PA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAF
1 , ar QtfMM Sovle.
ofalue of the Output of the Elec-
ironies Industry to the Value of Electron Tube
Production in th*J
and ln East Germany.
"Value of the Produetion of Radar
In tha USSR.
at Electron Tubes and Total Prediction
of Ihe Electronic* Industry in the
Estimated Consumption Pattern of Ihe Soviet
Electronics Industry. .
FiBurs I. Organization of the Electronicsthe USSR
"ijire 2. Orf >nl>ationel Control of the Electronics
Industry of ihe
- lv -
THE ELECTRONICS INDUSTRY IN THE USSR*
Thc electronics and telecommunications equipment industry inSSR has expanded more rapidly than that of any other nation during theears. The total output of the industry, estimatedillion rublesncreasedillion rubles4 and Will ri'seotal ofillion rubles
The Soviet electronics Industry4 cor.sis-.edlants and institutes employingersons. Almostercent o: the industry is concentratedeographic regions, and overercent of the industry IS locatedetropolitanMoscow. Leningrad. Novosibirsk,r'kiy.
Administrative control ol the industry is maintained principally through four ministries. The rather clearly defined functional boundaries indicated among the various administrative units provide assistance in the analysis ol product categories and end use.
The major effort of the Soviet electronics industry hasevoted ro the production of military equipment. Almostercent of the total outputhicheavy schedule for advanced types of radar and Other complex devices, was for lhe
* The estimates and conclusions contained In this report represent the best Judgment of ORR as
military program. Thc indicated trend of the industry is one ofexpansion in production, with the emphasis on meeting present and future military requirements. Production of goods for the civilian Section has Increased, especiallyut'the'civilian sf.are o: the industry's output will continue to be far less than that for the armed services.
A. Present Status.
During theears (he electronics Industry in the USSR has grown more rapidly than thai of any nation. 4 the ratio of its net output to the gross national productecond ooly to that of the US. the leading producer of electronic equipment in the world.
Tho electronics industry is broadly defined as that sector of the electrical engineering industries which produces apparatus employing electron tubes as functional component parts together with other circuit elements. In view of the administrative organisation of ministries In tbe USSR, this definition of the electronics industry also includes those Soviet facllitlea which produce wireequipment.
C. Major Product Ca:*gortes.
The products of Ihe Soviet electronics industry includegoods (such as radio and televisionommercial and Industrial products (such as communications stations, test equipment, and industrialelephone and telegraph equipment; rriiUtary radio communications, military radar; and special military devicss .
(such ae.miMil, guidance and controla and infrared devices) The major effort of the industry continues to be devoted to supplying military requirements.
!1. Or gani nation.
A. Ministerial Organisation.
The administrative control of the Soviet electronics industry a. inolcated ine exerted principally throughstriee under the Council of Ministers. The largest sector oi the industry is subordinate to the Ministry of the Radio-Technical Industryhose plants account for slightly more than half of aU finished electronic goods, to addition, plantshis Ministry produce all of the electron tubes and nearly all of the electronic components produced in the USSR.
indicate rather clearly defined lunctiona. ocundaries among the various administrative units. Typical examples are as follows:
Plants under the Fifth Chief Directorate (CD) MRT produce all the tubes in the USSR.
Civilian radio and television receivers are produced onlylants of the republic and local Industries and of the Second CD, MRT.ew in plants of the Ninth CD, MRT.
and telegraph apparatus is made inthe Third CD. MRT, together with some in facilities ofof Communications.
is produced in plants of the First CD. MRT, and
in plants producing electronic equipment but controlled by the
Ministries of Shipbuilding, the Aviation Industry, and the Defense Industry.
Dest>:tc the high degree ol security surroundingactivities in the USSR, theofappears to offer an additional and useful techniqueproduction in such fields as radar, missileconsumption
B, Plants. Employment, and Geographical'Distribution.
The entire Soviet electronics industry4 is estimated to consist oflants employingersons, *
The geographical* distribution of the electronics industry within the USSR is illustrated in* Almost SO percent of the industry is concentratedrincipal regions9 percent in the Central Region,ercent in the Northwest, andercent in the Urals and West Siberia. Sixty percent of the industry is concentrated in four obiasts: Moscow. Leningrad, Novosibirsk, and Gor'kiy.
Three independent techniques were available and Have been used in producing the estimates of total output for the Soviet electronics industry. Security surrounding the Soviet electronics program has precluded the use of direct reports of plant schedules or of economic plans in preparing aggregated estimates.
The first technique Is based upon the definition of the industry. This definition implies that the total economic effort devoted to thc industry manufacturing electronic equipment is related to the eflorl devoted to electron tubes. In practice, in those countries producing both electronic equipment and tubes, the ratio of the total output value for thc electronics industry to the output of electron tubes usually lies
0 See Appendix A. ** Following p.ee Appendix C.
within- rang*. For the USSR thla ratio has been selected
o I. Concentration of Soviet tube production tn six major plants,
estimates of total tubs production of greater accuracy than is possible tor other sectors of the Industry.
The second technique is based upon tbe fact that labor is the major economic input to the electronics industry. Detailed studies of plants and organisational structures have4 estimate, necessarily approximate,lants andmployees.
production methods obtained from technical studies of Soviet materiel, have provided th* means for estimating the output per employee-yearubles.
Th* third techniquebased upon combining order-of-battle information for military product* and plar. or press Information lor -consumer goods to provide an estimate for all equipment categories producedC-M. Sine* the ordcr-of-battle coverage la limited, estimate* of totals must be made from wide extrapolations, and plan and press information has been vague even at its best This technique it therefore considered to be the least exact, serving only as an approximate confirmation of the other methods.
B. Production Estimates.
Figures derived by using the three techniques resulted ln the following comparable estimatesromillionrom tube productionillion rubles; and from estimates of equipmentillion rubles.
Estimates of output66 are shown Inimilar US data ar* provided for comparison. Sov.e: ouipul increasedillion rubles7illion rubles
Following p. i-
hile the production-of the US electronic* industry expandedillion dollars> billion dollars) and dropped toillion dollars Although these estimates are purposely provided la units of domestic currencies as being mare significant, an approximate comparison ia valid for tha electronics industryollar is equated toublesnit of measure.*
IV. Consumption Pattern.
A. End-Use Sectors.
Three Independent techniques have also been used to study the Soviet consumption pattern for electronic equipment
The first technique is based upon an analysis of thestructure, including the reported product categories and employment figures for the various administrative units. This process is somewhat simplified by the functional lines of (See II. A. above.)
The second techniqueetailed study of Soviet production of selected categories of electron tuber
The third method follows directly and obviously from that technique described earlier in preparing production estimates from analysis of equipment categories produced.
The4 consumption pattern for the Soviet electronics industry ie shown in Pig-are 5. It is estimated thatercent of the output was devoted to civilian radio and television.ercent to essential nonmllitary domestic services, and TOto military devices.
SeeC Following p. 6
B. Consumer Gooes.
Although these estimates indicate that the Soviet electronics industry was engaged predominantly ln military workhe proporllon of effort devoted to the civilian sector increased more rapidly0 than did tbe total Industry. adioselevision receivers ware produced. roduction was greatly accelerated. 4 it is estimated thatillion radios andelevision receivers were made available for civilian consumption, 6 Plan callsillion radiosillion television receivers.
C. Soviet Military Capabilities.
The basic policy underlying the Soviet expansion in electronic has been the support of the military services. During World War EL Soviet army and air force operations suffered frequently from inadequate communicationseneral lack of aircraft detection and fire-control capabilities. Subsequently, several high-level atate-ments stressed the intention toomestic sour.ce of supply for electronic weapons and communications facilities which could put the Soviet military services on an equal fooling with those of the US and the UK.
The heavy planned rxpansion for civilian radio andequipment provides additional economic support to thla predominantly mii'.iary industry andoiential source of facilities and trained prreonnei which could be diverted to military elec'ronire tn (he evenieral war.
V, Military Electronics.
6 Ihe radar defenses of the Soviet Bloc have been greatly expanded in number and equipped gene rally with modsrnised systems. Tableummary ol the coverage in depth for
those areas which hav* been obaerved, aa well aa an extrapolated eatimate for th* balance ol tbe periphery, aad indicate* that the USSR relie*adar deployment involving large number* of unit*.*
Aboutercent of the total output ol the electronic* Induetry of th* USSR0 it estimated to b* radar equipment. Thlaha*ariety of functionally different un.ts of ground, naval, and airborne radar. Some of the types of radar equipment have certainly been produced Inuantitie* than similar units in the US.
In general, production of military radio* has beea sufficient toercent utilization for all tactical units, tanks, and aircraft, The most notable recent advances in ths USSR have been tbe quantity production of decimeter radio-relay systems and the rapid shift of aircraft command sets from high-frequency equipmenthannelequency radio set. It is eit-.rr.atad thatfh* production of military radios has absorbed aboutercent of industry output
of the Military Electronics Program.
As of6 operational typea of major Soviet military electronic equipment have been identified, .ae follows1"^
Sixteen (round radars, including early-warning, ground-control interceptidentification-friend or foeontrol, acqujaltion, and airport and harbor control
Fifteen naval radars, including early-warning, surface-search, fire-control, and IFF
irborne radars. Including IFF, navigational, bombing, tail-warning or gun-laying, and air-intercept (AI)
Soe Appendix C. See Appendix B.
Mora than IT lypefi ol ground communications
More than nine types airborne radio* and
SinceI lhe Sovietndustry has progressed Irom the positionei ondary sector of tbe electrical machinery industry, poorly equipped and oi extremely limited capacity, to the status of the second largest electronics industry in the world, with generally modern plem equipment. The almostide variety ol different complex typee of apparatus, many of which are of native design, and the apparent reliability and effective ness of some systemserhnologlcal capability far beyond the ability of the
To some extent, the industry is relatively vulnerable on two counts: th* continued, although decreasing, dependence or. importsew speclaliaed production material* and the geographicalof its most important fanlitiee.
The apparent over-allf the Soviet electronics industry is to emphasise all meanseeting present and future militarybe indirared trend for this industry le one ofexpansion in output, although probablyower annual percentage change than prevailed0resent plans call few anased shaie of output (or consumer goodshare whwh will continue to be (at less than the military share.
IDENTIFEP SOVIET MIUTARY ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT 4/
Soviet Type US/UK Name orCounter part
DUMBO WHIFF KNIFEREST
I WIN EYES
AAanadian AAK AA No.k II UK AAk III
Approximate)Approximate) Mk Ul IFF; AN/TPX-l
intercept Early-warning Kigh-lrequency tide nt illcation-
frlonil or ton Acquisition Hi gb-frequency Fire-control Early-warning/
intercept Harbor control Airport
World War II World War II
ifi St <fi
I. Output cf the Soviet Electronics Industry.
of Industry Output to Tube Output.
Production of tha electronic! Industry in the USSR waa eoti-matod by applying to estimates of Soviet tubs production an estimates ratio* value of the total output of the electronic! industry to theof electron tube production. Similar industrial experience in tit* USast Germany indicates that this ratio isu I. at shown tr. Table Esnmates of Soviet production4 support applicability of this ratio to Soviet tube data. The estimates of Soviet tube production4 are supplemented by two additional methods, one baaed on employment data and ihe.Ather on (ategoriei of equipment produced.
Output aa Related to Total Employment.
Analysise data summarised inrovides an estimate ofacilitiesotal employment of. Usable estimates ol employment are available forf :he identified plants; of the others, less reliable informal'.onthatrc small plants andrc large plant*. Total employment for theestimated" plants is; for this report, total employment in thearge plants wa* assumed atnd in themall
The derivation of these induetry estimate* is illustrated in
"ollows onollows on
Ratio o: the Net Value oi the Output of the Electronics Industry to the Value of Electron Tube Production in the USi.3 and in East Germany.
Nc! industry output (million US dollars) OO
Tube production [million US dollars)
In estimating the output per employee for the Sovietindustry, several sources were employed:
A recent CIA estimate listed the outputn agricultural worker0 rubles per year/ For the electronics sector of manufacturing, output per employee should be nearly twice that for all ner-agr.cultural employees,4 value0 rubles per year.
. indicates an outputofnd
rubles/ By excluding double-counting
the average output per employee for the industry will be less than
itpu: per employee in Individual plants
Continued on p.. -
From another CIA report, be average output per employee a! the Soviet tube industry isubles ptr year. Experience indicates that tho average (or an integrated electronics industry isimes the output per employee in the tube industry. 9/
On the basis of these sources. It is believed thator the Soviet electronics industry is close0 rubles per employee. otal industry output ofillion rubles is indicated.
C. Industry Output as Derived from Equipment Category Estimate*.
Analysisand of order-of-battle information
eans for establishing an approximate estimate of the total 'inventories of military electronicndus* ty studies of other sectors, including civilian radio and television and domesticprovide the additional data necessary for an integrated estimate.
Using the data in Table I* and applying estimated unit prices. the total value of production for radar is summarized ir, Table 4. Nearly all of the radar equipment has beenin tbe USSR
For theear period, estimates of productioncategories are as follows: military radio andercent ofillion rubles; special military dsvices.percent of military electronics.illion rubles; military atercent of total militaryillionradio and television receiver production and5 billioncommunications equipment and main-
tenance atercent of totalbillion rubles; and
P. 1C. above.
Qased on US analogy.ollows on
Based OA Ike distribution of employment figures as snow- La Appendix A-
essential domestic radio services,ercent of totalijlior. rubles.
Estimated Value of the Production of Radar in the USSR
Class of Radar
These figuresotal military equipment valueillion rublesonmilitary total ofillion rubles. On the reasonable assumption that the annual increment ir. output for the Soviet electronics industry is directly proportional to the increment in tube output, the output of the electronics industry4 is estimated atercent of the total output lorear.
D. 1 ma IMdu g'jP"
The application of the ratioo the most current estimates of electron tube production in the USSR to obtain the total value of the Soviet electronics industry is shown in Table 5.
Production of Electron Tubes and Total Production of the Electronics Industry in the
a. Estimates of tube production are from the following.figure misprinted, should beillion instead;olaled'on theJ0. Estimated byatioo tube production estimates. Margins of error, based on margins attached to tube estimates and on the range implied byatio, are as follows: lus or minuslus or minuslus or minuslus or minus, plus or minusercent.
II. Ruble to Dollar Ratio.
Ia view of the extremely broad range of products of the electronic! industry, it is essential to utilise an appropriate unit of measureggr*Ba'* treatment of the aubjact. Except for specific instances of detailed analysis, the use of physical units is unsatisfactory. The high degree of convertibility of facilities and manpower between different product categories and the general dependence upon common component parts facilitates the application of product value as an acceptable unit of measure. Industry experience indicates that the best measure of aggregate output or of industry capacity is expressed in terms of. value in current domestic currency prices.
For analysis of the Soviet electronics induatry or broad acctors thereof, the. product sales price ia rubles has been chosen as the best available unit of measure.
Earlier economic Intelligence studies have included initial attempts to correlate the ruble and the dollarnit of measure for theindustry. IS/ Information on. unit prices and on specific product comparisons has been limited. Subject to con-firmacion or modification resulting from newer information, available data Indicate that the average unit price for Soviet electronics products Li ruble* Isimea the US dollar unit price. For the electronics industry, therefore, the ruble/dollar conversion ratio hae been taker, aso 1.
UJ. Consumption Pattern.
Analysis of the indicated product mix and of tho estimated output of spsclflc tube families provides th* means of determining thepattern for the Soviet tube industry against selectedof endeview ofad ofrovides an estimate for employment in various ministerialand their subordinate equipment manufacturing plants. In view of tha apparent functional assignments and the reported product lines, ii is possible torobabls industry consumption pattern on the permissible assumption that output Is proportional to *raploy-merit in facilities producing electronic equipment. An end-use
consumption pattern (orear period04 ha. been cited above
Table b"ummary of results, comparing indicated consumption patterns as derived from these three independent techniques. The_ column ofas been used for this report a. the most4 consumption pattern for the electronics industry ot the
IV. Radar Order of Battle.
!. iround Radar.
The inventory of Soviet early-warning (EW) and ground-con-trol intercept (GO) radar aa of4 washe following manner.
. me northeastern Siberian seacoasthe northern and southern Soviet bordersotaliles). Radar for these areas is projected on the basiset periles for EWet periles for GCI. Tho EW number Is doubled forin depth The GCI number is doubled for depth in the case of the Siberian border but is allowed no support in depth along the northern and southern borders.
The method of estimating internal radar coverage accounts fore discreriancy inetween Observed Sites and
ollows on p.bove.
The projectiona ratio of radar aete lo urban population rather than lo area or total population. The assumption underlying thia methodology it that urban population ia tho beatrimary target*.
Fire-control radar la estimatedatioadar aetntiaircraft guns. It is known that fire-control radar ia used onlym gun* by the Soviet military forces. Th* inventory of these gun* operationally employed or. JI4 is estimated to be/
The estimate of the number of ground components of idenli-ficatio*-friend or foe (IFF) t* based on the method used to estimate the BW and OCI. To the total thus obtained has been added aneta on the assumption that
tiepattern of GCI radar with which IFF is used indicatesarger number of IFF sets probably have been produced.
2. Naval Radar.
Tho estlmala fora based on the order-of-battle Information on the Soviet Navy and on the visual observations of Soviet navalccordingly, ail Soviet surface ships and submarines are assumed to have ar. air-search radar.
Naval fire control is allocated as follows: heavy and light0 toadar sets per ship; destroyers.adar sets per ship; ocean and escortadar sets per ship.
All Soviet naval ships of consequence have IFF. Cruisers are estimated toet*, and daatroyers.ets. This report estimates IFF on long- and medium-range submarines. This capability Is not givenhort-range submarines, The current effective Soviet naval strength is estimated as
Destroyers Ocean escorts
3. Airborne Radar.
The USSR is eatimated to have ZOO air-intercept (AI) rad.
This report estimates that the Soviet airborne IFF ia operational in all military planes. The authorlaed strength of the Soviet Air Farces is0
Bombing and navigational radar has been installed in tht majority ol the Soviet operational light and medium bombers.ail-warning or gun-laying radar has been installedigh proportion of light and medium bombers. For thlaotalight andedium bombers has been assumed as operational.