MAJOR UNITED KATES IWELLIGESCS PnOBLEHS
Naval War College,5
Refer bo Admiral Robbies aod bla work as Director of the Net Evaluation
study under Admiral Radford aod DCI in. Refer to Admiral Cooolly as member of Clark Committeeperhaps adding
a remark about thoroughness and value of CC vork Refer to relations vltb Admiral Radford and Admiral Carney generally.
Also Adairals Espe and Layton (L. recently spoke atefer to Inchon Landings (details lu Annex A) as example of cooperatloa
that nay be achieved with Navy.*
II. SCOPE AND OUTLINE
Will concentrate on big picture, intelligence as it relates to and supports policy making at tbs national level, and above all intelligence on the prise target, tbe Soviet Bloc, Mention that weot in other areas, but it is in relation to Sov Bloc that intelligence is crucial and the greatest contributor to ouras opposed to operating contacts and working relationships. Three aspects to the problem:
. a. =Ac quasi*ion-on b. Processing and Coordinatingse of Intelligence by tbe Policy Maker
used this lest tlaie, but no otherhas occurredfioioasu
III. ACQUISITION OR COLLECTION OF INTELLIGENCE
A. Methods of acquisitionovert, covert, scientific end technical.
B- Division of workload enoag agencies. Role of the IAC as the central coordinating point to work out such joint problems as prioritiestomic caercconomic intelligencecientific intelligencend proposed guided missiles committee (GKEC). Basic principles arc full exchange of product, avoiding of unnecessary duplication, letting best qualified agency do the lcgwork (AFOAT ond ELDTT as examples) and not settinc up subcommittees unless theyeal Job to do. Main point is that ue havereuecdous distance from the rivalries and jealousies of World War JJ, and are almios to get the maxinua advantages of coordination sod minimum disadvantage*
specifically to the Soviet Orbit problem: C. Overt Collection.
of social contacts and travel have given us some helpyear. Insight Into Falenkcv and Khrushchev personalities (thomisleadlna lnsorar as it led setae to believe M. likely to cocetop. Hearst interview tends to 6bow K.ot smootherarty mood). General value of trsvellers impressions)
tho these have produced little specific military information, endnot let in any expert observers.
travel much eased, and Travel Polder program forbas yielded some
observations of possible* ITCKE sites around Moscow. Sovs harass
US personnel more than others, as shown "by Trans-Siberian and Stiff-Saner-
latte incidents. Overall result is that missions pulling their weight far
more than, say, two years ago, tbo most of info ia lev-level, and results
still insignificant compared to what Sovs can get fron the magazine counters
here. Strong chance Sovs nay now tighten up again.
3- Radio broadcasts, periodicals, and documents continue to be major
sources. Careful analysis of these gave us many indications of tbeIfilenkov-Khrushchev split. Published Soviet economic statistics we now think to be fairly reliable, and CIAajor effort into analysing every scrap of evidence or. the economy, both for itself and for military bearing. On military and technical matters, however, Soviet information security is excellent.
D. Covert Collection.
difficulty of this. Soviet counter-espionageGerman. Extent of border guards, document checks, surveillance ofetc. Communist China equally tough.
necessity of doing large-share of planning ou abasis, to prepare way for future operations, get credentials,cannot load mechanism down with toommediateoperations, also, are the only way to get sooe big dividendsScapa Flow story of German agent in place for uorc thanears.
c. Tbo our own-initiative direct agent operations thus sharply linltsd in effectiveness, ve nave been eettins very useful results frca several covert lines of fiction:
Defectors. These have been hiafclisht of past year. Kost valuable dope on Soviet intelligence personnel and methods, and leads for Inducing further defections. Also good general political info. Including strongest forecast we had that fcalenkov was through. In addition to proninent cases, steady flow of nediun and low level men frouspecially. Hope to develop this source more and moreaided by further friction at top of Sov system). Importance of lnter-service cooperation for this.
hould be noted that much effort coeButside Bloc, in seeking
to contact Sov personnel, persons receiving info free Bloc, etc. up problem of evaluation. Sov plants and simple paper millscase as prime example ln pest year when ve were
* able to puncture false stories. Kave learned-to use great cere inoo you con assume our reportB have been very thoroughly screened before dissemination.
total of the above is that we areomewhat better picture of tbe Bloc than, say, two years ago, but we have enormous gaps, particularly in our supply of concrete military information ;both ofand intentionr. (notable exceptionstockpile and military information on East Germany). Hence we are doing two things in particular
Reviewing priorities, which have just been redefined under new DCID to be sure we are concentrating on crucial rather than merely lm portent.
More important, seeking new techniques, particularly in the way of detection devices.
IV. PROCESSING AND COCBDIHATION
useless unless promptly and effectively presented toBaker, at the right level snd in the right detail.
for doing this now better than Jo^tjje past: ^Briefings. Scope and thoroughness of these.
Current Intelligence publications.
National Intelligence Estimates. IAC role in these. Day-to-day intelligence production of agencies. Basic IntelligenceNTS work. Geared to JCS requirements. C. Special problem of briefing special committees and Congress. D- At the national policy-making level, two key problems:
1. Warning. On this we have made progress ln past year by revising status of IACs Watch Ccoscittee and settingpecial National Indications Center,aall staff to which each IAC agency contributes one senior manull-time basis. This now set up in Pentagon, with tie-in to Air Defense CQaaaad and to White House. In this connection President baa approved NSC directive that NIC be furnished with all relevant intelligence and with important
operational information unless agreed with DCI that this too sensitive even for Watch Committee use. In practice this now applied in caoe of Navy briefings on 7th Fleet dispositions. In this connection, one peculiar problem with Navy is reporting of submarines sightings; this presents difficulty in that there areprobables, but we now have it worked out for prompt reporting of any possibles. NIC can be puthour basis at any time, and this has been done in recent weeks, with rotating duty roster. Shows high degree of cooperation
2. national Estimates support of NSC Almost all our estimates novlear KSC relationship,l6 ofor last six monthsere geared directly to pending NSC papers in scope and timing; Estimates on consequences of proposed major courses of action nov vitally important. Indochina, Korea, and almost routine vhere time permits (whereas first of these lessears ago!)* These quite often .matters of judgment incapable of proof, and mean intelligence ccannunity is taking heavy responsibility. But point is that President is entitled to best judgment in most precise form. Handling of dissents shows everyone's view out in the open.
E. Met Evaluation Problem. Many broad estimates of Soviet Bloc capabilities must take Into account our own posture. In most crucial field of Sovietfor surprise attack against US and key installations overseas, ve have worked out by KSC direction the Met Evaluation procedure, which worked with great success under Admiral Robbins'(and General Bull's) guidance. How clear that it is essential toightly held war-gaming exercise on such problems, in which intelligence and operations are called on repeatedly for answers tostages of the problem. Hew exercise just launched on this basis, and proces: seems here to stay in this field. Next step is to consider whether it cannot be used in other fields of sufficiently major importance- Joint committee of Chairman/jCS and ICl may be good answer and is being considered. This does not mean intelligence conmmity is getting into planning, but does mean much closer tie than in past at top level, where estimates of Soviet action must take into account whole range of political as well as military considerations.
V. USE OF INTELLIGENCE BY THE POLICY MAKER
A. Problem of belief always present. Hitler and Worth Africa, Yalu River case. On more long-range basis, danger that policy-maker vill think intelligence is trying toolicy case. claim that we cake Soviets "forty feet
tall"). Degree of coordination ond Impartiality we now have should ensure
minimum of this, hutlit will always persist.
Related problem of not crying wolf. Costa Ricaecent example
of calling it at Just the right
of progress in coordination, processing, and links to
progress ln analysis and production.
in last analysis, whole structure rests on collection base,this we cannot claim to be in strong position toward Soviet Bloc. Fairand on intentions in peripheral areas and for general wartook substantial preparatory action.** But ue cose back to thefor new techniques and for every ounce of coordinated effort to get these.
The Inchon Landings:, an example of effective cooperation P
Problem: to get best intelligence on Seoul-Inchon Area, as to lending sites, defenses, enemy troop dispositions, etc.
Problem eiveo to CIA0 in the field; final" HQ approvalugust
Period of preparationAugust
Arrived offeptember 1
Base established on Yonghuog-Do (vhich had been secured by ROK Kavy) vhich' liesiles from Inchon, short distance off coast
Teams of agents worked right up to invasion timeeptember sending back through the operations base info of immense value, meanwhile defending the base against enemy attack
Turned over operations to another, .intelligence unit end cleared out oneptember
Radioed cocnendatlon from Admiral Joy: Your work in current operations Inchon-Seoul Area has been exemplary. Reports have been timely and information has proven to be most accurate. You have contributed immeasurable to the success of the Inchon landings. Admiral Joy sending.