CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNDER DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY (SNIE 11-

Created: 6/28/1955

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

3 JB June 5

SPECIAL

INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE5

y the

CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNDER DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY

RELEASE AS SANITIZED

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

The leilmein.tr intelligence orgenleatlOns partiiipatedie /reparation Ol this estimate- Thr Centre! Intelligence Agency and the intelligence urgaiUiaUvns vf Ihe Departments of Slate, the Anna, the Navy, the Air Force. The Joint Stall, the Atomic Energy Commhtknt and the Federal Bureau Of Instigation.

Concurred tn bp Ihe

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

onS. Cmicurring were the Special Assitlant, Intelligence, Department ol St/dc; the Assistant Chief of, Department of the Armv; theSAF, Ihe Deputy Director far Intelligence. The Joint Staff: and the Atomic Energs commission Representative to the lAC. The Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, dissents Iram the conclusion ol this estimate,s been joined In part bp the Director nf .Vnwil litisj-Ugence. (See FBI and OKI lootnotesaragraph ?j

COPY HO. Ill 'JlRECTiW.ONE

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NftUonal Becorlty Conncll Departmenl of State Department ot Defence Opc.-aUons Coordinatingd Atomic Qserg* CommiuJon rweral Bureau ol Inrfisugatloii

JumIW? Warding agency to retain It in accordance with2

CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNDER DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the likelihoodoviet attempt to introduce nuclear weapons or their components Into the US clandestinely under diplomatic immunity before an all-out attack on the US.'

ASSUMPTION

That the USSR decides to launch an all-out attack on the US.

THE ESTIMATE

The USSR is capable of producing nuclear weapons which could be introduced Into the US either as complete assemblies or asparts or subassemblies. Such weapons could range from one kiloton to one megaton in yield, and in the present state of the art could be designed to break down intoweighingew pounds up to approximatelyounds In the case of small-yield weapons and up topounds In the case of large-yield weapons.

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'To.ls estimate Is In responsepecific request which eonflnej Itaeltx narrow ttmlU ofintroduction of nuckar weapons under dlplomauc Immunityore crtrnslteof Soviet capabilities for clandestineby any means, seeS.ross Capabilities for Attacks on the US and Key Overseas Installations and Fi iit.es-

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the USSR Intended to launch an allLick on the US. the major Sovietbe (a) to destroy or neutralize asas possible US capabilities forand (b) to inflict such physicaldamage on the US as wouldor at least hinder, lhe mobilizationwar potential. Accordingly, the initialattack would have to bo planned notachieve surprise but also to be oflo accomplish those objectives.as the USSR considered theof nuclear weapons into thewould plan to use these weaponsas the principal means of inflictingdamage on the US or (b) as anof inflicting damage, the mainits all-out attack being made byof delivery (aircraft, guided

CLANDESTINE ATTACK AS THE PRINCIPAL MEANS OF INFLICTING DAMAGE

military planners arc unlikelythat nuclear weapons could bo clan-

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introduced and put into positioncale large enough to obviate the need for an all-out attack by other means.landestine nuclear attack oncale would depend not only upon the initial introduction of substantial numbers ofweapons, but also upon subsequentwhich would be much more difficult to organize and keep secret. To achieve its objectives, the USSR would have toomplex clandestine operation mvolving the storage of weapons components,of assembled weapons or component parts over considerable distances, emplacement of weapons, and accurate tuning andof attacks at the target sites. Aoperation of this magnitude wouldgrave risks of premature disclosureof: (a) tlie large numbers of targets to be attacked; (b) the distances of such targets from Soviet installations having diplomatic immunity; (c) flic amount of Lime the devices would have to be held secretly prior to use; and (d) the numbers of persons involved in the operation.

believe, therefore, that in order tothe optimum combination of weightthe USSR would probably placeon nuclear attack by aircraft, atthe aircraft delivery system isintercontinental missiles. It wouldconsider clandestine employment onlyauxiliary method to attack certain

CLANDESTINE ATTACK AS AN AUXILIARY MEANS

estimating the advisability of usingdelivery as an auxiliary methodthe USSR would have to balanceresults to be obtained againstof detection with consequent loss ofand possible US counteraction.justification for its employment wouldin proportion to the contemplatedclandestine altack, the risks ofalso increase substantially.wc believe that, in consideringattack, the USSR would limit itsthose targets the destruction or damage of

which (a) is sufficiently important to warrant incurring the risks involved, (b) could be accomplished by clandestine means more easily or more certainly than by other means, and (c) could be accomplished with minimum risks of premature disclosure.

The USSR could minimize the risk ofdisclosure by limiting the clandestine operation to placement of nuclear weapons at Soviet diplomatic establishments Inand New York. In this way it couldinsure successful attack on two major targets withoutarge number ofand without incurring the risksin transporting nuclear weapons to areas which do nol enjoy diplomatic'*the other hand, the USSR couldork and Washington by air andould not have to rely onattack. In addition,ery limited clandestine effort would still not entirelythe possibility of disclosureesult of unpredictable events.

Although the possibilit. of limited Soviet use of tills method of clandestine attack can by no means be excluded, we believe that, since the adverse consequences of prematurewould remain and since the chances of detection could not be entirely eliminated, the chances are now slightly better than even thai the USSR would not undertake even this more restricted operation.*

'The Assistant to the Director. Federal Bureau of Investigation, believes that this paragraph should read as follows: "It Is Impossible to predict whether the USSR would or would not attempt to uUllxe thepouch to clandestinely Introduceweapons Into the US. However, since the USSR Is capable of, producing nuclear weapons for InlroducUon by thislsfc will continue to exist]

The Director ot NavST intelligence concurs In general with the views of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and would stress that the danger would rise in direct proporUon to the ease with which nuclear weapons could be Introduced Into the US without risk of detection.

Original document.

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