cairo orroraa tooaalool aad fla meat*taaaaiDoltalinc flnanolnf of tha propoaedtUa tlao, aaar lommif dly inqulrad
whdtfcor tha Soviet Union would be willing tc tartaroo* af hoary artlllary fur Egyptian cotton, ta wwoh soloa rapllad that ha waa authorised to give aa af firoatanavanr.
m lata July, d. T, ttooUev, odltortmry of tha Coaouuilet Forty, wlalt
offarad not only air ond pi mm hot doatroyore.
AO tw#irtad to you by Aafeoaaodor Bjroade,rfaahlrwrten, la
voro alao amid to ooounds (equivalent. oflly also mumcootod la diecuaelone
Sovlot spokoaoton ranorti
with attrition* that If direct nogotiatlooa with hoecow onoorraaood Cairo, Warsaw or rraguo could of for tho daal.
Shaollcl offor, tolda cotton barter deal to KXG'monka. Jotworo mlao amid to oo
ArrROVRD FOR REI.RARR DATE: 7
apparently originate with agyptlana
1 in aptfav? ta arias pressure
A report that Radio Masses had broadcast la Arabic to taa Near Hast aa offer Of free allltary Malatanoo to Sgypt eppe.ra to OO la error. The latest tgyptian olains are that Radio Iarael ends the atateenmt oaugust, that thla atateavent wee alahadhy an agrptiao aoriitoring station, and.E?oJhsAeeejetes, aaa paaaed to the areas as having hooa broadcast ay th*a Areola, and with tho paragraph lensiialas allltary aid delated. These report, and .taller onea all
They nay be tha united
to aatlafy Igyptallltary nooda oa favorable terms. The foot that no Waatern nonltors intercepted any eueh broadcast, coupled with tha lack of tlon for tho USSR to broach an offer of ou and portent in tola nanner, raises tho possibility of deception, which wo aro still trying to eonflra.
this approach was node by
in Tehran, first to tho to Xing sand, aad Deputy rsrslg* Mats tor Tsseln. In tho aprlngorlet efforo of nilitary, eeononle. and diploaestle also reported node to Syria.
the Egyptiansi heavy artillery, tanas, and boatbor aircraft and destroyers, in Los that could conceivably bo absorbed by
la our opinion tho USSR directly or through its Satellites la ablo to deliver tho ttons specifically noattoned by Jotho event1ties
Igypt or other nations in the Arab league without any perceptible effect oa ito own area progreat. Only In the event the Soviets anticipated general war in tho relatively near future would they hare any saaaelllng reason to hang onto all of their vast stockpile of this obsolescent nateriail, for eunple, the early alternate fate of theis probably to be turned into
Koreover the Soviets are undoubtedly mil aware Of tho alnost peychopathie preoccupation of Arab leader* mh oa Hoar oral King Saud with building their area etreeurth and would calculate that the aurwtt way tood position of Influence In those countries would be toubatantlal supplier of arewi with tbe attendant requirements for Soviet technical and possibly tactical training In their use.
It la alao quite cenalatent with what we know ef current Soviet external trade prograaw for the USSR to be willing to offer such equipment for lndlgenoue currency or baele eoaaaodltlee withterm* aa to tie* of repayment.
Finally, It aeeau to ue that the present soviet drive to relax tenslone between the power eentere ef Seat and Meet could well haveubordinate policy of sowing aeeda of dlacord In each trouble epote ae the wear Beet.
We, therefore, conclude that It la veil within Soviet capability to Implement the reported offers of area aid aad that it la probably their intention to de ee If the offeree governmenta accept their propoiala.
CP. CABELL Lieutenant General, usap Acting DirectorOriginal document.