PBHISTORY (W/ATTACHMENT)

Created: 1/11/1955

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

CW HISTORICAL REVIEW. PROGRAM'SANITIZED

MKMOSA-TJ-UM FOR MR. DULLES:

5

Briefly, the attacheddescribes the operation and successes. History which was the propaganda exploitation of Coianunist documents captured as the result of the overthrow of Arbenz in Guatemala.

Basedreviously aggreed to joint actioneamtate DeptA members worked with the CIA subsidized Comite de Defensa Naclonal contra el Communismo of Guatemala. Documents were seized, sorted and exploited locally and internationally through various channels and media as quickly and as effectively as possible. Conservative estimates are that the teamotalocuments. This excludes duplications, battered and illegible material, books, magazines, pamphlets, etc. Of this overall0 documents were5 were autostatediscellaneous papers forwarded to interested agencies in Washington.

Very few of the documents discovered were of the hot, top level, damaging type which might have been successfully exploited on anbasis. Hence, most exploitation was local and in other Central and South American countries where the impact and results noted were excellent. It is concluded that while there were not many sensational exploitations, the many propaganda releases locally and inhe commencing of the basic training of the Comite's personnel, theand government acceptanceermanent Guateaalan Intelligence Service, and the obtaining of valuable research material, all combined to make PBuccessful nrojeet.

The sum of E ich was allotted to the project proved to be more than adequate for the two tnqnths1 operation.

i have all of the materia Preferred case you wish to look at it.

U January

eiAigence

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of CentralDirector (Piano)

memo dated, to DD/P,

with attached Final Summary Report of PBH3ST0RY Project

The following brief summary of the attached PBHISTORY report was prepared for your information.

After tho downfall of the Arbenz regime in Guatemala, all possible efforts were made to exploit, a3 rapidly as possible, the documents left by the fleeing Communist leaders. Speed was vitally Important from tbe propaganda viewpoint, because of the perishability of the documents, particularly since they were in world news In addition, many of the documents woreurely local nature and the only chance to secure rapid publication was to utilize the widest number of publication outlets as soon as possible. This approach precluded the idea of compiling the documentsooklet, such as the slim grey book. Unfortunately, the documents themselves were of such topical nature and, in the main, of such low-level intelligence and propaganda interest, that they did not lend themselves to an impressive bound-

3. The preparation ofooklet, considered to be of interest primarily to United States Government sources, would have necessitated long translation and publication delays and, in view of the extensive publicity on the matter created by the KSrstenepresentatives relied heavily on PBHTSTORj for documents andtime and cost were considered excessive. Also, from the inception of the project, the Department of Stats was delegated the task of preparing scholarly research type volumes; hence, no thought was given, by this Agency, to duplicating their effort. The Depart-ment did produce "Intervention of International Communism in Guatemala" attached. This booklet did not include PBIOSTORY documents as such although, undoubtedly, they woro consulted in its preparation.

It. It is felt that the most effective possible use wasthe PBHISTORY documents, as indicated in the attached finalof the subject project. CIAegular basis hasemphasize through KUGOWN operations appropriate aspects of

Guatemalan revolution. The most recent operations in this sense areCruz Wer and upcoming Rosenberg trials in Mexico and the

of Arbenz to Switzerland.

Attachments

Office Memorandumunited states govekttottnt

TO i DCPOTT DIRECTOR,Jtf SU/

PROM : AC/WB SUBJECT: PB HI STORY

Attached is the final auscnftry report of subject project in which, because of your participation, you may be interested.

FINAL SUMMART REPORT ot

PBHISTORY PROJECT

Immediately following the downfall of the Communist-dominated Arbenz regime in Guatemala, this Agency dispatched onpecial two-man Commie export toam to investigate the possibility of exploitingwhich were left by the fleeing Communist leaders. Their reconvrwnda-tionsresented in Washington onJU, resulted in tho sendingoint agency team to Guatemala which was headedIA official and which was composed of CIA, State and USIA members. k,eries ofoint action plan (Attachment B) was agreed upon by all agencieseam, composedIAtate membersSIA representative departed for Guatemala. Prior to the team's arrival in Guatemala, arrangements had boen made between the CIA representative and President CASTILLO, with the Ambassador'sto give the team full cooperation in coordination with tho Guatemalan counterpart, the Comite de Defensa Kacional contra el Comunismo, which isCIA, The team would operate overtly in Guatemalabut without publicity, as research specialists and would be known as the Social Research Group.

TheIST0RX goal was to immediately exploit thegathered by tho Guatemalan Comitentelligence and propaganda purposes. Also, the PBHTSTOTCf team wasecords and files procedure for the Comite to serve as the basis for its new Intelligence Service.

a. Upon arriving in Ouatemala the team discovered that the Guatemalan government had just completed organizing their Comite, composed offficials and administrative assistants, and had assigned to them

tha taak of assisting. team in exploiting the documents and of giving, administrative assistance when needed. The team chairman, ,under State cover; immediately contacted President CASTILLO who offered^the fullest high level government support to the joint Comite-team project. With this beginning, the Research Group turned to tho task of physically sorting the assembled masses of documents, papers, magazines, newspapers and books. When the project was finished it was conservatively estimated that moreocuments, not including several hundred thousand duplicate copies and illegible or semi-destroyed papers and masses of Communist propaganda, books and leaflets had been reviewed. Of this material,documents wore considered to be of sufficient importance to warrant0 more documents of secondary importance were microfilmed; small numbers of original documents, most of them duplicates, were forwarded for technical study or as propaganda samples.

While the documents were being studied in Guatemala, CIA members of the team were assisting the Guatemalan Comite inasic file and records system which would serve then once theirwas formallylso, the PBHI STORY chairman, in collaboration with the Station chief and the Comite leaders, developed the organizational framework for the new Guatemalan Intelligence Service. It was expected that the Comite would evolve as the new Service since the ideaew anti-Communist organization had been supported and desired by CASTILLO.

b. Propaganda. PBHISTOKY, after initiating its analysis work, immediately began the propaganda exploitation of documents which vould graphicallyormer leaders as Communists and expose the extent to which the Communists had controlled the Arbenz government. The principal channels through which these documents were released were the Comite leaders themselves, the Government Press Ministry, the local UdlA officer andoutlets as arranged by Headquarters. During the entire project thereteady stream of documents which found good play in the local press. (See Attachment C) Less international play was received due to the local interest of many of the documents. In adintion to the use of documentsewsreel was made of the documents at the Comite headquarters. This documentary short played ln movie houses throughout the country to obviously responsive audiences. wo-man team, armedood share of PBHTSTORY documents, was sentropaganda mission to principalof Latin America to show the end result of what Communism moans -even in Latin America. Also, special documents were taken to the Ambassador in Honduras for use there. Documents were furnished to Representative HILLINGS, Chairman of the Latin American Sub-Committee of the House Committee on Communist Aggression, headed by Senator KISRSTEN, while Representative HILLINGS was in Guatemala. Also, the PBHISTOKY. chairman assisted in providing Representative HILLINGS with reliable, and qualified anti-Communist

SE(|RET

Guatemalans to testify before his Comittee In Washington. He recommended that President CASTHXOape recording of his anti-Communist activities instead of sending toess effective written statement. In Washington PBHISTORY documents were distributed aa followsi 6J4 to Senator EEP.STEN;o Ambassador LODGEjo theutostat0 microfilji documentsriginal documents to tbe State Department;utostat0 microfilm documentsriginal documents to USIA. CopioH of portinent articles, photos snd documents were sent out toield stations. (For complete details of the propaganda operations see Attachment D, prepared by LANr.EVTN, PP Case Officer.)

To assist in developing an entirely nowfuture Intelligence activities, the PBHISTORT chairman, inthe Station chief, who bad previously offered guidance alongdeveloped an organizational outline and an operations charter forComite. During the PBHISTORTComiteunable to form an operational arm which was capabletho few loads which wore developed from tho documents. Thiato lack of sinoero CASTILLO support of the Comite* It is believedduring tho formative days of his government, did not havein tho Comite and that he relied for intelligence mainly onof dubious volunteer andinformants. The Comite did

instigs te personal searches of the Communist asylees as they departed from Ouatemala but few revealing documents or papers were found,oodly number of travel documents, useful for CIA, were picked up. Without authority to arrest or to conduct house searches, the Comite nas severely hampered and limited ln obtaining loads for additional documents. Items of possible current intelligence value which woro forwarded from the field to Washington were given to tho interested desks, staffs, or special study sections. Copies of documents, where appropriate, were forwarded to other government agencies, other than those associated with PBHISTORT. Provisions were made to carefully record and file material not adapted for immediate exploitation.

Work. Tho task of physicslly organizing the Comitewas delegated to the Rl members of tbe tesm who,hortsetystem whereby tan unsorted mountains of paper wero givensort, analyzed snd, according to their importance,or copies for PBHISTORT use snd given to the Comite. After a

elected number of Guatemalans, supervised bywore capable of performing tho preliminary sort, leavingof th* PBHISTORT team free for analysis and copying work. analysis team swung Into full work, itnecessary to call for amicrofilm team to photograph many valuable research documents. sartlng and analyais work woe fully under way, conslderablagiven to tho Comite archive section. Full instructions on how tofile, carried outally basis, were given. Close supervisionto procedure detail to assure that the system would be retaineddeparture of the majority of PBHISTORT personnel. pecialleaders wer*ull briefing on archive procedure

For full details seerepared

m* urfleer).

Personnel. Ths CIA personnel assigned to this project vere mil familiar with the area and were bilingual. Other members of the team, fron State and USIA, were similarly qualified. Although policy matters with the Guatemalan leaders vere handled by the team chairman, allof the team worked closely with the Guatemalan Comite personnel. Language facility and gonorol professional ability on the part of. teamriendly and favorable impression with the Guatemalans, who were quite receptive to the criticisms and suggestions as offered by team members. This cooperative spirit on the working level greatly aided in the rapid and successful termination of the project.

Communications. Because of the highly topical nature of the project's material and necessity of obtaining rapid response for operational mattors, station oablo facilities woro utilizedreat extent. This method allowed for rapid exchange of information which Kas essential in such matters as the document preparation for Senator KSiSTEN and Ambassador LODGE.

Equipment. Due to delays in shipment of correct photcgrapnic supplies, there was an initial delay in the flow of documents to Washington. Once this situation wasteady straam of autostated andmaterial was delivered within the minimum time limit.

finances. The sum of r hich was allotted to the project proved to be more than adequate for the two months operation.

IV. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

General

low percentage of valuable documents precluded anyintelligence operation since few ieaeV wore obtained. ew Guatemalan Intelligence service, if followed up by

LA, will undoubtedly give thisaluable long tern asset.

Tho unusualress inthe efforts of the Ministry of Propaganda, plus the aid of therepresentative, enabled HJHlSfUrti to saturate the Ouato-ialans .iththat the Comite had confirmed what had been denied by thethe ARBENZ government was dominated and controlled by Communistsat last, AKBE?JZ himself was completely identified withds. Comite was loftantle of respectability, as differing withtalent reputation of the local police. Internationally, the Jobdifficult since few top secret documents were found, few storiesof honest world news covorage.

Because of the vacillating politicalCoaiite was nevor given the full green light by CASTILLO to totheir operations ara until tba latter part of September. Althoughthe serious disadvantage of not exploiting the departure of the aaydid have the advantage of notroup of uatrainea.from initiating operational activities which might haveand greatly depreciated the reputation of the Comity nuring The Comite leaders were, and still are, unusually receptivemado for their future organization.

Although the most basic system hasvento the Comite for their records control, one HIbeen assigned to actually work In the archive section during theOctober.

The liaison aspects of the FBHISTOHY projectquite favorable. Relations with the Guatemalan COmlte,ana employees, were excellent. It should be noted that thothe Documents Comlttee were notaDiy successful in creating andcorrect and friendly relations.

A successful working relationship was developed with the ilinister of Propaganda, who proved helpful ln distributing propaganda Material to the local and international press.

With meEfcers of other Government agencies, it is to be noted that tne State members on the team warn helpful and cooperative.inimum of contact was made with State officials in their local establishment, after the initial introduction and approval from Ambassador PKJRIFOi. In regard to the assistance from USIA, the local officer on many occasionsood source of support and adviceumber of propaganda matters.

The Station chief and other station personnel wore extremely cooperative and, aside from important administrative assistance, aided greatly in maintaining good relations with comite leaders and other officials close to CASTILLO.

faeport on the PBHlSTOtU material reviewed. All material autcstated haa been classified according to the nature of the documents.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS, a

In any other future operation similar to PBSU'JCniiS, provisions should be made so thst an organized document team, reinfcreed vith strong police and army elements can enter into the area where vital documents might be found. An even better solution would be to have selected two-man units inside the target area attempt to get the documents during theof any last ditch fighting.

propaganda exploitation of documents should beaeon as possible after the downfall of the defeated Communisttake fullest advantage of world press play. PBHISTCRY entered intotoo late to capitalise on the worJd proas, and for the most nartbe satisfied with local or limited internotlcnal play.

captured documents, however, which do not yieldimmediate exploitation, should bc vi thheld to give the propaganda play

a chance to extenderiod of several weeks and to provide various choice sources with "exclusives" which aid in furthering the project's propaganda assets.

is imperative that CIA send soonest to Guatemala anofficer with Station cover to continue to press home the officialof the Comite and to give basic training to theircandidates. CASTILLO has already mentioned to the PBKISTOiffhe would like toelected group of Comite trainees totraining with the FBI. It behooves CIA to have the trained caseto forestallraining program as envisaged by CASTILLO.

shouldilingual Rl representative to assistarchive sectionday periodhat the basic card and filing system recently introduced isas projected. Without this additional training it is quitean efficient Intelligence Service can be developed since all ofstaff lack totally in proper records technique.

VI. SUMMARY

In the future, any inter-agency documents task force will have the benefit ofore defined path of operation. In the caseIST0RY. or any similar project, the real success of immediate Propaganda-Intelligence exploitation depends upon hot, top level, damaging documents. PBfllSTORYfew of these. The mystery still exists why the Communists did not

-1-

bum or destroy more documents than they did. Although no traces were found of correspondence on such matters aa tho Alfelm/Polish shipment of arms and correspondence between agont contacts in other countries, PBHISTQlu' haaealth of material taken from the all-powerful Communist labor, youth or political groups. Researchers will have obvious answers to the Coeraunist takeover, the extent of its domination and downfall ln Guatemala.

The experience of threo differentagencies working in the field under ono agency head proved to bo quite workable since the principle ofas to mutual information priorities had been carefully vorked out before the team was dispatched to tho field.

The cover problem was minimised by the fact that nc Guatemalans, with the exception of Comite members, were allowed into the interior of the Comite's working area. Alao, special security arrangements were madehat the majority of the team entered and departedear ^onite entrance onlyay.

Although bulk of the PBHISTCRY material did not provide for many sena-tional exploitations; the many propaganda releases both locally and in tho United States; the commencing of the basic training of tho Comite'sthe outlining and govornamnt acceptanceermanent Guatemalan Intelligence Service; and the obtaining of large amounts of valuable research material^ all resulted in makinguccessful project.

Attachments:

of Burke and Metzl from Guatemala

PaHlSTOSY Plan

Books

Propaganda OperationIST0ST

Charter prepared for Comite

by PBHISTOItT

Charts prepared for Comite

by PUHISTOHT C. Details RI Phase of PBHISTCST H. Categorical Breakdown PBHlSTCaY Photostat Material forwardod to Headquarters

1 ae"alv4 to COS far Amhim.Br

1. EoargatUeetiaa Is Beaded eraaativ aaa la aorely

a. CoBucmalrt Partycontiaa* ta aald wa (oMmmiit paahHona they heldwadernaoectorea dal Trabajo aad of tba

taak aeybaaa li raibaaata> have left' TaahaVotoaaettvo Ufa ta to city, aaaaa aader

' iiiomJ anti

t. Tha freattlere ara eyes aad tha eacapc af ceaaaraalate la aat bloc had.

d . htea racpoaathla for tha tortara aad aaarder af aatl-caaaaaaaJatArhaaa have aat keea arrested araa though thalr Idaatltlaa ara known. It ia reportedol. Prera af tha Guardia Civil blackad theae imMi.

a. Tha COTO to attU active. The claoxajj af hta centralatta aart tha aetivtuas aa Ha daaaaaaaalat lead* re aad aaaaaaaadal membera who ara accaataand ta claadaatiaa activity,

X. Taa Junta ehateld aaaiaaatfa aad fellyaaawaaa with whom wa caa deal ia tha alimlaatiaa af caaaaaaadata foaaa all poaittowa af taflaaaee ia Qoatoaaaliaaad eocltty;thalr arraat. dataatlen aad iatarregatioa) laaeiaare aad etady mt hay docazaaata la tha eoeaxoaalat coaiairaeyj aaldha affectiveaa^siatta of coaaaaaadata to th* rightad aalra

9 Thara la aaaaet aoed tarr

eatral roaei|ttory of iaforiitlna aa. taa Coanzaaalat Party. Itaoiifca aad relet* a* graaaa.

h aaa ya tic, aati-aaavaratra aawed ta tha Oaardla Civil.

alwrt fkhk si milt

dHcee(uitoul. rational, maatclaal. ate )im CP. tlw COTO. tka paaaaat federation, all cemananiet fraattat

X) Oov.rnm.ai afOcea eemUalad ar atrcaaaly lailsenaed by caaaaaaaalatai

J) Tka Waaaa aad ettieae ml all la ad la* CP aaeaahere. aad af all tkalr relatives aad fraeade ventre thay may kara cached

la ardor to ba tare tbat tka Jeatta kaa la ita poaseesioa ail laaaartaat daaaaaoala aad race rda vtlch will

L> Clearly evltfeaca tka (erelfa direction ofntra aai at

2) Speelrlcally Ifeatlfy aet aaaly all la ad tag foretga aad lacal

eosbbneauuta lavolved bat all CP membera aad cellaboralora aa that thay can ba readered laeUtctul aad can be prevearted trameaawvd bad far pewr.

vill^rbvto-the Jhited S*

alr^tltoa Tor'tho ^ouo foro^fitaalan ^overruaent. Suitable ccver ianeto Ui# Anbasrador

vurt title 1'or

lMV their

te'saxlica; arrount of rapidomplete' Ige of nutuai tiiforr.ition prior L'-ies labporatloa':*jaapcn by tin

bbduala.bc working ifclj'bo dirootad or coorriina'.od trjtn openlyaervioea w'.ics thorcetLi ra.lon KB*

One* lt la ascertained that fullaat aupport la assured by the Guatemalanand thaor ting haa progressed to iha point vera analyala la poseible, aU US teak force personnel willjir soaimLig aotivltieo. Proa tola point on, tha highest degree of coopara-tlon will ba needed, elnoa tha priorltiea of tha (roup! Involvedvary and overlap.

Another factor to be considered to fie use of the documentstoe tlaa factor, aa opposed to operational needa.

chalraan will adaaavor to strike aaalanoa aa la poeelble betaeeo theae two faotore. Bo hae no proeoneetrad lotantiona to particularly favor either tha propaganda or tha operational as poet.

Por immediate document exploitation by tha axanclea represented, use will be made cf auteetat photographic eeulpnent. aail will be aaed with those documents whloh lend theaeelveaeproduction.onsidered this preeees will be used primarily tosrmanent record of naae liete, bound volwaee of offioial correapoodence,arlea of chronological papera. Bl haa been requested to furnish personnel oepeble of handling thia teak. Thayl.

Boric on the projeot la to eoanenee with the arrival of the personnel to be indicatedollowing paragraph, rending final project and Steto DepartmentJUSToRT pareeemol ara prepared tcugust. Travel crdera are currently being readied and State Department waa advised on 2fl July of the CU peraonnelwould be leaving.

At tha and of eachrogrees eumaery report will ba submitted to bead-quarters. It la not ctnteaplated devoting any of thia s' art period to detailed progrees or operational repartelnlaua of secretarial help la pi coned. It ia believed tl* time la of the oflsaaoe. Preeueat use of oeble facllitleg- for ope rati coal nuerlee la expected, interested "'ead-jartere aUff aeabera wUl be encouraged to rtelta field unit, jortieulirly if complicatedoneInvolved problem* arlae which eitfit uoneoesaerlly bold bock the workld analyst*. Theae vialte oould be corietructlve add.tlof.nl ron-eete *is inforaatlon priorities co-jld le aod if led.

At the and of the eecond month 'he chairman and various ether project personnel will be replaoed. omplete aum-uuy of .rograoo to

alH he writtenecoaaended modification of tha PBilSTORY structure aa it ia to continue will ba agisted.

The atac ed adainlatratlve plan n he c. usjdsratlon tttat the team inill oe eelf audficlent. Iteltbeat relatione can be maintained froa an auafniatrativewith bothtabaesyr aUtion If only mergency callefor their support and aaaletaooo, Therafore froaersonnel and equipment

nt tht group as planned is trou;-ht to be completeo accomplish its task wltbo.itonalstr*sotivll'.es of the Hibaony ora tlaa

H'KYARTl 1 avp.-rt o* the ii.iote^slan1 *

need with liry;pe of >iay:i. so realisedt^na.anaill faced with cil ri-eoBiroo whloh will cause-iier to exploit t'o looim-nta in Banner miehntider inept Jisastrcus, fron either aiUionel r'iewpoint. -'eadouarterat fich eve-a already warnad tho 3tsto and .TIA Utlv-ithis no ait'Uity. Tta reported value loo ran te not.t lasted, however, it is resaonatle tu supr,*B*ooctaf storlal ls valueless, "very effort will bo ^arfa to aeVilevo the rootxploltA-tJonkeeping Lt 'alaac* th#so -eta.

oo*

I, CIAill coneiat of tho,following!

A. /laid en

1 Chiof of1 OfflOOTW

PP Offieor

1 Rl Anoirot

1toretarr

9

Support

or PP Offioor

U Totol

[Heads.iwimini to bo assigned Ouataaala Desk, (ranch :IS Uvlolea)

21* Sat lasted coot* of Operations for throe aontbsi

Overtimeor hr.ro. per ocok per individual)

af too automobiles iacludlog gaa, oil modpor tailole

Travel and Par

nd Sunpliee (reproduction)

One porteile adorofila Qodslsupplies

Too Dictaphone aaohlneo oamplat*

Loeal projiiiooaut offloa oupolloa

Off: oo furnitar* (ifalla tio locally froci 'IS -Tttwni inataUaUom)

"stlmstad ooete perational -id Uiraa ao

distinguished froa admlnlstratlva axpocdlturws

wr if inolodeo parohas* or procurement of

doowaarta froa Ocvarmaaat aod ojeav^vsrmmamaouroee.

upportcatd.

k ef actr.orlty

h" Chief of CIA teaa ls dosii* "isbursvij aad ieocontabla -ffietr farrf- flffpaadedhe Piald.

ChieftV Division, laasOf fleer fer ail - *llcadgBartersof iho Ua*.

ft-ldltionsl fonAi requiredirst a- proved y P.

XT. Fundi for ua*ea* lofuldi

Th* ma aotharisedfor Oporotioaalolrld will ba sdnnoad to tb*f Stating, OuataaaTa, to ba aad* avaJlasla to Chiaf uf CiA ta*n. fh* Station *lll ualitalnowot forand th* Chief of Cl*U1 oubalt roooiptad/or dcotswrats to support Ma *> through thouf Station to UaadquarUrs.

Plnal Sunrarv uftivit!oi.

rb

of -.

p

a. To Indicate to tno pec;.lo oi" -f

etw

i' documents wiu vorou Igi

t. rvVlloit* iho above , tntH'vVlujUt Latin

a position ofucr* in uca

Co-dte Kaolonal oa Defense boatM alt- : ith tho propar Frestifce, w aJte lt onnfcraatloa on oaesvuniet penetrationoore oo to obviate possiblo detrlaoatalow Into ft orcall Oaatc;>ot etc>.

C^toratlonu

a. The preaa waa tho prlnol.-ol rooia uiicd . li-

peopleatemela, trte axiomooohad in tha ifajmille. rhotostctio cuploa fof. an, n onsnewspaper*. no lnatanooa Uasio wore tno..to be pu'alisbeuaj tlon;

were series of autosteted papers oniU re encthy ertlolo.

The Initial press roloaae Crux ihe Co-iltpopi ;ia*

ita functions, and tta i^fiJ/- leettkon bytoan Ir.-iici.T. . we

of doouaecta arvu propa^anue*

The method of rolcese of the toon aiftla^ luour'or.ta warn iuet:-eUJ tcdocumente that ml^ht beWff-cor.

cceptable docunontc woro fotoutn ^V"

ptlono or alette* were writtcv.ed Into Spanish, tbo dcounont uas. w

release oiioeta<iresaoU tor lc . -

roat logical for tho publtoitlon,wii|.wacia, IS wae uocuaaent wae of eufficient intcrost. loto pacaa^ woo

Secret-"

then cent by messonger to tboewspaper office, or mailed dlrootly* Other duounents were prepared in ihe some

norvon tori it ir of Pr-pat.anda, tc betorloa of press oonf ore noes, or to ba doled out to individual roportaro fron his offloe* All auoh doourtartBtj or oourae. woro opprored by oho local members cf tho Dotalrior to tholr release.'

Thoaeoond looal oothod waart,produced by tho Coal to* ii film waa ctr.jUul. tho PUHISTciiy. KUot-WH officer, six minutes

oontaiDod appropriate tltloatc nualoal background and narration by tbo throe announcers of "Radiohe baaio coat of tba flla woo ant byral to* although tho -orn expaifiivo Itom of aufflolont ooplea waa taken care of by rJoIs.Li*1*

Tho film, "DespuoB Peaoubrloos LoLaterown, and la atlll showing, ln the thootoraOity. rot afron one theater to another ro tnatsooner or later show it* Onoe It has rode Ita rollflt ls sehsdulod to bo aant to tha provinces, uolt will bo shown ln awry theater In Uiooopy of tha flla woo utilised by tho Klnlator of I for privateW a

Hadio, of course, wsa o* one Ida rod an ormedia lor storlo* baood onevldenoo, sndesult,8 was limited to tho "news" an^le as ropaa tad by cocr .onto tors*

A display window tn downtown Ouatemala City wao uonu tu orr thoa piny of Ooonunlet propaganda.

b. International* especially Latin American aovora^o, waothrough two press conferences of (toatasuilantha various news services* tha first when tittyvenrolease preparedndecond,arles of tho heretofore exclusive mosoo la low).

PBUZafORt raloaaed "Oray Hook" documentsanner that t'noy cuid to properly roved ed in tha United states by Senator iCcreten. Tho Associated irosstory un hia disclosures.

Individual releases, orexclusive"wore rropsrod for visiting oorrosponuonta ana locol repron.vifcatAvwi:-Of; ewapey-ofa*

SECRET

Through thaof OSIA, plastic matrixesTSTORY photographsrede. Thoso wore attachedengthy press release on tne work of the Comite and the description of some of the documents uncovered. PBHISTORT prepared these, even to the point of addressing the individual air mail envelopes, and handed these over to tho Minister of Propaganda to be sent torincipal newspsporo throughout Latin America. Copiss slso went to Madrid, Rome, Paris, etcetera, and Spanish language' newspapers in tho United Spates. English versions wore mailed to several Important newspapers in the United Stabss snd in England.

PBHISTORT originated the project in tho Ministry of Propaganda ofwo-man team through Latin America to publicise the true situstlon. After considerable delay and political wrangling, tho team left. Tnsy carried withopy of PBHISTORT film, and propaganda kits 0opposed of photostatic copies of documents, examples of Soviet propaganda sent to Ouatemala, and atrocity photo graphs.

PBHISTORT furnishad the local propagandaonstantof propaganda kits and document reproductions to be given out to visiting newspapermen snd officials.

When Congressman Hillings visited this country, he was supplied with propaganda kits, photo graphs,pscisl six-page "report" from the Comite outlining its aotivlties and its viewpoints of Communist penetration, as learned froa analysis of the documents.

PBHISTORT arranged with the Minister of Propaganda to extend

invitations to newsmen from neighboring republioa to visit

mala, andortoin number to be sent fron the country.

PB HI STORY documentation waa used to implement the reports of these

newspapermen.

Local officers of USIA were provided with some) reppo-duoed documents for immediate forwarding to their headquarters and ultimata use throughout the regular USIA ohannolo to Latin America.

A copy of the PBHISTORT film was sent, along with the original negative, to USIA Headquarters so that appropriate ecenee could be immediately released to commercial newsreel companies serricing tho Latin market.

An NBC television cameraman was given the opportunity of filming the Comite's sotivity.

secret

-Ii -

In some instances the pr.ee releases aent to various countrle-contalned an addenda* prepared by PBHISTORT to oak* the story hotter for publication. For example, tbeChile was augmentedescription of correspondenoe between Chilean and Guatemalan Cosnunleto.

PBHISTORT supplied ss many appropriste documents as could be unoorerod to SHJuffiR for pooslblo inclusionhite paper.

Summaries of PBHISTORT releases printed locally were supplied to tho USIA latin American wire sorrlces.

m. Results snd Analysis

of the firm propaganda objective Cto indioat. toof Ouatemala tho oxtont of Ccosmnist penetrationhighly ostisfactory. Press coverage was noted, however, that editors mads littlaeven tha moat provocative doouaents, unlessor stories written by the propagandapbotoststlo oopy. When any document was scoompanied by

an explanatory story, the entire text was invariably"general- photographsof the stscks of doouaentsetc.published.

The PBHISTORT filmisible impression on viewers, snd was applauded heavily by audiences.

There is no doubt that the people of Quatenela were informed satisfactorily as to tho graphic and documentary prooi uncovered by tho Comite.

of obtaining placement of neVspaperregularly by PBHISTORT ware unsatisfactory. This was

duo to the fact tbat only on. international news service (Routers) carried the Initial press release sfter it waa givTn to'the-ress conferenc. by^ gaoda. They felt the atory was notnews, anddid not value it to th. point of cable traffic.

Plans for BHISTORT staged "raid- on Comite trying to destroy the

plicate them" were abandoned when it woo found that too many indigenous persons would have to be io the aot. n operation would bav. undoubtedly hit the internstiooal cable services, bat was too risky considering sll faotors.

Coverage Latin Aan-lca en the USIS aire aervice. ef csunt.extent! Anti-Cemrnuniat declaration* of PodriguexKilSTOT delegate, la Santiago, Chile. received aloa play oo tha United Praia circuit. Viiitlog aeveaenTSTCPT anglee lo thalr atoriee ta boats aevapapera. "Vlaion" magazinetary ea tha Cemlte, almoit word for aord aa it vaa prepared for tne oorreep^ndent by PBHISTO*JT th-oigh the Coolt*.

Several Guatemalan 'diploaata leaving for ne* Latin Ame-ican porta vere supplied vithropaganda klta, aa veil as groupa of villting aditora from.

Praas releaaea accompanied by plaatlc atatriisa vere seat te neoipopen through'.a

Tba PBHISTORT commercial aavarael film ahota have been made inooploa throughA faoilitjea and are being diat-ibuted to allount-lee The Aatieaal^ Broad-aatlag Company uaad ahota ofea Itaeoaet faeilitieaag-jot.

e. "eaulta of the thirdaa altIra af lape-tanee for tbaeldered eminently aatlafactory. In all -eleaaes lt vaa atreaoed that tha Comite aot only vaa chaaing Communito, &uc vaa alao looking fo- the documentation that vould revard valiant anti-Ceewuniste. It aaa alco emphatlrod that the Coalta vaa-i .on the record ofenetration for the benefit ofhrcata laAff-rloas. etc

ia no doubt that tha Comite laell-ksevn entity Lb Guatemalan life.

Summary I Three faetora retarded propaganda action- tl) Thtit leas aiploilve

documentation thanexpected vaa) lack of aa ectlou am an', lack af dapandability of lndlgenoua peraona belonging to th- CemltCjhe faot that tha Ceelteolitical footballaf tha Coaite aera raluetaat to aid CASTILLc tao nuen and CASTILLO vaa leery ef tho potentialf thehuf dirtIt hia full euppe-t

-

"onctptoa Baatcos do Organisation ypara

oadtaarwa Sacional Centra el Gorauhiano

Fl Ooadt* eerl una organl*acifin dencia cc*?Ueuyarincipal ee protester al pueblo del e elonentoe subversive*. El Jefe de eata organ)k renia eua actividades aolo al preMdinte de la republic*. Com! ta woraiOari bub aetlvldadaa mp- de ceroa con laa de la Pueraaaa de la Pollcfa Cacreta,enor benaflolo oonp^eto de lac etas organ!-aaolonaB padeearrollai' er> el ourso da bus aotlvldadee nomalce. Rata* orfanlctclone* de ahora an adelante cetaran cualquler operericr. daontra el CoejunlPieo,apcioh do un contra espionage dertr de sue ni*mas filaa. aal to por an part* llnlterd eua aotiridedee dooeas proaovldaa por loecmpoa da atnilara.. Nou autorldad aobre la Polioiaac 'versa* in adae ti-Z; pero al herilloe infomaclonee aceroa, actlvicad'a cornnlrtai deeoublerta* por eataue arsan de interea para la: alamos,

PI Comite' on aoa operaclonea Iniclaleeil tart sus actlvldadeey eera ornaniaado en tonaecan para faellitar dlchaf fin embargo, aa preva la necealdad que al Comite. en el futureaeoolon lnj4rnaolonAl, eepeolalmente lntereaada an persona llla<icey aorlaf -nton qua tlenen lmplicaciooee dlrecta*aroanaa ropfibllcae da Centro Arafrlba. a pequefkc de losCentraa laa faollidadeB de norlalentOK de parte de laaIntarnaclonalaa del Comit* eon conaideraaaeeeonolelee.

DiohasprinoipiarAn

El CoKlle no acudrAdad de .ucitr JuatlclaualniatrarA suoa tribunalea do 1 1 rei la culpsblJidad de lot eupnorto* int:.s, ,fu-idonte quo caaoaot

ccaiunlotaa do bar An tener la/oa eepeoleles para aaagurar au pront* jf le>

p

reaoluolon. Dar poderea aloo. Lb au tori dad do Jurgar,vj jlur

su prlnolploo ser un cnipo don cortoil&

un objetlvo o> ataqua, ya quen regiiren donnocrAtlco,

perounal tJfftfido per el CoadtS reri unuciofannle exanlnado c

uando el tloapoparadtao

ami fontar on auarpo do ofiolnlue do auaia reajjonsabilidad oon quien la

olndadanla Uuateaalteca nsti doceiea deeei>etar.

Para erltar en- clrladentoo foodos para los agentuB y

oporaclooea coafidenclales dol '. ml'a)dober'or. ver.tr de lor

presupueatoo Confidejooacl/oa dol renldenta. Ho usi los iw.tot

genoraleo deantanlaltato quo pararon al presupuoato general

da la nscldQ. Sinu:w> scadalcn eape-'lalf-nto eecotiida de tree

hoahree acaibrados por el*_a, serines enoargadoe do estuuiar el

prooupuonto general dol CjaltA tl aer Aateanualrc-ntp, Aunquc

a/uiitoeotivldooee del Coflita no aorAn rereladaaf COeas a

saLarioe eneraloasunaa d>An deblda-

eaa>*lnadoe. Eata irsp3colch hari SMCltO oor ollninar critic* indabida'

t

el C'Xnit" [Mir:'ortin los corttrolrat >nr^doc lot atrojfpfntfsni del goviaroo*

Da gran laporta:ola aa el be-/ho jua ol eapiritu dolab* aer eo (odo apolitlco. Hebt BSfOrtacM tan pronto coato aea pcsible 'ara

politico ueado parapantecer individualupclsvp. oiqueRrupaclonea oolftlco*or^en!1/

aativldadee pollticae peren recortadoa dolatc el pUquen laanonert* .ionea dal r la adarea exlatancla dal Cortle au epelltleidse re.-XTjocldioeritiSI Jofa (upranmy por todoa loa;tro*olitico*.

Para llaaarion da protr^ar*traa fueraa* eubveritvu, al CoadUat rapidaM-uce aaa poaibla au* racuraoa da iniornaelon dantro d* la>nHiutwo Car pari naa,ltl-ioa, ii(:i'n n el eiateataa todoa loa mlnlst-rii* oal;ate. artn tanbien penatrat*.nu an axandca cc^iaia la eoonoada de la raoion. objetiaea eunque aoo .trlaaente irportantea, fueron eaeoclalnent* loe ni*xo* frupee quexunir.as babfafl perrartldo con nay oronde ae puaeV contanplar an* e'ilo* trataria" da entrar da naato.

Paraabo eataalt* orgatdtar* ivde* dcuior rny origan eatarin nia ar-roniauon oara VUarticular, Tanblin aa tantara dancubrirlapatiaadorean al axlllo.

Paraabo dlchoa prograsar, ea oOrio Bleareriarlanola de parte de loa nlaaos oficialea dal ronlU, lato peri on trabejo nuydmnoloeo al aer errrectaatente. eclater rapldaaMmte Saaar auprlalri*. i nlte .Mtapiei de on perlodo da tiattpo eapera tenerax operaeioriee, sabari peaereuldado enaoolin da aua, parrl.lr

oflcioncifc. fl chequeo delloantes don oflclal dol Comite ls aittragad* laa au ve* roclutarra oloafs /larS

demandaa nooo ofioialoo dol Cowila, quj-Jifa en nuchoeHobjotlTOc do rtdleulo,taque publico. .wli iiiteligencio, rroparacloY.onft pen-onal do'-oflclolea dela gantoatanal^ arlodad del trabajo dal Comite. Ciertaaonte el I'Popoalio de nu trabpjoi-ooBuniat* es vital nfis qua cualquier otro trabajo publico heoho ;or un .ificial publico en el pais.

Coao concebldo ol Comite aorao oraodae laa buenae agenoiae axtrangem: (to inteliscnel*. x responseoilidadea geograficae aerl claraatenteoa adminiitiadorw': centralesos enonrgadoa de lea cone* aeagrafloas. "xiiti qusdarA ton ocntralisado como sea pooible para cfnoorvw el apoyo. peolf laaaamte toda* sus ofloinasn un edificiot ofioialee ssanspartamento* fuer* da la eluded de Qua-

Como oporaclon tlplcs dal case la ei^ulento hlpotosls da Wieteria puade

oor un ejemploi En Enoro de &fi unas invoetinucionec oficialrs

del Comite* ee ab>rfl*ado por un oflclal da dicho dala*

de uit chequeo cospleto, entrevistos, axawnars ,

ol candidato ea ecoptado. Durante loslar se le da ctrena-

sdento blstco. Duranteoriddo,a asi^na-Io (por ol prop6elv>deroa-

sumero uno dc lq -iviolin do Ls diudatfntcmaia. Uv

primer taroa oo coneaguirn un sladicato do prolYcoros *nterior-

dominado por los commie to*. So la da dicftar;ue anVtrlorponM'

*

tt nuevo oflolal oon enjtperlancl* pae&da, dentro do un oorto periodo ee capes ds haoer contacto con Fulono ne Tel, una persona d> conootda roaponsaMlldad, que tlene la confientaIob antlnuoc profeeoree 'canmista* qua eaten secrotanento en contactoilataelienec eaten ancioeoa de crearvocaiuniBta au el aindieato de naentroe ya con otro nomtre,

* este punto en Junlo5 el oficlal entregarlfca cu ^len dau agent* superior que loare oac-ir el traoa'o, haci^ndol* ver elo de la operation, ol1 tieapoo* chanceslto que i plan os aprobaio, el Oficiul podrAiJanorlnclpLurscxivldac-'s ue lntoli^-rnci-i. al principle1 en Julio5 las -algnac**riuin nucha importancl*den le experienci* dal agcota. Mn embargo, deepue*C rosea el agentunto doiidf hu adqulrldo la confianaalotlespuefc de ana aerie oe reportoi eprobados, elpodr4 huoar loc arreetcn apropladoi; endoaaar la Informationa*peclales de prosecucion Comunlota. genteea entoncatrat lgnado otro cargo, si no !u> aldoaloTado de ma*l Oflolal asenlutar otrocapat de ilonar el reqaialtc raouertdo,

Euf'iclnlcnr*rJo con.su planS dado adttcuado apoyo fiiuuiclem, feendrfi el uao le lot archivesn crnclnlanto dol 'Cnit* para chequusrpoaro conprar equlpo oapcclal al eeodra reci'-ir mner^olnstruccicn unerioreeualquier silu-alonbra vonir.

'ate Kttydo de opr-ran Ion, oorpviff de pM.idc un tlempo, t* sobrelna'S'-Mntn v

vlvujn,,firo|tsVv Ult&i*

"jM;*'i'itjM.t'tJi;vioa^Itriitotdpiotl/

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scents*

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SUBJECTt Index by Source of Guateamlen Oocuoonto

Attached for your use is en Index shoving the sources of documents fron Guntenmla.

iron BuTf-ln, Cllof DRA/OIR, Stato

. Omn, Aisi^trjit Director for Ancrlcm"

I c J

, * 3

! -C 3

4

Original document.

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