Created: 5/1/1956

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible




Assistant Director

Office of Current Intelligence


Office of Research and Report*


This document contains Information within the meaning of Publict Congress.



9 the USSR has made great efforts to improvewith and among the European Satellites. These efforts have broughtonsiderable degree of coordination of the Soviet and Satellite economies. The question is raised, however, whether the Soviet leaders are working only for coordination of the Soviet Bloc or whether, beyond that, they areore complete integration of the several economies. This report, in analyzing economicand integration, evaluates the present state of coordination within the Bloc and treats the question of whether the Soviet leaders are expanding coordination into full integration.




Communist Party Influence

Prospecti for Coordination and Integration



A. Appendix B.

Appendix C. Appendix D.

Appendix E.

Appendix F. Appendix G. Appendix H. Appendix I.

of CEMA Agreement

Soviet Properties and Jointthe Satellites . ': '. ".

Satellite Production Patterns4 . .

Specialization of Production in

Commodities and Processes Reported as Standardized or Being Standardized in the Soviet

Satellite Payments to

Source References




5 57


Commodities of Production and Trade Reported To Be Centrally Planned in the Soviet Bloc. . . .

2. Indexes of Satellite Gross National Product. Total

World Trade Turnover, and Total Sino-SovietTurnover.3

3. Soviet Properties in the European

Satellite-Satellite Joint Undertakings,

Specialization of Production In tho European



vi -


and Processes Reported as Standardized

or Being Standardized in the Soviet Bloc. 49

PaymentB to 51


Following Page

Figure 1. Organization of the Council for Economic Mutual

Assistance (CEMA) in the Soviet

Figure 2. Plan Periods of the USSR and the European



- vii -



Summary and Conclusions

Although significant and rather stoady progress has been made in integrating the economies of the Soviet Blocs notthat the Bloc will be fully integrated It is concluded that the Soviet leaders will strive to perfect and extend present coordination of the European Satellite economies and to work toward the eventual goal of full economic integration of the Bloc.

The leading organizations working toward coordination andof the Soviet Bloc economies are the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (Sovot Ekonomlcheskoy Vzaymnoyhe state planning commissions and offices, and the ministries of foreign trade of the USSR and of the Satellites. The key organization is CEMA. which has general supervision over planning in all Satellites. CEMA's position in tho Bloc is that of an international agency servinglearinghouse for broad economic planning, production, and trade, activities of the European Satellites. The members of CEMA are the USSR. Poland,'Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Albania, and East Germany. Its operations are supervised by its Council, in which all member countries share representation. CEMA'sflavor is tempered, however, by the fact that in reality it is an agency carrying out the Bloc-wide economic objectives of the USSR. Consequently, Gosplan. the Council of Ministers, and the Central Committee of the Communist Party, USSR, function as organizations supervising and guiding CEMA.

* The estimates and conclusions contained in this report represent the best judgment of | |as of

The techniques employed by CEMA and related organizations revolve primarily around economic planning. CEMA. above all, is an organization coordinating plans among the European Satellites and between the Satellites and the USSR. This coordination is concerned mainly with the investment plans and production specialization patterns of the Satellite countries. In addition to this activity, CEMA, the state planning commissions, and the ministries of foreign trade all establish and guide Satellite trade policies.



Progress in achieving the objectives of CEMA. as set forth in the original CEMAas been uneven. Among these objectives, economic reconstruction of the member countries seems to have been realized or, at least, is well on its way. Steps also have been taken toward increasing the specialization of productionoviet Bloc-wide framework of division of labor and toward expanding the scope of standardization of products and materials within the member countries. These accomplishments are reflected by official statements as well as by existing production emphases whereby each member country specializes in producing certain commodities for itself and for the other members of the Bloc. The standardization of specifications as well as of production and management processes is based chiefly on Soviet standards which are being employed widely throughout the Bloc. That part of the CEMA Agreement calling for complementarywithin the Bloc is being achieved through coordinated planning, division of labor, bilateral trade agreements, and efforts aimedoordinated price system.

Soviet control over the direction and composition of Soviet Bloc trade is manifested in Soviet delegations working in the CEMA countries, in the prevalence of inter-Satellite trade agreements, snd through the establishment of regularized and specific trading In addition to controlling broad trade policies of the Satellites, the USSR supervises the intra-Bloc trade of certain specificThese controls over Bloc trade effectively contribute to the coordination and integration of the Bloc economies.

* See Appendix A.

A number of problems have developed9 which have impeded efforts toward.coordination and .integration. Complete inter-Satellite cooperation is prevented by occasional competitive bidding for Western markets snd by instances of trade monopolisation in certain commodities. Soviet planning directives on the first long-term plans of the Satellites have at times been overambitious. Problems arising from confused Soviet directives and from failure to coordinate plan revision! between individual countries have been left to Satellite officials to solve. In addition, confusion snd delays in shipping commodities among the Satellites and sporadicof delivery contracts, as well as shipping delays on the part of the USSR, have hindered the smooth growth of intra-Soviet Bloc coordination. An important problem facing Soviet leaders has been to gain the cooperation of all necessary officials in the CEMA countries for the carrying out of Soviet policies, which arein conflict with nationalistic sentiments. The pricing system is the least developed aspect of Soviet Bloc integration, as reflected in instances of price haggling between the Satellites, in price setting by individual countries, and in occasional inter-Sstellite price discrimination. Failure to solve these problems may well slow down and possibly even prevent integration...

ingle economic plan for the entire Soviet Bloc, in the senseingle master plan, has not yet been created, the plans ofe Satellites are now being coordinated with one another and with the USSR with respect both to major policies and to production goals for certain key commodities. The plan coordination among Bloc countries has increased to such an extent that their economies may now be regarded as largely coordinated, and although it is notthat the Bloc will be fully integratedhe eventual Soviet goal is. nevertheless, the full economic integration of the Bloc.

I. Introduction.

Coordination involves aligning various functions, usually of different organizations, and combining and orienting themore or less specific goal in order to achieve the results ofand harmonious action. For the purposes of this report, economic coordination is defined as centrally supervised Soviet Bloc plknning, production, and trade, with broad policy direction emanating from the USSR, Coordinationirst step in anytoward integration*

hase of development beyond coordination, involves uniting into one function, or placing under theingle organisation, those functions which previously had been performed separately by independent units or organisations* For the purposes of this report, economic integration is defined as comprising the following factors:entralized planning and division ofentralised allocations of raw and finishedhe establishmentoordinated and interlocked system of short- and long-term tradehe absence of harmful inter-Satellitenified price structure and financial system;xtensivein production and services, including the use of Soviet standards and specifications and the extensive use of technical assistance programs throughout the Soviet Bloc,

Once alt of these conditions are present, Soviet Bloc ^wideintegration would be an accomplished fact. For the functions of planning, production, trade, and finance, the Bloc could beas being an integral economic unit having unified economic goals and being directed by one authoritative organisation.

Whether or not the Soviet leaders are striving simply forof the economies or, beyond that, for integration is difficult to ascertain. Although it has been adequately demonstratedide range of sources that full coordination is being attempted, the

3 -


situation is not equally clear regarding integration. The USSR mayossible objectives in this Jatter respectomplete economic integration or only partial integration. If Soviet objectives can be obtained through partial integration, the Soviet leaders will not risk incurring Satellite' dissenslon-hy insisting upon more com-plete unification. Pragmatically, economic integration isoal in itBelf buteans toward the accomplishment of other objectives. An apparent lessening in the movement towardtherefore, would not necessarily mean that integration has been lost sight of or is being abandoned. essening might reflect either satisfaction on the part of the USSR with progress already achieved in this direction or temporary concessions granted to the Satellites by the USSR. These concessions, however, would not be such as to impede seriously major Soviet goals for the Bloc.

Long-range Soviet economic goals for the Bloc include the further Industrialisation of the member countries and the development and raising of individual Satellite production without losing control over these countries. The Soviet leadersignificantly increased gross national product (GNP) .for: the.Bloc and astronger^ trading position with regard to the West while regaining.relatively -independent of it. They also desire, through the mediumtrong Bloc, to penetrate underdeveloped countries .such aa those* iA Asia, Chiefly by the use of extensive economic-aid. Finally, the Soviet leaders seek to strengthen the .USSRonsolidating both thelntecnal and the qxternal position of itsnd integration, it would seem, would contribute to .theof these goal*..

A citation,of ahort-range Soviet economic goals includes the construction of atudimentary pr primary base of heavy

indusl ramificatic

nd long-range i

goal is the reduction' of agricultural deficiencies in both the USSR and the Satellites. Moscow is. also interestedore closely coordinated trade system for the Bloc, especially to insure the importation of specific commodities that.might have otherwise declined since tho termination of East German reparations and the abolition of most of the Joint Soviet-Satellite companies. he USSR Could be partially relieved of soma of the burden of industrializing the individual Satellites and Communist China by the establishmentigorously coordinated, and even integrated,

ccording to Communist doctrine, .heavy industry is .the material base of socialism, and machine building .is the/core of heavyheavy industrial ba'se"'ia a'current Soviet term meaning aor elementary level of machine'Voiding and primary metals industry.

Bloc economic system. Thus East Germany sndor example, are measurably contributing to the industrialisation of Albania and Chins. These short-range goals, as well as the longer range ones, establish the need for atoordinated, if not an integrated. Bloc economic system.

Proceeding beyond mere coordination, the movement towsrd Soviet Bloc economic integration perhaps inevitably stems in part from the nature of past and contemporsry Soviet Communism. If current Soviet dogma callsontinued and unlimited political and economic expansion (at an accelerating rale) as being necessary for the over-all advancement of Communism, then Bloc economic integration can be considered an eventual Soviet goal. itation of some Communist doctrinal statements supports this assumption. The worlddoctrine, which is well established, has been reiterated as recentlyenin prophesied that,eries of initial political and economic upheavals, nations would be mergedreat socialist unity.e also talkedfree federation of nations innd of the necessity.for "Russia" tothe advanced countries economically. 4/ Elaborating on this theme, Stalin notednion and collaboration of nationsingle world economic system is the material basis for world socialism,n the unfolding of the world revolution, hesocialist center" will form, attracting to itself all countries gravitating toward socialism. 6/ ommunist handbook statedorld dictatorship-of the proletariat would be promoted when newly established proletarian republics enterfederal union" with existing proletarian republics. 7/ Although theseof dogma are selective rather than inclusive, they dooctrinal basis for future economic integration of the Bloc.

The economic advantages which would accrue to the USSRnified Soviet Bloc economy point up the significance for the West of movements toward Bloc coordination and integration. Expanded trade capabilities stemminglanned division of labor and specialization of production in the various Satellites would result in better utilization of productive resources. This in turnigher degree of economic self-sufficiency for both the USSR and the Bloc. Developments in standardization of both specification and production.processes throughout the Bloc, supportedystem in which major .investments are planned from the USSR, also would contribute to- greater Bloc economic efficiency. rowth in over-all GNP should also result from .these developments.

The military significancenified economy on the relative capabilities and vulnerabilities of the Soviet Bloc would be such as to insulate itnit more effectively against both cold and hot war :

For serially numbered source references, see Appendix I.

cannot be accurately determined from

volume and types of goods traded withinrtne Biorrare not scrricient-to permit the charting of day-by-day developments in integration. It is" possible, however, to gain some picture of achievements infrom current information and to form an opinion regarding

current and future trends toward integration.


II. Organizational and Administrative Structure for Coordinated Economic Planning.

Soviet programs and activities are normally carried out with the help of special*institutional structures. The main organizations dealing with Soviet Bloc coordination and integration in the USSR and in the Satellites are CEMA, the state planning commissions or offices, and the ministries of foreign trade. With respect to economicand integration, the State Planning Committee (Gosplan) is superior in rank to CEMA, which works with the.Ministry of Foreign Trade, USSR. In all these activities, CEMA is superior to tbe planning commissions and the ministries of foreign trade of the member countries

A. Organization and Structure of CEMA.

CEMA, which was organized inas considered to be in part an answer to the West's Organization for EuropeanCooperation. It was also intended to facilitate trade among the Satellites, to increase their general productive capacity, and toto their greater self-sufficiency. 8/ iore basic objectivo in the establishment of CEMA, however, wae the coordination of Soviet


Bloc-wide planning and production so as to workivision of production for the mutual benefit of members of the Soviet Bloc, to standardize and Increase industrial production, to give grants and loans, and to make investments within the Satellites. 9/ At the time of its formation the signatory countries' were the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria. Albania joined9 and East Germany* '

The known organizational structure, ofs simple. It consistsupreme Council, an Executive Committee (Secretariat)ecretary General, and principal sections for planning,and production, foreign trade, labor, finance and price policies, raw materials, and capitalist market analysis. Subordinate to CEMA areilateral councils for economic and technical cooperation whichroliferation of subordinate commissions and committees, It is presumed that the main offices of these bilateral councils are located at the CEMA headquarters in Moscow. Finally, there are CEMA organizational outlets in the member

The top, or so-calledody of CEMA isthe Supremehis Council, according to the basic CEMAmeets as often as necessary, but at least quarterly. The Council's membership is composed of the CEMA countries, each being representederson with ministerial rank and/or otherof the economic institutions.n accordance with Soviet organizational patterns, the Supreme Council is the over-all, official ruling body of CEMA. its role being similar to (hat played by.the Supreme Soviet in the government of the USSR.

Real power within CEMA proper, however, is exercised not by the Council, but by the Executive Committee (Secretariat). This Committee, according to one report, even possesses the power "to deal with air questions related to economic cooperation within the Sovietocated in Moscow, the Committee is permanent, and is under the chairmanshipecretary. Pavlov, who has been identified earliereputy minister of the Soviet Ministry of Foroign Trade.

Representatives from the member countries to CEMA's Executive Committee in Moscow, as well as people working on CEMA matters in the various Satellites, are members of their respective planning committees, ministries of foreign trade, or other industrial ministries. This has been noted in the USSR, Bulgaria,ast Germany, zechoslovakia,lbania, Rumania, andn addition to the representatives from the state planning commissions and the ministries of foreign trade, specialists from various industries are brought into CEMA discussions from time to time when their particular industries are TheCommittee in Moscow has been reported astaff ranging

* Seeor the CEMA Agreement. ** See Figureollowing p. 8.


ew to several thousandizable staff is necessary if CEMA is to perform the mission which is outlined in the basic CEMA Agreement.

Below the Executive Committee arc theilateral councils (one for every combinationember countries). These are supported by at least the following commissions:

Planning andTrade


Each of these commissions, in turn, is assisted by several committees, such as the Committee for Commodity Exchange under the Foreign Trade Commission and the Committee for Division of Labor of theCommission for Industry, The number of these Committees, accordingly, ishe commissions meet-to resolve specific questions regarding plan coordination. These organizations,to and loosely grouped under CEMA.ast andinterlocking system of councils, commissions, and committees, all devoted to Soviet Bloc-wide economic coordination.

Each bilateral council is represented at CEMA headquarters in Moscowecretary general. These secretaries general discuss current problems, exchange experience, suggest proposals, and make decisions, which are then passed down through the bilateral councils to the subordinate commissions and committees and eventually to tha member

Soviet representatives from CEMA are attached to thegovernments, and there are subdivisions of CEMA in these CEMA representatives have been reported as located in the following state agencies;

East Germanyffice of Technical and Scientific

Poland Department of Cooperation with Other Countries in the State Economic Planning26/


Czechoslovakiaepartment of Economic, . Scientific, and Technical Collaboration

Hungaryommittee of EconomicOffice df International Economic)

It is assumed, therefore, that there is an organization within each Satellite government that is termed office of either Scientific and Technical Cooperation or of Economic Cooperation, which acts as the CEMA outlet within the respective countries. In addition, the state planning commissions and offices, as well as the ministries of foreign trade of the Satellites, maintain close working relations with CEMA.

B. State Planning Commissions and Offices.

1 Hi

Wweirhis assistance would provide ample opportunity for the coordination of Satellite planning.

C- Soviet Bloc Ministries of Foreign Trade and the Soviet Chief Directorate of Economic Relations.

Close working relations also exist between CEMA and the ministries of foreign trade of the member countries. In addition, the Chief Directorate of Trade with the People's Democracies Within the Ministry of Foreign Trade,eals with Satellite tradeand the Chief Directorate of Economic Relations (Glavnoye Upravleniye Ekonomicheekoy Svyaz'uSSR, maintains representatives in Albania, Bulgaria, East Germany, Communist China, North Korea, North Vietnam, and possibly even in Yugoslavia, Burma, Afghanistan, and India. The main purpose of such representation relates to the Soviet technical assistance programs.

The key economic planning agencies of the Satellite governments are the state planning commissions (State Planning Office inand National Planning Office inhich maintain working contact with the following Soviet agencies concerned with Satellite and Soviet Bloc-wide planning: CEMA, Gosplan, and the Ministry of Foreign Trade. With respect to Gosplan'a role, Kaganovichecent speech called for an improvement in both the system and the practice of long-range coordinated Soviet Blocuch an improvement may have been one reason for the organizational change (inividing the Soviet planning organization into the State Economic Commission (Gosudarstvennaya Ekonomicheskaya Komissiya Gosekonomkomissiya) for short-range planning and Gosplan for long-range planning. Existent evidence of long-range Bloc planight support the assumption that the Soviet planning apparatus (or that part of it found in Gosplan) is now structurally more able to concentrate on coordinating long-range Bloc planning. In thisepartment of Long-Term and Prospective Plans was created within the Polish State Economic Planning Commission in Details of the working relations between the USSR and the Satellite agencies thus far are not precisely known. The exact relation of Gosplan to CEMA Is unknown, but, since both agencies are concerned with Bloc planning,heir working connection musteasonably close

Isoviet experts assisting Satellite planners in the32/

In theomewhat similar pattern is assumed to prevail. The ministries of foreign trade are the organizationswith intra-Soviet Bloc trade. -In two instances (Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria) the ministries have taken over most, if not all, of the activities relating to economic cooperation among the


K.I. Koval* is the head of GUES, which wasindicates that this directorate was

formerly under the Ministryoreign Trade but ia nowto the Council of Ministers,UES, inbeing concerned with technical assistance, was probably alsowork with the Ministry of Foreign Trade and with CEMA toefficient and perhaps more rapid Soviet Bloc economicwell as to negotiate on defense commodities. The Engineeringwhich is subordinate to GUES. negotiates between countriesSoviet Bloc and, presumably, with, the West forn addition to thecientific-Technical Collaboration Directorate whichto it and is probably subordinate to GUES. TheDirectorate was under the Minister of Foreignnd was transferred to GUES after that date. Thethis Directorate. Lavrishchev,ho also doubles as aof GUES. t

III. Techniques and Mechanisms for Intra-Bloc Coordination and Integration.

Broad policy planning, specific production assignments, trade and financial relations, and Communist Party influence on anbasis all become, at times, techniques for Soviet Bloc-wide economic coordination and integration. Specific instances ofBloc planning for theeareflect such techniques. The CEMA Agreoment call* for: coordination of the economies of the member countries within the general framework of planning as prepared by the CEMA

Intra-Soviet Bloc trade relations as well as planning,reflecttechniques for coordination and integration. Long-termtrade agreements, for example, are the eventual expression. -

* Kovalormer Deputy Chief of the Soviet Control Commission in East Germany and was mentioned in5 as Vice Minister of Foreign Trade, USSR. He has signed for -the USSR protocols for technical assistance to Soviet Bloc

avrishchev was Deputy Chairman of Gosplan0 and for several years thereafter.'-

*** See Appendix A. 4 an official Soviet statement relative to intra-Soviet Bloc relations called for proportional development of the respective economies, socialist international division of labor, specialization and cooperation in production, and emphasis on heavy industrythat is, machine building and


A. Broad Policy Planning-

concepts are mentioned

The Soviet government, through CEMA, has long beenof centrally planningt least in broad outline formthe economies of the European Soviet Blocome reports even consider all Satellite plans to be officially channeled throughn discussing central planning for the Bloc, two differing

The first concept is that of

the existence, or near existence,ingle or integrated plan for the entire Bloc, The second concept treats the plans of the member countries at separate, but "adjusted" or coordinated with one another.

I. Single Plan.

The "single plan" thesis considers the economies of the USSR and the European Satellites to be so linked with one another and so closely directed and controlled from the center as toingle economic unit. ingle plan would involve extensive standardization of production, common or mutually complementary currency, unified and well-coordinated production and trading plans,

ivision of labor, with extensive specialization in production,

'discussed tne necessity for surveying lent machineryeveral other reports suggest integrated plan's if ifingle Soviet Bloc

2. Coordinated Plans.

There is littlo doubt that Individual Satellite plans are being coordinatedoviet Bloc-wide basis. The most widely quoted statement in this connection is that of the First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers.of the USSR, A. I.ninding together of the Soviet economy with the economies of the "People's Democracies"ith this announcementzechoslovak articlehich stated that members of CEMA will coordinate their economic plans and establish joint investment programs and joint outputwill coordinate their.industrial output,.and will setof productive forces. 4Ji/ This reiterates the provisions of the basic CEMA Agreement.

* Mikoyan has been both officially and unofficially associated with CEMA. It is believed that he is the Soviet leader at Presidium level concerned with CEMA activities and Soviet Bloc-wide coordinated planning.


all centrally controlled by the USSR.


Figureraces the plans of the Soviet Bloc members

7 Athat all mem-

bers of CEMA were clearing wilh one another at least their over-all. plans forear, and the plans of all member countries are coterminous for thia period with the exception ofhe beginnings and endings of the several plans were charted, by direction, inanner as to make it possible for them to run concurrently.- Even the present Five Year Plan of) can well be coordinated with the rest of the Blocearly basis:'

3. Decision-Making and Coordinating Powers of CEMA.

CEMA Is involved at times in detailed planning forBloc countries andto be completely coor-

ear plans for the The extent of CEMA's interventionIndicated by statements that decisions of its Council are binding and are never questioned and that final Satellite plans can be changed only with CEMA'sEMA's power was displayed when it held that Bulgarian payment for certain Czechoslovak exports was in conflictecision of the Council, that Albania could not sell oil, chrome, and asphalt to the West without permission from thend that CEMA canceled an Unused allocation to an East German locomotive plant because CEMA decided that this plant would no longer produce steam locomotives but would confine itself to tha'production of heavy diesel locomotives. Finally, *"

forbade Hungary to produce textile machinery.

Although Soviet loaders acknowledge that decisions are made officially by the Council of CEMA, they maintain such decisions are arrived at only with the* agreement of the countries involved, and the Sscrelary-General of CEMA told Gunnar Myrdal of the Economic Commission for Europe that CEMA is entirely advisory and consultative in/

The following occurrences show the influence of CEMA on the planning for one Satellite, East Germany. All members of CEMA were scheduled to participateeeting which wasplanned for5 for the purpose of coordinating economic planshe East German delegation from the Ministry of Heavy Industry stayed in Moscow the first half ofhere It submitted final documents for the First Five Year Plan, as'well as the draft plan for theear period, for all chief directorates of the East German Ministry of Heavy

/ Finally,eportthat only general linea

Following p.

of policy for the development bf heavy industry have been worked out for the Soviet Bloc countries as yet, because East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia were unable to submit surveys to CEMA of their Industrial capacities and raw material import requirements before the fall/ ollow-up to these events occurred when the delegation, which included representatives of the East German Ministries of Heavy Industry, Heavy Machine Construction, and



2 2




a Z



& 1 I

s <g





General Machine Construction and the State Planning Commission, flew to Moscow on5 to reach agreement with the Soviet officials on production tasks for East German machine construction. Thon the East German delegation spent part of November and December coordinating7 Plan with CEMA. Finally,

in6 mentioned the necessity for East uermany to formulate its Second Five Year Plan by6 in order to permit itsthe Soviet

In spite of certain reports indicating strong CEMAthextent to which Satellite planning in all its details ts directed from Moscow and from CEMA is unknown. umber of reports indicate, however, that the production of various Satellite commodities is being planned in Moscow, and other evidence suggests that CEMA is involved in the planned allocationumber of specific commodities. ist ofommodities whose production and trade are reported to be centrally planned in the Soviet Blocs shown in In the caee of three of those items, neither the planning agency nor its location is given. Three items are planned in Satelliten Leningrad;n Moscow (presumably either CEMA orndn Gosplan, Moscow; andre planned by CEMA.


the CEMA planning process to be as loilowrr-ano multilateral conferences are held between CEMA members to discuss speciality areas, such as coal, steel, and the like, and othor problems ofvolume expansion, and trade. The conference results, in the form of protocols, are then sent to CEMA Headquarters and are incorporated in the yearly plans of the respective countries. ecision is not reached in the conferences, it is made by CEMA. CEMA is also empowered to make needed adjustments in thetrade balances for key products and to alter the plans of individual countries accordingly. Each country thenelegation to Moscow to clear its final plan with

In addition to CEMA being mentioned as the motivating force behind individual Satelliteoviet "planners" have been identified at Satellite capitals, assisting theseofficials in preparing their plans. Although it is not known to what agency these "planners" belong, it must be either CEMA or Gosplan. In oneoviet representative (not further identified) had signed the draft plan of the Satelliteresumably to ensure its favorable treatment in Moscow.

4. Defense Planning.

Only very limited information is available on the success of efforts to integrato the Soviet Bloc economies in planning, producing, and trading defense materials and equipment. There is evidence that,

ollows on


Tabic 1

of Production and Trade Reported To Be Centrally Planned

in the Soviet Bloc.

Tabic 1

Commodities of Production and Trade Reported To Be Centrally Planned

in the SovietContinued)











in block* and rolled steel


and lead product*


machine construction


and ship*


nd optic*






industrial products









zecboslo vskia







and Czechoslovakia


Table 1

Commodities of Production and Trade Reported To De Centrally Planned

in the SovietContinued)





Plan Period

Soda plant Phenol plant Resin plant Imports and exports -Shipbuilding Electrical supply Shipbuilding

Textiles and agricultural and food products

and Czechoslovakia


Soviet Bloc Czechoslovakia East Germany


glass Czechoslovak exports Sugar

Roller bearings

Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia Hungary and Czechoslovakia Soviet Bloc

Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia and Czechoslovakia


Metallurgical Combine Hungary


nnd equipment Investment machinery

Bloc Soviet Bloc'



in addition to the presence of Soviet military advisers inome Bloc-wide coordination of military development and production The Engineering Directorate of GUES, and presumably the counterpart directorates or departments'in thegovernments, handle the procurement, jallocation. and export of commodities for military end use and even some of the end items themselves such as military aircraft. These directorates oralso at times control military equipmentEMA. in addition to the Engineering Directorates, has been identified in one analysis, as influencing defense production and as having military advisers attached to the CEMA Moscowhe Warsaw Conference of5 resultedloc-wide Treaty of Cooperation, Friendship, and Mutual Assistanceoint Military Command under Marshal This treaty should facilitate joint defense planning.

B. Detailed Production Planning.

[frequently contend that, in addition to the coordinarrcm-OT oroaa policies, many details in the Satelliteproduction plans are coordinatedoviet Bloc-wide

A CEMA form* was reportedly Bent to the East German Bureau of Statistics for the purpose of listing the present condition of and the future plans for development of East German industrialof major importance.he use of this form supports other evidence that monthly production statistics and records of consumption of the Satellites, as well as stocks on hand, are sent to This information also indicates that the obligation in the-CEMA Agreement, Articleo the effect that all members are to submit monthly production information to CEMA's Secretary General, ia being complied .

The production tasksatellite are reported to have been actually delegated by0 meeting in Budapest under CEMA auspicesesolution calling for proportional sharing of the manufacturing program between Poland andrague spokesman expressed his interest in the productionquare meters of window glass following Bulgaria's offe; "through CEMA" of soma free production capacity.

.yiuicnuii^iui -cno ir.eezi possibly meaning


available. Bulgarian production capacity. Finally, unused production capacity for rolled steel has been offered bySatellite to

In this connectionthe

Bulgarian officials that for the purpose, of reserving production(presumably, notification was necessary byn authoritative role has been played by-CEMA in the specific planning

* This form was described as "preparedulgarianhus suggesting Soviet Bloc-wide distribution of the form.



> state that bee approveentire pro-

of coal In Silesia and chemicals in Rumania as well as the planning of penicillin, steel mills, textile machinery, passenger cars, coal, machino tools, :and abrasives in other CEMA reportedly has ordered East Germany to increase byercent the production of its heavy machine building sector/ This authoritativen detailed planning is supportedeport contendingatellite'! production tasks, once assigned, may not be changed without the approval of CEMA. CEMA has-even been reported asommon Eastern European pool foreminiscent of the Schumann Plan. Evidence exists that the annual production plan of East Germany is closely directed by key Soviet officials. Walter Ulbricht, Deputy Prime Minister of East Germany, disclosedecent speech that adjustment of the most important "control figures" between the USSR and the Soviet Bloc countries reflects "great initiative" on the part of the USSR. He also noted that "amended" control figures for East Germany resulted from arrangements with Blochose "control figures" are interpreted here to mean the key targets in6 Plan. Moscow can amend. If necessary, .and duction plan oX'Bast"

JBeriln notified Tat Bulgarian

try ol Foreign Trace ol ah fc-ail German request for'manganese oreextent0 tons0 tons. These figures were listed in the protocol byJ7 This Commission is- presumably one ofcommissions functioning under the auspices of'


Integrated planning has not yet progressed to the stage in which Satellite planning in all its minute details is performed in Moscow. This is shown by the fact that these governments occasionally confer among themselves on production problems of mutual concern without making any distinct reference either to Moscow or tohis procedure may not be inconsistent with integrated planning, however, since Soviet internal planning procedureertain degree of local-plan formulation with later review and amendment by higher governmental organizations.

' ' it ion in Production.

Communist leaders have recognizedumber of years the economic advantages Inherent in production specialization

according to the principle of comparative advantage. They have declared their intention to move toward an economically integrated orbit by having each country specialize, at least to some extent, in those commodities to which it Is best suited by virtue of its natural

resource base. For example. Otto Grotewohl,'Prime Minister of East Germany, statedecent speech that it would be possible to encourage the production of certain products in the country in which

the most favorable conditions exist. 8Sfecent Rumanian news-

paper editorial-maintained that the socialist division of labor and the



most rational,of resources constitute the new and higher level to which cooperation among the "People's Democracies" and between" those governments and the USSR is According toocialist division of labor is developing under which all the "People'snited camp, supplement each other economicaUy. Each of these countries develops its economy in the light of its natural resources, domestic needs, and the demands of the entire world "Democratic" market. Without cooperation in planning it would be impossible to organize and maintain this division ofzechoslovak economic journal stated that, although it is notary for every nation to build up all branches of heavy industry, each nation should be able to develop that branch of heavy industry for which it has particularly favorable

ecent article in Szabad Nep states that the socialist international distribution of labor makes it possible for each country to produce chiefly those products and to develop those branches of industry for which the conditions in each country are most favorable. Although creationase of primary materials andational heavy industry is necessary for each country because these constitute the basisealthy development of the entire nation's economy, there are distipct opportunities for specialization under the peculiar conditions existing in the several

All of these statements ^appeared in4lthough declarations of Communist leaders concerning specialization and division of. labor among the Satellites have appeared from time to time in previouseritable raft of such statements has been made during the past year. Another significant aspect of these declarations is that they relate not only to division of labor which has already taken place or is now taking place, but also to that which is to occur in the future.

There appears at first glanceontradiction in-current Communist doctrine which states on the one hand that each member country of the. Soviet Bloc muse "build a. heavy industrial base but on the other hand that each must specialize in thoseodifies for which it is best .suited by reason of its natural resource base and by virtue of .Bloc,he.Soviet explanation of this apparent contradiction would lie in three, main points, as follows:

First, over-all Soviet economic goals are morethan pure "economic" efficiency, abstractly conceived. pecific goal, such as development of machine building, might be pursued, irrespective of the cost factor,eeming loss might be allowed in developed specialization.

Second, each country's long-range development and strength must be taken into consideration. Some Soviet Bloc specialization perhaps may be sacrificed for the long-term goal of strengthening each country's industrial development. Each country



thus would have an industrial safety factor of atimited heavy industrial development to rely uponar situation in which it might be severed from the Bloc.

Third, the establishmentudimentary industrial base in each country, seemingly contrary to specialization, may in the long run facilitate specialization by enabling each country to become more flexible in its production abilities and thus better able to handle various central production assignments. This would stem from the fact that each country wouldore ramified and widely distributed industrial capacity. Current plans call for the various countries to specialize with respect to capacity and resources within the broad frameworkeavy industrial base.


Since World War II, and especially since thein the "new course" inach of the Satellites, as noted above, has sought,reater or lesser degree, to provide itself with some formeavy industrial base, if such base has.not been developed previously and to enhance its specialization in the production of certain commodities. Although some of thia specialization has resulted of necessity from the type of natural resources base with which each country is endowed, more of it has resulted from deliberately planned development. Although it is not-possible to quantify precisely the degree of specialization already developed among the Satellites, information concerning trends in specialization and the types ofapecialized'in can be obtained by examination of existingproduction patterns, by analysis of trade patterns, and by consideration of known instances of deliberately planned specialization.

Distribution Patterns.

In viewthe relatively short period of time that Satellite production has been influenced by national planning and by inter-Satellite coordination, broad patterns of commodity distribution among the Satellites should reflect in part the specializations inherent in the natural resources base as well as in the historical pattern of industrial development of each of these countries. The historical production patterns* may provide insight into the patterns that may be expected to emerge from future coordination and integration.


Exports are generally indicative of production specialization in the exporting country. ountry^ exports increase faster than its GNPiven period, the inference can be made, other factors remaining constant, that specialization in the production of export commodities has been increasing during

See Appendix C*



concerning each country's exports. The exports of Bulgaria are pri-marily agricultural commodities and certainhe exports of Czechoslovakia are primarily certain types oTTnduetrial machinery and equipment, chemicals, textiles, and other manufactured The exports of Hungary are bauxite and aluminumther Information indicates that Hungary also exports machine tools, electrical equipment, motor vehicles, railroadand The exports of East Germany are primarily various kinds' of heavy machinery and machinehe exports of Poland are coal and coke, certain metals and their products, rolling mill products, and various kinds of manufactured Finally, the exports of Rumania are petroleum and its derivatives, as well as agricultural products, lumber, and wood

d. Planned Development of Specialization.

Thereumber of known instances of planned specialization in one or another of the Satellites. The development of the aluminum industry of Hungary is probably the foremost example. Considerable specialization hag also taken place in the chemicaland will no doubt be increasedesult of efforts which are being made among the major chemical-producing .countries

In the past several years there have been many reports of collaboration occuring between various Satellites in the field of industry in addition to those in foreign trade. Agreements which have been signed between Hungary and Poland and between Hungary and Czechoslovakia are designed to bringore rational utilization of the available metal rolling equipmenthe agreements allocated production of different kinds of rolled metals among the threelso, attempts reportedly were made to coordinate iron and steel production among Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.

Development of specialization among the Satellites has been furthered greatlyeries of bilateral productionagreements and similar protocols signed among the Satellitesresumably under the guidance of CEMA. On4 an agreement on cooperation in the field of light industry was signed between East'Germany and Poland, and on4 the formerimilar agreement withakia. The latter agreement provided that, among other things, all lead pencils would be produced in Czechoslovakia and all office machines would be produced in East imilar protocol was reportedly signed between East Germany and Poland for the chemical industry, in which it was agreed that East Germany is to develop its chemical industryignite basis and that Poland, though completing its present lignite combine, is to develop its industryitrcoal basis, each country agreeing not to develop those industries in which the other is to specialize. Such production specialization agreements are to be an integral part of theear plans of the/



Other arrangements have been made, and commu-sions for economic cooperation relating to specific industries have been set up. overnment Commission for Economic Cooperation in the Chemical Industry has been established between Polandhereommission for Economic Cooperation in the Field of Light Industry between East Germany and Bulgaria. / Inrotocol was signed between East Germany and Bulgaria to cover economic cooperation in the field of machine building./oegotiations were carried on between Hungary and Bulgaria concerning cooperation in agriculture and the food/ Finally, it was reported that4 awas formed to organize coordination between East Germany and other Satellites with regard to development and production of measuring equipment and electromechanical control gear. One of the tasks of the latter commission will be to decide which country will produce which type of equipment. imilar commission had already been set up for the coordination of machine tool/ Production of ball bearings has been similarly coordinated and/

A statement by I. Dudinskiy4 is concerned with cooperation between the USSR and the Satellites. In theplans of theivision of labor permits each country to devote part of its production to satisfying the need of other Satellites. Special attention is devoted to those branches of heavy industry for which favorable local conditions are/

Specialization in the Sixth Five Year Plan Period.

Various statements have been made by Satellite officials concerning the branches of industry in which each country is to specialize during theear planhich are to be developed and carried out within theSoviet Bloc-wide plans. In addition, two other statements are of considerable significance. An article in Pravda pointed out that "disproportions" had developed in the economies of the European Satellitesesult of their efforts to buildeavy industrial base in each country. By "disproportion" the author meant that the growth of agricultural production was insufficient to satisfy the growing needs of the workers. Theso disproportions were liquidated by regrouping capital investments; such regrouping, however, was notetreat from the primary development of heavy/ Present andear plans may further correct these disproportions1', either by concentrating production on agricultural products in those Satellites with primarily rural economies (Albania, Bulgaria, andr by deemphasizing heavy industry in favor of agriculture in some of the other countries.

Announcements ofear plans, and even the yearly plans of the Soviet Bloc countries, may reflect the constructioneavy industrial base in each country. In East Germany, for



example,6 Plan calls for anincreased investment in machineompared withercent and an increase in heavy industry (presumably takenhole) of/ Although it is acknowledged that East Germany is one of the more industrially advanced Satellites, these significant increases reflect earlier announced Communist objectivesurrent accent on heavy industry as well as an expected specialization in machine building.

Specialization of production in thes shown in Appendix D,* The table lists fours) reported specializationlanned specializationroduction patternsxport patterns The data in this, table are necessarily incomplete, and,ew instances bothre taken from the same source. Making allowances for these limiting factors, it is concluded that each Satellite not nowwilludimentary heavy industrial base, and, each will specialize in at least the following commodities for purposes of Soviet Bloc-wide coordinated production:

V* "luminum, bauxite,ools, transportation equipment, and agricultural


lbaniagricultural products and

Bulgariagricultural products and mining industry.

Rumaniail and oil derivatives,products, lumber, and wood products.

East Germanymachine building, machine tools, precision instrurhertts. transportation equipment, chemicals, and derivatives.

Czechoslovakiaeavy industrial production machine building, machine tools, agriculturalhemicals, aircraft, and certain textiles, " and perhaps some transportation equipment.

ining, metal products, coal and coke, agricultural products, transportationchemicals; leather goods, and certain manufactured products. '

* In Communist doctrine, machine building is the core of heavy industry.elow.


ave uecil Ul

are in the proce'ss of being standardized, onatellite-to-Satellite,SSR basis. Although some countries are setting or continuing their own standards where needed for certain commodities not applicable to the Soviet standards, the latter are becoming the leading pattern for Bloc-wide standards.

Standardization, once entered into, is seemingly Industrial standardizationong-term process and, by adopting uniform Soviet Bloc standards, each Satellite is therefore committedloc industrial orientationonsiderable length of time. The applicability of this orientation for long-termis to be noted in assessing future integration.

* Standardization is normally considered to be the establishment of specific characteristics and qualities which determine theproportions and quality of certain manufacturedTh* Sovietr norms, called GOST's, are example* ofn this report, standardization will apply to industrial and production processes and management as well a* toand* See Appendix E.


The participation of CEMA in Soviet Blocis littlo known, although it seems to be expressed in the implementation of Soviet standards in the Satellites as well as through the medium of Soviet technical assistance. Theside of standardized commodities is that of standardized processes and techniques. In this connection an Hungarian press report names CEMA as being instrumental in the coordination of standardization in production as well as in/ In1 an inter -Satellite agreement was signed for atariff in through traffic and for mutual use of freight cars. Ill/onference of five Satellites was held in Budapest toschedules of passenger cars in International

Czechoslovakia, Poland, and East Germany have been activelySoviet/

The extensive part being played by technical assistance in standardization, within the framework of CEMA's guidance, should not be underestimated. umber of Soviet specialists have acted as advisers to all Soviot Bloc countries. In addition, technical specialists from the more industrially advanced Satellites are sent into the more rural ones to advise on technical problems. reat deal of technical information is exchanged among the Satellites and between theand the USSR. In his speech before the XX Party Congress, Khrushchev announced that the USSR is helping the Satellitesnterprises and more thaneparate workshopshere have been even reports of Soviet "axperta" in these countries who were actually sent to learn technology rather than to impart technical/ The impact on Bloc standardization of large numbers'of visiting tochnical advisers can bo readily-The additional factor of indirect control arising from Soviet aid is no small consideration in the over-all technical assistance program.

EffortB to develop standardization are not limited to commodities and processes. Plans for railroad and air transportation seek to standardize.passenger and baggage service. Uniform rates for transit traffic within the Bloc have been established and agreements between all Bloc countries prescribed uniform raiLfreight andregulations. In5 there were reports that transit'permits for Satellites to ship goods to other Satellites through the USSR were no longer/ The commodities and processes reported as standardized or being standardized in the Soviet Blocre shown in Appendix.E,* This table indicates that muchhas been Bloc standardization, though the system has been neither completed nor perfected.

* The Central Committee of the East German Communist Party and other leading East German bodies have suggested the introduction of Soviet COST normsong time. The USSR, however, advised East Germany to continue her membership in the (all-German) German Committee on Norms (Deutscher NormenaueschussNA) and to refrain from using exclusively Soviet norms, in order to avoid curtailment of her trade with Western countries. East German scientists and-technicians have been participating in the DNA's efforts to establish'German industry norms (Deutsche Industrie Normwo-thirds of the members Of the Presidium of the DNA areof West Germany, and one-third are representatives of East Germany. The DNA represents Germany in the International Organization for Standardization (ISO). The committees of the ISO include both East and West.German*elow.



C. Trade Relationships.

The intensification and regulation of intra-Soviet Bloc trade transactions have an intimate and direct relation to economicand integration. There are three main types of intra-Bloc economic collaborationhe technical-cooperation agreements, the general economic agreements (relating to productionnd the trade agreements. Since only the lattor type is considered to be an instrument specifically for trade, it is the only one of the three that is discussed in this report.

1 As the regulation of intra-Soviet Bloc trade increases, one report concludes, foreign trado ministries of the Bloc countries more and more closely resemble internal wholesale trading agencies administering established/ By controlling reparations payments, directing joint corporations, dominating the sources of certain materials and equipment, and controlling the composition of trade through the bilateral agreements the USSR actually has been able, in addition to regularizing trade, to direct the pattern of production in some of the Satellites./ Since the Satellites are often dependent upon the USSR for imports of raw materials, the simple procedure of regulating the exports of Soviet raw materials to the Satellites by the USSR hasertain extent the effect of regulating/ This regulation in the chemical industry, for example, shows that intra-Bloc trade relations themselves become Bloc-wide coordinating/ The position of the USSR asin intra-Bloc shipments thus permits it toominating influence on Satellite industrial development. The importancecorrect" attitude in trade relations between the USSR and the Satellites is reflected by an incident in which Soviet leaders are alleged to have purged Bulgarian officialsor demanding more favorable trade terms from the/

1. Organizational Structure.

Intra-Soviet Bloctrade is carried out through theof foreign trade of the respective countries chiefly by meansagreements and through the trade sections offoreign trade enterprises in the form of joint-stockcompanion associations with limited responsibility./ companies, although legally independentin fact subordinate to their respective ministries of .

The organizations conducting trade in the Satellites are similar to those in the USSR. In Albania thereinistry of Trade, in Eastinistry of Foreign and Domesticnd in each of the other five Satellites thereinistry of Foreign Trade. In each of these countries, with tho possible exception of Albania and East Germany, thereirectorate or department similar in function to that of the Engineering Directorate in the USSR which works closely with the Ministry of Foreign Trade,





In each of the Foreign Trade Ministries of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, and East Germany thereirectorate or Department of Trade with the "People's" IZB/

A supplementary trade organization, the Chief Directorate of Soviet Property Abroad (Glavnoye Upravleniye SovetskimlmushchestvomSSR wasafter World War II to direct the Soviet-Satellite joint stock companies for purposes of economic penetration of the Satellite governments and of Austria, chiefly for the purpose of supplying goods to the USSR from these countries. IZbl InUSIMZ was removed from direct subordination to the Council of Ministers, USSR, and was placed under the Ministry of Foreign/5 the activities of GUSIMZ virtually hadhe economic exploitation and penetration carried oul by GUSIMZ through the joint stock companies was greatly diminished when most of these companies were returned to the jurisdiction and control of their respective countries following their purchase from the USSR, in effect, by these Satellites. These activities, once the scope of GUSIMZ, are no doubt adequately handled for the USSR through CEMA, the Ministry of Foreign Trade, and the Party

2. Operational techniques.

Operational techniques in planning and directingBloc foreign trade are rather extensive and complicated. light of CEMA's mission; it is believed that thissupervises intra-Bloc trade and even controls part of SomeCEMA to be planning the entire

trade volume of the Bloc / Such complete planning is question-


able, however.

It should also be noted that bateuuesegotiate with one another on various commodities for trading with no apparent reference made either to Moscow or to/

Nevertheless', on balance, CEMA apparentlylose and intimate relation to the planning and guiding of Soviet Bloc trade; This is evidenced by the necessary association of planning with trade, as well as by the number of meetings and agreements between CEMA members dealing with intra-Bloc trade problems'./

CEMAignificant part in establishing broad policy lines of "development in foreign trade for the Soviet Bloc, as well as in planning specific techniques of trade. EMA document lists such techniques as operational settlements.

- 28

bookkeeping, and customs accounting to be used by foreign trade representatives in their transactions. The document also contains specific procedures for conducting foreign trade transactions and for listing the required Information to be kept in the files of the trade organizations./

Other evidonce ascribes to the Soviet government arole in such varied activities as providing information to Hungary to permit it to bidlant for manufacturing superphosphate of calcium for Uruguay, setting Soviet Bloc timber export prices to the Welt, and approving protocols for intra-Bloc bilateral and trilateral trade/

3. Trade Agreements.

A significant device used by the Soviet government in controlling long-range plans of the Soviet Bloc countries is that of control over long-term trade agreements. asic element inCEMA control over trade is the regulation and general supervision of the extensive bilateral trade agreements, or treaties, which determine both the system of trade and lta mannerhese agreements arc usually made between the ministries of foreign trade of the respective countries, and they cover specific commodities at fixed ruble/ Although bilateralism in intra-Bloc trade is the norm, there have been some instances of trilateral agreements./ Finally, there appear to be an Increasing number of long-term agreements,/ probably in support of the long-range economic plan. One report lists East German long-term trade agreements which have been signed with all CEMA members except Bulgaria for the/ No evidence is available that any long-termhave been consummated for/ An

tdescribes the long-term trade agreements as tne chief instruments for coordinating tho economic plans of the signatory/ These agreements reportedly fix only the key products to be traded, not the specific volume of trade for individual/ The agreements are under continualin order to alleviate recurring problems./ Payments for the commodities are handled through the respective state banks. The agreements specify the type of goods to be exchanged. The actual trade is carried out through the foreign trade organizations, each of which is authorized toertain type of commodity accordingpecific list. Thus the trade organizations in the particular countries sign contracts calling for specifications, variety, volume, prices, terms of payment, and terms of delivery. The contracts are backed up by the concurrence and approval of the ministers of foreign trade of the respective countries. In cases of complaints, anboard, sitting in the capital of the respondent In the complaint, supposedly resolves the controversy./


The method of specified in contracts following up each intra-Soviet Bloc agreement. Listed in these contracts are the price of the goods, the manner in which accounts are balanced, the service charges, and the exchange rate./ The contracts alsofor central bank accounts in the names of the ministers of foreign trade, to which all transactions are/ Payment for specific transactions is made withinays following receipt of the appropriate documents and goods on the basis of the invoices. Any dispute over quality of goods may defer partial or total payment. The money is handled through the state banks of the respective countries by means of the inkasso form. The exporting organizations receive their payment upon presentation of the appropriate/ The trade agreements usually call for trade deficits to be balanced quarterly or semiannually through shipments of goods or, occasionally, cash payments./

Although Satellites have cleared their trade accounts independently, without assistance fromrequent mention is made of Soviet intervention in intra-Soviet Bloc financial transactions, chiefly through the granting of long-term credits by the USSR to the member countries'of thehrushchev announced that long-term credits have been given by the USSR to tho Satellites totalingilliony the use of these credits, the USSReasure of control over the respective economies by specifying'ond use and by establishing.the method of repayment./

D. Financial Integration.

' 1; Pricing.

Financial integration would require the establishmentwell-coordinated and uniform Soviet Bloc pricing system. set their own prices, however, with or without theof Moscow. There are. for example, instances ofbetween Satellites, even to the extenthe problem of price confusion between membersBloc caused in part by individual Satellite pricebe alleviated cither by the intervention of Moscow, becausethe final word in establishing or at least influencing prices, orBloc-wide agreement to charge similar prices to all CEMA The latter alternative is probably the one favored bythe

With respect to uniform Soviet Bloc pricing, there has been mentionDemocratic ^Soviet BlocJ World Market Price" as the standard for new articles. Reference has also been made to the "official pricehat is, that "Democratic" world market prices are also understood to be world market prices. Within therotocol agreementingle direct freight rate has been signed, and there is evidence of agreed-upon Bloc price/ Thereeportocumented price list for Bipc


it with

trade, supposedly toeasure of Satellite independence from world (Western) market prices./ CEMA's role in coordinated pricing is not clear. There have been references to CEMA's indirect participation in price setting, / and to advantageous creditsormal interest rate ofercent being granted in the form of goods to the members of CEMA by the/ It could well be assumed that CEMA performs the function of an arbiter and perhaps that of an over-all directing authority in questions of Bloc prices, at lea respect to certain commodities.

Payments to CEMA.



IV. Prospects for Coordination and Integration.

Many obstacles must be overcome before complete economicof the Soviet Bloc is attained. Although Soviet leaders are generally successful at solving problems within their area of control, it is entirely conceivable that formidable obstructions have forced and will continue to force compromises in Bloc Integration,

One of the obstacles to smooth coordination has been an clement of competition between individual Satellites, such as that in exploiting export markets outside.the Soviet Bloc. Report* show competitive bids by Satellites, the failure of one Satellite to inform another of external export bids, and the monopoly of trade in certain commodities./ This indicates imperfectly coordinated planning. There is also the problem of inter-Satellite competition for specific material* in short supply. Carefully planned material allocations may alleviate but expected to solve the problem of internal Bloc shortages.

Other obstacles that coordination faced In the past were at the planning level. Becauseontinuing autarkic orientation among the Soviet Bloc countries and insufficient experience in the field of intra-Bloc planning, early efforts at coordination were frequently esult, unduly ambitious programs were forced on some Satellite* by CEMA. investment plans were not coordinated, and export commitments essential to tho plans of the Satellites were not fulfilled. There were cases of plan revisions in one country which were not coordinated with the plans of other countries, leading to mounting confusion in the planning of production. / Centrally planned specialization also may be hindered by nationalistic sentiments still persisting within the Satellites.

Delays and even failures of one Satellite or of the USSR toplanned shipments to another Satellite, following from weaknesses in coordinated planning, create inevitable production bottlenecks for the recipient/ For example, failures have occurred in the' shipment of construction blueprints and of plant and construction equipment, and there have been instances when an excess number of railroad cars was sentarticular/ "

insufficient export orders from the USSR for an East German plant, sudden cancellation by the USSRrade agreement with East Germany, lack of cooperation between two Satellitesanufacturing process, excessive bureaucracy within CEMA, refusal by an East German ministry, to submit production information to the Soviet trade delegation, and disagreements and contract violations


between member countries./ There also havehas forced Satellites to export item* needed in thbir Thus Poland was forced to overexport chemicalsPolish industry.


Movements toward Soviet Bloc integration thus have faced re'curring obstacles which apparently have forced certain compromises by Soviet officials.ih this connection. The compromises have resulted in giving more consideration to nationalistic sentiments within certain Satellites.

Some of the above problems would be inevitable in any coordinated effort, and others (such as superfluous bureaucracy) seem relatively inconsequential to the success or failure of economic integration. In fact. Soviet Bloc coordination may not suffer unduly frommall degree of Satellite competition in external Bloc trade.

Recent developments in East Germany, where the USSR abolished the Soviet High Commission, returned the joint companies, and signedGerman agreements granting "sovereignty" to that country, all point up the Soviet desire to end or at least to diminish its more obvious and crude forms of control over the Satellites. Soviet officials appear to be placing more reliance on the relatively subtle techniques of control, such as CEMA and the Communist Parties. Other developments, such as abolishing all but one of the joint Soviet* Rumanian Corporations, also point up thltf trend.

The termination or deemphasis of the more obvious forms of Soviet control over the Bloc has set the stage for erecting anof mutual cooperation between the USSR and the Satellites and among the Satellites themselves.

In spite of the obstacles and compromises noted in the movement toward coordination and integration of the Soviet Bloc economies, demonstrable progress has been made in this direction. -aThe if olio wing conclusions may be drawn:

he economic plans for all the European Satellites are being coordinated forear plan, with all plans but those of Bulgaria running coterminous'for this period. Over-all direction of the economic,plans of the Satellites as well asover the planning of specific items, at least for some commodities, are exercised by the USSR through the instrumentality of CEMA- In Soviet Bloc-wide planning, CEMA is the mainthrough which Soviet economic directives are disseminated throughout the Bloc and isolicy body for receiving and clearing Satellite plans for Soviet approval. In addition, CEMA directly intervenes and controls the planning of certain commodities for production and trading by the Satellites. In all these activities, CEMA is considered to be at least indirectly subordinate to Gosplan, USSR, and to the Council of Ministers, USSR.

n spite of rather extensive and progressively systematic Soviet Bloc-wide plan coordination, there is too little evidence to stateingle economic plan involving all leading commodities in all the Satellites exists, although some trends seem to point toward the eventual establishment oflan.



Efforts continue toward workingivision of labor throughout the Soviet Bloc which could be expected to result in greater Blocevelopment, and independence. On the principle that each Satellite should develop atudimentary base of heavy industry if such does not already exist, each country has begun planned specialization in the commodities for which it is best suited from the point of view of raw materialseveloped industries, andlocation, as well as of the economic needs of the Bloc. In addition to specialization in production, the members of the Bloc are tn the process ofumber of commodities and some services thus pointingore integrated economic Bystem.

Although the Soviet Bloc countries use the ruble as themonetary unit in Bloc trade and more or less adhere to stabilized prices,fotr intra-Bloc trade, extensive financial integration within the Bloc haset been achieved. The pricing system is the least developed aspect of Bloc integration.

The organizational components carrying out coordination and integration within the Soviet BlocCEMA, the Communist Party, the state planning commissions and offices, and the ministries of foreign tradend related organizations seem adequately structured to achieve the results desired by the USSR in the way of economic coordination and integration.

The Soviet Bloc has nowegree of coordination sufficient to typify itoordinated economy. Proceeding from coordination to the question of integration, the Soviet leaders haveery positive start in this direction, and some features of economic integration of the Bloc have already been achieved. it is concluded,ong-range goal of the present Soviet leadership. umber of features of integration have not been realized as yet (such as complete central material andallocations, the elimination of any marked inter-Satellite competition,ompletely unified financialhe trend toward integration has been in force

lthough significant and rather steady progress has been made9 in integrating the economies of the Soviet Bloc, it is not anticipated that the Bloc will be fully integrated It is concluded that the Soviet leaders will continue to work toward the eventual goal of full economic, integration of the Bloc.'




The representatives of the Governments of the USSR, of the People Republic of Poland, of the People's Republic of Czechoslovakia, of the People's Republic of Rumania, of the People's Republic of Hungary, ant of the'Pebpie's Republic of Bulgaria, meeting today in Moscow, have agreed on the following;

Article 1: There is hereby createderiod oftwenty) years an economic organization to be called the Council of Mutual Economic Aid; composed of the countries represented and cited above.

Article 2: The purpose of this organization is:

, (a) to coordinate the economies of the signatory countries within theeneral economic plan;

to study, in each of the participating countries, the development of industries particular to that country, in order that the industries of all the signatory countries may'complement each other andomogenous whole;

to support the economic reconstruction of each country, taking into consideration their possibilities of production and supplies of raw materials;

to increase theproductioh capacity of each country by the creation of join* corporations, or other organizations, for theand exploitation of agricultural and mineral wealth;

organize the exchange of information;

(f) to standardize and'increase industrial production incountries, from the quantitative as well as theof

. (g) to .guarantee the sale of industrial or other

(h) to give grants or loans or to make investmentsiew toward the economic consolidation of'each'.of the signatory countries.

Article 3: Within theframework of the Council there is hereby created aSecretariat, to be located in Moscow, and'having at itsundone hundred million) rubles per year, to be paid as follows: y the USSR,

* /


top smit

rubles, by each of the othor signatoryubles.9 these sums should be placed at the disposal of the General Secretariat by the 1st of

Article 4: The Council .will meet as often as necessary and at least once every three months, each timeifferent signatory country; the meetings will be presided over by the delegate of the government of the country where the meeting is held, and will have aa its aim the discussion of the economic situation in each country.

Article 5: Beginningconomic plans for each country will be drawn up following the suggestions and advice of the Council. For the current year, coordination of existing plans will be sought in the light of the present agreement and will conform to the process verbaux of the Council regarding each country.

Article 6: The present agreement does not in any way exclude, annul or change existing economic agreements between the signatory countries, among themselves or with others, of which the Council is cognizant.

Articlehe Council may decide upon all applications for. admission into the Council of countries not partieipatAng tn the act of constitution, with the consent of the General Secretary.

Article 8: Each signatory country must place at the disposal of tho Council or of the Gene ral Secretary all information and documentary material needed to permit and facilitate the work of observers that the Council or tho General Secretary may find necessary to send to each signatory country.

Each signatory country must also accept and follow the advice of the advisors or technicians that the Council or the General Secretary may find necessary to send into any of the mem-bcr countries of the Council. '

Article 9: The governments of the signatory countries promise to send to the General Secretary sometime during the first five days of each month detailed statistics, documentary reports and all other useful information concerning the economic'and financial situation of their country. The General Secretary'may make any decisions, subject to eventual ratification by the Council, having as their aim the correction, alleviation or .elimination of any deficiencies in the monthly situation' of 'a country'in relationhe general plan of the Council.

: The decisions of the General Secretariat are final

and binding.

The present agreement becomes valid upon its signatureeriod of twenty years. It may be prolonged for


successive periods of six years each. Any of the contracting parties may signify their desire to terminate the agreement by written notice five years before its expiration.

Drawn up in Moscow on9 in six copies, Russian. Polish, Czechoslovak, Rumanian, Hungarian.and Bulgarian, each copy having' the same validity.




Properties In the

At the end of World War II the USSR tookumber of German, Italian, and Japanese assets in the Soviet Bloc countries. Most of these assets, totaling somethingnterprises in the European Bloc, were returned to the Satellite countries in which they were located by the end 54 some of the enterprises were reformed into jointly owned enterprises, the USSR owningercent and the respective Satellite owningercent.

The general partnership principle upon which the Joint companies operatedontribution by the USSRertain amount ofand skilled personnel (chiefly directors and engineers)ontribution by the Satellites of the physical installations, natural wealth (mines, oilfields, and thend workingisting of former and present Soviet properties in the European Satellites4 and their current status is shown in Table

Soviet Bloc Undertakings.

The Joint undertakings in the Satellitesrivileged position derived from special legislation. The companies were free from taxes, from export duties, and from nationalization lawsproperty, they werepecific profit, and they couldarticular field of/

Tho system of Soviet-Satellite Joint companies,ew exceptions, was nohort-run policy which tended to drain the resourcos of the Soviet Bloc more than it strengthened/ The political benefits derived from the transfer of the companies to the Satellite governments were of value to the USSR. Reportshowever, toonsiderable share of the control of the new Satellite enterprises to the/ Liquidation of the joint undertakings also may have been caused partly by the Soviet reluctance toumber of widely separated, minor operations. The most important single reason for the dissolution of these joint companies was to end the most blatant Soviet control over the Satellites.

* There is an extended listing of Soviet technical aid, machinery, and equipment sent to industries and plants in Poland. Rumania. Bulgaria, Albania, andollows on


Soviet Properties in the European Satellites a/


H East Germany


Czechoslovakia Poland

Enterprises Seized and Operated by the USSR

after World War II



Uranium mines An area of the

port of

3 zee zee in











Manner of DIBposal


Sold r

Joint CoBipanlri;


SAC's b/

Vlesnit 0

Formation Date





Joint Cfxnponics Returned' to Satellites




5 0

0 0

Date of Return,




imparl 1cj;_

Soviet- Uranium Bulgarian mining mining company



In addition to the joint Soviet-Satellite companies, there are some Joint Satellite-Satellite activities worthy of mention. ist of the known Satellite-Satellite joint enterprises is shown in Table 4. joint undertakings will probably continue to increase in number if not in.importance.

Table 4

Satellite-Satellite Joint Undertakings

of Formation


aluminum smelting enterprise

Hydroelectric plant Rumanian plant


Rumania-East Germany




chemical plants

Hungary-Rumania (natural gas)





Natural gas chemicals

bridge over Danube

Bulgaria -Rumania






roduce* agricultural products, but only in ginned cotton did this country produce4 as muchercent of totalproduction. In addition, Albania produces POL products and chrome ore.

Bulgaria produce* mainly agricultural products and their derivatives, as well as certain minerals. Its contributions to total Satellite production are as follows: lead mining,ercent; zinc mining, ercent; ginned cotton, ercent; wool,ercent; wheat,ercent; corn,ercent; barley,ercent; flour,ercent; woolercent; and non-self -propelled inland vessels, aboutercent.

Rumania produce* mainly oil products and their derivatives as well as agriculturallthough it also contribute* more substantially to the total Satellite production of certain product* of heavy industry than do Albania and Bulgaria. It* contributions to total Satellite production are as follows: gasoline,ercent; diesel fuel,ercent; crude oil, ercent; cement, ercent; tractors,ercent; freight2 percent; non-self-propelled inland vessels,ercent; wool,ercent; corn,ercent; wheat,ercent; hemp,ercent; flour,ercent; cotton fabric, ercent; and wool fabric, ercent.

Hungary providesll of the Satellite bauxite production, and in addition to the item* lilted below, produce* Urge amounts of chemicals and various kind* of machinery and equipment. Its contribution* to total Satellite production are as follows: aluminum,ercent; trucks,ercent; freight cars,ercent; hemp,ercent; corn,ercent; cotton fabric,ercent; wool fabric,ercent; and flour,ercent.

* All data in this Bection are taken


Poland* leading producer of coal, various kind* of metals, freight cars, oceangoing vessels, industrial and foodnd leather footwear. Its contributions to total Satellite production are as follows: hard coal,ercent; finished steel, ercent; pig iron, ercent; lead,ercent; sulfuric acid.ercent; synthetic ammonia,ercent; calcium carbide,ercent; naphthalene,ercent; freight cars,ercent;ceangoing and harbor vessels, ercent; email8 percent; flax, ercent; sugar2 percent:arley,ercent;3 percent; potatoes, ercent; flour. ercent; milk,ercent; leather footwear,ercent; cotton fabric,ercent; and wool fabrics,ercent.

East Germany specializes in metals, chemicals, and machinery and equipment, contributing only small amounts to the total Satellite production of agricultural and light Industry products. Its otherto total Satellite production are as follows: lignite and brown coal,ercent; finished steel,ercent; pig iron,ercent; primary aluminum,ercent; secondary aluminum,ercent; lead,ercent; sulfuric acid, ercent; nitric acid,ercent; synthetic ammonia.ercent; caustic soda,ercent; chlorine,ercent; calcium carbide,ercent; refined phenol, ercent; synthetic rubber,ercent; rubber tires, ercent; machinerucks,ercent; tractors,ercent; railroad passenger cars. ercent; bearings,ercent; freight cars, ercent; passenger cars,ercent; electric motors,ercent; generators,

oceangoing and harbor vessels,ercent;vessels,ercent; and leather footwear,ercent.

Czechoslovakia produces mainly certain kinds of chemicals, machinery and equipment, textiles, and leather footwear. Itsto total Satollite production are as follows: lignite and brown coal, ercent; hard coal, ercent; finished steel.ercent; pig iron,ercent;4 percent; nitric acid, ercent; caustic soda, ercent; chlorine, ercent; refined benzol,ercent; naphthalene,ercent; reclaimed rubber,ercent; rubber tires,ercent; machine tools,ercent; trucks,ercent; tractors,percent; passenger cars, ercent; bearings,

freight cars,ercent; turbines,ercent self-propelled inland vessels,ercentpercent; tanks,ercent; small arms,ercent;percent; barley (probably beer7 percent; leatherercent; cotton fabrics,ercent; and wool fabrics,


Tabic 5




Export Pattern4

c /

Machine building

Electrical industry

Transportation equipment


Machine tools



Albania d/


Electrical industry Transportation equipment Bauxite

Medium machine tools Agriculture

Bauxite Agriculture



Manufactured products

Nonferrous metals concentrates




Nonferrous metals concentrate)

Agricultural products

Reported Specialization i- 5


Production Pattern a/


Export Pattern4


" Nonfcrrous metals concentrates Foodstuffs

Rumania ij Oil

Oil derivatives



East Germany g/

Machine building

Heavy Medium

Nonferrous metals concentrates


Oil derivatives Agriculture

ropelled inland vessels



Oil derivatives Agriculture Lumber and wood


Medium machine building Heavy machine building

instruments Ships

Transportation, equipment

and tractors Chemicals

Precision instruments Tractors

Passenger cars

Chemicals and chemical products




Production Pattern4

Export Pattern4

industry products Machine tools Transportation Electrical power Agriculture Machine building

Steel heavy Industry products Machine tools


Machine tools Transportation equipment

Agriculture Machine building

Industrial equipment Industrial equipment


Agricultural machine building

Heavy machine building Medium machine building


Machinery Machinery



Aircraft (combat)


Aircraft Ammunitions


Textiles andproducts



Table b

teel b/

Machine tool industry c/

Heavy machinery d/

Medical factory (plans) e/

Screw threads il

Geodetic tables

Gauges, teat, and standards h/

Production methodologyailroad rollingMachine building k/ Construction methodsntifrictionransport machine building Agricultural machine building Construction equipment Power-generating equipment Metal-cutting equipment Casting and forging industries

East Germany East Germany Hungary Csechoslovakia Bulgaria

East Germany and USSR East Germany

East Germany, Poland. Hungary,

Csechoslovakia East Germany

Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia

East Germany



Soviet COST Soviet COST Soviet OST Soviet GOST

Soviet Bloc Soviet Bloc


Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia





industry n/ Rolling mill structurals Light industry

Machine buildingew exceptions) Basicaw materials Semifinished products Simple machine parts "All production areas" Tolerances and fits Weapons ol

Ballbearings and nuts and bolts pi General q/


Labor standards (wages, hours, and the like) Measures and grades of merchandise s/ Weapons andetallurgical

Tin plate and metals v/

Rolled materials and pipes w/

Electromechanical gear measuring equipment x/

Textile pattern rollers y/


Czechoslovakia East Germany East Germany East Germany Rumania (Soviet Bloc) Soviet Bloc Czechoslovakia

Bui gar ia

Soviet Bloc East Germany

and Soviet Bloc East Germany

and Czechoslovakia







Soviet '


and Czechoslovakia COST

East Germany and Czechoslovakia








Two main approaches are possibletudy of economic integration in the Soviet Bloc. The first approach is that of analyzing production and trade data for the individual countries within the Bloc. To be mostthese data would have to be broken down by specific commodities. Additional information would be required to place these data in context and to relate them to integration. The second main approach is that of analyzing all available official Soviet and Satellite statements and reports, as

I in order toeterminatruu ui me existing state oi Bloc coordination and integration. The limitations of the latter approach are that it does not benefit from the detailed commodity data called for in the first method. This report utilized the second approach because of serious information gaps in the commodity data,ertain amount of available Satelliteinformation and some trade statistics were employed.

The criteria forivision of labor among Satellites were those of official Soviet and Satellite statements, knownthe distribution of production, and export patterns. The latter two criteria are understandably indirect in the determination and analysis of specialization. To be fully answered, however, this problem would require considerably more research in several different fields than was undertaken for this study.


t and

Because of frequently sparse information on important questions this report waa more successful in pointing up trends towardthan in determining the precise state of progress in pac present integration.








The most fruitful sourcestudy such as this are documentary accounts of the organization and activities of Soviet Bloc coordinating and integrating organizations and mechanisms, such as CEMA. In this connection, official statements of Soviet and Satellite officials were considered, when applicable, as authoritative when reporting such events as CEMA activities.

In addition to relianceumber of official statements.

were relied ononsiderable -amount of


following the classification entry and designatedave the following significance:

Source of Information

- Documentary

Confirmed by other sources

Completely reliable

Probably true

- Usually reliable

Possibly true

- Fairly reliable


- Not usually reliable

Probably false

- Not reliable

Cannot be judged

- Cannot be judged

refers to original documents of fore ignand organizations; copies or translations of such documentstaff officer; or information extracted from such documentstaff officer, all of which may carry the field evaluationii

Evaluations not otherwise designated are those appearing on the cited document; those designated "RR" are by the author of this report. No "RR" evaluation is given when the author agrees with the evaluation on the cited document.


. 2. U.. Selected Worm1 volew York,

. Eval.

. U. Eval. Doc.

. Selected Works, 4th Russian edn, vol. U. Eval. Doc.

Stalin, J. V

Eval, Doc, andbook of Marxism. New York.ommunist.. U

V. the Foundations of Leninism. On the Problems pf LenmisjTv,,. val. Doc; Leninism, voloscow,

. Eval. Doc Eval. RR 2.



CIA. nstitutions and Arrangements inrade and Finance within the Soviet Bloc,

itra, Zdenek. "Hospodarska .spoluprace"(Economic

Cooperation)', Planovane hospodaratvl, Prague,- V, Eval. RR 3.

The Economist,. U- Eval. RR 3.

SE. ,

Eval. RR 3. (tr.oi Nova svo U)

val'. RR C- Eval. RR 3.




R 3.

Eval. RRva), RR 3.


Nagorski, Zygmunt, Jr. Christian Science Monitor,

2 U. Eval. RRree Europenc. News from behind the



Pravda. val. RR Z.

Jun bb.

RR 3.



. 2.

Eval. RR 3.

Eval. RR 3.





Eval. RR 3:



RR 3.

Eval. RRZ5 R. Eval. RR.3.

fco C.






no z





OFF USE. Eval. RRFBIS, Daily Report (USSR and Eastern. OFF USE. Eval. RR9. OFF USE. Eval. RR 3.

39. U. Eval. RRbid., U. Eval. RRbid.. U. Eval. RR 2.


lvamt aaaK. . U. . r; Evai. rjw.


-| 3 S. .

, -OSI." R. Eval. Doc.


Information Bureau West, Bp "III. Eval. RRtate; Tel Aviv, -DapW;Sa." C. Eval. RR'3.

Eval. RR 3.

val. RR 3;



DI) Summaryug Sb. OFT


. C. Eval. RR 3.

Eval. RRval. RR 3.

FBIS, Daily Reportnd. FF 5. OFF USE. Eval. RRtorgovlya. RR 3.

Pitra, on>" (

U. Eval. RR 2


R 3.


State, HICOG, Frankfurt. C. Eval. RR 3.

'ciA. CIA/RR, Hungarian-Rumanian Long-Term

Economic Collaborationormalized, C. Constantinescu, M. asting Peace,eople's. 2. U. Eval. RR 2.



FBIS. Daily Report {USSR and Eastern Europe^. FF 5. OFF USE. Eval. RR1. FF 8. OFF USE. Eval. RRIA,

Eval. RR 3.



C. Eval. RR 5

5: EVal. RR 3.

aily Report (Western Europe and Nearp.FF USE. Eval. RR 3.

RR 2.

RRummary no OFF USE.

Eval. RRCI, 'Weekly Summary. tate. Daily Summary, U. EvaL RR J. I 1 FBIS, Survey of USSR Broadcasts,.

C. Eval. RR State, HICOG. Frankfurt. S.

EvalV RR ST"'^

Eval. Doc.



. Eval. RR7 C. Eval. RR 3.

Jun bb.


r-pia, yauy Report (Western Europe and Near East),

OFF USE. Eval. RR 3.



S. 'Eval. RR 3.

Eval. RR 3.

Eval. RR 3.

Intelligence Summary,,

CTA. S. Eval. RRIA. OCI. Current Intelligence Bolletin,

State, Moscow. . Eval^RR 3.

Diplomatic Summa

Financial Times,ug 5

7al. RR 3.


RRval. RR 3.

55. U. Eval. RR 3,

RR 3.



RR 3.

Walther, 'Otto! rundlagen und Techmk derder Sowjetischeri'Besatzungezone" (Bases andFulfilling the Plan in the Soviet Zone of Bdnner Berichtc aus Mittel und Ost Dcutschland, Eval.-RR 3.

CIA. , Construction of Hungary's Sztalinvaros Metallurgical Combine



FBIS, Daily Report (UbbK and Eastern. HH 1. OFF USE. Eval. RR 3.





Summary no Ml,




FBIS, Daily Report (USSR and Eastern. FF 7. OFF USE. Eval. RR4

Radio Free Europe.

| Eval.



ipt U. Eval. RR 3.

Eval. RR 3.

State. -Bucapeet. U. Eval. RR 3.





C. Eval. RR 6.



r-pjo, j, ally Report (USSR and Eastern. OFF USE. Eval. RR 3.

S. Eval. RR 2.

Eval. RR. Eval. BB 2.

Eval. RR 3.


Soviet Press.

FDD Summary, RR U)


_7Aug53. S. Eval. Doc. FBIS. Dally Report (USSR and Eastern. OFF USE. Eval. RR. FF 7. OFF USE. Eval.8. JJ 3. OFF USE. Eval. RRoint Committee on Slavic Studies. Current Digest of the. U. Eval. RR 3.

OFF USE. tr of Planovane hospodarstvi. norague,


State, Budapeat. 6 LJMITED/OFF USE.R 3. (tr of Ssabad4 U) CIA*.




bid, ibid.

S. Eval. RR 2.

CIA.Unification of the Chemical Industry








le, Ber In.

2 OFF USE. Eval. RRtr of Probleme economice, volo 2, U)

Eval. RR 2.

" Eval. RR 3.


i U) FBIS, Daily Report (USSR and Eaatern. GG 3. OFF USE. Eval. RR FDD Summary. C. Eval. RRtr of Neuea Dcutschland. U)

1 FDD.Summ.ary C. Eval. RR 2.

ntrof Das Volk, U)


FBIS, Dally Report (USSR and Eaatern. KK 5- OFF USE. Eval. RR 2.

C. Eval. RR 3.

Eval.. -

FDD Translation,




Pravda,. U. Eval. RR 3.

I FBIS, Daily Report (USSR and Eastern Europe),

CIA. Vr.eaKnaya:

. FF 6. OFF USE. Eval. RR 3.

OFF USE. Eval. RRo, p. 8. U. Eval. RR 3.



FBIS. Daily Report (USSR and Eastern.. OFF USE. Eval. RR 3.

Vn^Bhi-.aya rorgoviy

S. Eval. RRa, ,nu 3,. U. Eval. RR. .JSval. RR 3.

kUU Summary no 4bJ,. SO ii. C

Eval. RR C. Eval. RR 3

FDD Summary..f. C. . ti. RR 3.

CIA. ORRoviet and German Economic Structures in East Germany, S. Eval. RR 2.

CIA. CIA|, above).

CIA. ,


State, Tel Aviv.5 C. Eval. RR i.


RR 2.

, OFF USE. Eval. RR.f..i7

Summary3 C.

Eval. RR. CIA.

Free Europe. 2 U. Eval. RR 3.

CIA. OCI, Current Intelligence Digest,. 4.

S. Eval. RR 3.







Eval. RR 3.


umanian-Soviet Trade and'Finahcial Relations,




S- .

. I - - -

in., Soviet Economic Assistance to the Sino-Soviet Bloc Countries. TS CODEWORD.

CIA. ORR6nd Trubenkov. V. FinansyCredit SSSR, no U- Eval. RRIA. CIA.



jFBIS,DailySSR and Eastern.. OFF USE. Eval. RR 3.

Dudinskiy, I. ayvitie mirovogo

demokraticheskogo rynka" (Strengthening in Growth of the Peaceful Democraticoprosy ekonomiki. no U. Eval. RR 3.

Situation surnrnary,

S. -Eval. RR0 .

Eval. RRIA. OCI. Current Intelligence Bulletin,. 7.

RR 3.



0'. Eval. B

3., above).




C. .

2 S. S. Eval. RR 3.

C. Eval. RRot ZU76. U. Eval. RRval. RRun bl. C. Eval. RR 2.

S. Eval. RRs C. Eval, RR 3.



Eval. RR 2.

fsuw. IA. bove).

CIA. . I


. 5. U.

JLVSl. kkIA. .f. O

Uaiiy Report OFF USE. Eval.

S. Eval. RRSR and EasternR 3.

News From Behind the Iron Curtain,ol 3.

U. Eval. RR, C- Eval. RRIA. OCI, Current Intelligence Digest,. 3.

S. Eval. RR 3.


OFF USE. Eval. RR 3.




rEvaX. RR 3.

) EVal. RRval. RR 3.




FBIS, Daily Report (USSR and Eastern. JJ 1. OFF USE. Eval. RR 2.

Eval. RR 3.


S. .

Eval. RR 3.

Eval. RR 3.

CIA. .. .



CIA/RRconomic Conditions in Tne-

Satellite a,ableata). S ONLY.

op.,. 2. U. Eval. RR 3.

I Jun bb. U. KKommuniat.. U. Eval. RR 3.

Eval. RR 3.

. NN 1. OFF USE; Eval. RR 3.

Eval. 3.

Daily ReportHUSSR"and Eastern. NN 1. ?

FBIS, Daily Report (USSR and EasternNOFF USE. rEval. RR 3.

Eval. RR 3.

U. Eval. RR 3.

Kommuniat,. U. Eval. RReuer Wcg, Berlin, h ed. U. Eval. RR 3.

OFF USE; Eval. RR 3.

UV Eval.

C. Eval. RR 3.

Berliner Zeitung, Berlin, U. Eval. RR 3.



aval. jc-o.

New York Times,.. Eval. RRop.. above).


-ui awai. kk3

_Eval. RR 3.

Kommuniat,. U. Eval. RRIA. CIA/RR, The Position of the Aircraft Industry

of the European Satellites, S

Daily Report (USSR and Eastern' . NN 1. OFF USE. Eval. RR 3.

C. Eval. RR 3.

Iar 55

U. Eval. RR0.


Eval. RR. Eval. RR 3.

IA/RRonstantinescu, op.,3ornmunist,>

FDD Translation, OFF

OFF USE. Eval. RR 3.






FDD Summary, lb OFF USE.

Eval. RR 3.

iT] |T5 S. . TDD

. NN 1. OFF USE. Eval. RRtate, Vienna. , C. Eval. RRerliner Zeitung, Berlin, U. Eval. RR 3.



G.hi idtioduction oiSoviet Standards. Into tho Czechoslovakianor Socialist and Technology, _Erague,o I,. U. Eval. RRBIS, Daily Reportastern Europe),

H 5. OFF USE. R 3.


Eval. RRval. RR 3.


Eval. RRS Eval. RR 3.


j .

. Eval. RR'

0 C.



FDD SummaryFF USE. Eval. RR 3.


7 Dec 50


Original document.

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