ee

B. Of fifty-two Provisional Operational ClearancosI;P) twenty-eight have been granted and twenty-fovr are pending. The average length of tine elapsed from date of submissionlearance to date of receipt has boon approximately eleven daye, which isod; however, in one important Instanceequestrovisional CSC, the request was submitted onU with complete biographical data and summary of local FBI records totothc with references of FBI Headquarters file numbers, but no action has been received as ofebruary in spite cf thr follow-up requests on the status of the case.

Operational Support;


A. Safehouses

as been in operation since The utilization of the Caae Officer's wife to manage the conestic and the day-to-day affairs has contributed to the smooth operation of this site. However, for personal reasons it will not be possible for the Case Officer's wife to continue and this arrangement will terminate inU. Therefore, plans must be made for the introductionlearedwithin the frame-work of the cover story utilised in the acquisition of this site. Also, this house was leasedh and in view of recent operationalwhich indicate the need for this siteonger period of time than was originally anticipated, exploratory negotiations with the rental agont are necessary in tho very near future. The original colored domestic was terminatedU for unsatisfactory services and the white domestic asnigr.ei.toas beer, assigned to Site A.




as been in operationanuaryandlocation neararea ted teohnl-

oal difficulties withouumg itadioand recording location, lt has been of inestimable valueafe site for coordination of operationalcinforences and livinc quarters durinfc the recent

tectinjis. The stuwio mom has been souna-proofcc to the extent possible and the redo technician liae advised

wreporta) plus the usual flimsy construction typical in the Florida area.

The utilisation ofas complicated by the svdaon departure of GUYOL who had established rapport with the rental agent. After her departure onu, the site was actually operated by the radio technician who managed to control the un-cleared domestic. Since the departure of RUFUSu and the transfer of the domestic to Site A, the technician has resided at the site. leared housekeeper fors to report on or aboutU-

as rented untilU and thereications that the owner is not desirous of continuing thishowever, tills will be explored in the near future although perhaps another ait* more suitableochnical atand-point may be more desirable, but continuine to utilizeor housing WSEURNT personnel and the writingotarial.

as not been in operational use due to the fact that PP personnel from 'iSBURNT have not arrived. The aitc was rented until ISU. Negotiations for continuation of this site will fce made in the future ifproves nccossarj.

Generally, the safehouse situation will improve witiiin the next two nonths considering the feet that the slorida winter eoascn will end and more economic and technically satisfactory eite3 will be available if they are needed.

Operational Vehicles

1) At LXfcCOLfti There are two rental vehicles at thefor the use of operational personnel. were procuredora-erclal pretextdifficulty has been encountered to date althoughof the* ot^the location ofproved somewhat

cumbersome. he tine those tvto rental vehloleo were obtained (during the week between Christmasew foar's Day) an informal agreement was made tltot ihey would be rentederiod of ayproxiiiltoii" twoTt was nocasaary to rake thia Infomal ccerdttwent In view ot the jiaucity of vohicles available for rentals particular time of the year. Kovsver, arranconents are boini, made tois service on or aboutnd replace thorn with vehicles procured through thr same cut-out arran^aient thoae beino utilised at the safe houses. This latter

eyes only

arrangement la much moro secure and, la the event of accident, the vehicle could mot be traced to tills organiaction.

Safe Sitest Three vehicles arc available for tha

use of tho case officers assigned to the safe sites. These vehicles are actually licensed ond insured in the nameecurity cleared cut-out and are rentedlat fee basis which precludes havingentral point. While the initial cost of the vehicles obtained in this manner appears high, the deposit and unearned insurance premiums will be returned to the project when the automobiles are returned.omparison of the figures of cost on automobiles beina rentedegular rental agency, whicha mileage cost of sever, cents per die, and the cost of vehicles procurod through tho cleared cut-out reflects little or no difference in coat.

Accident! Tha vehicle used by Hcdifcer at the

time of tha accidenteparata vehicle obtained the aecurity-cleared cut-outeriod of two hours. This vehicle was obtained for toft purpose of beinc available in tho event it. was necessary to move RUFUS on short noticeterile vehicle, not associatea with the safe sites, wCJ deemed norcaiarj by security. In view of the limited amount of time allowed for the procurement of this vehicle, collision insurance was not obtained although complete liability insurance was obtained. In view of thetaken in obtaining this vehicle, there appears to be no reason for concernesult of the accident from asecurity standpoint, although lt will be necessary for either Hediger or the project to pay for the damages to the vehicle, which amounts toCQ.

C. Hail Drops

servicedaily basis for the following:

Official mail from Headquarters

Personal nail cf personnel assigned to LIi.COlN

Throe boxes have been established for receipt of wall for the use of the occupants of each ofaee Safe


liooeipt of newspapers from foreign countries

There has been no problem in this rot,ard and all beocae are operationally secure.

D. Acquisition of Foreign hewspapers



A secure post office box was established in the nameommercial concern to backstop arrangements mado


date indicate that thiaatisfactory rears of obtaining nevsoaoera within one day of publication providing'

the newspapers to the airline into meet the daily flight that coveri all thesenatter will be discusser:or


Ii Support of KUHOOK OperaUons

Onequest was mads for the assignmentecurity sum to be aaalgned to assist KUHWK operations In both DTROBALOR2KB as tho needs raquirod. This man was to be experienced not only in Security, but in theof black flights and his duties would require furnishing assistance and Security guidance in both the staging and operational phases. He will coordinate the reception of material on black flightsRIKE to DTROBALO, assist and supervise secure packing of materiel as well asthe details with LINCOLN and Headquarters, on theto KKFLUSH and WSEOOFS originating from DTROBALO. On ICU, LINCOLN requosted Headquarters to havo this man available at LINCOLN onU documented and prepared for the assignment at which time he will be briefed thoroughly,

F. General Security Support

Arrangements were made for facilitating the entry oft itjirv thefc, rea and adequate precautions verc takin v? check for survoillance, etc. The secure entry und doparturo of RUFUS into and out of the United States was handled with maximum aecurity. New docunentaticn was arranged for RUFUSesult of the disclosure of his original travel alias whichhange In his alias.

Secur'provided escort service and protective ijon his visit to New Orleans to

Cover storlea for LINCOLN peracnncl were rewritten andand to date there has been no problem in thia regard. In addition, there were modifications made and new cover stories arranged for persons occupying the Safe Sites.

with US Officials;

Excellent liaison and rapport has been eatabllahed with the Special Agent in Charge of the FBI, and the District Director of the Irnlgration and Naturalisation Service. Both of these offiolals havo demonstrated their complete willingness to cooperate with the project on the basisare minimum of information.

perators who have language ability oro being selected to support the Security and CE phases of the project in the general target area.




of Funds Stage Tw Expended or U Advanced Outstanding eb As ofebeb

Overhead &






Requirements5 Mar

00 uOO.CO0













9 tJMuAAm


fGENERAL Operational Procedures,SCT{

(SPECIFIC Paychological InleUigence(PI) penerali

I- In consonance with existing apecific KUFIRS tasks, all PBSUCCESS Stations will honceforth concentrate on Psychological Intelligence (PI) in order to meet the special requirements of PBSUCCESS.

receipt of this directive, the Psychological Barometerheretofore will be discontinued. LINCOLN will undertakefor Headquarters and the field, based on overallestimates of the situation.

3- The procedures defined in this Directive will be implemented upon receipt.


Political action roquircs political intelligence. Military operations require military intelligence. Psychological operations require PI. PI furnishes the information on which psychological operations are based; PI furnishes the information by which paychological operations are evaluated.

Objectives of Pit

ascertain enemy psychological strengths and vulnerabilities.

To ascertain specific means of attacking the onery by psychological rarfare,

To ascertain friendly psychological strengths and vulnerabilities.

*f. To ascertain the effectiveness, or lack thereof, of PBSUCCESS KUGOWK activities.

6, To ascertain the paychological readiness of friendly and enemy forces for the implementation of the successive stages of PBSUCCESS. 1- Definition!

1. General

a. PIatter of "feel" solidly supported by facts. onstitutes deliberate, orderly examination of tho attitudes In andiven situation of both friendly and hostile individuals and social groups. PI systematically analyses tho mind and mood of specific individuals and social groups In specific sub-areas of tho target. Out of these specificPi at regular intervalseneral appraisal of the entire target area's attitudes.

b. PI encompasses =uch that may appear to be mere operational data on the one hand, and mere overt information on the other. In order to pssess tho value of such materials, the analyst shouldrame of reference which takes into consideration:

Tho goneral and basic conditions,

The habits prevailing in the target area,

The special vulnerabilities, and

(Ii) The traditional receptivity of the people to certain sets of ideas or moans of communication. If the targetovernment or its armed forces, for example, the collector must be alerted to watch for all information, fact and ruror, which ray be directed against the target and against the main elements of its support, so as to create an atmosphere of doubt, confusion, and final loss of confidence in which the target, shorn of major elements of its required support, must retreat, resign its efforts, or disintegrate, 2. Specific

a. Areas

PI for PBSUCCESS will concentrate on nine specific population centers in the target country, and will attcspt to provide as complete coverage as possible of tho prevailing attitudes in each.

The nine population centers will be identified by the following syir


True Identities will be forwarded by cable.


b. Arenas

(l) Arenas in this instance apply to the special sphere of Hi of certain selected groups, cliquos, or social levels, for example, political arena, the military arena, etc. and are limited to the are-descrlbed above. The arenas of specific PI interest pertaining to PBSUCCESS are categorized as followsi

(a)ffers Non-coms Soldiers Police

(e) (d)

ro-government Anti-government

Professional, Business, Landowners

rban(pro and anti-Communist) Rural(pro and anti-Comnunist)


te) eligious groups .

Tribal groups

ffffy eroupsfpro and anti-Coramunisi Woron(pro and anti-Comrmnist)


specific areas and o develoPupon

groups mentioned abSve. matorlal for overall studies of the


i- geportina; ^



2. Classification

Since daily PI la principally overt or semi-overt, or capable of beine

h0uld notwill, howeJerrbT

trooted as though it were classified CONFIDENTIAL.

3. Pouching Procodures

ttilJ^mSw9 fron "porting stations will be sent daily to LINCOLN and to Washington by diplomatic air mail.

u. Format

a. Oenorel

M wiH "tudy the format of the -DailyS and dispatched by the respective Embassies in which they erf

e prepared and ^graphed in amannor, as followat

nP Sly f1 reDOrt8 "HI bo entitlod "Miscellaneous News The city of origin and date will be indicated directly below this title.

m be given to identifynforMUooi Including, unless unknown, tho name

f station

adio report; and the Identity of

the speaker or writer,onversation or latter.

b- Specific

fih *XJ* 10 it will be accompanied by the following code to guide LINCOLN in its evaluation and uso


wAcC^acr, Por PI Purposes, the accuracy of the informtion^idedource, rather than the general reliability oT tho source, will be rated. To take oxtromoommunist newspaper may on occasion state facts 3source nay bo mistakun. In each rZHi officer must judge the content of the report on the following ecalei



ntrue ornknown

overage. 2very report aust indicate the coverage o; the iter, reported on, according to tho following scale)

- to more0 people

- to0

- too

- to

- to less.

- Unknown

araphrase veryome paraphraseo paraphrase required, Test Questions.

ilTe fcoWCGLH will send to thn

groups being covorod, amplo test question might readi

"What is the reaction to the military pacts now being negotiated by ODYOKE with KMFLUSH, DTFROGS, and WSHOOFS?"

(b) All replies to specific tost questions will be identified by the symbol prefixlus the serial number of tho- specific test question* Cable Rpports


.the Chief of any reporting Station daoms it essential,dally PI items by cable, or my content on pouched items Chiefs of Station are instructed to mako the mostof cables for PI.

items of PI interest, but too sensitive for transmittalpouch, will be cabled.

?. Weekly Reports;


Same as for Daily Reports.


pouch oach week, two copios to LINCOLN, two to Washington.


This Woekly Evaluated PI Estimate will be divided into two pai

Estimate of the Enemy Situation*

Estimate of tho Friendly Situation.'




c. The Weekly Evaluated PI Estimate will give Station Chiefs nn opportunity to express their views on information at hand and on tho general psychological situation,

0, LINCOLN Use of Reports i

LINCOLN will utilise the Daily PI reports for short-run KUGOWN guidance and preparation of PW materials.

LINCOLN will collate the Weekly Evaluated PI Estimates from Reporting Stations, plus FBIS, US Press reports, ODACID reports,n order to prepare foreekly PBSUCCESS Evaluated PI Estimate which will be furnished to Reporting Stations.

3- To fulfill objectives in paragraph C, above.

i- Timeliness:

In all PI reporting, timeliness is of the essence




5 %kSK

ileseb. 5h'


- No. x


City, Guatemala


U ofJanuary Colonel Enrique PARRINELLO de Leon, ArmyVtJpranking Guatemalan Army ta8 ahatred of

Ven tnou^.he has no use for President

Sr^ChS? iTi*he refuses to resign his post of

tan?WantS t0 benegovern

ment fells to tho opposition.


' noTputebruary Moving Uncle Sam treading8ndhat Tankee Imperialists areand despoiling then of their

- Oscar CONDE, owner of Radio Universal, arrested on nightebruary

uce80S. been repor^anti--El^nL^ Etta speochsuggested St^iT ^nce might be inaccurate or even fabricated. Relation between broadcasts and arrest uncertain at this time.

' we3nSgriand odvlsed1 beon told by severe del TrabaJofPOT-Conmnnist) that stir up some form of violence in

h3TO an eicuse t0 "tallate bi-

been attacked and that in

is forced to declare tho country undo-

Z Si ' ollflTOS *atovernment may be seeking anif to|S waling press.

DIAZ, El Espectador editorial writer, overheard to remark in restaurantandPaper at OAS Confers^ by^inlrolSg '

sengers in. Embassyome laughs, no growls.

II. Arenas;



Milltary<Officers, NCO's, Soldiers, Police)

Poll tical(PrO-Government, Antl-Governraant)

Professional, Business, landowners

LaborCUrban, pro and anti-Conoinist; Rural, pro and

anti-CoDiinnist, white collar, including government employees, pro and anti-Communist}

Sociological(Religious groups, tribal groups,ro and anti-Communist, groups, woman, pro and anti-Communistj




ntrue oress

- unknown


araphrase very

ome paraphrase required

o paraphrase required

o be prepared by LINCOLN.


(Detachable for daily guidance)









EEFERENCB) "Interim Report on Stage Two, PBSUCCESS,"February

nr* ^Port on the progressESS dupln* StaSeof "Program forovering the period5 March ltflu The report consists of.

PART ONE - "Assessment/Analysis"

PART TWO -Project Organisation"

PART THREE - "Re-extenslon Operational Plans for Stage Two"

Period of flexibility was highly desirable during

the early developmental stages of this project,eriod could not expect to be prolonged beyond the implementation of the logistical

8 ime

? narrowing to one of commitment beyond which withdrawal ccuLd only bring serious consequences. For reasons stated herein, PBSUCCESS is believed to be most capable of fulfilling its objectives during the first ten days of June,, providing*

Urgenoyi The importance, of meeting the schedule is

is fulfilled; neCQ3Sary eiTorV personnel-wise and logistically

o follow through once

committedogical or satisfactory conclusion is obtained.

3. elieve CIA possesses the capability to fulfill the

*riMd har0in ore recommend concurrence in this report.






I* General

3. Soaay

HI, Friendly

- JS

PARTroject Organisation

PARTe-Extonslon Operational Plans for Stage Two


Re-Extension of Operational Plans, Stage

III. Specific KOFI RE

IV. Specific KTTOOVN- la






The first Interim Report On Stage Two, PBSUCCESS, was submitted onh, Progreea made since that date does not yet justify proceeding into Stage Three, although it is expected that the decision when to enter Stage Three can be made within the very near future. In theecond Interim Report is submitted herewith, in order to obtain concurrence for contemplated operations in the period.

Enemy Situation; 5)

A. Assessment

1. Political

Throughout the period, the enemy was preoccupied with the OAS Conference on the external front andlowly mounting campaign of internal repression on the domestic front.

The OAS Conference, whicharch, was preceded inside Guatemalaropaganda campaign that was initially only against "Interventloniam" but in the later stage, shortly before the Conference itself, focused its attack directly on the United States. For example, numerous denocstrations were held throughout Guatemala in memory of SAIDING, The Nicaraguan insurgent whose movement was quelled6 by. Marines. Outright charges were frequently launched that the United States planned both armed and politicalin Guatemala. At mass meetings throughout the country, "civicere organised to defend the "national sovereignty" and to carry on ths struggle against "Intervention." At the same time,ignatures were allegedly collectedesolution on behalf of tbe "peace".

This In tern el propaganda in Guatemala was broadly supported by Communist-dominated unions, Communist fronts, and the various Communist Parties throughout the Hemisphere. Messages of support and sympathy were received, among others, from the French Communist Party. Soviet propaganda throughout the period advertised the Guatemalan cauae through voluminous radio and newspaper commentaries. From this, the significance that International Communism attaches to the retention of its beachhead in Guatemala became even more apparent.

The Internal political purpose of these variouscampaigns was clearly to gain and aolldify mass popular support for the ARBENZ-Communist regime. This campaign for mass support ia Intended not only to secure popular consent to the posture and measures of the current regime, but also to sake the Guatemalan public more amenable to curtailment of individual freedoms and privileges in order to "resist Intervention." Thus, the anti-American campaign can bea direct prelude to more intensive Communization of the country.




Besides propaganda exhortattona, the Guatemalan Govern-aant tried assiduously to curry favor by giving evidence of material benefits and progress that it had allegedly secured to the people. PresidentARBENZ'1 report to Congress was brimful of Soviet-style statistics on progress in the industrial, agricultural, and social servicehe Government has widely publicised the introduction of potable drinkine water into Guatemala City and, in the departmental capitals and towns, was likewise playing up instances of material progress in order to persuade the public that it can expectrewards from the regime.

The brash, overdramatlc Guatemalan position at tbe OAS Conference end the action of Guatemala in being the lone voter againstsponsored resolution was likewise intended to give Guatemalans, individually andDavid" complexis the Goliath of the North. Xt is possible that,esult of the Guatemalandefeat at the Conference, ths leaders of the country will call on the peoplego-it-alone" attitude and will use this thesispringboard for "defensive" measures in the form of tightened internal security, speedier econordc transformation of the country along Communist lines and increased militarisation of the populace. It is likely, in view of the Ingenuous' Guatemalan statements, both before and at the Conference, that the country was not Coomunist and the PGT's frequent assertions that although it supported the regime it was not Identical withhat this faster-paced progress toward Communisa will still be mads under the guise of "democracy*', "socialtc.

Some indications were received during the period that the Government and the Communists had actually succeeded inart of the population that the present regime waa trying to act in the beat interests of theeport from high Catholic Church L Conversant with tbe Guatemalan situation suggested that apart of the population believes that the ARBENZ Administration has tried to better conditions and would have made much more progress if it had not been for obstruction and Interference by theeports received on the labor aituatlon runomwhat similar vein. Due to the limited saapling represented by such reports, they cannot be taken as conclusive; they do make it appear imperative that anypolitical program aimed at capturing popular support in Guatemala must guarantee, not grudgingly, but generously, the preservation and

extension of all real or fancied "social reforms" made under the present regime.>.

The drive toward national mobilization waa reflected in several ways on the home front. The CGTG, after being asked by the Association of Industrialists to agreeon-aggression policy between capital and labor, repliedhinly veiled diatribe against the industrialists and against all private enterprise. The GOTOew assault on American Investments in Guatemalaemand forin rail and electric power rates, and threatened the entire statue of free enterprise by-declaring that private industry was not sufficiently energetic in promoting theeconomic development of the country, meanwhile, on the agricultural front, land expropriationapace and will presumably be intensified with the enlargement of the corps of inspectors of DAN. The progress of land expropriation and land distribution was still helter-skelter, marked by frequent irregular invasion of land by Communist-inspired squatters, by conflicts betv?een


the Communists and the DAN, and by conspicuous favoritism in theof land to government functionaries rather than to needy peasants butommunist point of view, the breakdown of the land-owning class was being systematically and effectively expedited*

The independent press and radio of Guatemala repeatedly came under fire. The PRO Partyeries of loaded questions to the independent press, asking whether or not these newspapersin the accusations of the White Paper; the independent press was oollectively derided as "tools of imperialism" and individualre singled out for calumny as traitors. Oscar CONDE, an antl-Conmunist radio broadcaster, waa haled into court on apparently trumped-up charges.radioert Jamedransmitter apparently located in Police Headquarters in Oust*mala City.

There were apparent rifts, however, behind the Ooverment-Communlst facade of unity and harmony. itter, back-biting series of rivalries flared over the question of who should ba ARBENZ' aucceasor in the presidential office. During the election of the president of tbe Congress, where the Oovernment candidate was Mario Antonio FRANCO Chacon, PAR deputy Mario .PAIZ Notales decided independently to try for the office and succeeded inledge ofotes for his The Government forces thereupon brought pressure to bear to secure the election of FRANCO} PAIZ Kovales and Salvador CHI COS Carillo were expelled from the PAR, and five other PAR deputies were suspended froai the Party for three months. The significance of this dissension in the PAR ranks cannot presently be gauged, but it is of potential importance because of PAR influence in the CNOQ.

In the labor fiald, there are recurrent indications that the CNCG and the COTQ are in conflict over the organization of rural workers. In separate Interviews with AFL representative Robert ALEXANDER, CNCG and COTO leaders indicated significantly divergent views as to the future of the agrarian program. CNCG leader Leonardo CASTILLO Flores told ALEXANDER thet as soon as the psasant got his land lie was no longer interested in the issues for which the COTO agitated) namely, higher wages, vacations, etc. To judge from CASTILLO Flores1 remarks, the CNCO tends more to favor the creationslass of small land-owners. CGTO representatives, of course, quite openly desire farm collectivization on the Soviet nodsl, even though they presently concede that the time forove is not yethere is no concrete evidence toa real split between the two labor federations; the CNCO is affiliated with the CTAL and WelV and CASTILLO Flores has been an enthusiastic participant in labor conferences behind the Iron Curtain. However, if the two federations do develop along the divergent ideological and organizational lines that their leaders indloated to ALEXANDER, the possibilitiesabor split are extant.

Evidence accumulated during the period suggests that President ARBENZ still has the capability of arresting or reversing the present trend toward makingenied area. The political parties are financially dependent on the Government, their leadership ie held in line by the executive authority and by political pnrtonage and their ideological basea are too skimpy to ^ive them independent direction. Similarly, the labor federations are dependent on Oovernment subsidies, so that their policies could be modified by Oovernment flat. However, there is no indication that ARBENZ has any intention of reversing the present course, but rather, to Judge from, the Guatemalan stand at the OAS Conference and from the Internal measures cited above, to acceleratehere is reason to believe that as soon aa the OAS Conference is terminated Guatemala will movo rapidly toward full-fledged status as an Iron Curtain country.




2. Intelligence

(ta attest toer.lo

itunlsts. -ner*secreW worKiag ior wu, torn-


undernG Cesar LANU2A, nay bo

3. .Propaganda.

inferior to the opplsftton! "aro^son^

papara is below tfit of th ^*


Apparently to alleviate th-sClliar-C^ straits.


Military and Paramilitary


The principal development in the paramilitary fieldcerninist-inspired appeal to the Ministry of Defense that it give basic military training to civilians so that they could assiot in the "defense against Intervention". This appeal foreshadows theof the existing Communist paramilitary forces. ate forof the proposal has not been set.

further information has been received which would

alter the estimate of enemy military and paramilitary strengthIn the last interim report. There have been frequent hints of dissatisfaction in the Army, but at the same time, there have been indications that the Ccmnunlsts are intensifying the training and equipment of their paramilitary formations. SEQUIN reports that tho three strongholds of enemy as paramilitary forces are Esquir.tla, Tlqulsate and Banaveraj arming and training are said to be in progress there,

n * t.

Enemy progress during the period shows intentions of converting Guatemalaenied area at an accelerated rate after the close of tha OAS Conference, thus making the tine factor extremely Important in oombatting the enemy. Enemy capability to realize these intentions may be considered questionable, in view of the rifte and squabbles within the government ranks, and the still-present evidence of popularto these plans, but there is reason to believe that the enemy will proceed despite its limitations. This analysis of enemy intentions possibly exceeding enemy capabilities suggests that the rate of progress of friendly forces should be adjusted to take advantage of thethat may result from enemy efforts to proceed faster than practicable.

During the period there were also recorded numerous Instances of apparent enemy Intelligence activity in the field of provocation. Shortly before the OAS Conference, thereeries of reports to the effect that the CALLIQERIS forces were going tooup on the eve of the conference: this not being in accord with the actual CALLIGERIS plans, it nay be presumed that the enemy was, by such ruses, attempting to smoke out oppoaition, both to defond itself and to gather propaganda ammunition for the Conference.

The enemy was exceedingly active in the field of deception, persistently stating,ariety of channels, the theme that AR3ENZ and TORIELLO were about to break with the Ccmnunlsts. highest level channel used for die semination of this theme was President PIGUERES of Costa Rica, who shortly before OAS reportod to the Amort can Ambassador in CoaUuRica that his personal emissary to Guatemala had Just received an assurance from ARBEXZ and TORIEILC to the effect that they would break with the Coimsunlsts.


HIl Prlendlv Situation; Aisnent

li General and Political-

In the Interim Report on Stage Two, datedebruary lyju, it was reportedirn agreement on working principles had been established between CIA through the medium of an "anonymous group"

nd CALLIGERIS in which the latter be cane identified as thc^JUliTA"! Predicated on this agreement, specific detailed planning and delineation of responsibilities were satisfactorily completed. However, it soon became apparent that for purposes of furtherof identity and organisational control that all decisions arrived at by the "GROUP" and the "JUNTA" should be identified as thathus giving one voice to the two entitles.

Shortly after CALLIGERIS returned to Honduras, it appeared at LINCOLN that he had disregarded the agreements established and was operating unilaterally. Although^ n Put in charge of political action, CALLIOERIS continued tooudget for and direct such activities. Although^ .jkad been put in charge of propaganda, CALLIOERIS sent hisui Propaganda to Mexico without priorwhere the Chief of Propaganda proceeded to contact the U. S#. S. visa and announce that he waslthough he had agreed to use only secure, "GROUP" communications channels, CALLIGERIS sant his own emissary to ths United States with (relatively less) propaganda materials for the OAS Conference. Although CALLIOERIS had agreed to coordination on all Intelligence natters, he insisted onotential double agent without consulting the "GROUP" adviser in the field; In interviews with LINCOLN representatives, CALLIOERIS equivocatedumber of comitmenta;

Thia series of incidents, while partially explicable by the necessity for action in the field without waiting for the cumbersome

recess of "high-level" coordination, raised the entire problemrelations, and, with it, the problem of theof the post-revolutionary government. It was evidentbeing in the field and having numerousetter position to command local loyalty thaiOn

the other hand, it was feltbeing lessTWtivaurf by

personal ambition and being fundamentally more sound andetter guaranteeof. interests in Guatemalasomewhat responsible forself-

assertion, jhas long persisted in saying that heremain in the bWRgrounT and has only recently begun to revealassets inside Guatemala, In any case, substantialbe made In tee near future towardalance ofand whatever other leading elements are to

be brougn? intotne new regime if CALLIOERIS arrogance, as dangerous to the current enterprise as to the long-range stabilityuture government^ Is to be avoided.

The most significant political development during thia period was the successful adoption of the Department of State'son Ccmunlam at the OAS Conference in Caracas, Unquestionably the political and psychological effeot of this international stand will have important bearing on the people of Guatemala, It should


clearly aet the future destiny of the Communists in Guatemala and serve to convince nlddle-of-th* readers that the incumbent adninistra-tion has been discredited abroad and is contrary to the best interests of the people. Although the resolution confined itself to theof Communist pentraticn in the Hemisphere and avoidedGuatemala specifically, it is believed that little doubt exists anywhere that thisirect warning to Guatemala, supported by the votes of) Latin American countries.

No word

Then compliancerevious request,umber of documents depicting the inroads and activities of the Communists in Guatemala for presentation at Caracas during the OAShese documents were prepared under the aegis of CSUAGE, FAGS and CEUA. In addition to this material LINCOLNist of suggested courses of action for PBSUCCESS in order to aid in theof the anti-Communist Guatemalan cause at Caracas. as bsen received to date regarding the results of this effort

atter of possible embarrassment to the Guatemalan Government during the OAS Conference, CALLIQEHIS arranged to have Jose Luis ABEKAS return to Guatemala clandestinely and, once there, make known his position, thence proceeding to declare that his personal safety was in danger, despite his congressional irrrxiity, seeking asylum in the Selvadoran Embassy. Althoughood maneuver, the lack of preparation and support by propaganda media left ARENAS at the ridicule of the Communists. The second deterring factor was the lack of cooperation of the Salvadoran Ambassador who, it has been reported, ia overly synpathetic to the Guatemala Communists. The situation appeared to resolve Itself in the normal manner wherein those who were anti-Communist believed in ARENAS and those who were pro-Cocrninists believed in the Government's charges. In all, it is believed that the maneuver was not entirely in vain. ARENAS departed from Guatemala to Salvador, using normal travel passport, s presently inwhere plans are being formulated to send himropaganda tour and at the sane time effectively remove him from the local scene.

Curing the early part cf this reporting period, C

JwithdrewC jtourlst card privileges which prevented LINCOLN iron aaaianinc-C

J]. Thia impasss seriously delayed thefor both SCRANTON and SARANAC and has thus farHERWOOD site In addition^ 1

without being in contact with CIA oiTiciaaiy or any representative of theas deeply Involved In CALLIGERIS' ocerationa and onlv hadhe latter's word to depend on,^

This situation prompted the conclusion thatIAnon-official Derson should confer withC Jaooneat

^Subsequent torequested that he receiveiui^for CALLIOERIS sufficient to convince him that this wasanother locally organized revolutionary attempt. Also,to confirm arrangemente in Salvador for the cooperationurtwnw^nt.mi*tinp Mack flights within its territory C. that he receive some

outside assurance of CALLIGERIS' support before he would bs able toclandestine operations within Salvador.

quoted as having established this prerequisite.


ecision was made by Headcuarters to

rZTZ* t Proceed t0 Nicaragua on aboutarch, where he will en-

0 enSUre

litUiiins the title ofnticonunista Salvadorer.a"unt cut-cut established contactESMTIC. as a

the exposes ofs pertaining tc the corcpronise ofS.T* InES"*

the modusesoSSsP Sif* taia* accurate concept of furious tc^eceseitateT^onc^ IT^ZZ^^L^

-top slcrl1

operations. Then, onk, It was disclosed that P

JPN Case Officer to CALLIQERIS, hadumber of slightly paraphrased official oables unguarded in Managua. Investigationthat aside from the acknowledged receipt of this information bytrong possibility existed that the information contained therein had reached enemy hands through the double agent, Jorge DELGADO. This security compromise taken together with the foregoing and the previous indiscretions under PBFORTUKE unquestionably hns provided the enemy with adequate information to deduce the official support of the United States Government inperations plus considerable details concerned therewith.

An analysis of available information concerning the identification of potential strength within the target area is possible at this time although concrete substantiation in each instance has not bean practical. Whereas in Report on Stage One, it was indicated from available Information that approximatelyof the population of Guatemala were anti-corramist, more recent reportsider range of diversified sources now indicate the need for clarification of the composition of potentially friendly parsons. erson* aa being responsive to the enemys Indians or non-participants, would leaveersons, assuming over-all population. This latter figure is considered the politically conscious group which In one form or another have not been responsive to Communist Indoctrination or approximately forty-five perf the population.

Tha political character of the friendly potentialabove remains largely unorganised and highly diversified and covers the strata from farmers, laborers, professionals, students, governmental workers. Of this large, generally unorganised population group, LXZCCLK has been able to identify the following specific organized elements which are regarded as the most active entl-Coramuniats!

Political Groups - Anticomunlsta

coalition front group under control of Osoar H, CARTER, This coalition actsoordinator and public council for CCS, CPA, COA, AJA, PIACO and PUA which are mentioned below.

loosely organized, anti-Communist

party in the western and northwestern areas of Guatemala with lasu'^enango, (Juezaltenango and Quiche as main points of local strength.


One of the most prominent entitiaa in Ouatensla, pnV marily located in the eastern part of the country with its greatest strength in Zacapa and Pto. Barrios.


A loosely organized anti-Communist civic committee in Guatemala City with representationinor scale in outlying provinces.

-top SCCREr rybat/pbsuccess


Labor 0roups





A loosely organized anti-Communist women's association primarily in Guatemala City which includes the marketworaen who have been vociferously anti"COD3Bunist in the past.

A thus far not clearly defined antl-Coamunist labor coasittee located in Guatemala City.

An anti-Communist youth movement, of primarily Catholic character, in Guatemala City.

The Railway Workers Union withstrength in Pto. Barrios, reportedly controlled by anti-Communists,

Principal bus line in Guatemala City, predominantly anti-Consunist,

Federationrt and Graphic Workers in Guatemala City; is considered antl-Communist.

An Industrial syndicate, predominantly anti-Communist.

Workersuesaltenango: This federation consists of aboutyndicates and has conspicuouslyaloof from all efforts of CGTG, to which it is In direct oppoaitioh.

Workers Union of Pto. Barrios. Thia union, consisting primarily ofis believed to have ato staunchly anti-Communist members which currently dominate the labor situation in Pto. Barrios.

Miners Federation, Coban: Thisis outside the control of COTO and is considered anti-Cceeminist.

The Workers Union of the United Fruit Company, is believed to be primarily anti-Cccriuniit despite COTD's efforts to control it.

The National Union of Free workers, presently remains onlyaper organization but has the potential of assuming real subatance once properly directed and financed.

The National Confederation of Rural Workers of Guatemala ia not presently under Communist control andotential pool of resistance strength.



Una between Comurists and anti-fcrRuniats ia becoming raPidtv drawn

.2. Intelligence

*aa enwuntered numerouswith rssidenceity as snail a8 Tegucigalpa,his becomingCft

J Taw matter*Jirou

by dispatch.

Hathev H. ONTRICHrip to Tegucigalpa and Sar Salvadorarch in order to attempt toreSShe

spent the najority of his time in Honduras interpreting for CA^rv lnel explaining the military plans and the propaganda^probifmi!

arch, LOOTON began work on the CALLIGERIS fn**

S^ SSSS wiSni" 9ecoived from LINCOLN, on biographicof known Guatemalan Communists contained in CALLIGERIS' fLTard

^aS'2atl0nal li8ttheir kll^t

foamc iscUMed "ith CAUIGSSIS in Hondurasi^ details of whichZJrangeaonts are presently underway for LOCflXJN

8entenplaUd to bring SEGDIa jto have him readily availableource of information.

him dlreotlvwith SECANT and reports from

oSeSeltioJ 0 Ltl, whoC7presently head ofALLIGERIS' organisation inhat he is safe and able to work. (Details of the plans concerning SECANT will also be covered under FT/lo).

. l3tCALLIGERIS1 sensitive Honduran and Salvadoran

ouarters under9 Feb. S opportunity during his recent trip to check-

by CmiOERISource, -nsre . cr^r Jwho HaSa very oloee personal' friend of CALLIQERIS. ?

-top secret rybat/pbsuccess

CALLI3ZRIS' contact Kith President OSCRIO and the nan who arranged the contact between CADICK, ONTRfCH and JURAWT, (Results and details of this nesting are reported under Para-nilitary.)

The two meetings, one with JURANT and theisclosed one very important thing. All indications mra that they were willing to help but wanted to sake absolutely sure that the operation would succoed and that the "Big Brother from, the North" was behind them, even though unofficially.

The problem of ERRATIC was discussed in detailand the subject came up,during ONTRICH's contact withopinion, which is ii s that ERRATIC should

not be cut in on any aspect oxoperation. Both CALLIQERIS and SSCOT stated emphatically that ERRATIC would exploit his participation politically and endanger the security of the operation. CALLIGERIS agreed that ERRATIC had at one tine had good public support, and probably still does have some. However, CALLIQERIS claimed that the military inwill not back any movement ERRATIC is in, that labor groups and students would not back him; that even El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua would be apprehensive toovement in which he'participates.

_In regard to Jorge Isaac DELOADOALLIQERISPanama to contact President REMON, but the Guatemalans and

DELQADC had been there first and bad told REMON that CALLIQERIS was only trying to use DELQADCcapegoat. CALLIQERIS also has received information that the Communists were attempting to re-contact IEIGAD0 in order to extract more information fron him. It was at this time CALLIGERIS asked if the "QROUP" could help. Headquarters stated that they could not bring the subject up with R'JCON since other sensitive negotiations were under way. No other information has been received on ICI/JADO.

Again the problemsHinnussod at


had nresented a 0 expense account for March, and explainca /T Jwculd approach everybody he knew in the organization for money, inn Merest danger'that presently exists is nows where


n hiding from tbe Communists, and isr money. CALLIQERIS believed that.ontacted by his people ana asked to come out of Guatomala,T Jwould comply, but the problem of where to "Jefter he left Quatenala would remain. LINCOLN is presently working cn the details of this plan and will attempt to

Jto the United States with his family until the operation is completed.

The production of intelligence from the fieldbe unsatisfactory, both as to quality and quantity. dataactical nature ia available and beingLUOTON, tha absence of Independent reporting from reliable,other than CALLIQERIS1 sourceserious deficiencyoperations. Reports from Station Guatemala droppedthis reportine oeriod an dj hose received remained largelydevoted primary effort to developing

ERRATIC and although considerable information was procured from this source, its value remains doubtful, If not negative, until confirmed by other sources. LINCOLN, in addition to attempting to improve existing Intelligence assets, has undertaken tile development of new assets as indicated bslow in sub-paragraph 5.



3s Propaganda

Vlhile still aerioualy hampered by the lack of aradio station and the nagging difficulties of getting Guatemalan propaganda writers to LINCOLN, the friendly propaganda program has made substantial strides forward during tho period.

The two outstanding public propaganda events of the period wore (a) the widespread publication of CALLIOERIS1 manifesto to the Quatenalen people and (b) the dispatchALLIOERIS delegation to Caracas.

The CALLIGERIS manifesto, prepared during his visitwas reprinted in full orignificant extent inMexico, Honduras and Salvador, both by the independentIn Guatemala, the newspaper El Bspectador

priiiwso. aigniiicant excerpts on an inside page; another newspaper ne.itly assisted the program of building up CALLIGERIS by printing his picture and that of his wife on the occasion of their twelfth wedding It is thus apparent that through the mention of his name in the "White Paper" and through his reply, CALLIGERIS himself hasubstantial propaganda asset, which must be consistently exploited*

The sendingALLIOERIS delegation to Caracas, with material showing Coanunlst inflitnation and domination of Guatemala, marks the entry of the CALLIGERIS propaganda organisation into open battle with the Guatemalan government. As of the close of this report it is not known how successful the mission will be.

Inside Guatemala, the ESSENCE propaganda organisation has manifested intensive, expanding and encouraging activity. For example, in the Communist stronghold of Escuintla, an ESSENCE-supported grouptrong manifesto, signed by more thaneople, affirming the religious convictions of the Escuintla populace and asserting that the area was not predominantly Communist and "never will be". Sticker, handbill and poster propaganda is flowing in greater quantities, with apparently good results. The propaganda is being continued, even while ESSENCE contacts report that there has been enough propaganda and the people are only awaiting action.

In the political propaganda-political action field, the ESSBNCE group has been organising local branches in all the departments. Group representatives have been making inspection and recruitjnent trips through the countryside, with apparently excsllent results in organizing sympathizers, propaganda distributors and agitators. Reports received from the western part of the countryigh degree of readiness to assist; reports from trips to the eastern part arc not yet in hand.

LINCOLN has been assisting the political propaganda-political action work with general guidance, with suggestions for specific operationsunning constructive critique of work in progress in the field.

The subsidized publicationa. El Rebelde, CSIIAOE and El Conbate, have continued theirublication and have shown United responsiveness to LINCOLN guidance, LINCOLN has,eekly basis, sent out finished Spanish-language articles and specific guidance to the case officers in charge of El Rebelde and CEUAGE; transmittal of material and suggestions have been madeunning basis to El Rebelde.


but ihc case officer for CSUAOE did not make contact until shortly before tho close of theo cut-out being available for El Combate, the material could only be mailed to the publication,

Useful support to friendly objectives has been rendered by the independent press in Guatemala. Close scrutiny of that press indicates that it has been as courageous and forthright as possible under difficult circumstances, missing virtually no opportunity to criticise the government end Communists, Clemente HARROQUIN Rojas, editor of La Hora and Impacto, is outstanding in this respect, an sffortto dispatch Francisco MENLEZ, editor of El Lapeal, to Caracas, but this plan was frustrated by Venezuelan unwillingness to grant him an entry visa. Nevspspors outside of Guatemala,those in Mexico and El Salvador, have widely reprinted anti-Guatemalan material.

Radio propaganda, hampered by the absence of thestation, is proceedingeduced scale in Guatemala, Salvador and Honduras, There is no present evidence as to the effectiveness and reception of these programs.

Flans initiated in the propaganda field include the henisphero-wide anti-Communist conference to be held in Mexico City, in early May; the openinghannel to an anti-Communistdeputy who will be asked to give LINCOLN-ghosted speeches on the floor of the Guatemalan Congress; the developmentuatemalan exile front in Nicaragua, etc. The Case Officer for SHERWOOD is on location preparing background material for radio scripts andthe notional broadcast.

It. Paramilitary

During the interim period it waa established that CALLIOERIS understands what is required of him and is apparently willing to cooperate with the "GROUP- in implementing the military plans. He has furnished the identities of key personnel at all target areas. Information on the exact present status of all former CALLIGERIS personnel is nowlicited from couriersual CALLIGERIS travellers for compilation and study.

) saboteur leader candidates commencedarch and will graduatearch. ) leadercommencedarch. andidates commenced training during the period also.

) sabotage targets have been selected and discussed with CALLIOERIS vhc ia recruiting the teams for each leader. One apecial mission has been assigned and discussed with CALLIOERIS, who will recruit the necessary personnel for the mission when alerted.

Methods of infiltratingquipment to various targets were discussed, and progress made on the planning in this field. Paramilitary tactics were rediscussed with CALLIGERIS1 military Chief of Staff, who compiled detailed notes. Complete agreement as to the manner and scope of operations was achieved between the "GROUP" ond the "JUNTA". CALLIGERIS volunteered the statement that the "JUNTA'S" men and himself have respect for the PM Field Officer's "professional efficiency".

- IU -


A tine-table Tor completion of operational tasks priorour was discussed. taging altos ware tentatively selected for procurement in Honduras. One air strip in Honduras was surveyed for suitability and the method of procurement, facilities necessary, signal matters and ground logistical natters were discussed for both this atrip and the alternate strip. Action on procurement is to commence on receipt of support notification from the Honduran Oovernment.

Procurement of one staging site in San Salvador was Th* .remaining two sites were discussed withf^

jand procurement is pending receipt of supportfrom the"Salvadoran Oovernment.

One strip inJJalvador was surveyed and foundwas another spotted byprocurement

ind preparation of facilities depends on receipt of notification aa to -he scope of government support.

The SARAlUO eamn was reconstructed andasthat

5. Defection and/or Hew Assets

Early In PBSUCCESS operations lt was recognized that considerable hazard existed in the fact that most operational planning had to be baaed uponT CALLIQERJS sources and that no other, completely iiKtopendeSt ana reliable, controlled sources were available. In addition to this situation of having the bulk of intelligence emanating from one principal group, it was also apparent that practically all propaganda, political and paramilitary assets were likewise contained In this same group.

The limited operations staff at LINCOLN precluded any effort other than firming up existing assets until the arrival of Oraham L.enior KUFTRE officer. Upon letter's arrival he was immediately assigned the task of studying all existing assets for CE operations and background for developawmt of defection and/or new assets whether for intelligence, propaganda, political or paramilitary. PAGE has made rapid progress and is now considered sufficiently prepared to undertake operations in the field. It is contemplated that he will proceed to Guatemala under deep cover during the next reporting period. His mission will be primarily one of attempting to establish defection operations against key target personnel and exploiting all opportunities to develop new. Independent assets. The utilisation of these assets would depend upon their nature and qualifications. eparate report will be prepared on this operational activity,

B. Analysis

Although continuing to be hampered by lack of rapid means of communications aside from cables and the urgent necessity of conducting all field operations as securely as possible, definite progress has been achieved during the period reported herein. The second effort to re-align CALLIOERIS' activities appears promising and now largely depends upon the ability of PBSUCCESS field personnel to implement their respective responsibilities.

Paper" and the OAS anti-Ccannmist resolution have

C!earlj bStween the rsapoctive camps with ^ nti-Communists are rapidlyoint of

fller ^Hrwluatlon ofopulation reduced thefiwBWoiMit information iTavaUable -J**eP^lcal.and labor elements have been fairlyas oni. .m

established as entitles of 'anti-Comauhisra.onclusionsi

, , inao^Quato information is available to accurately

determine the enemy's capabUities it is estimated

-the enemy is capable of exercising repressive measuresignificant portion of the opposition at will,

enemy would have the support of the Armed Forces in the eventoreign invasion;

" degree of the Armed Forces support in the eventopular, internal up-rising is in doubt;

enemy is capable of exercising police powersventublic reaction against the government;

enemy is cojwble of employing large numbers of paramilitary forces at will;

- in the event the Armed Forees failed to copeopular up-rising the enemy is capable of attempting to counter-balance the situationombination of police and paramilitary forces;

the enemy possesses the capability of subduing forcibly any minor up-rising or revolutionary attempt exploiting same to his advantage;

the enemy possesses the capability of resorting to Ci?Lor 6uerrilla warfare in eventajor revolutionary effort which succesefully dislodges his present control;

" the enemy possesses the capability of moving rapidlydenied area status; y

possesses the capability of completely subjugating Guatemala to true Soviet satellite statusasonably short period.

' 2* Intentions

. available information and knowledge of Communist

doctrine, tho enemy's current intentions ore believed to bet

praaiM*Praedures while implementing Communist


propaganda attacks on the U. S, Government and businesses, exploiting to maximum factual as well as notional data and/or situations;

subversion and neutralisation of his Aimed Forces;

-accelerate training, arming and preparation offorces;

*free preasontrolled opposition press;

;nitiate repressive measures against all real or potential opposition elements j

pulslon and/or expropriation of American business interests and investments!

to defend Communist gains to bitter end, IT necessary, while moving rapidly to Increase control over all- segments of the country.

1. Determining Factors

The advent of unfavorable weather commencing earlyu precludes any military operations thereafter until October

- 5SPeak will be attained about first ofE2JZdau, morale deterioration

will become unavoidable, ccawensurate with the length of the delay.

esistance personnel within the

and prepared to act after many

HOPSeriously considerod^m

any further delays beyond early

.Jiii?Bl oituafclor' Honduras, currently rapidly after mid-June igii, as internal

P^iS^i iCC"J! MC8ierated' indications are that the contesti^>nelectlona' to take place inU, will be hotly contested, thus negating any consideration of being able to conduct operations unhampered against Guatemala during this period,

_ h*natureevolutionary Movement precludes

hroughout, thus It is constantly vulnerable to penetration by the Conmeuiists. This security vulnerability will increase proportionately with the acceleration ofn?M roportion to the length of time of ^sr!: etor eust be considered before delaying the operation


in th-iTiVfl frlendlyand are placed iflttehands of indigenous anti-Coamunlst personnel, CIA, through PBSUCCESS, will not be able to ensure effective, control over the use

TOP SL-Gftgfr-

of than, una except through fulXUlBent or exl.tlnj operational man.

2. Favorable Fsctora

isjrg4nimtj?nal 8trUCtur* of ^SUCCESS vis the "JUNTA" la now considered approaching operational adequacy!

agreement on basic principles having been tested

or8tnUatlon Shouldcapable of neetincRe-^aluaUon of friendly potential population, while


^vltfhe ^whoaS?


fu^h The OAS Conference resolution, the Hemispheric anti-

, thus furthering tha determination of the people to resist Co^nism,


3* Attack Plan

. nalyzing tho enemy situation and capabilities in viev of

* that weather, the enemy,ale of operational

general timing will reach peak of effectiveness,

- that delivery of arms scheduledu

eoatponed or authoriled

to proceedirm basis of operational follow through;


that weather precludes operational action afterk until aboutu,

nstabUity in Honduraa and possibly Nicaragua, abouta, would

"Preclude* operational action at that time,

.therefore indicates need for immediate decieion

whether the attack phase will be authorized for early part of

s AtWfflS will be authorized to proceed on schedule to develop operational readl-

appears^ abouTtnl^

TOP wcillf

top sccrtcT





I, Qeneralt

aevealediltaujed PlanMdprogress toLO days behind. An extension of Stage Two forays was accord-

eflecting appreciable

ini mU1neededbefotefitherefore proposed to extend the Operational.

lp?l> approx-

H. Re-Extension of Operational Piano, Stage Twoi A. Craanlaatlon

Basic Objectives

Create dissension and defection within the target; Discredit target at hone and abroad;


Create hope and encourage patienco among non-Cornunieta; Begin economic pressure;

f trainingaramilitary force in exile and in the interior of the target.

C. Assessment

f same withto Heaoxniarters for future action.

A. Based In Guatemala!


The Principal Agent,, has been briefed regarding targets of Interest and lt is believed that he and his sub-agents can develop the desired coverage. It is noted, however, thatnd his sub-agents do not nave access to high level target personalities. Project agents are considered low and middle level operatore and by reason of educational background are unlikely to develop high level contacts. Kevertbele ss, their contacts in other than top level echelons are believed to be valuable and will probably produce desired information. Principal contributors to coverage of targets will be BSCONSON, and T, ill continue to provide operational backgroundrelating to travel, biographic data, etc. Their contribution to the FTA targets cited inill probably be nominal since they do not have the mobility and required accessibility. Security remains good; no contact or communication problems presently exist.

Estimated cost! VoOO.OO. 2. FT/2

ESCROW'S numberous contacts within Spanish and Ouatenalan groups as well as within diplomatic and consular circlesto afford the reporting station with timely information on personalities and groupa. He is being briefed on the necessity of concentrating his efforts within high level pro-goverraaent political circles although, ae will be noted from his past performance, he ie fairly well entrenched in such groups at present. The security aspect of this FT is believed good but efforts are being nade to provide himore secure place of contact. Communications between the Case Officer and ESCROW are channeled through Arthur VAIVADA and there is no present reason to believe the channel Is not secure.

Estimated costi . FT/3

Except for such prominent organisations as the Communist-line Allansa Femenina Quatemaltogaoverage of women's activities and organizations has not been complete in the past. As instructed, ESOTROPE will concentrate on the development of psych intelligence relating to major women's groupa. At the some time she willtudy of the entire target area to provide basic information essential to evaluating currentand possibly to plan future action. It ia doubtful that ESOTERIC will make an appreciable contribution to the collection of economic intelligence. Since hia withdrawal from the ESCOMSON operation he haa helpfully servedhannel of ccenunlcatlons with ESOTROPE and haa occasionally volunteered information

regarding economic natters. However, he appears to bewith personal business natters and does not appear to be inclined to expend extra effort in the collection of information of interest. Nevertheless, relations between hln and TRANOER are very cordial and an effort will be made to extract pertinent information from him when the opportunity permits; There are no .current operational problems Inwith this task. Contacts and communication arc believed secure

Estimated cost:

h. nfit In Mexico City

5. PTtfS

Since news of the recent plot against the government was made public, both ESODIC and his older brother, ESODIC I, have exhibited an attitude of extreme caution. eriod of approximately two weeks both were of the definite impression they were under surveillance by the local authorities. For that reason,contoct with them was sporadic and carefully managed. AsU both brothers areroject which calls for evaluating an extensive list of Guatemalan Army Officers; It is planned that when they have completed the project, which may be aroundoarch, they will be briefed on the necessity of carefully developing those officers whom they consider beyond any doubt to be anti-Communist; The security of the FT Is only fair at present; however, extreme caution continues to be exercisedystem of danger signals and alternate meeting places is being worked out; At present noIn written form are passed between either brother and Case Officer, No money ia currently involved but the older brother (ESODIC I) has been told that he must feel free to accept reimbursement for any expenses incurred in obtaining information for us. It is planned that he will beersonal operational expense account. If accepted, this willittle more control than exists at present.

Estimated cost: 0 6; FT/6

As yet the opportunity haa not presented itself for an attempt to develop the subject. It is planned that the approach will be made in the near futureeportat that time.

Estimated cost:

Subject is in Mexico,

Provisional operational clearance has been obtained for

tbe utilisation of these individuals and they are now being used to provide travel information, and infornaticn on political trends from their many unwitting contacts.

Estimated cost: 0T/9

A direct approach was made to subject on luat which tine he agreed thaterpossible travel expenses, he would furnish sson the C? as cane to his attention. Heno hesitancy in furnishing reports in his ownhas not hesitated to sign receipts for moneytrue name, and in other ways has given thebe has full confidence in, and is workingHelever Individual whose appear-

anceative intelligence. At present, control over him consists of retention of those handwritten reports and signed receipts and control over the amount of money he receives. Security of the FT is believed good although steps are being taken to improve it. Communications between ESPCUSER and the case officer consists solely of accepting written notea from him. Nothing in writing is ever given him by the Case Officer. His reliability has not as yet been established, but if and when it la. Subject will be briefed and aaked to furniah information on details of the CP paramilitary preparations within labor groups.

Estimated cost: Fj/10

Direct contact between the Case Officer and VAIVADA has been maintainedU. Sinceu VAIVADA has been in direct contact with ESCROW. The initial meeting was carefully arranged and was carried out without incident. Since that time ESCROV and VAIVADAn the average ofeek in order to exploit ESCROW'S potential to the fullest extent. The Case Officer and VAIVADA meet on the average of twice each week, especially on the morning following each meeting between ESCROW and VAIVADA. Thus far the security of the meetings between VAIVADA and tho case officer is believed good. The two meetre-arranged placere-arranged hour. Danger signals betveen the two have been worked out satisfactorily as well as "double talk" telephone conversations. Thus far there is nothat security is in danger. VAIVADA depends on the Case Officer for administrative support andhannel to Headquarters.

Estimated cost: . Based in Salvador:

1. FT/11

. This FT developed =uch faster than LINCOLN had anticipated


therefore, RENNELL has been as'red to go to LINCOLN indiscuss the involved details of this FT.eeting between JUEILIST II and JUBILI3TJUBILIST III undertook to arrange aJUBILIST II and ERRATIC. The conference As ofl C been in contact with ERRATIC through cutoutsJUBILISTull report has been received atreference tossets. Because of theof this task and the complications whichin, LINCOLN advisedcurtail the

frequency of the contact. Uu^dGiutio nas expressed himself very strongly that he does not wish to have any kind of help from, or contact with, ERRATIC. CALLIOERIS believes strongly that any help received from ERRATIC or any contact with him would do more harm than good to the operation at this time. Much more information will be available on this task after the conference with RENNELL.

Estimated costt pending conference with RENNELL) 2. FT/12 ,

The return of JUBILIARIAK to Salvador,

3nossible for JUIMiawivaiacnargeo oy tnefor economy resons and

re-hired by JTOILIARIANunoer guise of the Llga

JUBILIAHiiuV haa askedeeks delay In takingunder the guise of the LAS. Tbe time is--rjitge his affairs after his long absence. JUOATIONIn oontact with the looal Guatemalan Military Attacheattempting to establish good rapport with him. attempting to accomplishy direct approach butreluctant to approach Subject "Lice he is convincedloyalty to the current Guatemalan regime. JUQATICKinstructed byto discuss again Guatemalan

governmental affairs witn tne uuoQect and this time to view them with manifest distaste to see if his first Impression is still confirmed.

Estimated costi O.CO

3. 3

As stated inhis task is still being held in abeyance. C

Jit snuoto

provide information ana enccks on purportedand CALLIGERIS penetrations.

Estimated costi

U. ftM

jurist hasa proposed vacation


trip to PBPRIME on or aboutu. JURIST hasbusiness assistant take over the JUROR net in hisPart II designating ttiis person asasJUROR has been approved by

Headquarters for theecemberan estimated yearly cost

informed byT l that one of the Headquarters Senior Staff, when approving the JUROR project, recommended that the operation be developed slowly with emphasis on the maintenance ofsecurityiew to the project's long range nnssihjlty. This eecomraendation was sent directly to f_

HD with info copy to LIKOLtf. JURIST nas ordered the Ouatenalan polioeman recruited for the LAS and Is awaiting the report ofith PRQ data. JURIST reports the Ouatenalan policemanriend of long-standing ofnd is under obligation to him. He further reportsas talked with him and obtained his agreement to furnishwhich could bs used to combat Communism in Guatemala. The policeman has been transferred from tha border area, so it will be neceesary for JURIST to giveaoation so he may cross into Guatemala and contact the policeman at his new post. It is anticipated using the policeman's wife to act as courier to JUROR-I. as been asked to find out the following: Where the policeman is presently stationed? What are his exact duties? is the title of his position/ What salary does he receive? Who Is his immediate superior? Who ia his ultimate superior? Who is in charge of security? Can he provide information regarding police orders, special orders, and orders asking for checks on special peraons or groups in his area? Actual changes or even rumored changes in police orders and regulations? Information of persons leaving or entering Guatemala? Their names, their destinations, their activities, their contacts and their reason for the trip? JUROR has instructed JURORo arrange for the policeman's services at apprcjdmateTlyolones per month* The wife will be paidrio baa is. The policeman will be designated JUROR-IIT. RQ will beand submitted whan facts are aacertained. JURIST has been providing information on possible fincaa that nay be used by PBSUCCESS. as been located as solittins the border in th* mineralatF

TThese belong respectively tond JURORketch was"prepared by JURIST to show precise location and iH taction for approach. This waa furnished to LINCOLN under 7) . JURIST has undertaken to sound out the entity at Santa Ana who hasut warns that this individual's general reputation is one of liking to display his importance and JURIST has pualms regarding his secure handlingituation. It Is his idea to locate the proper finca, assure himself of the general position of the owner and then recommend the finca be occupied without prior notice with tha assurance the owner will go along and perhaps keep his mouth shut for the United period the finca is needed. The border fincaa are intate wherein we can arrange access to the owners for PIVALL and ha nay approach then with assurances of security.

Estimated Cost: ^CO.CO*

t. yuOutii-uO



Because of developments JUBATE was transferred froc.o JUBATE has procured information on location ofa and the none of the owners reported byto LINCOLN. He is handling JUBILIST who is unwitting end who owns air-strip No, 2. JUBATE will undertake, throughutouts, the stocking of fuel at said air-strip should the requirement be laid on. JUBATE has also taken overotential agent, also an employee of JUBILIST; they will henceforth be known asnd JUBATE-II. Both aro attempting the penetration of the local connunist party; they will be carriedew nonths and then dropped from the payroll unless they have achieved their goal; In this manner it is hoped to spur them to greater activity and at the same timeosition wherein they become asareer potential penetration agent.

Estimated cost:

close relationshlD with the family of President

ARBENZ hasof Subject as an un-

acceptable security rTsk at theime. It is planned to keep the task and Subject available for posaible political action with access to President ARBENZ if the situation ever wxrranta it.

Sstlmated coat:

A 7

RENNELLetterii) fromho stated that he and his family will ahortly depart by air for Spain, Italy, France and England for approximatelyks and return via New York City ^one week) to Caracas- by sea.

Estimated cost: No additional funds required.

. Baaed

1. FT/18

Both CALLIOERIS and SECX'IH report that weekly contact has been established with tha intelligence structure inand that all of it is presently operating. This is also confirmed by the reports of several of the trainees pressntly beina sent from Guatemala for training in Nicaragua.!"

he head of all CALLIOERIS' organisationsince SEOJJIN left theunder

him the SHINGLE net which includes SLEEKER, the CPthe military nets; and hists coveringfield. DireotlyESSENCE and his

group. In order toettor line ofresponsibility, direction, control and ccepartawnta >ion, it waa fully agreed with CALLIGERIS that ESSENCE and all the propaganda aspects



not know his wherabouts. He does presently have apicked, who can be briefed fully if somethinghim. The replacementfull biographic

data on this man should be available soon since one of

J contacts in Guatemala isusinessSalvador, possibly the week of lh. contact hir. in Salvador and it is planned thatalso be present for the contact. The Question ofalso discussed by OtmtlCH viith CALLIGERIS andwith SEQUIN. Both CALLIGERIS and SECUIN thinkof SECANT and believe strongly he can stay inorganize and run his nets from within the countryv out the dangers involved and also the possibilitybeing under control or at least the watchful eyeCommunists. CALLIGERIS pointedout that he was inwith SECANT and was positive the man was allOWTHOH's return to LINCOLN the Chief of Projectthat SECANT must bo brought out of Guatemala,and LC FLUTTERedL when itthat the first shipment of arms will startessage was sent to CALLIGERIS requestinginstruct SECANT to brief the roplacemtn, finishwith his people and set up his nets, be preparedhis nets outside Guatemala, bring out alland be in Tegucigalpa onu. planning to be in Tegucigalpa onerch to debriefare being made for an LC FLUTTER team toat the same time, SLEEKER has produced lettersCommunist agents in Honduras and El Salvador to CPin Guatemala City; these letters were copiedHeadquarters files. eport of an agent who wasand deported from Honduras on trumped-upaccording to arrangements made

is being prepared by LUGTGN. This agent ia presently in Guatemala and is starting to produce acne fair information. The raw reports were being processed in Tegucigalpa when ONTRICH departed.

Estimated cost: 0 Guatemala


2. FT/19

All of CALLIGERIS1 sensitive diplomatic sources are being handled under this task. list of these sources have boon furnished to Washington by OWTRICH had an opportunity to chajk onecse sources during his recent trip to Salvador;f

ine agents

wB islose rnenajuj^utiui, working in Tegucigalpa, San Pedro Sula, and along

tha Honduran-Ouatenalan border arc all under this task. Estimated coat: . Eased in Nicaragua 1. FT/20

According, C, VH has recommendedSRQATSS be terminated at the time ofk. Although LINCOLN was not consulted onLINC will agree with whatever decision is madeand H9 as to renewal of the project,

continue to carry ERGATES under Ft/20

until the conclusion of PBSUCCESS. TSRIGNember of the party and although not andocs have contactparty officialdom.

Estimated cost: .iCO.OO ?. FT/21

No change.

Estimated cost: No additional funds required. 3. FT/22

No change.

Estimated cost: No additional funds required. . Based in Honduras 1. FT/23

This task has been established Ln support ofLUOTON's coverin Tegucigalpa.


Estimated costt 0 Based in Guatemala 1. FT/2L

ESPERANCS Project, Guatemala Station. Requestapproval for this new task vhich will have as its mission the penetration of the PGT bynd will also attempt independent Milter* penetrations. (Reference:

Estimated cost:


U Specific KUoa:?l.. Based In Guatemala

ii ptA

Eicontinues to ba published weekly, with0 # There are two fifteen-minute radio programs dally over Radio Lntornacional. EUA pamphlet left the printers and was ready 'for distribution or.erch.amphlet was created and Is now in production, the title of which la Corsnunismi Enemy of Religion,, The Eecuintla affiliate of CEUA published alnanifesto entitled Manifesto al Pueblo, CEUA hasoem entitled la Frofecln; EaraO is now eeicg writtenecoring will be nade for distribution in Guatemala, Each .jesek-during thle period llason teams from the ESSENCE group visited various cities in the provinces;-these liaison teams are comprised of persons from the CPA, the AJA, and the CEUA. In the forthcoming period these activities will be liberally expanded to take advantage of all possible oppcetunities. In order toifferent type of KUGGWN activity, ESSENCE has been instructed torovocation telephone team which will be used to make black telephone calls. Another new effort will be to offer aidestitute persons living in the Escuintla Cemetaryuatemalan agricultural group. This gesture will be followed by CEUA propaganda which will point out that there are destitute persons in Escuintla, the hotbed of Ouatenalan communism. Other actions in the propaganda and political action fields will be taken as opportunities arise.

Estimated costt

2* PT/2

to remain cooperative.

Estimated costt No expenditure Based

1. PT/3

The weekly newspaper El Combate continues to bea circulationf0 copies go into This is the beat of the controlled news organs. Aminute daily program of^he PAGE continues to beRadio Crista!has one-way

nail communications only with FAOE. tep has "Been takon whereby PAGE will be put into direct contact with HEQARTT. In theperiod guidance and support to FAOS will be intensified.

Estimated cost: 2- PTA

to have access to the daily paper,

ueva, whichirculation.

Estiiated cost: 0


3. PTA A

This task Is not yet inmaking

The scripts

will To preparaa oy juvSNILE; the cutout between Tun andbe

Eatimatod costi

lu PTA

^Cfficer continues to cooperate

and is able to plant white materials supplied byJUVENILE, who is doing radfo scripts for PTA A, will appear toQ ^Cor guidance.

Estimated cost! /SOO.OO

C. Based

1. PT/6

HEQARTY, 'the cutout to CALLIOERIS and CEUAOE, has arrived in Tegucigalpa but his cover job Is taking more of his time than was anticipated; he is In direct contact, however, with an officer of the CEUAOE. The weokly bulletin of CEUAOE continues to be publishedirculationf whichs said to go into Guatemala; editorials submitted by LINCOLN are being used. An affllitated group, the CAGE, has been established In San Pedro Sula. The outstanding job of CEUAOE during this periodamphlet directed to the delegates of the Caracas Conference; this pamphlet is being carried to Caracas by three lawyers who represent CSUAGE and its affiliated groups! HEOARTY will endeavor to convert the CEUAOE bulletinaper which >rlll appeal to military men within the target country. KEGARTY will place as much emphasis as possible on achieving distribution of the CSUAGE product within the target country. BEGARTY will also make contact with PAGE,

Estimated cost: Based J

1. PT/7

The LIONIZER group is not liked byC. Jandcall the group "reactionary". It is LlftGJLN's opinionhave little to do uith the disagreement betweenfactions. The difficulty is morelikplv one ofhas been producinc well

<nryilGERIS, without coordinating ent


jto Mexico City with the idea ofgroup. Althoughnpt exist as yet, it

carries the nam^ "rtold not to

cooperate . ^following ffie inatructionw.o CAIXIGBkLS politely reprimanding him forin the SUGOVNis nowenter Mexico in order to attempt tCTron out these

and Guatemalan groupa.

ine LiOHIiOt group continues to publish twice monthly lt3 bulletin which is high-quality work. as repeatedly boen able to plant naterial through the press and has engaged

*or LINCOLN; at LlaCOLh tho cartoons will be reproducedto several other countries. as alsocountry refugees seeking haven in Kexico. art in the Hemisphere Congress scheduledCityayl8oceeding t0

-exico in an effort to bring unity to the severalthere in order that thia unified front mayHIELD in staging this

Estimated Cost: 0

SSXERAlDITE is in contact with the GRIT. Thus far this conUct has produced information on the Guatemalan laborn effort will be made to distribute labor propaganda within Guatemala through the ORIT mechanism.

Estimated Cost:

in Mexico coonarates fully witr Cm

J in addition to this,has three press

outlets, namely through UB3THENZTL-U, through RNLABILE,RIB HI ELD.has been verTauccessful in

planting materialsTh the hexico Press.

Estimated Cost:

E. Eased in Nicaragua

has been successful in planting

materials in two papersotal circulation

Estimated Cost: jiiOO.00


A new refugee group has been established in Nicaragua: the name of the group is Guatemala Libre.

Jis in charge of the group andTls cutout iaThe group is not yet in operation.

Estimated Cooti 0

P. Based in^ J

1. PT/11

SAFEeplaces both 5AFEnd SAFE HOUSE B. rour Americans arc new residing in the house: the housekeeper.

the productionagent, and a

radio map. lhere^illne agent residing in the

a security point of view, this

SAPS HOUSE is coach better than either of the old ones because it is situatedemote area and is surrounded by four acres of ground. There is ample room to house several more Guatemalan citizens. Eight such persons, with press and radio experience, are currently being considered and are possibly available for the job. Various degrees of action havs been taken to recruit all of them: one of theae persons is now in tho United States and should be at LINCOLNew days,

Eatimatod Cost:

HEDI0ER is now the only person in this bouse. The site will be given up in favor of SiteA request has been made that HEDIGSR be returned to Washingtonewchief has been spotted and requested. This new man is currently in Washington andtaff officer. Writers are being recruited.

Estimated Cost;

This task will be performed at Site D. Writers are being recruited.

Estimated Cost: CO

U* PT/1U

Raymond J. KTBZR will negotiate for installation of the clandestine radio in Nicaragua. The equipment is in readiness.

Estimated Cost: To be provided by KUCLUB.

This task is in process of development by Headquarters. Estimated Cost: To be provided by KUCLUB.

This task is being conducted by Headquarters personnel. Estimated Cost: To be provided by KUCLUB.

Liberation currency: Headquarters has expressed an interest in this idea and has requested thalf" ^produce

tho verbiage and suggested design for the currency. This will be produced by pon his return fror. Mexico. The black coffeet: Headquarters is considering thisa'trlca'.edl Cables: To date it has been learned that such cables can be" sent

i offoft *iii iff owriJu aluruigoming period to utilise These resources in sending fabricated messages. During the presentumber of messages were sent from foreign Fronts to delegates at the Caracas Conference. Tha rumor campaign! r"

*^JhaTo been requestec, to look for radio hams who may oe able to serve this purpose on an unwitting basis. These activities will be pursued during the forthcoming period.

Estimated costi


1. PT/18

The plans for thlB Congress are fully set forth The first major step was to

Mexico where he would try to achieve unity amongand then proceed to offer cooperation andto RJSblELD who Is managing the

is now in El Paso, Texas, endeavoring to obtain avisa. If he ia unsuccessful, plans will have to bo changed.

1 personal guidance would be highly beneficial to -rcongress but not an absolute necessity.

Estimated costi 0

top sccr:;r

SpeoUlc^KUHOOK Eased


Assessment is continuingroductive basis. CALLIOERIS has produced identities of civilian and military personnel in all target areaaj plus identifying certain safe house facilities with connected personnel. Names and available data have been submitted to Headquarters for orovislonal operational clearance* fj

3 on

the thirty-seven men in classsabotage) has been.Initial study Indicates the personnel to be medium level and properly assigned* Instructor's evaluation Indicates high morale and mental readiness for task. Thirty leaders selected, and now in training are being cleared. Initial evaluation by CALLIOERIS is high. The CALLIGERIS staff isoster of all personnel scheduled forpril. The status of CALLIOERIS personnel Inside the target area-ie being elicited from couriers and incidental travelers Of CALLIGERIS1 organiaatlon. Suitable sites for staging have been selected and occupancy authorized pending receipt of official or unofficial Honduras support. Strips and acconpanying facilities have been locatedj theirdepends on receipt of Honduras support. Such support has been indicated but its firming-up is being withheld pending an approach to Honduran authorities. During the porlod5 April, it la planned to complete the initial assessment, continue reassessment, and to make physical preparation for staging operations including occupancy of sites by cleared personnel and movement ofquipment to the sites.

Estimated cootl

BY Baaed

U NT/2

CALLIOERIS Indicatedof

"spiritual support" and assurance ERRATIC would befrom Salvador If CALLIOERIS'

high level contact '

CALLIOERIS6 Karoh and SKIMMER repre-

sentatives in Salvador at the tine were notified by Q

J that OSQRIO sent his "blessinga" and was assigning JURANT to lialeon with sy^CARP. OS0RI0 indicated that support beyond "spiritual" would be based on proof that this mbvementeal effort and not merely another flurry of Ineffectual actions, JURANT requested and received an audience with 3KHMER representatives who gave assurancea necessary within security levels. JURANT Indicated moral support andeport to CALLIGERIS byarch aa to the degree of support forthcoming from Salvador. Air strips and accompanying facilities for staging flights along with staging sites Vera selected in addition to those indicated last interim report. On reeeipt of notification


'Of tho scope of export, the stripe and accompanying facilities to be used will bo acquired. Staging sites will be occupied and preparations for staging completed within this period including occupancy of sites by cleared personnel and covenant ofateriel to the sites.



KUHCOZsabotage) training is underway with thirty-seven trainees. Graduation date isarch. KUHOOK Class XI (leaders) training is underway with thirty trainoos. Graduation date lepril. Ten additional sab trainees have arrived for the purpose of bringing sab teen leaders to ninlnua of thirty after culls have been removed. date Isarch, Commo training is underway. Oraduatlon date has been tentatively set for lit Hay. Tho commo training program has been reviaed due to program delays and moved-up deadlines. Tha original concept of radio operators qualified in agent radio/crypto procedures has been modifiedwo-man team concept wherein one manadio operator qualified in agent/operator procedures and the second In agent/crypto procedures. At the sans time, product reouireraente have been changed from twenty radio/crypto operators to thirteen radio operators and ton crypto nan, while recruiting of experienced radio operators has been intensified. Advantages thus gained include: (a) an extension of tine available for recruiting since each man is trained only in his specialty; (b) better produot since each traineeon his specialty; and (c) further compartmentation of tbe radio operator from the net since ho le not witting of the content of the massages be handles. Disadvantages include the logistioal and aeourity problems posed by using two men in place of one. Due to the scope of training problems, PTVALL has been directed to concentrate his entire effort on training| while his duties in Salvador and Honduras are to bo handled through other hows no weakening of moral and physical support ofUCCESS operations in

moved to the sane site as KUHODK training. Fromarch topril lt is planned to complete Class I, commence cargo kioker training of six CALLIOERIS personnel, continue Class II, and continue corao training.

Estimated cost: .

report received.

report received.





F. Baaed in J

Equipment and supplies have been assembled at FJHOPEFUL, All packaging and bundling, inspection, and preparation ere und arvay, equest' to neintain the FJHOPEFUL personnel and facilities statue quo through the PBSUCCESS operational period has boon eubaitted to Headquarters. Betweenarch andpril lt is planned to complete packaging and bundling, novo all ofateriel to the staging sites, and to nova forty per cent ofateriel to the staging sites.

Estimated cost: Staging area; Air and FJHOPEFUL operations to be accounted fordmin WHO*


Identityi PBSUCCESS Air Support; ResponsibleSupport Officer, LINCOLN. To prepare and implementplan with AMD Headquarters. Support requestscoordinatedChief,

FJHOPEFUL regarding assistance requires; ior "PBSUCCESS Air Phase One of air support olan (air deliverycargo from Washington toli

wall underway and will be completed in accordance with tha time table. Tha PBSUCCESS air support plan was completedhis plan waa coordinated with AMD representatives and aubmltted to Chief WHO for Eeadouartare coordination and approval. The five air crew members recruited from CAT by AMD arrived inarch. The air crews were briefednd directed to proceed to accordance with the air support plan and "their 'cover story. Airports in Salvador and Honduras were inspectedINCOLN representative. Request for the use Of* those 'airports are being submitted to tha respectiveuthority to use these airports will also insure availability-of aviation gasoline. The racruitnant of FJhTJPEFUL guards to be used as para dispatchers was Presently it is being attempted to recruit four CALLIQERIS men for this Job. Tho responsibility for providing para dispatchers still Vests with Chief, AMD. However, LINCOLN le doing everything possible to provide these men. LINCOLN le also Investigating the feasibility oficaraguan air strip for training para dispatchers andhase Four staging base. Duringpril, it is planned to establish, air operations at FJHOPEFUL, start actual air lift of cargopril, complete forty per cent of Phase Two and Three, recruit four para dispatchers, and obtain authority to use Mcaraguan, Salvadoran, and Honduran air strips.

Estimated costi(advanced by LIHCOLN to AMD airverall cost estimate ofo be furnisheddm, WHD.

REFEREICE' Report onvo' rasycCESV' datod

1 report cn Stan Two covering theU toa. Contrary to the practicethis report ie confined to the assessment and analysis only of the situation during the reporting period.

This period^proved toery unfortunate sequence of highwhich, at any time, could have terminated the Project oraltered it that the effect would be the sane. despite tho long delays encountered through each review concept of PBSUCCESS emerged as the approved method ofobjectives of the undertaking. In the light of this experience,believed that the following recommendations must be adhered to forof the program)

Urgencyr Time iaital factor to ultimate success.

Efforti The enesy is formidable. Therefore, no effort must be spared to offsst his advantagea by appropriate and thorough application of CIA's superior technical capabilitie

Thoroughness: Only by coaplete routing of the enomy will it be possible to attain the full objectives of PBSUCCESS.

the objectives of Stage Two have not been attained insatisfactory manner, it is believed within theof LINCOLN to proceed to Stage Three operations.





I. Generali

The objectives of Stage Two, being unfulfilled bya, were recoj^nded for continuation throughpril In the aasess^nt J? beUe7ed aufflcient progress had been achieved

pril and proceeding

as indicated herein, n. Enemy Situation: 5) A. Assessment . Political i

to Stage Three. Although not specifically stated In terns of stages, authority had beer, granted by Headquarters to proceed with the operation

The enemy's defeat at Caracas was followed by numerous signs of internal apprehensions and tensions during this period. The repression campaign reported under way in tbe early part of March continued unabated throughu*

Throughout the OAS Conference the enemy maintained an intense propaganda campaign on his domestic front and on the external front the enemy waa greatly aided by Communist Party affiliates throughout Latin America aa well as Europe and the Kremlin. Despite overwhelming acceptance of the anti-Communist resolution and the enemy's conspicuous position by voting against lt,-within Ouatemala Presidentoral victory at Caracas.

The most noteworthy conduct of the enemy was hie restraint from releasing an attack on tha U, S. Oovernment for being involved in supporting tha intervention of Guatemala by the exile forces. It waa known that the enemy possessed many facta re PBSUCCESS operations, as evidenced by his publication of the "IMte Paper" inu. Had the Ouatenalan delegateserious attack on the United States, the latter was prepared to expose specifically the true extant of Communist penetration and control of Ouatemala. It is believed that the failure of the Guatemalan delegation to attack the United States may be attributed solely to the wisdom and restraint evidenced by Secretary of State, Hr. John Poster DULLES, who refrained during the entire conference from levelling serious charges against Ouatemala specifically and confined his position to attacking Communism In general. oaaible corollary reason for the enemy's restraint may have bean his lack of confluence in the validity of his information ae subsequent friendly propaganda on thePaper" discredited so many alleged facte.

The moral victory theme was carried to extremes by AR83NZ and TORIELIO after tha Caracas Conference. uge, Communist-inspired reception waa staged at the airport upon TO.ITSXO'a return. His lengthy oration then extolled Guatemala's defense of democracy and tha principle of non-intervention. Shortly thereafter an exhibit stand was erected near the National Palace to depict TORIELLO'e brilliant stand at Caracas and the alleged sunaoct qf other nations for

i mi


ictory over "imperialists and interventionists." This characteristic over-doingalse propaganda line may have impressedCommuniet foUowers but the thinking, poll tic ally-cons clous people only recognised it for what it reallyover-up for having been publiclyoammist government. The true attitude of the government was revealed during this period by their arrest of Oscar CONDE upon his return from Caracas. nown anti-Communist radio commentator, was falsely accused of embezzling funds for his trip to Caracas. However, the Communists wereoareful to avoidolitical Issue of CONDE's arrest. Although unable to publicize their position against the ARBENZ government, the JUNTA'S delegation at Caracas, representing CASTILLO Armas,atter of open concern to the Guatemalan Delegation.

The constant haranguing overnon-intervention" at Caracas and at home had no sooner reached its peak of repetition than the Communists started to speak of "Invasion." In thearch several sources reported that the enemy was planning toiscoveryew international plot aboutU, arresting all opposition leaders at this time. The following week reports were received that tho enemy had alerted the Guardia Civil and the Army toossible invasion aboutprilonsequent general tightening of security. Border guards were reinforced and armed civilians were allegedly being brought into Guatemala City. During this periodarsons were arrested; some were anti-Communists, others only relations of antl-CoRmunists in exile. Some of these persons were heldew days for interrogation and then released. Tbe Government's actions wereollow-up of the non-intervention theme by charging that its enemies were planning to invade its soil, thusoral justification for increase of internal repression.

, ion scare" campaign in Guatemala, on

3ixed group of assassins entered Nicaragua clandestinely

anderious attsapt on the life of President SOMOZA. The

ensuing action resulted in the deathumber of the attackers

and ths seizure of nineteen others. Available information conclusively

indicated the complicity of official persons in both Costa Rica and

G^temala. The leaders of the attack were former Caribbean Legionnaires

who had allegedly planned the operation in Guatemala and, using Mexican

eras, made their penetration through Costa Rica where they joined with

certain anti-SOMDZA elements to make the

Motion between Major Alfonso MARTINEZ, Director ofNumber Two Coanunlet Carlos manual PELLECER, was believed toresolved due to reports to the effect that PELLECER hadabroad, possibly to Ogechoslovakia. Inveatigation ofdid confirm that PELLECER had been removed fromand that he might be abroad although uncertaintywhether he had fallen out of favor with ARBENZ. Atia believed to be in the Quezaltenango area, engagedParty organisational

The invasion propaganda andsre repressive measures evidently had their effect on the political parties supporting the Oovernment as the PAR had split and ARBENZ found it difficulty obtain support for certain appointments and political rivalries


became more apparent than heretofore. The Minister of Finance expressed littla confidence in the economic future of the government and the latter became embroiled over the agrarian prosramesult of Conmanist inspired so'lsure of land.

The enemy'e efforts to penetrate friendly forces apparently continued steadily during this period. Reports vers received to the effect that Communist agents were being sent to San Salvador and from there to Honduras with instructions to Join CASTILLO Armasgroup. In early April reliable information was received that three Government agents had been sent from Guatemala City to offer their services to CASTILLO Annas as anti-Communists.

The propaganda themes mentioned above! moral victory at Caracas, non-intervention and invasion scare, ware all highly propagated by Communist media^during the period. The independent press remained relatively unmolested during this time, possibly doe to Its cautious policy In attacking the Government and avoiding the subject of Communism,

U. Military and Para-MUltam

Reports of arms purchasas abroad continued to be received. Tho Chief, Armed Forces, Colonel Carlos Enrique DIAZ, departed from GuatemalaU, reportedly to arrange arms negotiations in South America, particularly in Argentina,

During the invasion alert mentioned above, it became apparent that the Army was planning and practicing for anti-riot duty and street fighting as such maneuvers were in evidence.

In the para-military field no further indications were received of the Government's intention to train civilians as previously reported. Information received continued to indicate, however, that the Communists had extensive small arras caches throughout the country. That civilians, reported above as having been brought into the City to increase its defenses, wore presentact not confirmed although their presence was consideredossibility in the role of militia or territorials, quasi-military organisations.

No information had been received during this period to alter the previously estimated military situation although reports persisted to the effect that dissatisfaction existed among the officer corps and many officers were openly anti-Communist.

B. Analysis

The enemy's hollow exhortationsoral victory at Caracas and beating of the"non-interventionn theme was soon discarded or rather converted to "invasion scare" talk in order to provide the rationale for his more aggressive and less morally correct repressive measures which undoubtedly appeared to be necessary to arrest the mounting opposition to Communism. The studious avoidance of attacking the Dnitedt States for

Intervening In Ouatemala now appears to novo bean out of necessity to keep up the' facade ofon-Cosmunist controlled government. The spectable of CoBRunlflta professing not be Coaninlsts while belaboring all tbe cliques of democracy is not new but is certainly one not to be forgotten.

tothat the Government actually expected

an irrrasion or an uprising in early April. However, it is very reasonable to believe that ARBENZ and the'Comuniate were fully aware of theof the anti-Communist movement and that CASTILLO Anas was continuing his preparations for an armed rebellion. Thus, the only defense for an unpopular political ideology such as CommmLsav was to auppreea all, possibility of organisation and aradng while increasing propaganda efforts to convince the populace lt waa all done in the nana of patriotism,

III. friendly Situation! A. Assessment 0, Poller

During the OAS Conference at Caracas the Secretary of State wes briefed for the first tins on the details of PBSUCCESS. Owing undoubtedly' to tbe position assumed by the United States and the developments at the Conference, Secretary DULLES sent wrd that he would prefer that CIA not proceed with PBSUCCESSoint where Its course of action would be irrevocably committed until be had returned and had had the opportunity of reviewing the operation.

In tha Second Interim Report on Stage Two, LINCOLN had analysed all relevant factors concerned and concluded that the moat propltioua time for tbe attack phase (Stage Five) would ba the first tan days in* and that the project would be operationally ready by that time. Furthermore, whereas the Project had been flexible up to this time and no attempt had been made to set preoiae schedules, the movement of arms Into forward areaa, thence into hoatile territory, would present an entirely different situation wherein tight scheduling of all operations had to commence if they were all to arrive by tha eama data of readiness.

The above situation had been presented to Headquarters by LINCOLN for concurrence which, in effect, constituted settingate atays in advance. At tha Coordination Meeting at Headquarters onu, the Sscond Interim Report on Stage Two was reviewed. Although lt was recognised that the final decision had to be approved by DCI, tha discussion which followed revealed only one dissenter, tha CHfl, Colonel J. C. KIM}. Ba did not accept the conclusions of LINCOLN and advanced hie objections to the KUHOOK aspecte of PBSUCCESS, stating that the project should be conducted primarilyefection of tha Army operation however long that might require as only in this Banner could ultimata success be assured. After prolonged review of both LINCOWs plan of operation and Colonel KINO'a proposal, theetermined that both views should be presented to the DCI for deolslon.

In the meanwhile, the Secretary of State had returned to Washington and the matter of reviewing PBSUCCESS with him became a


requisite, particularly aa the approval of theN proposal would constitute advancing beyond tha point of irrevocable corandtraont. The two proposals above wore reviewed with the DCI who decided that he would present the two altematea to the Secretary of State for his conaiderations one, the LINCOLN Plan,ontinuation of current operational plans to create tha maximum pressures on tha ARBENZ Oovernment within tha following) days and, if necessary, terminate in aggressive, combined assault, utilising all jobchanlsms prepared for this purpose; the secondColV KINO'a proposal, to abandon present plans and concentrateefection of the Army program over whatever period of time required to achieve the overthrow of ARBENZ,


A high level review of PBSUCCESS was conducted between the Department of State and CIA on the above prenlsea and onU LINCOLN was informed that lt had the "green light" on the proposal advanced In the Second Interim Report on Stage TwoCSoo pageubjeot to periodic review by stages. It will be noted, however, that operationally thisomewhat critical period and, unless and until the foregoing decision had been made, the Project was virtuallytandstill for about two weeks. Upon receipt of this approval to proceed to sohedule all operationsimetable was prepared, predicated upon the assumption that no unforeseenwould arise during thisay period. (See chart on next page.)

International Negotiations

During early March, Pre aidant SOMOZA of Nicaragua revoked all tourist cards for American cttleens and required all persona entering the country to have properly visaed passports. This aotlon was undoubtedly in tha interest of eecurlty and not directed ati, nevertheleea, it effectively blocked all LINCOLN plans for placing American personnel at SHERWOOD, SOMERSET and SAHARA. In addition to this,obstacle to progress, SOMOZA had refused to allow CASTILLO Armas the the GROUP to piece the clandestine radio(SHERWOOD) station on Nlcaraguan soil. SANTA FE had been ruled out in the mean-tire aa tooecurity risk end LINCOLN had no directwith either Honduras or El Salvador to enable lt to arranw* ftm this site in one of these countries. L








Partisan Forces

Training lanning and Preparations


I Specific riofl;g


nixing and

Organs f" Internal Organs i


;Clandea one Organs



Sub Plot

rTatfonn ^Oxu'crencti


i Air GlnRdck eaflets











Black flights tq Honduras/Salvador




Although LINCOLN hid recorawndrd, e>hat further .held in abeyance pending the return oif Tto LINCOLN.


that he had exceeded the bounde of plauaiblo denial and that the entire natter waa to be reviewedigh level meeting withtnent of State onpril. In another message fron Headquarters, WTLIAnERdirected by Oeneral SMITH to discontinue all furtherwith local authorities with regard to PBSUCCESS and that serious question had been raised over the desirability of continuing the operation as previously planned.

prU uwa3LNessage fromwhlohhat the high level meeting atssistant Sacretary of State, Mr.he general concept of

PBSUCCESS and, specifically, to take the following position:

4) Reason for the Project wae to accomplish planned result aa directed by top level.

b> State still primarily in^charge of basic policy decision and,

having approved ourighest level, we propose to proceed aa scheduled unless directed otherwise by State or unless operational considerations dictate modification of plan and timing.

o) Regarding situation In Honduras, we believe no decision should be made before we obtain full knowledge of all facts which LINCOLN was obtaining fromf" Jtoday.

Believe that deaplte WTLIAUER'a exceeding authority, the situation may not prove irreparable operationally.

Any aubstantial delay present plan by State would be serious and might mean any new effort thereafter would require startIns from scratch or worse.

Will advise soonest the outcoraneeting which we feel certain will not produce any final decisions.

night ofprllf Tu-rived at LINCOLN anddebrlafod' living specific attention to whether orhad exceeded his authority and thereby compromiseda result of this debriefing LINCOLN recognised that manyof the field's messages and that

WIL-ADSR had, in fact, maintained excellent security and that plausible denial remained intact. Inasmuch as the field had fully arranged for the first black flight to start onpril and that considerable importance had beon attached to the successful compliance with this

j?SPffwtake place per authority

in DIP^ou2. ull and ddtailed explanation of LINCOLN'a analysis of the situation was sent touring the early morning hours ofpril which also notified Headquarters of the trial black flight authorisation.


In LINCOLN'S opinion, all objestlo-vr held heretofore to the aek flight were dispelled by the facts which were presented by

"pfacts which were later confirmed by WILLAU2R. ho Headquarters message oitcdtbe completely in keeping with the urgency of the situationto support the arrangements made in the field by sendingfirst aircraft as requested. However, early In theessago was received from Headquarters(INFOt) stating "DO NOT UNDERTAKE MISSION DESCRIBED REFAPPROVAL DIR/HQS." The cable referenced was LIKCOLH's-FJHOPEFUL to proceed with the initial black flight


In view of LINCOLN'S cableaving the fallacy of the original objections tolack flight into Honduras, it was very difficult to understand whywould object to the trial run of this one aircraft.telephone call was made to ColonelINC, CWH, by

J asking whether or not thead receivedfwhat was the objection to the proposed flight? ed not seenut that, nevertheless, thecancelledesult of the high level meetingf Col. KINOeparate message to FJHOPEFUL

was necessary to cancel the flight or whether the INFO copy would be sufficient. The answer was that the Headquarters message was adequate, r Ithen requested his Deputy to attempt to telephone one of the Case Officers in Tegucigalpa to tell him that the flight had been cancelled. This telephone call was not completed since the circuits are closed for certain hours on Sundays. ater phone call from Headquarters, about two hours prior to take-off time for the first black flight, the explanation was given that certain commitments had been made to HOLLAND so that the flight would have to await his approval. Headquarters was requested to send an Operational Immediate cable to FJHOPEFUL or to phone there to make certain that the flight did not depart. INCOLN staff officer had telephoned FJHOPEFUL, calling attention to the fact that they had received only an INFO copy of the. Headqutrtaro had tried sinoe UOO hrs, that day to telephone FJHOPEFUL to make certain the flight did not take off but the call was not ccmploted until after the aircraft was airborne and beyond radio range. *

p. -. The initial black flight proved successful and committed L JIrrevocably to the operation thereafter. However,trong recommendation by KINO, CW, to the jwas removed from the position of Chief of Project end Mr. C, jy BARNES was appointed to this position. Due to the extenuating circumstances involved in the foregoing countermandingeadquarters directive and at the request of the Jfema^ned' as Deputy and Chief of Operations, PBSUCCESS. urther change was made in the chain of command wherein the Chief of Project thereafter vrould be responsible directly to the DD/P.

ii. mPolicy Roview

Subsequent to the above difficulties in establishing black flight privileges in Honduras, the newly appointed Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. HOLLAND, had certain firm reservations on PBSUCCESS. He had obtained the approval of Secretary DULLES to review the operation



thoroughly before expressing his views ss to whether or not it should .be permitted to continue. Consequently,eek was spent, prior topril, by'LINCOLN's senior staff working with Headquarters personnelosition paper for review by HOLLAND. The actualowever, was conducted by Assistant Secretary of State, Oeneral SHTTH with participation by senior State officials concerned, including Ambassadors PEURIFOTLAUSR and by CIA, The center of HOLLAND'S attention was on the


Tincident described above. This impasse was finallyH who later announced ooncurrance with CIA's position paper and proposed operations.

5. Intelligence

Being aware of the enemy's intensive efforts tofield operations, LINCOLN requested thatolygraph team be assigned to conductof all key Indigenous personnel. Onerch a'held at LINCOLN with Headquarters Security Officers and aaction was established for team to proceed to the fieldn examinatior. of CASTILLO Armas and all his toy personnel. trip was plannedpril for examination of alloperators at SCRAMTON, The two trips were made withoutand overersonnel were examined, including Only two serious case*uncovered andof the serious

subsequently isolated from the project and securely disposed/for the duration of the operation. Insofar as the polygraph may beeliable means of determining loyalty, it is believed that this exercise was very valuable and served to bolster confidence in the calibre of the personnel in key positions.

production from Guatemala Station had remained

so low during the entire period of PBSUCCESS that LINCOLNrelease of the Chief of Station and the appointment ofChief of Station. LINCOLN also recommendedcalled to LINCOLN for briefing. During the period

To Hewing compliance with these requests, Guatemala Station shoved an almost immediate increase in Intelligence production andresponse to all EEI's requested by LIfEOLN.

Considerable progress was made during this period in obtaining source identification and operational procedures employed heretofore by CASTILLO Armas and his followers. This information is In the process of being organised into more formal intelligence nets and the production of evaluated Information appears to be immediately forthcoming. Generally, the aource level le too low for anything except tactical intelligence which at this stage of developments assumes an important role. High level penetrations of the Conminlet .Party are considered beyond the capabilities of Hi SUCCESS at this time. However, high level penetration of government circles ia within the expectation ofrogramy-product of defection.

and SEMANTIC, keys within Guate-

mala, were both exfiltrated black into Honduraa at LINCOLN'S request and were among those successfully examined by polygraph teams in the field. Deerlefing of SECANT proved very valuable as numerous military personnel were identified by name and activity as covertly

supporting the movement of CASTILLO Armas. SEMANTICumerous new aourcea and factual data on Ma operations which will be worked over in the next few weeks in order toeliable civilian intelligence system to support contemplated operatlona.

A review of the alleged operatlona of ERRATIC fed to theconclusion that he was either being used by the Cmmunists wittingly or unfittingly and/or ha waslind egotist that he imagined


r and suooort far bevond the facts. LINCOLN'S experience withwaa completely unsatisfactory asvery evident that he failed to remain objective andto be influenced by ERRATIC and his American cut-outs toof being directly opposed to tho operational plans of-MMnano longeredium of commandordered to LINCOLN for personal direct

orientation. He waa firmly rebuked for his failure to followseverely cautioned over the danger of attetnotirw tnunrealistic or unwarranted

vided the benefite of LINCOLN'S analysis of ERRATIC and orientedoperational plans for the balance of PBSUCCESS which werecentered aroundmr*for

was our candidate. Although

appeared to understand and to be In full agreement with LTNCOliT shortly after his departure for San Salvador he resumed the same subjective approach. LINCOLN then requested hia recall from PBSUCCESS for the duration of the project and this waa aubsequently accomplished.

6. Propaganda

Tha Case Officer for the clandestine radio program, Mr. ,David A. PHILLIPS, arrived at LIICOLN and, after being fully briefed on his task, was sent to the field to personally familiarise himaelf with Quatenala and, at the same time, to recruit additional indigenous personnel, including several females capable ofoman's hour on the

The recruiting efforts of LINCOLN in January and February resulted in the actual arrival of four(u) indigenous radio specialists and bypril, upon the return of PHILLIPS, the radio script writing staff became operationalafe ho usnear LINCOLN.

LINCOLN prepared and received Headquarters approval toubmarine scare propaganda program which would reeult in the allemd sighting and photographingoviet submarine off the coast of Nicaragua. This would be followed by the exposeache of Soviet arms(planted by PBSUCCESS) on the shore near the area where the sub was aighted. Tho purpose of this exercise was to highlight the danger

of Soviet operations In Central America and by exposing soee of the Soviet rifles being used by PBSUCCESS it would serveuffer and ready-made explanation as to the origin of thebo arms. ater date, when arias started roving into the target area, it waathat another expose of the same type of cache would be made Inside Guatemala and used as evidence that the Soviet had been snuggling arms Into the area. With thia propaganda build-up it was anticipated that the Comnunlsts would be very reluctant to reveal or make very much out of the fact that CASTILLO Armas was being supplied Sovietn faot, if they did makeharge, PBSUCCESS would thenthem with attempting to cover up their Soviet connections, pointing to the Nicaraguan submarine incident as proof and claiming that any Soviet rifles used by CASTILLO Armae' followers mat be thoso which wore recovered from Communist caches Inside Guatemala. Thia operation was to be known as WASKTUB and was timed to take place the last week in Aprilbefore many arms had been moved into Guatemala.

One of the most deficient aspects of the PBSUCCESSprogram was the absence of something to be FOR as opposed to the constant usenti-Communist themes. This was recognized in PBSUCCESS and continuous study had been given to the matter.

Jhadolitical program in3 out it was never adopted in its entirety. From an operational point of view, lt was determinedositive political program should not be revealed until the situation within the target country was right. This meant that the enemy's system and regime had to bsdiscredited and some basic organisation of the opposition had to be In existence before exposing the tenets of the contesting forces. Whereas continual propaganda had been madeong period of time using "God, Country, Liberty and Justice,hemes, these had not been interpreted in the formolitical philosophy nor were the basic grievances against Ccsaeanism Interpreted into answersetter solution.

For purposes of planning and preparation, it wasa positive political philosophy should bs readypril and two weeks later,learly definedor program should bo announced as the alma and Intentionsopposition once the ARBENZ regime had been overthrown. drafts on the above after having obtained the viewsof Ambassador PEURIFOY. revious request had been


de for Headquarters to obtain the views of the Department ofhese, however, were never received. The drafts of the oposea political philosophy were titled "The Cross andFor God and Country.11 Copies were sent to Headquarters for review and to CASTILLO Armas for his consideration. During the above period of discussion of the pros and cons of LINCOLN'S proposed papers, CASTILLO Armas, acting unilaterally with his local advlaers, drew up what he called "The Plan of Tegucigalpa." He had thia publiahed by his group in Kexioo City infter reviewing this plan, LINCOLN noted that it contained basically all theositive political program and therefore determined to adopt it for the project, urging only the deletion of theegucigalpa."

de, tailed operational plan for organisation and conductla Mr. American anti-Ccmmunist Congress In Mexico City had beentad to">Hejdouartersof thisto scndf^ Jto Mexico City to ostablish initialwas dono but only after considerable delay in getting himand, once there, his health became very ooor. Due tobetween LINCOLN and

not permitted to carrv out Ms instructions huo returnedperson,eamo to

LINCOLNriefing on TBSUCCESS and on tno importance oT tMi Congress in the overall program.

roposal waa made, to Headquarterslack character assassim tion attempt be made on Colonel CRUZ War, Director, Guardia Civil, Ouatemala. This was approved and plana prepared for

v* he.PBSacCESS controlled publications, "ElAnd.^El Combate" continued to improve in their context and to increase their circulation. LINCOLNarge number of prepared articles and editorials tallch were used, in addition to close guidance by Case Officers-in the fleldi During the last week of tMs period -the police were'obstructing the publication of "Elaving seizod and'held the last two editions. At the request of "LINCOLN, "CEUAOE" changed over from Its student-typo publication to an entirely military publication called "La Vox del Ejerclto".

- ho-ESSENCE propaganda group reported considerable and very encouraging, .development of cells throughout the entire country for carrying on-antl-Corramist propaganda, either with ESSENCE* support Or independently. Reports received fron travelling inspectors provide excellent psychological intelligence coverage of the rural areas.

7. Para-mllitary

ri esult of detailed debriefing of SECANT anduring and after the polygraph examinations, considerable information was obtained regarding individuala in each of the ninety) target centera, both military and civilian. Prom this information it was possible to proceed with precise planning for each target. Both military and civilian leaders and alternatee were selected for each target and estimated vera reached as to the number of partisans that could be counted on to participate in direct action under the respective target leaders. From this data it waa possible to work out the logistical plans for each area as to quantity and type of arms and the means of effecting deliveries. Thus, as of this date, theorganization assumed form and substanceasis for further assessment and organization,

, Lw.-TheFJHOPEFUL, engaged in preparing tha differentf arms kitaT, 'accidentally sampled the emergency combat^ .rations, in^eh^ejd, for the1 fiold forces and found that they wore contaminated. Upon, .examination by local 'radical technician, they ware declared unfit for human consumption and very likely poisonous. LINCOLNull Investigation, to determine the responsibility for this situation and whether it was.negligence or deliberate attempt to sabotage frlondly elements during combat. Headquarters initiated


losin6 fli'" rtghte in Honduras reouired the ore-

iM 2S est-

8. JLProararaCDefection)

J to Guatemala wareQf.

S?"aociation Jwltof

IorU 1 establishing his defection program. 9. rations

with Plan Implemented about



pertaining to landing prlvilegaa in Honduras and Salvadorn air operations. The Chief, Air ersonal survey of Nicaraguan

airfields and facilitiea in preparationite for Usingposslblv fighter aircraftater date.He wasby

fRobertnd later ntacetfwKfl^C

_ _ the airstrip at Pto.reported JthatTH would do in an emergency but thatnot satisfactory for the type of fir operations which were

The following black flights ware conducted during this period!

arch: commo gear forMarch: Fits 2A, 2B, 0 lbs. comrao gear for SHERWOODApril:,gear forAprili Fit.rras kits


On thres separate occaaione -during this thirty-day period PBSUCCESS hung in balance and serious doubt existed as to whether it should be continued. Aalde from the tine lost by the senior staff personnel, such critical of doubtelling effedt on the morale of all conce.-nod ?nd unquestionably retarded the operational development

?fti .Froj5Ct' teeebruary

t it was estimated that PBSUCCESS had been delayedi lor administrative reasons. -This latter delay, In addlUon to the delays of the current period, roughly constitute two month* of unproductive effort during the course of PBSUCCESS since

' d'Uya during this period it is believed that sufficient progress had been obtained toward the objectives of Stage Two to warrant proceeding onpril to Stage Three. These objectives were as originally stated in the Program for PBSUCCESS:

Project Headquarters, in tho

dissension and defection within the target!

Although not achieved to the desired state, it is belioved auf--ielent dissension and defection has bean created for this period to warrant proceeding to next stage of operations.

target at hone and abroadi

The continued pressing of propaganda themes against tho ARBENZ Government internally is believed to haveufficient degree of effectiveness to proceed to Stage Three. The effective Action by the United States at the OAS Conference in Caracas is also believed to have discredited the target government abroad.


d. Demonstrate inability of target regime to represent beet Interests of the people i

This particular objective was not adequately covered during Stage Two and will have to await further attention in Stage Three.

P8 and encourage patience among non-Comraunistet Considered satisfactorily achieved.

economic pressure!

Although no specific operation was directed at this objective it is believed that tbe Intensification of the anti-Communist movement has resulted In an lncreaelngly serious economic situation in Guatemala. Thia was borne out by the remarks of the Finance Minister who said that he had no confidence In the economic future of Guatemala, the sharp reduction of international business with the united States and the virtual elimination of tourist traffic haa had its effect.

formation and trainingara-military force Inin the interior of the targeti

It is believed that satlafactory progress has been made for this Stage as evidenced In foregoing report.

NOTEi The practice of reporting the operational plans and the progress on specific tasks at the end of each report will be discontinued with this report. Every effort has and will be made hereafter to report significant developments and contemplated operations within the bodyhe friendly report.





-To create maximum antagonism to target regime, internally and externally.

To fan passive will to resist.

To commence fo mall zing defection efforts within the Armed Forces*

To accentuate pera-cdlitary preparations. Internally end externally*

initiate passive sabotage activities. II. Assessment i

A' Enemy1b) 1. Political

The events during this periodreflected theof the enemy and his desperate efforts to hold his regime together in the face of internal and external opposition. Although thereumber of significant developments, the moat sensational incident waa the arrival of the arms shipment onU. This shipmentPearl Harbor" to the opposition and served to clarify the issue of Coaammiat intentions. However, the events leading to thia development and related thereto should also be recorded because, takenhole, they reveal the first indications of fear and uncertainty on the part of the enemy's leadersespite their brave talk and the exhortations of supporting Communist propaganda abroad.

The talk of impending invasion conV-ued to be hammered out daily. PBSUCCESS propaganda efforts prioray reflected great sensitivity on the part of the enemy. The police aeisure of "El Rebelden resulted in warnings to ESSEtlCE that any further publication of thia anti-Cocnunist paper would be followed by quick arrests of all concerned. Thus thia publication became suppressed. However, the publication and dissemination of leaflets continuedesser and more clandestine basis. The adoption" aa the symbol of opposition to the regime, althoughew symbol,atter of considerable distress to the enemy as the results of the ESSENCE teams in placarding the city with these numbers quickly spread throughout the entire country. Despite strenuous efforts to arrest everyone, young or old. caught In the actrtnl this symbol, lt soonopular practice. Arrests were therefore discontinued, aa the police began to realise that the more they attempted to suppress the practice, the more people engaged in spreading the symbol.

Veiled threats of further suppression of free speech were soon followed by an anted attack on ^radlo station, "Radion the nightand of masked men. This



br?9d'a6tlng nTha Anti-Coarnmiat Hour"umber of

the past andrt

tine before had been jammed by the police radio. Jose

zreiaror;were .

f7 aa?ahad" Tharato be no doubt that thaaTad police protection, ae theitaUoT

^ People listening to short ware br^adcaatf^ '

chargoa made, thua obviating any attendant

Hfl. . . ' character assassination of Colonel OTOZtemporarily effective aS resulted In

tfn as Director, Ouardia dvU,hort period. Keanvhile the story was carried extensively in all independent publications!

Although the Soviet submarine plot (WASHTOB) received ex-

VBr Utln America and in Europe, the stor/ln Guatemala was only reported as picked up from Managua with wr/lltS

f^tif^Tt^' SSS' as in the case of the Mexican Congleaa, leepite the government's restraint, there is little doubt this expoee^reated considerable Impression on the enemy and served its purpose vary^mU.

.n 0overnment announced that hence-

ocordedapproved by the Director of Information before being permitted to go on the air. This official measure marked the end of free speech on the radio and theomplete suppression of all free speech in Guatemala.

2. May Day

wm.wM *i- * ai^nificant occasion for addressing J t ommunists and ARBENZ prepared^ great progress made^tnTregine

etc*> unleashing vitrioUc atUckT

against the united states, the UFCO and imperialism in general. Tlarge

r organizations formed Vof these exhibit* were

ce* stances obscenity was SSpSJd

leader Carlos

were present^on^the speakers platform, with all the prominent Communist

iffftraitors of dwST

and promised they would receive their puniehment if they tried tTlnvada the country. Most of his remarks were In recital of all tSIrett^gs


? acconPlj3hed under tha regime. The Secretary GeneralCGTO, Victor Manuel GOTlS,main speech aside from ARBENZ. He claimed the ballotsbeen manipulated by the Yankees who wanted to useeans of attacking Guatemala. Thet gainst tois danger. The

6 niUlon doUara for

and was fully exploited by GUTIERREZ. U. S. military aid to Nlcaraiua

was denounced as an openthreat to use thato^ST

uatemala. OUTIERRSZ further claimed that OuatemalfSd S

anf f John Poster DULLES

H,/for, . lthough various references were made to the Soviet by different speakers, Mario CASTILLO Flores, labor leader, gave the

' Pe0plMof China'aS all countries

S^uSP^ TO0ra?7' 1' DIAZ> although at the tinTto

Itpaclal MbU to COTQ which was read aloud,on this

afternoon and evening of May Day, the "Voice of

elmSlmtS ^de lt* ^al appearanc7on the air asanti-Communist radio

3. . ALFHEM, Arms Shipment

Mn* wr8actionovernment to tha initial announce-

ment by the Department of State on the arrivalarpeCurtain, was slow andobtllZly ^Sy E"TORXELLO, first denied knowledget0xtent that if any had been rel

itprivilaEe and right to buy in any market

brouant^'h*eleaa8 TOMEU0 admittedhat nment would not

make public the details of the shipment or the purchase negotiations.

An international furor was created over the shipment,

Opld Communist Party organs

considerable propaganda resulted. Behind the din of Corauniat propaganda, anti-Communist leaders became aware of the real seriousness of the threat existing inecognized tSf incident as proof of the chargeSoviet beachhead" iTcentral

U. InternationalfDURAS

. _ In early May, strikes were called by the UFCO Labor axeaSeached seriousconoray of theand tho stability of the government. Although specific evidence of Communistevertheless it was generally believed,ALVEZ, that the strikes had been stlgeYS this time to disrupt the country and possibly overthrow the regimf which had

oTo^ietir1^a of operatione for



L Coincided^om

adi? newj 0CCTnentthVeffeet

overnment over to ST

fi Defense"atter* well-knownJfc appearedommunist coup wase


but served to highlight tha danger present at that time.

were BliHn-fPf^^tU many thousands of workmenrderly Danda* Cottaunisteft wfJfS Va5uatema2 Mlitary

troops into the border area allegedly for defensive purposes.

threepertod toeGovernment declared

In the midst of the above strained relation* th*

refSed fl Drevailin8 conditions and even

refused to. permit their Ambassador to return to Guatemala.



that h. was studying the practicability of requesting SlfSSS*.


international Communist movement waa underway to

disturb the peace Inmerica, His basic grounds WW7

Tha plot against his lift which was Communist-Inspired and Instigatadj

Tha discoveryoviet arms cache on Nica-raguan soil;

The Communist-inspired strike In Honduras and Its relationship to forthcoming presidential electlonej

The ems. ALFHEM, and Its threat to



The Ouateaalan Ambassador to Haiti was declared "persona non graU- on, allegedly for personal and not offTciaT reasons.


tfw Volca of Liberation" came on the

ed broadcasting to the people ni<mto fight for their liber-

oluntary contribution in the battle of the air waves2m throu8hout the campaign;Tquoted and always supported the "Voice of Liberation."


that President ARBENZ

* "fT Be^in*n which they agreed to


olaln the difficulties encountered by PBSUCCESS in trying to elicit

L _ ooperation, later, aboutay, when the exna shipment became

eport waa received that OSORIO wanted

Salv^ i? asaumed by the Department ofJV"W

mll^iaalffrf^^tions ho "would have sided with the

anti-Communists once assured of the validity of their support.


Oenoral CARDENAS was permitted to speak freely

Of hieaupport for ARBENZ, the Mexican Government permitted the antt! Communist Congress to function freely and blast ARBENZ thoroughly. The Mericar. Government's movement of certain troops into the bordeVare. ofOuatemala was considered simply precautionary, however securiS con-

S^rSETl^V^e tlghtefMd considerlbSh way.. Thus, Mexico appeared to be assuming a

y senslSve for^p!

appeared to have been highlighted by

th- ii..of the clandestine radio on Hay Dav and

whoil, nrl thus Placing the blame on uTCO The.


the each* ^Pl^tlc corps to witness the revealing of

Hilitary and Para-Military

perfectly deer that theyto choo.eUeeUrf Worldu^rr^nce^Ld^

7. Intelligence (Police Action)

opposition leaders was being planned for the first two weeks in Urrounded sntANTIC's home in an efforthe managed to eaoape by going into

- Wnt iffeTWeirliWscene?


tha long-awaited crackdown had commenced against all known opposition.


his eventful period betweenpril andayserioue suppression of the opposition^ '

curtailing civil liberties and wholesale arrests, the acquisitionuge arms shipment and other factors which normally should have served to strengthen the enemy. However, these gains were offset by^endly psychological warfare toargetainty and anxiety seemedovernment circles by the end of the period.

. . 0 clandestine radio shook the Communists almostand continued dally to harass them and worry them. Letter publication made it clear to the Communistserioue threat to their future in thiscountry. The black leaflet airdrop stunned thethe face of the criticisms on the arms shipment, as it mustapparent that the opposition remained determined. All ofthe enemy, plus his own apprehension over the loyalty

lLr5 ^PS'(CftalnlyitUeonfident about at thT enane period.

B. Friendly1U) 1. Propaganda

a) SHERWOOD, Clandestine Radio (The Voice of Liberation).

. several months of preparationerint-uri11no

studio near LINCOLNransmitting

the clandestine radio program was ready to go on loo airecial

t^ilTn0uaterial*orkman's holiday,

all radio stations except the government's, TOW, were off the air. Ih

JIfSudi*ncehe Voice of Liberation, faked telegrams were sentotional broadcasting company in Mexico City,

Jefdi-ngto Quateraala City including the f < newspaper,pecial broadcast forwould be given at certain specified hours and frequency, with prominent Mexican artists. The papers were requested to place the notice in large advertisements and were told that the broadcasting compos representative would be therehort time to pay the Mils? Wto this advance publicity, the Voice of Liberation made its official debut.

interest and attraeK^^

really knew the location of the transmitter and made many fruitless searches throughout the country. Tho timing of the debut waTexcellent although coincidental as it followed within forty-eight hours of ?ta government'e decree establishing censorship of all radio broadcasts! Tnla point was stressed heavily in the program as the reason wSy it was necessary tolandestine radio. Also, mention was madfof thT assault upon "Radio Internacional0 in April,

as kept fairly current by means of

the daily newspapers which were received at LINCOLN withinours^f

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publication. Alao FBIS tr ana crip tlons proved very helpful froai the) timely angle. Thle vae augmented by recordings at LINCOLN of local OAUitemalan radio programs. All themes employed during Hay werewith the objectives of this period. Numerous attacks were made on Communist officials and ARBENZ as well as on the government in general. The Soviet angle of the hay Day speeches was cited as proof of the extent of Communist control. The arrival of. ALFHEM enabled LINCOLN to hit hard at the theme that this shipment, paid for by the Kremlin and delivered from its stocks, was for the purpose ofoviet satellite in Ouatemala. The Amy was warned repeatedly that tha arms were not for then but for the new Communist People's Army which ARBENZ was developing to replace the Army,

The above and numerous other themes were carried this flrat month in addition to talks on the nature of Coaavunlsm and how to combat It. " symbol campaign was supported strongly by this program and the air leaflet drop was tied in, in order to provide the impression that the radio program was partast, well-organised movement to overthrow the Communists. Considerable notional material wae used from time to time to give tho impressionell-organized underground primarily within the ranks of the Army or government offices.

The first month of SHEHUOOD was marked by exceptionally high audience interest and response, thus it may be considered as very successful.

b) SUMMIT, "First Congress Against Soviet Intervention in Latin Amerlca,,

Recognizing the propaganda machine of the Communists, with its local organs in every country of Latin America, capable of playing the same theme thereby providing an impression of popularend solidarity throughout the Hemisphere, it was the objective of PBSUCCESS to attempt the creationimilar counterpart among the anti-Communists. Tha existence of such an extensive external medium would enable PBSUCCESS to rally popular support for the anti-Communist struggle in Guatemala without showing the American hand. Tho long range advantages of such an organization were obvious and important, thus Justifying the expense and effort of trying to organize it in time for tha benefit of PBSUCCESS.

In January andb, there was certain doubt as to the auccesa of the American Delegation at the forthcoming OAS Conference in Caracas. In the event of failure, it wasatter of some importance to be able to follow up the OAS Conference with what would appear toopular reaction of anti-Communists in Latin America to demonstrate their opposition to Communisteven though the statesmen failed to recognise it in Caracas. Thusense it was conceiveduffer against failure at the OAS Conference. Should the Department of State be successful at Caracas, then the rapid formationopular, Independent anti-Cooraunist Congress in Mexico City would be very desirable on the basis of backstopping the OAS andedium for spreading propaganda directly against Communism in Ouatemala. hird proposition wasalong the lines thatongress and subsequent committee action in each Latin American country would provide the basis for gaining the support of those countries. inal proposition was to employ this means of uniting the various factions of anti-Coemuniat exile groups,

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- j

noted that

bitions toatin American Anti-Comr.unistut waa unable to obtain support for his plans.r ihafboldly LnoLad such plans several times in the press and most recently on uPsbruary tmTwithout strong support, hie efforts failed to materialize, uZLftdrance PUbUcity Was of vaiQ0 to PBSUCCESS as it served to giveiSea 8BnUiM ^cal undertaking, With thisasis, LINCOLN obtained Headquarters approval to proceed with the developmentlan

lue"Print for thia operation which admittedlyajor undertaking forhort period of time.

peration was designed to servediati?ctive Permanent value thatjhe WH Divisionfor ita Cementation

r0Vlaed "Stance throughout the

' ^anuxdates were selected and dispatched to tour all Latin

h9and Une up delegates. It8 deal" toat as many prominent anti-Comunist persons aa

1 add mature and dignity to the Congress.Vari0U8 masons, this did not occurew

tUnd' thus Preluding the impressionow level meeting of insignificant personalities.

ttwywu it*.. 6 ^etemalan part of the Congress was handled by SS^'Ama3edisproportionatelyemalan Delegation of both persons from within the country and

Se 'lSs^ZSion was kepteasonable


. , .ongress convened onay andnlysent delations, these were suf-

he Congress.

an anti-CommuMst^at?er

ountry oasis. The issue which was most effectively

documented was that of the Co^uniat danger inWa3* condemning the tamz* Congressthe^ASLof(Gu?tenala- Before adjourning, the Congressllected adeBrazil, as the aite'of

f view, considering the limited

nd tha fact that only oneaSJoel E?

l7efinite contri-SSS. .aluation is based on the fact that this

ricawat theof the plan submittedebruary was executed byay

it* < erly supported hereafter this operation should be an increasingly more valuable KUGOWN apparatus for years to come.


Inurequested to

nCityhis contact from GuaWa who handled his relations with ArchbishopRELLANO for the



Jori uX95UaKBOn

ational crusade against Communism.

The Archbishop's "Pastorals it later became known,orceful message calling on all Roman Catholics toational crusade against Communism in Guatemala. He assured them that Communism could be removed from their soil if they countered it with "all means authorised by their conditions as free men and as Sons of God.11 He chargedrabble of international adventurers trained in Communist tactics" had been given facilities for attacking the security of the nation and the soul of the people, etc.

The significance of the Archbishop's callrusade against Communist activity waa that it primarily provided the moral sanction for anti-Comnuniat activity in Guatemala which is predominantly Roman Catholic. PBSUCCESS and WH Division immediately proceeded to exploit this powerful psychological message in Guatemala and throughout the Hemisphere. The religious keynote had been an Integral part of all anti-Communist propaganda aa the creed used most frequently was "For God, Country, etc." Thus, this Pastoral Letter provided substance and strength to the anti-Cocaranist cause. In the SHEKXWD clandestine radiothe Pastoral Letter was often repeated and Interpreted,as well as in all the press madia of PBSUCCESS. Throughout this period the religious theme was one of the most frequently used subjects and, possibly to the credit of the Archbishop, it was the theme which received the greatest response, although this cannot be judged accurately at this time.

d) " CAMPAIGN, The Symbol of Resistance.

In every resistanceymbol is adopted to represent the reason or the objective of the resistance. ymbol was sought by LINCOLN for PBSUCCESS. After considering many creative symbols it was determined" would be the most suitable as it represented the constitutional articlo which forbade "the formation and the functioning of political organizations of an international or foreignhus applying to Covrniniam. This symbol had theof simplicity and ease of reproduction. It waa notew idea as it appeared on the banners in the popular demonstration against the new Electoral Law,hich demonstration had been broken up by crude government force. It was used againhan the anti-Communists0 signaturesetition asking for an interpretation of the constitution and legal prohibition of Communism. Thousands of persons collected before the National Palace to support this petition only to be driven away at machine gun point by the Army and the Guardia Civil.

An important ingredientesistance movement to build up its popularity is to provide something for the peoplo to doj soxe act that anyone could profom aids -atertally in developingto the movement. With this in mind and In the interest of estab-


liebing"opular symbol of resistance torogram was outlined to the field and instructions provided for about two weeks or more of placing this symbol throughout the countryonspicuous manner without providing any explanation whatever as to its significance. The purpose here waa to create curiosityollowing up with explanations. Despite the previous

hBtuIdecognize its full significance in thie instance.

The above silent campaign was initiated by the ESSENCE SSS^f^ controlled publications about the second week in April. ESSENCE organized teams and sent them Into all the provinces to contact the local cells or groups to start narking walls, buildings, bridges, etc. Inside Guatemala City several teams consisting mostly of university students, during the course of three night operations, covered the city

'sl1- t and crayons were used accordinghe object. By the second and third night the police increased their vigilance and were busy trying to eradicate tho symbols as fast as they appeared. Several students were arrested during this period.

press picked up the story almost at once and gave

the campaign considerable publicity. In the provinces from San Jose to Puerto Barrios to Copan to Quezaltenango and points in between,ook up the campaign and were marking bridges, telephone poles, signboards, private and public buildings, in general, successfully placing the symbol so that one could scarcely travel anywhere inwithout seeing lt. However, the police outside the Capital City acted more promptly and rigorously, arreeting all persons caught in the act. Although originally the work was entirely done by organized anti-Commmist elements, itery short time before It became anatter with people" on their own hor.os and school boys painting It on their hats or jackets.

, lanned to follow up the silent campaign with

TDxplaining the significance of the symbol. The text was prepared carrying the theme that" was for the Constitution, the Constitution was the nation, the nation was the people, and that unless this article of the Constitution was upheld, the people would fight. However, the articles were never printed due to the suppression of "Elnd were carried on the Voice of Liberation broadcast. The campaign proved very successful and resultedopular cause by anU-Coreronists throughout the country.


ISeeMnal Report, Stage Two)

,1* JnU, appropos of the report that Major

Alfonso MARTINEZ Estevez, Director of DAN. had cone topurchase arms for Guatemala,an

article in "La Prensa" alleging That the arms were to be delivered by Soviet submarines. This artiole re-appeared in the Miami Heraldand gave rise to the possibility of providing substance to this allegation. The value ofropaganda incident would be twofold: Toover story for counter-acting any charges that CASTILLO Armas was using Soviet rifles, which was the case; and to produce alarm over the danger of Soviet aggression in Central America.

In furtherance of theomprehensive plan of operation waa prepared and forwarded to each Station concerned. Although



ew local twista to the story, in the main the actual implementation of tha plot followed very closely to LINCOLN'S directive.

Tha followingummation of what actually occurred!

hadin the local pressa|that unidentifiedbeen sighted off their respectivea re-play of the above stories,tatemeni fromNaval District that no American submarines wero in thosethis particular time.

eport fron the Guardia Nacionalwhich had been searching the coastal area forconnection with the recent political disturbances inthatU, two coastal residents had seen aa deep harbor known ae Los Qigantes. The names were providedfishermen who alsoav hadtwo periscopes twoin the sameNacional with

cameras and Increased the vigilance of this area.

O) Appropoe of the above release,hotograph montageoviet submarine at sea

ae if taxen irom off-shore. (The shore actually wasthe

submarine photo was obtained J With thismall cheap box camora, an appropriate story wasexplaining how the coastal patrol hadubmarineit in the above-mentioned area. Onith certainwas publiahed with the

photograph of the submarine across tne front page of the Managua official newspaper.

(U) The next step was carried out very quietly. pecial arms cache was prepared by KUHOOK personnel from PBSUCCESS stocks in Nicaragua arid turned over toCT burial. When the story with the photograph of the submarine was released, SOMOZA stated he hadlose investigation of the entire area where this submarine had been sighted. Shortly after the secret burial of this armsrranged to have itU, by workmen andlanagua.

(5) b, SOrDZAress conference of the entire press and diplomatic corps. With dignity and seriousness SOMDZA displayed the arms cache to all present, explaining the chain of events whioh led to its diacovery. The cache contained LO Sovietovietzech machine guna anderman hand grenades plus ammunitionmall quantity of Guatemalan cigarettes and candy wrappers. Everyone present appeared completely convinced including the American Ambassador who had not been cut in as of that time. The U. S. Army Attache identified the origin of the weapons. The French Minister who had served in Greece pointed out how the cache completely fitted the pattern of those in Greece. The British Ambassador was able to read the Russian markings end said ho was going toable to his government advising of the gravity of the situation. The final show of the arms under such formal and dignified conditions by SOMOZA, together with the careful build-up of events, served to make this otherwise fantastic tale


b8er78r8 Md Considerable pub-

- - "wd


KURIOT was requested to provide photostatic copies of


"nd mta derogatoryadjuel^nt


0 oaPaM"organising aV"combination SouldbTeuperior to

tne Army which was allegedly alreadyio

with the

Meanwhile after ascertainingprepared notional

cable offices on successive cays between tf .if aTi^ wSTS-1



During the above oable operation, ESSENCE was busily distributing clandestinely the u5 photostatic earnsto showing CRUZ War's nenbership in the Communist Party. These carnets were distributed to Array officers. Influential businessmen, newspapernen, politicians and clergymen.

The three currents! the news stories abroad, the rumors and carnets in circulation, and the cable fabrications, createdimpact on the government and the local press in Ouatemala City. The story broke on the front pages of most of the independent newspapers with each one treating it differently but not completely denying the plausibility of truth being somewhere in the case against CRUZ Wer. Inside the National Palace the operation is believed to have had some success. Although ARBENZ stated publicly onu that he did not believe the stories, CH'.XUQD KaOdnald, Minister of Interior, asked for CRUZ Wor's resignation. CRUZ Wer had absented himself from his office but refused to resign until Colonel Carlos Enrique DIAZ, Chief of Armed Forces, returned from South America, as CRUZ War claimed thisaneuver to take advantage of DIAZ'a absence. DIAZ and CRUZ were known to be very closeutual assistance pact existed between them.

CRUZ Wer was furious that Major Jaime ROSENBERG had not been ao maligned when lt wae known that hie connection with the POT was ao obvious. ESSENCE was then Instructed to sow further discord by telling CRUZ Wer in an anonymous letter that the plot had boen Instigated by the Communists and ROSENBERG In order to place the latter in charge of the Guardia Civil. Although CRUZ Wer waa only temporarily relieved of hie official duties, the operation was comparatively successful as itery useful purpose in creating diasention and discord among tha Guatemalan hierarchy. ARBENZ was quoted at this time as beingover the growing discord and division of loyalties among his officers. Had Colonel DIAZ bean pre aent in Ouatemala at tha time of the above crisis, it is entirelyore serious situation would have resultod involving conflict between DIAZ and the Army.


j irfj viiBVf,. miring uels

was SJ;Voice of Liberation" and there evidence of lessening interest on the part of the opposition

S-dsationconsisteven ft,

Arls^ability on the part of CTsTILIX)

Annas' forces before he wouldalace coup.

During the unloading of. ALFKEM, an unsuccessful attempt waa made to sabotage the rail line fron Puerto Barrios,eneral feeling of despair appeared to be developing among the anti-Conmunists which required some positive action to offset. During this

Under the circumstances described above and the pressing need to drive home the true meaning of the arms shipment to tha Army, it was determinedlack flight would be made over Ouatemala City topecial leaflet which was considered particularly timely for this purpose. The leaflet consistedackground showing the main gate to Guardia da Honor garrison,croll on each side. The scroll on the right readi "Fight fori God, Country, Liberty, Work, Truth and Justice." On the left scroll were the wordsi "Fight against! Communist Atheism, Coranunlat Intervention, Coanunist Oppression, Communist Poverty, Communist Lies and Communist Police." At the bottom wore the words: "Fight with brother patriots1 Fight with CASTILLO Armas.

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tMa t. flB "oted nemy's reaction reported heretofore in

this report, the airdrop staged onk was highly eueceesfulery worthwhile undertaking.



atter of preparing for Stage Five operations,are -CCtzerp In Tegucigalpa ande InejlTCOted to prepare their existingersonnel assets into teams capable of operating completely black if necessaryeriod of disturbance. All ESSENCE personnel were to prepare to go into strictly clandestine type operations, setting up aecret headquarters and safe houses for thia purpose. Mimeograph machinea, paper and inks were to be stored in the safe houses. An emergency communications system was to be developed and all teams would have code names in order to receive theirby the clandestine radio. In Tegucigalpa the Case Officers were requested to form teams of five men to be capable of fulfilling pay-war missions while accompanying the shock teams into action.

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rybajj8ssp '

oe arreats ofay, essence had niade very

EntST"*that aboutr teams had bean myograph machines were being aSad" fet' "eerve headquarters had been selected

ngked withive ^ama would bePfo.4d3 ard their ^teferatlon into the castillo

Armas forces

2. Intelligence

The intelligence system established in the early stages through CASTILLO Armas waa centered around three key Principal Agents in Guatemala: SEMANTIC, SECANT and SEQUIN. The latter fled to Salvador early in February after the White Paper expose and resumed bis operations from that country. SEMANTIC handled the civilian penetration agents and SECANT was In charge of military intelligence. They were both brought out of Guatemala in April and given polygraph examinations In Tegucigalpa which they cleared satisfactorily. In early May they were sent back to Guatemala to continue their work which by this time had changed from primarily Intelligence to organisational work In forming the underground forces around each target garrison. For this rsason Intelligencey-product of their effort although still they remained fairlyon low level information. Stephen LUOTON was instructed to start planning for strictly tactical type intelligence operations to serve ths shock forces once the latter became operational.

Intelligence continued to be received throughdiplomatic and high level Bourpsr-- Thn ana* valuablethis period was received from

which proved to be fairly reliable. The Guatemala Station providedcoverage of. ALFHEM shipment and the initial reports that it consisteduge arms cargo. Owing to the heavy requirements for target data and other tactical, low level Information, the Station was fully absorbed in these requests which for the most part werewell covered.

Although recognized as premature, onUhe had four Guatemalan Air Force pilots ready to defectaircraft. Accopjinfflv arrangements were madesafe landinginstructions were relayed back to

SECANT as to the correct proceduree for the pilots to follow.

3. Para-Military

U all claaaes at SAHANAC completed their training, graduated and started their return to Tegucigalpa in small increments. Planning and preparations were underway for organising tho shock teams and sabotage teams and the organizers or instructors were provided individual orientation on their specific problems. SEMANTIC and SECANT completed their de-briefing and planning with CASTILLO Armas and the KUHOOK staff and departed for Guatemala. During this period it became easily apparent that CASTILLO Armas lacked the ability to plan and direct operations, thereby making it necessary for the KUHOOK staff to organise the GHQ and work out every detail to ensure its being done. At this time there was considerable encouragement that the underground partisan organisation actually existed and would be capable ofreal power once fully armed and led into action. Key personnel

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in various target complexes had been pulled out elmoat at will forand instructions and sent back into Guatemala.

The most difficult problem during this period was theof arms into the respective target areas. One system whichmost feasible consisted of buying and renting trucks inand sending them on regular runs between certain points toand to be ready to move arms clandestinelyollectiona distribution center or direct to the final site. Severalinside the country wore readied for the reception of armsto be brought across the border by mule trains moving onlyof darkness via small trails. econd system had beenarms were to be trucked into Salvador clandestinely andof empty rail tank cars. Through the cooperation of keyplaced, the tank cars with arms were ostensibly to be movednormal manner across the border to Puerto Barrios foronce in Guatemala they would bo shunted offidinghours where reception teams would remove the ams beforecare rooched Puorto Barrios. Other less complicated meanssuch as cargo-bearers, false bottom trucks andtwo vessels were purchased and readied for shipment of arms,Puerto Barrios and the other to San Jose. Wo difficulty whateverin removinethe warehouse

was under guard

The firat week in Kay, Headquarters advisedhip,.as on its way with the long-expected arms shipment for Guatemala. LINCOLN requested permission from Headquarters toDT effort against this ship upon arrival at Puerto Barrios. About eight different types of aggressive action were proposed. Of all methods LTNOOLN preferred the UDT operation and considered it had the capability ofsuch an operation using magnetic limpets and forty-pound shaped charges. After the exchange of views it appeared that Headquarters disapproved of action against the ship, preferring rail sabotage once arms started moving to Guatemala City. LINCOLN'S desire was to destroy the shipment in the water as rail sabotage would only delay its delivery and probably not affect the ams themselves, 'ihila this exchange was taking place between LINCOLN and Headquarters, the KUHOOK staff was urgently assembling andDT unit. Later the rail sabotage was selected by Headquarters as the means to be employed, thereby requiring the field to shift from UDT to rail sabotage preparations.

In the meantime. Headquarters, acting promptly on. iiULFSBROOK and working through the Departments of State and Defense, was able to re-route the vessel to San Juan, Puerto Rico, and with the per-miasion of its owners, proceed to inspect tha cargo. llo this was in progress, Station Ouatemala reportedhe arrival of. ALFHEM in Puerto Barrioseoret cargo undoubtedly containing arms as the Minister of Defense and various Army troops were proceeding to the port. After confirming the cargo consisted of arms, LCI COINapproval to launch sabotage teams against the rail line between Puerto Barrios and Guatemala City. Onay, two hastily prepared teams of two man each departed overland from Tegucigalpa. One team ms to blow the bridge with train at Gualan and the second team had the same mission near Sntre Rios. hird, four-nan rail harassment tear, was being readied to departay to operate black between tbe first two teams.

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The Guatemalan Army movedull battalion to Puerto Barrios pluslainclothes men of the Guardia Civil. security measures were clamped down within twenty-four hours of the arrival of the vessel. The entire waterfront area and rail yards were closely guarded by armed troops. Tho unloading of the ALFHEM got underway without delay except for one day of bad storms. Onay, ten carloads of arms arrived in Guatemala City and by lateay overarloads had arrived. Oneport was received that an arms train had been delayed by an explosionridgeiles out of Puerto Barrios, sustaining only minor damage. Aside from this incident the unloading and transshipment to Ouatemala City continued uninterruptedly throughay.

The sabotage teams had failed in their initial missions. Although this failuroefinite disappointmentiscouraging performance from teams that wero expected to carry out vital missions during tho attack phase, it is believed that recognition should be given to the fact that the leaders had just returned fromew days before end also that the teams were hastily briefed and sent on their wayery short time. The team that attempted to blow the bridge with train had not followed their instructions on bow to place the charges. However, If there had notalfunction in the electrical wiring it Is believed the three charges that had been set would havethe train in the river. The team sent to Gualan reported that theyumber of troops guarding tho bridge, and,eam of only two men, they withdrew. The third team encountered enemy forces near Champona and were engagedireflght. Being greatly outnumbered, they were soon scattered and one member was captured but later escaped.

Onb. SCRANTON completed its trainingall radio operators (lh) were sent to Tegucigalpa for finalpreparation for infiltration. he first operator ready toprepared and dispatched overland for his home in Ouesaltenanao. Hieequipment was to be passed to him by

after he had arrived at his destination.

ii. rogran, Defection

The Casewith but independent of

tha Station, attempted toprime several of the de-

fection targets among the high ranking officers of the Amy. Q uring his tour of duty in Guatemala, had made many close and personal friendships with these officers. However, upon hie return on this occasion he found an entirely different attitude towards him and toward Americans in general. It is believed that he lost hie confidence, and it soon became apparent to the Case Officer that he was of no particular value. Consequently, his return to the United States was approved onU.

Although the abovo oxperienco proved disappointing, the satisfactory development of the underground partisan force, theof the clandestine radio and the belief that the Amy Officer Corps was basically anti-Communist, gave reason to feel confident thatrogram would be able to make certain progress inompletely separate force within the Army's hierarchy. LINCOLN'S optimum at this time was to achieve an independent but complementary group of influential officers in high places who would defect "in place" and await the general uprising to be led by CASTILLO Armas' forces. In this manner Internal




pressure would be available for sppllcetlon simultaneously with toe external pressure. inimum, LINCOLN anticipetedrograra would be sufficiently successful in creating havoc within the Amy's High Comand during the attack phase to materially reduce the Army's effectiveness againat CAST HID Areas' forces. In this regard the Case Officer waa cautioned to avoid any precipitous action and to makethat defection would occur in place to permit appropriate timing with other factors.

eries of clandestine meetingsreported he was able to overcomestrong

oppoaition to CASTILLOand accept him" In the plans for unquestionably opposed to the Com-

munists, he appeared toerson of strong convictions end wasto acceptP/JUNTA cover story aa sufficient evidenceto overthrow ARB3JZ without the support of the united JJv astute and patientable to con-

vincflLl jwithout going too far that theiiberafion Movement was completely compatible with United States Government's policy and that beyond thia the United States could not go without becoming directlyin intervention. Further, that the United States preferred to see Guatemalans place their own house in order but that if this were not done and the Communists continued tohreat to Hemisphere security, it would simplyatter of time before overt military force would be employed.

During thishoth CASTILLO Armas

andUP aa being the real force which would overthrow ARBENZ. His own role was clarified to the extent that further defection in place of other high ranking officers would be done through him. He was to proceed energetically but cautiously, working first on his friend the Minister of National Defense, Colonel SANCHEZ, then tho Chief of Staff, Colonel PARIMELLO de Leon. Meanwhile ho was to line up other officers who could be counted on to handle the palace coup coincident with the CASTILLO Amaa uprising.

5* rogram, Deception

A number of minor deception operations have been carried out by LINCOLN and several major efforts undertaken. However, it was not until lateU that deceptionajor subject under what was termed therogram".

One of the principal deception thenea or objectives was the matter of spreading the responsibility for PBSUCCESS over as many Latin American countries as possible in order to lessen the Impact of American participation and increase the acceptance of thia Project throughout Latin America. In thia regard the following countries have been directly or indirectly Implicated in PBSUCCESS as of this period!

HONDURASi Directly implicated by permitting an overt base of operations for CASTILLO Armas.

NICARAGUAi To the same degree as Honduras.

EX SALVADORi Only to the extent that General YDIGORAS Fuentes may beonspirator and that "El Combaten is permitted to be published and otherof PAGE are tolerated without interference.

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top srcncT

MEXICO: United to the "First Congress Against the Soviet Intervention in Latinnd theactivities of LIONIZER end CASTILLO Amas group which publishes ^Pronto."

EPUBLIC: Past record of interference and alleged support of XDIGGEAS Fuentes. Thie country was mentioned in the "Vhite Paper.'1 More recently the radio stationas been broadcasting strong anti-Ccemrunist programs against Ouatemala and openly advocates support for the Liberation Movement. An attempt to implicate this country further byDominican ems for use inside Ouatemala failed to materialise through lack of cooperation of the Dominican Ambassador to Honduras.

VENEZUELA: This country was mentioned in the "White Paper" as planning to send money and airplanea to CASTILLO. An effort was madeeriod of months to actually obtain tha participation of Venezuela using the ex-President of Costa Rica. CALDERON Guardia, as an intermediary for CASTILLO and

In April, CALX TO!rip to Caracaa on behalfJUNTA and arrangedeeting to take placePresident PEREZ Jinenes and CASTILLO Armas inthehis Chief, Seguridad Nacional,

Colonel Pedro ESTRADA, to Managua, Nicaragua, to confer with SOTJZA and CASTTLI/j. This meeting took place onay andisit to SKERW0O3 which evidently was part of the convincing plan to assure ESTRADA that Americans were actually participating in the JUNTA. CASTILLO expressed optimism and anticipated FEREZ would provide him with monetary aupport and aircraftater date if needed.

g) COLOMBIA: It was originally contemplated that acontingency para-military capability would be organised among tho discharged Colombian Army veterans of Korea. equest had been made ofQ

n ond instructions provided; however, monthswithout any productive action. en an effortto stimulate this

Contract Agent in charge of this task, reportea tnat it could not ba dona without risking U. S. Involvement and that tha government would refuse to permit such action. Later, however, after the task was abandoned, Treported that Korean veterans wereto-Tight with the anti-Ccnmunlata for the liberation of Guatemala. This report arrived too late to re-open the proposition.

h) CUBA: Although often consideredogical andthe onlv effort made to approach Presidentw" uU-en being handled

rpouested that arrangements be

mad* Aitneror P

"jfor hirs to meet*BATISTA on his trip to Cuba to hire the CAT crews for the sterile aircraft. The two traveled to Havana, remaining about. hB hours, and then departed. rief report ^limply stated they were unable to see BATISTA on this trip.




In order tomokescreen over CASTILLO aTMaS'

pIh^ or aid, but once in

Panama he would be sequestered away and returned to his fielrt aeaMM

ircraft: Although olan^. Air Support

this Period over) black cargo flights


fron some nearby country, particularly Mexico.



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pilots with ATR'a and an average oflying hours perwere considered all-weather pilots. Recruitment of fightervery difficult both as to toe paucity of candidates and thesecurity limitations involved. The only two fighter pilotswere very well qualified Naval Reserve oilots and were boththese crews were sent to Havana wherethen and com-

pleted their contracts, after which they proceeded to SO'IERSET.

The acquisition of fighter aircraft was initiated abouth. Aaida from the possibility ofB and0 from

Jit waa determined thathould be made available for escorting the Initial daylight cargo flights. Headquarters handled this problem through the Departments of Defense and State.

7. Analysis

The careful pre-planning and preparation of Stage Three operations resultedery active operational period, tor the most part these operations were conducted successfully, serving to attain the objectives established for Stags Three. The sensational arrival of. ALFKEM, aside from its military significance, served an extremely valuable psychological' purposs as it clearly showed the hand of the Soviet, thus dramatising the gravity of the situation in Guatemala. The failure of the KUHOOK sabotage effort waa unfortunate and reflected the known unreadiness of the KUHOOK program for direct action of thia kind.

III. Conclusions:

Despite the May Day exhortations and the arrival of. ALFH2M, it Is believed that PBSUCCESS successfully seised the initiative from the enemy during Stage Three and kept him on the defen-sivo throughout the period. The concentration of psychological pressure internally and externally created considerable Impact on the enemy's heretofore solid, almost arrogant, self-confidence and positive

unquestionably the enemy is experiencingeeling of desperationesult of preeaure applied on him from so many angles. The attempt to arrest SEMANTIC and the seizure of hie papers at the end of the period nay prove to be the outwardof the extent of the enemy's despair and the beginningesperate effort to roll-up the underground organisation before it la too lata. The extent of tbe comproniae resulting from the loss of SEMANTICS papers was not known when this Stage ended.

It is believed that tbe objectives desired for Stage Three, build-up, have been successfully achieved andh the critical perioday will commence.




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I. Objectives;

To apply naximun. divisionary preesurej

To develop defection effort* to maximum;

To provide trineition from paeeive to active resistance;

To create invasion scare to draw enemy forces away from capital*

To commenceay preparations for para-rdlitary force within target area;

our and necessary advance readiness for the attack. II. Assessment:

A. Enemy Situation8. Chronology

Having seized the psychological initlaUve from the eneny during the preceding period, it was anticipated that ha would commence taking desperate measures to prevent the collapse of his regime. In the psychology of revolution or resistance it has been demonstrated in many Instances thateople have permitted an undesirableto existumber of years without showing determinedto that government, they develop an indifference to it and an attitude of letting others do the objecting. In the cass ofrge majority of the peopleommunist minority to gain and sustain control over their government without moreew hundred doing the objecting. Aa people generally in such oircunetancea only react to the extent that they thermelvee are affected, it becomes an unfortunate truism that such persons must be hurt by Comauniam In order to personally react against it. Being hurt nay be limited to eimply the apprehension of being harmed. esistance movement thrives on oppression.

During Stage Three, PBSUCCESS confined Its application of psychological pressure to the arousing of ths people to take passive measures of preparation for the struggle to follow. The suooess of this maneuver was not loat to the enemy who could readily discern the proximity of the match to the fuse. Byritioal period to develop between the build-up period and the showdown, PBSUCCESS intended to provide an opportunity for the enemy to take one of the following courses of action:

If the divisionary effort had been sufficientlyprior to thia time, any desperate novae might wall result in disintegration of the regime and the overthrow of ARBENZ.

If the defection effort had been sufficiently successful prior to thia tine, an attitude of desperation could

"HiP StSftB

well provide the proper environment for the Army to dispose of ARBENZ and take over the government.

o) If neither of the above circumstances developed, then the expected reactionesperate enemy would be to indulge In excesses of brutality and/or defensive neasuresi his excesses would then serve to destroy bin.

f arrea^ initiated by the enemy onay

was countrywide and althoughinor scale to what soonthe Independent press spontaneously setue and cry that terror stalked the land. Enemy outbound corcwrclal aircraft had been hooked for weeks in advance with people wanting to leave before trouble

cameGuatemala. Parents were keeping their children hone from scnooi. Food prices went higher and higher as people began hoarding. There were no longer any tourists coming to Ouatemala, and business in general wasepression with no signs of improvement under thoregime. une, the first wave of persons seeking asylum In foreign embassies took place in Ouatemala City.

U, Augusto CHARKAUD KacDonald, Minister of Oovernment, announced that they had discovered "the best organized plot in the history of the country,'" that over forty of the hundred keywere known and that full details would soon be released after allaPPrehendad. ontrolled source reported that the Chief of Staff of the Army, Colonel PARKELLO, stated privately "the regime is at bay but is determined to fight for survival short of direct President ARBENZ announced that he was ready toery extensive internal conspiraoy directed from abroad and that police action would continue until this conspiracy had been eliminated. une,r, Director of Guardia Civil,losed meeting with all provincial officers presumably to review the campaign then underway against anti-Communists.

.u ater government announcementress conferencethe recent plot described itwar of nerves" and saidclandestine radio was spreading unwarranted fear throughoutthat the plotters were organising civilian brigadesivil war; and that no member of the Armed Forces wasin this vast conspiracy. The announcement further statedhad nothing to fear as long as they stayed withinbut anyone spreading subversion would be punished. Democraticliberties were to be preserved at all costs. Thesuspend those liberties unless necessary. The press waa

warned against the use of unconfirmed information, rumors and untruths. To guard against such falsehoods the Government would provide reliable information to the press. In otheroluntary censorship of the press was requested by the authorities. In the same announcement, the government claimed to know where the clandestine radio waa located.

nwLreceiving solidarity messages

as announced in Salvador that Colonel Rudolfo JIENDOZA, Chief, Civil Air Operations, and Major Fernando SHUPP, former member USAF Mission to Ouatemala, had fled from the countryrivate alroraf t, requesting asylum in Salvador. On tha same day aAir Force pilot defected with aircraft to Salvador and nine cadets of the Polytechnloal Institute, local West Point, deserted and wereheading for Honduras.


After an alleged meeting with Cortnunlst leaders and hia cabinet, Preeldent ARBENZ announced atOu, that all constitutional liberties had been suspended for thirty days, thiscomplete censorship of the press, grounding of all private and commercial aircraft, and the right to search and seizure without duo process of law. old move against the anti-Communists, this constitutedrastic, desperate action that it Immediately created fear and anxiety within governmental circles as well as among tho people at large.

h, ARBENZ had been given an ultimatum by thebreak with the Comuniota andew government or resign. was reported by three reliable sources which were insubstance but not Inthat the Council of

National Defense had called on ARBENZ to ostensibly thank him for theby. ALFHEM and naed this oocasion to tsll him thatwas solidly anti-Conmunist and wanted toreak with the The Army's dissatisfaction with the state of affairs was ESPERANCE reported thater cent of the Army officers hadtheir opposition to Communism and had asked ARBENZ to disposeCommunists and change the government or face an Array revolt. allegedly given untilU to take action. Stationthat rumors were circulating thatrmy officers hadto throw out the Communists and change the government orhad (riven Mmune to answer. Later, onU,reported to

uatemala, that ARBENZ had tola nim tne Army was

trying to persuade him to Jettison the Coaxninlsts and change thebut that he had no intention of doing so and would arm all the peasants if necessary to fight to the last nan.

A second Army incident with AR3ENZ apparently occurredU, which may haveubject of the above-mentioned meeting of the Council of National Defense. The Chief of Staff, Colonel PARUfELLO da Leon, was reported by an Embassy source as havingroup of Army officers who opposedropossd plan to arm peasants and workers to fight the antl-Communista. This action was disapproved and PARIN2LLO was given the opportunity to resign, which he declined. The neetina. however, served toreak In the AmyZ. L Jiad mentioned in his report of the meetingune that PARINSLLO'e position had weakened with ARBENZ and that the latter had rebuked Leonardo CASTILLO Floras, CNCO, for his circular to the peasanta,eferredlan for the mobilization0 peasants. Jhad not made any reference to the question of arming the peasants.adio newscast from TOW on this date stated that CASTILLO Florea claimed to have organised peasant brigades to aid ARBENZ and that the Army objected to his doing so, as the Army considered itself capable of handling the defense of the country.

During the first week in June, the Department of Stateits desire to convoke an OAS meeting of Ministers to consider the Guatemala situation in light of the recent shipment of arms to that country. Coincident with this diplomatic action. Foreign Minister TORIELLO made conciliatory gesturea to Ambassador PEURLrOI. Certainmisunderstood the Intentions of the Department of State and felt that this diplomatic step which was scheduledould result in damaging the resistance movement and permit ARBENZ time to consolidate bis position. In actuality tbe maneuver was an excellent


demonstration of the desire of the United States to use diplomaticin consort with member nations of the OAS to rectify tbein Guatemala, thus softening any charges of American interventionnilateral basis. Further, if PBSUCCESS was to succeed at all, It would have done so priorU. Uf TORISLLO told the Salvador an Ambassador that beaster card for the OAS meeting. He intended to request that the United States and Ouatenala sit in OAS as litigants and the other members aa arbiters.

0U, TGW reportededitiouswas crushed by the Ouardla Civil in Anatltlan Province near Duraeno, The disturbance developed when the Ouardla Civil attempted to arrest some people believed to be anti-Communists and were attacked by about JO peasants using machetes. Three Ouardla Civil officers were slain in the first encounter before reinforcements arrived from Ouatenala City, The number of peasants swelled very rspidlyairly serious situation developed. The Guardia Civil killed and captured an unknown number of the anti-Communists and drove the rest into the hills. It waa said that the peasants had been training and preparing to fightevolutionrigade.

Further reports of OAF pilot defections with aircraft were received from Salvador on. Twoursuit aircraftad allegedly been given the mission to search for the "phantom aircraft" which had been appearing over various parts of the country. However, after the GAP pilots became airborne, they flew to Salvador and asked for asylum, .tore cadets from the Polytechnioal Institute were reported to have defocted to the anti-Coommnists, Mexico announced she had closed her frontier to all traffic onune Onune, ColonelD0ZA took refuge in the Selvadoran Embassy* Onune, when MENXZA arrived in Tegucigalpa, headio address to Ouatenala saying that heerious split existed in the Army and was certain moat of the Army would join the anti-Connuniste told of the terrible torturing that was going on by the Guardia Civil and said that things were comingead. He was convinced neither the Army nor the people could tolerate the Communists any longer andevolution could come soon.

Onh, TOW announced that the Guardia Civil bad seised an arms cache in the home of Alfredo ABULARACH Sabat and that he committed suicide while being questioned by the police, Perfeotoell-known anti-Communist in Quezaltenango andC

fter being Jailed for several days, was found in tnenear oeath, having been run over several timesehicle. He died soon after. The Ouardla Civil claimed he had been released and apparently had an accident. On lit June, it was reliably learned that Gabriel MARTINEZ del Rosal, weU-knownournalist In the ESSENCE group, had bean tortured to death in Guatemala City. Meanwhile* reports and rumors were rampant that the jails and prisons throughout Guatemala wero being filled with anti-Communists and that terrible tortures and executions were taking place. Many of these reports were made by the hundreds of people fleeing across the border into Salvador and Honduras, or seeking aaylun by diplomatic neana.

On the diplomatic front, Presidont OSORIO publicly acclaimed the complete neutrality of hie country,

_jli wisjjno Honduras repneo -iiXm tic overtureMutual Friondahlp and Non-Aggression Pact" to the effect that Honduras could see no reason foract at this tine, and preferred to seek its international de-fenae in the treaties and covenants existent within the framework of the OAS. They denied the existence of any trained relations between the two countries or the possibility of war. Thus, in essence, Honduras politely but firmly rebuffed the Guatemalan effort to neutralize that country.

The rumors regarding tho Army's ultimatum to ARB3NZ, which were believed to bave contained some basis in fact, had reached Mexico and the Dominican Republic where they were recited over the respective radio programs, heard in Quateaala. The enemy obviously reacted at once, and all day onk, over TOW an announcement wasevery five minutes categorically denying such reports, claiming that the Army waa more loyal to ARBENZ than ever before. The enemy also denied the defection of any OA? pilots or aircraft, or any cadets of tha Polytecfinical Institute. TOW reiterated many times that the nembers of the Armed Forces were completely loyal and were in no way Involved in the current conspiracy.

Following the second successful air leaflet drop which was made over Quiche, Quezaltenango and Kasatenango, and the first arms drophich was unsuccessful, the enemy became more alarmed than ever and the Army became openly disturbed over its vulnerability to air attack. Auguato CHARHAUD ItacDonaldublic release onunein which he said the government haderies of emergency measures to meet the situation described as being "acute." The Department of State was cited as the instigator of the subversive movement now underway giving proof by reciting its stand at Caracas OAS Conference and tho public statements made by American officials.

esult of the first arms drop in the Tequlsate areanmall number of arms were turned over to the Guardia Civil, the Communist controlled peasants in the area ceased working on their farms and formed armed bands patrolling all roads and villages as far as Guatemala City. The source of this report stated that the small Army elements in tbe area were forced to take orders from the local Communist leaders.

At the close of thia period, the anemy had announcedational maaa rally would be held0 onunein Ouatemala City and that several hundred thousand loyal peasants and workers would participate. The Voice of Liberation warned the people to stay away from this meeting, inferring that there would be trouble. LDiCOUi urged Station Ouatemala to inform t_ Jto use his influence to warn the Amy that if this meeting too* piace, it would resultBogotazo" and the Communists planned to use thisopular move to take over fron the Army. Whether this message was delivered, or, if eo, whether it had any effect, is not known at this writing. However, by noon onune the mooting had been cancelled despite the presence in the capital of hundreds of persons from out of the city. 0 hours this


auntthe city firing machine-

guns into the air to terrorise the crowds in the main plaza. The effect

anic as peopled inlve^

SiLWhat KaSdemonstration^

solidarity for the enemy regime turned out toemonstration of friendly air power resulting in pandemonium.

2. Analysis

. of this stage toritical situation

o PBSUCCESS would emergeonsequent thereof orinimum the situation would be broughteak of

SSon "Nation of the latterS P speared to be extremely

fri6?dIyerrible toll to many anti-Communists and possioly many innocent persons. However much it may have hurt, it

a?r? JHedanonatrato conclusively the evils of Communism and removed" f" gy completely from the ranks of the antl-Cormunists. The issue became drawn and clear; there was no middle ground.

a*.periodresulted in PBSUCCESS losing

organization but it also created great

0 demonstrate that the Army was not com-

SesaSSt8wmis^ despitelersonal loyal-

Jpflod 0AF was ^ om-

pletely ineffective force through defections.

B. Friendly Situation8U)

bosses Sustained From Enemy Action

- y realized in the beginning of PBSUCCESS and allowed

build-up period and the showdown for reasons stated under

of this report. It was also recognized that the enemy would engage inaat-ninute' desperate act to preserve his regime. tr operational plans it was contemplated that the basic etructure

ce TOuld oonpletely clandestine and highly compartaented. However, in actual practice, long delays wereand circumstances did not permit the orderly/ey^t^ or?

as pWd-h WSUriHas es?Lateday should be during the first ten days in June, and barrirr unfor-

J* operaUonally^adTbV^daSf However, in the period followingerch, thirty days were lost due to poUcy indecisions;. ALFHEM incident caused additional delay through diversion oferious blow was dealt the 0pera5ofin

P e overlooked worn the delays encountered in Hondurasesult of P

alTmovements for

mentioned obstaclesf6 or^Einal conclusion that theUrin! th? ^Qth"till considoreS

o?not Tntperationally rlady

"as based on the belief that from June onward/ friendly assets would be experiencing the law of diminishing returns for

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effort expended. Forf.lM&Pj^triiitfJ5 were pressed hard for the maxlnun readiness in June. By the end of Stage Three, an active, organized underground was "in being" but not yet trained in clandestine techniques or conpartnonted, as this was to be done during the first two weeks in June by the SARAUAC-trained organizers and instructors. According to the plan, this formalising and going underground by the partisan force was to have been largely accomplished in Stage Threo, In order to be able to withstand enemy action while preparing clandestinely for Stage Five. Therefore, when the major crackdown was started by the enemy aboutay, SEliAHTIC and SECANT were still in the organising stage and thetarget organizers and Instructors had not yet entered Guatemala.

The above aituation may have been fortunate in the long run as the enemy's roll-up proved far more extensive and severe thantemplated. As it turned out, all the top echelon of the agent mechanisms escaped capture either by fleeing the country or going into deep hiding. The second echelon suffered badly; many were captured and tortured, and sono did not survive the treatment they received. If the third echelon may be considered as tho file or participants of the movement, it is impossible to estimate even at the date of this writing how many of them were seised, tortured and probably executed. Some well-qualified sourcea place the number of persons arrested atithf then being executed or dying from mistreatment. reat many of this third category were never actually involved In PBSUCCESS but were arrested simply because they were known aa anti-Communists. The brunt of the enemy's brutality fell upon thoso people.

Aside from breaking up the underground organization in terns of individuals, the enemy's seizure of documents fromone resulted in the following compromise of PBSUCCESS plans:

Collection Point:

The key collection point for arms smuggled fromultimate distribution via truck to GuatemalaQuiche and Cohan was locatedarmnear Gualan. SEMANTIC,

who was in charge wue internal trucking arrangements, had all the plans for this collection point among the papers which were seized by the Guardia Civil. The first shipment of arms had moved out of Tegucigalpa for Piedras Blancas onay and consisted of four tons of diversified area. Upon receiving word ofompromise, the Field Command Post (FCP) was informed at onco to withdraw the shipment. Fortunately the mule train was Intercepted before it reached the farm, and the arms were returned to Honduras*

J* "jwas alerted but was nevertheless apprehended on $

Tune anc later executed.

Tank Car Plan

One of tbe most promising rapid means of getting armswasail tank car plan. ^fgasoline In tank cars from Puerto Barrios toand, after unloading, these cars were returnedPuerto Barrios. Throueh

in San RalewtftvGuatemala




was worked out whereby arm trucked into San Salvador couldclandestinely at night into the empty cars. Whenwaa completed,in Ouatemala City would be

informed by cable message ana wie cars would be ordered back to Puerto Barriosormal manner; however, en route they would be placediding near Gualan not an unusual occurrencewhero they would be unloaded clandestinelyeception team. SEMANTIC had arranged this plan in Ouatemala City, and unfortunately the plan was among the papers seized by the enemy. All participants in this plan were promptly arrested by the Guardia Civil.

c) Air Supply Plant

Although no specific dates were provided SEMANTIC, the plana for air supply of different partisan groups wore passed to him in April includingi Orid coordinates of DZ's, number of, number of bundles and contents, tine of drops, DZ markings and danger signals, all clear signals, and disposal instructions. These plans were all compromised; However, as SEMANTIC claim* no tactical maps were seised, it was unlikely the enemy could decipher the coded, special grid coordinates used.

Defection Plan:

The plan for GAP pilots to defect with aircraft to SOMERSET had been passed to SEMANTIC Just prior to his escape front the police* It is not known whether this information was in such form as to completely reveal^ art and the special signals. However, the plan was considered as compromised,

Sabotage Plan:

ories of letters and plans forwarded to SEMANTIC for firming up within Ouatemala City, lt is believed that he had among his papers more or less the whole comuni cat ions sabotage plan for the Capital, which included radio,telephone and telegraph systems and points ofas well as the names of the saboteurs in place who were to perform the acts.


Undoubtedly SEMANTIC had among his papers the nine target complexes and the names of many of the key personnel as well as the nature of each complex and area organisation. The extent of this compromise haa not been determined at the date of this writing, as tha names of the military and civilian leaders have not appeared among those arrested during thia period.

for Organizers:

It Is quite possible that SEMANTICopy of the instructions for the organizers which explained their duties in organizing cells, clandestine techniques, sabotage, street fighting, guerrilla warfaro, team action, etc. The releases

TOP sn:ncT.



made public Airing thia period reflected considerableabout the plans of the conspiracy, which inforr.ation was close to being accurate.

u"ificationnfonution I" *manner,J* at aU' ad lived forear in greatbe exceptionally adept in clandestine^fSLrs.

f0UX ^nth8 havlne completely black and nad

"ostly blunder which However, upon examination, ompromised, it was still possible tothe situation and plan anew where

2. Propaganda


tS cantur. It Sia' SeTeral tiaM tf"announced wasSf tedly claimed that the stationhe Honduran Oovernment seised an illegal

itaimmediately claimjd

ridi^le^hlthe latter come back *

tT^^t' claiming all the while to be in the" of the programsPro3ect etherised tho transfer of thef

nnouncers to SHERvrjoolor

? CMl5'Ch4nge Waa ^thout interrupting the ^SS^St'SSSl^ST^optionally important stap as opnentaf losely Integrated with operational devel-

3. Intelligence

Eternal assets, and the forcing of

jnfrTJnt^t^ . * country, effectively tarainatad all

fTr co^^m 1neta> ?SreUance on Station Guatemala

lu Para-miitary

JunQ was devoted to an aaaeeement of theEMANTICS files, and tohe 22 Prolans thus encountered. The most serious loss was in the arms Ingress plan, which necessitated relying heavily on airlift to make up for the time and facilities lost by enemy action! Special* briefSZ

in raanant* recoCnisederious aituationor partisan force, it was believed

aS iTS^ 2andlhat "t7 or e more ready than ever to participate

evolt against the Communist regime. Therefore onune theand sabotage leaders were given their final briefing and dispatched to their respective areas of assignment.

The radio operators, having graduated from SCRANTON and returned to Tegucigalpa, were given their final briefing and asalgnments. Considerable difficulty vaa encountered in trying to infiltrate the radio sets into the areas, due to the extensive eoourity precautions being taken by the enemy. Station Guatemala was called on to oache several of the radio seta and others were carried In by different means. Byune,,ere in place and in contact with the base. All TRO's were with their respective Shock Teams awaiting activation.

About lhU the field reported thaten had ex-filtrated from Guatemala and wanted arms so that they could return and fight. It was planned to form these men into small groups of five to ten men each, and to give then arms and instructions on how to engage In harassment tactics. They were to be known as HORNETS and were considered of possible value if they did nothing but oreate disturbances throughout the countryay arrived. However, onune when the Shock Teams were formed to move out to the staging sites, it was learned that CASTILLO Armas did not have available all the men he had claimed. It therefore became necessary to'Incorporate these new arrivals into the Shock Teams.

Byuneall the Shock Teams were in readiness at the staging sites as follows:

Puertoen, CO. Colonel TORRES.

Missioni To move from ilacueliso to Tenedores to Entre Rlos to seal off Puerto Barrios.


mission! To Asuncion Mita to Jutiapa.

Zacapa0 men, CO. CHAJOH.

.-ttsslom To Carta Blanca and await signal for attack on Zacapa.

ChiQulimla6 men, CO. HEEK^HEITHAKN.

Mission! To Copan Rulnas to Camotan to Vado Rondo to seize Chiqulmula.

Suez altoen, CO. ColonelD0ZA.

Mission! To lleuvo Ocotepequo to Esquipulaa to Quezeltepequo.

en, CO. PEREZ.

. Kissioni To leave Puerto Barrios team and proceed to Morales.

Plans were completed on the ams program which provided fornumber ofay ajr nwmlv drorv by theso be flown bypilot ofGuatemalan

nationality who had only recently Joined CASTILLO Armas' forces. mall vessel was purchased and prepared for carrying three tons of arms anden to Puerto Barrios for the inner organization. It was learned from new contacts established in Guatemala City that the area group in Barbarena Dolores region was still intact and claimed they hadough partisans ready to fight as soon as they received arms. Special airdrop missions were established for this group. In addition, arms were moving


forward by private vehicles and lndividuale. All arms for theinto Salvador and readiedour. On 9

,Ris first flight in the Cessna to his farm near

Mazatenangomall quantity of arms and the saboteurs for this area. Onune ha repeated the trip carrying inM3'e0 rounds of ammunition.

Recognizing the importanceingle field commanderattack phase who would have authority to direct all around, airoperations, LINCOLN requested permissionassume, this position in Managua. Headquarters disapproved this = remain at LINCOLN as Chief of Operations. ThispreciudePhowever, the assignmentield rcmander anddelegated thisune

. The chain of command was thereby streamlinedi Headquarters - LINCOLN as OHQ; and Field Command Postless


5. rogram, Defection

under prompting by the Caserivate, conversation onk with PARIHELLO de Loon, Chief of Staff, and SANCHEZ, Minister of Defense, told them the Guatemalan government waserious moment. The American people were said to be determined to eliminate the Communists from Guatemala. They were told that an American was In town who was anxious to see them to make this position clear. Q Reported they reacted with obvious panic and replied there was nothing thlTAmerican could tell them that they did not already know.

eeting between the Case Officer3 June

, the latter stated that he realized the Liberation Movement had been hurt badly by the government's repressive measures but that the effort must be continued and he procoeedto carry on and organize an independentif necessaryJwas fearful that the United States waa permittingreathing spell by its aotions before the OAS, thuswing to the difficulties of the moment, the Case Officero lay low for the present.

U, tho day on which constitutional libertiesthe Casethatrogran was

stalemated and that the enemy was going through an Impressive The opposition had been subdued. The Case Officer seemedthe United States was abandoning the "go it alone" program andcollective action to resolve the problem. In conclusion, heauthority to return to LINCOLN onU. LINCOLNurging him to remain as the damage to the internalnot too serious and tbe external assets were very much intactbuildingreater capability; thus there was no reasontoeld at this" critical moment. Station Guatemala didinthe Station reported it would be unfor-

tunate timing, asaojej becoming no re favorable than ever for to return to LINCOLN for up-to-


Duringbreaking off periodcrieie

U developed beSJeen the Armv and ARBENZ, as reponedSituation for this period, nd de-briefing

at LINCOLN, lt became clearpossiblyoint in the

m sccnn


development of hia plans that be could make an affirmative moveArmy coup, providing CASTILLO Areas' movement could devolop someturn-oil to stimulate action. timulantthat he ho informed that if he were toe facto government, the United States wouldhim. It was forseen that CASTILLO Armas might be capablea successful military campaign ould capitalizebyoup against ARBENZ. Thisould In anyin PBSUCCESS achieving its objective, and the final outcomea strictly local matter. LINCOLN concluded thatC- houldto take action soonest and requested Headquarters biurronce

Upon receipt of Headquarters concurrence in the foregoingaction, onU, LINCOLN cabled Station Guatemala that theappeared to beery critical point and that it waswo seek and apply maximum measures at this moment to force thethe absence o'C, he station should use ESQUIRE towaa imptuthe'Q, ade tc realize that the moral

issuevoiding bloodshed at thiswas so overwhelming that he must press for aotion within the Army at once toerrible tragedy. (Z as to be assured of the fullest covert American support and that oT^the Liberation Jfovement which was gaining strength rapidly. There was to be no question of the ultimate outcome. Communism would not be

Tne aboveast-minute maximum effort to force anbefore preparing for the final assault byto return to Guatemala Cltv by first available cocwi-cxalto assist in the handlingwitfC^ s directed above am urgeo umcall uponin tne army to take action at once to remove ARBENZ.C not disagree but reiterated his previous condition that some lornor strength be demonstrated by the Liberation &venent toa catalyst for the Army, making an issue of whether the Armyfor or against Communism. The mass rally planned foruneGuatemala City was selected ir. CZ. s the optimumforonb in the center vf the racetrack nearby totho Army into action and enable him to execute his coup ecame vory insistent on this point and Stationshareo ma viewomb would have the desired effect. had plannedighter aircraft demonstration overcoincident with the rally, LINCOLN did not concur in dropping aHeadquarters shared this view. Although the fightersaryeffect on the populace and served to alarm the Army Jflatly stated he would not be able to force the coup untilhad been met as specified in the caseomb. the eveay, the effort to force the Army coupfailed to materialise.

Military fl! J

The Case Officer reported that he hadesirable location for his station and had received and installed allequipment byU.


Permission was obtained for the purchase ofnd the deal was consummatedU, in the name

top sccnn


CASTILLO Armas, s QSHlBJ. acting as the agent. The

Jpurchaee plan waa discarded Jpointed out it waaentral America and everyone knew it "belonged to him. Attempts purchaseahrough Statebecame bogged down over purchase and title procedures. ere to be sold to CASTILLO Armas in the same manner as Hsent strong cablesWashington to expedite

the transaction and onunethe deal was'conaunmated. Through prompt and effective action between Headquarters and the Air Force,8 were placed in combat operational condition in Puerto Rico and were flown to FJHOPEFUL onune and ferried to SOMERSET tha following day. In the meantime the air ordnance requirements established by LIKCOLK were airlifted to FJHOPEFUL and transshipped by black flights to SOMERSET.

U, tho air leaflet drop was successfully executed over Quiche, Quesaltenango and Haaatenango. Pilots reported in the last town they could see people get outrain in the station to pick up the leaflets, and wave at the planesecond pass over the town.

During tha period8, the air supply drops scheduled for this period were conducted. On the first mission, lii June, athe drop was made without receiving the proper ground signal, which resulted in some of the aims being recovered by tho enemy. Air Operations were cautioned against this practice. Consequently, on the ndasions immediately following, the supplies were not dropped because the crews failed to find the proper ground signals. The situation was rapidly becoming critical, as it was known that friendly forces were in these areas. It le not known whether they had failed to receive tha couriers with the DZ instructions, or whether circumstances locally prevented them from giving the proper signals. After de-briefing tho pilots, the Air Operations officers were satisfied that the failure of the missions was not caused by inability to find the correct DZ sites, although this could well have been the case in certain instances. Two missions aborted due to weather. After conducting fourteen unsuccessful missions. Air Operations was authorized to make blind drops in areas where it was reasonably certain friendly forces would be able to recover them. Cargo flights on blind drops successfully discharged their cargo as follows:

undles at

undles at

undles at

undles at

OnU, after planes had sustained flak damage over Guatemala City, authority was received from Headquarters to engage in flak suppression attack under limited conditions and to bomb military targets in the tactical areas. By this date the Air Operations Section at SOMERSET was fully staffed, air ordnance was in adequate supply and the following aircraft were available for operationet s; T's; and6 (not operational). Two lightessna-ltiOessna-lBO, were transferred to the operational control of the FCP in Tegucigalpa.

8. Analysis

The operational objectives of this Stage were not successfully realised owing to the effectiveness of enemy action and the unfortunate seizure of considerable operational data from SEJIAKTIC. The internalorganization was almost completely lost, leaving only the external



assets intact at the ond of the period. rogram was not damaged by the enemy, but on the contrary reached maturity during this time and gave cause for encouragement of ultimate success. Despito ths adversityforay preparations were authorized for implementation. Maximum readiness of Ul remaining assets was achieved onk, and PBSUCCESS was prepared to make an all-out effort to attain its objective.

Ul. Conclusions (Establishmentouray)

f PBSUCCESS from the date of its inception was

Army would be the key to success or

mounted by PBSUCCESS had the one ultimate objective

of creating pressure internally and externally on the Army to force or persuade it to dispose of President ARBEHZ and the COrsmunists.

Jp^.exa?inajl0n^ options it may be clearly seen that SST^ *1 hat anti-Communists were shaken from their apathy and organizedorce that threatened the stability of the government, that the government was broughtoint ofwhich resulted in the commission of excesses against the majority of its people; thatesult of this situation created by PBSUCCESS, the Amy was forced to the point of vital decision as to whether lt would continue its support of ARBEHZ and his Corounist masters, or remove this cause celebre of the people.

D. In the crisis at hand during Stage Four, in full recognition of the operational losses sustained, it was concluded that nothing would be gained by further withholding of external assets. It was decided that an all-out effort should be made to determine whether the anti-Communists, oncehance to fight, would do so, and whether the Army would fight effectively in defense of Communism. Thus, it was dotorminsd onkour would"ay would behV'






I. Objective:

- To make maximum, all-out effort to defect the Guatemalan Army IT. Chronology, 0k)



Strategy i

Z?awould be employed until eo authorised by Headquarters. ^ econdary strategy, tha employment of para-mmtarvea^

what extent. Tactical Situation:

at their^SS-L f? St^ge Four ae being ready

6 eaatern boundary of Guatemala. bLan


Itarffi mpply nd.rt.iM sohadnLi for this



clandestine radio or "Voice of Liberation" (VA) inmaterT^etely noUonal broadcaat stating that an Army of overQ^temalan exiles hadar against atrong to-coast attack was said to be underway with

Spl^n^l^Ptfld.ia Sa"tankaablaze/and

in Puerto Barrios where there was fighting in the streets.were said to have broken out in many places in the tottrS?.

trong broadcastnaent, charging thatart^EE H tonalan Orders, dropping arms andre actually paid mercenaries of the

nd orders were issued forudontBfense of0 faU- Guatemala is the symbolS other


ircraft demonstration over the Capital was toconditions to enable him to organic

were no?h. h tothat aerial acrobaUcs were not enougn: he hadomb dropped within the City on the

SJ^JJ other moana, to be able to

bring the army to the aotion contemplated.


lishedto^on estab-

day has8sufficient orally acceptable. Although all air

of the

air exists. The failure to align Salvador with CASTILLO Armas resulted

e?Olfi0?toe intended for JutiaPa> ^ch wfr^ from immediate plans: Enemy troops were roportedly In strength all along the frontier of Honduras; therefore

wfth^sffS^urs! 10




XC*?turged authorization be granted to make limited use of air fire power for flak euppreealon and tactical requirements.

Taotical Situation!

inh^ *SSatone was eliminated In Salvador. Of the five remaining teams no reports were received on this date from Puerto Barrios, Morales or Zacapa and it waa assumed they werT on the march to their respective positions.

The CMqulmula Team, CO, mBSSBEmm, wasCamotaninor flrefight, one WIA, one POV and j iguel MEMDOZA, reporUd at

efl0rUonaoccurring, transporting of was reported holding nigh

queued! and ChWtepeque. Aerial reconnaissance was rj-

. abotage team sent to Gualan to blow the rail bridge accomplished its mission. Civil disturbances reported in Hetalhuleu and ^uesaltenango were believed to be caused by partisan forces.

trafing attack on Puerto Barrios airfieldID and hand grenades. The following air supply drops

i*rescorted7hen buzzed the Capital, dropping leafletsj they also buzzed Zacapa and

BU3taiMQ *over


friendly: Leaflot drope wore conducted over the Capital by fiflhter

ain Shock liana,

presumably engaging in field propaganda activities. roadcasts

* S* S ^radio themes^ ftf Mnfld,ncevictory Khila* efection of tha Amy. CASTILLO Armas requested

to Joln the Cause byune, but this

oraafS tofl?StPr8^tUr0 ft'PtZaC6pa- the'official

jiS?Latlon "towwot* quoted throughout the world, chiefly

olOMl RudoUo ltEND0ZAinterviewed as ?ai?th*ity. CASTILLO Armas- fight Presented, showing great confidencereat cause. Falar

onHf* 6iVOnrovided detailedsabotage techniques.T, Dominican radio, continuedfor support of CASTILLO

SP.announced Ouatemala had requested the CW Security

TeaPJH SUCd?7the internationaliadthe quetzal was to

People to have confidence In their currency, government radio also warned that penalties would be invoked on


^f3 ^their businesses, and urged oeople to bo calm-everything was said to be under control. Solidarit/^sstges were

student.on behalf of the Guatemalan"Stained an extra-heavy propagandalarr^oS

praiX of tt^Sn^ He concluded In praise of the "new Amy of Ouateaala" that would defend her honor An


ARBENZ assumed direct command of the Amy. admittedly because of

waS Si, . chance to defect the Army.

f ^ LDW0LH requeet^auUority tT


; flUccese and/or strength remains only notional. Unless sub-

1^ r^ Clatoa of Oration Movement, it will be running grave risk of being exposedyth, thus giving aid and comfort to the enemy who is presently believed to be in doubt.





Failure of demonstrated air power capability to oroduce the rf*

Smid<iUir"ra"convinced itif^damage to interest?of

Tactical Situation:

^r'ting beyond Tenedoree near Entre _h IDERHErT^ra reported having captured Camotan^ cmualty-


About tanHafD0ZA captured Esquipulas without reeletanca.

*CHAJ0N t Wedras BlancasT CF-yoS/tae

U- "Ported need for additional email arms and

aw-tam. Bombing of Zacapa waa requested

to Mr. wbhivwa ujUP* er FERNANDEZ was re-equipped and aent thrt^ST^ o be ready for the attack on fron

M^ri- k ^ , enemy announced that Morales and Bananera wore in and ?SLl^ troop trains had been macKgunned trairsarrios. Station Ouatemala reported troop

out of Ouatemala City were reported, destination unknot klrZrZJS

* students and Uborers were Report

ror induction. Large truck convoys were to move the newly inductedonce to La Ermita to engageVSSSt




away from military targets in tne Capital. Considerable attention was given lo tne Army, leading from strength and keeping to moral, patriotic lssuos. Instructions were given to mythical brigades and agent teams.ave an encouraging broadcast stating that CASTILLO Armas wasighly successful battle at Chiquimula. Radio San Salvador repeated the story of ARBEHZ taking charge of the Amy because he could not trust his officers. The Liberation Army claimed the oapture of Retalhuleu. Motional themes became threadbare as facts became more generally known,rowing need for more eubstancs to support victorious claims.

r.nomy; Tbe Guatemalan complaint was in process of being reviewed by the Security Council of the United Nations, with the Soviet assuming the role of defender. The United States position, supported by several Latin American countries, was that the proper international body for this complaint was the OAS, not the UN, according to the charters of both OAS and UN. Meanwhile, under the intense stimulation of the Soviet, the force of World Communist propaganda was brought to bear on the case of Guatemala, with practically every Communist country in tbe world responding more or leas with the same Communist theme. Considerable adverse propaganda was also engendered by this campaign from many governments and organizations not believed to be under Communist influence* In addition to thisexternal propaganda, TOW carried on with its set tirades against the "invaders'1. An appeal was made to all vehicle owners to make their vehioles available for any emergency. All gasoline sales were rationed for military use only.

K-Program i

Tho Guatemala Station and the Ambassador remained adamant in their recommendationomb be dropped over the Capital in order to set the stage forC, Jto defect the Army. The Station had not con-tactedC- Jsince The possibilities for the Amy'e defection were believed to have lessened with the large movement of troops to the field.


destroyed in manycut or

elusively on radio!the enemy to rely almost ex-

General :

The Guatemalan situation had cone before the world and was rapidly resolving itself into an issue between the United States and tho Soviet, involving the prestige of both countries. The immediate action by the enemy In taking its caae before the UNime when he held everyadvantage except moral righteousness.trong probability that the Soviet desired to exploit the situation for its own ends. Aside from this consideration, it may wall have been that the enemy knew that the majority of the poople were opposed to Communism, and, lacking confidence in hia own Armed Forces in the faceell-organized threat, appealed to the UN for sucoor out of sheer doubt in hie ability to handle the problem.

In the field, the propaganda war of nerves was rapidly novingilitary eituatlonajor engagement was expected to develop within

seem i

in air power and???

expected to resolve^

-rep-scene, t-




No change. LINCOLN requested removal ofuthority and granting of authority to employ air power as required to meet the present "military situation." Time was considered vital to success. The situation waa complicated by UN hearings and by the fact that the enemy claimed his capital had teen bombed. Tbe position of the United States was made stronger in the face of this falsehood; therefore the decision to validate the enemy's claims required careful consideration regardless of the exigency In the field to take this action.

Tbe authority of the Fieldwas redefined

as pertaining only to tactical operations within the conbat zona. Strategic operations outside tho conbat zone were to be directed by LINCOLN per Headquarters policy guidance.

Tactical Situation:

Ground s ate report received indicated TORRES had captured Chachaguaiillanune, Champonand Entre Rloenune, destroying all land communications at these points. Onune, TORRES reportedly captured half of Puerto Barrios but due to lack of ammunition and supplies had to withdraw to Corrodoresor aerial re-supply.

The supply boat with arms for the Puerto Barrios inner organization was reported by the enemy as capturod after several days of firefights.

captured Morales, Bananera and Los Anates; as

there was no radio operator, reports were received by courier.

CHAJON was re-supplied by air four alias from Gualan. Later de-briefing of the TRO revealed that CHAJON hadatrol to Gualan where, instead of reconnoiterlng, they became engagedire-fight. CHAJON rescued the patrol and continued the atack into Gualan,

NEIDERHEITMAIG' consolidated his position at Jocotan and prepared to attack the enemy in the area of Vado Hondo.

MENDOZA received the FERNANDEZ team and together they were preparing to attack the enemy at Quezaltepeque. MENDOZA reported havingen while in Esquipulaa.

Estimated strength:

handmade TNT bombs in the

Cessna-ISOT made an air attack on Puerto Barrios, hitting andgasoline storage tank. While attempting to destroy two AT-6'sground, they were brought under heavy if} fire and barely Managedto Honduras where theyorced landing. Supplycompleted as follows: 1 at2 at Fighter missions were flovn to2towns in the combat zone,ight unidentified aircraftat Esquipulaa, and sustained minor damage from small amsreduced to on* fighter aircraft, permlesidn was granted topurchaseto replace the one lost onune. Head-

quarters initiated action to obtain threes

for resale to SOMERSET.

"nanyt Zacapa strength was reinforcedotal of LUGO troops includingn outlying areas. Puerto Barrios strengthen, who were reportedly short of ams and ammunition.



Friendly: One leaflet drop was mace on enecy troopa nearT continued the amplification of previously mentioned themes in support of tbe Liberation Movement and appeals to tho Airy, mentioning large-scale defections taking place among troopa who were reportedly turning their guns around to fire on those who remained to defendtated its case for the foreign free press, requesting them to make known to the UN that the Guatemalan government did not represent the people, and that thisase of rebellion as most of the troops were within Guatemala and only exiles were crossing the border*

Enemy: Foreign Minister TORIELLO reported over TGW that the Security Council of the United Nations hadesolution condemning the fighting in Guatemala as an act of International aggression and called upon all nations concerned to close their borders and to discontinue any support to the aggressors. essage waa read over theradio from the Guatemalan Ambassador concerning his government's appeals to Honduras to close its borders and arrest all Guatemalans who were breaking the peace between the two sister republics. Messages of solidarity were read over.TOW from countries throughout the world aa proof of the popular support for the ARBENZ regime. It was claimed that the American pilote downed in Mexico had been engaged in bombing the Capital, and that the only damage sustained was on Colonel Rudolfo lENDOZA's home, which was burned to the ground.


Reports from Station Guatemala appeared very discouraging,Government was becoming confident and the anti-Communistsfurther contact was madeboth the Station and the

Ambassadorinal oleaomb on the Capitalatersame daystated ARBENZ made a

strong bid fo*^T_ Tsupport through an intermediary, of ferine tlal campaign if he would indur*^ Jfco makespeech or some other expression of support.Q 3a of tho OAF were bitterly anti-ARBEWZ. An ARBENZ representativeofficers in asylum that CASTILLO Armas would be defeated thisan Army Forcehousand men will mow them down." The

believe In the effect^Jsaid thoy didacrobatics^ SCOffed at theij

cnly waitin, for the-


Although Guatemala was successful in obtaining support in the Security Council of the United Nations, thanks to the Soviet and France, it now appears that the United States and other nations will bein transferring the action to the OAS for appropriate disposition. The support in the Security Council and the steady, world-wide barrage of propaganda sponsored by the Kremlin have undoubtedly given considerable moral courage to the enemy. Vlith the resulting stiffening of spirits, it is only reasonable to expect that ARSEXZ should anticipate early victory ovor the Liberation Army, particularly as thus far his troops have not actually come to grips with CASTILLO Armas. Accordingly, the effectiveof PBSUCCESS air capability became essential on this date.




No substantial change. Policy on use of air power was clarified to the extent that strafing of military targets was authorised and bombing would be limited to Chiquimula and Zacapa.

Tactical Situation:

Ground: TORRES and PEREZ were unreported on thia date. An attempt to re-supply by air was unsuccessful. CHAJON entered and captured Gualan and before he had an opportunity to consolidate hieuperior enemy force moved up from Zacapa and heavily engaged his forces.

Lieutenant CHACON badmall tean above Gualan for purposes of interdiction. HeHO and on this date reported he haden in his command. An effort was made to have CHACON, support CHAJON in Gualani however, CHACON reported that the enemy forces between his position,nd Gualan were too far superior to permit this action. The tactical plan for Zacapa provided for CHAJON to by-pass Gualan and attack Zacapa from the north simultaneously with synchronised attacks from the east and south by NEHERKEITMANN and MENDOZA, respectively. CHACON was to remain in place to block reinforcements to Zacapa from Guatemala City, Therefore, the involvement of CHAJON in Gualan dislocated the operation on Zacapa.

NEIDSHHEITMANN and HENDOZA Joined forces at Vado Hondo after capturing thia town. CASTILLO Armas Joined them at this point establishing the Advanced Command Post in Vado Hondo, The three officers then prepared the final plan for the attack on Chiquimula. essage waa received that Colonel FLORESorce at San Estebanverlooking Chiquimula and was under attack by the enemy. He reported the enemy had fortified positions between the rail line and the river fronting hie position at San Eeteban. The two senior officers of the Chiquimula garrison were captured by surprise at Vado Hondo, apparentlyatrol to recormolter friendly forces.

Eetimated strongtht

Air: Thes made continuous attacks on the enemy at Chiquimula using fragmentation bombs and hand grenades. Air supply missions were as follows: U at56 cargo at Esquipulaa and leaflets over Gualan and Los Robles. Fighter Missions: Strafed gasoline tanks near La Aurora Airport In Guatemala City, setting small fire and causing loss0 gallons of gasoline. Ho flak was encountered over Guatemala City, no activity sighted along the Pan American Highway. Headauarters succeeded in arranging for threeF-UT'e Jmeanvhile, effort was still being made 3nadnand for irowdiate use asS remained non-operational after an electrical fire. Additional personnel were assigned to SOMERSET. 'a were proceeding to FJHOPEFUL with second allotment ofmmunition and bombs. Onlyl remained

Enemyi It was reliably estimated the onemy hadrmy troops in the coabet zone including large elements of the Guardia de Honor and other first line unite. Examination of troop movements clearlythe enemy waslacer maneuver with forces divided between the northern rail line and highway to Gualan and Zacapa forming tho north prong and other forces entering the area via the Pan American


Highway to Ipala to form the south prong pointed toward Chiquimula. Both prongs could either cone togetherynchronized operation with friendly forces in the middle, or simply hold pressure at these points while conducting simultaneous flanking movements which would result in an envelopment of the friendly rear area.


Friendly; Despite the realities of theept some notional tone of confidence and great strength with victoryatterhort time. ist ofowns waa read off aa having been captured by the Liberation Army, many of which had actually been taken while others were mentioned purely as propaganda. Kany messages of congratulation and encouragement were given out to completely mythical teams or brigades in the enemy's zone of interior. The Sovietization of the Army, as allegedly planned by ARBENZ and the Communists, was explained at length citing the ALFHEM arms as being intended for the People's Army and stating the National Army was being sacrificed against the Army of Liberation to make room for the People's Army. ilitary Mission from Moscow was reported now sn route to Guatemala City to make this change. laimed Zacapa had been taken and all the troopa had Joined CASTILLO. Furtherwere provided" for anti-Communists in the interior to cut all tele-phono/telograph wires and keep them cut. old how ARBENZ tried to fleerivate aircraft but the Comnunlst leaders prevented his escape. ARBENZ waa asked to concede his defeat and spare his people and troops further bloodshed. This notional broadcasting in the absence of supporting substance was simply whistling in the dark butseful purpose in confusing all those who did not know the truth.

Enemy: The COTG and CNCG messages of appreciation addressedto the Soviet and French delegations at the UN were read over TOW, on the occasion of the support Guatemala had received from these countries in the Security Council. Many messages of solidarity from other countries or organizations were read over TGW as wellescription of the student pro-Guatemala demonstration in Tegucigalpa. TOW read an Army High Command bulletin which claimed the Rebels had been routed at Gualan and driven into the hills after Buffering heavy losses. The Army waa mopping up in the Gualan/Zacapa sector and would soonecisive victory. In Puerto Barrios two attacks by Rebels were successfully repulsed, one by sea and tho other by railroad; the Amy claimed the capture of vast stores of arms and one armed vessel. At Chiquimula the Rebels were also defeatedierce battle and were being pursued. The National Army claimed it was beginning its general offensive and the Rebel losses were great.ater broadcast, TOWumber of Rebels had parachutedthe lines only to be massacred by the peasants with machetes. The Ecuadorian Foreign Minister was reported to havoeeting with the diplomatic corps to protest the Invasion of Guatemala and asked all present to file similar protests with their governments.


-re dating to friend*tooT



decision were attributed to the United States, and would bethe attitude of the people toward lives and property ofIn Ouatenala. Several hundred people demonstrated beforePalace thus giving thef popularStation had not reportedune and

free its estimate, as noted above, the situation had greatlyproportionately diminishing the possibility of defection. Although admittedly the situation in the Capital appeared discouraging, LINCOLN did not share tbe Station's views on an overall basis.





No change In policy.

The friendly situation was considered precarious. Accordingly, the Field Commandor was directed to avoidinal stand at Chlqul-nula or Zacapa and, If necessary to withdraw, to do so without returning to Honduras, resorting to guerrilla warfare operations and making maximum use of air support. Every effort should be made to reach the enemy's rear. The present state of affaire would not be favorable for anyinto Honduras, as that country would be forced by world opinion. If not the OAS or UN, to disarm all such troops. Although friendly forces were landlocked, every effort should be made to seise Chiquimula and Zacapa, shortast ditch battle, in order to achieve an air baseivotal position for airlifting troops to attack either Puerto Barrios or Ouatemala City.

Tactical Situation;

Ground: No report from TORRES or PEREZ.

CHAJON wae overpowered by an enemy counterattack and forced to withdraw from Gualan to La Union. CHAJON was captured and reportedly taken to Ouatemala City and executed. The remnants of his group were contacted and instructed to join HELDERK3ITHANN.

MENDDZA and KEIDERHEITNAfIN attacked Chiquimulasupport excepttheho flew six hours over

Chiquimula dropping hand-made bombs, hand grenades and strafingMG, The ground attack was successful except for enemy troops in the garrison wherentl-Coimunlst prisoners were being held in the center courtyard. Thirty-two EH and two officers were captured. Upon questioning the PsW they reported tbe Army did not desire to fight CASTILLO Armas. The lack of fighter aircraft supporterious effect on the morale of friendly forces, despite their capture of Chiquimula, as it was expected the enemy wouldtrong counterattack and hie artillery batteries were still firing on the city.

Estimated strength: No report.

Air:theas tha only aircraft in support

of the attack on Chiquimula. Fighter strikes were made on this day as follows: Zacapa garrison hit withound bombs and strafed by three different sorties; railroad bridge heavily damaged south of Chiquimula and the railroad station at Gualan was bombed, weather was very poorT'a. Air supply missions were: 78 at Gualan and Jocotan. a .were operational as one was obtained fromL. ending the arrival of thee en route with ETA SOMERSETune.

Friendlyt The close proximity of tbe agent radio base station and the radio 'broadcast transmitter at SHERWOOD made lt almost impossible to carry on both activities simultaneously. Therefore when the tactical nets were active, as they were on this day, due to the battle at Chiquimula, it was necessary for the Voice of Liberation to remain off the air for long periodsime. During short periods on theavebattle bulletins and warned all persons to keep off the highwayZacapa and the Capital as it was heavily mined. trong appeal


tnter;Jtphold their traditions and fight on niet8- The Ouatenalan Air Force was chSsT


panting asylum to exiles from Guatemala and do-

bedllon Into an internaSonaTcoSllct,provisional government was announced aa having taken

frte aS .SFK^ the support oTSl

iree and anti-Communist countries of the world.

toOW. The people were urged

the^National Indian Federation were read as proof of their supportrogram:

he use of airrmative urging that full

support be provided CASTILLO Armas as increased pressure on theArmvwouS


tand prolonged tension.

sSo"^It'rfn capability should hereafter become a

ofS? Armfr ^action and in inducing defection

of tartS impatient with the restrictive use

Hm Sf-nSSabout the ePParent lack of success.

He demanded to see the senior person in charge of the ocerat'on for

t 2 Cr-he victory lo ChiquiSa

SL^edr LfS;renUyf fi6hte"aircraft,7ns ooneveo| Jwas somewhat reassured.

toon received from the Station ainceu.

- Ii, -

top sccnrj



8) .SSrSl.defection effortof military objectives within the City. and favorable, this action would beto seize and hold the National

b> POrce earliestdecision at *nd Zacapa, opening approaches to Guatemala City and poasibly achieving defection of the Amy.

e) Puerto Barrios, In the event the above actions fall or are determined beyond the estimated time limita maximum effort would be made to seize Puerto Barriosombined land and air attack. The early


"tabUshment of all support

Puertoprovl8ional 6ovemment in

Tactical Situation;

exceotved eitner TORRES or PEREZ

Chiqulmulai Fighter aircraft was directed acalnstwS17in the are. and an ^ir showna2 ovtr the


Estimated strengthi Unreported.







Wc-m cationa of succeas at Chiquimula, the enemr'a din-

ShllVSTnre^r6 preeented the Sua pol

ftturef Thf llrL^ "Ji?* W ent8 to tbe conbat zone coincident with

hat the ene^ was




in the event the raid on Katamoros failed to create early effec-tive results in inducing defection of the Army, tnen firs, priorxty vould be given to combat operations in order to secure the airbaseacapa Snifh would be vital to any airlift action directed toward either Guat-emala City or Puerto Barrios.

Tactical Operations:

Ground: Ho report fron TORRES or CHACON.

was reported under air attack by enemy AT-6's near

llorales and forced to withdraw into the hills.

Chiquimula: The enemytrong counterattack fron Zacapa. roup was to meet the attack but withdrew in the face of the enemy. LieutenantETA withstood the attacken. By his strong leadership and weapons placement he repulsed the enemy,nemy casualties, hany recruits joined CASTILLO'S forces at Chiquimula bringing estimated strength to0 in this city. Using thehartered aircraft in additions, an airlift was arranged to equip and arm the forces at Chiquimula infor an attack on Zacapa.

Air: s attacked Matamercs, but only one dropped its bonbs; the'second aircraft was unable to release its bombs but strafed the Fort. ireet hit was obtainedecondary explosion. During the day, fighterere nade against the trains in the Chiquimula/ Zacapa area and at Four trains were sighted and strafed with the engine of one exploding. One fighter aircraft sustained flak damage over the Capital butafe returnF2SCT. ridge was destroyed at .CI Jicaro and the road between Chiquimula and Zacapa was cleared of all traffic by strafing. upply mission was carried out at Chiquimularop was made atear Jalap*roup af women in the DZ. Shortly after tne Jalapa drop uaseport was intercepted that fighting had broken out in that city.


Friendly: oncentrated its available tire on toe ^tamoros idefectiorrthemTthroushout the day. Leaflets were prepared and dr opperoops in the field. ARBSKZ's appeal to Moscow for support was fully jBtploited.

tnda for this date. Program:

Enemy: Ko information is presently available on the enemy'shis

The bombing of Hatamoros was laid on to satisfy F 3sforoup. Prior tostrike. Station Guat-

advised that the Case OfficerPlanningoeparv that

or LIHCCLH by train via Haxico. washify.w. ii was assumed that the Station had takenhandlingno report of contact had been re-

iived by LhKOW since IS June. (SEE OVER)


Kin: Coi of


sp Officer ifii Prograajesire ts clarify thepgr returnfrom L'ncoln, *h* vtetler, .noer

^Mftd Lincoln instructions, took over my -air- aourcesi Cend

Afterdeparture frcm Lincoln and while enrcute tc -e'.emala City, th* Stationequest tc Lincolnhouin -v.

- arrive* in Guatemalaas adrisvd byC

j#ould be loa'h tc relinquish control averr;rrar having ro choice in theon'-urr*-dhe

It was arr'.ed by the Stationhould leave Goats malaearliestvailable. Since cranesc* the tr.

handii iv them


'v .wxican border,"




Without awaiting the re suite of the Matamoros bombing, it was decided to issue the terms for cease-fire and negotiations in the name of the Liberation Army in order to provide ARBENZ or anyone likely to succeed himlear eet of instructions as to what steps would have to ba taken in order toessation of hostilities.

Meanwhile, tha first priority would remain that of seizing Zacapa and securing it as an air base for lifting troopa as required.

Tactical Situation:

0roundt TORRES* group was believod decimated after strong eneny air and ground attacks at Champona. arge number of hia men were ill and were reported at Corredores awaiting re-supply.

PEREZ'S position was unknown] possibly dispersed.

CHAJON'a group was reduced toen after the defeat at Oualan and was reported at

Tha Chiquimula force was again counterattacked by tbe Zacapa Oarrlson; however, the enemy wsre caught in the open by fighterand thoroughly routed.

Jalapa: The small group that vera armed onunea larger supply drop on this date and they resumed the attack onreport from the Oarrlson CO. stated he

waa under0 Keoeis. It le possible that the timelyof the Jalapa Partisan Qroup delayed the Guardia de Honor elements from continuing their advance toward Ipala and Quezaltepoque, thereby preventing the enemy commander at Zacapa from committing his reserves at Chiquimula. The enemy strength was estimated athile friendly strength in the area was reported to.

Air: Fighter missions: Five trains were sighted in marshalling yards at Zacapa, one was destroyed and tho others damaged by strafing; strafed troops atestroyed artillery positions atxploded locomotive and strafed three trains at Zacapa; damaged bridge atestroyed artillery position atnd suppressed AA in Ouatemala City. One aircraft sustained battle damage.


Friendly! evoted almost the entire broadcast tine on this day to repeating the terns for cease-fire and negotiations aa dictated allegedly by CASTILLO Armas, although actually drafted at LINCOLN. The text as follows:

The Supreme Council of the Liberation Ifovement hereby announces conditions necessary to be net before peace and order may be restored to our country.

B, The Army ia not our enemy and we are not its enemy.

Our enemy and that of the Army is Communism, personified by ARBENZ.

We appeal to all officers and men in the Army to arrest ^confine immediately all members known to be Com-



ghthe Army



top sccncT



"cognition of the possibility that the enemy would be ableemploy hiegreater military capability, and that adecision would be the only solution to the situation,trengthen friendlyory as the prestige ofStates had become too deeply Involved to countenancethe impending action by OAS necessitated definitivethe remaining time *

MtX)UJheadquarters approved the following immediate measures:

Authorise CIA personnel to enter hostile territory to direct and supervise operations!

Issue 8lmm Italian mortars and Oeman

fighter aircraft capability by three orl's;

"raining center at FJHOPEFULeserve ofr more ClA/KUHOOK personnel for extra-hasardous asslgr-monts in support of operations;

and equip two ocean-going vessels in preparation for an attack on Puerto Barrios, one for assault purposes and


Premiset Either Zacapa air base would be secured, or Chiqul-mulaTand/or Esquipulaa airstrips would be available forground troops byune, and friendly forces would be reasonably intact.

ALPHA Operation, If sufficient favorable factors wereajority of enemy troopa away from the Capital City,

ckuHOuld be conducted to neutralise militaryin the City; the same day troops would be airlifted from one of the above airstrips to Jalap* andtrips, prepared to initiate ground attacks In theof the Capital. The next day under fighter cover, troops would be continuously airlifted to Cipreaalas Airport

ab0!jtufted during

daylight hours, establishing perimeter defenses upon landing. During the night the perimeter defenses would be enlarged and on the following day the attack on the National Palace would commence under fighter cover while additionalcontinued to arrive by air. The objective would be to seise the Capital City by airborne assault while Keeping the enemy's troops pinned down in the field.





- BETA Operation: If ALPHA were not considered favorableecision not rendered at Zaoapa, thenuly the following operation would be mounted to seize control of Puerto Barrios within 2li hourst TORRES' group would be re-supplied andn strengthjaa for attach by land fron Entre Rios supported by fighter aircraft. An armed assault vesselocket-launcher team ande coil less rifle teams of Americans supported by the vessel's fire power and fighter aircraft would attack the waterfront. With fighter aircraft havingide area around the airbase the previous day and repeated the process atroops would be airlifted to this base to form an attack coluan toward the center of the city. This preponderance of strength and fire-power would ensure the rapid capture of the city and enable the supply vessel to land the SHERUXID gear without dolay. The following day SHERTOOD and SOMERSET would be airlifted to Puerto Barrios and operations against the enemy resumed from bases entirely within Guatemala.

With the above as guidance, the Field Commander was directed to seize Zacapa air base byune, if plan ALPHA was to be implemented, oruly if Plan BETA was to be Implemented. If unable to accomplish these objectives, an orderly withdrawal would be made to Chiquimula holding this point until Plan BETA was completed.

Tactical Situation:

Ground; CASTILLO Armas led an attack on Zacapa and withdrewheavy oneray fire and lack of air support (weather). could only ba approached from Chiquimula by one bridge andwas in command of all high ground around the bridge, whichvulnerable to destruction by tha enemy. CASTILLO counted onaerial bonbardment of the enemy's position, accompanied byconvoyapid advance over the bridge to secureaide for the remaining attack force. Friendly rear guardat aboutas attempting to contain the enemy'aQuesaltepeque and/or Chiquimula while awaiting friendly airstrong enemy motorized column was reported moving towardwith the intention to sever CASTILLO'S rear route CASTILLO waa instructed to hold his present positionthat became impossible, to phase into guerrilla warfare but tomain engagement until adequate air support became available,28

llEj Capability increased to four operationallys en route. All tactical targets were weathered in for The only fighter targethip at San Jose

was unloading arms and ammunition. 8onb run onThia vessel,irect hit end caused lt to bum. Supply89 propped gas drums at Chiquimula and fragmentation bombs on the enemyC. O dropped suppliesndC.2RSET dispersed all aircraft after being alerted byT Tthat enemy aircraft obtained in Mexico were planning an air raid oTi the base.


Friendly.: During theeiterated tha ternsease-fire ana quoted the textassage sent by CXJZ War to all departmental governors to capture at once all knownand hold them in

f att8ckBhcct them tactics which the Army wae urged

warn^hn? ? oln ahbehz waa warned that the Liberation Army waa onlyilometers awav fron thA

seize ArfBLNZ and comply with the terns of cease-fire.


fcSJ nf^Perms of cease-fire at once or the City would be H, lit f " foUowedepetition of the cease-fire terms.hB Army "ot to accept DIAZ because newaT 8

to join the Aw of

kept stfloSSr,Carrled ARBEKZ'a fareTOl1 He attempted to martyr himself by

a sytboVorene^make him

. hate and therefore he would remove himself in order to snare

XTX10 roeram:

waa riL as tbe^arlv ld

^tne^iell hV^T"0

*asetition ofJun^tak0 Petition would be ready

his petition might induce DIA2 and

J 8committee in whichT 1


lillhould be the

nextanted PBUHBOI toease-fire so ttrttrooW



Blight be brought back to kaep order. CASTILLO Armas vas not acceptable to then. DIAZ was to tell ABBSKZ of the decision and if no agreeirent could be reached SANCHEZ was to bring up artillery. PSURIFOX declined to have any control over CASTILLO. econd meeting it was settled that ARBENZ was to go and DIAZ waa to take over. The Junta would remove all Communist leaders, sending them out of the country. The United States was asked to use its good offices toease-fire on both sides. PEURLTOT reported that the Junta should be foroed to deal with CASTILLO as ths man who had the courage to bring aboutownfall. General i

ARBENZ ostensibly resigned for the best interests of the people! however, his resignation appeared toolitical maneuver to remove the stigma of Communism attached to ARBENZ, while DIAZ would continue the Government along the identical course set by ARBENZ. econd bombing of Katamoroa was planned forune to demonstrate CASTILLO'S determination to force DIAZ to negotiate*

1 Jill 11

Top sLcnn-




_ Ho change fromU, except that LINCOLN waa2Sto the political eituaUon with Head-

quarters before sending to the field.

Tactical Situation:

TORRES waa contacted and re-supplied at Colonel BE^AIiZAloined TORRES, planned to conduct harSLmt operations on 29

PEREZ was located at Los Tarroswn awaiting resupply. He claimed he held Morales and Bananera for three days and was forced to abandon them for lack of arms and ammunition. He washe could recapture the towns afteresupply.

aa. CHAJ0?'SMaB re-supplied at eft. They were instructed to harass Zacapa from thelocated ateported enemy morale very

low and rapidly diminishing further due to air attacks and shortage of food. Many soldiers were dessrting and only the enemy's artillery units

^JT^?^ apa. CHACON was instructed to

assemble tus hundred men and Join the attack on Zacapa from the west on

woes at Chdouimula prepared for an all-out

attack to Hie present strength at Chiquinula0 well-armed men eager to fight.oordinated ground-air attack plan was completed for Zacapa, weather permitting. All troopa were preparing to move to the Una of departure under cover of darkness. All air capability was assigned to Zacapa for the attack. Fire power was increased by the arrival of six 8lna mortars. an faint attack was launched in the direction of Ipala for deception.

h4 ^Bhter aircraftirect hit on Matamoros on the second strike at this target. Ammunition was obviously hit,arge secondary explosion occurred. An attack was made on the TOW towers and transmitter

.TTTfL8a8onbs' the Pilot returned to strafe the building. omber strike on the Zacapa garrison resulted in aexplosion. Trains and trucks were bombed near Zacapa. Supply missions: S tot


sed themes of popular appeal to the Army: the

Junta, if true,tep in the right direction but not enough; the Army must join the Liberators. Leaflets were orepared for daylight drop in Zacapa0 was the deadline" for joining CASTILLO.


Information Is available on the enemy's propaganda

Station Guatemala advised that PEURIFOT made his agreement with DIAZ and the Oeneral Staff as the only expeditious way of removing ARBENZ DIAZ waa recognized as being too closely aligned with the past regime




to remain. eeting was0 hours thin date betweenCI

J It waa

toand that an agieaiwnt wouia be reacned with

CASTILLO. econa meeting was held with the following

j The point was

TuiaeDIAZ was too close to AB3EKZ. DIAZ

dosired to know if rBURlFOT would confirmview. Thus"EURIFOT joined the meeting and confirmed/.

J Colonel Elfego MJftZON, would oe-

cone the new presiaent of the Junta.

In the event DIAZ doublecrossedthe Station requested resumption of air raids. 0 hours the Station requested the City be bombed again as MONZOH had simply been taken into the Junta as Minister of Oovernment, and DIAZ remained as Chief of the Armed Forces. DIAZ claimed they were the real anti^mmunlsts and slandered CASTILLO. The Station's message ended, "Boobs would persuade them fastbomb this afternoon." Thirty minutes after this message was sent,sover the City and dropped two bombs on Katamoros,arge secondary explosion that shook the City.


Kith the enemy thus on the run, victory was indeed very close.

ion sfeea **

-top scene?


Strategy t

To exploit current cease-fire negotiations to obtain objective* of PBSUCCESS while remaining in readiness to rosume operations in tho event of failure.

Tactical Situation:

Ground: The Liberation Army waa ready and poised for the all-out attack on Zacapa when the cease-fire/suspend attack order issued by LINCOLN was received by CASTILLO Anus from the Field Cownander. At this recraont there0 well-armed men practically enciroling Zacapa where an enemy garrisonen awaited the attack from all sides aa well as fron the air. All troops were ordered to hold their positions, prepare their defenses and be ready to resume the attack in the event of treachery by the enemy. Colonel CASTILLO and Major OLIVA ontered Zacapalag of truce andocal battle-field cease-fire. The Zacapa Commander had received prior notice from Guatemala City of the impending cease-firs. However, his first question was whether CASTILLO would call offplane bomber attack which he had been told was plannod for the next day if he did not Join the Liberation Amy.

Airi Supplies were dropped to advance forces beyond Chiquimula. The following fighter sorties were flown prior to receipt of theorderi Air cover was provided field troops getting ready to mount the attack on Zacapa, artillery pieces were knocked out around the airridge was bombed east of Zacapa. ital hit by small arms fire and crash-landed at Chiquimula. The pilot wasand immediately flown out of the area and later returned to SOMERSET.


Friendlyi arried the cease-fire message all day. Leaflets were air-dropped on friendly and enemy troops announcing cease-fire preparations.

Enerayt No information is presently available on the enemy's propaganda on this day but it is assumed that TGW also broadcast the terns of cease-fire.


ireot result of the second bombing of Matamoros, the Junta promptly agreed to negotiate with CASTILLO. Using the good offices of the American ESnbeasy, the Service Attaches were to prepare the plansoint cease-fire. The Papal Nuncio was asked to be thef the negotiations. At 0Uu5 onune the Junta was taken over byZON as President, Colonel Jose Luis CRUZ and Major Mauricio DUBOIS. This Junta agreed to accept CASTILLO Armasember. xplained that DIAZ had forced himeal which obliged him to play his cards carefully for an inside coup, thus accounting for his actions.

Station Guatemaland others would welcome CASTILLO'S return to the Capital. The population waa overjoyed with the situation and wanted their hero to appear. The Aray was willing to deal with him. Inasmuch as the Embassy's good offices were being used to arrange the

top Mr



Project General:

aasauraed responsibility for thisand CIAshifted from operational responsibility to an In conclusion regardingrogram, in the final hour aluable^ the ultimate conclusion of this

infomedt was relieved of further operational

resporuabjlity now that the Department of State had assumed charge of the negotiations. lIBCOLM's responsibility for the next few day!was confinea to maintaining the status quo.





Colonel CASTILLO Annas, accompanied

Maoof OLIVA, departed this date for San Salvador to participate in peace negotiations.

TOP i'jlijIiii^



OSOPJO of El Salvador acted as mediator during the meetings the afternoon and night ofune, but no agreement could be reached between Colonel CASTILLO Annas, Chief of tbe Liberation Army, and Colonel Elfego MONZOK, President of the Junta governing Guatemala, Tho main point of disagreement was the presidency of the Junta. The meetings were dead-locked and on the verge of breaking down. CASTILLO Armas had made arrangement* to return to Chlqulnul*. Kajor OLIVA had already been sent back to Chiquimula with instructions to continue the march into Ouatemala City0uly if no agreement was reached and Colonel CASTILLO and hie party were forced to remain in Salvador. Rumors at the tine were that they would not be physically permitted to leave Salvador unless an agreement waa reached.

Ambassador PEDRLTOY arrived in San Salvador the morning of 1conference* eot under way againery strained relationshipOfficer, arrived in Sanuly and immediately contacted CASTILLO Armas andf_

^CASTILLO claimed tha? were in agreement except on the onepresidency of theunhappy about the way

the negotiatlono were pro seedinginstructions fron

Headquarters were "to support CASTILLO Armas in every reasonableto ultimatend to aealet Ambassadornmeetings fron breaking down. The presidency of the Junta seemoddemand, and tbe position CASTILLO Armas should have inJunta. 0uly,r Jmot PEURIFOY and discussed thopointing outTILTo's position and the necessitythe nan we had backed throughout the whole operation. agreed, but claimed he had Justhono call fronofwho strongly urged him to achieve an earlysome nlghtP essage informing him that thewas now fa the bands of tha Department of

Ambassador PETTRIFOY that he was there to help tha Ambassador in any way possible and asked what terms the Ambassador desired in the agreement. The Ambassador said that agreement should be reachedive-nan Junta composed of Colonel 1DNZ0N, Colonel CASTILLO, Lt. Colonel CRUZ, Lt. Colonel DUBOIS, and Major OLIVA, with Colonel tONZON aseriod ofays duringermanent president would be elected.

mmodiately for the Palace and contactedanda short conversation, CASTILLO aaroed^to

sign the agreement if that via the desire of tha

was not so agreeable. Ha claimed that he would have no part inocument. It waa finally agreed that only the twothe agreement. This solved the problem of the signing,felt that thav had won the battle and lost the peace.

waa pointed outAmbassador PEURJFOY had assured

Colonelonel CRUZ wasASTILLO man and that, therefore, even if CASTILIfJ waa not president, he still controlled a

top Siena


majority in ths Junta and could call for tho election of thetime henot fully satisfied, but at

three in the morning he and Carlos"SALAZAH agreed to rewrite tbe terms of the agreement which had been very poorly drafted by MONZON'a lawyers. After the document was rewritten, lt was prosented to IDHZOH's lawyers who disagreed on the phrasing of three points. Word was sent beck to ht-NZON's lawyers in the other snoke-filled room of the palace to agree to ths document as it was written or there would be no agreement. MDNZON's lawyers oont word back that the document waa acceptable* It was typo-written in final form and signed at Ohk$ormal core-mo ny attended by members of the diplomatic corps, members of the military missions, the Papal Nuncio, and many other dignitaries.

The same morning0 Colonel CASTILLO departed for Chiquimula to check his forward command and explain the terms of the agreement to his field commanders who were most dissatisfied with the outcome of the meetings. Colonel CASTILLO convinced his officers that this was the best way to stop further bloodshed and bring peace to their country. The nightU, Colonel CASTILLO apent with his wife in Tegucigalpa, returning to San Salvador the following day to meetndZON for the flight to Ouatenala City.

The new Junta was welcomed by what was reported to be the largest crowd ever to assembleublic gathering in Guatemala City. There was no doubt that CASTILLO Armas was definitely the hero in the public's


The alow, tedious work ofow government conns need almost immediately. Prom the beginning it was certainive man Junta was unworkable and people were becoming restless because of the lack of action against the Communists. CASTILLO succeeded in getting the majority of his men in the ministerial posts,ew HONZQNcaused much alarm, especially the HlnlBter of Agriculture. The situation was definitely becoming more chaotio and unveatful. Colonel GONZALESZON man who headed the Ouardia Civil, was permitting the Camauniate to go along unmolested. ublic de-wr.stration which night have resulted in violence, was being organized foruly to demand that CASTILLO Armas take over the presidency of the Junta. The shifting around of the governors in the provinces instead of appointing new ones was also causing much alarm.

In view of the above situation, b ColonelOLIVA,tho early morninguly. Colonel

CASTILLO was told that he had untiluly, to take overof the Junta and reduce the Juntaorkable size of This meant obtaining the resignation of Colonels CRUZ andthe meantime, the AmbassadortalkingiZ0N,

CRUZ and DUBOIS, Tho arrangements were completed andnanirxtus vote CASTILLO Armas was elected permanent presidentuly and the Junta was reduced to three men. Colonel CASTILLO, Colonel IttNZON, and Major OLIVA.

During this period In whioh Colonel CASTILLO was being urged totrong stand and positive action, he claimed he was unable to do so because he did not control the army garrisons in Guatemala City. This was definitely one of the disadvantages which resulted from the holding up of CASTILLO Armas' force at Chiquimula and of the agreement at San Salvador. It also pointed up the disadvantage ofemporary


president who himself did not take strong action.

, c aw Colonel CASTILLO for tho last time before departing Guatemala City onuly. The Colonel felt much more secure in hiswith the Army in the capital. He had Just appointed Colonel I'JEIDERHEmiAHK as Commander of the Base Militar and was in the process ofew Chief of the Guardia Civil.

Colonel CASTILLO iatrong man but with the right men in the right Jobs and plenty of strong direction and guidance, which he is willing to take, he should be able toood, stable government.

II. Conclusions:

PBSUCCESS had fully achieved its objectives;

PBSUCCESS should be terminated.



Original document.

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