LETTER TO LEON MOORE FROM A. W. DULLES RE LETTER OF JUNE 29 (W/ATTACHMENTS)

Created: 7/26/1955

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

FOR RELEASE DATE: 5

Allen W. DuUoi

Main P. O.3

. C.

5

Loon Moore,ark Avenue Now. T.

Dear Leoni

Many thank* for your letter ofuneave read with the greatest interest and have shared with my associates.

I hope to get away about tho middle of August and am looking forward to sea Ing you

In Europe.

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I would like to write you sone re .narks about present Soviet foreign policy.

Irte first indications of the new Soviet slogan forcoexistence" with the outside world appeared Issssdiatoly after Stalin's death. However, only the final decision about West Go man rearmament and the new situation in Asia transformed theseinto full really.

After the Inst war it looked like the center of gravity of future war or peaco moved from Europe to Asia. Such shift, which initially probably appealed to Moscow, involved in the finalot of Russian losses and responsibilities without giving then any advantages.

The victory of the Chinese Communists forced Ruinla to give up practically all important acquisitions in Asia obtainedesult of the last war (Manchuria, Port Arthur, Darien, etc.). Probably Russia also lost to their "Chinese brothers" the territories like Sing King which the Soviet controlled for at leastears. IStalin foresaw it and was reluctant to go all tha way toull victory of the Kao regime. Stalin probably was quite unhappy that this country tolerated sucheivided, fighting, weak China. Now the Russians rust "falre bonneauvaishe apparition of the Chinese Communist state forced Moscow to return all former Chinese territories, coramltod Russia to eventual complications in Asia in vhich Moscow is not interested, cannot control them or obtain any gains. Furthermore, the isolation of Communist China put exclusively on Russia the heavy burden of enormous economic help to China.

Whatever happens in future Communist aggression in Asia, Russia has to bear an Important part of the consequences without gaining an inch of territory for themselves.

This special situation and its implications should not be The Communist theoretical basis of into motionalhe Communist nations remain national in appearance but international inas substantially watered before, during and after the last war by strong nationalism. Today China and Yugoslavia and, even, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Rumania will never become simpleof the Soviet Union, which would have been the case under classic Leninism. The existence of separate national entitles, based Internally on Communist doctrine (often differently Interpreted and applied in count rios like Jugoslavia, China, Russiareated in- erstate contradictions which, in spite of Communist "solidarity" must grow and eventually clash in one or another form.

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Allen5

The right evaluation of these contradictory tendencies should be Hie basisonstructive foreignhey are, without doubt, the moving force for changes in tho present Russian policy.

3. The German rearmament and new conception of modern warfare also influenced the changes in Russian European policy. It is an accepted fact that the Hazis nearly won the Russian war and only American supplies, the bombing of Germany, landing in Africa and Italy and Hitler's stupid policy towards tha population of occupied Russian territories changed the defeatictory.

This is well remembered by tho Soviet leading group who also realize that overwhelming superiority in the land forces may notecisive factor in modern, future war. As things stand today, Russia is still behind in the development of atomic weapons and reached only limited possibilitiesneak attack on this At the same time she is exposed to decisive retaliation from nearby located bases. To bring their atom, hydrogen and aviation forces. levels, Russia needsot of time under very favorable clrcunstancQs, or an effective (for the Allies) agreement outlawing the use of atomic weapons. The elimination of the use of atom bombing only would not probably solve the Russian problem. They need to get the elimination of all atomic weapons whichmilitary numeric superiorityecondary advantage.

I do not think that the Russians seriously believe in theof substantial disarmaments, but they may go far in order to get what they want.

Consequently, Moscow pursues three goals:

to win the maximum of time in order to reach atomic and aviation superiority either for an eventual sneak attack on. orecisive shift in balance of powerj

to try, meanwhile, to reach whatever possible agreement in outlawing atomic weapons which would be fully binding on the Allies and difficult to enforce on the Russians;

to continue their efforts to divide the Western Allies wiih special emphasis on France and Germany, making full use of French fear of German rearmament and of German desire for unification; (Moscow more likely Mould sacrifice the East German Communist regime If they couldeal neutralization of Germany.)

d) to.wie use of propagandistic advantages deriving from the present course of Soviet policy.

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Alien

ur so of "friendly coexistence" ia also due to pemanent Sorlet internal econonic difficulties and to increasing complications in ruling satellite countries. The policy of cold war was harmful to tho Soviet Union more than to anyone else. This was clear even in Stalin's time hut nobody in tho Politbureou dared to say anything. How with collective leadership in the Politbureau, certainly freeand exchange of views take place. Under theseepetition of the mistakes character is tic of the last years of tho aged and stubborn dictator is hardly possible.

Logical reasoning and moderation are, In my opinion, predominant in the present Russian foreign policy. The eliminationne-man dictatorship made the unforeseen and unpredictable in this policy rather improbable.

Best regards.

Sincerely yours.

Leon Koore

LM S

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