Office of CurrentNo. -
ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS OF THE SOVIET MINISTRY OF 4
.CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM ^EASEASSANITIZED
Office of Research and Reporlu CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This report is an all-source companion study
Thc joint report is an expository prescnta tion of thc organisational structure of the Ministry of Communications. USSR.
Since the organisational structure and functional responsibilities are presented in extensive detail in the joint report, thc present report discusses them in general fashion only.
This report is an analysis of the actual day-to-day operation of the Ministry. It is based on an analysis of thc general principles of administration and management which are used in the Ministry. It considers the administrative methods of the Ministry and analyzes its organirational and managerial strengths and weaknesses.
Since the writing of this report the Ministry of Communications haa bcon changed from an AJl-Union ministry tonion-republic ministries. Lack of detailed information on the manner and extent to which this change has been, or is being implemented, hasany textual analysis of its impact upon ministerial operations.
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I. Central Organization
Administration and Functions
of Authority and Operational Control .
Liaison with Union
Relations with Higher Echelons
with Lower Echelons
Echelon Management . . .
Centralization and Decentralization
of Credit .
VI. Material Allocations
Bonuses, and Incentive
VIII. Influence of the Party in the Management
nfluence of thc Trade Union in the Management
X. Influence of the Executive Committees in the Management
XI. External Relations of MINSVYAZ* .
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C- Coordination of Civil and Military
D. Coordination of Civil
XII- Trends in Organization.and
Appendix B. Gaps in
Appendix C. Source References
Organization of the Soviet Ministry of Communications.
ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS OF THE SOVIET MINISTRY OF
The Soviet Ministry of Communications (MINSVYAZ')ighly centralised structure that is organized along production-territorial lines. Its operational functions are divided amongainwhich are aided by abouttaff departments and The regional organization parallels the administrative structure of the USSR,ommunications administration, or office, found at republic, kray, oblast, city, and rayon levels. The Ministry operates virtually all civil telecommunications, radio, wireline, and postal facilities in tbe USSR.
Communications in the USSR are dividod into those for general use, which arc controlled by MINSVYAZ'. and special governmental agency communications. These latter systems are under the operation of other ministries but still remain subject to thc technical control of MINSVYAZ'. Communications enterprises are usually divided functionally into joint and specialized types. The former carry out operations in the over-all field of communications and are known as local administration. "The specialized enterprises arc limited to specific operations only such as post offices, radio, telephone, and telegraph stations.
The estimates and conclusions contained in this report represent the best judgment of ORR as
The management ol MINSVYAZ' in based on the conceptroduction-territorial system of organization and the principle
the resulting dual subordination of local operational units to both the local administration and thc main administration in Moscow. Over-all management is shared by the Minister, his deputies, and the Collegium. Thc latter can make no decisions without the Minister's approval, and thisailure to relieve theof the Minister. The operational responsibilities of the Ministry are divided among the deputy ministers.
Control of the regional offices is extremely centralized and strict. General coordination of communications activityepublic is the responsibility of the authorized agent of MINSVYAZ' in that republic. His position is weakened by an evident lack of authority to give operational direction to the administrations within his jurisdiction. Thc extreme centralization is more apparent at lower echelons,ack of independence and initiative hurts the efficiency of operations. This is highlighted by the necessity for emergency actions to be initiated by Moscow or to require Moscow's approval before implementation.
ln functional management for planning, finance, personnel, and material allocations. MINSVYAZ' adhers generally to the usual Soviet practices. The planning process is carefully controlled and supervised from Moscow. Considerable evidence of plan alterations and changes in emphasis during any plan year, however,imited flexibility which allows planning to be fairly realistic.
A significant change in the financing of MINSVYAZ' has been the transfer of certain postal, telegraph, telephone, and radioystem of self-support (Khoaraschet). By this change, these enterprises now finance themselves from current receipts rather than being financed by the state budget. This change should increase local independence in financial matters and make local managers more responsible for the financial soundness of their operations.
Management problems in the field of material supply have resuited in systems of control whichigidity in local operations. Many of these problems result, however, from conditions over which MINSVYAZ' has no control.
Personnel management in the Ministry is confused because of multiple direction within MINSVYAZ' and complications arising from the influence of external organizations.
The influence of external organizations such as the Party, trade unions, and executive committees is noticeable in MINSVYAZ' management. Of these, the trade union influence is least. The executive committeesairly prominent voice in planning and financial matters through their control of local budgets and the administration of state loans for radiofication. The influence of the Party is strong, particularly in personnel matters. The available evidence shows that the Patty, although potentially disruptive, generally acts in the interest of local communications enterprises.
Much of thc activity of MINSVYAZ' is concerned with theof communications systems in other civil ministries. MINSVYAZ1 exercises strict control over the: technical aspect of these systems and also furnishes and builds facilitiesontract or lease system. MINSVYAZ' is also involved in military communications. The system controlled by MINSVYAZ' undoubtedly would be meshed tightly with the military systems in the event of war, but none of the details of such arrangements is known.
At this point in its development, MINSVYAZ' seems to havetage of consolidation of its communications systems. There also have been several major consolidations of its mainat Moscow. imilar consolidation of radio and electrical communications facilities has taken place in local offices. In addition, MINSVYAZ' is now absorbing many of the communications centers formerly serving other ministries, such as the Ministry of These changes willightening up of the vast organization of MINSVYAZ'. There shouldesulting economy in expenditures of money, manpower, and materials.
The reorganizations seem to reflect an opinion that MINSVYAZ' havingtale of development commensurate with the needs of the economy, should now strive for increased efficiency. The reorganizations shouldong way toward achieving this goal. The evolutionore efficient system may. however, be hampered by continued and increased centralization inasmuchigh degree of centralization has the effect of depriving regional organizations of the independence and initiative necessary for efficient operations.
I. Central. History.
Whon the Communists seized powerhey formed the People's Commissariat for Posts and Telegraph to direct and administer communications. 4 the Soviet constitutionthe Commissariat as the All-Union People's Commissariat of Posts and Telegraph.** On2 it was renamed the People's Commissariat of Communications. It was renamed again6 the Ministry of Communications (MinisterstvoINSVYAZ').MINSVYAZ' is one of thc few ministries that have been relativelyy the numerous major reorganizations which have taken place in the USSR since Stalin's death.
* The organization of MINSVYAZ' is presented in thisbrief form. Aspects of thtf'organi zationn1
each organ arc discussed in detail
** An Ail-Union ministry is one which directs the branch of state administration entrusted to it throughout the USSR and does not have corresponding ministries in the union republics.
*** For serially numbered source references, see Appendix C. Recent and projected reorganizations of MINSVYAZ' areection XII.
B- General Administration and Functions. 1. General Functions.
MINSVYAZ' controls virtually all civilin the USSR. * It is the Soviet equivalent of RCA and Mackay Radio, thc US nationwide broadcasting network. Bell Telephone. Western Union, and the US Post Office combined. 2/ MINSVYAZ' constructs, maintains, and directs virtually all radio, wireline, and postal facilities in the USSR. In addition, one of its primeis to control the construction and technical operation of all aspects of elect roc ommunications and broadcasting which are under the jurisdiction of other civilian organisations. 3/ Any relations which MINSVYAZ' may have with military communications are not considered in this report.
Some ministries operate communication systems for their own use which are not under the immediate jurisdiction of MINSVYAZ1. Among them are the Ministries of Transportation, .the Coal Industry, the Maritime Fleet, and the River Fleet. Even these organizations make extensive use of MINSVYAZ1 services totheir own. Thc ministerial systems are particularly dependent on MINSVYAZ' in technical matters. They are all under the technical control of MINSVYAZ1 in such matters as monitoring, frequency allocations, and scheduling. Further details of the relations of MINSVYAZ* with these outside organizations are discussed in Section XI.
2. Central Administration-
The All-Union Ministry of Communicationsighly centralized organizationreat concentration of power at its center, in Moscow, from which"isast network
* See the Chart, "Organization of the Soviet Ministryollowing p. 6.
of regionalhc Ministry is organizedommon Soviet pattern based on the production-territorial system.
Thc work of MINSVYAZ' is controlledumber of production (or operational) main administrations (Glavkl) and specialized departments and administrations.
a. Main Administrations.
These main administrations are the most important elements in the MINSVYAZ1 system. Thoy manage all the production-technical activity of tho separate fields of communications. They are also responsible for all matters relating to the direct management of organizations concerned with organization of work and production, quality of operation, establishment of norms for development and use of equipment, and planning and plan fulfillment, as well as technical development and allocation and consumption of material supplies. 4/
b. Departments and Administrations.
A system of functional departments andexists to supplement the above operational main The functional departments have an over-all responsibility for all questions of planning and finance, inspection and control, accounting, technical problems, and wage scales. No functional organ has the right, apart from the main administration, todirectives and instruction on operative matters to any activity or enterprise. Si This practice is in accord with thc Soviot concept oi odinonachaliye (ono-man leadership andhich vests all responsibility for the performance of any mainon its head administration. Thc concept would, of course, be weakoncd if thc functional departments could givo operational
* Since the writing of this report the Ministry of Communications has changed from an All-Union ministry tonion-republic ministries. Lack of detailed information on the manner and extent to which this change has been, or is being implemented, hasany textual analysis of its impact upon ministerial operations.
direction to the units subordinateain administration. Final responsibility for the over-all direction of MINSVYAZ' rests, of course, with the Minister.
3. Types of Communications.
All communications in the USSR may be dividedommunications media for general useommunications media for special governmental agencies. Communications media for general use are concentrated in MINSVYAZ'. Communications media reserved for governmental agencies are intended for the excluaive use of the other ministries or enterprises, and the facilities are dia-tributedumber of organisations outside of MINSVYAZ'. The influence of MINSVYAZ' over such services, however, is very strong. In addition to the technical.controls previously mentioned, it frequently enters into agreements to operate facilities for other ministries. It provides and maintains facilities, exercises technical control, assigns frequencies, and controls transmission schedules for thesystem of the Ministry of Cultureontract basis. 6/
Communications media for general use are organised by MINSVYAZ' and are subdivided to provide services to the general public, organizationa.and enterprises, as well as institutions. These services are. in turn, classified into magistral and intraoblast and intrarayon.
The two major media of rapid communications operated by MINSVYAZ" are radio and wireline which are used to provide telephone, telegraph, facsimile,nd other services.
* Control in this sense refers to the remote control of an activity by means of electrical or radio impulses. The role of MINSVYAZ* or its subordinates in military programs, which use remotesystems, is not specifically known.
Civil radio communications, which include telephony, telegraphy, control, and facsimile, are directed primarily by the Main Administration for Radio. They are classified into communications of general use. internal departmental use. and special purpose. 7/
Magistral and intraoblast communications are handled by the Main Administration for Radio, while intrarayon communications are handled by thc Main Administration for Radio Installation and Rayon Electrical Communications.
All wire-line communications, which includestelegraph, control, and facsimile, are partnified system of communications directed by thc Main Administration for Telegraphic Communications through the regional directorates and offices of MINSVYAZ'. Thc five basic organizational operating units forserviceU. main centers handling communicationsepublic or large kray. oblast. or industrialU, telegraphic stations of an oblastU. telegraphic stationsayonS, communications sections;O, city sections. Wire-line telegraph links are divided into magistralnteroblast, intraoblast. intrarayon. and city linksattern similar to that used by the Main Administration for Radio. The type of link determines which of thc above units shall have immediate jurisdiction.
In addition to these wire-line communications handled by MINSVYAZ'. many^ ministries have their own intra -organizational systems. Although generally outside of MINSVYAZ' system, they can be used, with MINSVYAZ' authorization, for public communications when service is not available otherwise. 8/
Thc telephone system of thc USSR, is handled by thc Mam Administration for Intcr-City Telephone Communications and the Main Administration for the City Telephone System. Specific jurisdiction depends on whether thc system handles city or intercity telephone communications. The main organizational operating units are the Central Telephone Exchangehe Chief Telephone Exchangeelephone Exchangend City Telephone System (GTS).
Doth radio and wire line are used toinformation about what
organization or administration is responsible for the transmission of facsimile communications.
4. Types of Enterprises. *
Most communications enterprises are divided functionally into joint and specialized typoB. Joint enterprises carry out operations for the over-all fields of communications and are referred to as local administrations. Specialized enterprises are limited to specific operations connectedingle field such as post offices, telegraph and telephone stations, and radio stations.
In addition, communications enterprises are classified according to the volume of revenue. In the first class are those with an annual income of2 million rublesillion rubles; in tho second class, those from6 million to2 million rubles; in thc third class, those from3 million to6 million rubles.
The figures given in thia section are/ 4 has not been verified. They are taken0
Telegraph offices are divided into the following classes: first class, with an exchangeelegrams inours; soi^-nd class,00 telegrams, and third class,elegrams.
Telegraphic offices with an exchange of lesselegramshour period fall under the joint communications enterprises.
In addition to joint and specialized enterprises, therehird type. To this group belong the largest enterprises ofsignificance. They are in direct operational-technicalto tbe Ministry of Communications at Moscow. Such enterprises as the State Institute for Planning Communications (GIPROSVYAZ') are assumed to belong to this group.
C. Regional Administration and Functions.
The regional administration of MINSVYAZ' is exercisedast system of local offices which conforms to theadministrative structure of the USSR. These organizations, known as Communications Administrations, are arrangedierarchy starting with the administration of the authorized agent, which is found at the union-republic level, and descending in the normal fashion to kray, oblast, okrug, city, and rayon level.
The authorized agents and heads of the local administrations have responsibility for thc functioning ot all communications services. Thoy constantly receive instruction from thc main administrations in Moscow and, in turn, submit reports to them either directly or through the next communications administrations in the
The administrations of the authorized agents, the local communications administrations (kray and oblastnd thc local offices of communications (city and rayon level) are all organized in departments and sections analagous to the correspondingand departments of thc Moscow organization. In the smaller offices, however, many of the departments are consolidated. In a
local administration, for example, one telephone-telegraph department may manage the operation and development of intercity telephone and telegraphic service in its territory, the lines and exchanges, and all intrarayon In Moscow thereeparatefor each of these fields.
The kray and oblast administrations are usually controlled directly from Moscow. Sometimes an exception is made and oblast administrationsray are controlled by the kray13/ The kray and oblast administrations manage their territories by means of okrug, city, and rayon offices of14/
The okrug, city, and rayon offices put the means ofinto operation, and under the general supervisionray or oblast administration, manage the local enterprises and establishments within their respective territories.
II. Central Management. A. General.
The two basic concepts used in the management of MINSVYAZ' are the product ion-territorial principle and the principle of edino-nachaliye .
Under the production-territorial principle. MINSVYAZ' Is organizederies of production or operational maineach of which controls specific operations, such as radio, postal communications, and construction, throughout the USSR. In the over-all direction of MINSVYAZ', each of these mainis aidedystem of staff organizations which deal with planning-financo, transport, and-peraonnel.
In operation the principle of cdinonachaliyo implies that thc head of each organizational unit alone has full responsibility for the activities within his jurisdiction. Certain interferences with this
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principle which arise from Ihe role of such external organs as Ihc Party, the trade unions, and the executive committees, arein later sections of this report.
Some internal managerial problems may arise because of clashes between these two principles. The head of each field administration alone is responsible for all activities within his territory. At the same time, however, the operational units under him are also responsible to the operational main administration in Moscow. Although any shortcomings or deficiencies may, in fact, be blamed on the head of thc regional office, it is apparent that the dual responsibility of the operational units under him may often deprive him of the authority he needs lo meet his responsibilities. One measure which has been adopted to avoid this difficulty is invariably to route directions to an operational field unit through the head of the regional administration. In the same way, any correspondence of operational field units goes through and is signed by the head of the regional administration.
B. Over-All Management.
The over-all direction and guidance of the organization of MINSVYAZ' is the responsibility of the Minister and his deputies. As might be expectedighly centralized organization such as MINSVYAZ', the number and nature of matters referred to these officials for solution or action are extensive. Several devices have been used to facilitate the handling of these problems.
The firsttaff arm and secretariat for the Minister known as the Chancery. This office distributes the Minister's various regulations ando the field and handles the numerous personal complaints and minor problems which are sent to the Minister. This device leaves the Minister free to devote more time to matters of policy and substance.
Another device to relieve thc heavy work load at the lop is the Kollegium. This organization, which is common to all ministries, is composed of the Minister, his deputies, heads of mainand It considers problems of general
management, the more essential orders and policies ol the Ministry personnel selection and appointment, and similar matters. In addition it checks on the execution of the orders and policies of the Ministry.
In conformance with the principle of cdinonachaliye. the Kollegium has no authority to make or to implement any decisions unless they are approved by the If. in practice, this restriction means that every action must have thc Minister's personal consideration and approval, the resulting workload on the Minister must be regardedositive management weakness.
A further device in over-all managomont is thc division of over-all functional responsibilities among the deputy ministers. This delegation of responsibility is particularly importantinistry such as MINSVYAZ'. which handlesast group of operations throughout the entire USSR.
Five deputy ministers function in an over-all coordinating and supervisory capacity. They are Sergeichuk (Planning and Finance). Topuriya (Radio Communications). Zernovlokov (Linend Cherenkov (Supply).
It is difficult to judge whether the deputy ministers are able adequately to meet the broad responsibilities assigned to them. If not. it would be reasonable to expect that many of their duties and responsibilities would have been transferred to lower echelons in accordance with the decree on "Expanding the Rights of USSRhich was issued in In the materials surveyed, however, there were no obvious indications that any MINSVYAZ's authorities at any level now exorcise any more authority than they have in the past.
C. Administrative Control.
Administrative control in MINSVYAZ' reflects thehighly centralized system of Soviet management. In routine matters the chain of command is rarely violated. An
extremely extensive system ot reporting serves to keep top leaders fully informed on In the Fifth Main Administration alone, for example, some mine pro-formas arc submitted monthly by fieldairly common control practice is to have pro-formas signed by both the head of the reporting office and the chiefn other cases the pro-forma also requires the signature of Party and/or trade union In addition, external audits and financial chocks of regional communications administrations arc carried out by the Central Accounting Of/ice, and the administrations of the authorized Examples of controls in the fields of planning and finance will be found in the sections of this report dealing with those subjects.
D. Delegation of Authority and Operational Control.
Operational control of the activities of thc MINSVYAZ' is vested in the heads of the main administrations. The amount of authority which can be exercised at the level of regionalappears to be slight, At the lowest levels, all activity is controlled by sets of rigid regulations which spell out every conceivable detail of day-to-day operation of communications Moscow specifies, for example, the number of men and poles to be assigned per kilometer of line It may be that the technical problemsommunications system necessitate such strict control of field operations. This method has certain advantages in procedures such as the one which virtually requires automatic reporting of communications disruptions.
The multiplicity of detail which is found
however, is prima facie proof that heads of regional aaministrations do not have authority to settle even the most minor problems. Even in relatively simple financial problems such as the paymentill for transport services, thc field offices ask Moscow what to/ There is also evidence to show that an authorized agent is evidently unable to assign excess personnel without applying io Moscow for
In emergency situations, ouch detailed central control amountsather serious weakness. Procedures for emergency operation are all precisely defined in official regulations, but implementation is hamperedack of authority at thc local level. In at least one instance it was apparent thatasic step as securing additional manpower to cope with thc emergency could not be initiated in the field, but had to await action by Equally serious was the fact that during emergency disruptions of the system the authorized agent at Baku evidently lacked the authority to order changes in the routing of communications and had to ask Moscow to do
The examples cited above show clearly that the high degree of centralization and strict control of field offices is paid foreduction of initiative and independence of action at the lower levels. This inflexibilityigh cost inost important factorountry in which rapid and efficientsystems are so important. To the extent that remedial actions against communications disruptions must await initiation or approval from Moscow, the Soviet communications systemc judged to sufferasic management weakness ofand control.
III. Regional Management. A. Authorized Agent.
1. General Functions.
Although each headocal communicationsis.ense, an authorized agent or representative of MINSVYAZ'. thc term "authorized agent" is applicableo those persons heading administrations of the authorized agents. These administrations are usuaUy located in the capital cities of the union republics. In only one instance has an authorized agent been identifiedity othernion-republic capital, namely
information generally describes thc authorized agent as responsible lor liaison with union-republic governments in behalf of the All-Union ministry which he These agents, therefore, are the highest representative of MINSVYAZ' in the republics and represent it on all questions concerning communications. They coordinate orders and instructions with union-republicintroduce plane for the development of communications to thc union republics, and control thc observance within-union republics of All-Union legislation involving communications. They are also responsible for the direction and control of all communications organs within their
Despite this latter
not show that the authorized agent exercises any positive or direct control over the administrations within his area. They do show, however, that he is actively involved in all facets of communications activity within his area. He is apparently in constant touch with communications organs, and is knowledgeable about every activity within his jurisdiction. Nevertheless, most day-to-day operational orders originate with MINSVYAZ' and its Main Administration in Moscow.
2. Liaison with Union Republics.
In his role of liaison with the union republicagent is involved in the broad communicationsthe entire republic. Thus in Azerbaydzhan SSR it wasagent to whom the leadership of the republica program for radiofication* and telephonization wasauthorized agent, in turn, interceded with Moscow onthis program.
* Radiofication (radiof ikatsiya)eneral Soviet term meaning the development of radio from the point of view of thc consumer. It includes thc manufacture and distribution of radio receivers and loudspeakers as well as the organization of listening.
His liaison role also extends to trade union activities. The authorized agent seems to work directly with the Chairman of the Republic Trade Union of Communications Workers in thc negotiation of the annual collective/ He also sends to Moscow an accounting of thc work done in concluding collective
A further example of his liaison with organs outside of MINSVYAZ1 is again in thc radiofication program. There is evidence to indicate that the authorized agent is empowered to, and often does, negotiate with collective farms on the development of wire-diffusion In this connection he also sends reports to Moscow on the amount of wire-diffusion workt is not clear whether or not the authorized agent is thc sole agent through whom all such contracts for communications work for outside agencies must be negotiated. Evidence presented in X. below, would seam to indicate that in many instances these negotiations can be carried on directlyommunications administration, and an executive committee or collective farm.
3. Relations with Higher Echelons of MINSVYAZ'.
evidence of an authorized
agent givingctly to lower echelons, there are numerous examples of actions concerning personnel problems, wage and financial matters, and supply problems being channeled through the administration of the authorized agent. In many respects the institution of the authorized agent seems to be an administrative device for the general control and coordination of the communications activities within major political subdivisions of the USSR.
* Wire-diffusion radioystem of loudspeakers which are connectedentral program distribution point by cither telephone circuits or by specially strung wire lines. The program distribution points are, in turn, connected to the broadcasting station cither by wire lines or. in the case of small places and remote areas, by radio receiving units. It is. in effect, mate control of program and station selection.
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In some cases Ihe authorized agent actsirect representative of MINSVYAZ'. An example of this practice is the instance of an authorized agent consulting with MINSVYAZ' and acting as its agent by conducting personnel examinations in behalf of His roleeneral coordinator andis seen particularly when lower echelon field offices arc not operating efficiently. In these cases the authorized agent acts on complaints from Moscow about the unsatisfactory performance of these lower Moscow has also gone to the authorized agent for actionower echelon has been laggard about replying to directives or questions from
A major function of tho authorized agent is to actind of administrative control for his area. It seems to beprocedure for the authorized agent to receive copies of any plans made for sectors within..hisarticipation in the planning field is evidenced further by examples of the authorized agent submitting general planning programs to Moscow and reporting on general plan
The authorized agent sends to Moscow, as aadministrative control, consolidated reports of varioustho sectors within his Among such reports arebalances of the enterprises within the territory, asreports on financial innnections of the Itnoted thatauthorized agents
submit these consolidated reports, mere is apparently no well-established procedure for the local offices to submit their reports to the authorized agent. Invariably any pro-forma report
submitted directly to the main administration con-cernea. The reports to 'he authorized agent of
The only known instance of lower echeion pro-forma reporting to thc administration of the authorized agent concerned reports on breakdowns in communications and the measures taken to remedy He. in turn, submits reports on the repair of communications
Mm Ii ol the Authorizeddealing* "iUl MINSVYAZ' arc concerned with questions about administrative planning and management It is the authorized agent, (or example, who proposes to. and negotiates with, the Ministry on the composition of the staffs at locale is also consulted about and asked to approve the appointment of supervisory personnel at thc It appears, however, that actions on the release or appointment of these personnel must be confirmed by the main administration
Other administrative matters which authorized agents have discussed with central headquarters have been questions of wage rates andhe assignment andof personnelhe detachment of personnel to carry out specialinitiated innd the establishment of training programs and school
4. Relations with Lower Echelons of MINSVYAZ'.
As stated above, the authorized agent seems to exercise no direct operational control and guidance over the lower echelon organs within his territory. In addition to his role as ancontroller and coordinator for central headquarters, however, the authorized agent does seem to play an important role in support of the operations of lower echelon communications organs.
This support is particularly apparent in the bothersome field of material supply. Here the authorized agent acts as an expediter. If the shipment of materials within MINSVYAZ' is involved, he deals directly with the main administration for supplyf suppliers outside of MINSVYAZ' are involved, he establishes contact with the appropriaten at least oneroblem of material supply was handled by the concerted action of several authorized agents. An advantage enjoyed by the authorized agent in problems of this sort is that he can and does seek help directlyeputyocal administration on .the other hand is usually, though not always, limited to corresponding with the main administration for
supply or the operational main administration concerned. The authorized agent also intercedes on behalf of the lower echelonsariety of other problems. An agent requested the Minister lo expedite the approval of plans, for example,ase in which construction was being delayed because of the failure of the Ministry to
In his relations with lower echelon organs, the authorized agent through general coordination of programs and administrative planning, seems to act either as an expediter in easing operational problems orore direct medium for ensuring efficient and prompt lower echelon compliance with ministerial programs.
5. Management Weaknesses.
The information given above shows clearly that the authorized agent is an important factor in administrative control and direction of lower echelon communications administration. evice for bringing the administrative machinery closer to thc operational units, the institution of the authorized agent seems to be reasonable. To the extent that the authorized agent is responsible for direction of lower echelon organs, however, his position is weak.
It may be. indeed,are in
error and that the authorizedn tin-*
practice musteleterious effect on the authorized agent's
ability to fulfill his coordination and administrative control It wouldilling effect upon any responsibilities for active direction. The shortcomings of the position of authorized agent in this respect in turn have some significance in terms of the effectiveness of the Soviet communications system.
An illustration of the practical effect was apparentay breakdown in communications at Baku in
agent, although fully aware ol this serious communicationsin an important industrial area, was unable to take effective It was necessary for him
i to seek the intercessioneputy minister in asking cnat alternative communications routes be established. anagement approach to efficiency of operations, this was bad on two counts. The first is that the disruption should have been allowed to continueays without, such alternative routes of communications being used. The second is that the authorized agent evidently did not have enough authority to set these alternative routes into actionconsulting Moscow and without turningeputy minister for aid.
This incident pointsairly significant management weakness at the level of the authorized agent. If he has the authority to direct, the authority cannot be effectively exercised. If he does not have tho authority, the ability of MINSVYAZ* to deal with emergency disruptions to its communications networks is obviously hampered.
It is at this level of organization that the Soviet authorities appear to beood opportunity to strengthen management in MINSVYAZ'. The very position of the authorized agent in the administrative hierarchyompromise in the problem of centralization versus decentralization. He is high enough in the hierarchy to reflect the policies and ideas of Moscow, and near enough to thc bases of operation to understand local problems.
Given thc proper independent authority and power of direction, thc authorized agent could serve lo relieve the work load in Moscow and still retain ample centralized control of the field apparatus. hange in management procedures within MINSVYAZ' wouldorm of decentralization which would seem ideal for avoiding the weaknesses of the present structure in coping with emergency situations.
B- Lower Echelon Management.
Lower echelon management in the USSR reveals astructure of both parallel and horizontal chains of command which often intorscctonfused manner. The most ready condemnation of lower echelon Soviet management is its relative lack of authority commensurate with its responsibility. Other operationalare faced by local managers, suchonsiderable degree of administrative inflexibility, undue restrictions on managerial initiative, untenable situations arising out of unrealistic planning, overabundance of red tape which occurs in virtually any operation, and the fact that so many local offices are far from thc central controlling point at Moscow. igh centralized administrative system permits several possible advantages to the local managers, such as greater flexibility in utilizing the nation's labor force, unlimited financial resources (if approved in all instances by highernd the availability of centralized assistance which can be brought to bear on particularly difficult problems. Lower echelon managementinistry, such as in MINSVYAZ', illustrates and points up specific aspects of these problems,
2. Independence and Inititative.
Thc materials available for analysis of theindependence and initiative of local managers show tha' 'hese Qualities are Quite restricted at this level of"
no pointed out al thehia directive revealn wl early planning, lack ol faith by Moacow Headquarters in the ability of field administration to planormal event, the winter season,ailure of the field administration to reportrequent and adequate manner.
In another instance, severe winter storms seem to have left local organizations somewhat This disruption was due, in part, to probable failures of both technical andfacilities, In the actions taken to remedy tho communications disruptions it waa necessary for the Minister to request aid from the local executive committee. In dealing with such emergency situations, good management practices would dictate that the initiative andfor such measures should originate with the local organizations at the scene of theack of such initiative and foresight by local organizations is shown by the fact that the aid had to be sought by the Minister in Moscow. Moreover, this situtationack of independence on the part of the local communicationswhich prevented their dealing with the situation quickly and effectively.
J. Ccnlrjliganon and Decentralizanon.
Tlierii arc many instances whichery high degree of centralization in the Soviet economy in general and in MINSVYAZ' in particular. rend toward even greaterof the Ministry has been evident in recent organisational changes. The organizational consolidations of4 and the one projected for5 which bring thc Main Administrations for City Telephone Systems. Intrarayon Communications,ingle Main Administration for Radio Installation and Rayon Electrical Communications, for example, illustrate this
Strict adherence to proper channels of authority is required even in the most detailed matters. All changes inf an organization, like changes in other details of the plan, must have the approval of the Moscow headquarters. Thus, when the Main Administration for Communications at Irkutsk desired additions tof the management staff, thc matter was referred to the Central Administration of Lines and An official of an intercity telephone system needed the consent of the MainIn order tolant of the Azncft'mash Trust by
Attempts have boen made from time to time to meet the problem of overcentralization within MINSVYAZ' by introducing some measure of decentralization. In Khabarovsk Kray thereove to decentralize by transferring certain press and paper distribution centers to Nizhne-Amur and to the Jewish Autonomous Oblast./ Thc Machine Tractor Stations formerly communicated by telephone with the farms only via the regional centers. ew plan was'devtsed to permit direct communication between Machine Tractor Stations and thc farms, bypassing the regional centers.
There are other examples that indicate that at least some degree of decentralization exists within MINSVYAZ'. Ineeting of chiefs and personnel workers of oblastadministrations was held to formulate orders for the
presentation of awards to communications
Psurlscvocal personnel department lotdel kadrov) in Khabarovsk toecision which thc local office had previously This decentralization is evidently confined to minor matters and does little to relieve the shortcomings discussed above.
In an analysis of lower echelon management within MINSVYAZ1 it is assumed that this Ministry is necessarily more highly centralized than many other economic ministries. The obviousfor uniform operational schedules, and regulation of telephone and telegraph procedures, for example, does require an abnormal amount of standardization and centralized control. In one sense,ell -constructed centralized organizational apparatus possesses certain virtues. This type of organization is particularly advantageousationwide operation where universal technical and operationalare necessary if the parts are to operate in harmony as an organic whole. Still, it would seem that the organization andof MINSVYAZ' reveals an excessive amount of administrative centralization and of dependence by local offices and administrations upon the Moscow headquarters of the Ministryotable absence of initiative on the part of these local organizations and subdivisions of the Ministry,
The question of the ability of lower level management in MINSVYAZ' to achieve its objectives must be answeredeserved affirmation. The Ministry does, indeed, achieve many of its goals. In this connection, certain aspects of Sovietsuch as centralized dispatching of critical materials, works to the advantage of lower echelon management. From the point of view of efficiency, however, it would seem that many problems could be facilitated and streamlined by less centralized control within MINSVYAZ'. reater number of functions of the Ministry could well be delegatedower level, thus enabling higher echelons of the Ministry to be free to handle important matters more carefully and more thoroughly.
The process of economic planning in the USSR involves several regular steps which reach down through most levels of the hierarchy in their application, The completed yearly plan, for example, contains both broad and specific targets for production, prescribes the various conditions attendant thereto, andetailed program of capital investmentchedule for the allocation of resources. The several stops and phasos of the planning process itselfhe setting of broad economicilling in the minutiae of requisite detailedinal approval of the plan by high governmental officials.
The process oparates neither as smoothly as the above outline would indicate nor as rapidly as the Soviet officials wish. Problems ofompromise, adjustments, and reallocations continually come to the surface from the initiation of the plan through its final fulfillment or nonfulfillment.
The formulation of plans for MINSVYAZ'. as in other ministries, involves several steps and processes. In the first step the central ministerial apparatus sends an outline known as the "blank summary plan" or pro'ekt of the yearly plan to itsoffices and These outlines of the proposed annual plan are sent out from Moscow during August-October of the precedinghis so-called outline of the plan broadly lays down the terms for the ynarly plan. The executive committees on the several levelsray. oblast. rayon, and the cityre involved in ministerial planning to the extent of assisting the ministry in plan formulation and alteration. The committees also check on plan fulfillment and maintain copies of the plans of all organizations and institutions within their respective areas. The executiveapparently do not haveecisive voice inontrolling authority over ministerial planning (see X, below|.
The second step in plan formulation occurs when the local organizations and enterprises of MINSVYAZ' receive this outline plan, fill in the details, and conclude agreements on thc plan goals, thus completing thc formulation of the plan in all This process is referred to as "drafting the pro'ektr formulating the "draft This rather detailed plan is then submitted to Moscow for final approval some.time in:the latter quarter of the preceding Late receipt of the plan by the localoften results in late submission of the draft plan by theseevertheless, the Ministry officials do notreat deal of time to thc local organizations to prepare and submit the draft
The third and final step in plan formulation involves ministerial and governmental approval of the "draft pro'ekt"by the local organizations and Once this approval is granted, the final plan is sent down to the lower organs as the established plan for the coming The established plan, therefore, is the result of rather careful thinkingonsiderable amount of preparatory planning and "counter" planningelatively large number of persons on various operating levels. This method would appear to facilitate the establishment of plans which areonsiderable extentthe more so as heads of local administrations are allowed to go fo Moscow and defend their recommendations for the draft
C. Plan Alteration.
Even after it has been formally established, the annual plan is not inflexible. Alterations in the plan are frequentlyby lower organizations and often granted from Moscow. These requests for changes inlan might be concerned, for example, with increases for administrative-managementcapital repairs, or for thc wage
Some requests from lower organizations for changes in the plan (changes which would favor these organizations) are approved, but others are The determination of whether or not to alter the established plan is made In the Moscow headquarters, obviously based on Moscow's view of the necessity and/or desirability for an alteration in any specific instance.
A certain flexibility in plan alteration is apparent in cases when plan changes are necessitated by broad policies. An example of this was in the plan alterations made3 in accordance with new policies for the expansion of communications between Machine Tractor Stations and state In this instance it is apparent that the plan alterations were the result of policy considerations originatingevel higher than MINSVYAZ' and in which MINSVYAZ' had no choice but to acquiesce.
As in other ministries. MINSVYAZ' requires frequent and strict reporting of the results of plan fulfillment on the part of its subordinate organizations. There are monthly reports to be sent to the Ministry, occasionally as earlyays after the end of the current These reports usually require cumulative totals for the year, in addition to the total reported for the current In addition to these reports, there are. for example,onth; and, of course, the customary yearly reports to be filed with the Finally, the reports on plan fulfillment may be of several kinds, such as reports for theof the entire plant or reports on the productionpecific item or group of
The planning process in MINSVYAZ', in general, seemsthe rather normal oal'otn of otherics within thcelements of
careful and calculated long-range planning which involves many steps, limited flexibility, and the usual manner of reporting on the
results of plan fulfillment. If not originally very realistic, the annual plan lends toward that goal as the year progresses. This adjustment is evidenced hy the abundance of traffic discussing plan alterations, reallocations, and changes in emphasis.
Complexities of financing in the USSR, as illustrated in the operationsinistry, result in part from the organisational structure of the Soviet economy. Approval for the operating fundsinistry, for example, must be granted by at least the Council of Ministers, the State Planning Commissionnd the Ministry of Finance beforerant ever gets to the ministry. After receipt of the financial plan by the ministry, any significant deviation therefrom must have the prior consent of higherorgans.
A leading problem in ministerial financing seems to involve the transfcrral of funds from one operation lo another. This difficulty is caused by inability to accurately forecast ruble profitability, materials shortages, and wage expenditures. Ruble shortages are illustrated in repeated requests from lower to higher organisations for supplementary financial allocations above planned estimates.
B. MINSVYAZ1 Financial Policies.
Communications enterprises arc traditionally financed through the stateignificant change in the financing of some communications enterprises was scheduled to go into effect By thishe operational enterprises
of postal, telegraph and inter-city telephone communications, city telephone networks and radio relay networks ofere to be transferred to The significance of this.
* oviet system of accounting in which an enterprise is self-supporting. The term is often translated as "business accountability.
change lo khozraschct is thai henceforth these enterprises will finance such items as wages, raw materials, and fuel from their current receipts. Capital investments and working capital will also be provided from their own resources, and allocations will befrom the budget if such resources are insufficient. The actual implementation of this change has not been confirmed, and it is uncertain if this is thc first instance of the transfer ofenterprises to financinghoaraschet basis.
The change, if it really has taken place,oviet trend to place more and more of its economic enterpriseshozraschct basis. anagement point of view, this change may make these enterprises less dependent upon Moscow for the details of their financial operations. Local allocations, however, would still have to conform to the national plan. The change, moreover, would serve to make local managers more fullyfor the financial soundness of their operation.
Financing of expenditures in MINSVYAZ' is probablywith practices followed in other ministries. The normal pattern of financial management is illustrated by the requirement that outside labor allocations shall be approved by either Psurtsev or Deputy Minister Sergeichuk before being cleared through the State Bank (Gosbank) and the city finance This procedure was also used when thc Main Administration for Rayon and Electrical Communications directed the Ministry of Finance to reduce the budget of MINSVYAZ'pecific amountesult of an unexpected increase in Localof MINSVYAZ1 are assigned specific monthly financial "limits" for operating expenses, among other things, by branches of These local organizations usually pay for some of their own items out of the "local
C. Supplemental Financing.
Problems of supplemental financial allocation, over and above planned estimates and allotments, are dealt with in several ways. The Planning-Financo Administration of MINSVYAZ', for
example, has power to charge some supplementary allocations to the next plan quarter or to the next half-year budget or power to transfer funds betweenf In addition to the Administration forumbor of other main administrations have been identified as approving or disapproving supplementary
Central and branch offices of the Industrial Bank (Prombank) also exert some influence in the determination of payments for supplementary It would seem logical to assume, however, that the jurisdiction of Prombank isechnical and legal nature (such as setting loan limits) and that most decisions onallocations come from ministerial or higher governmental officials.
A continuing problem for MINSVYAZ' and its subdivisions is getting additional finances for overexpenditures of the established wage fund. Instances occur, for example, of administrations having difficulty in getting supplementary wage/ In some cases, excess wage funds may be charged to certain unexpended Glavk funds. On occasion, however, the Glavk has refused toon behalf of local offices in financial difficulties and has left them to solve their problem by negotiating with the heads of the local communications administrationsransfer of funds from other/ General estimates for wages are sent to Moscow for/
D, Letters of Credit.
Many transactions arc carried on by means of "letters of credit" in lieu of prior payment. The letters of credit arc issued to organizations for each quarter from Moscow./ Although Prombank probably guarantees payment for most or all letters of credit, some are granted without Prombank's specific guarantee of payment./ In this connection, an outside supplier will not release goods before heetter of credit./
In addition to thc Chief of theember of the Kollegium, haswith letters of credit. In this connection.
Popov informed the Communications Administration at Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk and the chief engineer at Khabarovsk that shipment of some items waa being delayed because the shippers had not received the necessary letters of credit./
The financial management of MINSVYAZ'airly logical pattern of controls consistent with the high degree of centralization prevailing in many other areas of Soviet management. There is no evidence of increased powers being granted to lower officials in MINSVYAZ1 for below-limit financing, as has occurred, for example, in tho Ministry of Agricultural Procurement. ecurring problem in the financial management of MINSVYAZ' has been the over-expenditure of wage funds which often results in the actual inability of local communications enterprises to pay their workers. From this point of view the change to khozraschct financing may be beneficial to the better managed enterprisesofrofit. ,
VI,- Material Allocations. A. General.
Shortages of materials, both raw and finished, continue to be one of the serious problems in the Soviet economy. This problemreat strain on the management system. Following from the shortages themselves are concomitant problems of procurement, allocation, shipment, and distribution of materials.
Many factors enter into the materials picture which militate against smooth production schedules. The fact that an organisation meets its production schedules, however, is no assurance that delays in procurement and transportation will not create bottlenecks for the consumers of its products. Anof this problem is the frequent nondelivery of ordered
items, or the delivery problem oi items which were not ordered. Thin situation applies especially to the communications industry, where prompt and proper availability of material resources is vital to the smooth functioning and maintenance of thesystem.
The allocation, procurement, and distribution of materials to and from MINSVYAZ' and its subordinateinvolve the established patterns of material supply as carried out in Soviet industry. MINSVYAZ'. for example, is faced with the typical problems of material shortages and of the highly centralized control over materials allocations andfaced by most Soviet ministries.
Material shortages and failure of the distribution system result in fairly common complaints that these problems are causing disruption of the plan and day-to-day operation of communications enterprises./ In some instances, disruptions and badpractices have resulted in such measures as the taking of communications equipment from one enterprise to keep another going./ The shortage problems also result in the practice of extremely close supervision of the material supply situation of enterprises and the transfer of their surpluses to Although this procedure is laudableituation of tight supply, it alsoeakness in that it may deprive anof suitable reserves to cushion itself in the case of emergencies. The numerous complaints of emergency need for equipment and emergency shipment of the same would indicate that most enterprises are forced to operate on an extremely narrow margin. It is not apparent, however, that this is due any more to bad management than it is lo the basic problem of material shortages which existsthe economy.
The system of allocations within MINSVYAZ1 follows regularized procedures, except in emergency situations. ystem as yet undetermined of allocations exists whereby various offices
assume responsibility for allocations. Generallyho respon-sibility of the Main Administration for SupplyL.AVSNAUSV YAZ', lor example, seems to control allocation of auto vehicles. / In Khabarovsk, however, thc kray administration is responsible for thc allocation of spare parts to enterprises in its area./ It may be that in this case Khabarovsk makes detailed allocations within broad limits established by Moscow, or it may be that Moscow allocates tbe basic items whereas allocation of support and maintenance items is decentralized.
In many cases, material allocations are made directly by the main administrations supervising the requesting office./ Among these is ths Sth Main Administration, which not only makes thc allocation but also names specific suppliers for specific items./ In many situations, field offices also seem to have authority to transfer needed items from one to another./ Another common practice is to allocate goods as an advance on allocations for future/
Procurement of materials in MINSVYAZ' is handled infashion. There seem to be established deadlinessubmission of requisitions of various items. Mostseem to bo submitted during the October precedinpyear in which the materials are to beut-off date for material requisi-
/ Requisitions for combustible fuels for the following year, which were submitted onuly were, however, regarded as/ Thus different dates exist for procurement requisitions of the various commodities.
The importance attributed to procurement and efficient utilization of materials is inherent in some procedures. Thus it seems to be standard procedure for enterprises to make itemized reports to Moscow on the amounts of materials selected for each quarter./ In addition, the heads of regional administrations alsolose watch on enterprises within their territory. When
enterprises (ail to take stocks from their suppliers, tho regional administration reports them to Moscow. In situations of this kind there appear to be procedures for tho cancellation of stocks not consumedertain period of/
General supervision of these procurement procedures rests again with GLAVSNABSVYAZ' which also handles measures of emergency/ Intervention by GLAVSNABSVYAZ' occurs, particularly, when lower echelon organizations fail to get satisfaction from the heads of the local administrations. The lower echelon organizations can then appeal lo GLAVSNABSVYAZ'./ If GLAVSNABSVYAZ' fails to take action, appeal can be made directly to thc Minister./ Appeals in the event of procurement problems are also made to the authorized agent./
Standard procedures also seem to exist for the procurement of certain items in short supply from state reserves./
Most of the liaison and negotiation in troublesome cases concerning procurement from agencies and ministries outside of MINSVYAZ1 is handled byember of the/ Popov appears as the main representative of MINSVYAZ* with other ministries for thc procurement of timber and fuel. His efforts are devoted largely to expediting problems in distribution.
The shipment and distribution of materials, once allocated and requisitioned, is one of the major problems in material supply. Many of the distribution problems in MINSVYAZ' reflect basic transportation problems in thc USSR more than they do deficiencies in management. oncern with thc transportation aspect of the problem is seen in Psurtsev's order that "in compliance with Government Order, all communications enterprises should take steps for the timely shipment of/ Similar measures have been noted in other ministriesasic transportation problem in thc/
Numerous requests for thc expediting of shipments In addition to internal MINSVYAZ' problems,
with requests to the Ministry of Trans-
portai.on and the Ministry of thc Maritime and River Fleet asking for additional means of transport./
The materials supply sector of MINSVYAZ' experiences some of the greatest problems in ministerial operation. In addition to the leading role of GLAVSNABSVYAZ' in handling these problems, their urgency is indicated in the factember of the Kollegium devotes almost full time to the same problems. This supply problem has been the subject of many government decrees.
A major result of the supply situation has beenystem of tight controls over material allocation and consumption. Although the tight controls involved mayertain rigidity in the operation of communications enterprises, it is probable that the Ministry has no choice, because the problem of supply and distributionasic one in the economy. In addition, failures of material supply often seem toetarding effect upon successful plan fulfillment.
VII. Personnel Management.
Thc field of personnel management, difficult enough in any regime, suffersumber of problems which in the Soviet system arise in part from the complexities of that system. The recruitment of workers in the USSR seems to be rather smoothly handled, chiefly because of thc high degree of centralizedand assignment. The problem of personnel transfers also appears to be handled fairly efficaciously. Even here, however,
confused lines of authority cause irritating delays in securing approval for transfers. Other personnel problems, such as the availability of qualified and properly trained technicians, and the implementation of wage and general incentive systems, create many difficulties for Soviet managers. To these may be added the ubiquitous problem of labor discipline which plagues Soviet efforts to realize rational production management. It probably can be assumed that it is in thc field of personnel management that Soviet managers face some of their most difficult dilemmas.
A recurring problem in Soviet personnel management is overstaffing in thc administrative sector of the economy. Although the details of this problem in MINSVYAZ' are unknown, it is apparent that the recent campaign for reductions in administrative management personnel also applied to this Ministry./
B. Recruitment, Assignment, and Transfers.
Recruitment of many communications workers is conducted through normal recruitment channels, such as the Mainof Labor Reserves, which is attached to the Council of Ministers. In addition, various main administrations of MINSVYAZ' also have been involved in recruitment activities for theirorganizations.
As would be expected, the Main Administration foris chiefly involved in these activities. The heads of main as well as regional administrations are also consulted in most personnel actions taken within their/ Thus in any personnel action, particularly those regarding transfer andumber of organizations in MINSVYAZ' will participate.
High appointments and transfers, such as thathief or chief engineer of an administration, will cleareputy minister and, on occasion, through the Minister himself./
The Ministry carried on its own extensive on-the-job training programs. It conducts periodic teats to determine the quality Of workers in various specialities and to enable them to raise their qualifications for higher positions. In many instances, young trainees workrobationary status before fully assuming thc responsibilities of their positions.
The significance attached to thc training program is illustrated by one complaint which stated that the fillingacancies was causing serious disruptions to the/ In addition, trainee receive full pay during their course of/
Bonusos, and Incentive Systems.
The wage system and bonus payment plan in the USSR creates continuous problems and tensions. Plan underfuliillment in MINSVYAZ' organizations is occasionally blamed on overexpenditures for wages and overpayment of The underfuliillment in this case would be that of ruble profitability.
The Ministry of Finance (MINFIN) is vitally concernedmatters of financing for organs of MINSVYAZ'. Pay ratesof MINSVYAZ' must have MINFIN approval,evidently will hear appeals against delays in Thc pramffl pavment of wagesroblemvery/
The entire system of worker incentives is constructedichotomous formula of punishment and rewards. Some of thc positive types of rewards are liberal unemployment compensation, sick leave, hospital expenses, and even money to families to visit hospitalized workers./ ystem of longevity awards for meritorious service can result in as muchpcrccnt additional pay for as little asear's service./ Punishments usually take the form of wage reductions or other disciplinary action.
Worker rewards are administeredomplicated system oi special commissions, conferences of chiefs oi adminis-trations. personnel department workers, and even deputy ministers./ Local offices present candidates for rewards, some of which arc givenow rate of damage or absence of thc incidence of damage in work./igh award, such as the "Badge of Outstanding Radios often awarded by Psurtscv himself./
The Ministry of Financeajor role in controllingf every Soviet organization. Within MINFIN theretate Table of Organization Commission which approves orall changes in's of Soviet organizations. The subordinate units of this commission are attached to the finance departments of the executive committees with whom's of administrative and management personnel and all estimates of administrative and management expenditures must be registered./
Within MINSVYAZ', control's isesponsibility of the Planning-Finance Administration and the Administration of Labor and Wages. ISO/ By means of this process for controlubstantial power over thc administration and management of MINSVYAZ' is placed in the hands of an external agency.
Management discipline over workers, the punishment aspect of worker incentives,trong and effective weapon in MINSVYAZ'. Breaches of discipline, often resulti ng in fines, include such actions as nondeparturcorkerew assignment (classified asrequency and technical deviations from established procedures on the part of communications specialists, work delays, and failures to submit administrative and management reports./ In additionystem of fines, another form of discipline is the" loss of previous awards and the withdrawal of extra pay for longevity and meritorious service./
Thc Soviet system of personnel management)
onfused pattern of intermingled authority and directives, involving many staff organizations. Even outside organs, such as the Ministry of Finance and the Party,ajor role in many personnel decisions within MINSVYAZ'.
The labor incentive system, based on an apparent dichotomy of severe discipline and liberal rewards, probably could be conducive to hard work but might militate against individual initiative and moral*
The most obvious results of management deficiencies in this field are revealed in considerable problems of nonpayment of wages and/or overexpenditure of allotted wage and bonus funds.
VIII. Influence of the Party in the Management of MINSVYAZ'.
Any consideration of the operation and management of MINSVYAZ' must pay some attention to the role of Party organs. Wherever there is an organization or enterprise ofarty organization will exist. The tasksarty organization at any level is to conduct propaganda and political organizational work, to find ways leading to higher production, and to exercise "political" control over the enterprise or organization./
This political control means that the Party organization is independent of the MINSVYAZ' enterprise director and has the right of "control over the economic activity of the administration" and the right to insure plan fulfillment in accordance with Party aims and policies. These Party organizations are subordinate to thc local Party committees (raykoms or gorkoms) and through them to Party committees on thc oblast, kray, and republic level.
The problem of Party control and interference inmanagement is prominent in Soviet literature./ There
have been fairly consistent Attempts toroper balance between the interests of the enterprise manager and the Party organization. The problem basically is one of insuring political control and surveillance oi industrial activity without disrupting effective management and of allowing the Party to guide and supervise without taking over the administrative-management/ It reflects the difference in approach of the manager operating in the context of efficiency and attainment of economic goals in contrast to the Party organization, which is motivated primarily by political considerations.
The intensity of conflict between these two approaches is lessened by tho fact that both are motivated In their actions by thc common necessity of successfully attaining the goals laid down by the Soviet leaders. This necessity should serve to limit those Party actions which would interfere too strongly with theof thc manager's goals.
Another factor that may serve to reduce the conflict between Party and management Interests is one apparent in the historical process characterized as the rise of thc new technocracy. In this process thereerger of the Party man and the technician in the person of the economic manager. Significant examples of the merger of the technician and the Party man are seen in the careers of such leaders as Pervukhin. Tcvosyan, and Malyshev. Their importance in thc Soviet hierarchyynamic illustration of the apparent reconciliation of the conflicting interests of thc political and the economic branches of Soviet society. Insofar as the USSR docs experience an Increasing ascendancy of athat is correctly oriented politically, the problem of Party interference in industrial management thus tends to solveimitation on the practical realisationolution of this kind is the continued existence within thc economic apparatusolitical (Party) organization not responsible to management,of personnel outside of management and possibly motivated by political rather than managerial considerations.
11. Party Activities.
Those activities controlled by MINSVYAZ1 serve as an excellent means of testing tbe validity of the above thesis, since the communications field is primarily thc realm of the technician. Thc materials surveyed on this problem indicate that the problem of harmful Partv interference with management is virtually non-eyi'tont
On thc contrary those Party matter;
indicate that the actions of Party organizations arein favor of the management andalutary effect upon day-to-day operation of the Ministry.
Tho aspect of administration in which the Party seems to play the greatest role is in personnel matters. In this respect it seems that MINSVYAZ' follows the usual Soviet practice of having all personnel appointments approved by Party organs. Party approval also appears to be in order for the presentation ofdecorations to communications/ It is also to the Partyorker turns when he is unable to secureactions, such as transfers, through the regularmachinery of MINSVYAZ'./ triking exampleartv organ acting in aidommunications enterprise is
the Kray Party Committee protested airectly to Minister N. D. Psurtsev concerning thc removal of two highly qualified technicians from thc local/
Other examples of Party intercession in behalf ofenterprises are seen in requests for living quarters for communications/equest to getocal Department of Capital Construction./ An advantage of Party intercession^ such cases is that invariably the Party organization deals directly with the Minister or one of his deputies rather than lower echelons of the Ministry.
Much of thc liaison of Party organizations withfrom Party responsibility nrooairanda andParly aclively
tries to increase the limits of press distribution and subscriptions and lo increase the distribution of Party propaganda/ In this respect it ia noteworthy that the Party will go so far as toeputy minister to overrule the actions/ Although the lack of details in the matter prevents evaluation of the action, it could represent an example of Party interference in management of the Ministry.
A final function of Party organizations is to act as an overlord of operations of communications enterprises. In thisthe Party is known to report to Moscow on the unsatisfactory performance of local communications organizations./ At thc same time, itole in the procurement of equipment for local offices and in the establishment of communications links./
An interesting aspect of the relations of Party organs with MINSVYAZ' is seen in cases when the Ministry turns to the Party for aid when it is unable toob itself. An example of this practiceinisterial request to Party organs to aid in theto local agencies of certain construction jobs which the Ministry lacked the facilities to do itself./
on the problem of
Party interlerence with management inhe conclusion seems warranted that the Party organizations act generally in the interests of thc local organizations and often work jointly with them to enable the successful performance of their tasks. It is apparent, however, that the harmony of interests between management and the Party organization is greatly dependent on the day-to-day relations of the individual involved. The pictureher.*
amce tne Party organization is always potentiallyvo good management, it must be regardedeak link in thc managerial apparatus of the Ministry. Through its power of veto in personnel matters and its evident great influence in operational matters, the role of the Party organization in effective management may always be regarded as vital.
IX. Influence ol the Trade Union in the Management ol MINSVYAZ'.
The Central Committee of the Trade Union oforkers (Tsentral'nii Komitet Soyuza Svyaal,lthough nominally subordinate to thc All-Union Council of Trade Unions, has
close connections with MINSVYAZ'. rade union committee is lo
be found at all enterprises of MINSVYAZ1.
TsKSVYAZI' supervises all thc trade union activities of personnel of MINSVYAZ1 through its subordinate committees in the republics, krays. and oblasts. It supervises thc negotiation of labor contracts, or collective agreements, between workers of MINSVYAZ' and their respective organizations. / It adjusts complaints of workers regarding labor conditions and alsobonuses or special awards for meritorious service, oversees wage payments to workers, and supervises social security and pension funds./
Within thc context of management in MINSVYAZ'. TsKSVYAZl' functions as the third leg of the historic ruling triangle in Soviet management: Party, government, and trade union. In actual practice. the trade union is an unequal leg of the triangle, restricted to limited participation in wage questions; overtime authorization; negotiation of collective agreements; and the general programs calculated to improve workers' morale, such as social insurance and rest homes./
Actual instances of TsKSVYAZl' intervention in thc affairs of MINSVYAZ' management arc .rare. One case involved trade union insistence that the Ministry release certain quarters for recreational purposes./ In another, the TsKSVYAZl' organization at Baku complained directly to Deputy Minister Topuriaopy to TsKSVYAZl')ain administration not sending materials to
its field office at Baku./ Even in these cases of apparentin management, however, the action was taken through channels of thc trade union organization itself.
TsKSVYAZI' is administratively independent of MINSVYAZ'. and in almost every instance this administrative separateness is maintained. In the abundant reports on negotiation of collective agreements the chains of command of TsKSVYAZI1 and MINSVYAZ1 are never crossed. iven report is usually internal MINSVYAZ* or internal TsKSVYAZI',opy to the other organization./ Many of the reports, however, are prepared for the joint signature of both/ Joint signatures of TsKSVYAZI' and MINSVYAZ' officials are common in cases involving theof/ In thc same fashion, orders from Moscow concerning both organizations are sent under the joint signature of Psurtsev and Yusupov and addressed to both TsKSVYAZI' and MINSVYAZ' organizations in the/
TsKSVYAZI' handles all trade union matters affecting communications workers within the internal jurisdiction of MINSVYAZ'. ln those cases when MINSVYAZ' does work with or for other ministries or organizations, it appears that such problems as the negotiation of collective agreements are then handled by the trade union of thc ministry or organization with which MINSVYAZ' is dealing./
The characterization of the trade union as the weak leg in the traditional triangle of Soviet management is borne out by the role of TsKSVYAZI' in MINSVYAZ' management.
There arc no actual cases in which TsKSVYAZI1 has actually attempted to interfere with thc management of MINSVYAZI1 enterprises. While some of the programs which TsKSVYAZI' handles result in tangible and material benefits to the worker, they
way in which such programs have an impact upon management is in their effect on worker morale. As the custodian of many of the incentives in such forms as bonuses and rest home permits, TsKSVYAZl' may have some additional significanceactor for getting more production out of the worker.
X. Influence of thc Executive Committees in the Management
Executive committees are the local government bodies at the kray. oblast, city, and rayon levels In the USSR. Their role in administrative management of Soviet industry is unclear. eneral practice, any executive committee usually has staff departments to deal with the various industrial branches within its territory. This practice, however, is usually followed only in the instances of an industry controlled by union-republic ministries./ In those instances in which an industry isby an All-Unionounterpart organization usually docs not exist within an executive committee. Examples of executive committee participation in administrativeare fairly common in industry of the union-republic category,/ Executive committee participation in affairs of an All-Union ministry, however, is more difficult to trace. The problem is particularly difficult in regard to matters ofoperation of an All-Union ministry such as the Ministry of Communications.
B. Relations with MINSVYAZ'.
One of the more genecal tasks of an executive committee in relation to MINSVYAZ' is similar to the general Party function of surveillance and exhortation in relation to fulfillment of the broad programs outlined in tho annual and Five Year Plans. Thus an executive committee would be expected to be kept informed about the general progress of such programs and. in conjunction
with Parly organizations, to initiate steps to insure theirin Die event the program is lagging.
One field of MINSVYAZ' activity in which theappear to enter into the policy making aspects The executive committeeiven area,would participate in drawing up radiofication plansarea./ In addition to thc planning departments,seems to rest also with the agriculturalthe executiveappears
that any radiofication plan must be submitted to tne- planning department of the local executive committee, which will secure agreement with Gosplan for the plan. It is only then that thc local communications directorate can submit its requisitions for materials and equipment within the financial limits established by ths/ There are no indications that an executive committee has, or attempts to exert, any influence on the operational executionadiofication plan once it has been agreed upon. Another relation in the planning process is evident in reports made by local communicationsto the executive committees on the state of existing radioand problems involved in such work./ It is assumed that these reports are intended to serveasis for planning and for measures to be taken to ensure plan fulfillment.
There are several examples in which tbe resources of an executive committee are used to aid communications directorates in their work. An executive committee is apparently empowered to raise additional financing for communications work./ It can also authorize the transfer of funds for thc acquisition/ Another service furnished to MINSVYAZ' by executive committees is the training of collective farm radioervice provided for by the agricultural departments of thc executive committee, / In addition, executive committees recruit workers for communications directorates./
These several powers exercised by executive committees are enhanced by additional financial powers. The financial powers arise basically from executive committee control over allocations to the local budget for communications activities. Among such
activities would bc allocations lo the local budget (or the extension of radio telephone/ Other matters involvingallocations in which the executive committeesubstantial voice concern construction. Typical of these arc thc constructionadio Dom by local (not MINSVYAZ')/imilar example is the provision of housing upon executive committee authorization./
The financial powers of the executive committee also arise from the fact that the radiofication of collective farm and village areas is financed by loans made by the state./ Administration of this loan policy at the local level wouldatural function of an executive committee.
Another area in which the executive committees appear to have fairly extensive powers in communications activities is in the opening of new communications offices. The details of thisare nofvery clear. In one instance, communications were established with various points "in accordance with thc decision of the OBLISPOLKOM (Oblast Executive Committee).f In another, communications branches were opened by MINSVYAZ' order "in accordance with thc government It is probable that in this question an executive committee is involved onlyedium for implementing higher governmental decisions and policies. It would seem unlikely that any executive committee on its own initiative .could order MINSVYAZ' to open new offices.
The matters discussed above show that theairly substantial role in implementing communications policy matters and in financial controls over communications operations. The exercise of both planning and monetary controls over some communications activities by an agency outside of MINSVYAZ*ituation'potentially disruptive to MINSVYAZ' management. Thc answer lies, of course, in the manner in which disagreements between MINSVYAZ' organizations and executive committees are settled. Unfortunately, available materials shed no light on this question. One possible answer is that potential frictions
are keptinimum, since both organs arc probably limited (airly strictly to the mechanical implementation ol higli echelon policy decisions.
In addition to the issues discussed above, the executivehave (airly extensive relations with communicationsin two other fields.
Thc first arises from the role of executive committees as consumers of communications services. ypical example is an executive committee as the payer for the installation of local telephone systems./
The second arises from emergencies in communications services. In the event of disruption to communications caused by weather or other factors,thc Minister of Communications is empowered to call upon the government (in this case, executive committees) to furnish manpower to cope with the crisis./ This practice appears to be the resultegularly established procedure for communications emergencies. As nearly as can bo established the initiative for this type of aid must originate from Moscown apparent weakness in times of emergency when speed is thc essence of rocuporability. The necessity of going to outside agencies for additional manpower is not indicativeanagement weakness when the emergency is of severe proportions. In emergency situations the details of administrative correctness arc adhered torocedure stipulating that the personnelfor emergency service will be compensated at approved rates to be paid by the communications organizations./
XI. External Relations ol MINSVYAZ'.
A. Council of Ministers. "
MINSVYAZ' is represented in thc Council of Ministers of the USSR by the Minister of Communications, N. D. Hsurtsev. Because of the highly technical aspects of communications, the Minister appears lo have been selected because of his technical.
rather than his political, qualifications. Through representation on thc Council of Ministers. MINSVYAZ' is presumed to take part in planning and policy formulation at the All-Union level.
B International Negotiations.
MINSVYAZ' is believed to have major responsibility in international negotiations related to telecommunications. Since the close of World War II, Soviet delegations to majorconferences under the auspices of the InternationalUnion have been headed by an official of MINSVYAZ'. The majority of personnel on these delegations also appears to have been from/
No information is available concerning the participation of MINSVYAZ' in the activities of the International Broadcasting Organization. This organization is composed chiefly of Soviet Bloc countries with headquarters at Prague, 'and it is reported to be the mechanism for intra-Soviet Bloc coordination of/ It is probable, however, that MINSVYAZ' doesin its activities along with the Ministry of Culture.
The only other available indicator of the authority of MINSVYAZ' in international telecommunications negotiation is aagreement to organize and further develop telecommunications which representatives of MINSVYAZ' and the East German Ministry of Postal Affairs and Telecommunications entered into in Moscow By this agreement, traffic and rate regulations between the USSR and East Germany were established./
C. Coordination of Civil and Military Communications.
Under directives of the,pouncil of Ministers. MINSVYAZ* is responsible for civil telecommunications operation in thc USSR. On matters of basic policy and long-term planning, however, it cooperates closely with the Ministry of National Defense, which is interested in the strategic aspects of thc communications systems, and with the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which is responsible for the military security of all communications
facilities. These miivstrieft also operate communications systems independent of Die civil basic system. Close cooperation is reported to be effected in some of the higher echelons by jointly locatingof thc three ministriesingle office.
All personnel of MINSVYAZ* wear uniforms anduasi-military status with ranks which arc recognized by the armed forces. Consequently, these persons can be sent to take charge of any military communications installation or project without being called to active/
Current provisions for transfer of facilities and personnel to military control under wartime or other emergency conditions are not available. In connection with antiaircraft defense, pre-World War II instructions, issued jointly by the People'sof Communications (NKS} and thc Chief of Staff of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, placed the organization, preparation, and operation of civil communications facilities for thc use of the Observation, Warning, and Communications Service (VNOS) of the Antiaircraft Defense (PVO)esponsibility of the NKS together with the corresponding agencies of other People's Commissariats, under plans to be approved by the appropriate military authority. Workers were especially assigned by the NKS with direct responsibilityiven VNOS rayon communications network. Duringpecial employee assigned to direct supervision of the VNOS communications network was subordinate to the Chief of the Communications office of the NKS. but inhe operated under thc Commandant of the VNOS operational center of communications. In effect this instruction provided for immmediate transfer to military control of the civil facilities needed for antiaircraft defense (PVO) during wartime emergency Whatever the existing plans for conversion of civil telecommunications to military use for antiaircraft defense or for other military purposes, it follows that the facilities and personnel of MINSVYAZ' must necessarily be utilized to carry out thc bulk of the operation.
D. Coordination of Civil Telecommunications.
The components which contribute to the satisfactory end product of communications consisthe development of techniques and facilities to serve the purpose. hc production of this equipment in appropriate quantities,he installation and operation of that equipment.
In general terms, Soviet telecommunications technological research and development is an interest of the All-Union Council of Radio Physics and Engineering of the Academy of Sciences,/ and the All-Union Scientific and Technical Society of Radio Engineering and Electrical Communications imeni A. S. Popov The latterentral coordinating organisation for Soviet scientific research and development in the various fields of radio engineering and electric communications research andin the/ Production of telecommunications equipment rests mainly with the Ministry of the Radio Technical Industry. Some equipment, however, is either produced or assembled by plants of other ministries. Installation and operation of communications facilities is the responsibility of the MINSVYAZ'. togetherumber of other ministries operating functional systems for special purposes.
Research and Development.
VNORIE conducts the annual All-Union Scientific Session in Moscow and scientific and technical conferences in the largest cities of thc USSR. In addition, thc VNORIE conducts conferences on specific problems such as television, radio navigation, and loud-speaker system. Among its members are the ministers and deputy ministers of the Ministry of Communications and of the Ministry of the Radio-Technical Industry, directors of many scientific research institutes and higher educational institutions, and practically all of the prominent scientists and technicians in the fields for which it is responsible. Top officials of MINSVYAZ' appear torominent part in the work of VNORIE.
In fulfillment of its dutiesoordinator of scientific research, VNORIE allocates specific projects to its members, It also passes resolutions callinginistry, an institute, oran individual to proceedarticular subject. It appears that these resolutions carry considerable weight due to the high level of the personnel which are party to them. The implementation of such projects in research laboratories and factories of the USSR is likely to be carried out chiefly within enterprises of both the MINSVYAZ' and the Ministry of the Radio-Technical Industry andesser extent within the communications enterprises of other/
Other than through the mechanism of VNORIE and the identification of some of the producing plants, no information is available as to the details of the relationships of MINSVYAZ' with the Ministry of thc Radio-Technical Industry or with other organizations which produce telecommunications equipment.
There is no information available concerning theof MINSVYAZ' with suppliers of equipment for the postalor is it known whether the production of such equipment is aof MINSVYAZ'.
The various intraministry telecommunications systems, which are operated independently of the basic systems of MINSVYAZ', are intended to serve the dispatching and operational needs of the operating ministry. The most important of these so-called functional systems are operated by the Ministry of the Maritime and River Fleet and the Ministry of Transportation and by the Mainof the Civil Air Fleet, the Hydrometeorological Service, and the Northern Sea Route. Other functional systems, which apparently serve industrial complexes, are operated by components within the Ministries of Agriculture, Petroleum, Coal, Ferrous Metallurgy and Nonferrous Metallurgy and thc Fish, Timber, and Paper and Wood Processing/
As the Ministry responsible (or the technical aspects ol the operation of Soviet civil communications. MINSVYAZ'the technical standards and operating practices and procedures for these systems and authorizes their operationicensing system in much the same manner as private enterprises are licensed to operate communications facilities in other/ MINSVYAZ' appears to bo empowered to enforce its procedural regulations for all civil telecommunications usage and to levy fines on operators guilty of violations. Its Technical Radio Monitoring Center (TsTRK) performs the prerequisite radio/ Information as to the scope of the authority of MINSVYAZ' over civil communications of other ministries
tends to confirm this/
The basic telegraph system of the USSR, operated by MINSVYAZ', is further extended by utilizing the telegraphic facilities of these independent systems, where offices of MINSVYAZ' for the handling of general traffic are lacking. Authority to carry on this service must be obtained fromnd telegrams must be processed in conformity with the "Telegraphic/ No other information on tho administrative arrangements between MINSVYAZ' and the operating agency is available.
Whether there are similar arrangements for the extension of the telephone system is not known.
In other cases. MINSVYAZ' furnishes andfacilitiesontractual basis. Theoperation of this typo is the broadcasting network ofundor contract with thc Ministry of Culture, whichfor/ There is also evidenceservice,ore limited scale, is performed for thcof the Meteorological Service and thethe fish/ It is probable thati'.other ministries and organizations
Insufficient information is available to establish thc identity of the coordinating and policy mechanisms of the Soviet government which arc responsible for the jamming of foreign broadcasts. It has been established, however, that MINSVYAZ" facilities and personnel are employed in implementing the jamming/
There is sufficient information to support the belief that the Main Administration for Lines-Cable Service and the Main Administrations for City Telephone Systems install and/orwire line facilities for other agencies under contractualnd that in some cases the suspension of lines is carried out by agencies of other ministries, with the authorization of the Main Administration for Lines-Cable/
At the local level the wire diffusion receptionfacilities are installed and maintained by the local offices of MINSVYAZ' for whatever local enterprise has requested the installation. In many cases the wire diffusion relay center is physically located in the building housing the local communications/
XII. Trends in Organization and Management.
The nature of the communications services rendered by MINSVYAZ' and their great importance to the Soviet economyin an organization of vast oxtensity and complicated structure. The resulting problems are compounded further by the expansion of communications facilities in the Far East, an area particularly dependent upon rapid communications/
ln thcears there have been many instances of measures adopted by MINSVYAZ' authorities with the evident intent of bringing more order to the communications system and increasing its effectiveness. These measures will bc discussed under general headings of reorganizations, internal consolidations, and thc
- v. .
consolidation of external communications facilities. There have been, in addition, other general measures designed to improve MINSVYAZ' organization and management.
In dealing with the fairly common Soviet problem of top-heavy echelons of administrative-management personnel, MINSVYAZ' has participated in the nationwide campaign for thc reduction of these Although thc indications of this action are present, there are no details on thc extent of the program. Some degree of the earnestness of the reduction
personnel (ana tne resulting reduction in wage allocations) cannot be used to make reductions in work/
One of the basic problem areas in MINSVYAZ'is that of the strong degree of centralization. It is an area in which the improvements could probably be made most easily, and yet virtually nothing has been done. The only known example of decentralization is in the field of journal There have been no apparent steps taken to delegate any more authority to lower echelon organizations. The quantitative reductions resulting from lower echelon consolidations will do little to ease this problem until those echelons are given more independence and decision-making authority.
Some of the measures taken can be correlated with MINSVYAZ' efforts to contribute to the "new course. " Among these are thc above-mentioned expansion of facilities in thc Far East, which, in addition to being caused by demandsrowing economic area, may be designed to give better service to the/ During thc past year there hasoncerted effort to improve services to the consumer through publicity campaigns, the expansion of telephone and telegraph facilities, and changes in operating hours to accommodate the/ urther action was the reduction of subscribers' fees for loudspeakers connected to thc wired radio centers, which was made in/
Another example of MINSVYAZ' actions directly related to the "new course" is the intense program for thc radiofication of collective farms, state farms, and Machine Tractor Stations and technical improvement of their means of/ This program has direct relevance to the Soviet plans for improving the performance of the agricultural sector of the economy, and
Psurtsev indicates that it is to be regardedfirst-priority"/
3ome fairly important reorganizations have taken place or have been scheduled in MINSVYAZ'.
The first of these was the consolidation inf thc Main Administration for Radio Broadcasting Stations and the Main Administration for Radio Communications into one Mainfor/ These main administrations are responsible for thc technical aspects and servicing of radio communications and radio broadcasting. They have been consolidated and separated several times in the lastoears. This would indicate that MINSVYAZ* authorities arc either dissatisfied with this sector of the communications industry or are unable to agree on the merits to be gained from consolidation or division of these technical radio functions.
The second major reorganization is still in progress. It involves consolidation of those communications organizations concerned with the radiofication program. When the reorganization is completed, three main administrations (IntrarayonCity Telephone Systems, and Radio Installation and Rayon Electrical Communications) will have been combined into one Main Administration for Radio Installation and Rayon This reorganization was scheduled to take placeong period of time and will be completed
The initial phase of the reorganization was the abolition of the Main Administration for Intrarayon Communications. Despite the abolition of this Main Administration, its regional departments
continued to exist under the supervision of the Main Administration for Radio Installation and Rayon Electrical/ These regional departments for intrarayonere scheduled to he dissolved in4 and their functionsto tho rogional offices of thc Main Administration for Radio Installation and Rayon Electrical Communications, but It has not been confirmed that this has yet taken place. The next step in the reorganiration will be the transference of the regional city Telephone Systems to thc jurisdiction of thc Main Administration for Radio Installation and Rayon Electrical/ This last change is rather puzzling, since the city telephone systems must be regarded as operational rather than technical, and it is strange that they should be mixed when generally operational and technical functions are kept separate.
These reorganizations of the radiofication sector of the economy seem to be well planned in stages in order not to cause disruptions to the system. They willrastic simplification of the organizational apparatus andesire to fulfill radiofication plans effectively.
C. Internal Consolidations.
These reorganizations of the main administrations also have bedn accompanied by an intensified program for consolidation of communications media and facilities in thc lower echelons. The financial savings, increases in operating periods, better efficiency, better space utilization, and decreased labor forces resulting from these consolidations have received much publicity in
Thc basic trend of the consolidationsen to mergecommunications and radio installation facilities. Inthe connation has also included the postalindicate that ibis consolidation program
is having greatis meeting with
some resistance or at least disinterest on the part of some local/
Thi! move towanl consolidations lias been ml<;rprctcd as showing that the Russians, now having attained effectiveness in their communications system, are now striving to improve its/
D. Consolidation of External Facilities.
In addition to the program for improving the communications facilities used in thc agricultural sector of thc economy, there isove to expand thc basic communications system bymany communications centers from collective farms and other enterprises to the jurisdiction of/ The same consolidation moves are also being made in reference tocenters controlled by the Ministries of the Timber and the Paper and Wood Processing/
The absorption of these centers into thc MINSVYAZ' apparatus and the resulting expansion of the basic system will also have some effect on the "newince they will open these services directly to the populace. By putting them directly under MINSVYAZ' control, many of the bothersome problems of liaison and coordination with outside agencies also will be avoided.
Thc basic reorganizations and consolidations offacilities now taking place should, on the surface, mean an improvement in both thc organization and management of MINSVYAZ'. They will reduce thc present cumbersome structure and should cause significant reductions in expenditures of money, manpower, and equipment. One result of these.changes, however, is that the Ministry will be even more centralized than formerly, and it is probable Chaflhc lack of independence and authority at the lower level will become even more intensified. This restriction and dependence of the lower levels upon thc central authorities may prevent thc attainment of more efficiency. It is of considerable significance in relation to technicaland initiative and the attainmentigh level of
The general procedure used in this report was to consider the administration and management of MINSVYAZ' in relation to the general principles of administrative management used throughout the Soviet economy. These theoretical principles are presented in brief fashion and then examined to test their applicability to MINSVYAZ' administrative management.
The first parts of the reportonsideration of those general aspects of management as they relate to the entire ministry. These are followed by sections dealing with administration and management in such functional fields as planning and finance.
When possible, the analysis of MINSVYAZ' administration and management has been aided by reference to US practices which have broad and general applicability.
GAPS IN INTELLIGENCE
There are substantial gaps in intelligence with respect to the detailed and specific aspects of the internal organization of tho Main Administrations of MINSVYAZ'. Although more is known of the detailed organization of regional administrations, this information is by no means complete.
Similar gaps exist in reference to the more specific aspects of planning methods and procedures, the nature of specificin finance and material supply, and the precise limits of MINSVYAZ' control of communications systems operated by other organizations.
materialseneral weakness of dealing with only broaa matters of MINSVYAZ' operations and treating with management problems onlv indirectly
Evaluations, following Che classification entry and designatedave the following significance:
ot usually reliable
annot be judged
- Confirmed by other sources
- Probably true
- Possibly true
- Probably false
- Cannot be judged
refers to original documents of foreignand organizations, copies or translations of such documentstaff officer; or information extracted from such documentstaff officer, all of which may carry the field evaluation"
Office of Current Intelligence
opy No. - ""
Supplementary Source Reference:
ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS OF THE SOVIET MINISTRY OF COMMUNICATIONS
Office Of Research and Reports CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Supplementary Source References
ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS OF THE SOVIET MINISTRY OF COMMUNICATIONS
Evaluations, following the classification entry and designatedave the following significance;
Confirmed by other source
Cannot be judged
refers to original documents of foreignand organizations, copies or translations of Such documentstaff officer; or information extracted from such documentstaff officer, all of which may carry the field evaluation"
Evaluations not otherwise designated arc those appearing on the cited document; those designated "RR" are by the author ol this No "RR" evaluation is given when the author agrees with the evaluation on the cited document. "