Created: 3/9/1956

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The data and conclusions contained ln this report do not necessarily represent the final position of ORR and should be regarded as provisional only and subject to revision. Comments and data which may be available to the user arc solicited.


Office of Research and Reports

This report describes the availability of food in the USSR, the European Satellites, and Communist China during the consumption yearhrough To provide comparativeavailabilities of foodrewar period and duringonsumption year are also described.

The supply and consumption of food in each country are measured by the conventional "foodtatistical device which reflects directly the standard of living and indix^ctly the economic progressountry. Properly prepared, the food balance ia an accurateof the availability of food ln different periods of timeiven country and in different countriesiven period of time.

The quantities of food available for human consumptionountry depend on production, net trade, changes in stocks, and nonfoodeed und waste, feed for livestock,ndustrial utilization. In estimating the availability of certain grains and oilseeds, therates in processing also must be considered. Because of the many factors involved Inood balance, and because of the lack of specific data concerning those factors, the food balance must be an approximation. It expresses the national average of foodin terms of calories per capita per day, but it does not reflect the Pinny disparities in levels of consumption among population groups. Moreover, only the major foodstuffs arc considered in the food balance, and food "consumed" is measured in terms of food available to the pro-djirer at lhe source level and to the nonproduccr at the wholesale levelfter retail sale the extent to which food is wasted, misused, or fed to animals by the nonproduccrs is unknown.

Tills report should be consideredreliminary and tentative analysis of thefood situation In the Sino-Soviet Bloc. In particular, the estimates of trade, changes in stocks, and,gross avaiiability for use as food should be considered tentative. Lack of information makes inpossible any direct appraisal of current consumption. It has been necessary, therefore, to use historical information on consumption, evaluated in the light of current conditions and Bloc policies, to derive an estimate of the quantities of food available duringonsumption year.

- in







3- Changes in

of Food

Vulnerabilities, and Intentions

III. European

A. Food


Changes in Stocks

S. Food

of Food

E. Capabilities, Vulnerabilities, and


IV. Connunlst


of Food Consumption .

Vulnerabilities, and Intentions


Appct*llx A. Statistical

Appendix B.

Appendix C. Gaps ln

Appendix D. Source References

- vi -



of Caloric Consumption In the,

Distribution or Calorics In the,

nd 11

Calories per Capita of Selected Categories of Foods

In the', and 12

*. Index of Agricultural Production lb the European Satellites,

by8 and

5- Index of Agricultural Production in the European Satellites,

by Product, Jo

et Trade ln Selected Agriculturalthe European Satellites,,

of Dally Consumption of Food per Capita In the European


Contribution of Selected Foods to Total Caloric

Consumption In the European Satellites, 2*

of Agricultural Commodities by


Contribution of Selected Foods to Total. Caloric

Consumption ln. and


In Consumption of Selected Foods ln Communist China,

- vii -

Supply end Utilization of Food in the USSR,


Supply and Utilization of Food in tbo USSR,

Consumption Year

ill. Estimated Supply and Utilization or Food ln the USSR,

Consumption Year

Supply and Utilization of Food Id Albania,


Supply and Utilization of Toed in Albania,


Supply and Utilization or Food lu Albania,

Consumption Year

Supply and Utilization of Food In Bulgaria,


Supply and Utilization of Food in Bulgaria,


Supply nnd Utilization of Food in Bulgaria,


Supply nnd Utilization of Food ia Czechoslovakia,


Supply and Utilization or Food in Czechoslovakia,

Consumption Tear

23< Estimated Supply and Utilization of Food in Czechoslovakia,

Consuaption Year

2h. Estimated Supply and Utilization of Foodst Germany,


- viti -


25- Estimated Supply and Utilization oi" Food in Eaet Germany,

Consumption Year

?6. Estimated Supply and Utilization of Food in East Germany,


Supply and Utilization of Food in Hungary,


Supply and Utilization of Food in Hungary,

Consumption Year 52

Supply and Utilization of Food in Hungary,

Consumption- ^

Supply and Utilization oi' Food in Poland,

Consumptionverage 5*

Supply and Utilization of Food in Poland,

Supply and Utilization of Food in Poland,

Consumption Year 56

Supply and Utilization Of Pood ill Rumania,

Consumptionverage 57

Estimated Supply and Utilisation of Food in Humania,

Consumption Year

Supply and Utilization of Food in Rumania,

Consumption 59

Supply and Utilization of Food in Communist China,

Consumptionverage .

Supply and Utilization Of Food in Communiat China,


Supply and Utilisation of Feed ln Communist China,

Consumption Year

- ix -





The availability of food ln the countries of the Sino-Soviet Bloc during the consumption yearU through5 was still below prewar levels. In terms of calories per capita per day, the availability of food for humanangedown Communist Chinaighn Poland. The daily per capita caloric Intake in the USSR

In the USSR, grains and potatoes contribute aboutercent of the calories in the average Soviet diet.4 production Of these foods Increasedevels, the indigenous supply was still below prewar levels, and Soviet authorities again had to drawillion metricf grain from reserves.vailability of the so-called "quality" foodsmeat, fats, milk, fish, and sugarthat provide less thanercent of tho total calories increasedercentbutercent below the levei.

The pattern of the Soviet diet has remained about the same since prerevolution years. This pattern, more nearly Asiatic than European, is characterizedigh-carbohydrate diet of grains and potatoes and by sot* of the world's lowest consumption rates of protein and fatty foods. ation's economy becopies Industrialized and its population becomes urbanized, the requirementsetter balanced diet, relatively high in the proportion of quality foods, tend to rise. The rapid industrialization of the USSR has not brought such an improvement in the quality of the diet. The deficiency has retarded labor productivity and has given rise to the recent emphasis onconsumer welfare through greater production of agriculturales.

* The estimates and conclusions contained in this report rep-csent the. best Judgment of ORR as ofovember The foods used in deriving food balances normally account for aboutercent of the total caloricsational diet. Statistics usedhis report have not been adjustedercent.

Tonnages throughout this report art- given in metric tons.



Some has been made to improve the quality of the Soviet diet by imports of meat and other quality foods. The caloric value of these Imports, however, may be largely offset by exports of grains. It is consistent with Soviet policy that the USSR continues to export grains and is at the same time forced to withdraw from reserves grains for domestic consumption. The Soviet export policy depends onand economic considerations that usually circumvent restrictions arising from current production and utiilzatioo.

Sincek, Soviet leaders have launched two extensive programs designed to raise agricultural production: (l) expansion of grain acreages on "new lands" in which both soil and climatic conditions are marginalxpansion of corn acreages in the Ukraine and in other areas of the USSR that are not well suited for the growing of corn. Natural limitations, particularly climate, appear to be such as to prevent the loitg-run success of cither of these programs.

In the European Satelliteshole, agricultural productionncreasedercent above thatnce again failing to reach prewar levels, despite government policies directed toward increasing productivity under the "new course." , thereerious decline, in production Of bread grains, particularly In Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany. Production of potatoes and sugar beets increased somewhat in thejor growing areas, but the quality of these crops was affected by high moisture content. Actual production of sugar4 in the European Satelliteshole was lower than production The supply of animalailed continually to satisfy Increasing postwar demands, and there was no significant increase in production't - To maintainlevels, the European Satellites probably have loL7t0rater extent tian at any time since

The more highly Industrialized northern European Satellites have had the greatest difficulty in meeting both quantitative andrequirements for food. ecline in production of animal fats and vegetable oils has been felt especially by Eastny and Czechoslovakia. In an attempt to obtain more meat and dairy products, both countries have made trade overtures to Western countries. Kot only has low production plagued tbe European Satellites but also the


problem of procuring foodstuffs from tbe farmers hasressing one during recent years. East Germany In particular has suffered duringonsumption year. The government has been unable to procure adequate quantities of food from the producers and also has been unable to increase imports to make up for this loss. The shortages have created unrest among the workers and have contributed to lower labor productivity ln East Germany.

During theearB, improvement in the quality of the diet in the European Satellites will have to come from increased imports rather than from indigenous production. It is Improbable, however, that the governments of the European Satellites will be willing to expend the amounts of foreign exchange that would be required to purchase the large quantities of animal products needed toignifleant Improvement ln the diet of the average worker.

In Communist China, gross production of foodbbercentevels, aad it was still at the general level ofverage. 7owever, population had increased byercent. > then, the availability of food for human consumption, in terms of calories per capita per day, was aboutercent below the prewar level.

Production of food in Communist Chinaas curtailed seriously by extensive floods in the rice-producing districts of the Yangtze and Kuai Rivers. Winter production of crops, however, was greater than that of the previous year, and production of crops outside the flooded areas soaewhat offset the losses caused by the


in the prewar period, Chinaet importer of food grainsajor exporter of vegetable oilseeds, largely soybeans. In the postwar years, China has reversed its position and haaet exporter of food grains. Although Communist China has continued toajor exporter of oilseeds, exports have not regained prewar levels after falling off duringi. hina continued toet exporter of food, total exportsto aboutalories per capita perercent of the nationul average diet.

3 -

Because the national diet in Communist China iaery poor one, the export of food has aroused some resentment. The export of foodstuffs, however,n important means of acquiring capital for the Chinese Communist industrialization program, and officialhuo tried to minimize the importance of exports of food,of those to the USSB.

Little is known about the effect on food availabilities of the Chinese Communist efforts to stockpile grain. The government has indicated Its intention to stockpile betweenillionons of grain by the endut apparently there hus beer, very little progress toward thia goal.

Because efforts to increuse production of food have beenthe Chinese Communists haverogram of food transfer between surplus and deficit regions and have imposedonsiderable segment of the population. Preharvest hunger has been common, however, and in soiae areas there has been actual famine.

X. Introduction.

Production of food in the USSR und the European Satellites occupies more than half of the labor force but provides the people withodest diet. Toiet still less adequate requireG the efforts of more thanercent of the labor force of Communist China. In -he US,ercent of the labor force works in agriculture.

The failures of the countries of the Sino-Soviet Bloc to solve their food problems have given the question Of foodentral position ln government policy. It Is the purpose of this report to discuss such policies, and the programs that have resulted from them, only to the extent that such discussion will assist in analyzing the problems of food consumptionn the individual countries of the Sino-Scviet Bloc.


In analyzing these problems, use is made of "foodhe conventional means of bringingarge part of thedataountry, soetailed examination and appraisal of the food and agricultural situation can be accomplished. As far as possible, the same foods are specified in making up the balances for each country. The foods specified for the USSR and the European Satellites account for aboutercent of the total caloriesand the percentage may be higher for Communist China.

The scope of this report is restricted to the examination and

analysis of the available food supply of each of tbe countries of the Sino-Soviet Bloc with regard to domestic production. trade, and stocks. It Includes an examination of the patterns of consumption ln the various countries5 and drawswith selected prownr periods and postwar years. Comparisons with prewar periods are not Intended to suggest any judgment on either the adequacy or the desirability of the levels of food consumption, although levels of consumption in China, the USSH, and Southeastern Europe vere generally considered inadequate In prewar days. These comparisons are used because theyonvenient measure by which the agricultural developments ln the Sino-Soviet Bloc may be appro1 nod.

The calorie Is used as an over-all indication of the average quantity of food consumed. Iteasure of energy value. the calorie does not measure the quality of the diet; high caloric levels are, however, generally associated with highof the more desirable foodsthoseelatively high proportion of animal proteins and fats.


A. General.

Food balances of tho major eomaodltlai produced for humanin the USSBndicate the avuilobilityaily intake per capita2 This level of intake duringonsuaption year, although slightlyhan thatt, is about it percent below the level-

*The foods shown in the food balances (sec Appendix A) represent aboutercent of the total caloric intake, which probably isalories per capita per day. ** ercent.


In recent years the pattern of food consumption In the USSR has been about the cane asnd ls core Asiatic thanIn character. The average Soviet diet continues toreponderance of starchy foods such as grain products and potatoes, vhlch account for aboutercent or the total caloric Intake.

Production of grain, the nost important Item In the average Soviet diet, wasercent higher* thanbecauseood harvest in the "new lands'* area of Siberia and Kazakhstan, vhlch offset the results of drought in parts of the Ukraine and the Volga region. Despite the slight increase inof grain, it io probable that the USSR again withdrew grain from reserves, as lt did, In order to meot bothcommitments and domestic requirements.

Among the so-called "quality"ugar showed the moBt significant decline In productionoviel Imports of sugar were increased significantly in order to supplement indigenousImports of oilseeds were also Increased somewhat over the levels.

Since the early spring* the USSR has launched two extensive programs designed to raise agricultural production: (l) the expansion of grain acreage on "new lands" where both soil and climatic conditions arc marginalhe expansion of coin acreage In the Ukraine and in other areas of the USSH not veil suited to production of corn.

In viev of the investment of inputs in the "new lands'* and the top-level backing which the whole program is receiving, It Is unlikely that the project will be quickly abandoned or even seriously curtailed in the eventerious crop rniiure. Preliminary studies indicate, however, that natural limitations, particularly climate, are nuch as to prevent that long-run achievement of success for the "new lands" program which is anticipated by Soviet leaders.

Bsc MUM of climatic limitations and the lack of adequate inputs such as lime and fertilizers, the Soviet corn program, callingevcnfold increase in acreages unlikely

"Mi'ut, fate und oils, milk, fish, and sugar, for example.

toignificant increment of grain per hectare above that already being produced on the same land. In addition, labor input will be eigniflcantly greater for corn than for other grain or fodder crops.

B. Food Availabilities.

1. Production.

^ crop season in the USSR was characterized by drought conditions in parts of the Ukraine and the Lower Volga region and exceptionally favorable weather in the "new lands" area Of West Siberia and Kazakhstan. roduction of grain and potatoes, the two most Important foodstuffs in the Soviet diet, increased over the mediocre levelsercentercent, respectively. Despite these slight increases, production of these foods* was still below the prewar levelsercent andercent, l'espectively. In the meantime, the population had Increasedercent.

Of the remaining food ite&s, sugar showed the mostdecline in indigenous production. Production of sugar* is estimated at about three-fearths of3 tonnage and slightly above the level. An ll-?erccut increase was rej>orted for production of vegetable oils4 co^pax-ed with productionn increase made possible, at least in part, by increased imports of oKseens. Production of vegetable oils" exceeded productionyercent. Production of meat, compared with production, remained ot approximately the some level. Production of fishver that, toevel aboutercent higher than- The caloric intake fron fish, however, still is lessercent of tbe national total. Production of milkhowed an Increase ofercent over production3 but is still only two-thirds of the level.

2. Trade.

Two significant aspects of the Uovict trade patternre continued, though diminished, exports Of grains and increased imports of sugur. The net export of grains, accompanied

ithdrawal from reserves, repeats the pattern ofrade year and emphasizes the fact that Soviet export policies are based on considerations other than the existence or absencerue exportable Burplus. The sharp increase In imports of sugar, chiefly froa Western countries, was necessitated by the low level of production of sugar ln the USSR ln

In terms or calories, the food value of Soviet imports of agricultural productsas twice that of the exports. The net export of grain was equivalentaily intake ofalories per capita, and the net import or quality foods (sugar, meat, fata and oils, and fioh) amounted to an intakealories per capita.* the per capita caloric contents or exports and imports were nearly equal. Imports amounted toalories par capita per day, compared withalories per day for exports, , there were no net Imports, and rocports amountcd^toalories per capita per day.

3. Changes In Stocks.

As recently asKhrushchevofficial statement concerning the need for maintainingof grain. The current food-reserve program probablya few years after World Since that time,been additions to the accumulating re&ervos of grain andand three additions possiblyeakonsuaption year,

however, the USSR had to draweserve stocks of grain ln order to :oeet currant needs. 2/ evised estimate places the withdrawal rrcn grain rcoerves* atillion tons."

In5 consumption year, probably tba USSR again was forced to withdraw from grain reservesarticularly reserves of wheatin order to meet food requireinento, to fulfill export obligations, and to provide seed for the expansion or acreage under the "new lands" program.

Indigenous production and ;nuorts or rood products other than grain probablyUpply sufficient to meet currentwith no net change In stocks.

For serially numbered source references, see Appendix D. For aathodology, sec Appendix ii.

C. rood COOflU-JPtlOD.

The daily Intake per capita in the USSR inonaunp-tion year Is estimated toalories- This level of Intake represents an locrcsse of onlyalories above the level* and Isercent, below the level- An Index of caloric consumption in the USSR,,, la shown in Table 1.

Table 1

Indox of Caloric Consumption in the, and


There Is no available information on the different levels of consumption among various segments of the Soviet population. Inyears, however, the urban populationigher proportion of the quality foods than did tlie rural population. It is likely that this differentiation lias continued and. In fact, may have increased during the last few years, when the government haft been able toreater proportion of meat, milk, and the like from the producing rural regions.

Tito distribution of food hasontinuing problem In the USSR. InKhrushchevevision of the program for the distribution of agricultural produceevision which would have the effect of increasing local responsibility for meeting production targets. In this proposal, agricultural produce

von Id be allocated to various arcuB core on Lhe basis of production than on need. In effect, this procedure would penalize areas failing to meet produciion goals. According to Khrushchev,efinite part of :he centralized state fund (food obtained through procurements) must be directed to the satisfaction of the needs of tbe larger towns and Industrial centers which cannot draw sufficient produce fromregions, und also to the satisfaction of the needs of the army, foreign trade, and state reserves. As for the remainder of thefund. It must be distributed among the other towns and regions of the country with regard to ^helr actual needs and taking into account existing productionf

D. Pattern of Food Consumption.

In recent years the pattern of food consuaption in the USSR hos been nearly the 3aiw as it was- The percentageof calories in the USSR,ategory of foodstuffs, Ja,hown Jr.

hows that starchy foods account for about three-fourths of the total caloric intake and that In the average Soviet diet grain products alone account for tvo-thirds of the total. The slight perccnt-aga changes shown ln Table P. Indicate the continuity of this patternelatively low-quality diet.

Daily calories per capita for selected categories of foods in tha USSR, ,re shown in*

hows that, in teres of absolute quantities, the caloric Intake froa grain products has declined in theears compared* There also hasharp decrease inof whole milk. Per capita consuaption of sugar and rats and oils has increased somewhat, primarily because of inportB to supplement indigenous production.

follows en. ** ollows on


Table 2

tribution of Calories in the,

1'. rccnt



bread groins


basic foods

and fish

and oils

quality foods


- II -

fliien ii 'f-

Table 3

Daily Calories per Capita of Selected Categories of Foods In the USSR,5







1 20


+ lA

basic foods


and fish Fatsils

v :<








Quality foods



a. Foods shown Tn the food balances (see Appendix A) represent aboutercent of the total caloric Intake.


E. Food

The abundant publicity Riven by Soviet leaders to the problems of agriculture in the USSK und the extreme measures taken to increase total output lixlicate the continued failure of agricultural production to meet current requirements. The necessity of withdrawals from gruln reserves during the past two yearn further emphasizes the failure.

The "new lands" program, inaugurated in the springU for expanding wheat acreage in marginal lands, lorgcly in West Siberia andontinues to receive great emphasis. In addition, aexpansion of com acreage0 was announced in5 and has been widely publicized. These two programs are designed to increase both the numbers and productivity of livestock herds ond to double the output of livestock products oal ln Itself Is unrealistic, but it represents anaattempt to improve the present low-quality diet- In5 Khrushchev stated that in addition to the grain needed for direct consumption, for reserves, and for export, grain was needed to meet the requirements of an expanding livestock industry. Production of grain significantly in excess of that achievedould be necessary, however, before feedcould be high enough to raloe the output of livestock produceevel permitting any significant Increase in the intake per capltu of such productsparticularly in view of the needsopulation which is Increasing by moreillion per year.

F. Capabilities. Vulnerabilities, and Intentions. 1. Capabilities.

In no postwar year huve food shortages been suffleieutly serious to deter possible Soviet military action, and during5 consumption year, there was no significant change In either the total caloric Intake or the ccoposltion of the average Soviet diet.

4 the "new lards" area of West Siberia and Kazakhstan had unusually favorable weather,umper crop was horvented In much of this area. Similar successeriod of years to unlikely, but there is the possibility of generally favorable weather tlu-ougliout much of the USSR in any one particular year,esultant production of bumper crops.

2. Vulnerabilities.

The USSB Is engaged In tvo broad programs which seera to have little likelihood of long-run success. The first of these, the grain expansion program in the "new lands" area, has been referred to briefly above- This "nev lands" program is being implemented with some of the necessary inputs machinery, labor,he like omewhat faster pace than that set in the majority Of the "cure-all" programs previously inaugurated. Pending completion of more detailed research on the capabilities of the "new larxis" project, it is believed, however, that natural factors,climate, place definite limitations on the long-run success of the program.

'*'hc corn expansionhe second!> Ix-iaj stressed by Soviet leadership. Hie Sovietinaugurate an Iowa-style corn-hog program on the scaleeven more risky and. costly than the "new lands" *'i"-r

to the US corn belt. Even assuming that corn is to be harvestedthe inputs of labor, machinery, fertilizer, and thobe 'Xtr nely large even to

extremely doubtful tha- the corn expansion program willignificant Increment per hectare above that already being produced on the same types of land by other crops. In fact, lt is notthat the whole program will full into disrepute, along with previously abandoned projects such as the grass rotation program In dry s.

The Soviet food balanceontains no definable indications of Intentions to wage war. The currentn strengthening the agricultural sector of the economy appears to be the result of belated recognition of lags inproduction and does not In itself Indicate definite Intentions.

i fl'n T'

III. European Satellites.

The following discussion concerning the current food situationEuropean Satellites will treat, as far as possible, thehe situationpecific country warrants individual

treatment, this will be given. In discussing connodity production and food availabilities, the European Satellites will be divided into northern" androups, whereivision Is applicable.

A. Food

1. Production.

Agricultural production* In the European Satellites fulled once again to reach prewar levels. In spite of government policies directed toward Increasing productivity under the "new course agricultural production* in the European Satelliteshole registeredercent Increase

During the consumption year3 throughdverse growing and harvestingeduced* harvest of grains and oil needsumber of the European Bread grains were particularly hard Not only was the harvest poor quantitatively, but also the quality of bread grain was below average- In the grain harvestoland was able topercent Increase3 when the harvest was below normal and Albania and Bulgaria showed only slight increases.

Although production of potatoes in Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, and Albania was greater* thanant Germany having the greatest increase the quality of the potatoes was affected by high moisture content, and losses during storage may reduce availabilities for food- Likewise, production of sugar beets* approximated or, an in Czechoslovakia and

Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Poland.. Albania, Bulguria, Hungary, and Rumania. Statistical data contained in this section, unless otherwise noted, have been derived from Appendix A, Tables

Flooded lowlands in Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Hungary increased harvesting losses. see Table-elow.


East Germany, exceeded thatut the quality of the beets, in terms of sugur content, was poor, and production of augurU in the European Satelliteshole was Jess than

Production of animals and animal products, which hasfailed to satisfy increasing postwar demands, did not increase significantly Although theremall over-all increase in hogs and cattle, the primary meat animals, their production in Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Hungary decreased somewhat. None of the European Satellite governments claimed thath plan for production of animals was fulfilled.

^ the European Satellites failed once more to increase availabilities of foodstuffs through increased indigenous production, despite tlie "new course" measures adopted. To maintain adequate levels of consumptionhe European Satellites have had to depend, probablyreater extent^than at any timsn imports of food-

A-., by eounti-y,, is shown in

index of agricultural production in the European Satellites, by product,'i, is shown ir.*

2. Trade.

Duriiiij t'nconsumption year the European Satellites imported large quantities of grain, animal fats, and fish. The northern European Satellites accounted for most of the imports of food, as they did. For the first timeungary and Rumania were net importers of bread grains. Normally exporters of groin to the West, the European Satellites negotiated for imports ofillion tons of grain from the West during Imports of quality foods, animal fats, and vegetable oillight decline. Imports of fish inby East Germany, the major Satellite importer, increased0 tons over imports

* ollows onollows on Continued on



Toole J

Index of Agricultural Production in the European Satellites, by Product


Bulgaria Czec hoslwak 1a Germany Hungary Poland Rumania

Field Crops

Bread grains







For some yeare, GUgar has been the major agricultural export Item of the European Satellites. Exports of sugarrobablyons below the levels, largely because of the shortfall ln production. Rumania, an exporter of sugar during the postwar years, haset importer in5 calendar year. Despite current shortages of meat throughout the Sino-Soviet Bloc, Poland and Rumania have continued to export meat to the West.

Although Imports of foodstuffs by the European Satellites have increased*hey have not been sufficient to Improve significantly either the quality or the quantity of the worker's diet. If requirements are to be met, greater quantities of animal products and vegetable oils will have to be imported. Such imports will force the European Satellites into greater dependence on the West; it does not appear that the USSR is willing to Increase its exports of food to the Satellites* Because the Europeanhave been forced to use foreign exchange for imports of food rather than for importB of raw materials for the consumer goods industries, the planned Increases of consumer goods promised under the "new course" have not materialized.

Estimated net trade in selected agricultural commodities by the European Satellites ln, ands shown in

3. Changes In Stocks.**

Three consecutive below-normal harvests in the European Satellites and the "new course" policy of increasing availabilities of foods to tlie consumer probably haveemporary halt in the stockpiling of foodstuffs. Although thereefiniteon state reserves, withdrawals from reserves, as announced

fws on

*" The term stocks refers to state reserves of food thut arc kept for strategic purposesmilitary, economic, or political. Normal inventories and channel stocks are not considered; these stocks are assumed to be held at relatively the same level from year to year.


m m





ssg.ssa sa- *



in OO OOO l> O


by some of the Satellitesnd recent official statements of the need to increase agricultural production to provide adequatein times of emergency, tend to confirm assumptions of failures Id the stockpiling programs of the European Satellites. The use of critically short foreign exchange for imports of foodo re over. Indicates the inadequacy of the reserves that the Satellites ctty have had to drawn times of short supplies.

It Is estimated thatadditions werestate reserves of food in the European Satellites except smallof sugar in Czechoslovakia and of wheat In Bulgaria. Ifadditions other than those mentioned, the food available towas In even shorter supply than is presently estimated. of grain being stockpiled by Poland should not beview of its largo imports, but there is no evidence of such

B. Pood Consumption.*

Estimated daily consumption of food per capita In the European Satellitesangedalories in Albaniaalories In Poland. In the other SatelllUs the range wasalories per day." In the US, normal daily consumption of food per capitaalories.

Food rationing was abolished by Rumania innd only Albania and East Germany still ration certain foodstuffs. With the announcement of the "new course"he government of East Germany promised the people that food rationing would be discontinued The poor harvest* and inadequate imports, however, prevented the abolition of rationing of meat, fats, and sugar, andhe caloric intake in East Germany was lower than that. Bulgaria and Poland vere the only European Satellites able to reach or to exceed prewar levels of caloric consumption per capita. An Index of dally consumption of food per capita in the European Satellitess shown in

For methodology, see Appendix A. East;;; and. The range of error ln calorie estimates isercent.



Table 1

Index of Dally Consuaption of Food per Capita in the European



* .




verage for Albania, Bulgaria. Czechoslovakia, Hungary, andjB average for Poland;verage for East Germany.

A basic problem that has plagued tbe governaento of theSatellites ln recent years Is the procurement and distribution of food. he situation did not Improve, and everygovernment admitted failure in fulfilling procurement plans. Because compulsory delivery quotas were reduced as part of the "newonfulflllment of these quotas greatly reduced the share of indigenous food production controlled by tbe governments through official distribution channels. This situation created shortages In urban areas, and the population waa forced toreater share of their food requirements on the free market at high prices.

East Germany In particular suffered duringear. The government could not procure adequate quantities of foodstuffs from the pensant, and it could not increase Imports to make up for this lose.esult, consumption of food declined ln the cities, and an extremely tight food situation existed throughout the last half ofonsumption year. The shortages created




worker unrest und contributed to lower productivity. loss serious but similar situations developed ir. both Czechoslovakia and Hungary. The recent reproductiontiff collectivization policy in bothand Hungary probably includes the strong enforcement ofdelivery quotas, which gives the government controlarger share of agricultural production, particularly in years of below-normal harvests.

C. Pattern of Food Consumption.

Tlie "new course" emphasized the need to, A faf.fl. . -

trlalizatlon of the European Satellites levies greater demands for animal protein for consumption by the labor force. On an average per capita basis, however, consumption of meat and animal fats hasbplow prewar levels, and there was no significant improvement in the diet inoiieumption year. The percentageof selected foods to total caloric consumption in the European Satellites In prewar. andlu shown in

The more highly industrialized northern European Satellites have Had the greatest difficulty in supplying enough food of the required quality arid variety. hortfall in production of animal products and vegetable oil lias been felt especially by East GermanyCzechoslovakiaboth countries have been making trade overtures to Western countries in animport meat and dairy products.

Improvement ln the quality of the diet in the Europeanduring theears will hove to come from increased imports rather than from indigenous production. It Is unlikely, however, that the European Satellites are willing to expend theamount of foreign exchange for the large quantity of animal products needed toignificant improvement in the diet of the average worker.

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D. Food Reculrcirei.ts.

In the European Satellites, official press releases5 emphasized the lag in agricultural production and the failure of output to meet requirements. Substantial increases ln the importa of foodstuffs from the West*5 are clearly indicative of indigenous shortages. Because of the decline in indigenous production, however, the increase in imports has not been sufficient toet increase in the availability of foodstuffs.

Duringonsumption year, the governments of theSatellites made no greater progressatisfactory balance between food supply and food demand than had been made inonsumption East Germany and Czechoslovakia, moreover, had greater difficulty in satisfying food requirementshan

E- Capabilities, Vulnerabilities, and Intentions. 1- Capabilities.

Under present government policies, no immediate improvement in the food supply of the European Satellites is likely. It is possible that,hort-term basis, tighter government control of procurement couldarger share of the present production of foodstuffs to the Industrial worker and thereby improve hi3 supply of food. In the long-run, however,rograo would have disastrous effects on the incentive to peasants and would reduce productionevel at which food availabilities would decrease substantially.

The military capabilities of the European Satellites, particularly East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, have been affected by industrial workers dissatisfied with the supply of food and by the low level of agricultural productivity.

2. Vulnerabilities.

The governments of the European Satellites have been unsuccessful in raising levels of agricultural production and in obtaining an adequate share of indigenous production to meet urban


requirement*). In limeshortfall ln production, therefore, the urban population has suffered, and, lacking controlizable share of the food, the governments have had difficulty in lowering basic food costs to the worker.

nd VM Ute European Satellites have increased their dependence on ihe West for imports of foodstuffs, particularly grain,nd fruit. It is probable that, in order to maintain or inprove present levels of corsusiptlon of quality foods, the Satellites will be forced to continue Imports froa the West. If Western imports were cut off, the food supply available to the labor force would be reduced and co&ts would be Increased. Labor productivity andproduction would certainly decline. In spite of substantial imports of food. East Germany ir, now facedabor force highly dissatisfied becausehortage of basic foods.

3. Intention?-

Positive indications of the military intentions of the European Satellites would be strict food rationing in times of normal production and major additions to state reserves of foodstuffs. There has been no evidence of such activity duringoodyear.

IV. Coattunlat China.

A. fOCd Availabilities.

1. Production.

Production of fooo>crops* ln Ccnimunlst China lo estimatedillion tonsercent lower thanillion toes estimated to have been produced

* Food crops do not include cottonseed, which is crushed for oil. In these estimates, potatoes oreross weight basis. It haa been tba custom to report food production with potatoesrain-equivalent basis. This is not done in this report, because lt is believed that the Chinese Ccranunlsts arc reporting production with potatoes Includedross weight basis. Thus, Jr. Decemberhey claimed that production of "grain" for the yearillion tons. 6/ This claim fitted conveniently with the plan ofhich calledercent increase In agricultural production over that


n of food* was appro*lmatclyhe average ofIneriod and aboutillion tons below the peak of production2he best year under the Chinese Conounist regime. 7* the population of China Increased aboutercent.

roduction of food ln Communist China was reduced seriously by the extensive floods In the chief rice-producing districts of the Yangtze and Hual Rivers. Production of winter crops, however, was greater than that of the previous year, and other crops outside tbe area of floods were relatively good. Although these favorable factors somewhat offset the losses occasioned by the floods,he availability of foods for human consumption. In terns of calorics per capita per day, was aboutercent below the level.

In contrast to prewar levels ln China, there has been in recentefinite decrease In the average availability of food. This decrease ls shown in the following tabulation:


Index ofCapita per Day'


Concerned by the low level of the availability of food, the Chinese Cocmiunists, withoutucccce, have exerted efforts to Increase production of food. Tha government hasrogram to transfer food between surplus and deficit regions, and

Because of "the number of quantitative estimates required in the preparation or each food balance, some of which are based on very little information, the acceptance of the quantitative results shown In the food balances is unwarranted. For example, lt is probable that tlie Indexes of the postwar period overstate the actual fall in the availability of food per capita. Tho general trend and the relutionohlp between the various periods, however, ore believed to be correct.


this uction has been accompanied by rationing restrictionsonsiderable segment of tlie population. In spite of this effort, pre-harvcst hunger in certain localities has been common each rtpring in Conrtuniat China. Evenfter the comparatively good harvestsreharvest hunger vas relatively widespread. This condition has developed into actual famine in some limited areas. It la probable that, if the food talaice Inreflects the true situation In that year, the spring5articularly critical period for those living in the deficit areas.

2. Trade.

Before World War II, Chinaet importer of grainseavy exporter of oilseeds and their variouset basis, China exported aboutalories per capita per day,ercent of the average calories per capita per day of the average diet.""

During the period of Chinese Communist control, thehas tried to reduce to the smallest practical extent imports of foodstuffs and to expand exports of agricultural commodities for the purpose of obtaining foreign exchange for Imports of capital goods.

esult of this policy, the Chinese Cosnunists have increased total exports of food, both calorics per capita per day and percentage of total calories available to the population. Exports of agricultural commodities ty, are shown ln Table


It is clear that,elative sense, Chinese Communist exports of food In terms of the total availabilities are not large.ountry In which absolute availability lsow level, however, exports of even small magnitude have had adverse psychological effects. The Chinese Communist propaganda has tried to reduce resentment aooog consumers by pointing out that exports of certain items aremall part of total production of those items.

Although the estimate of net exportsyChina must necessarilyreliminary approximation subject

* This statement includes Manchuria. See Appendix A,.ollows on


Table 9

Exports Of Agricultural Commodities by5



a. Preliminary estimate.

to revision, it Is crrapatlble with other evidence. 23 were years of normal, or bctter-than-nonnal, food production, butroduction was adversely affected by weather conditions. During5 consumption year, moreover, there was some reduction ln tbe shipments of grain which had been going to North Korea as part of the plan of Chinese Communist aid to that country. This reduction would be expected, as North Korea probably Increased its production of grain after the end ol' the Korean hostlltloo. It is probably true5ear of leveling out ln the rate of increase of Chinese Communist exports of foodstuffs that had held0 through


The status of food reserves in ComniuniBt China continues toubject on which data are insufficient to support aestimate. Por the purposes of estimating food balances,the anoumptlon has been made that from year to yearinto and out of stocks have been about equal. There are reucons to believetate reserve of foodstuffs Is programmed by the government of Communist China. Both the general level of foodand tbe extent of the export program, however, indicate that

witlidrowaloarge reserve liave been unlikely.* It ls possible that some reservesyhlch vas an excellentyear, and3 these reaerves aay have been maintained and even Increased. It is difficult to see hov these reserves, even if they exist, could be maintained Assueing that such reserves existed and have been maintained, they would be reflected in the availabilities of calories per capita per daycalorics per capita per day. vould be somewhat lower than arc shown ln the food balances for that year. If these renewes were used, in part or in whole, to meet the emergency of the flood dicaoter, then the food balancehould show greater availability of cai or leu per cuplta per day than it actually does. Although lt is possible that reserves of food were used at that time, this hypothesis is not supported by the food balances for those years.**

B. Pattern of Food Cor^ug.ptlon.

The level of living in any country, insofar as foodstuffs are concerned, Is determined roughly by the "starchy staplehis ratio has always been high in Chinamore thanercent for the periods shown in the food balances. The starchy 3taple ratio has shown considerable stability, and there has beer, no significant char-ge under the Communist regime. The percentage contribution of selected foods to total caloric consumption in,, are shown in Table

* There lo no general agreement with this opinion. Indirect evidence has suggested to some analysts that perhaps as muchillion tons of grain were withdrawn for reserves

** To give some idea of possible magnitude, the following data are presented: illion tons of grain (wheat andn the basisllllon population vould, on tbe average, afford betweenndalories per capita per day. Thus the calories available per capita per day, as shown in the food balance for this year, could be raisedoalories if (l) the government had reservesillion tons of grnln,eleased these rcoervco inonsumption year.

*** The starchy staple ratio is the ratio of calories from grain products and potatoes to total calories consumed. In general, the moreountry, the lower will be this ratio. Thus, for the US, this ratio vas aboutercent lneriod, but byonsumption year the ratio had fallen to aboutercent,* Tableollows on


Table 10

Percentage Contribution of Selected Foods to Total Caloric Consumption In5


Other grains



Total basic foods Oilseeds

Meat, eggs, and fish b/

Fata und oils


Total quality foods Total calories



ercent to balance.

b. Excludes fat and fat cuts of porfc, which are listed with fats and Oils.

Tableives no indicationrend ln the composition of the diet. rend can best be shownomparison of the actual calorics furnished by the various foods. Trends in theof selected foods In CommunlDt China!5 are shown In* Tablendicates that trends or shifts ln the consuaption of individual foods probably arc not significant. The dominant fact is the general decreose In available calories, reflected in consumption of all foods except potatoes. The fact that the enntribution of potatoes to total calorics has Increased while those of other foods have fallen may reflect some deterioration in the quality of the diet.

Table 11

Trends ln Consumption ot Selected Foods ln Cccsnunist China Ir Calorics from


Averag. {Total Calorlaal











basic foods



eggs, and flab s/



and oils





quality food*


Excludes fat and fat cuts of pork, vhlch arc listed with fate and oils.

C. Food Requirements .

Requirements, for food ln Communist China aet difficult to define because they are relative and may be defined ln oltlier an economic (demand)hysical (necessary levels of energy intake) context. It Id known that, although prcharvest hunger occurs In Communlot China, the population continues to expand. In an absolute physical sense, then, there must be enough food to go around and, over given periods of time, to take care of greater absolute numbers. On tbe basis of present nutritional data, however, no one rtmlly knows Just what figure for the average number of calories per day represents therequirement. The only possible conclusion Is thatpopulation, denaads for industrialization of the economy, and demands for exports of food products increase food requirementsate that probably Is slightly greater than the rate of increase ln production. This conclusion is supported by evidence of theof the average diet, as shown in the food balances, and of the apparent increase in the incidence of prcharvest hunger.

Capabilities, Vulnerabilities, and


The lowered caloric intake per capita in ComimuiiBt China duringonsumption year probably has not been sufficient to deter the government from possible military action. Givenveather conditions, Chinese Communist agriculture should be able to increase production considerably during the next few years. of the procurement mechanism and LrsprovcneEt ln the allocation of foodstuffs to non-self-suppliers should contribute to greater nonfarm labor productivity and should increase ths capability oftorowing Industrial ccor.Cray.

The food level of the average citizen of Cocraunlst China is ouch thut In the event of hostilities the interdiction of Internal food movements would result ln local shortages and probably in local famine. This docs not mean, however, that such occurrences would affect the capability to wage war. Chinese Communist control over the national supply of food Is such tbat the government can divert


food to military end lines at the expense of the population. Theeffectsolicy of Ignoring population distress over food shortages, however, urc unknown. The apparently low level of strategic stockpiles, coupled with the relatively low average of food availability in Communist China, indicatesisastrous crop year through either natural or nun-created causes mightonsiderable setback to the capabilities of the Chinese Communists.

The Interdiction of food imports by hostile action, either by economic sanctions or by naval blockade, will not affect the food position adversely. To the extent that Western action might decrease exports of grain and oilseeds, it would tend to raise levels of food availability in Communist China.

3. Intentions.

In the Chinese Communistalances In this report, there are no definable Indications of intentions. Although the government han programmed stockpiles of grainumber of eventualities, there is no evidence of extreme stockpiling efforts that might indicate that the Chinese Cccraunlats ure planning major military activity.




The statistical tables (Tobiesn this appendix sbcw food balances for the USSR, Die European Satellites, andChina. For each country, three food balances arorewar period and for theandconsumption years. Except for revisions of seae estimates, the food balances for the prewar periods and> consufoptlon year arethe same ae those Riven in The methodology for the revised estimates ln these balances and for the estimates in the balances in5 consumption year is explained either ln the footnotes to the individual tables or inf this report.


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The oethodology uaed In constructing the food balances given ins essentially the same as that used in constructing rood balances in the published report onood situation in theovlet Bloc. It would be impracticable to reproduce that detailed methodology in this report. Onlythodology used in deriving new estimates and in revising previous estimates, therefore, is discussed below, and there is frequent reference toi


Tht* food balance sheets for the USSR for the consumptionemain as published

B Votxl. .Balance..

Tlx- focd balance sheets for the USSR for the consumption" remain theor ull commodities except grains and sugar. The aethodology pertaining to all other is

1. Grains.

Figures for production of grains3 are revised.

KJgsjres for trade in grains, as well as In all other productsre preliminary estimates obtained from scraps ofand reported trade agreements up to, unless otherwise noted, end are subjectargin of error ofercent or more.

It is believed that during* consumption year the USSR had to draw or. reserve stocks of grains in order to meet current needs. The revised estimate of withdrawalsillion tons from reserves vas based on the relation of the estimated total grossor bothnd food usesto estimated production.


Estimates ofd waste are as follows:








il &

estimated quantity of Bread grains fed to livestock has

of wheatye. Estimates of oats and barley fed to livestock have been revised downwardroportion to the downward revision in theof their No revision has beer, made in the estimated quantity of "other grains" fed. The estimate of corn fed to livestockesidual figure obtained byted quantities of bread grains, barley, oats, and "other grains" fed to livestock4 from the total requirements for grain feed ofillion tons, lj/as follows:

Type of Livestock





Numbers(Killlon Head)

Head 2CO


Total. (Million Metric Tons)


I al

ercent of production. As


Previous estimates of industrial uses of grains remainik/ for all commodities except corn. That estimateillion tons to bring the total up toillion tons required for productionillion gallons of alcohol distilled from grain uudiilllcn hectoliters of beer.

No significant change was made in the previous estimate of the total gross availability Of grain for direct consumption. The minor changes in distribution of the grains resulted In very Insignificant changes in caloric intake.

2. Sugar.

The estimate of production of sugar3 has been3 million/ The estimated amount of sugar diverted intovas revised slightly upward on thef the higher

c- d Balance

1. Grains.

figures for trade in grains, as well as in all otheraro preliminary estimates, based or. scrapsui reported trade agreements up tond are subjectargin of error of at leastercent.

Estimates Of seed and waste are as follows:

tidi! ig





Seed and Waste (Million Metric Tons)





3 percent of production.


0 Ii 4U2

Because Of the increased demand for seed created by the expansion of acreage under the "nev lands" program, the estimated quantity of wheat fed to livestock lias been held arbitrarilyons, and thut Of rye has been increasedons. The estioates of barley and oats fed to livestock have been, taking into consideration the fact that the percentage increase in the quantities of these two grains fed to livestock would certainly exceed tlie gross increase in production. Tlie quantity of "other grains" used for feed is assumed to have been the same as't. The estimate of the quantity of corn used for feedesidual figure used to bring the total quantity of grains fed to livestock inup7 Billion tons, divided as follows:

_ Annual Consumption

Numbers* r



and goats

The estimated quantities of wheat, rye, and barleyihc ai'Jiufact-.ire of alcohol beer, arbitrarily in-

ons above thestimate to bring the total up toillion tons required for productionillion gallons of alcohol distilled from grains andillion hectoliters of beer-

2. Sugar.

The estimate of production of sugareltrcinarybased on Soviet

** Feeding rates are the same as.

J. Potatoes

The estimate of production of potatoes was derived by multiplying an acreage slightly greater than the acreagey the yield per acre

Waste is conventionally estimated atercent of The estimate of seed was derived byillion hectaresilograms (kg) of seed per hectare. The estimatedf seed and waste haa been rounded6 million tons.

The use of potatoes for feed was estimated toercent greater than This increase is in proportion to thein production.

The use of potatoes for industrial purposes includes the quantity of potatoes required to produce (X) ml.or. gallons ofdistilled from potatoes.

U. Meat.

Tbe estimate of production cf seat vas based on estimated livestock makers mod slaughter weights. Details arc given in source lg/.


The estlmato of production of slaughter fats vas computed from production of meal by the use of standard factors.


The estimate of production of vegetable oils, including edible and nonfood oils, was basedlanned increasever the production level. Industrial use was estimated atercent of the total supply.


Production of marine oil was "iwi to be the sane as



8. Oilseeds.

llie slight increase in production of oilseeds was basedeported increase in

This estimate of seed and waste includes the quantity of seed needed to sow the5 acreage of oilseedsa^te factorercent of production.

The use of oilseeds for industrial purposes includes the quantity of oilseeds required toons of vegetable oils.

9- Vist-

The fish catch was basedlanned increase of 'poflage and waste

mated at aboutercent of th* total available supply.

IC. Milk.

Production ofillion tons, was estimated by multiplying the estimated number of cows2 million us5y the estimated average yield per cowiters. It wan estimatedf milk wereorg Of milkg of butler). Whole milk was estimated atillion tons, ofillion tons areto have been fed to livestock, and I'l million tons consumed as whole milk or its productsheese, ice cream, and the like.

European Satellites. A. General.

The prewar food balance sheets prepared fcr the European Satellites are the suae as those previously For the consumptionowever, minor revisions in the balance sheets from these previously/ were made in view of changes in population, production, and net trade. Tile revisions* the methodology for5 food


B. Albania.

1- t Food Balance.

Revisions In estimates of production ln Albania, based on more complete information, were made for sugar, meat, and slaughter

- * nPattern of bread grains and corn for food resulted in increased estimates of stockpiling and animal consumption of grain.

2. ood Balance.

> * ,Th0ate of Production of sugar vas calculated onsug^ SUfiar lB considered to equalercent of

Data on trade are estimates based onumber of sources.

Estimates of seed and waste are as follows:




per Hectare)



Totul Seed (Thousand


Haste" (Thousand Metric Tonsj

Total Seed and Waste (Thousand Metric Tons)


5 percent of production.


The estimate of Industrial uses of grainshe pane as that shown inood balance.

C. Bulgaria.

1. ood Balance.

Estimates of production of seat, slaughter fats, and Bilk ln Bulgaria have been revised on the basis of more complete. Estimates of utilization were changed by application of the sane methodology used in source 2JS/.

2- BS-faSS Food Balance.

The margin of error In estimates of production is 10

Estimates of trude were based on fragmentary evidencea number of sources.

Estimates of need aid waste are as follows:

(Thousand Hectares)

Rate (Kllograms per Hectare)


S< ed






nonfood usee were calculated in the the report onood

ercent of production.

D. Czechoslovakia.

1- ood Balance.

Seed and waste requirements In Czechoslovakia have been changed from the previousesult of the change in the area seeded. Data on trade have been revised on the basis of more complete information. Only in the estimate of milk has therehange from the previous food balance and in the methodology for obtaining estimates of industrial uses. atio ofg of milkg of butter was used.

2. 5 Food Balance.

Data on trade were compiled from many different sources, of which all are available in CIA files. All estimates of trade are preliminary.

Estimates of seed and waste are as follows:







has been calculatedesidual figure, except for miik, which has been estimated atercent of production. There has been no change in methodology for estimating industrial uses since the report

aste factorercent of production of grains was used In view of extremely unfavorable voat^ier conditions during harvest tine. ** Equalsercent of production.


E. Eaat.Germany.

Food_ Balance.

Estimates of production in East Germany have been revised on the basis of more complete information, as has the estimate ofof wheat to the Soviet occuputlon forces, which hasons. The decline ln stocks of sugar was estimated0 tons. Information reveals an increase in consumption of sugar so there were probably no additions to stocks^ For the estimate of industrial uses of milk, the ratio ofg of milkgas changed too 1.

Food Balance.

All figures on production of grains and potatoes are as reported In, except as noted. Data on trade In grains are estimates based on fragmentary evidencearge number of sources, except data on rice, whichlanned/ This applies to trade in all commodities.

Estimates of exports of potatoes were based primarily on the Soviet occupation requirements0 Soviet troopsilograms per man per year. Allowingercent for waste, this isons. Added to this figure0 tons for normal frontier trade. Estimates of seed and waste are as follows:

(Thousand. Hectares)

Bate (Kilograms per Hectare)

Seed {Thousand Metric Tons)

(Thousand Metric Tons)

Seed and Waste (Thousand Metric Tons)



ercent of production for each grain except wheat and rye, each of whichercent. ** Equalsercent of production.


Three percent of production of wheat waa used for feed. Twenty percent of production of rye was used for feed. esidual amount of production of barley and oats was used for feed. An estimateg of potatoes per hog was used as the annual feeding rate. This figure, multipliedillion hogs, yielded the estimated amount of potatoes used for feed. The prewar feeding rateg per hog per year.

In the methodology for estimating the amount of grains and potatoes consumed by industrial uses there has been no change from that employed in the report.

The extraction rate of wheat and rye was raised fromoercent; and of "otherromo

Production Of sugar was estimated atercent of its raw value, estimatedons.

Trade plans5 called for the exportlan, however, haii called for the export

tons, but actual exports amountedons. It Is probable, therefore, that exportsill equal those.

Imports of meat were planned0 tons, 3j/ of which it way ai^umcd0 tons were to meet Soviet occupation.

It was assumedons of R'j?at were added to stocks to replace withdrawals

No allowance for buttere for Soviet occupation troops. The estimate of0,ecrease0 tons below that for the previous year. jMj

The volume of trade in slaughter fats was assumed to beercent of production It was assumed thatercent of the total supply of slaughter futs was consumed by Industry.

Plans fcr imports of vegetable oilsons Of soybeans0 tons of peanuts. ^1 il equivalent vould0 tons.

Industrial usee vere estimated to have consumedercent of the total supply of vegetable oils. On the basis of available data igr^SJiJ6 ftSreeiDeDts' Ifl>POrts of fish vere slightly above the level of

It is estimated thatercent of production of milk vas used for feed. Industrial use vas estimated on the basis of the quan-tity of milk required to0 tons of butter at the ratio of co to 1.

F. Hungary.

Food Balance.

Revisions in estimates of production In Hungary from the previousere made for meat, slaughter fats, vegetable oils, and milk. Trade In grains was revised on the basis of more recent and complete information.

Food. Balance.

Data on trade vere compiled from many sources. Allof trade are preliminary.

In the methodology for deriving estimates of nonfood uses there Ib no change from that employed in the reportstimates of seed and waste are as follows:


Total Seed (Thousand Metric Tons)



Waste* (Thousand Metric Tons)

3 i'l ih

Total. Seed and Waste (Thousand Metric Tons)


5 percent of production.


G. Poland.

Food Balance.

Estimates of production of sugar, potatoes, meat, fato and oils, and milk in Poland have been revised on the basis of moreInformation.

Estimates of trade in grains and sugar have been revised on the basis of more recent information of trade agreements and actual movements of commodities.

The estimate of rye consumed as feedesidual figure amounting5 percent of total production.


Production figures, except for fish, have been revised on the buals of more complete information. The estimated production of flan Is the same as that.

Trade in grainH has been estimated on the basis of tradend the actual movement uf commodities, reported by many sources. Estimates of trade in other commodities are assumed to approximate thoseecause of the lack of data. Allof trade should be considered preliminary.

It is believed that consumption of wheat and ryeuo apprcxijtately the same as. Imports increased conaldcr-ably, although it Is not known whether Poland absorbed all of these laports orortion was destined for other Sino-Soviet Bloc countries. The assignmentillion tons of bread grains to stocks was arbitrary. In view of Increased laports as veil as Increased production.

Estimates of seed and wnute are ae follows:








other utilization of production was determined bymethodology as that used for* food balance. ercent) of production of rye was allocated

i(. Rumania.

.1. ood Balance.

Estimates of production of sugar, iieat, milk, and slaughter fats in Rumania have been revised on the basis of more complete There was no change in methodology for estimating utilization.

2. ood Balance.

Estimates of trado were derived from data obtained from many sources giving the actual movement of trade for tlie last hall"nd trade agreements in effect during the first half

and food uses of various commodities were derived methodology as that used to estimate the food balance.

Estimates of seed and waste are as follows:

ercent of production.

w- -



Rate (Kilograms

per Hectare)

(Thousand Metric Tons).

Total Seed and Waste (Thousand Metric Tons)

I. Cqnniunlst China.

The food balance sheets prepared Tor China estimating the prewar average andonsumption year have undergone minor revisions from those previouslyhich were basedonstant population of KQo million persons. Those food balances, therefore, reflect primarily the changes in production from year to year, the different levels of net imports or exports, and any changes in utilization andrates.

he Chinese Communists published the preliminary results of their first census of the population, as of JO Those data Dade possible the recalculation of the estimated availability of food inf kilogramsapita per year and caloricapita ptr day.

Production of food is estimated for the calendar year ln which lt is harvested or produced. Consumption is computed for theonthsulyiven production (calendar) year throughune of the following year and is associated with the populationanuary. Another adjustment was necessitated by the fact that only port of the Chinese population liveseas for which data on production are avail-able .


The total population reported by the Chinese Communists as3,9 persons living in Formosa, the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region, Sinkiang, Tibet, and Changtu, as well as overseas Chinese and students studying abroad. The net population as of3 In the Chinese Communist area for which data on production are available.

Assuming that the annual increase in populationercent, the net population as of4 was estimated. 'Die average of those two, is the estimated population asc be associated with the food balance foronsumption year. The population to be associated withood balance.

The estimates of population were carried back to 1on the assumption that the annual change in numbers

The average of the7 is used as the prewar base for comparison of production of food in China and is used as the average of therewar base for comparison of consuraptlon - The average populationwith the average prewar consunp-ior. year is the average of the population asanuary for the2hich.

These revisions in population, resulting in certain changes in kilograms of food available per capita per year and the daily per capita caloric Intake, are presented in* Recent information also has made possible revisions in the estimated gross production of certain commodities.

1. ood Balance.

The revisions in production, together with the revised estimate of population, have resulted in ail upward revision of the estimated caloric Intakealories per capita per dayalories per capita per day, an increaseercent.

* Pee Appendix A.


a. Grains.

po rrA tvn . fSb^ot?as been revised from; of corn,onsonsf millet,onsO0- of Kaoliang,onif miscellaneous grains,onshere were no changes in estimated imports or expJrt. n view of the revised estimates of production, appropriate revisions have been made in the pertinent figures, according to the privies of methodology described in the previous report on food baSnces

spccificad to be node in estimates of

seed and waste because Of revisions in certain of the previous estl-

1WS MjUstment rep"lts cbaiiaee in the estates

t ?VaTG' t0eroent of th* revised estimate of production has been added to account for waste.

Estimates of seed are as follows:





thread beans

Hectares (Thousands)

Seeding Rate

(K1 lograir.ii per Hectarcj


Seed Allowance (Thousand Metric Tons)


. "astc for miscellaneous wains ore esti-

matedons. This is theproportion thaWs allowed inor the previous estimate of miscellaneous grains

b. Potatoes.

Estimates of exports of sweet potatoes have been revisednd of seed and waste fro- ?ooo tonsons. >j/ Estimates of production ofat^

- S3 -sac

have- been revisedonsonsxports,0 tonsstimates of seed


In Ihi JvtK* T .T he principles laid down in the footnotes for the previous/

Cane sugar exports remain

and Oilseeds.

egetableerode soybeans, rapeseed,^ CEaiae'ctt0-'E^d' estimate of production

revised downwardo tons0

1 fcvlslonseeds except cottonseed are in conformity with the data given in.

in 1 ottonseed was estimated to be in bales8 Pounds Of seedound of lint, as reported by

the IB Department of Agriculture, 6pJ and utilization was assumed to be in the same ratio as in the original prewar food balance.

,of production of broadbeans has been

t0r'S Estimates

fSbeans have becn revised0 tons to

Minor adjustments have been made In utilization.

e. Fats and Oils.

Production of vegetable oils was assumed to beercent Of the revised estimate Of oilseeds used of oiis^eds were revisedonsons including both China7 and Manchuria

Industrial uses of oilseeds were estimated to8 percent of the total supply, as in the previous food


revising the food balance sheets prepared for Cocnunlst ia for the consumptionevised population figure of


illion has been uocd instead of the figure of UflO million usedaput leg the previously* food This increase ln population of about percent would indicate adecreaae in the supply of food per capita ln terms ofper year as well as calories per day, other things being equal. Recently obtained information, however, haa resulted In the upward revision of certain substantive estimates ln* food balance, so that the estlutcd supply per capita In terms of kilograms per year has been reduced byercent and the estimated calorlea per day2 percent.


There have been no revisions in previous estimates of production of wheat, miscellaneous grains, nonglutenous and glutenous rice/ Revisions have been made in estimates of production of certain grains (in thousands follows: barley,t>

; oats, from QlU

millet,proso-olllet,nd kaoliang,0

Estimates of exports (in thousand tons) have been re-vlord as follows: wheat,ats,oorn,; millet,; and kaoliang,. The foregoing estimates and all other figures on the trade of Coramunlst China are preliminary, based on incomplete data plusfor the movements of commodities lndlcuttd by trade agreements.

The estimates of seedaste have been revised on the basis of revised estimates of production and acreage. Estimates hkve been made for grains, potatoes, brondbeans, and field peas as


rcage (Thousand Hectares)

Rate (Kilogram* per Eectarc)

Allowance (Thousand Metric Tone)

(Thousand Metric Tom)

Seed and Waste (Thousand Metric Toun


ercent of praJuclloa Alloweded and waste)

ercent of production allowed

(iced and waste)



Estimates of winter crops other than wheat were based3 acreages. Summer crops also wore haBed3 acreages. This estimate of planted acreage does not agree with estimates of acreage published elsewherehich generally wc estimates of harvested acreage. The estimates of acreage used here are preliminary and arc subject to revision.

Changes in estimates of production have necessitated changes ln the estimates for feed and industrial use. These changes are based on the percentage factor* used ir. toe prewar foodaking into consideration certain differences in practices between Chinand Manchuria.

The estimated extraction rate for wheat flour has been raised fromercent toercent. The estimated extraction rates for ronglutonous and glutenous rice hm been raised toercent and

ercent of production.


ercent, respectively, froa theercent andercent used In estimating the prewar food These revisions vere made because in the fall3 the Chinese Communists began enforcing the grain-processing standards that were setjJ Earlyhla policy of enforcement affected the availability of bothnd rice.

The estimate of production of sweet potatoes has been revised downwardons0 tons, Jg/ and appropriate changes in utilization have bepn made, resultingecrease ln estimated grams per capita per year95ecrease In estimated calories per capita per day

The estimate of production of cane sugar has been increasedons Estimates of exports have been increased0 tons0 tons. The revision ln the estimate of the population resultedevision of the estimate of calories per day fromo 9-

and JJllgecds.

Estimated production of vegetable oilseeds has been reduced0 tons0 tons. The revised estimate Includes data for China proper 8l/ for various seeds (in thousands follows: ; unehelled; and. To these figurea have been oddrd estimates for Manchuria (ln thousands follows:; and. An estimateorn of cottonseed was based on an estimate of lint, applying the ratioon of lintons of seed.

Exports of vegetable oilseeds were tstimated (in thousands follows: ; peanuts,esame, 8l; and These are estimates based on many scraps of information on shipments and commitments. An estimate of wastage, computedercent of production, was added to the estimated


requirement* Tor seed, which were obtained by applyingo tbe following acreages: ndectares.* 4 estimate of cotton acreage la based on the3 acreageectares planned for expansion The following acreages also were estimated to have been seeded ectares;; and.

The oilseed allowance for feed for livestockercent of the production of soybeansons. The quantity of oilseeds consumed directly as human food, estimatedons, includes soybeans, peanuts, and sesame. The estimated proportion of the crop consumed directly was based onor soybeans and peanuts und onor sesame.

Tlie estimateons of oilacedsesidual figure derived by subtracting exports and other utilisation from the total supply.

On the basis of recent Information,the estimate or production of broadbeans has been revised downwardons and the estimate of production of field peas revised upward to


e. Heat.

The estimates of production of meat for thoof livestock have been revised since the completion ofbalance prepared In the spring The factors andused In estimating production of meatvettockgiven in sourcefor the estimate of livestock

numbers ii given In source gj/.

Estimated production of poultry meat, based on poultry numbers, was revised upward with the revision of livestock estimates. Because or tho comparable importance of poultry and hogs to tholt was assumed that poultry increased at the same rate as hogs. With an approximate increase ofercent in poultry, production of eggs was correspondingly increased.

* This is tha seeded acreage and does not correspond to the harvested acreageecause of the destruction of considerable cotton by the floods of that year.


f. Fish.

The estimate of the fish catch In Communist Chinaand subject to revision. Before World Waxillion tons, and unofficial landingsillion tons. The largest part of the unofficialstemmed from estimates of the catch from pond culture, whichunreported. There is no information available onlandings Official landings were reported byCommunists for Kwangtung The total catchon the assumption that the Kwangtung catchpproximately the suae relation to the total catch that The total catch2 is froand thecatch2 la froa sourceassumed thathave Increased from2 estimate by the suaeofficial landings were estimated to have Increased.


6- .

Total production Of vegetable Oils was calculated from estimated production of five oilseeds. Tlie methodology employed is similar to that used inood/

for Oil*Metric Tons'


Oil Production (Thousand Metric Tons)





Cottonseed Total




Kach of the figuresesidual derived from production less export (if any) and other utilization.


Information Is lacking on which toefinitive estimate of industrial uses uf vegetable oils. onsiderable uniuunt of vegetable oils was used for lighting purposes before World War II. With the growth of industry, it Is probable that there has been sane Increase in the Industrial use of vegetable oils. The shortage of vegetable oils and the increased supplies of petroleum, however, make it probable that there bau been some decrease ln the use of oils for lighting. It vac estimated that. InIndustrial uses consumed appro* laatelyercent of the amount thus consumedhe estimated Increase in production of pork fat3 percent overons previouslyn conformity with the increase in production of pork. The figure was roundedillion tons.

3- ood Balance, a. Grains.

Production of wheat'* was estimated0aking into account the losses occasioned by* floods. The estimates of acreage and production of barley and oats for China proper were carried over at the levelith allowance made for flood losses. Estimates of spring barley and oats grown in Manchuria were Increased.from the estimated levels of production3 In proportion to the total Increaseillion tons In production of grains in/

Production of com, millet, and kaoliang In China proper was estimated as equivalent to3 acreage, minus the acreage under flood4 multiplied by the average yieldTo this figure wan3 production in Muiehurla plus ashare of the* increaneillionn There is no reported production of proso-mlllct In Hanchuria. Production of proso-mlllet in China proper was estimated in the same

grains In Manchuria3 vaa estimated'/ Favorable weather conditions are estimated to have raised

This increase was distributed among the various grain crops in propor tion to the harvested acreages3


as production of millet. The estimate of production of rice in China proper van based on3 acreage minus the estimated flooded acreage multiplied by3 average yieldercent, aaby source lQg/. To this quantity vas added the estimated Man-ohurian production of rice, obtained in the earn? manner as theHanchurlan production of millet. Estimates of foreign trade in grains, cr, veil as in all other products, arc preliminary approximations based on scraps of Information obtained during the first three quarters of the year ending At thia time it can be assumed only that the exports of certain commoditiesere approximately the same as The quantities involved are so small that they vould have hadinor effect on the caloric Intake per capita per day.

At the present time the only estimate thnt can be made is thatd requirements aay be approximately the same as those indicated in the tabulation onbove, Riving the seedfor the acreage to be Inercent of estimated production hua been added to the seed requirements to allov for woste.

Estimates of grains used for livestock feed and of industrial uses for all grains, Including rice, were assumed to bear

the jiamo percentage relation to total production as they did/

Estimates of extraction rates for flour and grain cealu ore the some as. The extraction rate for nonglutc-

nous rice has been raised fromercent toercent, and for glutonous rice, fromercent toercent. Tlie latter revision was made because the austerity measures announced in tlie fall/ began to show their effects in tlie spring

b. Potatoes.

The estimate of production of sweet potatoes ln China proper was baaed on3 acreage minus the estimated flood acreage4 multiplied by the average yield


The estimate of production of white potatoes lnhau been carried aver at the level

Sced and waste for sweet potatoes were estimated atercent of production and, for white potatoes, atercent of production, as.

Potatoes used for feed were estimated atercent of production for sweet potatoesercent of production for white potatoes, as- Sweet potatoes used Industrially were estimatedercent of production for sweet potutoecercent of production for white potatoes, aa.

Production of sugar was estimatedegional basis. The estimate of production In Kwangtung was increased in proportion to the announced acreage expansion. Acreages estimated3'i are from/espectively. The estimute of productionzechuan vac Increased according to the plan announced for production of sugar in the Toltiang Hlver area. Ipj/ Theof production in the northeast was Increased by tbe tomethat total crop production Increased in the northwest. Theof production ln the rest of China vaa increased In proportion to announced productionn Fuklen.* Total increases arc equivalent0 tons.


Production of soybeans in China proper was estimatedons, obtained by multiplying3 acreage less the estimated flood acreage4 by3 nv*ragc yield. To this quantity wasons for Manchuria, estimated as the proportionate share of thellllon-tou grain increase In the northeast'i

Production of peanuts in China proper vas estimatedillion tons andons ln Manchuria, aaRapeseed waa estimated/ Production of sesame seed was estimatedons, based nn3 acreage minus th?4 flooded acreage multiplied by3 average yield.

Sec/3 and/


Production of cottonseed was estimatedons, twice the figure for production of lint cotton Inas follows: 4 acreage seeded to cotton was estimatedectares, fromectares (based onere deducted for flood damage. The remainingectares, was multiplied by the estimated yield of lint cotton per2/ resulting ln an estimateons of lint cotton. Total production of oilseeds was estimated0 tons.

The estimate of trade was basedhat little is known of trade in the July-December periodn estimates of the relative flow of exports ln the first half4 In relation to the second half, and on the use of the trade data estimated

With the exception of rapesccd,5 oilseed crops were not plunted at the time thesf estimates were mude. The estimates of tho latest known year were therefore usedIn thishicheed requirementons. Waste was computedercent of all production of oil reeds, except cottonseed forercent was used. The resulting totalons indicates seed and wasteons.

Peed, vas estimatedercent of production Of soybeans, as inood balance.

The quantity of oilseeds available for Industrial use (oil extraction)esidual figure left after deducting other nonoil uses from the total supply. Xonoll use alsouantity of oilseeds consisted directly.

Oilseeds consumed directly are soybeans, peanuts, and sesame. The proportion of soybeans and peanuts consumed directly vas based on The amount of sesame consumed directly has been held at the some ratio used in

Data on broadbeans and field peas have been curried over frcn estimates ofood balance.


The methodology used in estimating production of meat from livestock numbers is given ln The basis for anof livestock numbers is given in. The methodology for estimating livestock numbers is as follows:

For numbers of cattle and buffalo, it was estimated that the annual rate of increase would be one-third as great as the average annual increase- This estimate was based on three considerations: (l) the average annual Increase of cattle and buffalo was basederies of years of expanding croproduction of crops leveled out, and4 itecline because of adverse weather conditions;attle numbers estimated3 were In excess of the estimated prewar numbers. It was assumed that the number of hogs and poultryould be approximately the same usV It is believed that the decrease in crop production'* and the actual death losses caused byloods will act toet increase. In the case of sheep and goats. It was concluded that one-third the rate of increase23 was the best estimate of increase- Although the rate of Increase in Bheep and goat numbers has been extremely rapid over theears, it tended to slow down In the latter part of the period, and this trend probably will continue-

The estimate of production of eggs has been carried over at the level.

The estimate of the fish catch for Communist China ls preliminary and subject to revision. To date, lt ls not known what the Chinese Communists claim as the size of official landings. official landings were given by tile Chinese Communists for Kwangtung/ter reports of the spring catch indicate that the planT may be/ An estimate of the total, catch was derived by assuming that the Kwangtung catch4 bore the same relation to the total catch as it did The unofficial landings were assumed to have increased from3 estimate of unofficial landings by the saric percentage that official landings were estimated to have increased.


h. Fats and Oils.

Estimated production of vegetable oIIbderived hv employing the methodology previouslyBo2

for OilMetric Tons'

Oil Production

(Percent) Metric Tons)

China Manchuria













The estimate of vegetable oils consumed fors the came as. Production of pork fat was to be the same asecause the number of hoe* remained the same.




The three major gaps in intelligence on food balances in the Sino-Soviet Bloc concern state food reserves, trade, and animal feed.

One of the most serious gaps is the lack of information on annual additions to, or releases from, the state food reserves, and on total quantities of food stored. These statistics arc significant inthe total supplyommodity available for consumption and in evaluating the Intentions and capabilities of the Slno-Soviet Bloc.

Information is also lacking on trade ln foodstuffs within the Sino-Soviet Bloc. Very little information on trade is available except for East German-Soviet trade and even this information is incomplete on East German reparations and occupation deliveries of foodstuffs to the USSR. Intra-Bloc trade in foodstuffsore significant effect on availabilities of food in the Europeanthan in the USSR or in Communist China. ore concentrated effort in compiling Intra-Bloc trade data and the opening of new sources of information will narrow the range of error.

The third Important gap in Information concerns the allocation of cereals and potatoes for animal feed. Most of the feedhave been based on prewar factors. The validity of these factors and the amount of variation between crops need the support of current Information. Studies on livestock feeding which will be doneater date may help to fill this gap.

Although other gaps in information exist In the food balances, tbe three gaps cited above are the most significant in influencing estimates of the food available for annual consumption. Other gaps in Information pertain to factors or quantities which are heldstable from year to year and therefore have little or no effect on trends in consumption in termsational average.



ave the

nl ovlng

foil )ving the classIfIcatlon entry and designated significance:

Source of Enfon itlon

-sually reltiairly relialotot reliable FCannot be ioffead

- Confirmed by other souro

- Probably true

- Possiblyoubtful

- Probably false

- Carjiot be Judged

re andfficer; or lnformatl officer, all of vhlcf

rs to original documents of foreign gove ics or translations of such documents by pn extracted from such documentstartfcurry the field evaluation "Document) y

not cited document; No "RR"n the cited document^

designated are those appearing oil the

"RR" are by tbe author of thii report, given vhen the author agrees vith the ev. luation

1. el U. Eval. RR 2.

ood Situation ln the Sov pt Bloc,


. u. tvai. RR. Ibid.

5, CUT S/


CIA. FBIS, Dally Report (Far.FF USE. Eval. RR 3.

. The world's. U. Eval. RR 2.

CIA. CIA/RRbove).

. S/

. p/

51. - 8'.

. Sugar Information Service, Supp rpt9. 1. U. Eval. RR CIA. CIA/RR. B/ H- Izvestlya. U. Eval. RR 2.

Pravda, Eval. RR 2.


Pravda, U. Eval. RR Ibid. -


CIA. CIA/RRbove).

Ibid. I


Ibid. [

Ibid. .

ibid. ;


CIA., S.

CIA. rdlo, uaiiy Report (USSR and Eastern

OFF USE. Eval. RR 2.

0 8.

V) 8.

Ibid. .


. e,

/Hong Kong. U. Eval. RR 2.

State, Hong Kong. Dep U. Eval. RR 2.

Ibid. .




U. Eval. RR 2.

. U. Eval. RR. U. Eval. RR. U. Eval. RRIA. CIA/RR. IA. CIA/RRroduction and Utilisation of Sugar In the Soviet4 State, Hong Kong. , ei>ovc).

Bureau of Agricultural Economics. Foreign Agri-

culture,. U. Eval. RR 2.

State, Hong Kong. , ebovs).

. 0. Eval. RR 2.

. 3BT. U. Eval. RR 2.

CIA. 2 U. Eval. RR 3.

(Chang, Yu-chlang. Conditions in the Agricultural and Animal Products Exports Industry of_ Northeast China, U) cTXI C'fA/RRbnvej,. - . S/ State, Hong Kong. , above).




73- Ibid.

74. State, Bong Kong. Dsp, CU. CIA/RRP.. Ul. . S, .

77- State, Hong Kong. , U. Eval. RR State, Hong Kong. 3 U. Eval. State, Hong Kong. , above).

80. State, Hong Kong. 1 U. Eval. RA 2.

Hong Kong. , above).

State, Hong Kong. 9 U. Eval. RR 3.


State, Hong Kong. U. Eval. RR 3.

State, Hong Kong. 8 U. Eval. RR 2.

CIA. CIA/RRreliminary Estimates of Production

of Textile Fibers In the Soviet

sTT ;

Air. intelligence Information S. .

CIA. , above).

State, Hong Kong. , above).


State, Hong Kong. , U. Eval. RR 2.

hina, sec 6l, Fig. C. (to be CIA. FBIS, Economic Abstracts, l6 C.

Eval. RR 2.

04. State, Hong Kong. 0 U. Eval. RR *.

th KIG. ar

Eval. RR 2.

CIA/RR- . UO. S,

99- State, Hong Kong. Dsp, above).

CIA/RRffect of4 Floods on Agriculture

in Communist China,T

FBIS, Economic Abstracts, C.

Eval. RR 3.

Hong Kong. Survey of China Mainland Press,

U. Eval. RR 2.

CIA/RR. State, Hong Kong. , State, Hong Kong. , above).

IO6. CIA. FBIS, Economic, Peking, English,

U. Eval.- State, Hong Kong. Survey of China Mainland Press.

pr U. Eval. RR 3-

FBIS, Economic Abstracts (Far3


FBIS, Economic, Foochov, Mandarin,

U. Eval. RR 3-

Hong Kong. , above).

hina, C.

State, Kong Kong. 8 U. Eval. RR Air. Intelligence Information S. .

CIA. CIA/RRbove).


State, Kong Kong. , U. Eval. RR 2.

CIA. FBIS, Econoaic Abatracts (Far6

C. Eval. RR 3-

CIA. FBIS, Economic Abstracts (Far21

C. Eval.. CIA. CLA/RR- S

Original document.

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