4
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NUMBER
(Supercedes)
COMMUNIST COURSES OF ACTION IN ASIA7
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE IN FULL
Submitted byDIRECTOR OF CENTRAL DVTEU.IGENCB
The lolloiclng Intelligence organisation! participated In Iht preparation of thlt tttimate: The Central Intelligence Agtneg and tht intelligence organisation! of the Departments of State, the Armg. tht Hang, the Air forte, and The Joint Stag Concurred tn b, th* DfTCLUCDfCK ADVISORY COMMITTEE
on IIoncurring unit the Special Aitittant, Intelligence, Department of Stale; the Assistant Chief ot. Department of theht Director of Naval Intelligence; tht Director o] Intelligence. VSAF. the Deputy Director lor lattttigtntt. The Joint Staff The Atomic Snergy Commission Representative to the IAC, and theto tht Director, Federal Bureau Of Investigation, abstained, the subject being oultute ot Iheir /urlsdietton.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AOENCY
DISSEMINATION NOTICE
estimate was disseminated by tbe Central Intelligence Agency. Thisfor the Information and use of the recipient indicated on the front cover and ofunder his Jurisdictioneed to know basis. Additional essentialbe authorized by the following officials within their respective departments:
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ofC, for the Atomic Energy Commission
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iti nV> c'l'tll""
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR ONE 1
MEMORANDUM TO ALL HOLDERS OF, "COMMUNIST COURSES OF ACTION IN ASIA
SUBJECT: Errata Sheet
Please make corrections In your copies ofs follows:
footnote at bottom of pageecond line of text:read "probably".
portion of paragraphhich Is printed on theat the top of pagehould read as follows:
They probably believe that such actions would lead to war with the US, possiblynuclear weapon attacks on mainland China. If the Chinese Communists should come to believe that US determination toTaiwan had markedly decreased, the likelihoodommunist assault on Taiwan would be greatly increased. Finally, if the Chinese Communists should come to believe In the course of their tests of US Intentions or otherwise that the US would not in factTaiwan and the Pescadores, they would probably attempt to take over Taiwan by force,
Central Intelligence4
Ihis document has been approved for rcleasa through the HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM of tha Centrslncy.
COMMUNIST COURSES OF ACTION IN ASIA'7
THE PROBLEM
To estimate Communist, particularly Chinese Communist, courses of action in Asia
CONCLUSIONS
the USSR possessesinfluence in the Sino-Sovietthe main outlines of Communist policy in Asia are almost certainlyjointly by consultation between Moscow and Peiping, not by the dictation of Moscow. Chinese Communist influence in the Sino-Soviet alliance will probably continue to grow. We believe that such frictions as may exist betweenChina and the USSR will not impair the effectiveness of their alliance during the period of this estimate.
The current tactic of the Communists in Asia appears toariant of their familiar policy of combining professions of peaceful intent with continued efforts at subversion and continued expansion of the Communist capability for war. The chief new element in this policy, evident since the death of Stalin and particularly since the calling of the Oenevaineightened effort
ere used. Includes Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, Indonesia, Ceylon, and all ofAsia east ot (but not including) Iran and Afghani stan.
to convince non-Communist countries that Moscow and Peiping desire "peacefulhat reasonable andarrangements with the Communist Bloc are possible, and that US policy is the only obstacleew era of peace in Asia. This new element conforms with present world-wide Communist tactics of minimizing tensions and of exploiting methods to divide the free world, andto detach the US from its allies,eriod in which the significance of US nuclear superiority is being(The professed Communist desire for "lessened tensions" in Asia appears in fact, however, to be markedesire to lessen the dangers of full-scale USaction against mainland China and to dull the vigilance of non-Communist Asia, while at the same time continuing Communist expansion by means short of open war. Within this framework, the Communists are prepared totate of extreme tension with the US and Nationalist China, acceptingn brief, Communist China and the USSR will continue their present
2
of wooing Asia with protestations of peace, while at the same timeto subvert Asia, in the expectation that this long-range "peacefulpolicy will with minimum riskin both the realization of theirmilitary and economic objectives and the eventual elimination of US influence from Asia.
The Chinese Communists will continue committed to the "liberation" of Taiwan and the oiTshore islands, defining this issue as an internal affair in whichinterference will not be tolerated. Hence this issue will continue to present the greatest danger of large-scale warfare in Asia>,
We believe that as long as the USits firm support of the ChineseGovernment, remains committed to thc defense of Taiwan, and continues to keep major air and naval unitsIn the general area, the Chinesewill notull-scaleof Taiwan or the Pescadores. Short of invading Taiwan, thewill almost certainly concentrate on an interim policy of subversion and other means of softening up Taiwan fortakeover.
We believe that the Chinesewill almost certainly increase the scale of their present probing actions againsi the Nationalist-held offshoreand will probably attempt to seize some of the major offshore islands. They would almost certainly attempt to seize some of the major offshore islands if their probing actions were to provoke noUScounteractionY
We believe that the Viet Minh now feels that it can achieve control over all
Vietnam without initiating large-scale warfare. Accordingly, we believe that thc Communists will exert every effort to attain power in South Vietnam through means short of war. Should Southappear to be gaining in strength or should elections be postponed overobjections, the Communistswould step up their subversive and guerrilla activities in the South and if necessary would infiltrate additional armed forces in an effort to gain control over the area. However, we believe that they would be unlikely openly to invade South Vietnam, at least prior tohe date set for national elections.
Elsewhere in Asia (the Nationalist-held offshore islands and South Vietnam excepted as perhe Communists will probably not, during the period of this estimate, initiate new local military actions with Identifiable Soviet. Chinese Communist, North Korean, or Viet Minh forces.
The Asian non-Communist countries are dangerously vulnerable to theof Communist power and influence because of their military weaknesses and consequent fear of antagonizingChina, their political immaturity and instability, the social and economicthey face, and the prevalence of anti-Western natloralism. The effect of the Geneva Conference and subsequent events has been to increase this vulner-
Assistant Chief ol, believes lhat this paragraph should read: "We believe that lhe Chineae Communists will SnfcaftW Increase Uie scale of their present probins' actions azalrut ihe NaUonalltt-heM onshore Islands and are likely to aelte some of these UUnnda If such action appearsin part ot their overall political-mill-Ury-psycholoelcal program."
3
Accordingly, the Communist leaders almost certainly estimate that theyide area of maneuver open to them in Asia in which they can safely continue efforts at subversion andof armed insurrection withoutunacceptable US counteraction.
The Communists will probablyto exercise considerable control in thc northern provinces of Iaos and willapability for subversive activity against the Lao Government. However, we believe that the Laotians can limit Communist political advances and that an anti-Communist government willin power providing It continues to receive outside assistance and the Viet Minh do not invade or instigateguerrilla warfare. We believe that the nature of Communist aggressiveagainst Laos will be moderated by the Communist desire to continue their "peaceful coexistence" line in Asia,directed toward Indianandesser degree by theof US counteraction.
In the absencenilateral attack by ROK forces, resumption of hostilities by the Communists in Korea is unlikely.
Japan and India will becomeimportant targets for Communist "coexistence" policies and propaganda. We believe that the Communists willtheir efforts to undermine Japan's stability and present orientation and will seek an expansion of economic andrelations. They will make greater effort to create the impression that their termsesumption of diplomaticwith Japan arc flexible, and may offer toormal peace settle-
ment during the period of this estimate. Wc also believe that the Communists will focus increasing attention on India in an effort to insure at least its continuedand if possible to bring it closer to the Communist Bloc. However, even at the expense of friction with India, Communist China will seek to increase its influence In the Indo-Tibetan border area.
ommunist influence in Indonesia has grown considerably since the present government took oflice inndesult of recent politicalthe government is increasinglyupon Communist parliamentary support for its continued existence. We believe the Indonesian Communists will probably continue to support the present government or, if it falls, lo work for the establishment of another government in which they would participate or in which their influence would be strong. They will try, through both constitutional and illegal means, to expand their influence in the bureaucracy and the armed forces, and to prevent the formationnified and effective opposition. They willalso attempt to strengthen their capabilities by the organizationarty-controlled armed force. Inhowever, they will probably avoid highly aggressive tactics in the nearlest these provoke counteraction by the military or by domestic opposition groups before their own strength hasgreat enough to deal with it.present strengths and trends are suchommunist takeover inby subversion or force is possible during the period of this estimate.
4
DISCUSSION
INTRODUCTION
hc net crTcct to date of the Genevaand of subsequent development* has been to advance the Communist position in Asia. Western prestige, in particular that of France and the US. has sulTered greatly.of North Vietnam has strengthened the Communist strategic position InAsia, and has greatly increasedeapabililies to subvert the remainder of Indochina, and Southeast Asia as well.China's claims to great power status have been enhanced. Lastly, the"peace offensive" has had some successes in further deceiving many non-Communist elements as to ultimate Communist aims. The conclusion of the eight-power Manila Pact and the establishment of closer tiesPakistan and the US have somefor countering future Communistbut their effect to date has not offset the gains of the Communists.
II. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS Communist Objective* in Asia
he USSR and Communist China share the following long-range objectives In Asia: (a) augmentation of the military andstrength of Communist Asia;f US influence in Asia, and extension of the area of Communist poliUcal influence; and (c) neutralixatlon and eventualof non-Communist Asia.
e believe that Communist China seeks: primarily, to carry out rapid industrialization of Its economy and modernization of itsestablishment and. for this purpose, to obtain greater Soviet assistance; to increase Chinese Communist influence overmovements in Asia; to gain anpositionorld power andthe leader of Asia; to gain control of Taiwan; and to eliminate the Chinese NationalCommunist China considers Taiwan to be part of China, and looks upon itsas unfinished business of the Civil War. Apart from this, however, we believe that the
Chinese Communists feel under no immediate compulsion to expand China's present borders, but will continue to keep alive certain border demarcation disputes.
e believe thai the USSR seeks; lo make Communisttrong and reliable ally; to this end, to Increase Communist China's military and economic strength, but to keep China dependent upon the USSR; and toSoviet influence over Communistelsewhere In Asia.
It. Certain Communist leaders elsewhere In Asia probably entertain objectives for their countries which do not coincide with the short-teim alms of Moscow and/or Peiping. The objectives of thc local parties may bein the formulation of Communist lac-tics, but over-all Bloc strategy will probably be formulated primarily on the basis of Slno-Sovlet objectives, sacrificing if necessary the ambitions of local Communist parties.
Communisthe USSR has never controlledChina as it has its European Satellites, but seems rather lo have dealt with China as an ally. In this partnership Moscow possesses preponderant Influence because of thepower of the USSR and because of Communist China's military and economic dependence on the USSR. The USSR is acknowledged by Communist China as leader of the Bloc. Nevertheless, the main outlines of Communist policy fn Asia are almostdetermined jointly by consultationMoscow and Peiping, not by theof Moscow. Communist Chinacapability for some Independent action, even for acUon which the USSR mightbut which it would And difficult to repudiate. We believe, however, that the two countries are disposed to act in concert.
hc influence of Communist China in the Sino-Soviet alliance has been growing since
his growth has been accelerated since the death of Stalin, and has recently been made evident in the Sino-Soviet accords ofhis process is likely to con-
tinue during the period of this estimate.umber of questions frictions may existMoscow and Peiping: over the control of Asian Communist parties, the nature and timing of action against Chinese Nationalist territories, the amount and character ofaid Io China, and perhaps other issues. We believe, however, that such frictions will not impair the effectiveness of tht alliance during the period of this estimate.
Coinmonisl Strengths, Weaknesses, ond Capabilities'
The Chinese Communist regime hasa virtually complete consolidation of control in continental China. There ispopular resentment of the central authority, bul there Is no indication of serious organized resistance.
On the basis of present evidence, wethat Chinese industrial expansion under Peiping's five-year plan will result In nearly doubling72 output of theindustrial sector. However, farm output has lagged during the last two years, andthe past year the regime has moved tomore rigorous controls over the economy in an attempt to maintain its industrial progress To counteract increasingpressures. Peiping has monopolized the distribution of important consumer goods and hasationing system for large segments of the population. To Increase its controls over production, the Communist regime Isrogram providing for compulsory sales of specified amounts of farm p: oducts to the state, and has speeded up socialization measures which7 aim to organize over half the nation's farmers and handicraft workers Inlo productionand to place virtually all industry and trade under state enterprises.
hc Chinese Communists have certain capabilities for, and have demonstratedskill In. employing trade or trade overtures for political warfare purposes, even
' Certain of these questions are discussed ln detail in, "Soviet CapabiliUes nnd Probable Courses of AcUon throughatedeptember
wlth the limited means at their disposal. Moreover, the regime has with some success sought to convey the impression thatof trade controls would open largefor industrial products in Communist China and would develop sources of rawa development which would ease some of the problems now facing Industrialsuch as Japan and certain Westernnations. In addition, thc regime has impressed many non-Communist countries with its statements that trade controlsajor hindranceeneral reduction of political tensions in Asia. Actually, these claims of the possibility of greatly expanded trade appear to be largely propaganda. In time, with the development of Its industrial base, Communist China's capability forwarfare by economic means will beThe USSR's capability in thisin Asia is far greater than that of China, but is still substantially limited by internal Soviet demands and other pressing needsthe Bloc*
he Chinese Communist Army of over two million has been gradually improving inand organizational effectiveness The role of the Navy will be primarily limited toin coastal waters. Its capabilities may be Increased by the addition of at least 6andotor torpedo boats. The Air Force, which hasircraft, of which more than half are Jet-propelled. Is gradually improving In numbers of aircraft, quality of aircraft and equipment, and In combat eflcc-tivetiess. It Is limited primarily to operations under conditions of good visibility, and isloubstantial all-weather capability during the period of this estimate. During the period of this estimate, the Chinese armed forces will remain critically dependent on thc USSR for resupply of heavy equipment, spare parts, aircraft, and POL, However, the strategic position of China will be Improved by the expected completion5ew Sino-Soviet rail link through Mongolia.
"Die problem of trade conlrola Is being examined In detail InConsequences ofPossible CoufMf of AcUon wiih Respect to non-Communist Controls over Tradeurrently in preparaUon,
6
Communist forces nre capableThailand. Burma, and theof Indochina against theforces currently present In thoseagainst any indigenous forces likely toIn the area during thc period ofThe Chinese Communists willcapability throughout the period oflo seize Taiwan, the Pescadores,onshore Islands if opposed by Chineseforces alone Communist Chinaof successfully defending itselfinvasion effort by anypower, despite China's logisticaland vulnerabilities to attack.
The demands of Communist China'sprograms, together with China'sto air attack, will piobably tend to inhibit Chinese acceptance of major risks in the field of foreign affairs. If, as we believe probable, these domestic programs go farward without major setbacks, this progress will augment China's capabilities for extending Communist Influence In Asia. There might be some danger of foreign policy adventurism in the event of major setbacks in China's domestic programs. We believe, however, that on balance such setbacks would have the opposite effectthat of dictating abstention from military aggression.
The Communist regimes In North Korea and particularly in North Vietnam augment Chinese Communist and Soviet military nnd political strengths in Asia. These two areas will serve both as buffers protecting China and thc USSR, and as bases for furtherpolitical or military expansion in Asia. The economies of both North Korea and North Vietnam will be closely coordinated wtth those of the Communist Bloc during the period of this estimate. Primarily because of Bloc aid, North Korea will probably effect substantial economic recoveryowever,evels of production in North Korea will probably not have been attained, and heavy demands on the populace will almost certainly detract from willing support of the regime's programs.
he Viet Minh Is consolidating andits armed forces by grouping pre-
viously independent regular and regional units to form new divisions with augmentedThis augmented firepower will result principallyigh level of Chinese aidncluding illegal aid since the cease-fire. By the endhe Viet Minh will probably have at leastrnfantry divisions, two artillery divisions, and one anti-aircraftThese developments would more lhan double the pie-Geneva combat effectiveness and capabilities of the Viet Minh regular army. It will exert an even greatereffect upon the Vietnamese lhan it has toiet Minh Air Force will probably be developed, covertly or otherwise, during the period of this estimate. The Viet Minhwill continue to require Bloc military, technical, and possibly economic assistance, and Its policies will probably reflect aof Sino Soviet views. The Viet Minh Ls expanding and improving its transportation and communication facilities, Including rail and highway links with South China
he Urge overseas Chinese communities in many Southeast Asian countries provide the Chinese Communistsignificant potential channel of subversion. Suchas was given by these overseas Chinese to the Communist regime has0 under the Impact ofdomestic policies affecting the families and property of overseas Chinese, as wellonsequence of Communist efforts to extort remittances from overseas Chinese. Atthe great bulk of thcillion overseas Chinese tend to be politically inactive and neutral, with the politically-minded minority split between allegiance to the Communists and the Chinese National Government.Communist influence among overseas Chinese youth has been Increasing, especially since the Geneva Conference. In sum, the subversive role of the overseas Chinese In Southeast Asia generally is limited by the apolitical nature of most overseas Chinese, by their Isolation ln the Southeast Asianand by the popular onus they tend to bring to any cause with which they are too closely associated. However, these overseas Chinese communities inaintalnlng numerous ties with the Chinese mainland will provide a
7
channel for Communist Infiltration, espionage, and propaganda acUvitiy, and would. In the event of war or insurrection,rave threat,
Non-Communist Vulnerabilities
Within most of the countriestate of uneasy equilibrium exists- No Communist party outside ofand possibly Laos at presentilitary strength sufficient by itself toseriously the existence of the nationalFuthermorc, no Communist party In the area, with the exception of that inhas the capability of significantlythe national government'sDespite these facts, the Asian non-Coinmunlst countries are dangerouslyto the expansion of Communist power and influence because of their militaryand consequent fear of antagonizing Communist China, their political immaturity and instability, the social and economicthey face, and the prevalence of anti-Western nationalism. The eflect of theConference and subsequent events has been to increase this vulnerability.
South Vietnam remains the mostto Communist subversion and expansion. Developments In Vietnam willirect bearing on non-Communlat prospects in Laos and in Cambodia, and in turn Communist successes in South Vietnam, Laos, orwould markedly increaso theof other Southeast Asian states totactics.
Communist Estimate of the Situation
has been no evidence of changebasic Communist view that the USthe center of opposition to theand extension of Communist powerWhile the Communists almostthat tho ultimate US objective inthe overthrow of the Chinesethey interpret present USforeign policies as indicating that thethe foreseeable future does not intend,provoked by Communist action, towar or to run great risks thereof
in Asia. Furthermore, they probably alsothese policies, especially US restraint in Korea and Indochina, as Indicating that immediate US policies in Asia go no further than opposing the further expansion ofpower and influence, building up the strength of non-Communist Asia, andachievement of Chinese Communistobjectives.
The Communists probably also Believe that their capabilitiesong, primarily political struggle are greater than those of the US. The Communist leaders almostestimate that theyide area of maneuver open lo them In Asia in which they can safely continue efforts at subversion and support of armed insurrection withoutunacceptable US counteraction. The Communists probably recognise thatamong the non-Communist powers on many aspects of Asian policy make it difficult for the US to bring effective force to bear against Communist expansion throughshort of overt aggression.
The Communists almost certainly believe lhat recent events, whileS reluctance to become involved in major war In Asia, have delimited more clearly the area In which tho US would take militaryto prevent Communist militaryIn particular, the Communistsbelieve that open military aggression against Japan. Taiwan, the ROK. Thailand, the Philippines, or Malaya would lead to strong US counteraction, probably including action against mainland China and possibly including the use of nuclear weapons. They probably further estimate than an overtattack against Laos, Cambodia, or South Vietnam might result In at least local US military action, and that an overt attack on any other non-Communist Asian state would entail serious risk of US militaryMoreover, there is almost certainlyarge twilight area of possible courses in which tho Communists are uncertain of US reactions Such courses probably Include: attacks on the NaUonallst offshore islands, greatly Intensified paramilitary subversion in Indochina, or Infiltration of armed groups into Thailand,
The ConimunlsU. particularly theCommunists, almost certainly regard the orientation of Japan and India as the key to the future balance of power in Asia. The Communists probably believe that Japan's tics to the West can be weakenedolicyeconomic and political inducements. They probably consider that in the neara policy toward India which shows atuperficial respect for India's position in South and Southeast Asia will bestIndia's neutral position.
The Communist estimate of US actions and reactions in Asia will be the factor of paramount importance in their dctcimuia-tion of courses of action in Asia throughout thc period of this estimate.
III. MAIN LINES OF COMMUNIST POLICY IN ASIA
current tactic of the Communistsappears toariant of theirof combining professions ofwith continued efforts atcontinued expansion of thefor war. The chief newthis polky, evident since the death ofparticularly since the calling ofConference ins aeffort to convince non-Communistthat Moscow and Peipinghat reasonable andarrangements with the Communistpossible, and that US policy isew era ol peace In Asia.element conforms with presentCommunist tactics of minimizingand of exploiting methods to divideworld, and particularly to detach theits allies,eriod in whichof US nuclear superiority isreduced. The professed Communistfor "lessened tensions" In Asia appearshowever, to be markedesirethe dangers of full-scale USagainst mainland China and tovigilance of non-Communist Asia,the same time continuing Communistby means short of open war.framework, the Communiststate of extreme tension with
thc US and Nationalist China, accepting the attendant risks. In brief. Communist China and the USSR will continue their present policy of wooing Asia with protestations of peace, while at the same time continuing to subvert Asia, In the expectation that this long-range "peaceful coexistence" policy will with minimum risk result In both theof their present military and economic objectives and the eventual elimination of US influence from Asia.
he Communists will attempt to impress free-world countries, particularly Japan and the Asian neutrals, with their willingncbs to negotiate outstanding issues. In so doing, they will probably make proposals forwhich may be attractive to some non-Communist nations but contrary to USand. as al Geneva, may on occasion make significant procedural and tacticalCommunist China may attempt to negotiate, on the basis of the Chou-Nehru fiveeries of mutual nonaggresslon,understandings with most of its Asian neighbors. In these efforts, thcwill continue to seek greaterand acceptance of the Peiping regime, and to hold out the promise that Asian and world problems can be solved by Great Power deliberation if Peiping is permitted totherein. In addition, the wisdom of closer diplomatic ties with Peiping will beupon non-Communlst Asia byexaggeration of Communist China's strength, progress, and peaceful Intent.
he Communists will almost certainly make every effort to publicize the attractive possibility for non-Communlst nations oftrade with the Bloc, and to blame the trade control program, and the US as the chief supporter of that program, for thcof international trade to reach higher levels. Communist China will also seek such trade to supplement Bloc assistance to China's industrialization program, to reduce suchon Bloc over-all economy as thismay now entail, to carry out politico-economic courses of action elsewhere in Asia, and lo reduce the level of domestic political pressures required to support economic It Is probable that Communist China
will continue to exchange trade missions with many non Communist countries and totrade agreements, both formal andwhich express hopesigh level of trade and disapproval of trade restrictions.1
Except as noted below with respect to the Chinese Nationalist-held offshore Islands and South Vietnam, the Communists will probably not, during the period of this estimate. Initiate new local military actions ln Asia withSoviet. Chinese Communist, North Korean, or Viet Minh forces. Communist courses of action will probably be designed to expand thc area of political struggle while maintaining nnd increasing capabilities for future military action. The Communists will almost certainly attempt Increasingly toCommunist China's power and prestige in Asiapearhead for Bloc policy there.
Despite our estimate that new Communist military aggression in South and Southeast Asia is unlikely, the Communists mightnew aggression in reaction to US policies,esult of miscalculation on their part of probable US reactions, or because of prospects of easy success in some area,if the strength and determination of the US and states cooperating with it seemed to be weakened. In particular, acute crises may arise out of the Geneva settlement or out of thc Chinese Communist determination to gain possession of the Natlonallst-hcldIslands and Taiwan. Thus, throughout the period of this estimate, the possibility of war remains.
The Chinese Communists will continue their efforts to subvert and exploit theChinese In Southeast Asia. They will attempt to gain control over schools and youth, commercial and other groups, and will exploit continuing Ues between theseand mainland China for financial purposes, andhannel for infiltration, espionage, and propaganda. The degree of Communist success in exploiting the overseas
' The problem or trade controls Is being examined In detail InConsequences otPossible Courses of AcUon with Respect to non-Communlst Controls over Tradeurrently In preparaUon.
Chinese will be strongly influenced by thc over-all fortunes of Communist China.because the usefulness of most of these Chinese is limited (their members areculturally Isolated, and disliked byhc Communists will probably concentrate their activities primarily on the governments and indigenousof Southeast Asian countries. TheCommunists may even makeon the nationality status of overseas Chinese, believing that such compromises would not greaUy diminish the subversive potential of the overseas Chinese
IV. SPECIFIC COURSES OF ACIION Nationalist China
he issues between Nationalist andChina will continue to present the greatest danger of large-scale warfare In Asia. The Peiping regime will continue committed to the "liberation" of all Chinese Nationalist-held territory, defining this issue as anaffair in which foreign Interference will not be tolerated. The future course ofaction toward the offshore islands and Taiwan will be determined largely on the basis of the Communist estimate of US reactions.1
Assistant Chief of. believes lhat this paragraph should read as follows: "Chinese Communist aeUvUy against Taiwan and ihf offshore Islands hai fluctuated during the lasl four years from almost completeto recent heavy pressure against Uie Chlnmens and the Taeh'ens. Current pressure appears to be part of an over-all pattern ot Communis! poUUco-military action. Theregime Is committed to Uie "llberauon" of all Chinese NaUonallst-held territory and has denned this Issue as an "Internal affair- in which foreign lnuiftrer.ee will notuccessful assault against the offshore Islands Is well wlUiln Communist capabilities, and It would be unreasonable to assume Uiat they think otherwise These Ulands pose no particular military threat to Uie Chineseand are of only limited military,and psychological value to the Chinese Nationalist*. However. Uie Chineseby eonUnulng military pressure aialnst Uie offshore islands without direct assault, ara Footnote continued on nexl page
c believe lhat thc Chinese Communist* will continue to bomb and conduct raids against the Nationalist-held offshore Islands, to occupy undefended adjacent islands, and lo Increase air, naval, and artillery activities. Tliey will almosi certainly increase Ihe scale of such probing attacks on the onshore Islands, and will probably attempt to seize some of lhe major offshore Islands during the period of this estimate. They would almost certainly attempt lo seize some of lhe major offshore islands If their probing actions weie to provoke no appreciable US counteraction. On the other hand, as long as the US responds to these probing attacks with shows of force, lhc Communist* may not attempt all-out assault* against the major offshoren any event, the Chinese Communist* may attempt to provoke local incidents involving us forces which could then be put formally before the UNase of US aggression and of US interference in the internal affairs of Chlna.T
e believe that as long as thc US con-llnues Its firm support of the National Gov-ernment, remains committed to the defense of Taiwan, and continues to keep major air and naval units available in the general area, the Chinese Communists will notull-scale invasion of Taiwan or the Pescadores.
Footnote tonUnued from pace 9
able to Keep the Chinese NaUonanSU and tha US on Uie defensive wondering where the Com-muniita will strike next. In add)uon.propaganda concerning Talwin tends to accentuate the divergence of views between the US and her allies on the China queiUon "
'The Assistant Chief of. believes that thin paragraph should read as follows: "Wa believe the Chinese Communists willto bomb and conduct raids agalnttNationalist-held onshore Islands, to occupy undefended adjacent Islands, and to Increase air, naval, and artillery activities. Peiping probably estimates that efforts to take the Nationalist-held offshore Islands mayisk of war with the US. However. In spite or their esUmate that risk of war may be In-volred. lha Chinese Communists are likely lo attempt to seise some of the NaUonalUt-hekl Islands II such action appears desirable aa part Of their over-all poUUcal-mlltary-psycholoflral program."
They probably believe that such actions would lead lo war with the US. possibly Including nuclear weapon attacks on mainland China. If tlie Chinese Communists should come to wise that the US would not In fact defendhad markedly decreased, the likelihoodommunist assault on Taiwan would be greatly increased. Finally, If thc Chinese Communists should come lo believe in the course of their tests of US Intentions orthat the US would not in fact defendand the Pescadores, they would probably attempt to take over Taiwan by force.
of invading Taiwan, thowill almost certainly concentrate onpolicy of subversion and othersoftening up Taiwan for ultimatethis end. they will probably attemptthe international andof the Chinese Nalionalto weaken ils ties with the US.and diplomacy, thoy willembarrass and discredit the US andGovernment, to exacerbatebetween the US and IU alliesnon-Communist powers on theto promote International favor fordisposition of Taiwan acceptableand to put pressure on the USits military protection andthrough continuingthe offshore island*,subversion, and perhaps nuisanceagainst Taiwan, they will try toNationalist morale. Increase theirand sabotage potential on Taiwan,defections, and promote politicalon the island.
Indochina*
believe that the Viet Minh willto gain in political strength andwith Chinese aid. to increase Itspower in North Vietnam. Theprobably now feels that It canover all Vietnam withoutwarfare. Accordingly, we believe
NIB: -probable Developments ln South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia uiroueh Julydated4
that thc Communists will exert every effort to accomplish their objectives through means short of war. Vict Minh agents will continue lo subvert all susceptible elements of theto Intrigue lo prevent the coalescence ot thc various factions and the building of any slienglh In the Soulh, and Vlel Minh "shadow-governments" and polltlco-military networks will be established wherever the failure of the national government or the French to impose controls leaves thea vacuum In which to operate.esult of their activities and probable degree of penetration in South Vietnam, it is possible thai the Communists will succeed Inmost Vietnamese in the South of theof Communist control.
If, on the other hand. South Vietnam should appear to be gaining ln strength or if elections were postponed over Communistthe Communists probably would step up their subversive and guerrilla activities In thc South and If necessary would infiltrate additional armed forces in an effort lo gain control over lhe area. However, we believe that Ihey would be unlikely openly to invade South Vietnam at least prior tohe date set for national elections, because: (a) they would consider that their prospects of gaining control over thc area without resort to invasion continued to be highly favorable; (b) they would be concerned over theof US military counteraction; and (c) they would probably fear thai Invasion would induce the neutral nations ln Asia to move toward open alignments with the WesU
The Viet Minh isonciliatory line toward France, thus seeking to exploit French hopes of retaining their economic and cultural interests in North Vietnam. It probably hopes that French susceptibility to an arrangement with the Viet Minh willand consequently reduce Frenchtotrongly nationalistic state ln South Vietnam.
The Communists will probably continue to exercise considerable control in theprovinces of Laos and will retain afor subversive activity against the Lao Government. However, we believe lhat the
Laotians can limit Communist politicaland that an anti-Communistwilln power providing itto receive outside assistance and the Viet Mlnh do not invade or instigateguerrilla warfare. Wc believe that the nature of Communist aggressive action against Laos will be moderated by thedesire to conlinue their "peacefulline in Asia, particularly directed toward Indian reactions andesser degree by the possibility of US counteraction.
However, If South Vietnam should fall to thc Viet Mlnh during the period of thisCommunist capabilities for pressure against Laos would be substantially Increased, and the Laotian will and capability lo resist these pressures would be correspondinglyThe extent to which the Communists chose to exploit this situation would depend almost entirely on their estimate of thereactions of the Manila Tact powers and of the neutral countries of South andAsia.
Although some Vietnamese Communist troops and their dependents have beenfrom Cambodia, we believe that aViet Minh cadre has been left behind. Moreover, lhe Cambodian Communist armed bands, although ending their guerrillahave failed to demobilize or to turn over their arms. Future events In Cambodia will be considerably affected by developments In Vietnam andommunist takeover in South Vietnam would Increase Communist capabilities against Cambodia and wouldCambodian will to resist furtherpressures, though we estimate that the Cambodians would be more resolute than would the Laotians under similar
Japan
will become an Increasinglytarget for Communistand propaganda. The Bloccontinue to seek an expansion ofand cultural relations, playingpopular expectations in Japanpotential benefits of trade with Commu-
ft fXAn Mrtl
China. They will continue to hold out the possibility oi* negotiations leading to closer relations with the USSR and Communist Chinaeans of resolving economic and security problems facing Japan. Thcwillreater effort to create the impression that their terms for aof diplomatic relations with Japan are flexible, and may oiler toormal peace settlement, possibly involving theof some small Japanese Islands such as the Habomats, and the conclusionon-oggression pact. There are no Indications at present of any change in the basic Sino-Soviet requirement that Japan terminate its alliance with the USrecondition for diplomatic relationseace treaty, but it is possible that within the period of this estimate the Communists may be willing to acceptless.
Communists will continue theirto undermine Japan's stabilityorientation through subversionJapanese Communist Party, andof informal negotiationsnongovernmental groups. TheCommunists will continue toarmed revolution to tlie "peaceful"of "united front" and "unifiedtactics. At the same time, thewill continue to developorganizations and may, onto sabotage and limited acts of violence.
India
USSR and Communist Chinaincreasing attention on India in anto insure at least Its continuedand if possible to bring it closer toBloc. Communist Chinatoormal non-aggressionIndia, and may even agree to anof respective Sino-Indianinfluence in Southeast Asia. Even atof frictions with India, Peipingestablish diplomatic relationsand seek to Increase Its nowthere and ln Bhutan, Sikklm,along India's borders
India, the native Communistscontinue their efforts,legal andnited opposition against theParty. They will seek to exploitneutralist, and anti-Westernand probably to aggravatedifferences. The Communistsmay join in riots and employ othertacticsmall scale,outbursts of violence have beenby non-Communist groups. localwill try to enlarge theirthe Kashmir government.
Korea
Communist policy during the period of this estimate will probably seek totabilized situation in Korea. We believe lhat the chief features of this policy will be; (a) to refrain from renewing hostilities in Korea, but to be militarily preparedesumption of hostilities; (b) to refuse to accept any settlement in Korea which either endangers continued Communist control of North Korea or precludes hope of eventual Communistof all Korea; <c) to rehabilitate North Korea and to strengthen its military andpower; and (d) to attempt lo weaken the ROK by infiltration and subversion.
The Communists probably will withdraw most If not all Chinese troops from Korea within the period, claiming credit fortensions In Korea and thereby imposing pressures on the US to effect further US troop withdrawal from Korea. Dissolution of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Committee in South Korea, if it lakes place, willustained propagandaagainst the US, but probably will not lead to renewal of hostilities or seriousin Korea. The Communists probably will continue to urge that negotiations on the unification of Korea, possibly In the formew international conference, be reopened. They will continue to suggest that ifcannot immediately be achieved, lesser arrangements can, such as economic andintercourse between North and South Korea. The Communists will almost certain-
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not agree to unification based on freeunder UN supervision, but will piobably be willing to make procedural concessions in negotiations and to enter Into economic and cultural contacts with the ROK. Thenevertheless will continue efforts to increase their now limited capabilities forwithin South Korea, and for exploiting political instability and grievances against the US and Japan.
forces In North Korea arccertainly capable of repelling aROK attack. The Communists wouldconsider such an atiack asan attempt to conquer the entirebelieve, however, that thewish to avoid becoming involvedwar with US/UN forces, and thereforewould invade South Korea only ifthat thc Invasion would notsuch involvement.
Indonesia
influence In Indonesiaconsiderably since the presenttook oflice innd as arecent political developments theis increasingly dependent uponparllmentary support for itsCommunist influence has beenespecially through CommunistIndonesia's principal labor,agricultural organ nations,PERBBPSI. and. Attime. Minister of Defense Iwa, whoa long history of Communistattempting to Isolate anti-Communistin the security forces and tomilitary commands under his directIt is possible that other individualsdirect Communist control will byparticipateovernment duringof this estimate, and In this caseinfluence would probably rapidlyIf no prompt and determinedto this latter developmentthe chancesompletetakeover would be high.*
We believe the Indonesian Communists will probably continue to support the present government or, If it falls, lo work for theof another government in which they would participate or In which their influence would be strong. They will try, through both constitutional and illegal means, to expand their Influence in theand the armed forces, and tothe formationnified and effective opposition. They will probably also attempt to strengthen their capabilities byarty-con trolled armed force. In general, however, they will probably avoid highly aggressive tactics In the near future, lest these provoke counteraction by theor by domestic opposition groups before their own strength has become great enough to deal with lt.
The prospects of the Communists ln the elections, now scheduled forreand may depend on election procedures which the Communists will attempt toIf an anti-Communist government
Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department ot state, believes this paragraph should read as follows:
"Communist Influence In Indonesia has grown considerably since Uie present government took office Inndesult of recent political developments the government Isdependent upon Communistsupport for Its eonUnued existence. Communist Influence has been exertedthrough Communist activity Inprincipal labor, veterans' and peasant organizations. respecUvely SOBSI, PERBEPSI, and. Minister of Defense Iwa, who hasong history of Communist assocla-Uor, ls attemptng lo Isolate tbe more anU-Communlst elements in the security forces and lo develop new military commands under his control. There Is no Indication, however, that Communism has made any extensive Inroads In Uie Indonesian army, and there have been reporlsovement to heal factionalism within thc army In order to resist Uie efforts of politicians to Influence that body. Direct Communist Party paruclpaUon ln UieIs unlikely during Uie period of this esU-mate, It Is possible, however, that Individuals who have Communist connections andsupport would be Invited to parUclpateovernment thus enabling theto conUnue to Increase their Influence."
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to power In the near future, with or without elections, wc believe that thebecause of their present limitedprobably would not considerarge scale to be feasible. Their principal efforts inase would beto the improvement of their localand of their capabilities for future action. On the other hand,overnment of tlie present character continues in power and if Communist strengths continue to grow as rapidly as In the periodhe chancesommunist take-over byor force during the period of this estimate will greatly increase.
Thailand "
he Communist* probably consider that their prospects In Thailand depend chiefly upon the course of events In Indochina. They will continue subversive activities In Thailand, primarily among the Chinese and Vietnamese communities. However, the most significant Communist activities relating to Thailand will be conducted from outside the country. We believe that there will be increasingactivity supported from southern Yunnan and Laos. In addition, Peiping will exert pressures on the Thai Government toeiping-organized "peaceo this end, former Thai Premier Prldl Phanomyong may become Increasingly prominent In Peipingpokesman for suchethat these Ucttca will not haveeffects In Thailand as long as Western assistance and support to Thailand continue and the Thai are not faced with an Imminent military threat from China or majorgains In Indochina.
-Sec, "Probable Developments Inlo be published In
Burma
Chinese Communists face adifficult problem in determining whatto strike between soft and hardobvious support of the insurgentswould probably move Burma closerWest and arouse Indian apprehensionCommunist intentions.Moscow and Peiping probably dothe present Burmesewholly reliable. We believeChinese Communists will attempt toa middle course towardpeacehile fosteringactivities, particularly in the border areas.
Pakistan
the USSR and Communistcontinue to maintain correctwith the Government.will be weighted In favor ofoccasional terrorism. The alms ofwill be necessarily modest:their now limited strength inand toand ln causing angovernment to be replaced by oneand anti-Communist. Theyin particular to exploitand religious differences, theproblem, and differences betweenand Pakistan.
Elsewhere in Asia
present policy of infiltratingmovements In Malaya willincrease Communist political potentialarea by the later period of thispolicy involving theHong Kong, and Macau Is likelyalong present lines.
Original document.
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