PROVISIONS FOR EMERGENCY CONTROL IN THE USSR 1955

Created: 4/6/1956

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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57

PROVISIONS FOR EMERGENCY CONTROL IN THE 5

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FOREWORD

This report is the seconderies of studies which analyze the Soviet control structure and its ability to operate in normal and emergency conditions.

This report, which is speculative in nature, is based on reported World War II actions which modified the Soviet control structure and is an analysis of some of the courses of action which might be adopted by the USSR under emergency or wartime conditions.

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CONTENTS

Page

I. Communist Party Activity and

II. Changes in Governmental

and Current Changes

or Probable Changes

Delegation of Powers

Dispersal of

ChangcB

for Local or Individual Plant

1. Mobilization Plans .

Z, Reserves

of Decision Making

Taken to Minimize Loss

Underground and Isolated

Regionalization and Dispersal . . . .

Protective Construction

Control

Command and

Page

and Delegation of Authority

and Civil Authority

V. Police

VI. Civil

Service of the

or Rayons

Sectors

Society for Cooperation with the

Army, Air Force, and Navy (DOSAAF)

of Paramilitary Societies

and

Cross and Red Crescent Societies

and Training

Plans

Page

Facilities Identified with the

MPVO . . .'. . '.

PVKhO

Factory

Training in.Schools and

DOSAAF Training Program

Behavior Instructions for

Situation"

Alarm

Alarm

Aspects of Civil Defenset.

Organization

. . .

Support Groups for Medical

Self-Defense

Medical

Cross anoViled Crescent Societies .

c. Medical Transport

of Facilities

against Chemical Warfare

Aspects of Civil Defense.

Motor Transport

Communications

G- Defense against Nuclear

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Page

H. Possible Action to Retain

1. Suggested Modified

D Day (Possibly Two Weeks)

before Attack (About H

Minus 8)

Release of Soviet Attackay,

H Hour)

Time of "Air Alert"

Z. Composition of Civil Defense

and

and

(Enterprise)

3. Advantages of the Suggested

Appendixes

Appendix A.

Appendix

Appendix C. Source

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Page

Tables

Distribution of Gross National Product

in the USSR, Selected Years,

Movement of Defense Industry in the USSR

since World War II, Selected Years. v . .

Phasing of the Soviet Mobilization Plan

Charts

Following Page

Figure 1. Organization of Civil Defense in the USSR

Figure 2. Organization of the Voluntary Society

for Cooperation with the Army. Air Force.

and Navy (DOSAAF) in the

Figure 3. Sketches of Apartrrtent Air-Raid Shelters

in the USSR (from DOSAAF

Figure 4. Soviet Gas

Figure 5. Sketch of Apartment Air-Raid Shelter , ., -

Near

Figure 6. Sketches of Apartment Air-Raid Shelters

at Stalingrad and Stalino

Figure 7. Organization of Medical Civil Defense

in the

ORR)

PROVISIONS FOR EMERGENCY CONTROL IN THE USSR"1

Summar

In preparing for wartimereat power mustthe effects of possible nuclear attack. The probable destruction of many large cities in the initial stages of war would result in very Serious damage to the transport and communications systems. This, together with actual losses of many governmental, economic,and other leaders would make administration, operation, and internal controlountry at war exceedingly difficult.

The Soviet administrative structure is highly centralized and tightly controlled. It is therefore particularly vulnerable toof communications and loss of key officials. To prepare for maintenance of controlar of either offense or defense, the Soviet leaders probablyecentralize authority as far as practicable inlan for delegation of authority and modification of the control structure for inclusion in mobilization plans;repare for civil defense of the country, particularly for the protection of its leaders, transport, communications, and vital industry.

It is logical to assumend there is some evidence tohat Soviet officials arc planning emergency or wartime control Such procedures may be assumed to include an orderly succession of key officials, selected evacuation, alternate headquarters,

* The estimates and conclusions contained in this report represent the best judgment of ORR as

carefully worked-out mobilization plans, and even alternate control situations (in which the Communist Party, for example, might assume the functions.of economic or police officials who were casualties).

A program of gradual decentralization and re gionah ration of the Party structure would seem to be logically inevitable in any plan to meet the exigencies of modern warfare. The Party is well organized to effect these measuresinimum of disruption. Underrogram the importance of the Party territorial committee in any area probably will increase, since this committee would be the focus of all activities in its area.

Another probable measure is the planned relocation andof alternate Party headquarters. This program undoubtedly would be meshed with similar programs for the governmental and police structure.

It is also expected that the present distinction between Party and government, or Party and economic, control structures will be lessened. It is possible, indeed, that the Party control structures will serve as the nucleusupreme control body consisting of members of all control structures under the chairmanship of the regional Party chairman or secretary.

The nature of Party work and the rigorous qualifications demanded of its members in regard to initiative, education, and ability, plus the long experience of Party officials in controlling all aspects of Soviet life, tend to make the Party the most important control structure in the USSR. In its total ranks ofillion person's the Soviet leaders have an excellent reservoir of talent and ability. Thus the great majority of Party members may be regarded as potential control officials, trained, experienced, and capable of giving support,and direction to the other control structures.

A few governmental changes occurring recently would work to the advantage of the Soviet government in wartime. These changes have taken the form of an amalgamation, or in some casesof inefficient organizational units. There have also been

improvements in tho organization of some executive committees. Administrative staffs are being streamlined, and excessivefor administrative purposes are being reduced. Finally, lower and middle-level officials have been granted the right to mako some decisions without referring problems to Moscow to be resolved.

Soviet officials have recently been attempting some degree of decentralization of the economic control apparatus. This has taken the form of granting more powers to members of the Council of Ministers, delegating more decision-making authority to individual organizational units, and placing more responsibility in the hands of union-republic officials in the field. Other steps have been taken to improve Soviet economic management.

The Soviet government has been carryingong-term plan for regionalizing the economy and for making each economic region both compatible with the other regions relative to current andproduction and also somewhat independent of the other region. There are, of course, mobilization plans for most sectors'of the economy, ready to be implemented at anytime. Furthermore, thereather well developed system of state reserves storage bases which stockpile food, materials, and equipment for emergency use. Finally, there have been noted moves toimited number of vital industrial installations underground and to disperse others.

Measures taken to assure continuity of military control will be conditioned by World War II experiences and the expectation of control requirements under conditions of nuclear attack. On the basis of World War II practice, the State Defense Committee would probably be revived as the supreme state authority in the USSR. Its military functions would no doubt be exercisedtavka, or General Headquarters, composed of the top military leaders. The existenceombined General Staff in the present Ministry of Defense may mean that little or no reorganization would be needed. Stavka is importantmechanism for the direct exercise of operational control over field forces without the intermediatelinks of the static headquarters such as the Ministry and Military District headquarters. These static headquarters would be

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free to devote full energy and resource* to administrative and logistic support of military operations. Wartime practices would undoubtedly involve simplification of the control structure through theof one or more Military Districts into Fronts.

Mobilization plans are drawn up in extreme detail duringand implemented by Military Districts through their Military Commissariats at the local administrative levels (city, rayon, and oblast). The Mobilization Plan, as such, is drawn up to be implemented withinays and would involve the mobilization of anillion men. The chances for successful mobilization are improved by the fact that it is executed at the lowest administrative echelons, many of which are not in major urban areas that present lucrative targets for major aerial attack.

Probable conditions of nuclear warfare make it likely that there will be sharp deviations in the USSR from the usual system of rigid centralization. This regionalization would undoubtedly be accompanied by significant delegations of authority. The Military District or Front organizationogical focal point for such decentralization.

There are three possible ways in which the relations between military and civil authorities could be expected to change underof nuclear warfare as follows: he absorption of several civil organizations into the military structure (for example, such ministries as Communications andhe declaration of martial law, particularly in Front areas;he merger of civil and military control structuresingle structure combining both military and civil powers under one authority. This would be similar to the regional State Defense Committees established during World War IL

Basic measures for the dispersal of military forces may be regarded as axiomatic, particularly for all forces from division level down. Dispersal is facilitated by basic communications practices requiring each cchoion to maintain communications with the next two higher echelons. Thisatural recuperability against damage to the control structure by giving the vertical control structure

greater resilience. Some limitations of dispersal programs exist for certain static forces such as Long-Range Aviation, Air Defensend Naval Forces. But even here, improved rccuperability is possible through the use of alternate facilities and dispersal of aircraft. Present deployment aims of Soviet leaders arc believed directed toward considerable expansion of underground facilities. ell-developed dispersal program not only will save military forces but also will strengthen capabilities for relieving the chaos and disruption to control channels that result from nuclear attack.

Planning for control of the population is reportedly the concernobilization section of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) and, presumably, the Committee of State Security (KGB). Although the internal control in the MVD and the KGB is highly centralized and directed from Moscow, both organizations are union-republic rather than All-Union structured, thisasis for the establishmentore decentralized pattern of control and of decision making. It is estimated that, in addition to the normal MVDeserve troops could be mobilized on short notice. The KGB is known to have an officer reserve.

The USSR has an extensive, widely organized civil defense system. ressure has been evident to improve its organization, to undertake defense construction, and to increase training. An integral part ofcivil defense is the responsibility of the Chief Directorate of Local Air Defensen arm of the MVD. Under GUMPVOull-time, well-paid body of trained civil defense staff officers who are assigned at all levels of Local Air Defense (MPVO) officers are also present in many major enterprises, supervising civil defense preparations in factories, ports, railroad centers, and other economic enterprises.

At the primary operating level, the community or the region, civil defense in the USSR stresses the use of all available resources and personnel. Governmental and economic bodies, such as Fire Guard and communications enterprises, arc used extensively to furnish operating equipment and crews whose peacetime employment makes them of value in time of emergency. Auxiliary personnel for

5

civil defense crews or teams are recruited from workers or from the general population. In the city or region, plans, training, and procurement are carried on under the MPVO office of the city. Civil defense "services" in cities include those for security and order, camouflage, fire fighting, medical aid, damage restoration, chemical defense, communications and reporting, shelter, evacuation,and others as determined by local conditions. Civil defense in economic targets of importance is specially organizednit basis. The crews are developed similarly to the city services, utilizing the internal guard, fire-fighting organizations, repair crews, and medical organizations, with supplementary personnel added from the workers of the enterprises.

The Soviot system provides for both specialized training of civil defense personnel and training for the average citizen. The Voluntary Society for Cooperation with the Army, Air Force, and Navy (DOSAAF) is the organization chasged with giving Air and Chemical Defense (PVKhO) training to its members and to the general population. Its membership is probably overillion at the present time, and PVKhO training is compulsory.

9 the USSR hadrogram of shelter construction, which probably was set up to include air-raid shelters and other civil defense measures in the Initial construction of public buildings, factories, schools, and apartment dwellings. Reports of

|such construction indicate that the inclusion olshelters in new buildings was standard practice. The shelters are designed to be gas-proof and to withstand collapse of buildings.

The fact that urban and industrial fire-fighting forces, which are reported to be efficient in the USSR, are also subordinate lo the MVD should facilitate thctr integration into the MPVO system. Firehas been stressed,jj^^henew emphasis on concrete construction should steadily reduce vulnerability to fire.

No realistic instructions for civil defense against presently possible nuclear attack have been released to the general population. Evidence indicates that only key individuals have actually received any such instructions. It seems that the USSR is trying to prepare for nuclear attack by some shelter construction for the most essential personnel andeneral attempt to raise the competence of medical, fire, and other bodies connected with civil defense in order to cope with disaster after it occurs.

There has been no evidence of training for the evacuation of cities. If the USSRolicy of evacuation, however, its civil defense staff, closely allied with an extensive nationwide police structure, would greatly facilitate the execution ofolicy. The millions of DOSAAF members, who have had military and civil defense training, would be available for duty as auxiliary control personnel.

Civil defense training and organization as at present constituted in the USSR would make possible the preservation of many members of the control structure by evacuating some key personnel from areas which are likely targets for nuclear attack and by enlisting others into civil defense units.

Training, including the removal of civil defense crews from urban areas, has not been detected, although German and Japanese experience in World War II thoroughly demonstrated the futility of stationing air defense personnelotential target area. It is probable thateriod of international tension, action would be taken to direct the removal of civil defense crews from urban areas during air alerts. Without substantially altering civil defense instructions, the USSR will be able to include in its active civil defense crews many persons from Party and government who possess valuable managerial and technical skills.

If the USSR were the aggressor, it wouldurther Mobilization planners of the security and military services would not leave unnecessary bodies of troops in major urban areas and would probably evacuate some key personnel and vital records.

It is concluded that thes aware of the problem ofcontrol under the conditions of moderns trying to improve and decentralize its controlsontinuing effort to develop civilrobably has anplan of defense which would logically include provision for preserving the control structure and the facilities necessary for its operation,s taking measures for defense, both detected and probable, which would operate to improve the ability of Soviet officials to maintain controlartime situation.

I. Communist Party Activity and Functions. *

As the supreme controlling organ and driving force of all aspects of Soviet life, the Communist Party would be most active in all measures designed to deal with wartime or emergency situations. Although many of the practices adopted during World War II would have validity in any future war, one major exception is the extent of centralization. During World War II, centralization of industrial and governmental administration was in its most rigid state;the overwhelming devastation of nuclear warfare would dictate that present planning for^gmergency or wartime action be based on decentralization of the control apparatus but with retention of as much central control as possible.

* The factual data upon which this report is based arc found in an earlier CIA report. (For serially numbered source references, seeocumentation is given in this report only for that factual data not presented in the earlier report.

The Party is so organized as to make decentralization feasible. Its actions in this field undoubtedly would be similar to those of economic and government agencies. An intensive decentralization of governmental and economic functions would necessitate aincrease in the authority of local Party agencies for control purposes.

Action taken by Ihe Party at any particular time would be limited by the availability of potential alternate control centers, with adequate facilities for day-to-day operation of Party and administrative organs. Party actions in relocation would be restricted by the necessity of retaining contact with and control of those economic structures which do not have the physical flexibility of administrative structures.

It Is probable that present attempts toeparation between government and Party or economic and Party structures would be discarded. This does not mean that Party agencies would replace governmental or economic agencies, but rather that their control would be more direct and immediate. An example of this is seen in World War II practices, whereby Party workers in economicwere converted into special assistant directors, evidently with full authority for economic direction of the plants. ractice is feasible because of Ihc longtime experience of professional Party personnel with control functions in economic enterprises.

The expectation and insistence that Party members be the leaders and initiators of programs In all aspects of Soviet life also warrant the assumption that they will control and direct all emergency planning and activities. During World War II, various programs of economic reorganization, retraining and mobilization of workers, relocation of industrial plants, and the supplying of economic'and military.needs were reportedly under Party leasfership. 2/ .

The key role of Party organs was also indicated in tbe structure of the State Defense Committee, the supreme war cabinet during World War II. In those areas where regional offices of the Stale Defense Committee were established, it exercised supreme governing authority. The composition of the regional committees included the four major control structuresilitary, MVD,and Party. The position of Chairman was occupied by the secretary of the regional Party committee. imilar device for consolidating all control structures under Party direction would probably be used in any program for setting up regional governments as focuses of control.

Other possible organizational measures would be the revival of the former Military Departments in lower echelon Party organizations. These departments, which existed9 but have not been identified at this time, would handle activities concerned with conscription, mobilization, and related matters,

A particularly vital area for Party leadership in wartime or emergency conditions would be in propaganda and agitation fields. In World War II the Party was particularly active in programs for developing patriotism, popular resistance, and similar activities for maintaining public morale and support for the war effort.

The relation of the Party to military bodies during wartime or emergency conditions is problematic. This relation has always been confused by the Party's attempts, to maintain political control of the military without impairing military efficiency. Thus, after the poor military performance against Finlandhe institution of political commissars who were co-equals of military commanders was abolished. t was restored, however, in order to cope with widespread problems of low morale and desertion. At present the political commissar existseputy to the military commander, who has undivided authority. The key to future Party activity in this field would seem to be the extent to which military activities are successful and military forces are reliable. At any rate, the existent political structure in the armed forces is such that strong party control could be reassertedinimum of reorganization.

Tho flexibility of the Party apparatus makes it vitally important for wartime and emergency control. The all-pervasive character of Party operations causes Party members to be knowledgeable in all aspects of Soviet life. This enablos the Party to fill substantial gaps in the control apparatus of other agenciesll theillion Party members are thus potential controllers. The quantitative aspects of this are, of course, substantially reduced by the fact that most Party members are also members of the other control structures.

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Party importance is also increased by its control of mass organs which are, in effect, junior partners in the Party apparatus. This applies particularly to the organizations of the Young Communisthich, because of their closeness to the Party, izable reserve to be used in the control of other agencies and of the populace.

II. Changes in Governmental Control.

A. Recent and Current Changes.

In considering the operation of the Soviet government under severe emergency or wartime conditions, it is logical to assume the probable formation of an inner wartime cabinet, similar to the State Defense Committee created during World War. The formulating decree for this wartime committee granted "full plenitude of power in the State" to this committee and ordered all citizens and organs in the country unfailingly to execute the orders of thism This State Defense Committee operated as both ancoordinating body and as the highest directing group in Party, military, economic, governmental, and security matters. The committee was composed of the top officials in the USSR at the time--Stalin, Molotov, Bulganin (who replacedalenkov. Beriya, Kaganovich. Voznesenskiy, and Mikoyan. uture severe emergency may result in the formationimilar committee or group, composed of the leaders of the USSR.

Although there appear to have been few governmental changes that apply specifically to the problem of direction andin an emergency situation, increasing decentralization is indicated in the recent establishment in some union republic governments of new ministries which are counterparts of the Soviet Ministries of the Coal Industry, Ferrous Metallurgy. Non-ferrous Metallurgy, the Petroleum Industry, and Communications.

Kommunisticheskoy Soyuz Molodezhiomsomol.

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Significant changes in the governmental-economic structure in the spring3 increased the powers of ministers of the USSR, made the work of Gosplan more efficient by reducing its former detailed work, and improved the responsibility and control exercised by the Executive Committees of the local Soviets. 4/

ome changes were made in oblasts in the three largest Soviet Socialist Republicshe RSFSR, the Ukrainian, and the Belorussian. In the RSFSR, some oblasts were too large to supervise the agriculture rayons in their areas effectively. They were broken up and new oblasts (Arzamskaya, Balashovskaya, Belgorodskaya, Kamenskaya, and Lipetskaya) were formed (the new Magadanskaya Oblast was formed in. In the Ukrainian SSR the new Cherkasskaya Oblast was formed and the very small Izmailskaya Oblast wasart of the larger Odesskaya Oblast. In the Belorussianarge oblasts were formed frommall ones, thus streamlining the over-allcommittee staffs and0 workers from the apparatus of the oblast institutions and organizations. 5/ There have also been improvements in the organization of Executiveof rural Soviets in some provinces. 6/

The chief reason for these governmental changes is that they are logical improvements in the administrative-management structure of the USSR. Their significance with respect tofor emergency defense is that the changes should help the republics to operateore independent basis in an emergency situation.

B. Planned or Probable Changes.

1. Delegation of Powers.

The trend in Soviet governmental organization is toward decentralization and delegation of power to lowerofficials, thus enabling them to make more of the operational and localized decisions and streamlining the work of higher officials. The success of the new plan for the delegation of authority cannot

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as yet be assessed. Some problems have already developed. It is possible, however, that in many spheres the new system, developedeacetime economyill be fairly effective at present, and probably will be more effective in emergency or wartime Decentralization and delegation of power will help the USSR prepare for emergency situations insofar as decision makingepublic or even local basis is concerned.

2. Dispersal of Offices.

Key governmental offices and headquarters are usualjy located in or near the centerAlthough there is no evidencelanned dispersal of governmental offices, it is logical to assume that some such plan exists. Rather extensive published information on modern warfare would suggest that Soviet governmental officials areartial dispersal of key governmental offices.

It is further suggested that in an emergency situation the Soviet officials are planning to utilize existing buildings of sufficient size and durability at some distance from the center of cities. Thus jails, hospitals, industrial buildings, and the like, located on the periphery of cities, might well be the planned alternate governmental control points in an emergency. In this connection the installations most adaptable to communications facilities, and even those having existing facilities of^their own, would be. logical locations for dispersed governmental offices.

III. Economic Control.

A. Structural Changes.

One notable trend in the Soviet peacetime economic structure affecting emergency preparation is the decentralization withineconomic ministries which has occurred in the past year. These changes appear to be designed to develop greater administrative efficiency and better decisions on the operating level. ore logical administrative organization, as well as more local independence is thus achieved. The "decentralization" of decision-making authority

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elegation of authorityigherower echelon of administration. Although there may be functional delegationarticular level of administration, decentralization normallyeographical delegation of decision-making authorityentral organizationubordinate field organization. elegation of authority in certain matters of raw material procurementSSR Minister in Moscowield directorate in the Ukraine orlant manager in Irkutsk would be an example of decentralization of decision-making authority.

There are also problems inherent in the decentralization process. One theory of decentralization and delegation ofauthority is that the more powers are delegated andthe more closely they are controlled from the top and in fact centralized. This ia the, paradoxhat the more top management tries to decentralize decision making, the more it must centralize itsof decisions. Although authority may be delegated andresponsibility {or the bulk of it) must remain largely undelegated and centralized, especially under the Soviet conception of administration. Soviet officials have tried to solve this problem by eliminating many of the intermediate and superfluous links in the chain of command, thus strengthening the relations of.the lowest units of production with the central organs of the government and with the economy. 7/ossible consequence is to strengthen central decision making and thus work at cross purposes to successful decentralization.

The structural changes mentioned earlier tie inNo. 2 of the Council of Ministries.Powers of USSR Ministers." The purpose of thisto grant to lower level economic officials moreand duties, and it haB already been carried out to somedecree seems to mark the initiation

oi serious attempts at economic and governmental decentralization. 9/

The Soviet government in recent years has been attempting to "regionalize" the economy,iew toward enabling the various

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economic regions* to functionore independent basis, being less dependent on other regions and even on Moscow. It is felt that this policy Is economically sound because of the existence of natural resources and some potentially productive farmland in what wereunderdeveloped areas. Military defense probably is not the paramount consideration. Nevertheless, regional!zation would aid in emergency defense as well as in the immediate and long-range recuper-ability of the region. If these regions are administratively and managerially independent or reasonably so, their severance from the Moscow control center should not seriously hamper their ability to recoup after an emergency, given preservation and restoration of certain physical resources. The question is the extent to which the regions are now independent of Moscow in their control and

It is assumed that the Soviet plan to decentralize and improve lower echelon administration has met with some success, and that the Soviet administrative hierarchy at all levels is better able today to sustain interruption from the control center at Moscow than was the case several years ago. Current plans call for additional administrative decentralization, probablyiew toward making the various areas and regions even more independent and self-sustaining in periods of emergency interruption and isolation than is now the case.

A number of problems, not effectively solved, have beset Soviet officials in trying to decentralize their vastand managerial bureaucracynadequate and insufficient delegation of power, confusion among lower echelon officials as to their precise powers, obsolete tables of organization, confusion in chains of command, inertia, lack of initiative of lower officials in making decisions, and conflicting and competitive jurisdictions.onfusion arises from the duplicity of Soviet officials in delegating some power to lower ministerial officials while simultaneously calling for greater Party and Executive Committee control over the activities of the same lower

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It would seem, therefore, that in the foreseeable future only limited success will be achieved by the USSR in decentralizing and regionalizing the administration-management control structures adequately for defense and recuperation purposes.

B- Preparation for Local or Individual Plant Operation.

1. Mobilization Plans.

At the plant level there are mobilization plans and some mobilization stocks which will assist in enabling the plants torapidly to wartime It is reasonable to assume that important plants have well-worked-out mobilization plans. Most plantsection or department in charge of mobilization plans and resources. Although each mobilization department (mobotdel) is subordinate to its plant's parent ministry and to the Chief Directorate of State Material Reserves, it is under the general supervision and control of the plant

An area or regional mobilization plan may befor one or several established territorial districts. The Chief Directorate of State Material Reserves is divided into territorial directorates, each of these being virtually an entity in itself for stockpiling reserves. Military Districts also relate to mobilization. obilization departmentlant is subordinate to its parent ministeVial mobilization department,erritorial directorate of the Chief Directorate of State Material Reserves, and also to the mobilization directorateilitary District.

It may be assumed that the USSR is alreadyfor mobilization purposes. The appropriate regions for this purpose aro the economic regions and subregions. the territorial divisions of the State Reserves system, and Military Districts. ogical regionalization for emergency conditions would utilize the most efficient arrangement of one or more of these regions and districts.

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There are several types of stockpiled reserves, as: (a) military (grouped by Militaryb) Sovminmall group of reserves directly controlled by the Council ofnd (c) Statearge, mancuverable stock of centrally controlled commodities located throughout the USSR, including emergency reserves at the enterprise level.")

The Chief Directorate of State Material Reserves, attached to the Council of Ministers,wofold function. Itand supervises stockpiling of food and material reserves for use in periods of shortages and considerable need. It also controls and supervises the stockpiling of critical items needed for conversion of the economy to wartime operation and would sustain such operation during wartimeeriod of several monthsears. The organization of the Chief Directorate follows functional as well as territorial lines, with the purpose of making each territory semi-independent a6 far as raw material and food are concerned in the early daysar or other emergency.

eserves basesoragfl dePOtfi_oi_the Ch Directorate of State Material Reserves

supervising organs ol the reserves bases are the ritorial Directorates. Nearly one-half of the

/ The

located basest oi the Urals. j_ Territorial Directorates also have some jurisdiction overstockpiles in warehouses of industrial plants located within their territories.

The Soviet stale reserves system was in existence before World War II and is believed to be functioning smoothly at present. This system is designed, among other things, for emergency use. It seeks to maintain on hand adequate stocks in good condition to support the operation of the regional economy. For example, in Khabarovsk thereerritorial Directorate controlling aboutases, thus contributing to the regional independence of the Khabarovsk area.

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Mont ofDirectorate* are in

cities ofopulation, located where Ihey can supervise the activityumber of subordinate bases. Probably allDirectorates have alternate headquarters at nearby subordinate reserves bases, to be used in an emergency.

The Territorial Directorates utilize the radio system of the Ministry of Communications for normal operations, but in an emergency situation Ihe reserves traffic might be shunted to the wire facilities of the railroads, since most reserves bases are situated on main railroad or spur lines.

Emergency controls arc nolital necessity in areas which already have reserves bases and can, according to plan, continue some economic operations without central direction. The State Reserves system has to be preparedeasonable extent for disruption of both command and leadership. This system must be countedonsiderable asset in the developing attempts at administrative delegation and regional independence,

3. Modification of Decision Making.

it may be assumed that there are carefully worked out planscontrol officials and the making of decisions in an emergency situation. It is believed thai the emergency plan callsofficials to carry on part of their normal duties and simultaneously to assume additional duties in controlling and directing various high-priority operations.

There may be plans to permit lower officials to assume greater and more varied and extensive decision-making powers tn emergencies. Although under normal operation many problems may be referred to higher officials, emergency plans may call for certain types of decisions to he made on the spot, without referring them lo higher authorities.

This emergency procedure may be the alternate control plan for decision making by key officials, to go into effect during an emergency. This plan emphasizes sufficient local delegation to meet emergency situations, and at least semi-independence in the whole realm of decision making.

C. Measures Taken to Minimize Loss.

1. Underground and Isolated Plants.

nderground and isolated plants existing in the. The locations of some of the underground installations in Economic Region VIII (Urals) are shown as follows:

Selected Underground Industrial Installations

in Economic Region VIII

Location (Vicinity of)

-

N -

plant

N -

plant

N -

plant

N -

15'

water plant

N -

plant

-

plant

-

plant

N -

plant

N -

'ski y

N -

plant

N -

and shell plant

Tagil

N -

tank plants

of these underground plants or narti dat-

mi uirucigiuuiiu pidius locaroa seem largely devotetrto'

atomic or arms production.

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Some large industrial plants are located in smaller cities and isolated localities. Examples found in Region VIII are shown as follows:

|of Selected Industrial Installations in Smaller Communities

in Economic Region VIII

Verkhniyc Sergi

Ust'-Katav

Nyaxcpctrovsk

Irbit

Verkhotur'ye

Yugo-Kamskiy

E

E

' EN -E

E

Electric machine building plant

Machine building plant

of the Ministry of the

Petroleum Industry Railroad car building

plant (has produced

armaments) Kalinin machine building

plant (heavy earth-moving

equipment) Motorcycle plant Chemical plant Agricultural machinery

plant

Petroleum machine building plant (hasarmaments)

may be concluded that highly selected production activities, mainly military, are utilising sheltered underground locationsimited extent. Also, some plants of military-economic significance exist in isolated localities and smaller cities those examined are mainly machine building plants.

2. Rcgionalizatlon and Dispersal.

The emphasized goal of the regionalization of production is the full utilisation of resources for maximum satisfaction of national needs, with each region having lo develop lis own fuel and

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power and to procure local raw materials. The planning oi thedevelopment of economic regions and of republics must, therefore, assure not only correct distribution of the new enterprises to bebut also the proper "cooperative organization" of existing enterprises, so that inew enterprise the problems of supplying the enterprise with raw materials, transport facilities for its output, and the like, will be adequately handled. The proper working out of material allocation for each region should fulfill an important mobilization function in the utilization of the internal resources of each economic rogion and in the elimination ofshipments to and from the

0 and earlier the USSR has been trying to plan the development of balanced economic regions. The XVIII Party Congress9 issued directives for the development of economic regions, stressing the necessity for increasing production of fuel, building materials, fertilizer, and consumer goods. The Fifth Five Yearalls for extensive regional development, so that the regions are partially independent and yet are able toand assist neighboring regions in the supply of needed Theajor economic regions of the USSR as presently constituted are shown as follows, with their principal industries:

Economic ActivityIhc USSR, by

EconomicIndustries

I. North andwood-processing, coal,

petroleum, and shipbuilding and repair

II. West (Baltic and Belorussia) Machine building, dairying, and

light industry

IH. South (Ukraine and Moldavia) Coal, metallurgy, livestock.

machine building, fuel,Southeast (Lower Donpetroleum, coal.

Northand light industry

-

Vt Volga

VII. Central

VIII. Urals

IX. West Siberia

X. Kazakhstan and Central Asia

XI. East Siberia XII. Far East

Petroleum, cotton, metallurgy, machine building, light industry, and coal

Petroleum, grain, fish, machine building, construction materials, electric power, and textiles

Machine building, power stations, textiles, light industry, metallurgy, and fuel

Metallurgy, machine building, chemicals, petroleum, timber, power, light industry, andmaterials

Coal, metallurgy, fuel, timber, machine building, grain, and livestock

Cotton, nonferrous metallurgy.

machine building, and fuel Power, metallurgy, hoavy machine

building, and coal Fish, metallurgy, machine building.

shipbuilding, coal, petroleum,

timber, and paper

a view toward further increasing the independence of each of these economic regions. The Fifth Five Year Plan calls for developing and expanding in each region thoso industries for which the region is best suited, as well as improving the industries in which the region is poorly developed.

* ollows on

The USSR has achieved some measure of regionalization because of the forced relocation which took place during the German occupation in World War II and the postwar efforts mentioned above. Some measure of Soviet achievements in regionalization is shown in Table

A sharp movement of industry to the east occurred during World War II, and. although development of industry in the South and the Central Regions fell proportionally, the total industrial output in these regions has shown an absolute increase.

Defense industry (small arms, artillery, and ammunition) moved even more sharply to the east than did industryhole following World Wars shown in Table 2.

Table 2

Eastward Movement of Defensen theUSSR since World Warelected Years,

Percent of* Total Production

Year

3

III and VII (Ukraine

and Central Industrial)

43

Regions I, II, IV, V, and VI (Peripheral European USSR)

37

2 22

Regions VIII to XII (Urals

to Pacific)

75

Total Production

1 Rubles)

07

boundaries.

* Before Worldhe heavy industry of the USSR was concentrated largely in the Petersburg and Moscow districts and in the Donets and Dnieper districts of the Ukraine, thus making armaments production vulnerable even to land attacks from central Europe.

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As shown here, the eastern areasharp increase ineriod. This is partly due to the priority evacuation which was given munitions-producing enterprises during World War II. The movement eastward has been achieved in greater measure lor defense industry than for manufacturinghole.

In addition to World War II. other factors have facilitated or induced-thearmaments" industryin. "the, eastern areas. Population and markets, which influence the establishment of enterprises for general manufacture, can be largely disregarded in locating defense industry. Large mineral deposits, particularly in the Urals area, would attract armaments production. The movement eastward may not actually reduce vulnerability since new concentrations in themselves have resulted in the Urals and Siberian areas.

Criticism has been directed against the practice of locating the headquarters of some ministerial trusts and directorates far from their basic producing enterprises. Some gas fields in the Ukraine, for example, are in Drogobychekaya Oblast, although the directing organization of these fields is not in Drogobych, but in Other criticism" id .Levied ai mini attics-for having in Moscow controlling directorates which would be more logically located in tbe/ This criticism will undoubtedly result in the morelocation of some headquarters installations, in conformity with regional and physical considerations.

">*

The population and industrial pattern developing in Siberia may be compared to the western part of the US. The location of Soviet industry and its eastward movement do not differ sufficiently from the settlement patterns of the population to indicate that defense factors arc the overriding consideration in the development of regions.

The regionalization thus far described is the planned development of regions in order to make them partially self-sufficient, in addition to developing and utilizing the resources of each region to maximum economic efficiency. This policy has been based mainly on economic considerations, such as reducing transportation costs, but

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lET

TOP SECRET

it also has the effect of reducing relative concentration and, in some measure, vulnerability. Any reduction in vulnerability achieved in this manner would bo counterbalanced in part by tho scanty railroad facilities In eastern areas, which are particularly vulnerable tointerdiction. The regionalization plans of the USSR have been marred by inadequate application in some areas and occasional failure to carry out the movement on the part of some lower officials. In addition, certain factors, such as too great expenditure of time, equipment, and money, and location of specific natural resources, serve to limit the effective carrying outlan for regionalization.

3. Protective Construction.

Shelter and other protective construction for personnel, materiel, and equipment in* economic installationsasic need in preparing for possible emergency or wartime operation. The USSR has engaged in such construction for some time.

An order was issued in the USSR not later9 requiring shelter facilities to be installed in new buildings. Available

that air-raid shelters are being

included when new industrial litnlrfinan arp

excavation of an air-ram uneitcr near tne annum aeration Imilding of an older plant

helter in industrial

uction.

inacilities in the European Satellites reveals active shelter constr

in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria. I

"forking on plans for categoryhelters in plants.

These were supposed foeight ofilograms per square meter. Secret and presumably heavier shelters (categoryere to be constructed in some defense plants1 / Numerous

* "Categoryhelters were World War II Soviet shelters that were supposed to withstand complete building collapse.

-

which indicate that important Hungarian lactones are equipped with air raid It is improbable that provision for such shelters in the Satellites preceded construction in the USSR..

mo man hi-

industrial pi

fire and other protective measures in ll measures are fairly widespread.

it can be assumed that Soviet

eiiorts toward protective construction in economic installations against air attack have been well-conceived and are probably becoming more and more effective.

IV. Military Control.

Measures taken in the USSR to insure the continuity of military control and capabilities for effective action in an emergency will undoubtedly be influenced by the experiences of World War II.by expected conditions of nuclear warfare. The measures taken are in the following categories: modifications in high command and administration, mobilization, preparations for regionalization through the delegation of authority, substitution of military for civil authority, and dispersal of military forces and facilities,

A. High Command and Administration.

During Worldasic changes in the Soviet command and administrative channels were effected by the creation of the State Defense Committee and the Stavka or General Headquarters of the Armed Forces.

The State Defense Comrniltoe functioned an the supremo state authority in the USSR. Consisting of the five foremostin the USSR, it combined the executive, legislative, police, military, and Party power of the USSR. For the exercise of its military functions the State Defense Committee relied upon the Stavka. both organizations being headed by Stalin.

The Stavka consisted ofoop military leaders representing the chief branches, arms, and services. Its major function was to translate military policy decisions of the State Defense Committee into operational and strategic plans, and to providedirection of the war. The authority cf the Stavka extended also to the then NKVD and NKGB, although neither body was represented on the

The Stavka had no separate organization, utilizing rather the existing staffs of the Army and Navy. The primary significance of the Stavka during World War II was that itivorce offrom administrative functions in military affairs. In actual direction of military operations it bypassed the Military Districts, and the command chain went directly to front units, so that the existing static structure (Ministry and Military District Headquarters) became for all practical purposes an administrative control organization. Operational command was facilitated further by the practice ofMilitary Districts into Groups of Forces or Fronts.

A significant factor in present-day structure of the armed forces that is relevant to the possible revival of the Stavka is that all forces today operatenified command of one ministry. During World War II the control of naval and army forces bynified high command such as the Stavka. It may be, therefore, that the present unified General Staff of the Ministry of Defense is. Ineacetime version of the Stavka. If so, the question of revival of the Stavka is academic. The distinction in operational command is,eature of the World War II Stavka that probably would be revived, so that the operationalfunctions of the Military Districts could be abolished. This would seem certain in combat areas, where the Front or Group of Forces would have replaced the Military District (thoughimilar headquarters structure).

The significance ofeparation of operational and administrative command is that the continued functioning of Military District Headquarters is not imperative for operational control of the armed forces. Consequently, centralized Soviet control of thestructure is not dependent upon continued operation of Military District Headquarters. Problems of administration and logistics, however, would still depend upon the functioning of the decentralized Military District Headquarters and its Rear Services. The operational-administrative separation is also of significance to the extent that the removal of operational functions from such headquarters couldtheir assuming added functions such as the exercise of martial law.

B. Mobilization.

Mobilisation for war in the USSR ia carried on by Military Districts and their Military Commissariats, which are discussedrevious The Mobilisation Plans, which are worked out In peacetime, are considerably detailed. They may provide for open or secret mobilization, and they embrace every reaource of the country.

The human mobilisation base is classified by trainingategories and by.agelasses. .Reserveonsists of those reservists who are fully trained and have atears of active service, andonsists of those conscripts left over after tho peacetime forces were brought up to required strength and those deferred for family or other reasons. Both categories are divided into classeshe first includes those up toears; the second, those up toears; and the third, those up toears. Current estimates of Soviet reservesillion men, of whichillion are in8 million in category

Mobilization in tho USSR has two general phases. The first phase is provided for in the Mobilization Plan. It provides for the expansion of first-priority regular units to wartime strengtheriod of M*he expansion of other units and the creation of new units, staffed with fully trained reservists of category The Mobilization Plan is extremely detailed. It lists the units to be formed; the schedule for theirthe sources, by district, of personnel and materiel; and Ihe transport to be used in moving units to strategic areas. Officers are assignednit by name, and enlisted men are assigned by numbers. Materiel and transport facilities are assigned to collection points within military commissariats. One source indicates that for thia first phase of mobilization, key personnel are ordered to reportinus

Mobilization Day.

-

The second phase of mobilization occurslusnd technically is not within the Mobilization Plan. It is drawn up in general terms only, aa an operational plan for replacement training and for the formation of new units consisting mostly of reservists innd the older age classes.

Estimates on the probable mobilization program are shown in Table 3.

Table 3

Estimated Phasing of the Soviet Mobilization Plan a/

M

+0

Divisions

that5 category has been

now byategory, at which time the number of combat-ready divisions should, whileivisions would be in the process of being mobilized or trained. The new estimate0 is that there shouldombat-ready divisions, with anothern training.

The top mobilization level is estimated at aboutillion, ofillion would be ground forces.

-

An interesting facet of the Soviet mobilization program ia its provision for margins in excess of requirements, which are as follows:

Enlisted

to 30

to 50

Soviet mobilization planning ia so detailed that an initial mobilization of first-priority- that is, their expansion tostrengthsould easily he done without too much danger of compromising any plans for immediate aggressive action. This is possible on two counts. The first la that existing units are probably at an average strength ofercent of the table of organization. Second, the mobilization program is focused on the rayon level, andocal activity would not be easily discernible to foreign observers. Moreover, it could be carried out without press or radio publicity, so that the clement of surprise would not be lost. The importancerior initial mobilization is obvious from the operational point of view, particularly for force units in border areas. It has certainfor interior zonesuch mobilization wouldolid core of forces and materiel for the preservation of public order. It would alsooncentration of human and other resources for such emergency activities aa evacuation of strategic areas,support to civil measures for defense, fire fighting, first-aid and medical care, and other measures to combat disaster.

Such initial mobilization would probably be confined to interior zones, since mobilization of forces abroad would necessitate substantial Iroop movements, so that the element of surprise would be lost. Forces abroad probably would remain at aboutercent of their tabic of organization strength.

-

and Delegation of Authority.

It is probable that the conditions of nuclear warfare wouldeviation from the Soviet tradition of centralism resulting in lack of authority and initiative at lower echelons of the Sovietstructure.

The expected conditions of nuclear warfare tend to make continued centralism more undesirable in the command structure. Itreasonable to assume that, in order to combat the rigidity and Inflexibility of strong centralism which could exist in the revivaltavka. the Military District commanders may be given more authorityf not for military operations, at least for logistics and administration. The advantage of such measures would bo that theof Military Districts under conditions ofwould tend to offset any losses in vertical control. Self-sufficiency would also be increased through the unification of several districts under one command, or intensification of lateralbetween districts. This would be very pertinent to the problem of economic soLf-Bufficifincy and to relevant questions of logistics. The boundaries of economic regions and Militaryare not greatly at variance.

The proper delegation of authority in order to increase the independence of Military District* would also help speed up measures for recuperability and probably make for greater These measures also have relevance to another probable course of action, the substitution of military for civil authority.

and Civil Authority.

Civil-military relations in the USSR could be expected to change in several ways in an emergency. First, in the absorption of several civil organizations into the military structuren World War II the Ministries of Communications, Transportation, Maritime Fleet, and River Fleet, and the Chief Directorates of the Hydro meteorological Service, the Civil Air Fleet, and the Northern

- is -

TOR SFyRF.'l

Sea Route were thus/imilar change in their status could be expectod in another war. The normal quasi-military status of these ministries would make their full militarization very simple.

A second way in which the civil-military relations could chango would be through invoking martial law, especially in front areas. It could also be used in the interior zones,evice for maintaining order during the periods of chaos and panic which might followor nuclear attack. The importance of martial law is that its complete subordination of civil to military interests gives.the military structure control over all the resources of civil control structures.

A third way in which civil-military relations could change woulderger of the two. This is particularly pertinent to the question of military decentralization and delegation of authority. It would makeombination of military and politicalthrough concentration of governmental powers in one body. recedent for this would be the regional State Defense Committees established during World War JJ. From the military point ofinimum degree of administrative reorganization would be required, since the Military Council of each Military District is made to order for such functionsarticularly if the expected separation of operational and administrative functions occurs. Under normalits membership includes, in addition to the military authorities, the regional Party secretary awu the MVD (or KGB) representative on the Military Council. epresentative from the state administration were added to the Council, civil authority would have full

The carrying out ofystem of decentralization or regionalization could be hampered where Military District boundaries cut across republic boundaries. Since this consideration applies to only three of the constituent republics, however, it wouldajor drawback in view of the advantages to be gained from decentralization.

E. Dispersal.

Basic measures for the dispersal of forces in the USSR in an emergency can be regarded as axiomatic. In the ground forces this would apply to all forces from division level down. Even higher static

topXecret

echelons such as district and army headquarters could be expected to take some measures for dispersal. actor making dispersal feasible is the requirement that each echelon must keepcontact with the next two higher echelons. Thus direction and control over dispersed units could be maintained unless two successive static headquarters were immobilized. Even then, practices of alternate communications probably could surmount the loss of both of these static headquarters.

Limitations to dispersal do occur with certain static forces such as Long-Range Aviation. PVO, and Naval Forces, but even Long-Range Aviation.can gain some recupcrability through the se of alternate facilities or the enlargement of others which could easily be converted to strategic bombing needs. Dispersalare more apparent with tactical aircraft and are reflected in reports of general trends toward dispersion. The USSR is believed to be workingispersal policy aiming at one regiment to an Deployment aims are also reported to include each light bomber and ground attack regimentome baselternate. Fighter bases supposedly will be constructed to serve as alternate light bomber bases, with underground fuel and ammunition storage and administrative facilities.

A well-developed dispersal program can be expected not only in order to save the armed forces, but also to aid in relieving the chaos of wartime and minimize disruption of communications.

V- Police Control.

Except for civil defense preparations, which will be treated separately, the chief preparations for wartime operation of the police or security services are largely speculative. During the last war MVD and MGB were merged under'Beriya. Beriya himselfember of the State Defense Committee, together with Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov. and Malenkov. -:

There is within theobilization Subsection under the Personnel Directorate which is charged with the formulation of plans for control of the civilian population in time of It seems probable that this unit has considered the foreseeable problems of nuclear warfare and hagchema of action andaimed at maintaining the control structure.

A. MVD.

Although the MVD is organizednion-republic basis, control presently is exercised centrallyhat is, as if it were an All-Union ministry. In case of attack and isolation, however, the status of ministers in the republics would give them bothand authority to make decisions. As longeturn to the control of Moscow was expected, such field decisions probably would bo carefully weighed for conformity with stated or implied Moscow policy.

Units of Border Troops and Internal Troops were called on during World War II to police rear areas of the Armyhis was an added function, in the case of the Border Troops, and units thus employed were dually subordinate to tho front commanders andpecial directorate within the Border Guard Headquarters in Moscow. Border Troops and Internal Troops were also used in resettlement of suspected or diseident minorities. In addition to those operations, the possibility of resistanco activities in the USSR and Satellites would appear to demand still greater numbers of MVD troops. These would be presumably obtained through recall of reserves and conscription. Reserves have been estimated.obilizationossibleays.

B. KBG.

The task of ideological guidance and its policing, which belongs to the KGB was reduced during the last war byise in patriotism and Great Russian Certain religious concessions were made also to the Orthodox

There would probably be concern in any future war over potential resistance in the Baltic areas, the Ukraine, and throughout the European Satellites. This apprehension should leadigherof KGB agents in these areas, especially of those with area and language competence. Increased armed forces would also make new demands for personnel tn the Armed Forces Counter Intelligence.

Any significant demands for personnel probably could nol be met satisfactorily from reserves, so lhat additional selection of personnel would be necessary.

VI. Civil Defense.*

Inasmuch as civil defense is the physical basis for any emergency control plan, it is included in this discussion. In the USSR, civil defense has been described as an integral part of air defense and is closely associated with two of the primary control structures, the armed forces and the security system. One of its primary objectives would necessarily be the continuance of effective control. To do this, it would have to achieve preservation of sufficient key officials and communication facilities. Adequate civil defense preparations would reduce losses andeneficial effect on morale. Pooror no preparation would ensure heavy losses of life and property, which probably would rraVe an adverse effect on the morale of the population and of the armed forces. oss of morale would also weaken the control structure. The examination of the Soviet civil defense system is therefore appropriate.

A. Organization. **

The organization of civil defense in the USSR is well It involves the useull-time corps of Local Airtaff officers for planning and direction; the maximum use of existing

* Documentation, unless otherwise noted, is fully presented in an earlier CIA

ee Figureollowing Mestnaya Protivovozdushnaya OboronaPVO.

-

TOT SEfRPT

facilities, organizations, and services for implementation; and the use of mass social organizations for general training of the population in first aid, air, and chemical defense. orldaw. whose repeal is unreported, made all able-bodied citizens between the ages ofndiable to serve in civil defense assignments.

Air Defense or, more precisely, antiaircrafts the name given in the USSR to all measures for combating air attack, for denying the enemy opportunity to attack, and for diminishing the consequences of air attack. It includes Active Airs well as the MPVO. Air defense is the responsibility of the Air Defense of the Countryeparate organization under the Ministry of Defense. The Commander-in-Chief for PVO-Strany probablyeputy ministor. Civil defense is coordinated with or monitored by PVO-Strany, andity or region is under attack, the PVOif one is present, takes over operational control of civil defense.

1. MPVO Service of the MVP.

* Protivovozdushnaya OboronaVO, ** Aviazenitnaya Oborona* Glavnoye Upravleniyc Mestnoy ProtivovozdushnoyUMPVO.

-

The central body of the Soviet civil defense systemtaff corps of specialized personnel known as the MPVO. This body is under the MVD and is administered from Moscow by the MVD Chief Directorate of Local Airubordinate to GUMPVO at the republic level are directorates.*and at oblast and rayon levels, Cities have Headquarters of Local Air Defense. GUMPVO is responsible for the local air defense (civil defense) of the USSR, which includes the appointment of local headquarters staffs, staffs of training establishments, and inspectors to supervise and coordinate activities of air defense teams provided by ministries and local organizations. GUMPVO is also charged with the supervision of civil defense planning andentral Scientific Research Laboratory for research and design.

ORGANIZATION OF CIVIL DEFENSE IN THE USSR

I

PABTY

istms

i i i nmi t

aifi

Ctkm

Unon

I N I

-3

Mamal Arfoiri <MVO)

sc

P

bof local

Ur

nm-tor-lar ol Airni (KPVO)

Maolih, Tro moot lotion.

co-ti.in.

and othan

Mililary mobiliio'lon

Oapartmanti

support

Sartor MPVO Craw.

1

laroat MPVO Crawl

fCWI/rdar AMi'-<na*Wcof Hra Madknf

Groaca TaoM, Ordar.

nd finf Aid

SKopMPVO SaoMrn

fira. Ordar.find Aid

In addition to the national and local offices of the MPVO, there are MPVO officers in important factories, as well as inand communications installations.

In preparing for air defense, the MPVO is charged with the monitoring of new construction both on community-wide scale and in individual installations. It has been reported that eachtrust employs an air defense specialist. MPVO personnel who have been identified in these trusts probably are engineer officers, who are included in the MPVO organizations.

The structure of the MPVO is thus composed primarily of staff and planning personnel at all levels of government, staff officers for local air defense of important industrial installations, monitors for construction, and inspectors.

a. Cities or Rayons.

The basic operational unit of civil defense is the city or rayon organization. All departments of the city or rayon must be integrated into local air defense. Technical facilities of public property and industry must be widely used, and air defense is to be carried out by local governmental and Party bodies,public organizations, and large masses of workers.

The responsibility for civil defense reststhe Council of Workers' Deputies of the city. The chairmanExecutive Committee is the Chief of MPVO. Heand directs the system through an organization known"Staff of MPVO. "Chief of Staff of

MPVO is the actual person in charge of the civil defense organization, communicating directly with GUMPVO in Moscow on civil defense matters.

The civil defense responsibilities of the Chief of MPVO and his staff include the following: ormulating plans, (Z) staff and unitrganizing and mobilizing crews and detachments for local airrganizing training programs

- 39

for specialized personnel as well as for the generalreparing andinancial and materials procurement plan, and supervising all these activities through timely controls. In the event of an air raid, the Chief of MPVO and his staff are to direct the forces and faculties of the city in the elimination of the effects of the attack.

In exercising these responsibilities tha MPVOity organizes and controls the following services: isaster restoration,hemicalommunications and reporting,reservation of order andhelter.) evacuation,) veterinary. Other services maybe added in largo cities or under special conditions.

Sectors.

Within large city MPVO organizations are found Sector Commands and their crews. The crews are similar in mission and title to the city services and are charged with operations within their area, subject to the directives of the city MPVOecent report has indicated that air-raid drills were carried out in Stalingrad by "zones" which coincided with police and fireof tho town.

Targets.

Production enterprises or establishments of great economic or defense importance are considered MPVO targets (Ob"yekt) and have their own MPVO organization. The mission of the MPVO bodyarget is to assure the uninterruptedor functioning of the enterprise under an air attack, including the preservation of the physical plant, personnel, and stocks and the rapid elimination of damage after the attack.

Although the manager of an enterprise is nominally responsible for civil defense, the Chief of MPVO, who must have had special training in civil defense, presumably is the operative head.

40

The MPVOlant is subordinate both to the Military Mobilization Department of the ministry concerned and to the MPVOity or rayon. Among MPVO matters handled by the ministry appear to be planning and reporting, personnel matters, pay, and financing. In tactical matters of civil defense, the MPVOlant is subordinate to the city or rayon staff of MPVO. Within the factory, target crews are formed with responsibilities for such functions as communications and warning, order and security, fire fighting, decontamination, medical service, and repairs. Because larger plants normally have their own guard and fire-fighting forces, the reinforcement and training of the order and fire-fighting crews are simplified. of the existing plant dispensaries or hospitals are the nuclei for the medical crews. In addition to the target crewslant, there are shop crews, organized under the shop manager, for decontamination, fire fighting, medical service, and order and security.

d. Self-Defense Groups.

According2 DOSAAF publications, the local air defense ol dwellings is to be accomplished by the formation of self-defense groups, which are formed in each dwelling unitr more people. Large apartment blocks may have several groups organized forersons. Where dwellings house lesseople, the aaoups are formed cooperatively with those of other buildings.

Self-defense groups consistmall staff (chief, assistant chief for political work, property manager, and orderly) plus six teams. These are order and observation, fire-fighting, gas decontamination, repair-restoration, medical, and shelter. The commander of the shelter team is the commandant of the shelter.

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2. Voluntary Society for Cooperation with the Army. Air Force, and Navy

a. Aims.

The second important body concerned with passive air defense in the USSR is the Voluntary Society for Cooperation with the Army, Air Force, and Navy. ** According to its bylaws, DOSAAFmass organization of the workers of the USSR, establishedoluntary basis with the aim of strengthening the Soviet Army, Air Force, and Navy." The tasks of the society are to disseminateinformation among its members as well as the general population and to prepare them for all types of air and chemical defense.

Civil defense training is by no means the only mission of DOSAAF. Us members are also encouraged to acquire military skills in such fields as skiing, marksmanship, flying, parachute jumping, gliding, amateur radio technique, automobilism, motorcycling, horseback riding, the construction of model airplanes and ships, and the breeding of service dogs.

b. History of Paramilitary Societies.

* See Figureollowing* Dobrovol'noye Obshchestvo Sodeystviya ArmiiOSAAF.

-

Paramilitary effort on the part of the USSR dates back to the period immediately^ olio wing the RevolutionOSAAF was formederger of three former paramilitary organizations in the fall The work of DOSAAFas carried on by means of an organizational committee, although the bylaws of DOSAAF provided for the Ail-Union Conference as the highest governing organ. ress recruitment campaign, the general tenor of which was highly critical, was carried on from February to Low membership, insufficient guidance, nonpayment of dues, and the low level of training were criticized. Following thisew chairman of DOSAAF was appointed.

Figuri 2

ORGANIZATION OF THE VOLUNTARY SOCIETY FOR COOPERATION WITH THE ARMY, AIR FORCE, ANO NAVY (DOSAAF) IN THE USSR

tl-UMON CONFERENCE

vbll.hing Hhfi

School.

>

> >

oot YaonJ

T

Organ* ofcaaalo-r

Ah ondi. Mttlltj', Iroinlng end Sparti Nofol f'o-ivng end Sporfi

Auloatafrra Training and Sped

Santa Dog

Audio

Pear nut* TioMng ond Spoil

Republic

DOSAAf

t'frf'i I

Union laavfalV

Orgciiiotional oudVrfng Propagofron ol Mirrlory

Worwonon Ait ond Cna-WceiroiHbj and Sparta Naval

Sarvrta Dag

Porocnsfa Training ond Ipe"i

A.diling Comrnliwos

PVKhO Schooli

'oy. OWoil, mfftm

DOSAAF

fCoittiw I'try twoI)

Commit! an

Sachoni

s onol-ovdi'ing

Propogofion ol MHifaf

In formation Air and Cfcaaiicol Da'ania Milrfory 'TrdiUng aid Sporfi Novo! Training ond Sporti

Training ond Spell

Sdrriea Dog *odio

Porotharla Training and Sport!

OrgoMia-aaa

o- -

S<ot. lo,-.

Irortar

and Spart Craaea

A.r

ond

CKanUtol Daftwa

Training

Compvliory in oW primorj organiiolioni

TOP SECRET

In October and3 the DOSAAFCommittee published in the society's monthly organ, Voyenniye znaniya, two withering articles on the state of work. The newfound that membership had increasedercent inears since the beginning of DOSAAF. This figure, however, was questionable because of neglected records and even deliberate An inspection of records was ordered, and severe punishment was threatened in case of deceit or falsification. Additional criticism was aimed at the low level of participation, the poor recruitment system for instructors, and the unsatisfactory state of supply and sports activity. To encourage membership and participation in DOSAAF activity, an extensive press and radio campaign was initiated culminating in the first All-Union Conference of DOSAAF in Moscow which ended on Following thia conference. It appears that DOSAAF was able to enlist increased support from other public bodies,from the Komsomol. Although the bylaws of the Komsomol obligated its members to devote time to military study, its members had not been enthusiastic about fulfilling this obligation by entering DOSAAF activity. Pressure on Komsomol membersad apparently been unable to overcome this inertia.

Following the change in lea'dership and duringof publicity for the first All-Union Conference of DOSAAFto December

]Inomsomol

kray conference "ordered" its members to improve mass defense work in cooperation with DOSAAF organizations. Trade unions also were warned sharply in the newspaper Trud that they were "obliged to achieve the setting up of primary organizations of DOSAAF in every enterprise, in every institution and establishment of learning, in every state farm and machine tractor station. " Inomsomol committees and organizational committees of DOSAAF began holding joint meetings.

-

Two interesting

reflect tha effect of the new campaign in the Estonian SSR. Noting that DOSAAF activity was poor2thatrban Komsomols were participating iuuDOSAAF, and thatercent of theorkers in the port of Tallinn had been enrolled in DOSAAF, the younger ones more or less by force. In addition. ercent of the port workers had been given short courses in air and chemical defense measures. These reports support and are supported by Soviet claims for increased membership and activity. ASS transmissionor example, claimed thatew primary DOSAAF organizations wore set up in theonths

c. Membership,

The size of the membership of DOSAAF has not been announced andubject for speculation. The Society for theof Defense and Aero-Chemicalirectof DOSAAF, had an announced membershipillion Membership in DOSAAF2 is estimated to have beenillion. Since membership drivers accompanied the election and accountability campaigns3here probably have been substantial gains since then. The new measures to gain recruits from the Komsomol and trade unions have been noted above. (Tolal Komsomol membership was recently announced The low ageOSAAF makes it probable that some Young Pioneers have also been recruited. 3 the DOSAAF chairman stated that DOSAAFmembership ofnd4 he used the term "many millions" and indicatedgrowth. Pravda stated that DOSAAF was one of the largest mass public organizations in the In view of the size of the membership of its predecessor; the manpower reservoirs of the Communist Party, the Komsomol, the trade unions, and others: the evident pressure for enlistment; andguarded satisfaction expressed. DOSAAF membership appears to bo betweenillion andillion at the present time.

* Obshchestov Sodeystviyahemicheskoma Stroitel'stvaSOAVIAKhlM.

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TOP Sf/C'R'-.T

(In Baku, on the basis of dues payments, DOSAAF membershipestimated atercent of the population. This proportion may

be applicable to urban-industrial areas whichopulation ofillion, but it should be deflated in rural areas.)

According to its bylaws, DOSAAF's highest governing organ is the All-Union Conference, which meetsears. The Conference decides important questions determining the society's course of action and confirms and makes all necessary changes in the society's bylaws. The All-Union Conference elects its executive organs, the Central Committee and the Central Auditing Commission.

The DOSAAF bylaws also provide for theof DOSAAF organizations and committees on the union and autonomous republic, kray, okrug, oblast, city, and rayon levels.

Primary organizations of DOSAAF may be setall enterprises and institutions, kolkhozes, factories, andthere are at least three merrfocTB of the society. is open to all citizens of the USSR who have

and Supply.

The financing of DOSAAF is complex, and many of its aspects are unknown. According to the bylaws, the monetary funds of the primary organization consist of initiation fees,f the membership dues, funds allocated by public organizations and institutions concerned with development of the society's activity, and "other" receipts. These funds are spent by the committee for training needs in accordance with estimates made by the general meeting. DOSAAF membersembership feeear, eithernstallments.

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E

Other sources of financial aid as well asmaterial resources have been reported or discovered. institutions, in which many DOSAAF units are found, furnishstudy groups, ) '

committees furnish quarters for oblast and kray UBRs as well as funds from the "local budget." Regular military units give material aid. including the use of military equipment, ranges, and instructors of the regular military establishment.

Qfunds from the Central Committee ol DOSAAF indicates sizablefrom the committee to subordinate DOSAAF units.

3. Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.

These voluntary societiesajor role in first-aid training for civil defense and in furnishing scmitrained personnel for assistance to the medical services of civil defense.

The membership of these units was reported recently atillion. As in the case ofrimary units are found throughout the country in such locations as factories, collective farms, and schools. Primary units are controlled by committees at the rayon level, which in turn arc under tho jurisdiction of city or oblast Central control is assured by further organization up through Union-Republic and All-Union Committees.

These units conduct courses in first aid leading to qualificationSO (Ready for Sanitary Defense) standards. Trained personnel arc integrated into the civil defense medical services of the MPVO.

B. Plans and Training. 1. plans.

Civil defense, like other aspects of the Soviet systemrepared according iohe present Five Year Plan penod

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is1 Plana are drawn up at the local level on directives from Moscow. b"yekt (target) plans were to be developed on the basis of instructions from the ministry concerned, instructions from the Chief of the target MPVO, and city requirements for the MPVO. Plans probably include procurement, construction, finance, personnel assignments, and training.

It was reported0 that the USSR planned toillionear in civil defense,oviet publication referring to0 Plan called for enlistment of "tens of thousands" of instructors for the development of air defense study groups. special plan" for air-raid shelter construction, probably based on particular legislation, was mentionedoviet manuallans for specific city, sector, and enterprise civil defense groups have not been uncovered; probably because they are subject to strict security controls. Plans at the time of World War II calledreat deal of initiative at the city level, using local functionaries and organizations to form civil defense services, crews, and the like. Directives included the use of groups such as the police, the fire guard, local medical personnel, local communications personnel, transport of the area, communal services, and repair crews as the nuclei of civil defense forces. Auxiliaries were provided by the existentsociety and by the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. Detailed planning, as well as recruitment, training, financing, and supervision, was the functionChief of MPVO of the city.

2. Train inR.

Training of the MPVO corps for civil defense is apparently accomplished through various schools and courses. Course for Senior Commanding Officers" located in Moscow would logicallytaff college. Republic or kray courses of MPVO

1 have must often been relatedfor civil defense workers from enterprises. Ina "Leningrad School" with MPVO

training. It is possible that this school is the undergraduate school for MPVO officers, since the approval of the head of GUMPVO was sought for candidates proposed by the MVD.

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According to Soviet publications, the Chief of MPVOity is responsible for the training of the command and administrative staff of the MPVO. To help him in thishief Supervisor of Education is appointed. Tasks entrusted to the Chief Supervisor are planning and implementing local air defense training, supervising instructors, and reporting on completed drills and instructionomplete analysis of work, including recommended measures to eliminate shortcomings.

3. Technical Facilities Identified with the MPVO.

The MPVOentral Scientific Research laboratory, which conducts research in development and design aimed at improving techniques and materials for civil defense. Experimental Plantf the MPVO is located at Odessa. Its function ie-unknown.

It has been determined that State Construction Planning Institutef the Ministry of Shipbuilding in Leningrad is in some way connected with construction plans for the MPVO, perhaps only for that Ministry's subsidiaries.

| reported that Inshelter

plans which originated from the "Planningeningrad.

4. PVKhO Schools.

Air and chemical defense* training has been the subject of steadily increasing attention in the DOSAAF program. It has become compulsory for every DOSAAF primary organization to set up study circles for PVKhO. To train instructors, DOSAAFetwork of schools and training courses. Mention has been made in DOSAAF publications of factories sending workers to the oblast or local PVKhO school for training, and these workers, on their return, are utilized as civil defense instructors. Graduates of these schools are also utilized to teach leaders of self-defense groups from offices, homes, and schools. These PVKhO schools probably are supervised by the MPVO because MPVO officers havein examinations of graduates.

himicheskaya oboronaVKhO.

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Training.

During the last several years, emphasis has been placed on the formation of DOSAAF primary units inractice which is undoubtedly aimed In part at providing civil defense training for the target crews and shop sections as well as for the general body of workers. Major plants have the advantage of the presencerained Chief of Staff of MPVO. The guard force, firemen, maintenanceand medical personnel of the individual plant are sources of instructors and also form the nucleus for the various civil defense groups. Reports on civil defense drills in ob'.'yekts are meager.

note that practice alerts were held once

i monthonfectionary plant in Kiev,onthospital in Baku, andonthscientific research institute near Leningrad. It is probable that drills are held periodically in most major plants. This level of training is feasible because DOSAAF organizations are widespread in economic installations, and the majority of workers in these plants must be presumed to have had basic PVKhO instruction. It was notedOSAAF publication that citizens who had passed the PVKhO requirements should be given the course againears, indicating that, in some areas, at least, the first cycle of training had been largely completed.

in Schools and Universities.

->*

As noted above, instructors for PVKhO in schools have been trained by DOSAAF. DOSAAF units present in higher schools aim at preparing students as potential leaders for civil defense activities by giving them thorough theoretical and practical training in the organization of passive defense for factories and other economic installations. Children in lower schools also are trained in civil defense in accordancepecial plan. In the autumnor example, it was reported that all Estonian school children were toours of training in air, fire, and chemical defense. Some gas masks and protective clothing were issued for training.

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7. DOSAAF Training Program.

DOSAAF is responsible for civil defense training for the general population. Within each DOSAAF primary unit there must be study groups for PVKhO. Pravda has redefined the priority goal of DOSAAF as the giving of modern PVKhO training to "all" the It was reported2 that civil defense instruction was to be given in three phases as follows: first, to members of theParty and its affiliates; second, to industrial workers; and last, to all civilians. The insertion of the word "all" in the Pravda article implies that air defense training has entered the third phase. The training given under the PVKhO program includes instruction on air-raid shelters, construction of trench shelters, first aid, fire fighting and fire-fighting equipment, types of gas and gas detection, and gas defense measures (including gas masks, shelter measures, decontamination, and care of water and food). Other subjects are recognition of types of bombs and warning signals and general familiarization with the MPVO system. On completion of the course those who successfullyractical examination are awarded the title of "Ready for Air and Chemical Defense" ICotovk PVKhO). In view of the past emphasis on introducing DOSAAF and its activities into schools, factories, institutions, state and collective farms, and machine tractor stations, and in view of tho recent unusual call for the training of "all" the population, it is possible that most DOSAAF members andstudents in the above-listed points have been given basic instruction in civil defense. Thegoal, then, logically would be to reach the remainder of the

population. Onethat, house

managers in the Estonian SSR wore put through special MPVO courses by DOSAAF, which would also be timely for the current organization and instruction of the self-defense groups in dwellings.

8. Drills.

Reports of city air-raid drills have been few, but the training carried out in DOSAAF units, institutions, plants, and schools could easily be carried on internally. Blackout driving exercises were reported in Mogilev From Stalingrad comes

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the only description of an air-raid drillectority. As

itlackout, movement ol people to shelters,toppage of traffic. The only vehicles on the street were police jeeps, ambulances, and fire trucks. Auxiliary civilian firemen were noted. All personnel (presumably of the civil defense crews) wore gas masks, and simulated "hits" and casualties were part of the exercise. With the current priority for giving civil defense training to the general public, sector and citywide drills will steadily become more feasible.

9. Behavior Instructions for Dwellings. g

Situation. "

Announcementthreatening situation" indicating that an air attack is possible is made by radiobroadcast and byof the announcement by the Executive Committee of the local Soviet.

In dwellings the house manager isseeing that blackout is initiated and that the self-defensefully equipped, manned, and aware of their duty posts. for various economic purposes are cleaned and madeshelter signs are posted.

J The various teams for self-actcnSe arc Checked by Eheir leaders, and readiness of matorials and personnel is reported to the chief of air defense of the dwelling. Individuals carry gas masks.

Alarm.

* Based on information as

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Announcement of an air attack is madeinute sounding of whistles, sirens, and the like and by radio announcement. Citizens on the street put gas masks in the "ready" position and take shelter as directed. People in dwellings send children and infirm persons to the shelters, cover food and drinking water, and turn off utilities. If they have no other duties, they then

Cake shelter. Self-defense teams, except those charged with blackout and movement, report to their place of assembly, check or receive equipment, and take shelter. All teams reportf possible, to the house chief.

c. Gas Alarm.

A gas alarm is signaled byetallic object and by radio. All those nothelter put on gas masks, and in shelters the gas-filtering mechanism Is started.

C. Air-Raid Shelters.

The use of air-raid shelters is being emphasized in passive air defense preparations of the USSR. Noting World War II experience, the newspaper Krasnaya zvczda (Red Star) has said that troops in towns under air attack should make use of cellar shelters. Thisthe existence of numbers of such structures, and the failure to mention massive, deep-level shelters may indicateecurity restrictioneficiency in this respect.

During World War II the Moscow subway was used as ashelter, and it has been reported that the subway was inas such. The subway is also reported to haveey power switchoaard and some federal offices. are equipped with ventilating systems which were fittedduring the war. At the height of the German air raidseople were sleeping in the subway. Thesystem has been expanded since the war, and plans forhave been announced. ecently

returned from Moscow, felt that the expansion ol the subway was unwarranted by transportation demands and described it as "the world's largest and safest air-raidoting its great depth and central location. OSAAF exhibit of3 related to air defenseictureubway station, indicating that the Russians are well aware of the possible use of the subwayomb shelter. An underground railway is also under construction

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in Leningrad. Aside from these presumably adaptable subways, no mass urban shelter for the civilian population of the USSR have been reported.

It is, however, becoming apparent that the USSR is spending considerable time, money, and materialsonstruction program for other types of shelter.

in the USSR.

|the first indicationong-range program ot air-raid shelter

'the instructions of the Oblast

{&hltaj Directorate of the MPVO to make provisions for cellars in all new buildings under construction." Some reports on the existence of air-raid shelters were receivedut they hardly made it possible to form any firm conclusions as to the breadth of the order or its implementation. 12 the DOSAAF publishing house in Moscow published manuals giving schematic diagrams of cellar shelters for masonry apartment buildings. * These manuals are basically civil defense training manuals for the general population. In addition to shelters constructed accordingspecialention is also made of the conversion of existing cellars. It is stated that cellar shelters give protection to theagainst shock wave and splinters from demolition bombsthe building andave-in of the upper part of the building. These cellar shelters are probably similar to "categoryhelters of World War II. which were designed to withstand the collapse of the building. Inote was made of smoothly plastored airtight walls to prevent gas leakage, double airtight doors,ilter ventilating installation which would furnish air directly or through filters. The air was to be drawn in by an electrically powered fan which could be manually operated in an emergency. helter, according to the manuals, should have water, sewerage, heat, light and hand tools for emergencies. anual

describes similar plansivilian-type sneuer0 describes in some detail the filtering system. The fan is ideally connected to two intakes on opposite sides of the building, and the fillers proper are in the form of metal canisters, mountable in series to attain the required capacity for filtered air. **

For sketches of apartment air-raid shelters in the USSR, see Figureollowing

** For sketches of Soviet gas filters, sec Figureollowing

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1

worked on masonry con-

at such varying locations as Sverdlovsk.and Revda in the Urals; Stalingrad on the Volga;Krasnopol'yc, Kadiyevka. and Stalino in the Ukraine. reported cellar shelters in Rustavi and in Khabarovsk i:

eastern Siberia. It thus appears likely that shelter construction has been going forward in implementation of the order9 and of the plan indicated in the manuals1

The descriptions of apartment shelters given by the

jwere remarkably consistent with the plans mentioned above and with each other. * Among the items mentioned were housing built according to "type" and "series" plans and "shelters built in accordance with new air-raid precaution

legislation."plans

stamped "Planning Institute, Leningrad,"

tne cellar depth toeters, with wallsoentimeters (cm) thick. The estimates of ceiling thickness vary considerably, fromom, including reinforced concrete plates. difference in thickness may be caused

by variations in the span width or by the inclusioninished flooring in some estimates. Priority for certain personnel also may dictate

better protection in some instances. The doors to the sheltersf

Hteel or metal-clad woodre double, hermetically sealed with

rubber gaskets, andas lock between them. I

ketch of an apartment air-raid shelter near Kiev, see Figureollowing

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Specified in some descriptions are escape passages which are essentially concrete-lined tunnels with covered manholes at some distance from the dwellings. In apartmentsunnel is notescape hatches are built into the upper cellar wall. Two toilet

IPSj^RL

J6

SKETCH OF APARTMENT AIR-RAID SHELTER

5

rooms are customarily installed, and first-aid stations and showers have been identified in some shelters.

One report indicates the use of tile facing on the interior wallshelter, and, in another case, inspecting officers insisted on extremely smooth plaster-coated walls. These probably are measures to guard against gas leakage. Other antigas measures described include the hermetically sealed doors (common to all reports) and ventilator ducts for the air-purifying units. Some of the reports noted that filter ventilating devices had not yet been installed. Two reports mention the careful installation of electrical

wires entering thethat this care was

connected witha stainless

steel gas-detection pipe (three-fourths of an inch in diameter)helter wall connected to the filter ventilating apparatus, and another single report states that pipelines in cellars were splinter-proof.

The walls of the shelters are built of brick, concrete, or stone, with the floor and ceiling of concrete.* Concrete mixtures used in air-raid shelters are reported in two instances. Oneixtureementarts sand. (This

does not seemhaveart

cementarts other ingreaients. j ore plausible mixture reported" cement.arts sand,arts, gravel. Cement of good) evidently was not always available, and the substitutionas been noted. One description of the specifications of the steel re-enforcement of ceilings said that the cellar ceilingmillimeter steel wire mesh,ons of iron were usedquare meters. This seems high, unless the steel used in structurals was included in the estimate.

* For sketches of apartment air-raid shelters at Stalingrad and Stalino, see Figureollowing

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The construction of shelters was inspected by military officers. In view of the known role of the MPVO in monitoring civil

defense construction, it is likely that those were MPVO officers or engineer personnel loaned to the MPVO for inspection purposes.

The above descriptions of air-raid shelter construction cover onlyozen important industrial locations, cities

reason to assume that similar construction also has been going on in-other areas, although no reports on them are now available.

Air-raid shelter construction dates at least

3re substantially in agreement that all

There is every

new masonrynd

ncluded cellar shelters. Several state that shelters were started9 and that0 shelters were generally included in new apartments in Krasnopol'ye, Sverdlovsk, and Stalingrad. Other reports state that "all /new buildings/ncluded cellar shelters in Stalingrad and Stallno. One report says that there are practically no cellar shelters for civilians in the Estonian SSR, but shelters are reported completely ready in buildings used by the armed forces, the militia, and the state security forces. In work was in progress to construct air-raid shelters in all government buildings in the Estonian SSR, and they were half

Some priority as to personnel evidently has been usednew apartmentscrefore, air-raid shelters. constructionrobably was largelyParty and government personnel. Some of theworked on apartments3 reported that there was

grumbling about the allocation of apartments to more privileged groups, but several stated that apartments were also occupied by workers in an armaments plant, employeesopper combine, postal telegraph employees, coal mine laborers, and others who could be grouped under the heading of workers in essential industry. The logical system of priorities which seemingly has been followed in the provision of improved housing is as follows: first,Party, military, and supervisory personnel; second, workers

APARTMEI

SKETCHES OF APARTMENT AIR-RAID SHELTERS

6

__3

Ralnfoicod

cur c

jJA

2

a

in essential industry with higher paid technicians having first call, and third, the general population as housing becomes available. The lack oi apartment shelters reported in the Estonian SSR is anthat the more important industrial areas in the USSR proper have received priority.

Concurrent with the program ior apartment shelters, shelters also have been included in military barracks, government and Party headquarters, clubhouses, schools, hospitals, and department stores, Some of these were installed as earlyccording to reports on the Baku area. Inew Party buildingtrongconcrete cellar was completeduilding rumored lo be the new Government House was reported9 to have reinforced cellar rooms with steel doors. The Military Headquarters in Baku likewiseeavily constructed cellar rooms whichith rubber-lined iron doors. In the Ministry of Interior Building in Kiev and in the House of the Red Army, large air-raid bunkers with gas locks were reported Two other official buildings in Kiev were reported8 to have basements two stories deep.

Plant shelters are also included in new building. These have

been reportedi plants inn Stalingrad, and

1 in Odessa. o reason to believe that these are isolated occurrences. Considering the Soviet concern for developing and protecting an industrial economy, it cannot be supposed that bomb shelters are not being included in new factory installations.

In aruas where formal shelter is nol available, thedvised to dig dugouts or slit trenches. The areas for these arc preselected by order of MPVO officials, but construction is not started until express orders are received. These shelters are woodlined and may be improved by various measures such as lo addition of doors, gasproofing, heat, and light.

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D. Medical Aspects of Civil Defense.

Tbe centrally controlled, uniform pattern of the medical system of the USSR is well suited to, and already integrated with, tho civil defease program. Under the added strain of wartime conditions, however, the Soviet dependence on inadequate facilities andarge proportion of poorly trained personnel probably will limit their ability to cope with simultaneous and numerous emergency situations.

1. Organization.

The Modico-Sanitation Service of the MPVO* ison the normal Soviet public health system. ** It utilizes the existing network of therapeutic and sanitary establishments of local health departments and auxiliary medical servicesasis for emergency medical operations under air-raid conditions. An an integral part of the nationwide MPVO system it cooperates with the Soviet Military Air Defense Command and is subordinate to it in time of war. The vertical organization within the Ministry of Healthop-level MPVO section at the ministry level, which channels down by way of the existing internal echelons. Horizontal organization is achieved by working agreements and coordinated activity of the various Ministry of Health echelons with the other interested government agencies, public organizations (particularly the Red Cross andumber ofarticipating elements.

* Mediko-Sanitarnaya SluzhbaSS MPVO. '* For the organization of medical civil defense in the USSR, see Figureollowing

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The most important medical defense organizational unit is at the target level. The heads of city or rayon health departments also serve as chiefs of the corresponding MSS MPVO units. These executive medical officers supervise the pertinent medical civil defense training and in time of war are charged with reducing the medical effects of air raidsinimum. Specialized

problems related to epidemic control or chemical decontamination under air-raid conditions are the responsibility of the State Sanitary Inspector (Gosinspektor). He is also the assistant chief of the city or rayon emergency medical service.

The city organization coordinates medical defenseperformed by all departments which are operating within the city limits. MSS MPVO units are organized in rayons of cities which are divided into rayons. These are headed by the person who holds the position of chief of the rayon health department.

2.

The following missions are assigned to the MSS MPVO:

practical administration of all medicallocated within the city limits (such as hospitals andand their adaptation to the needs of local air defense.

of stationary and mobile facilitiesfirst aid to victims, including the following: mobile first-aid stations; stationary and mobile dressingand mobile clearing stations; stationary and mobilestations for the decontamination of the clothing ofpoison gas; stationd medicochemical laboratoriesdetection and analysis of poison gas in such things as water

crows and services of the MPVOequipment.

and requalifying medical personnelin the various medical institutions and crews of the MPVO.

military training of all medicaland crews of the MSS MPVO which are designed for useof enemy air attack.

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I. Registering all medical property found in homes, institutions, and business establishments.

g. Planning and directing the organization and training of the general population (medical units and militia) for medical defense, self defense, and mutual aid. Such work includes the following: first aid and evacuation of the victims of air attack; organization ofsquads for the decontamination of areas, clothing, water, and food in case of gas attack; aid stations for those sufferingesult of gas attacks; organisation of local defense against air attack within mcdicosanitary establishments, sanitary and epidemic control measures and maintenance of all means of protection; and sanitary supervision over collective protection facilities during air raids.

3. Support Groups for Medical Defense.

In carrying out its civil defense mission, the MSS MPVO uses the following types of units:

Solf-Doienso Groups.

These groups are trained in first-aid methods and transport of the injured. They arc organized before the outbreak of hostilities at dwellings, industrial establishments, and other Red Cross and Redposts substitute for these groups where they do not exist. 3 the USSR was engaged in training large portions of the Soviet population in medical defense by means of the "Ready for Sanitary Defense"anitarnoy OboroneSO) norm. Sanitary posts, sanitary self-defense groups, and sanitary teams at dwellings, enterprises, kolkhozes, and sovkhozes are formed from groups of people who have completed courses under the GSO training program.

Medical Brigades.

These brigades are organized at industrial or other enterprises and are composed of employees of that particular Detachments are equipped and trained at the employees'

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expense. rigade may include medical MPVO battalions andas well as medical teams of the Red Cross.

c Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.

These societies,embership reported to beillion or more, are also assigned roles in sanitary and first-aid aspects of civil defense operation. The Red Cross civil defense units are formed in cities, rayons, transport systems, kolkhozes, sovkhozes, housing units, factories, and schools. Red Cross or Red Crescent sanitation teams represent reserves of the city or rayon MSS MPVO and are used according to directions given by the city or rayon staff of the MSS MPVO. ed Cross or Red Crescent sanitation teamroupseople each. Each group is provided with equipment similar to thatanitary post. edicaloctors' assistant, or an experienced leaderanitary post is appointed as chief of the sanitation team. The wide dispersion of the primary units of these societies and their medical and sanitary training make them an important source of medical assistance in time of emergency.

Detachments.

The detachments consistedicaledical assistant;hysician, who heads the detachment. These detachments operate in the focal area which has been affected or in its immediate vicinity. If necessary, they may engage the help of medical posts and other medical units in the area.

Transport Teams.

The teams consist of specially designated MPVO transportation units that utilize litters, ambulances, trucks, and other reconverted vehicles.

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4. Use ol Facilities.

The plan for medical aid establishments of the MPVO makes use of medical facilities to care for the different types of air-raid casualties. The medical aid establishments of the MPVO include the following: first-aid stations in hospitals and clinics, bathing stations, stations for anhydrous disinfection, andlaboratories attached to hygiene and bacteriological laboratories. Schools, clubhouses, motion-picture theaters, institutes, air-raid shelters, cellars, and the like may also be used. Places at which medical aid is given before the injured are treatedhysician include first-aid stations, dispensaries, and hospitals. irst-aid station may haveeldsher (doctor's assistant), who would be locatedidwife station or an ambulatory polyclinic. First-aid stations give medical aid to persons suffering from light wounds, traumatic injuries, or burns, as well as exposure to nonpersistent toxic agents. Dispensaries give medical aid to all classes of injured and provide temporary hospitalization inasmuch as they are located al hospitals, sanitariums, and health resorts. Because of the lack of qualified surgeons in medical aid stations, surgery is performed in hospitals onlyhe function of medical aid stations is necessarily limited to giving first aid and preparing patients for evacuation. If the area under attack is not farospital, there is no need for sending people to medical aid stations.

E. Defense against Chemical Warfare.

The Soviet civil defense program stresses defense against chemical warfare. The few reports of training (in schools, factories, and other localities) generally include observation of chemical defense activities.

Gas masks of high qualityere made available to

the public in DOSAAF storesJ. The design of theask suggests that it was intended for protection against bacteriological as well as chemical agents.

Gas maiki and decontamination supplies have been reported to be stored in factories. DOSAAF units, and MPVO warehouses. Although the amount of such material that is available is not known, the level of training and the DOSAAF manuals suggest that keyworkers in essential industry, and those expected to perform civil defense duties have gas masks (probably other thannd protective clothing where required.

The majority of reported air-raid shelters are equipped with filter-ventilating mechanisms or are designed for their installation. As more shelters with such filter mechanisms become available, the vulnerability of the USSR to chemical warfare will decline.

A recentreport stresses the effects of chemical

attack on an unprepared population, which could be disastrous from the point of view of morale as well as numbers of casualties. If thi is true, the increasing numbers of gas-proof shelters, theof high-quality gas masks, and widespread chemical defense training shouldsychological advantage in the civil defense of the USSR.

F. Other Aspects of Civil Defense. 1. Supply.

Information on supplies for civil defense in the USSR is meager, and quantitative estimates are not possible. Certain types of supplies applicable to civil defense are stored in various locations.

A Worldanual refers to MPVOin factories, which were to be issued upon notification Postwar reports of civil defenseplants enumerate gas masks, gas-protective clothing,drugs, and decontamination materials. reported to have received gas-protective

clothing and boots

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There probablyariety of stores in MPVO and MVD warehouses, including communications equipment, boots, food and clothing, and decontamination supplies.

It has been noted that DOSAAF sells civilian gas masks.

Although no stockpiling in the USSR has been connected specifically with civil defense, many items are stored which would have importance for civil defense purposes. These items include fuel, food, clothing, building materials, communications equipment, automotive equipment, and tools.

Motor Transport.

Motor transport has many potential uses in civil defense, including supplying vohicles for city services and relief columns, for evacuation, and for use by motor messengers. Government control of most vehicles in the USSR should facilitate their use for civil defense purposes.

Civil defense training for bus and truck driversto have taken place in This

included general air defense training and blackout driving. 4 states thathave

sets of benches and mounting ladders storea ror earn truck. trucks are nominally for military use, their potential usesand transportation of civil defense disaster crews

In the fall4 the automobile-motorcycle clubs of the Committee for Physical Culture and Sports ware transferred to DOSAAF. (DOSAAF already was conducting driver training.) The unification of driver training under DOSAAF places qualified drivers under better control for integration into the civil defense system.

/

3. Communications.

Instructions indicate that civil defense alarms are to be given by word of mouth, by radio, and by sirens or whistles. In some localities, sirens and loudspeakers have been installed or restorednd sirens have been periodically tested in Sverdlovsk.

Operations during World War II and published comment indicate that parallel communications (wire, radio, and messenger) are recommended in the USSR to link the air warning service, MPVO command posts and observation posts, and MPVO units in important industrial targets* MPVO offices have purchased telecommunications equipment, and MPVO signal equipment was sent to the Ashkhabad quake area Fire and police radio probably would be used for civil defense purposes.

DOSAAF club activity includes radio study groups. They have been active in the installation of radios and wired speakers9 government decision to complete basic radiofi-cation of the countryillion receivers and relayhis directly facilitates dissemination of civil defense warnings and information.

DOSAAF radio clubs could be usedource of operator personnel in the MPVO^systcm.

G. Defense against Nuclear Warfare.

The USSR refrained from describing the hazards of nuclear warfare in open publications Release of such information occurred shortly after classified manuals on the subject were disseminated to Soviet troops in the fall

* Probably means wide-diffusion loudspeaker locations.

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eries of articles in Red Star, which started in4 and ran through most of the year, the physics of nuclear forces, dangers from an atomic explosion, atomic defense

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for troops, and peaceful uses for atomic energy wereed Star is published for the armed forces, but it is an open publication available to civilians. Some of the Red Star information appears to have been copied from US publications. Accompanying the articles were Soviet broadcasts on the same subject, but these were also directed principally to the armed forces.

Instructions for atomic defense for civilians have beenreportedut generally such instructions have been restricted to selected personnel.

DOSAAF civil defense manuals12 omittedof nuclear weapons. anual publishedowever, mentioned atomic bombs and their use in World War II by "American Imperialists." ravda article4 called for preparation of the population for "modern" air The insertion of the word modern presumably referred to nuclear defense. Instructions for atomic defense have been mentioned openly. escription of methods for the physical removal of radioactive matter was published in Komsomolskaya Pravda in An articleOSAAF periodical indicated that the air and chemical defense training norm will now include some instruction in defense against atomic

Soviet civil defense plans for protection from nuclear attack are unlikely to become available outside the USSR. Some of the measures already taken for civil defense, as well as the instructions given to troops, are worthy of examination for their possible uses in nuclear defense of the general population.

It has been noted that the USSRonsiderable program under way for the inclusion of shelters in all new buildings. In the Red Star articles on atomic bombs the author stated that there arc reliable means of defense against them. Repeatedly mentioning blast effect as the major hazard of nuclear warfare, the use of ground cover, trenches, and prepared shelters was urged as the principal means of reducing casualties. Noting World War II experience, the articles stressed the fact that in urban areas cellar shelters with reinforced or arched concrete ceilings are protected

from the major blast effect, which dissipated on Ihc upperhis approach is consistent with known shelter design in thehichellar ceiling designed to withstand the complete collapse ol the building- Although information on massive or deep-level shelters ts inconclusive except for subways, heavy shelters probably do exist for key government installations. There is no known referenceass evacuation plan for urban areas however, thi* lack of evidence does not prove that none has boon prepared. No evacuation drills havo been reported.

Tho recommendations for protection against light, as givenilitary handbook, are shielding the face, lying down, or taking cover. For defense against fire, the military envisaged organization of fire-fighting details within troop units, providing equipment for combating fire, and various fire-preventive measures such as cutting clearings, plowing, and removing inflammables from troop areas. These plans suggest improved fire-preventionell-organized fire-fighting force, and increased fire-resistantfor urban areas.

For protection against radioactivity, standardized alarm signals and reconnaissance to detect and combat radioactive elements were recommended. Markings were to be employed for contaminated areas and for passages through them. Individual protective measures recommended were the use ofclothing and gas masks. One of the Red Star articles mentions the use of gas masks and washing with soap and water as adequate moans of protection against radioactive In civilian practice thesecould bo readily translated Into the use of chemical defense groups for reconnaissance, the use of civilian gas masks against inhalation of radioactive substances, and the use of public baths and vehicle-washing establishments for decontamination Filter-ventilating systems in Soviet air-raid shelters would

presumably be used with the same effect as gas masks for filtering out radioactive particles.

Nuclear defense in the USSR could be superimposed en the existing civil defense structure. The use of cellar shelters, although admittedly not entirely effective, should reduce casualties

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in areas removed from "ground zero." These prepared shelters have the advantages of provisions for gas defense and quick accessibility. The use of headquarters, public building, factory, and subway shelters might also reduce casualties.

No realistic instructions for civil defense against presently possible nuclear attack have been released to the general population. If an evacuation policy were adopted, however, the Soviet civil defense staff, numerous security personnel, and trained DOSAAF membership would be useful in implementation.

H. Possible Action to Retain Control.

It is relevant to examine lines of action which the USSR might employ to minimize casualties and avoid loss of control under nuclear attack. The USSR exploits at least our open literature on the effects of nuclearnd, it must be presumed, is familiar with the published information as to bomb size (up toillionadius of destructionfallout" danger, and other data regarding the effects of nuclear weapons. 5Z/ To assume that the USSR has not considered the advisability of some evacuation in the light of current civil defense thinking and publicity would be dismissing Soviet defense officials as totally incompetent.

If the USSR reached ajiecision to commence hostilities against the US using surprise nuclear attack as the Initial weapon, Soviet defense authorities could modify their civil defense, practices using presently available organizations. Before deliberate attack they would undoubtedly review all defenses in full expectation of "massive retaliation. " The capabilities of Soviet defenses would be reevaluated in the light of the most recent damage information, and the authorities would altompt to take measures to insure continuing control while guarding against loss of the element of surprise. Possible measures would be limited in part by the present control structure, current practices, and material on hand. (It may be emphasized here that the MVD and KGB probably have mobilization/ for war planning, and that GUMPVO is charged with civil defense

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In view of the Above Assumptions and the currently discernible aspects of control and civil defense, the adoptionelatively simpls plan might save large elements of the control structure. Thetolan would be attempting total evacuation or taking no action at all. Total evacuation is not considered probable because of the lack of observed activity in this field and the chaos that might result from attemptingeasure without involved preparations and practice. Absolute inaction would be unrealistic and isangerous underestimation.

1. Suggested Modified Plan.

odified plan of civil defense were chosen, the following course of action might be taken:

D* Day (Possibly Two Weeks).

Renew or issue sealed mobilization orders to implement the plan. (These orders would be opened and acted uponthreatening situation" was announced.)

Pressure could be increased on Party. Komsomol, trade union, and governmental personnel to participate actively in the DOSAAF organization and civil defense training. This has. in fact, been occurring in the recant

Stockpiles of food, construction material, fuel, and the like in dispersed depots could be slightly increased by holding urban stocksinimum level.

before Attack

Move some of the following bodies up toiles outside urban areas under cover of maneuvers, training, or routine checking exercises:

* ayate of initiation of attack by the USSR.our hour of take-off for Soviet strategic bombers.

armed forces.

MVD troops not currently engaged in duties necessitating their presence in cities.

Reserve hospital units, particularly those having personnel situated in central urban areas.

Dispersal of earth-moving and heavy construction equipment from dangerous target areas might be started at this time.

c. Upon Release of Soviet Attackour).

threatening situation" and mobilisation based on this plan.

mall portion (aboutercent) of Party and government control personnel in each major city tosafe locations. There they could set up alternatecontrol centers, aboutiles from urban areas.

Disperse transport (water, rail, and motor) not in use (or to be used)mile radius.

Disperse^ some KGB. Goskontrol, and Gosbank personnel with vital records. (Presumably near alternate Party-Government Headquarters.)

Assemble and romovc (by motur) military reserves and remaining troop units not needed for urban control.

Alert civil defense forces. Load civil defense equipment on trucks and have loaded trucks stand by at assembly points with additional transporter crews. Set up skeletal civil defense headquarters in protected locationsiles from cities.

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(7) Make ready prepared shelter* and orderwithout these to dig hasty type shelter.

d. At Time of "Air Alert"

Place population not to be evacuated in shelters, cellars, or prepared trenches. This is in conformance with currently published instructions forbehavior under air attack.

Assemble and move out, by vehicle, services and crews of civil defenseinimum detachment fororder, and firemen engaged in actual fire fighting. These might moveistance ofiles or more unless prepared shelter or good defilade permitted them to be stationed nearer. While training for such movement has not been reported, the experience ofnd Japan in World War.s well as civil defense plans of the US, are consistent in showing that disaster crews and fire equipment should be removed from areas expecting attack in order to avoid losses.

2. Composition of Civil Defense Units.

In addition to the removal from target areas of certain control elements included in the armed forces, security troops, and alternate elements of government, more key personnel might be preserved by assigning them to the air-defense crows and services. These services are as follows:

a. Order.

Order crews would probably contain elements of the militia, its auxiliaries, and DOSAAF members. Once the population was placed in shelters,mall antilooting and control body would be necessaryity. Self-defense groups of the population have their own order and shelter control bodies, reducing the need for police control.

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b. Communications.

Communications crows are organized for operation and repair of communications facilities and would contain manywho normally work in the communications system. There seems no good reason to keep personnel otherinimum operating groupikely target area. Repair personnel particularly should be evacuatedafe distance to be available after attack. Some DOSAAF personnel arc trained in/ and these probably are also enrolled in communications crews.

Crews for rescue and repair are probably heavily weighted with personnel assigned from public utilities andorganizations. There seems no valid reason to leave other than minimum operating personnel to undergo attack.

World War II experience proved the advisability of evacuating fire-fighting crews from cities under potential attack, leaving only thoso units actually engaged in fire fighting within the city.

and

The formation and evacuation of civil defensecrews wouldurther opportunity to preserve for service doctors, nurses, and other medical personnel. It would be advisable to leavearget area only the minimum number of medicalto care for hospitalized persons and emergency cases.

f. Anticheraical and Antiatomic.

These crews would probably contain mostly technicians. Chemists, physicists, and teachers of these subjects probably would be the leaders of reconnaissance and decontamination crews.

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8- Plant (Enterprise) Disaster.

There appears to be no compelling reason to keep civil defense crews of economic enterprises entirely within plants in major target areas. These crews could be splitasis with the larger part; or.half, being evacuated from the target area in vehicles, to return immediately after attack or just before the "all clear" signal. ucleus of control andpersonnel and skilled workers could be preserved by this measure.

Millions of personnel are being trained for civil defense in and by the DOSAAF organizations. It is therefore presumed that these organizations (plus the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies for first aid) will furnish the chief recruiting ground for civil defense crews and services. DOSAAF members are screened, the entrance requirements being substantially the same as for the The Party, Komsomol, and trade unions have been constantly urged to support and participate in DOSAAF training. It has been stressed that local air defense crews and services should be made up, using existing local organizations wherever possible. These crews, therefore, will consist of many police, fire-fighting, utility, communications, and medical per-sonnel whose loyalty, position in the control structure, or skills in repair would be valuable bofh*in maintaining control and restoring damage.

If thisimilar plan were adopted in the USSR, the following groups would be left to take their chances In cellars or other shelter in largehe majority of theinimum level of controlrisoners (in urbanospitallder people and the unfit,nreliables.

3. Advantages of the Suggested Plan.

This or some similar plan has obvious advantages which could lead to its consideration by Soviet defense planners. These advantages arc as follows:

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inimum chance of loss of thesurprise, since no substantial action occurs until shortlyattack by the USSR is initiated.

forces and unoccupied MVD troops canfrom target areas. From there they would be availableand control if the city is attacked.

of field hospitals could beattack by military and reserve units.

transport would be saved by dispersal orin moving troops and air defense personnel to peripheral areas.

of life, while large, would be selective as

to skills and reliability, ensuring continued control and some ability in reconstruction and repair.

needs would be minimized during theby placing the general population in shelters. Themay be convinced that this Is the best defense.

nature of civil defense crewsrepair, rescue, fire, communications, and the like) canto the general population. The movement of troopswouldormal thing in wartime. The holding ofdefense crews in the area until an actual air alert andimmediately after or even before the "all clear" wouldthe impression that the general population was being abandoned.

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APPENDIXOURCE REFERENCES

uaedhis report fall into six general categories,

as follows: (I) unclassified information available to the general mihlir

Civil as well as military defense preparations are obviously the subject of strict security controls in the USSR. Published informati

while easy to obtain, coversimited field, f

-

CIA/J , Civil Defense in the USSR.

A. Industrial Management in the USSR.

U. Eval. RR 2.

Izvestiya,. 1. U. Eval. RR 1.

U. Eval. RR 2.

Pravda,. 4. U. Eval. RR 1.

Izvestiya,. 2. U. Eval. RR 1.

7 U. Eval. RRravda, U. Eval. RRbid., . 2. U. Eval. RR 1.

J

bove).

FBIS, Daily Report (USSR and Eastern Europe).

. AA 8. OFF USE. Eval. RRzvestiya,. 2. U. Eval. RR 2.

Pravda, f. U. Eval. RR 1.

CIA. ilitary Mobilization Departments

in the Economic Ministries of the USSR. ayI-

top/ecret

p..

CIA- CIA/1 ,et Reserve

C.

S.

Cvai. KK 3.

"Kujj 3J. I. U (KK 31

C.

vJ}.

CIA. . S.

I S. Eval. RR 3.

49. S. .

C.

C.

S. Eval. RR 1.

S.

21.

SO.IA. SO.

02

O (RR ii.

S.. Air. Treasure3ir. Treasureir, Treasureir, Treasureir, Treasure0 R. Eval. F

25.

51.

lanovoye khozyaystvo. no 4,.f. U. Eval. RR.f.

CIA. egional Product in the USSR.

S. Eval. RRbid.

U- Eval. RR 2.

Pravda,. 4. U. Eval. RR 2.

Air. USAFE. ,

C. .C.1 C. . Ibid.., C. Eval. RR 2.

ai, C. Eval.

54.

Fvai rigid r. ran

45.

CIAJ . above).

SSR: S.

above).

Ibid.

A.

RR 3.

| "" S. .

NB Zk,SSR: Public Order and Safety.

. C.

F.L. Soviet Politics at Home and Abroad.

New. U. Eval. RR 2.

| S. .

bove).

Pravda. U. Eval. RR 2.

I

Lrravaa, ji ivai. KR 31

Digest of the Soviet Press, vol

U. Eval. RR 2.

Znaniya,ay.SS.. Eval. RR

OFF USE. Eval. RR 2.

. iii. OFF USE. Eval. RR 2.

New York Times, . vj. U. Eval. RR 2.

CIA. 0TFZT1

Ij FBIS, Daily Report (USSR and Eastern Europe),

go. DD 1. OFF USE. Eval, RRIA. CIA/RRVoluntary" Membership in the DOSAAF

Original document.

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