MORALE ON TAIWAN

Created: 4/16/1955

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

XMTBLLIOENCB 1 . ^lOO-uA-55

rT nALE OHv.incn Copy

Submit led by the Director of Central Xntvlll'vnco

winr Intolllvencc irrwdtntionathe prcpirsti^ntatlmtei The Centralcnee Apuncyvc int-jlll-cnce or-anls^ti^is

thoof State, thotho tiavy, tha-

Air Force, and The Joint Staff,

Concurredhe IntoUircncolttc

on Cneurrinr were tho Specialntc-lllHico,of St-tcj the Assistmt Chief of, Departnont oj tho Army; theival Intelligence; tl* Director of Inlollirenco, USATj and tho Deputy UirtcV.rXntolUcunce, Tho Joint tiff, The At->sdc Bncrjy Comissionire to the IAC. and the Assistant to tho Director, Fwrterol Bureiu ffin, abstained, tho subject Doing outsirto their Jurisdiction.

mi

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE I

HDRTtf OM T

TIE PPODLEI!

To aiiclyru the pattern of norr.la and subversion on Taiwan, and to oat lrc to the extent and intensity of the reaction* whichccur tn Taiwan, nnd ln certain other count rice of free A*f tho Moteu rod Quctyiy (roup* should bo lost or evacuated under certain given dltlom.^

THE ESTIMATE

X. GEWERM. CQWnUSIOMS

X, On theL' the general str.to of Chlnoso Nationrllet tx>rclc rumlns fr.lrly (pod doapito recent evuuta. Wo have not detected

3/ "Taiwan" oaereinhe Pvnghuo (PoaeMoroc).

2j Jrpan, tlw Philippines, the ROK,lctvn, Cactsjoia, and Laoa.

These contingencies hr.vo been given the Intelligence erexamltyasis for nuking tht* oetlrcta.

C.unlilvi. activity rf lujor prop-.rtlt.no on Taiwan, ml strongarc bolnc onfjrecdho Island. *meniivnt hasivwy fruotrntluftsnpiriiitvnts during it* six years on Taiwan, end rd verso psycho -loglc.il force" rrc nlinat certainly ntboncnth thoof Hctlon-llot society.

S* The lclnivls ofnd Matiu leva recently assured such

trrportance In tlic eye* of the Rationalists that their lots during the

current crisis vculdcvorc blow tc nornlo, lrrcopectivc of the

circumstances or cuuUtlans under which thu lnea occurred. Tltc effect

voulU probr.hlylaernbly greater If theli to Caucunlst

; -'li My if US forces wore tnvulvud, than if thoy were evocuoted

without erred ewfllct. In nrvywovur, wv bollovo that the blow

vuuld not be soa to cz.inc tho Ectlonallots to We bclicvoi: cntlnuo their rceistaacu tepressures,

nt leastirx-.^ The behavior of the nationalists wjuld depend In

kfssistant, Intclllnvneu, Depart!lent of State, end the Assistant Chief of, parti cat of the Anry, believe that these twv sentences overly ora>hrjiro theeffucts or possible rVjwejg tn o> rdo on the future courses of nationalist cctico and would rephrase these scutcners as TAlx/zi "In any ovont, wo believe tliot thewrul-1bo go great ao to destroy tho Hatlonrlist will to rcslbt orset In nvtlonthct wjuU causolnoaliatJ to fold up. We believe that they wiuld ecntlnue their resistance to Coorsnlst ureeoures cm long ra they hrdIn tie detcrntnctlailllty of tho US to do form] Tr.lvan.

if ic US octl'wu wllh resect to Taiwan, *ndUSvaanist ifM. )

3. henterna MaJaran,linplnct, tho ri, Thailand, South Vietnam, Ban-brvUa,f"ffihore lnl-yy'^wlthout'nrivyjldmt IcV t* sicnlfleant chancespolicy] It wool" Iw emoted with ref In Jip*n, but wiuW nrousoenncern elsewhere in thur discussion thnt the USV- cwH Ita forces to farena.

km TossslandssaMat assault, withmitn their deft-nan icuHldes?rond feeling nr-m. the cowUiua un-'cr dine*.sithat if tho Islands were not to be defended by tho US, thu Nationalist earrisons shouldoonrather than sacrificed. US prestigesuffer, Laos, Sivth Vietnam, Cambodia, and Thailand, In which the USases, would prnurblyincreased doubts as to whether tin US would rivfund thou in sua of no ad. Theseries would prolably be disposed t> lnerooslnr caution in theirha Cmviunlsta.

.

r.vnv.Ticf;

6, ft* f Taiwan fall Into tw; nrdnrtco, tho Trt*rrjk:Bc end the The fjrrerr.rgcly passive,f.yrcrnlrv:,nfl sure ruscntjcnt against tho orinlonO "lnvrdcrn" and ti.elr pest policies, but in presentycltul'igical factor of little lrjportanoo. Aneaig the Holnl-tn-lors,arelnc caroocnts; (a) Chime Kil-shck on! hie close ou>?nllnrtcsic military and theceij

the burcauerncy; and (d) nonofflelal poranns. Including especially

tho latclllyntslr.

Of theso conpononts, tho rjorclo of tho first two Is tost Important, slnco they fetendns political action. Chiang Kai-shekis clcsc subordinates, by tholr deads, their expression of roaolve, and by the expectations which thoy con in part craato, dotortdne ln largo -ueasurc the spirit with which decisions aro node and ljjplcrcntod thrc*igh-out the bureaucratic and military chains of cccjiand. The nllltery and the aecurity forcco constitute tho key clcncnts, since thoy will largely actor-one the effectiveness of defense, end the llkcUliocd of teasor ad 'ctat. Tho rank and filo bureaucracyesser

In iNrtetrdalttS iVffiaa, es do the Intel! It? ntstn,vro, Onl -cl*ants. Nevertheless, irldcsproart disaffection Is*^"

tfeftfl theseeventually to Wenkon tha

ena

A. irr.'it fit, nit; of H- rrlc

10. "AWtoN mall on' public utterances do ttA noconcrrtlytrue state iaf Chinese Rationalist uornlu rari vIlHrfiwoa topressures nnl lnrtuecicnto. The prlncljfll factorsf key flraipo on Taiwan opperr to be thj fallowing! turn te the mlnlrpfli (b) prospects for IT' Ccfcnoo offtf tineiTient; and (c)

Bntior-Tllat return tn paver on the mini and (see) -

lM3 Mainland

U. All daunts have been suatalnod byhe Rational Ocvcrnrtont will return to tho nclaland. For sgverol years, hovever, actual expectntiuna appear to havo bean dlrxard, notably ononfl the higher

civilnlltr.iy irVl;ne. Tlxrrv loo been little reaurniico ct tny tlra: wiuljr.tionr.llct offlclclo tltnt the US, oxcant thr/ugh. nvolvcixntTr..'rl MT, woulu -assist the NatlonallstD to establish r. bcr.elihcnu. ng ns throe yo.oro og* officials in private ccnvcrsatluna would nVilt that, contrary to public asaurrncee, they actually horborod llttlo hopo of evrr returning tu tho crlnlntd excupt In the ovent Ofar. MJre recently, U5 official etrtencnts probably hr.ve IncreasedtiinollDt duibts rogrxding their prospectseturn to tho

Ct

12. Chiangis tlie uutotnndlng eyobtlpo for returnminimi, and tin*enter and pcrpotuntur of this hope. Chihocn unio/teljr mtcrussful inense of unity end purposs Unlike tlw oltuotlon on tho mini andore few

s.mircci of Independent pjwer or Influence vlthln the roglac, and politics nnd personal relationships rcvolvo cl/iost exclusively aboutrata. Bis steadf.-xtncsB In personifying return to the ncinlnnd has beenfor sustaining this objective, hovovor rcsyto or infoaelble It night bo.

4

lj. /eilMir vhlfh clcirlytKf tvtuni t

ill hawrlvo rffoct .ft Pilate Mrllcnrllnt nnr-Je^ If tlw CUikcc PntlonaliBU co Trivrmollcvoliero could U. iw tVtURi to thethe effect upxi uurrlu nnd ujr.ci Clilnrfl Knlu k'b |Birorwil pruotlga would be *oriou*ly olvcroo. Huvcrthelaao, Chiang would ertainly he able to uclntnln hi* authority. Pr-ctlc=U;

eejuT,ldr Tripel to octalocttleicatll tn feet signify that the Nntluncl Cl<ngerc ignf clrlu to thehile HrtiomllBtcivilian* nj longer live out ofhey hevo ca yet nodeto an InauLir existence* B'vovor, certainivv have uc-lcrtihan vxi: tend to frcllltato odjuatrunt* tolife on the

ij

, Pirnr.nc of-nd Curp-irt id* theeninent

la. oet bcalc roquipaicnt* farof rjorelo ono flriblo evidencelm UT. Intention to defend Taiwan and tovertvunt am the lcgltlirile gcvenvnt of Chlna._

The Muturl Lvfenou Treaty lie*t tlw firot ofcaulreDCDt*.

Bui wllhV, the sec- nd,rrlst anon*"

Nationalist*. ylu, thereht* ii to US lr.Un-ti-n*he Defense, of tho offshore islands, US attl-Units low.ird thossasSj. andorn US

conccrnlrv ive*rnltian ofraiMat rcrlmo,|Top uchclon* an Taiwan rr^bibly slew with olam whit they be Hero to be'a US tendency to nwirX direct unitary dvaresient with CwunlBt China,S willingness tocofulf tho Taiwan Straits problem. They feirhese dovcloyivnts lm'lr-tc an lvint'onwent by tho US of support of thoavernntnt as tho lcnitisnto covvrnacnt of Chlm andven of theexistence of the national went Itself.

ationilist return to rower on too rVdnlind j?

n

w,

IS. Although all croups snlntiin tha hono that the National Oovoi-rswjnt will return to tho Mainland, snny individuals almost ecrtnlnly haws eonsldorod cortiln altornatlvos. ld bo (a) defection to thotimud life on Taiwan; ando other non-Crrtvunist aroas.

10. rho attractionsmuniot China are rcobnbly rrl-yehalo.-ieal. Tho Chinese Nationalists on Taiwanhe mainland na homo where thn families of many still remain. In addition, thtro nro many dissatisfactions, with tha situation on Taiwan, ln particular lack of opportunity for*ntellectuals,urcaucra*s, nnd military officers, finally Pcipinc ciowerful aj.po.al throurh its nppartnt dynnnlam nnd lti> enhanced staturo ln world affairs,

17, Since JulyandB.nce tho evacuation Vw, of the Tachcna ln Februarythe Chinesec_-becnh prcssuroenmpnirntirectionsaiwan and tho offah-rc lsl-ndB. Thishas included specific apjoalBformer friends on tho mainland V>tl-nalist officials and officers, as wolli;ril assurances of pardon and of full uso of anyfuctir's talents, ThiB cnmpaiitn haB not ns yet had any Tlalblsut Cwmnisto recently cT.Mm.xl thatami aim, -dded to continued military prosrurcs against the Nntt-nr.Msts, will In time result in thoaiwan.

In. H :v. r, nostn Taiwan nro awiro thit tha

tr*ls of the Fcl;m RM Snich nora

e thin tVse to which they are subjectedthe island.

Inrte tons nlsr* the lncrcisin-ly nuotcro life on the

eninlind JWnor thoon Taiwan, wt^cre

the stand vd of livinrwe^r1 -mly V>f Japan la tho Fir Eint. The thorns of returnt precludedo^ree of ndJttPtesnt by prtlnlnnd Chimbotn dr preasnt existence whichin-illyto njpcTX wore acceptable and lesscowcr# the Natl-nil 1st leadership now on Taiwan constitute* the aost eneNe, rojrd.il nrunlit elwunttho Chinone,

19* In view ofie, ws be1levy tint thef Chlnoeo on Taiwanldfor the solnlvid at tho present tine, even If It wore possible to sovo froely outiwm, wiuld bo snail,

thejLgfjgnjj

20, On the surf-tec tho proscnt .tt.ltilf an rale on Taiwan resnlnsw* Uesjpite roocnt ovonts. Aside fronwtont ini-naliit-contr-lled

heivoonvisible cvMtnca ofllrvp that this relatively satisfactory

st*t'! "ftnr-y nire apparent than real, Tlio ndvorso psychoces nnalyicd abovo,rtlcular tho dis- npp-intrwnt* tnrwr ecrtnlnielos, nrs almott certainly fitbeneath the surface of Nationalist Bocloty. Those foreeappearo bo of serious proportl'ns, but their erosive offect nay jrcparj thon nceoleratod cVtoriora-tlon cf morale In thoationalist China sh-uld suffer andi-tlonal setback*.

Sffcetlveaoya of Internal Security

21. Although our lntollircnee on tho euhjoct Is nat full

cr conclusive, wo beliavo thatsubversive activity on

Tfiluan at tlie present tine Is not of major proportions and

*

in beln- effectively supprsssoU. Tho substantial threat

Castsubversion resulting ln conviction have been halved in the past f'urr avcraito cfer month1 tob. There is no nocossary corrclati-'n between tho number of "caocs" and the number of individuals convicted. Tha Fcneoeadquarters nt TalpolUeaaca5 jcraons had been tabled In tho first throu quartersU. Of th^ssore later oanvlctod.

'<mdewnlst aetlvlt*e*aiwan In

hW'rii-Uj- rxuoed by *lCOT*m*tallet BMmtor-

Ihll^nnllaiand mirvinv.co cf Cwwnift

nctlTitlunelieved pood, ore ^rabably euat

effective- in the rant* of the Military, rcaa-anbly eotho

l-"tion at lnr(:o, end fncwhat 1cm effective) aartnc

fficlilaWin. Recent defection*ew. Over and oh-vo tha effoctlvcnoa* of li-tl-naKot eccuritydefection le inhibitednnbor of prnctical consldora-ti -ns-. distancehe Mainland, few nc-ne of circs* frnet Taiwan, and tho difficulty nf eatAbllehinr: ehvutele ofithnr.oiit*a

at defections consist rflraon, andveryo lsVm'i. General Weir-nr. Kong inIon.*quivocal cb-araetor, Hu hie rrtssociated vith tlioeadership eir.ee bv flod tor* fru* tho Mainland

m. trmrt on kationalist morale of hie loss of^the offshore

ISLANDS A'D OF UTHEli TOSS! ME DEVELOP;

23, p if tho offshore ielarv'e duriiu* tho current crisis .

Vhg SocialIntellicence, IVpartrcnt of State, and tho Assistant CliSwf, Lcllcvu tintfiilcncn In the willingness .and ability of tho us to defend Taiwan is tho stainconsidorntian affecting duvcloficnte lnlonallnt sornle ns well ns the elrnlflcnnce of such f'-welonricnU. They believeTB|nd Z$ taken -as a bscure tho key in; -rlnnco if thisld substituteawim: forthree9 'Toffshore Islam's durin" the current crisis wouldff etimorale,uld any do-Vblajrvntho chances 'r inhv US an* Uwunis to or ln'tente) that theeway fr-e> suntt Katl-nallet nej Jrntl^nsuturn tn tin mlnVurt, Tin. extenthle l'.-ss of r. -iu es wellece part toLs affectChJncsc Matt'nail si ustlmtnIry. So lem;ih.so 'Mi nilletlnwllUmnuss and ability nflefta! Taiwan remain* firm noof thecoiuitdurud belaw ie likely Mono to dee troy llaU-mlist will to r- Mat or to cause tho Chirk, so National Oovurnncnt t- fallwithin.*

Ui arc Man to Chtitrsellot1th- w circuiwtanecerMtlT* w'er which It took plntO. Since retiring V. Taiwan Inhutioml-rpwoa fturlue of crisoe and fruntntjntwhich tho current offehnro Inland crisis is but tho sr-st roccnt-The frustrations and dlsaj-nolntswmts of the pant tlx years, together with tho moro rocont IrYjiea that the IT. would beetleMilitarily involved In tho i'.dfemo of the rfTnWej lel-uVe, & Jffho peyrh^lrtMr-il lrr -rlarooVtwyeat-.unho loow ofslands womV* hivn varying ndverne effects uponralc dependlnr; upon thoof their loss as described ln par airelcw.

toss of tho offshore Islam's would probably be taken es evidence that the US was srvlnr furtherof Mati-nallst asj iratl-ne for return V* the an inland. 1st leaders, and perhaps the Matl-nalist rank-and-file, probably do not have anyconviction that the U3 will-in fact supporteturn, except ln the event of war between the US end Cw.unist China. It wouldifferent matter, however, to admit finally to themselvesherished hope hart beenfoundation, ww do eot bcllrvc that the natinnoliete hav* yet

* Brdnlnslon. or that theybeo it

ho offth-rvere loet and thopteerud '

rernrdfinal, ldloser tr it,

tawewrj and tho lnj-aet would bo rrrnt anoni* all uluncnta

taiwan. thoru si jit not be any sudden increase in

or otbxr manifcsvitl-n* afriltl'.b. bat tiw leader* ship would find it much nor* difficult t- suatiin it* awn Borale nod the loyalty of lower level**

it la our catbwato thitd up, buttirai. their resistancej re*suras. tho behavior ofianall*t* wouldineasures on *paclfie us actions withtand us ruacti'ns to subsequentt bows.

b. ol'-b

on taiwan to tb* loss af the offshorewary aceordiiu; to theof the loss, wctho foll'wlnr contingencies.

?7. forces inoffshore island* ovneuatod nt_usnd with usto tho application

ft'jM and attainedfjgf!to 'ffsh-ro Iplin's Atnd

USldtronoualy resisted by Chlanr. Kal-shok'fficlildon. Such onould fose trr the Hati-rolisl lnadors arrnbtrjnustlf lMti*>nw Failure V* defend tho *ff*hTO islanls wouldho [rtotir* and nelf-rus;<cet of tho Military, Thecatlvr earlytllltle* endeturn to tho pnlnlair*. Many Kitl-nnlisle would evinceand bitternessituation In which they would, eonolderheir Interests were beubordinated; to tho purelyfwnsive interest* of the US. Cooperation between the US and the UatWrtlists would be adveraoly affected. ll elcr>ont* on Taiwan would, probably continue to estlnate. that tha OS wouldiwan. ventual eonfllct between tho US and Coranunlat China would rosnln. In those clrcunstancaa, we believe that Nationalist leaner* would continuetrol loyaltl to, llwdt subversion, nnrtnuniat Military prosrur**.

2ft. ithdr-^nil aec-fer-irled by apu^rantyc bynunist *tott*hoof TalwoTi. The rwoitlnceney woulddiffer apirodably from

, r.La,n aofr Talwin. wi.Hca itu'ranlvc ri nt additional naouraneo liaoBt curt-inlyxomcleto thoiaWend to rcluco tho ehancca iS rr l< twho U3 nn-lChina, and thusu elnnciji of nt" tlw mainland. It trMddj In tho Natl-nalift view,t- MwrcJ-ilv Um US with the hritiohT'llcy, or cwaa *rlft toward inb>*rmli*nalIt Taiwan.

29. hhoirlan'bcnnlttw amiwlih-gl. ounteraction.f aturltl-n, thuncr, aBim.ly rufumt tho fact tint o'f theiroes wwo boSni' rrwhnUydmuniem while thoncl r'.wtnUwcnt would be ni-ivavnlcl if tho U3

r tr- jn iVcabnd rn tlw eleven iff-

tr.-ojn rr*aa fBtOun.-yin Or -up, UliiCC "Bthrcolo tsnfQuDthe two LslnnlethePf wab| and jfafgj onour Inlands rj thotmi]..

r-rcf-cnt restrictl-'ne :nullltvy o[ arn- l'ita VftjffSt the mainland. Sh-uid Mitlorollst Ic.vlor* lnrod that thold not Intervene. Vwy adrht request .

US nanistincc to nwnUislands. In any ctont thero

itterness aralnat the US andfcelliv that vhe

IT-in hali'lni* Tainanta nun security.

In tine, thla contingency wuldurlauely ni-

ffectncrnlc. fcvtrthc-ltss, we bo11eve

that they would continue tn believe that thold defend

Tilvan, an* thewuli continue to control loyalties

and limit h

30. tlonillet forces In tha offsh-rc Islands defeated and tho lel-ir.'a stltcd with no Intervention hy IE frrccw. Tlie reaction to thlald beu.'dcn and even nore acrl-ue than tho ivuui, we haw noted9 above. The lose of u; to one-fifth of the hVitionillat onbat forcce would na tori ally eeVjeeceehe defcnao of Taiwan. The loss would -Toatly lncreaao satl-nallst vulnerability to rroraranla themes "finvincibility, Nationalistess# end the undepcndabllity of the US ae an ally. While Nationalist leaders slrht entertain scri-tie doubts an to 03

ft* with rvsi oct to the ricfona*o believe thattJu eh-rt tern theyrn tn their o rtofcnJ. Taiwan, ll^wr.vcr, continuation of thin c'.oUrmlinM^n, ami tho nttlHy of the Ratlonr Hathtp to retain loyAltloe and to Unitn Taiwan would dujend, In larro nuarure,hether (a) the Katiinallete hadl t thu tine ofatunlst waulthe offshorehat the US woe norally eon-dtUd t- tho Jcfcnee of thei Island'sould ln fact defend thenj. nodhe nature of US ncraurwe taltcu concurrently with find lieuc'latcly following; tho lois rf tho offph.ru ielnnt'o.

31, nffsh^rn lalanr'a l'Titrnur.lwt fia'iult wfalna wMchntervened locally and auUacgvcntly "laeniTired,tln-tney, the effectLitiomllat noralo would he ojctrumly crave. Tholrt bo eoncornod for thuexlatcneo of their regime. Tho eyfepb-JU of dlelnto-^ration wuld quickly rtcvolnp. Nevertheless, we bollovo thnt Chlani: Kai-ahck woull jrbo able In the ehart torn to naintoin control on Taiwan. Mst will end determination toruniet proa but te end lrvhjccwcnta over tho Ion, or

- '

li'ntoiTt*S measures or.he loss cf tho rffah-.ro lslint's andsubsoquontUS aeti-na in ivrtpuisc tn Cvnaunlst ^ves.

If tho US_ should faillrn Taiwan carrie-tt- the Iops of theislands un'or ftnv thec"ntlnfwnelea, there would to nn accolerntuCf moralo ant',aluan. nunist air raid* wore heavy and lonrwithout US counteraction, the tf-.tjon-llote would loss all fnith in tho US.

31. Vc hivo bvufl asked V> estlnatc tho effect upon Chinese Nationalist srrile if the<or-rrlsc VAyv.nt on Taiwan subsequent t- the lnss of the offshore lwlan-'s. estimate that thoeuniat* canrrt In the near fuburourprise lruVriont in sufficient fnroto dyltcto Nationalist mlllt-iry realfttanee, Incluciinc US avftort if necessary, or to attract maj'ir defpoti>ns.

3ii. ctlreocntChlanit Kai-shek. Chiang la so inportant to tho unity an*.af the Nationalistt that hlaat*ld introduce, aort^us

vnctrial nil into the situati'vi on Tnivan. Present inTlc-ti-na

ho likelihoodonstitutional sueccsei'-nVIoo

TrcRi-'cnt Cn'or.robably followed by J* cktyia- for

r Leninl thu oconos. obnble Initial loae if unity "

in the top leadorahlp of the fchtlop.ilJet government nfter; Chiruog

Kai-shek's death or retirementeflected nt nil luvcle

of the population, and mirht make them mr3 susceptible-

snmist moves. US policy ftiv- actions vruld I* of key imrortaneo

in rrst-rini- stability and cnfldsnco in the government. In

any event, it la unlikely that Chlanc'a death or retirement

would by itaolf Ivadn-ld erllapeethe will of tho

lea".ere nrvl people oq Taiwan, since the external unlfyine

particularly tho CemunletoulO remain, nix] nines

Chinni*etirementhe oc-ne would presumably not niter n

thenr ltjxcnt to supportl^mllst (jovernmont. ^ZJz>^

3?. Iho ittntl"nlnr ofinclu^lnrc

t'i vision

rronnd forcedaiwan, withconcurrencethe ahtl'-nnllatn, followinr tho Ionsign's urv'cr any of tho clr-cnm-itancca 'Vpcrlbed inl^vc, wouldene- lclal effectorale and wr>uV* increase dc tor mi nation to resist. Tho presence nf these force* would smcwhat nffett tho

It

alio'a Srt'vatly lncr."bo fetl-anllst confidence In tho security of Taiwan,

IV. JXT OMAXK STATTS AH) CimUFS IN ASIA* OF TiC IfSS Of THEfliiE ISLANDS

Tim effect* ofs of tho of fst* ro iiL-mie on otherin,ffects 'h Taiwan, would vary with tho elrouiwtancon un'cr which Hie lose "ceurrod.

37, f tho Iwlin'fi 'tIt to aasrault would fr^uco pom ndverso effectshe covcmmcnU under Clecuaslon, ntkl U2obably would puffer In vnrylne t'.T'cB In all of the bp countries. In the IhHiprlnce ouch anouldcernhe USronared to cowr.lt Its forces In forward, areas, ant sd-ht cause theolcarur definition af thara treat to defend Fhllliilnc security. There wmiMossor concern In Thailand,onboilla,th Violmn. oaders would Iai iTcatly disappointed. o dominant reaction

' ljiisC -nly coneliH.rs the ructions nf the pvorecaa

Chitv.-su, tho MMC, tiiunvs, SjuUi VKtnasi,ani.ottta, Thailand, and Jajcn.

lny< me of central relief.

he

uv'-crli to unuuly cr>nc^rrK^ by an Vaevf thu US renffirned iu IntontOofend Taiwan ste**rta#uhen wulrt enter ill ly change theiresult of tho nracuiti^n.

31, If tho IF hy* nt InVrvene* wMl* tSo CMnu*tlu*ghTc lwltn-'H,he USeaser 'I.tuu ln tho

m.a. t other ^Tcmsunts urv'.-iceiccUlly

ncsc, mulbe relieved that h- atili'.Ke between the US ,fcCw.unlst China M'kTcl'pcd. IHfivur, thsn ir-nlo arisingofe ^oecrlbad ould be ooroy evident* There r: iTCT, tint If thanot to defcnrloJ by the US,niipt

vo boen eraemted rather than encriftsod. US pre* tire woul'I euffcr* ith Vlotivw, Canb- :tta( andn wnlch Uwcoesue( wouU probably fetl Incnnsud tWubte aswhether thelrt dofenrt thoa In KbMeo-U llably beed tn

ull on in their policies Wardmuniste,

Tr theIslam's had been ItI tor unlet

'.nrt which thenU-ryoned Ideally "nr* hat.

mii.won.vtnt.lv dlrcn-ataxl, US jmstiie throughout the nrci

would ho veryounly rfamarert. Tho adverse effectsicLnn des- ribed in thenn iJirorraih would Loravatod. There wouldnndoiejr ln mont cf tho rtalcs urn'or discussion toomewhat store neutralist position and to novo less vigorously ln situations thatrxouso Co).jRaNist counteraction* Tho VOX wauld not weakenmuninn, but would become noro fractious Inrcl".ti*ns with tho US,

hO, The st'tl-nlnr of additional USosjorce rllvisJon, on Taiwan, with thoheeurront with any of thetln-cnclcs, would probablyoncflcialralo In theunder discussion. d.nlr.um Itld assure theso countries that the US wrji fully prepared to honor explicitA tnente*

o -iv.Tr-as Chinori., The rny-rlty ofr,resent,ne-mlttci miOwe* lonalists or the tTosjiiunlnt cause. They have little lb the lrnj-tormte of the

tlvy sAVOlluslr.nud by tlie rtowcotle policies) re? rcli'ln.-. Traditional loyalties to tho Chineseo tclrv-ery iTidual iT^ccns of lntor ration -politicalntoomnsiity of residence la Inkiisj Although the bv.bs of the overseas Chinese wouldnnaln indifferent in nny of thoc-ntlnevelopments withto tho offohors Island* which appeared t- enhanco leljlnr'sld Increase the number ofand active Coxmunist BurvortcrB inwunltias, and reduce the number ofmlttodationalists. Dcfectlona awn- isq ortant Chlncee Intellectuals and former IHT officials inould increase.

u2, Wc bclievo, how over, that tho mass of overseasven In the evento;tobbIvo and serious lUvcrlarftttan in thu position of the Chinese national Government, would tend tocosrlttod. would, -ranarq setlvily to Berrs leipirc only if the stato In which thoy rrsidelo accommn. date or wis urr'cr en imnudiatn throatakeover bysturdots.

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