. CAESAR 12
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN POLITICAL STATUS OF SOVIET ARMED FORCES
OA HISTORfCH. REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE AS SANITIZED
Office of Current Intelligence CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This document contains information within the meaningt
SOVIET STAFF STUDY
This studyorking paper prepared by the, Soviet Staff, OCI, to assist Soviet Staff analysts Inommon appreciation of some of the background factors affecting current intelligence trends in the Soviet field. This particular study Is the twelftheries prepared under the gon-eral title "Project CaesRr" to ensure the systcmat_ lc examination of all available information on the leading meabors of the Soviet hierarchy, their political associations, and the policies with which they have been Identified.
recent developments in political status
I. Apparent Gains of Military Under
Relaxation in Armed Forces
of New Military
of Armed Forces
Representation in Government/
of Disgraced Officers
Number of Military Promotions
on Military Gains
XI. Apparent Losses of Military Under. 17
Consolidations In Defense
in Military Personnel
of Military Economies
JJ. Effect of Malenkov Economic Policy on Military
III. Role of Military in Light vs. Heavy Industry
Dispute and Fall of Malenkov
Dissatisfaction of Military
Aspects of Dispute
re Military Role in Malenkov
PREFACE: Context and Purpose of . . 3
TABLE OP COSTENTS (Contd)
IV. Position of military Under Khrushchev/
Bulganin Leadership 6
of Important Developments Since
Control in the Armed Forces
Control in Armed Forces
of Konev as Counterweight to
Appearance of Military
re Control of Military
and Military Groupings.
V. Probable Influence of Military on Soviet
ecent History of Doctors' Plot;
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN POLITICAL STATUS OF SOVIET
PREFACE: Context and Purpose of Paper:
An examination of the political status of the Soviet armed forces during the period2 toublished in the ninth of the Caesar series under the title, "Politics and the Sovieted to the following conclusions:
that the military has in the pasta relatively passive attitudeinternal crisesendencyfragmentation and inaction.
that military freedom of action istrlctedumber of ways: bynetworks of political and security officers operating within the ranks; by
a tendency toward conformity amongand men alike; rowing officer caste system; and by the presence in the officer corpsigh percentage of Communists subject to party discipline.
in the post-Stalin period, thepassive position of the military in politics shiftedore active role, with the armed forces participating In the removal and sentencing of Beria.
that by the endhe political position of the Soviet military leaders appeared better than "it had for several years previously, and an uneasy alliance was probably maintained between topofficers and Party leaders.
lso pointed out that despite evidence suggesting greater freedom for the military leaders to run their own establishment without interference, and evidence suggesting greater importance of
the nii.lt.ary lea.derab.lp In tho formulation of the Soviet governmental policy, there was practically no evidence of any formal change In the relationship of the military forces to other branches of the Soviet government. It was postulated that some cliques or groups of high-ranking officers hadmore than others by the changes In the regime and hence were more loyal to certain of the new political leaders, but very little evidence could be adduced to identify those military leaders who directly supported or were supported by one or another political faction.
It is the purpose of this paper to summarize all available Information which would update tho examination of the role of the Soviet military in politics and place In perspective the position of the military within the context of Soviet Questions concerning the control of the army, possible groupings within the militaryand the probable Influence of the military on Soviet policy will be considered.
I. Apparent Gains of Military Under Malonkov
Certain gains which were to result In the greatly lnoreased prestige of the military began to appear as early as This may have been partly duo to the support of the military la the Beriaut may also have been due to the general conciliatory policy of tho Malenkov regime. These gains tookforms: ertain relaxation of security within tho armed forces; the introductionew military personnel policy; the granting of honors; imited Increase in the number of officers in government and party positions; the rehabilitation of disgraced officers; and the unfreezing of promotions and re-assignments.
A- Security Relaxation Among Military:
The earliest concession, apparent as early asas the relaxation of security regulations among the Soviet troops in occupied countries. Into their former prisonlike existence, troops (both officer and enlisted) were now permitted to fraternize with the local population, to purchase liquor, and to marry local nationals. In addition, officers of the rank of lieutenant and above were permitted to wear civilian clothes off duty and to bring their wives and children, of both preschool, and school age, to the occupied countries. Schools with Soviet teachers were set up for officers* children. (Previously only high-ranking officers had been authorized to bring their wives, accompanied only by children ofany of the privileges granted the enlisted men were to be later rescinded in certain areas because of the resulting misbehavior and crimes. It is not known who was responsible for this decision to relax security for the sake of morale. Although the Chief Political Directorate has the prime responsibility for troop morale,ecision seems to go back to Zhukov, who,rofessional, would be fully aware of the effect of morale on fighting efficiency. int of Zhukov's porsonal role in this program is found in his interest In the defection of Valery Lysenko, the dependent son of an officer stationed in Berlin. By taking the unprecedented move of writing personally to President Eisenhower about the affair, Zhukov appeared to be interested not only in tho boy but also in the effectuccessful defection on the entire program.
B. Introduction of Now Military Personnel Policy:
The now military personnel policy apparently introduced about3 aimed primarily atthe abuses prevalent under Stalin by stabilizing and standardizing induction methods, service, andmeasures. There had been grossof9 Universal Military Service Law, which provided that army privates and junior officersfterwo- and three-year term
respectively, could be held in service only in case of need and for no moreonth period
calls toos) servea lour to six years. The now policy standardized the term for army and air forceat three years, and the publication since3 of the Defense Ministry's annualorder, ordering the release of all persons who had served the term established by law, seemed designed to prevont the recurrence of abuses.
Othor aspects of tho new policy Included greater privileges for ro-onlisteosrogram to develop the leadership abilities of NCO's. C
^2 attempt is underway to buna up tns leaaersnlp qualities of NCO's, who are mow to be assigned as platoon loaders. The better educated conscripts, are to be sent to military schools for three years Instead of into military service; upon graduation, most of them will be placedunior officer (NCO) resorve. This report has been substantiated by the stress on leadership of sergeants which has recently appeared in troop propaganda; and contrary to the general pattern of notommander's name In broadcasts, the names ofshowing exemplary leadership qualities areeing mentioned.
Tho responsibility for the adoption of this policy may lie with the military leaders, who probably recognlzod Its relation to troop morale; however, it is conceivable that the political leadership, with its stross on legality In all spheres of Soviet life, encouraged the adoption ofrogram.
Uilltary personnel policies achievedby aboutnd since that date there have been no major shifts, although specific military requirements have evidently affected the length of service of certain critical specialties.1
C. Glorification of Military Forces:
A tendoncy to glorify the military forces has become increasingly evident during the entire post-Stalin period. This flattery was undoubtedly intended to give the armedense of closewith the regime and Its political goals. This was revealed by Voroshilov, who, while handing out awards on one occasiontated, "Theto you of orders and medals is graphic testimony of tbe love and concern with which our people, party and government surround their armed forces,anifestation of profound confidence in yourand steadfastness." Although efforts were made by the Malenkov regime to appease other groups by the granting of awards, their honors were in no way as spectacular as those heaped upon the military. ontrast to the Stalin period of slighting thethis rising prestige took on added significance.
During the Malenkovfficers were singled out for honors, includingrders of Lenin andrders of the Red Banner; in addition, on at least three occasions, awards have been made to"generals, admirals, and officers" of the armed forces.
was Tssued on4 extending for one yearof service for antiaircraft andin the Soviet army.
adar and communications reserves of the signal corps were being recalled to active duty late4 and that civilian communications specialists were also being drafted into service.
Busts of nine amy officers who bad twice woo the title of Boro of the Soviet Union, including one of Marshal Zhukov, were unveiled during the Malenkov reign. Approximatelyrmy officers are entitled to this honor, according to Soviet press. This was In marked contrast to the postwar 'period in which'ew of Stalin's known favorites, such as Marshal Konev and General Chulkov, were so honored. In addition,emorials wore erected to Soviet/ Russian Military heroes.1
X/ To honor traditional militaryigantic equestrian statue of Field Marshaloot statue of Admiral Hakhlmov withworo unveiled; and, apparentlypecial honor to thotatuo to Schors, the Bolshevist military hero from the Ukraine, was also dedicated. otal ofemorials, honoring theof Russian and Soviet military heroes, nine of which were in the Orbit, were dedicated with Soviet and local dignitaries in attendance. These monuments were usually of Immense size. In Norway and Egypt two monuments were erected by the USSR Ministry of Defense to honor Soviet/Russian fallen heroes. this numbertatue erected In honor of9 defeat of the Japanese at Khalkhln-Gel, tho battle in which Zhukov first won glory.
- 9 r-
Minor military anniversaries received more than customary publicity. The Soviet navy honored every possible anniversary, the majority of which bad previously beenlements of the navy made much-publicized state visits to Finland, England, Turkey, and Sweden, as well as to certain Orbit countries.
In addition, graduations from military academies received unaccustomed publicity, and book exhibits and artillery exhibits showing the glorious history of the Soviet armed forces appeared.
A further manifestation of rising prestige was the fact that the uniform was made the special prerogative of the army. An order of4 put civilians back into mufti. Army and air officers made their appearances in new uniforms of operatic splendor.
1/ Those celebrations Included, among others, the TOOth anniversary of tho defense of Sovastopol against tho British and French in the Crimean war;th anniversary of the Russian naval victory over Sweden near Gangut Island; thof the defense of Petropavlovsk against Anglo-French forces; h anniversary of the sinking of the Russian cruiser,thof the Kronstadt fortress; hof the Russian naval commander Admiral Makarov; tbe anniversary of the victory over the Turks at Slnopo.
O. Military Representation in Government/Party Positions:
In the elections to the Supreme Soviet ineputy from nearly every important military position was elected.1 otaleputies elected0 were military officers as compared tofficers outotaleputies elected This is in contrastrop of approximatelyercent In MVD
That the electing of more military men to government positions, like the giving of awards, was meant to identify the military with the aims of the regime was indicatedravda statement that "the elections to the Supreme Soviet have demonstrated, with new force the boundless devotion of the Soviet fighters to their government and the Communist party."
1/ 4 military deputies included the following: the defense minister, his first deputies and all his known deputies; the navy chief and his first deputy; the air chiefossible deputy; the chief of the general staff and one of his deputies; the inspector general; the chief of the Chief Politic cal Directorate; the chief of personnel, and the chiefs of cavalry, engineer, armored, artillery and airborne troops; four of the five fleet commanders[ all military district commanders. Only the chiefs of the rear services and of the signal troops were not .elected. The navy and air force appear to have improved their positions. The navy now has six identified deputies compared to only one the air force representation Is now headed by two marshals ofwhereas0 It had none.
More officers than formerly were electedof commissions of the Supreme Soviet.
General H. V. Zakharov, Commander
of Leningrad military district, to the Credentials Commission, Council of Nationalities.
General A. S. Zheltov, Chief, Chief
Political Directorate, to Commission on Draft Bills, Council of Onion.
General A. a. Grechko, Commander
of Group of Soviet Forces, Germany, to Commission of Foreign Affairs, Council of Union.
check has revealed that only political
officers (Bulganin, Zheltov) ever served In suchpreviously. Membership on these commissions is believed to berestige position.
Int various republic party congresses (exclusive, of course, of thehe number of military officers elected to the republic central committees and buros was conspicuously greater than in the past. From theepublics where there are major troop; headquarters,ilitary men, includV ing theilitary district commanders involved, wore elected to the party central committees of theirpective republics. ew exceptions, all were elected full members. Although the actual military representation increased, the significance is lessened somewhat by the fact that the size of the republic central committees was in general Increased; military representation on the various republic centralvaries from none (in republics where there are no troop -concentrations) to five percent (in the Ukraine)..
Of theilitary district commanders involved in the areas affected by the elections, nine were chosen as members of their republic buros.l heck ofraphic information available indicates that previously only four military district commanders (Grechko, Konev, Antonov, and Bagramyan) had served as members of the highest party body in the republic in which they were stationed.
In the opinionigh-level defector, the giving of an increasing number of important party and government jobs to the military was an original move of Malenkov, designed to subject the military toisciplineore fundamental sense by increasing their responsibility to the Party.
E. Rehabilitation of Disgraced Officers:
The regime's attempt to correct some of the wrongs suffered under Stalin was probably responsible for the rehabilitationumber of militaryome of whom are known to have undergone imprisonment. Stalin's jealousy of the glory justly earned by the military during the war led him to degrade, on various charges, tbe outstanding leaders of all services. Stalin's death brought Zhukov's publicin Moscow2 and restored the naval chief Euznetsov to his original rank of fleet admiral, the 'most remarkable restoration to favor occurred in the
1/ Mention should be made of the two military district commanders who were not elected. This occurred in the Ukraine, which encompasses fourdistricts. Of the four military districttwo (Konev and Chuikov) were elected buro members. To elect all four Ukrainian militarycommanders toman body would have given theuite disproportionate representation.
2/ There Is reason to believe that Zhukov was back in Moscow as earlyossibly taking the place vacated by Konev as Commander in Chief of Ground Forces. His return was not publicized.
case of air officers. At the end of World War II, practically all the top commanders of the various air forces bad been sent into obscurity. 3arious disgraced air officers, with their original ranks restored, were given awards and medals "for long years of service.*! Those honored included the following who are listed with theheld during the last war:
Marshal of Aviation A. A. Novikov,
Commander in Chief, Military Air Forces.
of Aviation G. A. Torozhelkin,
1st deputy Commander in Chief, Military Air Forces.
of Aviation N. S. Skrlpko, Chief
of Staff, Long Range Bomber Forces. (Note: Skrlpko may have been In the Air headquartersubordinate position; he has become publicly prominent only since.
Gen. A. I. Shakurin, head of avia-
Gen. A. E. Sepin, Chief Engineer of
the Military Air Forces.
Gen. N. S. Shimanov, Political deputy.
Military Air Forces.
Gen. M. I. Samokhln, Commander,
Baltic Fleet Air Force.
Zhakurin isirst deputy minister of theIndustry; Skrlpko is believedC o be connected with the Airborne Forces; and Novikov Is carried by an unconfirmed report as Commander in Chief of the Long Range Air Force.
F. Increased Number of Military Promotions and Roassignments:
The relaxation of the virtual freeze on officer promotions which had existed under Stalin's regime was noted inncluding twoto the rank of marshal and six to army general. In addition, certain other promotions have been notednd have presumably beenby unpublicized promotions in lower ranks. Among the more interesting have been those of N. J. Vinogradov to admiral and M. A. Shalin to colonel general. eputy to the Commander in Chief of the Naval Forces, holds the title ofof Submarines of the USSR and his promotion is presumably related to the increased attention to the submarine program. Shalin is head of theDirectorate of the General Staff.
The greater' relaxation of security under Malenkov, so unlike the secrecy of the Stalin regime,luid situation relating to officer re-assignments. The more important changes, other than the public return of Zhukov, affected the following positions:
of Chief Political Directorate
(with the Air and Navy political chiefs also undergoing changes)
Chief of DOSAAP (twice changed)
Chief, Airborne Troops
Commander in Chief of Administration
of Armored Troops (probable)
Commander In Chief of Naval
Chief of Frunze Military Academy
CinC of Soviet Forces in Germany
CinC of Central Group of Forces
Commanders of four of the five fleets1
The greatest number of changes has occurred in the military districts. Of theilitaryexisting at the time of Satlin's death, only three still have the same commanders. Of these changing commands, two military district commanders moved into the Defense Ministry, one (Konev) became the commander of the Soviet bloc combined command, three were reassigned as commanders of otherdistricts; one was assigned as chief of Soviet Forces in Germany, and four lost their jobs when their military district headquarters were abolished. Of the commanders affected, onlydefinitely known to have suffered disgrace.
The significance of these promotions andand their possible relation to the Soviet political situation will be considered later.
G. Check on Military Gains:
In spite of the blandishments, honors and flattery heaped upon the armed forces under Malenkov, efforts wero made to keep their popularity under Military men were not given significantly greater access to the public. Mo speech by acandidate was broadcast over Radio Moscow. olitical marshal, reviewed the parades and gave the addresses on the most important military anniversaries in34ayovember); it was customary previously to havesoldiers take these honors. In general, the voice of the military was heard only in connection with military anniversaries, with one exception where propaganda purposes woreletters qf Vasilovski and Zhukov berating Montgomery and Churchill for allegedly ordering the stacking of German arms after World War II for possible reissue to thefor use against the Soviets.
1/ This list includes all changes since Stalin'some of which were already summarized in Caesar 9.
II. Apparent Losses suffered by Military under Malenkov:
The aost obvious loss was tbe reduction infor Military purposes as providod underbudgets. This cut was apparentlyfinance Malenkov's consumer goods program. budgeteveling off of military the announced defenseillion rubles as comparod torubles Thisatefor military expenditures of less thanas compared to increases of well overper year Underhe announced allocation for military purpose*
A. Administrative Consolidations in
Tbe Defense Ministry, as all sectors of the Soviet government, was affected by the reorganization Instituted by the Malenkov government after Stalin's death. This program attempted to reduce expenditures, to improve efficiency, and to transfer an estimated million workers from the administrative to thesectors of the economy.
The first changes in the military services took the form of consolidation of certainheadquarters, with resulting reduction of functions and personnel. Four of theilitary district, headquarters, an intermediate echelon headquarters,leet headquarters wore probably
abolished.1 It is reasonable to assume that some economy measures took place In all military district headquarters.
B. Reductions In Military Personnel:
Within the headquarters of theutbacks were ordered,ommission sot up to work out proposalseorganization. Even the General Staff, the most sacred of all organs of the Defense Ministry, was subject to reductions, which were met with strong resistance by senior officers. The Operations Directorate and the Intelligencequickly regained their, although
1/ In the Far East, the Headquarters of the Forces of the Far East, which has serviced twoFar East and the Maritimethe 5th and 7th Pacific Fleets, was abolished sometime in The Maritime military district was absorbed by Far East military district, and the former commander of the Headquarters of the Forces of the Far East (Marshal Mallnovsky) became the commander of the enlarged Far Eastary district. The 5th and 7th Pacific Fleetsombined with headquarters at Vladivostok, and became directly subordinate to Moscow naval headquarters.
In addition, the Gorki military district was merged to the Moscow military district: the Don military district was joined to the North Caucasus military district; and the East Siberian military
district C '
Jie believed to have been merged with
tne rransbalkal military district. hange In the
name of two of the northern military districts also
took placehe reason for which is not yet
apparent. The White Sea military district was
designated the Northern military district; the
Archangel military district was renamed the White
Sea military district.
the latter was downgradedhief Directorateirectorate. The personnel strength of theDirectorate was Initially reducodercent; nut was soon brought back to its original size and in fact stay have been increased.1
Tho demobilizationercentage ofpersonnel was undertaken for reasons ofand efficiency: to reduce the officeto weed out the semlllterate officers whocommissioned during the war. An attempt atwas made, as efficiency ratings andto be considered in considering retirement. establish the percentage of retiredapproximatelyercent; hirdeduction was ordered although this iscontrary to plan,
the demobilization was carried out in an that those who were retiredf payension while thoso who werewith loss thanears service, therequirement, were retired without ponslons. said to havearticular hardship onmost of whom were without civiliancase of an cx-ofservingark guard. It is impossible atto assess the effect of those retirementsmorale.
Service attaches were sent for the firsto theugoslavia, Egypt, India, Pakistan, Greece, Belgium, the Netherlands, Lebanon-Syria.
2/ percent reduction would Involve00 officers. It would scorn that*an officer demobilization of this extent would havo como to the attention of our military attaches. In this connection, however, it should be pointed out that the reductions were to take place outside of Moscow in military district headquarters and in the flold, whore MA's would be less likely to hear rumors or to identify recently demobilized officers.
There apparently was some reduction in enlisted personnel, although the extent cannot be determined. The number of soldiers released3 was probably greater than usual, for it included not only theclass but also those who had previously been held
in service beyond the term required by law
) to. Ucmuol' Of
Vuo OS embassy noticea soldiers, owiously just released, in tho harvest fields as early as August. Thesoldiers were closely tied in with the newprogram and the opening of tho new lands. As early asoscow papers reported that released soldiers were pledging their support to the program. There are numerous reports suggesting tho pressure on releasees to go to the new lands. Military divisions, as units, were assigned as patrons ofstate farms with the responsibility of keeping them supplied with manpower.
roop reductions were to be carried out oy skeletonizing every thirdwithin the USSR to cadre strength, with themen from such battalionsen) being put on reserve status. The validity of this report cannot be determined.
There are hints that even the career military service faced some competition in regard to priority on manpower, particularly from agriculture,
C. Evidences of Military Economies:
Unfortunately most of the information on military organization and expenditures deals only with the Far East and generalizations cannot be made for the entire Soviet Union; however, from that area comes considerable evidence of reduced expenditures and possibly personnel cuts.
During the spring and summernown departures ol military passengers from the Chukotsk, Magadan, and Kurlls areas exceeded known arrivals by (This figure Includes uniformed personnel plus civilians In the employ of the armed forces). I*
It also appears that since April andilitary construction activities have decreasedin tho Chukotsk, Sakhalin, and Kurlls areas. This couldurtailment or simply the normal completion of projects that have been in progress for several years.
Available data on union budget expenditures In some sections of the Transcaucasus and Central Asia suggest that decreases have also occurred in nonclvillan expenditures In those areas. This may in part havo been related to abolition of the Don military district.
D. Effect of Malenkov's Economic Policy
It cannot definitely be stated how theleadership reacted to the retrenchment policies3 and The evidence on retrenchment: itself shows only the direction of change, without providing an accurate moasure of its extent. Itperipheral reductions and economies without any serious reduction in the combat capabilities of the Soviet field foroes. This conclusion is supported by other evidence that programs for re-equipping and reorganizing Soviet military forces proceeded in orderly fashion all through the'period of changing political leadership. .
Tbe changes in personnel policy andconsolidations cameime when the Soviet military leaders apparently had achieved greater freedom to manage the affairs of their own(see Thus, these changes may in large part reflect the attempt of Soviet military leaders to systematize personnel policy and weed outor surplus personnel, especially noncorabat-ants, who had hung on since the end of World War II.rogram was undoubtedly favored by the Malenkov regime in its desire to further its agricultural and consumer goods programs and to cut unnecessaryherever possible. It may also have been in part the price paid by the military leaders to Increase the effectiveness of their forces despite budgetary restrictions.
III. Role of Military in Light versus Heavy Industry Dispute ana' Fall of MoTenkov:
In attempting to determine the role of theleadership in the light versus heavy industry dispute and the fall of Malenkov, It is necessary to consider certain questions: Had the military been pressuring the leadership for Increased military preparedness? Khrushchev and his followers woo the support of the military for their cause? Or did the viewpoints of the two groups happen to coincide on the necessity of Increased military strength?
A. Probable Dissatisfaction of Military:
Despite the gains achieved under Malenkov, there are reasons to believe that the military leaders may have been unhappy They may have become convinced that Malenkov was jeopardizing the safety of the country by his readjustment of the economy and by what was thought to be the failure of his foreign policy. They were surely uneasy about the imminent rearming of Germany; the growing strength of the West and the diplomatic success of its position of strength; the possibility of their Chinese ally becoming Involved in new military risks; the Increased military needs of the Satellites and China, particularly as they related to the proposed Soviet counterpart to NATO. Such considerations may have forced the military to desire other leadership.
In contrast to Malenkov, Khrushchov and bis followers, disappointedonciliatory foreign policy and believing through conviction and experience that military strength as an adjunct to diplomacy shouldajor role in foreign affairs, argued for the need of Increased military preparedness.
There are hints that4 there may haveunning argument on military pre- paredness. An FBIS study, in analyzing the speeches of Party Presidium members untiloncluded that the members were apparently divided into two groups on the question of allocation of funds to the armed forces: the more militant group (Bulganin, Khrushchev, Kaganovich) 'which consistently emphasized Western aggressiveness in order to keep military expenditureigh level; and the non-aggressive group (Malenkov, Saburov, Pervukhin) which was inclined to consider the financial needs of other sectors of the economy at the expense of the military.
B. Military Aapoets of Dispute:
Three developments point to the fact that military considerations wero closely bound up to the light versus heavy industry dispute:
pointed relation in public statements
of heavy industry priority to defense needs, emphasizing the necessity for such priority to maintain the defensive capability of the country;
the height of the dispute, prop-
aganda related to the necessity of military preparedness was intensified]
strosslng Increased military
strength occurred immediately before and after malenkov's fall, both within the DSSB and tho bloc.
Although in gonoral4 Soviet leaders urged the continuing development of heavy industry, the defense-related aspect did not receive as much emphasis as later during tho dispute. Only Bulganin was to refer consistently to the defense aspect; this has led to speculation that he may have been actingridge for the military viewpoint. In his election speech ofe gave particular attention to heavy Industry. "The basisurther upsurge of our national economy always has been and remains heavyeavy industry Is the foundation of the invincible defensive ability of the country and the might of our gallant armedhrases such as these were to be much In evidence during the subsequent argument over heavy versus light industry.
In the propaganda field, the stress on military preparedness was exemplified during this period by two trends:
roforonces to "surprise
attack" with Its connotation of "Be Prepared";
the reappearance of the theme that war would destroy only capitalism, repudiatingrevious stand.
Immediately preceding and following Malenkov's removal asoncrete indications of anon increased military strength became evident.5 Soviet budget, announced in February,that the Soviet government intended to return toevel of appropriations for defense. Tho budgetillion rubles formilitarypercent increase over4 allocation. If the allocation is completely utilized, these expenditures would boostwar high.
A shift in Soviet economic policypreparedness may have been reflected inchanges of Theof V. A. Malyshevupraministerlalchargeroup of ministries in thefield may indicate added attention tofield. The appointment of Khrunichev,connected with the aviation industry,rank of deputy chairman of the Councilpoints to increased attention to thisof the defense picture. The background5 as head of theMinistry of General Machine Building,the new ministry may be dealing withf
Within the bloc, military preparedness was suggested by the setting up of tbe much-publicized combined Soviet-Satellite military command under the Warsaw Agreement of Although thevalue ofove, proclaiming the unity and determination of the "peaceas paramount, military gains were also achieved. Tho creationermanent staff, composed of representatives of tho staffs of the participating countries, probably constituted an administrative improvement over the previous Soviet system of bilateral control over Satellite military activities. The location of the headquarters in Moscow and the appointmentoviet officer as commander will provide firm Soviet control over day-to-day operations.
C. Conclusions on Military Rolo in Malenkov Fall:
It is believed that the armed forces leaders contributed to the pressure on Malenkov, probably because of their dissatisfaction with his policies and not because of any desire to seize power or totheir own power. It is also quito possible that Khrushchev's followers did seek the support of the military leaders, but it is extremely doubtful if the military were the primary power factor in bringing about the change. It appears most likely that these two dissatisfied groupsheand Khrushchev's followers) were broughtwithout the necessity of too much wooing on either side, by similar viewpoints on the failure of Malenkov's policy and the necessity of increased military strength.1
IV. Position of Military under Khrus heulganln Leadership:
A. Review of Important developments since Malenkov's demoTTon:
The governmental reorganization which followed the demotion of Malenkov in5 brought significant changes In the top leadership of thermed forces. Marshal Zhukov movedebruary into the position of minister of defense, which had been vacated by Bulganln's rise tp premier. This was the first time9rofessional military officer headed the combined armed forces of the DSSR2.
1/ Seehe Resignation of Malenkov.
2/ During the previous period of,olitical marshal, was Minister of Armed Forces6 untilhen Marshalrofessional officer, took over.
Although the influence of the professional military leadership in the government roseew high with Zhukov's appointment, the political leaders took pains to keep the power of the military well within definite limits. Ho representative of the professional military class was promoted in February or subsequently to the highest policy-making bodies of the USSRv-the Presidium of the Party Centralor the Presidium of the Council of Ministers. In the Party Presidium, which presumably" holds the final voice on policy matters, the armed forces will continue to be represented by Bulganin, a Although recent events suggest that some decision-making power may now have been extended to the Party Central Committee, the percentage of military figures in the Central Committee does not giveecisive voice in that body. Ofull members of the Central Committee, who would have the voting privilege,ercent) are military officers, and this number includes three who would be consideredVoroshilov, and Brezhnev. Onlyilitary officers are Included in the list of candidate members of the Central Committee.
That the new leadership was willing tourther rise in military prestige was shownariety of ways:
continued glorification of the armed
forces through the granting of awards, dedication of monuments, announced planned publication of works onsubjects, etc.
exploitation of the popularity of
military officers by making greater use of thorn as policy spokesmen.
rather obvious efforts of the leader-
ship to show the unity of the party-government-military leadership, such as the attendance at Govorov's funeral in5 and the telecast of Zhukov-Bulganin-Khrushchev for Armed Forces Day in
tho ostentatious mass promotion of
several officers to the highest ranks In the USSR In
the granting of greater latitude of public expression to military officers on militaryeven problems of grand strategy.
Onix officers were promoted to the rank of marshal of the Soviet Union and five to the rank of chief marshal or marshalpecial arm or service. This was the largest simultaneous promotion to these high ranks ever made in the USSR. At special ceremonies, Voroshilov presented the marshal's star and patent to the nowly createdplus the two highest-ranking naval officers.*
Certain high military officers in their turn contributed publicly to enhancing the reputation of the post-Malenkov political leadership, byelect list of Party leaders who allegedly most to the Soviet military effort in World War II. ecent study has found that during the weeks immediately following Malenkov's resignation, six different military leaders paid public tribute to the part in winning the war played by Khrushchev, Bulganin and the deceased Zhdanov and Shcherbakov. Those military men who spoke out in such fashionKonev, Bagramyan, Zheltov, Moskovsky (the editor of Red Star) and several lesser figures. The use of selected listings of this type had alreadyart in the discrediting of Malenkov, although military leaders had not been Important as public participants.
presence or naval
officers reveals an incident of interservice Jealousy in the Soviet armed forces. Shortly after the mass promotion, it was made public that the highest naval rank had been changed from "admiral of tho fleet" to "admiral of the fleet of the Soviet Union." This change was apparently designed to correct any popular misunderstanding that the highest naval title might be inferior to the highest army title, although,to Soviet field service regulations, the two titles had always been of equal rank.
BIS, Politics and Military Doctrinalamong the Soviet Military Elite, RS.75
otal ofiterary works on military subjects will be issued by the Military Publishing Office, aocordlngAS3 announcement Of special interest Is tbe fact that the series is toumber of books about outstanding military leaders of tho last war. Soviet writers have been Instructed to write more books for children about tho army and to make them as romantic and inspiring as possible.
oscow conference of tho Union of Soviet Writers held in late May, in which the Defense Ministry participated, public requests were made for less censorship of military writing, more accuracy In reporting, emphasis on better biographies of prominent military leaders, and, mostevision of tho Stalinist versions of military history and strategic military doctrine which had developed during World War II. iscussion of basic strategic doctrine this springew practice of public appraisal of world-wide military developments, in contrast to the practice during the Stalin era of airing only those opinions which conformed to the military views of Stalin. Recent public statements by Soviet military officers have challenged the military genius of Stalin by callingeappraisal of the traditional emphasis of those "permanently operating factors" in warfare which had been stressed by Stalin as being tbe decisive elements for victory and by asking for more consideration of tho significance of the element of "surprise attack."1
During the late spring and summers the extremely active Khrushchev-Bulganin foreign policy unfolded, Soviet military forces at homo and abroad were used as an Important bargaining elemont
1/ The five "permanently operating factors" which- determine the outcome of war are, according to Stalinist military science: stability of the rear, morale of the army, the quantity and quality of divisions, the armament of the army, and the organizing ability of the command personnel.
in tho regime's campaign for relaxation oftensions. In contrast to the militancy of the period around the time of Malenkov'sthe Soviet leadership embarked on aof concessions In which military leaders were prominent instruments.
The rapid series of foreign policy moves affecting the military establishment began with the Soviet agreement in May to end the occupation of Austria. Following final ratification of the Austrian treaty in July, Soviet forces began to withdraw In August, and the withdrawal was virtually completed by early September. Bulganin used this wlthi-drawal at the Geneva conference as the opening gambiteries of moves designed to prove to the West that the Soviet military threat had evaporated, when he announced that the total strength of the Soviet military establishment would be reduced by an amount equivalent to the strength of the forces withdrawn from Austria.
This was followedonth by the dramatic Soviet announcement thatesult of the "relaxation of international tensions"Geneva, the Soviet armed forces would be reduced in sizeotalen (estimated to be approximatelyercent of total militarybyecember. All the European Satellites except East Germany, which has no official military force, have since followed suit with promises of military manpower reductions of roughly similar scope.
A continuation of such moves was foreshadowedoast delivered by Khrushchev in Bucharest onugust, in which he stated that the announced Soviet reduction was "not our last word" on theof international accord, and that if Soviet actions are followed by similar Western actions, the USSR will "continue to march on this road."
A further Soviet concession Involvingforces abroad was made oneptember, when the DSSB agreed to return Its base at Porkkala to Finland.
The degree of participation by Soviet military leaders In theso decisions is not definitely known, and there is very little information on which toypothesis regarding tholr role. Marshal Zhukov, as defense minister, logically signed theregarding the removal of Soviet forces from Austria and the reduction in over-all military Zhukov himself was one of the four leading Soviet figures at Geneva, despite the fact that his position in the Soviet governmental structure was lower than that of many persons not Included in the delegation, although his presence may well beby bis previous close association withElsenhower. At aC ' uncheon with the Presldont at Geneva, Zhukov is reported to have dwelt at length on tho "collegiality" of present-day Soviet decision-making. Following the announcement of the intended evacuation of Porkkala, Zhukov took occasion to Inform Western press correspondents that "we decided that tho time has come to liquidate our bases innd "tho sooner the West follows suit the bettor." (In this statement, Zhukovheme emphasized by him in an Interview with Western correspondentsust prior to his appointment as defense minister.)
It must be emphasized that the use ofleaders and military forces as Instruments of the present conciliatory Soviet foreign policy does not Imply that the Soviet leadership is In its own estimation reducing its over-all preparedness effort. The increased military budget announced In February apparontly remains in force, and tho statements of last winter regarding the needtrong defense have in no way been retracted. The "concessions" that have been announced rofor only to aggregate manpower and to bases of relatively little military significance. Tho Soviet estimate, concurred in by tbe military, may well be that the realities of modern warfare are such that other factors of
military strengthuclear weapons and the means of delivering them) now outweigh sheerstrength, some of which can be channeled to economic production. It is too early to tell what means the USSR will use to implement its announced troop reduction, but many possibilities arewhich would minimize its significance toSoviet military capabilities. "It"is, moreover, quite possible that5 announcement Is in part an attempt to take belated credit for some of the reductions which took place3hus there is at present little reason to suppose that the concessions of the summer5 would have met with serious objections by informedleaders.
B. Party Control in the Armed Forces:
The enormous prestige and improved status now enjoyed by the military raises the question of theirn the future. Despite the impressive gains of the armed forces, the traditional party and security controls remain, and there are reasons to bolieve that the leadership will attempt to keep them as effective as in the past.
It is possible that Party and Komsomol membership In the military has increased recently. Molotov in4 speech to the Supremo Soviet said that, foren in the army, there werearty or Komsomol members. Earlier, inarshal Vasilevsky bad stated4 percent of the officers and generals were Party or Komsomol members. As most of the senior officers have long been nominal Party members, it is doubtful if Party membership among the officer class hasappreciably. Assuming the statements mentioned above refer only to the army andan army2 percent officer component, this would indicate that approximatelyercent of the enlisted men are either Party or Komsomol members. On the other hand, if the above statements refer to the armed forceshole andorceith the same officer percentage, theof Party and Komsomol members among the enlisted men would beercent of the total.
Party figures are not available to ascertain if thisubstantial increase in Party and Komsomol membership. It is doubtful if moreew percent of the enlisted men are Party members as most of them are in the age group for Komsomolnd under). In view of the emphasis being placed on NCO leadership, however, it is possible that more NCO's are now being admitted to the Party than formerly. In regard to Komsomol membership, an analysis of information Cp
^reported mat neavy pressure is exertea ou sciaxers to join; and thatesult practically all the troops have at least gone through the formality of taking out It appears that the Komsomol organization in the armed forceseorganization in the fallut details are not available. Aof the armed forces radio service, inpoke of the conversion of thenew structure" with organizationalbeing held for that purpose in various armed forces units.
In the matter of Party control ofore liberal approach has been noted.
the compulsory curriculaolitical training were relaxedoilitary Party cell, instead of following prescribed study assignments as in the past, were permitted to use their Initiative in the choice of studies. The deputies for political matters were to supervise the courses and to evaluate the work of
1/ of3 on
political operations in Soviet Armed Forces reached the conclusion that in peacetime, approximatelyercent of the total military forces are party This would meanilitary men are party members; this figure is considered doubtful as the total Communist membership in the OSSR is less.
each member.1 Evidence of the truth of this report has appeared in Soviet military publications. In Red Star,eference was made to the 1Tputting into practice of the principle ofin party enlightenment." Theointed out that during the current training year, many officers have raised their ideological-political level by "independent" study; batthe article continues, many of these officers had had insufficient experience Instudy. The article goes on to criticize political organs and Party bureaus which very superficially fulfilled their responsibilities for resolving the difficulties of the officers.
Certain concessions appear to have been made to improve the position of the commander for the sake of military discipline; but these gains have been partially nullified by saddling the commandersreater sense of Party responsibility. C.
t, membersilitary party cell may not criticize their commander, as such action might undermine military discipline; official complaints of the military are forwarded not through political channels but through military channels; the position of political officeras4 down only to battalion level, whereas formerly it was found through company level, with the commander assuming political duties on lower levels.
1/ The new emphasis on independence in political activities has its parallel in the tactical field. Officers are now encouraged to use initiative with the service regulations onlyuide, whereas formorly strict obedience to regulations was expected. Earlier in this paper mention was made of theprogram among the HCO's. It is tempting to speculate on the long-range effects of such policyInitiative and leadership can be localized only in the channels desired by the Party.
Tbe nuneroua references to strengthening "one-man command"ontinuing sensitivity on this subject. For example, Red Star in5 spoke of the nocessity "to explain more thoroughly the instructions of the Party in tbe matter of one-man command." It is not known whether this refers to some recent instructions or whother it is an amplification of earlier directives on the subject. As summarized in Caesarheofficers lost tholr command powersevertheless, their continued Interference In command functionsirective to bo Issued1 limiting their work strictly to the political field. It would appear that tbe professional military officers are particularly watchful for anyIn tho command field.
There are hintsore sophisticated approach to this problem of unity of command. The political officers are to be kept definitely out of the command field, which is tbe acknowledged bailiwick of the professional soldiers, but the commander is to be made increasingly aware of tbe fact that the final responsibility for the political education of his troops rests with him. Political and military training are considered to be of equal value. There haveumber of references to this dual responsibility of the commander in the military and political field, as illustratedather flattering quotation from an article, datedy the editor of Red Star: "One of the most important measures of the Party and government Introduced into the Soviet armed forces in recent years is the strengthening of unity of command. This raised the authority of commanders still higher and Improved discipline and order in troop units. Our army and navy have at their disposal tho most experienced cadres of officers and generals, persons who are selflessly dedicated to the motherland, and who are capable of training and educating troops In conformity with present-day requirements. Tho most valuable commanders are those who skillfully combine tholr combat activity with the political and military training of their subordinates."
That greater freedom of expression on the whole problem of politicalin the armed forces is nowis indicated by the appearance in Red Star in5 of an article wTOTTEe rather startling title, "Party Work Should Be Subordinated to the Interests of the Unit's Battle-Readiness."
C. Security Control in the Armed Forces:
The military counterintelligence apparatus, now controlled by the KGB, is believed to be as active as formerly in ferreting out any "subversive" of the military. It is doubtful that the security police lost much of their investigative power by theof Beria and the reorganization of the security apparatus. Publicwas directed not against the police system per se, but against the previous leadership and its methods of operations. Both former deputy MGB minister Ryumin and former MGB minister Abakumov were executed for their alleged extralegal use of police power. The securityhas been definitely subordinated to the Party and limitations have been Imposed on Its indiscriminate use, but the police organs survive with their voluminous files and vast network of informers.
Stalin always maintained control of the security apparatus and now Ebrushchev appears to be using his influence to assign his followers to the KGB. The chairman of the KGB and his two identified deputies are known to have had previouswith Khrushchev. This may Indicate that Khrushchev now commands loyalties: in the KGB and is therefore Influential In its operations. It is unnecessary to emphasize that Khrushchev and the KGB, aware of the enormous prestige of tho military, would be particularly watchful for any evidence of thinking or acting on the part of the armed forces or Individuals within it.
D. Control of Zhukov:
In considering the problem of army control, attention must be paid to the personality of Zhukov. Be is unique for several reasons: hiscompetence; bis ability to inspire almost fanatical loyalty among his followers; his position as the most popular figure in the USSB, both with the populace and the armed forces;ertain independence of mind.
There is no reason to question his loyalty, either to tho Party or to the government. He, like many of the more prominent Soviet officers, has longember of the Party, which he Joined Most of his speeches have followed the general policy line of the moment, although with notable moderation of phraseology. His lotter attackingand Churchill in4
was undoubtedly written at the bidding of thewas in terms so vitriolic as to appear towritten by someone else. In hise duly gave credit to the Partyinspirer and organizer of victory. hints of independent thinking havewith reference to his concept of There is reason to believe that he mayviewpoint as to the effectshird worldnearly in accord with the opinion expressedin March
hukov in his first Pravda article after his return to prominence stated that "war means heavy losses for bothhis was the closest approach by any top Soviet figure to Malenkov's thesis of destructlon-of-world-civili-zatlon. 5 interview with Hearst reporters, Zhukov again used this theme, stating that "atomic war Is just as dangerous to the attacker as to the attacked." Although Zhukov, in hisebruary address on Armed Forces Day, made no allusion to possible Soviet lossesew war, he failed to reassert forcefully the themeew world war would destroy capitalism alone. This reticence appeared unusual id view of the bluntof Malenkov's thesis by Molotovebruary and by Voroshilov onarch, as well as the presence of this theme in the Soviet press at that time. In5 Pravda article, Zhukov wrote: "One has to be surprised at the fact that big military expertsand especially those of Britainhave such anttitude toward the problems of atomic and hydrogen war. We, the military, realize more clearly than anyone else the extremely devastating nature ofar."
Zhukov has been described as an ardentwbo is-intensely interested in the defense of his country. Be may have favored the moreforeign policy of' Malenkov; however, the failure of this policy plus the imminent rearmament
of Germany might have thrown him on tho side of those advocating greater military preparedness at the time of Malenkov's removal. He has made several statements, apparently sincere, indicating his desire for peace, such as his remark madearsawin May. C
rf Zhuaov aavinea toeo maxe peace, saying that he had fought seven wars and had had enough. His personal correspondence with President Eisenhower and his letter to thePress Club ofpril were undoubtedly efforts to reduce tension. In his letter to the Overseas Press Club, he expressed certainty that thewould do everything in his power to giveaid to the cause of peace, stating that "new efforts are now needed to avoid further aggravation of international tension. He also remarked that while "some politicians would like to instill the idea that war is inevitable, the common people of the world do not want bombs dropped on theirn this letter Zhukov referred to the destructionew war might bring to "children, mothers and wives" in "Hew York or Moscow, London or Paris.
His appointment as defense minister may well have been to Increase the popularity of the party and governmentimeore austere internal policy was to be reintroduced. Although by bis appointment his prestige has increased significantly, his power is limited. He wasull member of the Party Central Committee inut he has not been elevated to the Presidium of the Party Central Committee, which Is considered the final policy-making body in the USSR. Nor was he elected to the Presidium of the Council of Ministers, whose responsibilities presumably Include somefunctions. He is one of the more thaninisters who form the Council of Ministers.
It was previously mentioned that the KGB would continue to restrain any ambitions to power on the part of the military. Mention should be made of the relations between Zhukov and the man apparently
handpicked by Khrushchev to be head of the KGB, I. A. Serov, whose promotion to Army General was revealed In According to reports, Zhukov and Serov, who were both in Bast Germany following World War II, thoroughly disliked each other. At that time, Serov was purging anti-Soviet elements in the Soviet Zone of Germany. Reports indicate that their paths may also have crossedater date. Serov was sent as an MVD officer to the Ukraine; at that time Zhukov was militarycommander at Odessa (Ukraine). hukov was dispatched into semiobscurity to the Urals.
There are also indications that the party leadership is taking steps to holdrestige within bounds by building up Marshal Ivan Konevossible counterweight to Zhukov and by belittling Zhukov's wartime successes.
E. Buildup of Konev as Counterweight to Zhukov:
Marshal Konev, although stationed outside of Moscow2as at the center of several major political controversies in recent years. He was namedoctors' Plot victim in January 1e reportedly took part with Zhukov andin the arrest of Beria innd he served as chairman of the special session of the Supreme Court which tried Beria and his associates.x
e acted as spokesman for the armed forces at the Supreme Soviet session. He was also picked to write the Pravda article for Armed Forces Day,n which he singled out Khrushchev for special attention. In
1/ For information on tho fate of the Doctors' Plotee Appendix A.
doing this, he departed from the customarylisting of wartime political officers to name Khrushchev ahead of Bulganin, Zhdanov, and Shcherbakov. His Pravda article was the most widely broadcast commentary of the anniversary; in contrast,peech, which had beenwas not broadcast andrief summary appeared in Pravda.
Konev was again chosen to give the main address atelebration at the Bolshoi Theatre, the first time such ceremonies had been held on this date. His speech, which has been characterized as being particularly Stalinist, was given unusual prominence. Again he set Khrushchev apart from the other political officers by stating, "Comrade Khrushchov, comrades Bulganin, etc."
It Is noteworthy that two other military figures, Bagramyan and Zheltov, subsequently copied Konev's technique of listing Khrushchov before Bulganin, although they did not go so far aE to separate Khrushchev from the others listed.
Konev, described as an ardent Communistevoted friend of Stalin, joined the party7 and was active in organizational work. He began his military careerolitical He wasandidate member of the Central Committee, CPSU,chieving full membership in Since his assignment2 to the Ukraine, be has been active in Ukrainian party affairs. The Germans described Konev, whom they nicknamed "Batcher" because of his heavy troop losses, as "moreoliticianoldier."
Konev was picked by Khrushchev to accompany him to Warsaw on two occasions theof the Soviet-Polish Treaty of Friendship and the anniversary of the liberation of Poland.
Konev was Identified in Aprileputy minister of defense, only to be named in Hay as the commander of the Soviet-Satellite combined forces.
Little is known of the personalbetween Konev and Zhukov. During World War II, Konev participated in military operations coordinated by Zhukov, serving In the defense of Moscow and the reconquest of the Dkralne. Zhukov's apparent confidence in Konevilitary commander is indicated by the fact that in the drive from Warsaw to Berlin, Zhukov, then personallya front as well as co-ordinating all activities in the area, consistently kept Konev on his left flank. One area of conflict between the two has been reported: Konev allegedly favored strengthening the political control system In the armed forces in contrast to Zhukov's insistence on strict one-man command of units. There may be professional jealousy between the two, since Konev succeeded Zhukov as commander in chief of the ground forces6 when Zhukov was reducedilitary district commander.
In the build-up accompanying Konev'sas commander of tho combined Soviet-Satellite forces, wartime history was distorted to challenge the pre-eminent position of Zhukov. Perhaps the most revealing exaggeration of Konev's position was carriedolish newspaper the day after his appointment: "The figure of marshal Ivan Konev, twice Hero of the Soviet Union, commander of the First Ukrainian Front during the war, conqueror of Berlin, and liberator of Prague, is growing to the dimensionsymbolthe. symbol of the invincible might of the Soviet army and of our entire camp." (ZYCIE WARSZAWT,.
This quotation distorted facts by ignoring the major role of Zhukov in the conquest of Berlin; furthermore, the only military figure in tho USSR who could approach the statureymbol is Marshal Zhukov. There were similar,in the speeches of various Satellite Party
and government leaders, which magnified Konev's wartime role at tho expense of Zhukov.
A biography of Conov (Moscow, Hews,urther disparages the military record of Zhukov. This article stated that Konev's forces "in coordination with those of Gen. K. F. Vatntinouted and smashed Hitler's Belgorod-Kharkov grouping. Then followed the sweep across the Ukraine, during which Vatutin and Konevthe famoushevchenkovskii operation, the "Second Stalingrad." From4 onward, Konev's forces inflicted major defeats on the Nazis in Poland and Czechoslovakia, and it was his troops, in conjunction with those of the First Belorusslan Front, which took Berlin Thooperation of the war, the thrust Into the Ore Mountains of Czechoslovakia, was also the work of Konev, and it was highly characteristic of his type of generalships" la this write-up, It is completely overlooked that Zhukov as theof STAVKA (General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander) co-ordinated all the ground and air activities of.the operations referred to; operations such as these usually Involved two to four frontsotal of ten to twelve armies, plus air support. In addition, Zhukov had personal command of the First Bc-lorusslan Front.
A Pravda article5 by General V. I. Chulkov on the battle of Berlin not only failed to give Zhukov credit for planning and co-ordinating all operations, but distorted truth to give Konev and Bokossovsky equal credit with Zhukov for the Berlin capture. Rokossovsky's contribution was, in fact, indirect, as he remained la northern Poland and northern Germany when Zhukov and Konev rushed from Warsaw to Berlin.
ecent broadcastilitaryin Moscow, Zhukov's part in the battle of Stalingrad was completely Ignored, although he was tho STAVKA representative who planned the operation and was in tho field during the German
offensive. Lesser individuals wore mentioned,Colonel General (now Marshal) Vasllevsky who, according to the broadcast, was sent "by the Party."'. Khrushchev's part in the battleember of the Stalingrad military council, was played up as It had been on previous occasions.' Incidentally, the name of Malenkov, who had been sent by the State Defense Committee to Stalingrad, was also Ignored.
1/ There has been somo build-up of Khrushchev's roleolitical officer In the last war. In the past it bad been customary to give the State Defense Committee credit for victory, listing its contribution ahead of the work of the political generals. The first variation in the official order of precedence was noted inHUD, on the anniversary of Stalin's death, statedCentral Committee, without mentioning the State Defense Committee, send Comrades Bulganin, Zhdanov, Shcherbakov, Khrushchev, and others to direct military work. The same four were named in This may have been an attempt to undermine the prestige of Malenkov, whoember of the State Defense Committee, while Khrushchev was not. nh anniversary of the victory ofravda article Ignored all military heroes; besides Stalin, only Khrushchev was singled out and personally associated with victory.
P. Probable Appearance of Military Groupings:
It has been speculated that Khrushchev may be attempting to fractionallzo the loyalties of the military by building up his own clique among theclass, in contrast to those who might be called Zhukov's followers.1 The background of officers promoted in rank or position since the fall of Malenkov has therefore been examined for evidence on the following points: ast association with Khrushchev or Konev;vidence of more than usual Party activity; indications of Ukrainian ties.
Of the eleven officers promoted to the rank of Marshal onvidence would indicate that three possibly have loyalties to Khrushchev and Konev; therelight possibility that two more owe such allegiance. Of the remaining five, it is impossible to advance an opinionfour of them, but the fifth has strongties to Zhukov. Mo generalization as to allegiance can be made in regard to the officer promoted at tbe same time to Army General. C
^xne limitations of attempting to line up followers by the :ttbove.-mentioned criteria are nevertheless,W
j, plus the fact that some of these officers
1/ It is impossible to isolate Zhukov's followers on the basis of association. During the last war he came in contact either directly or indirectly with every prominent officer and, during his period of eclipse after the war, his influence would not have been felt in theor promotion of officers. The allegiance that he commands would date primarily from the wartime and post-Stalin periods.
were promoted In place of men of equal or greater
qualifications, suggest that some political in-
exerted on their behalf. There was
atherInterrelationship ofties among those promoted.
nriA.iKi.officers who are considered possibly to favor Khrushchev and Konev are:
s- "oskalenko, Marshal of SO.
Commander of Moscow Military District and Commander of Moscow Garrison;
Grecnko, Marshal of SO,
Commander, Soviet Forces in Germany;
_ .s- Varontsov, Marshal oftoia
slisht JSu otticere whose careers indicateKhrushchev and
. . A. I. Yeremenko, Marshal of SO
Colander. North Cues us Military Dletrlcl; '
n " F' Zhigarev, Chief Marshal of Aviation, Commander in Chief of Military Air Force;
S. X. Rudenko, Marshal of Aviation, Chief of Staff of Military Air Force;
v. A. SudetE, Marshal of Aviation, position unknown.
Promoted officer with major wartime tios to
I. Kazakov, Marshal of Artillery, Doputy Commander in Chief of Main Directorate of Artillery Troops.
It was pointed out inhat Konev's subordinates during and after the war have risen, possibly through his influence. These officers include:
A. S. Zbeltov, Colonel General, Chief, Chief Political Directorate;
G. K. Malandin, Army General, Chief of Staff, Ground Troops, and Deputy Chief of General Staff.
A. S. Zhadov, Colonel Gcnoral, formorly Commander in Chief, Central Group of Forces; no*eputy to Konev.
y. V. Kurasov, Army General,Voroshilov Military Academy.1
Of those high officers who have advanced in position sincehe advancements of Konev and Marshal V. D. Sokolovsky are the most significant. Konev's rlso has been discussod.
The Soviet press revealed in5 that Sokolovsky isirst deputy Minister of Defense and Chief of the General Staff of the Army and Havy. rilliant staff officer and army commander, was Konev's chief of staff in the drive across Poland; ho was relieved before the Frankfurt/Berlin breakthrough, apparently to be Zhukov's staff co-ordinator for the Berlin operation. Be replaced Zhukov6 as commander of the Soviet Forces in Germany and as chairman, Soviet Element, Allied Control Council, Berlin. Western officers in Berlin found him intelligent, hard, and skillful in carrying out Soviet policy, in which hoonvinced believer. It was under his direction that the Soviets instituted the Berlin blockade.
He became first deputy Minister of the Armed Forces for General Affairs inhich position he retained after the separation of the Armed Forces Ministry into the War and Navy Ministries. e was identified as chief of the General Staffeputy minister of war.
An apparent favorite of Stalin, he wasull member of the Central Committee, CPSTJ, in It is Impossible to ally him to any military or political grouping.
Of the six new military district commanders in the western USSB, four have major wartime ties to Zhukov; this Is also true of the officer who has been recently named chairman of the central committee of DOSAAF (All-Union Society for Cooperation with the Army, Aviation, and thehe Sovietand civil defense organization. L
cwly assigned officers with probable major Zbukov associations include:
A. V. Gorbatov, Colonel General, Commander, Baltic Military District;
I. I. Pedyuninski, Colonel General, Commander, Transcaucasus Military District;
A. I. Badzlevski, Colonel General, Commander, Odessa Military District;
V. Ya. Kolpakchi, Colonel General, Commander, Northern Military District;
P. A. Belov, Colonel General, Chairman, Central Committee, DOSAAP.
In attempting to outline the possibilities of groupings or cliques within the militarytwo other recent developments must bo taken into account. The first, already discussed. Is the singling out by certain military leaders in the spring5 of the select grouping of Party leaders who allegedly contributed most to winning World War II. Konev, Bagramyan and Zheltov were chief among the military leaders who chose or were chosen to perform this service for Khrushchev and Bulganin.
urious public airing of military doctrinal problems apparently cameead in March, April anduring which periodmilitary leaders made statements regarding the significance of surprise attack and nuclear weapons in modern war. The question of the impact of surprise in war goes back to Stalin's assertion following the early German victories1 that surprise was not one of those factors whichthe final outcome of war. Some re-examination of this theory has been evident since the year of Stalin's death, but it now appears that an entire reworking: of the theory has occurred and has been brought to light in recent Soviet publications. The full implications of this re-examination are not clear, particularly since it has been interwoven with vigilance propaganda, assertions of Soviet nuclear strength, and the debate over theof atomic war touched off by Malenkov
WW JiLUJLJ "
In public statements, different military leaders haveariety of approaches to the problems of surprise attack and nuclear warfare.asilcvsky and Bulganin called for heightened vigilance and preparedness to use all weapons in case of surprise attack, but it was not until afterdemotion that the first hints were issued that atomic surprise, because of its decisiveness, mightalid general principle of modern war. Sokolovsky wrote on5 that themust be deprived of the element of surprise and that one must "not allow oneself to be caught unawares." Onarch, "Marshal of Tank Troops Rotmistrov publicly callede-examination of Soviet military science, declaring that "in certainurprise assault using atomic and hydrogen weapons may be one of the decisiveof success, not only in the initial periodar but in its entire course.
The possible results ofar have been alluded to by several military leaders. Zhukov and Vasilevsky have publicly warned of the heavy losses in life and property that would be visited upon both sides. In contrast to this relatively realistic appreciation, Konev and Lt. Gen. Shatilov (deputy head of the Chief Political Directorate under Zheltov) have avoided indicating the mutually destructive power of nuclear weapons, the latter warning the West to "remember well that atomic weapons as well as suddenness of action are double-edged weapons." Bagramyan stressed Sovietby repeating5 claim of Soviet superiority over the OS in hydrogen weapons and called for the Soviet armed forces to "nip in the bud every striving of the aggressors to carryurprise attack on our Soviet
Although little has been said publicly on the subject since May, the problem was left without any clear resolution in Soviet military circles of the question of whether or not atomic war implies
mutual destruction. For tho purposes of this paper, however, It must suffice to point out that different military leaders have4 publicly adopted quite divergent viewsey question.
G. Conclusions Regarding Control of the Military and Military groupings:
In summary, the traditional Party andcontrols apparently remain as effective as in the past,ote of subtloty and latitude appearing in the method of Party control. Defense Minister Zhukov is well under Party control, but as Insurance against too much Influence or Independence on his part, two developments have appeared: The build-up of Konev,ounterweight; the possible appearanceilitary grouping whose firstmight be to other than Zhukov. It is not to be inferred that the military leadership is divided into pro-Konev and pro-Zhukov camps; there are undoubtedly many independents who command loyalties of their own. But It does appear that groupings do exist within the top military hierarchy, arising from factorspatronage within tbe military establishment, associations with and support for political leaders, and divergent views on strategic questions. Konev figures in one way or another in much of the material on these groupings, probably In part because of his recent prominence and because of the greaterin identifying Zhukov's associations. At the present time, the most that could be said of such groupings Is that they would detract somewhat from Zhukov's pre-eminence. The suggestion is strong,
however, that in continuing future study of the position of the top Soviet military hierarchy, Konev and his associates must be watched closely as potential key figures in political intrigue.
V. Probable Influence of Military on Soviet Policy:
At present the military enjoy their greatest prestige since tho war; their Influence has grown with each crisis since the death of Stalin. it not to be implied that the military areecisive political role, for as before mentioned no representative of the professional officer class is on tbe major policy-making bodies of the USSR.
The influence of the military remains indirect rather than direct, but the prestige of the military In the USSR has become such that indirect Influence can be more easily exerted than before. Their favored position indicates that military leaders are no longer viewed with the suspicion and distrust that was their postwar lot under Stalin.
The influence of the military must be exercised from within the Soviet ruling group, rather than from the outside. The political control apparatus in the armed forces would seem to prevent the military from adopting an Independent positionuestion and then successfully seeking support for their viewpoint outside Party circles.
It Is probable that the greatest influence of the military leadership is exerted in the personal relationships between military personalities and members of the Soviet political leadership, and only those officers whose loyalty to the regime and leadership were beyond question would beosition to exercise this privilege.
Recent History of Doctors' Plot Victims:
Ofilitary officers (Shtemenko, Konev, Vasllevskl, Levcbenko, and Govorov) who figured in the doctors' plot, only Shtemenko seems to haveefinite decline in position. As be was removed from his post as Chief of Staff of the Army in the autumnis removal cannot beto the Beria affair. He was elected anmember of the Central Committee ine was reported in East Germany from roughly2 tond was last seen at the Hay Day celebration in Moscow Unconfirmed reports have placed him in the Far East.
Marshal Konev's status has definitely risen; he has advancedilitary district commandereputy defense minister as revealed in5 to the commander of tho Soviet-Satellite combined staff in At the time of the first governmental reorganization following Stalin's death, Marshal Vasllevsklirst deputy Minister of War, along with Marshal Zhukov, under Bulganin, who was appointed Minister of War. He remainedirst deputy when tho ministries of war and navy wero merged on3 into the Defense Ministry. It is not believed that bis failure to become defense minister in5 is directlyto the doctors' plot; it is believed that larger considerations entered into the appointment of Zhukov to that position. Admiral Levchenko suffered no apparent decline; he has6eputy commander in chief of Naval Forces in charge of training, and he has appeared recently as in the past at certain Moscow functions.
The detailed medical bulletin Issued5 on the lllnoss and death of Marshal Govorov may have been Intended to silence any suspicions that his death might have been duo to unnatural causes. In the ceremony surrounding his funeral, coming as it did so shortly after the removal of
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Malenkov, great efforts were made to show the unity of party and government with the military leaders. Virtually all leading party and government officials stoodhort time at his bier, and allattended his funeral on Bed Square. This tribute was In marked contrast to that accorded to Marshal Tolbukhln who diedhen onlyand Shvernik stood by the bier and only six Politburo members attended tbe funeral, the notable absentees including Stalin and Beria.
Govorov6 had become Inspector general of tbe armed forces, which position was taken over by Marshal Konev0 Konev was sent from Moscow2 to the Carpathian Militaryand it is not known whether Govorov regained bis former position of inspector general at that time. There may have been some rivalry between Govorov and Konev; however, both are believed to have enjoyed the full confidence and trust of Stalin.
Govorov appeared prominently at functionspreceding and following Stalin's death. He attended the meeting of the Aktiv of the Defense Ministry which denounced Beria innd, according to the modlcal bulletin issued at the time of bis death, he would have suffered his first stroke about this time.