Created: 9/12/1955

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible





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The Honorabl The Secretary of State.

Mr. Secretary:



and the policy character of theave felt it advisable to bring it to your personal attention, rather than distributing it through the usual governmental channels. I

The observations are presented in the context ofjwhat the source describes aajtfac rapidly deteriorating morale of the Asiatic members ofue to an utter lack of accomplishment of the organizationhe highhanded manner in which themilitary are running it. The source I

that the Pakistanian andTTjnssnTrec^Uii^iecllngTJ

A. CINCPAC in its military planning was patently unprepared for the creationollective security organization in the nature of "SEATO". Admiral Stump, following itsfound himself confronted with representatives of Asian countries inad little or no confidence and of whose military capabilities he was not sure. This has resulted in the United States postponing as long as possible participation of Asian members in the serious planning necessary to carry out "SEATO" military objectives. This is exemplified by the complete lack of accomplishment of the April Staff Planners* Conference at Baguio and the July Military Advisors* Conference*^


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Bangkok. These conferences, although highly publicized,aste of time and resulted in nothing except making plans for future conferences. This lends credibility to the premise that the United States ia using the conferences for nothing but propaganda purposes^

}b. Since the United Si.r. .

the light of their suspicion andfrBTWWTTCTLf,

were not prepared for the establishment ofhey intend to run the real show without allowing Asian members any substantial say in matters of command and direction^

C. Since the Asian memberefhave no say in major political and military decisionajthey are rapidly losing interest in the entire organization, and the spirit ofsecurity on which "SEATO" was predicated ia being rapidly dofeated. When the representativeember nationentative suggestion at the recent military planning conferencehairmanilitary planning committee be. representative (unnamed) stated that he was not going to take orders from anybody except thehich statement defied the principles under which "SEATOTrwaa founded andreat deal of hard feeling toward the United States.



Thf organisational structure of "SEATO" makestreaty with CINCPAC rather

than wiT^^ne^Kite^^taTes^lt was originally decided that the Military Advisors would submit their proposals directly threugh the Council Representative (previously Ambassador Pour if oy for the United States) to the Ministers. Admiral Stump, in July at an informal gathering of several military advisors in Bangkok, (said he would not subordinate himself to the Council Representative and would use his own channels for transmitting hisroposal would go from Admiral Stump to Navy to Defense to State.

0er^onal an

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E. If the situation outlined above continues to exist, "SEATO" is not really necessary. There have hitherto been no accomplishments which could not have been made without "SEATO".

e source expressed himseli as feeling that remedial action could and should be taken to correct the defects described above, and to make out ef "SEATO" the kind of collective security organisation vitally needed in the area. He said that the Asian members of "SEATO" want to follow the lead of the United States, but that the United States must showin its followers and allow them at least some voice in major "SEATO" decisionsTy

I am also sending this to Admiral Arthur W, Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Honorable Reuben B, Robertson,cting Secretary of Defonse; and Honorable Douglas MacArthur II, Counsellor of the State Department.


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