Created: 6/23/1955

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

3 June 5





DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE The lMowing rnteUujcncc organimtiont participated ii the preparation of IAu estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency end tht ImtlUgtnctl tht Departments ot State, the Army, tha fart, the An force. The Joint SUff. tht Atomic Energy Conminkm. and the Federal Bureau ot

elliaence.. Department ytnce, the Direct



estimate was disseminated by tho Central Intelligence Agency. Thislor thc Information and use of tbe recipient Indicated on the front cover and ofunder his Jurisdictioneed to know basis. Additional essentialbe authorized by the following officials within their respective departments:

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Chief of. for the Department of the Army

of Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navy

of Intelligence, USAF. for the Department of the Air Force

Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for the Joint Staff

f Director of Intelligence, AEC. for thc Atomic Energy Commission

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theof the within Uke imTiiMm laws. Title IS.theof which


DTION: White House

NeUoual Security Council Department of Btate Department of Defense Foreign OperaUons Administration OperationsBoard Atomic Energy Commission Federal Bureau of Investigation

This docuTsnt has tnca approved for release through tho HISTORICALROGPAM of tho Central Intelligence Agency.





To estimate Soviet gross capabilities for attack on the US and key US overseas installations and forces' as ofndithout taking into account the effectiveness of allied defenses and countermeasures.


In planning an attack on the US and key US overseas installations and forces, the Soviet rulers would consider such an attack in connection with their over-all strategy for general war. Accordingly, some of their forces and materiel, including nuclear weapons, would almost certainly be earmarked for use against US allies and for reserve. This estimate does not consider the problem of such allocation nor, except in section VIII, of over-all USSR strategy, but confines itself to the gross capabilities for attack on the US and key US overseas installations and forces as indicated by the estimated state of USSR weapons, equipment, and facilities during the period of this estimate. In Section VIII, the probable USSR strategic objectives and methods in attacking the continental US and key US overseas installations and forces are considered.


In attacking the US and key USinstallations and forces the major Soviet objectives would be to: (a) destroy or neutralize as quickly as possible US

'Key US Overseas InstallaUons and Forces:tacUcal, and naval air forces and bases,NATO UwUcal forces and bases: bases and facilities for thc support of navalarmy depots and port complexes; major headquarters; transportaUon faculUes.key bridges, tunnels, marshalling yards, and trans loading points.

continental and overseas capabilities for nuclear retaliation; <b) deliver such an attack on urban, industrial, political, and psychological targets in the US as would

LocaUon of key US Overseas InstallaUons United Kingdom. Western Europe. Far East (In chidingrench North Africa-Libya Pacific (including Hawaii and the Philippines) Middle East. North AtlanUe (Including New foundland, Oreenland. Labrador, and Iceland) Bermuda-Azores. Alaska, and Panama Canal Caribbean.

prevent, or at least hinder, theof US war potential; and (c) inflict such destruction on US overseasas would hamper or prevent the US from reinforcing or reapplying its forces.)

The Soviet leaders would probably cal-culate that in order to achieve success in neutralizing US capabilities for nuclear retaliation, suchian-attack would have to be accomplished wl(f>rWrprlsftA-'onBistent with -ihe-re-quked -scale -of attack. Therefore, the USSR would endeavor to launch its initial attack from such bases and under such conditions as would offer the greatest security from detection. )

In order to achieve the optimumof surprise and weight in an initial attack on thc continental US, we believe that the USSR would place chief reliance on nuclear attacks by aircraft. This type of attack would probably receive the highest priority because of: (a) the limited capabilities of naval, ground, and airborne forces against the continental US; (b) the security difficulties inherent in the delivery of large numbers ofweapons by clandestine means; (c) the ^sufficient development of other methods of delivery of nuclear weaponsarge scale; and (d) the insufficient development of other mass destruction weapons, or handicaps to their large-scale use. )

The USSR had tested by the endmall and medium-yield weapons and has employed thermonuclearprinciples to produce an energy yield upilotons of TNT.4 test scries showed stockpile types in the medium-yield range and extensive devel-

opment in the small-yield ranges, but there was no further development in the large-yield range. During the immediate future, the types of weapons stockpiled will probably have the generaland explosive powers of weapons already tested although the quantity of the large-yield type that could bewould probably be limited. We estimate that byhe USSR could have nuclear weapons with yields rangingTT and fromhrougheapons with yields rangingT0 KT.

The areas best located geographically for launching long-range air operations against the US are the Kola Peninsula; the Leningrad complex; the Chukotski and Kamchatka areas in northeastern Siberia; the central Arctic area; and the Baltic-East German area. ThcKola, and Kamchatka areas arcadvantageous as forwardor surprise attack since great circle routes would initially avoid overflight of nations friendly to thc US. With jet heavy bombers and inflight refueling the USSR would still require these advanced bases in order to launch two-way attacks on the most distant UShe BEAR, turbo-prop heavy bomber with one inflight refueling, could reach any point in the US from interior bases on two-way missions provided great circle routes were flown.

The BULLven if modified to increase its radius-rangeimilar to theonversion and

U no Intelligence to indicate Out the USSR hai ever employed owever. IUeadily within their technical capabCKy.

with bomb loads limitedounds, still could only attack targets in the US Pacific northwest on two-way unrefueled missions. On one-way unrefueledmodified DULLS could reachall of thc US. If the USSR now has an inflight refueling capability, BULLSound bomb loads could also conduct two-way missions against thenortheastern tip of the US and an area roughly northwest of an arc through Phoenix, Kansas City, and Chicago, providing great circle routes were flown. (See Maps,

No two-way missions, even withcould be conducted against thc US with the BADGERetbomber, unless great circle routes from the Chukotski area weren one-way unrefueled missionsound bomb load it could reach as far as Detroit St. Louis, and Oklahoma City from thc Chukotski area and as far as Boston from the Kola area. On one-way refueled missions from these areas the BADGER could reach most of theindustrial areas in the US.

The BISONet heavyon two-way refueled missions0 pound bomb load could reachall targets in the US in aof missions from Chukotski and Kola areas, providing direct great circle routes were flown. If employed on one-waymissions, they could strike all of the US from interior bases. On two-way unrefueled missions thc BISON

circle route* from Kola and Chukotski would involve refueling over US or Canadian


could reach targets roughly within an arc through Minneapolis, Denver, and Los Angeles from thc Chukotski area but could barely reach thc northern tip of Maine from the Kola area.

BEAR turbo-prop heavytwo-way refueled missions with apound bomb load could strikein the US from interiofbases,direct great circle routes weretwo-way unrefueled missionscould reach any point in thethat portion south of anCorpus Christi, Atlanta,from the Chukotski area,the Kola area Could reach onlyan arc through Seattle, Chicago,From interior bases inarea, on two-waythe BEAR could reachEastern part of the US as farNew York, provided direct greatwere flown. If employed onone-way missions theyany point in the US. (See Map76)


Present Soviet capabilities for large-scale air attack on the continental US are limited by the small number ofheavy bombers and by the relatively undeveloped base facilities in the Kola, Chukotski, Kamchatka, and other Soviet arctic areas. They are probably also limited by the lackeveloped inflight refueling capability.

Although thereack of sufficient evidence toirm assessment of the capabilities of individual bases in the Kola, Chukotski, and Kamchatka areas

for staging bomber aircraft, we believe thatajor effort, the USSR would be capable ofaximum ofircraft from these bases in an initial attack against the US inf all were committed to one-waymissions,ight reach US target areas, not considering combat losses. We believe it almostthat the USSR is psychologically capable of employing one-way missions. If inflight refueling were available and usedfircraft launched would probably be tankers andould be bombers, In thistrike aircraft might reachareas, not considering combat losses. Some of these aircraft would probably be used for electronic countermeasures or diversion. )

If the USSR elected to utilize all available bases, including those in the Baltic East German and Leningrad areas, and thus lessen its chances of achieving surprise it couldaximum ofircraft5 in an initial attack on the US. However, the groat bulk of these aircraft would have to fly one-way missions. Not considering combat losses,ight reach target areas. )

Assuming the launchingombers against the continental US, the USSR would have availableombers for attacks against key USinstallations and military forces and for reattack or for other missions.ould be immediately launched against key US overseas installations and forces. Not considering combat losses,ight reach target areas. In addition, some portion of the

et light bombers currentlyto be available could be used foragainst targets within theirradius ofautical miles.)


Bye estimate that the USSR will have availableln operational unitset heavy bombersurbo-prop heavy bombers, and couldonsiderable inflight refueling capability, thus giving it much greater flexibility in launching attacks on the US since interior bases could be used. By this time, moreover, we estimate that the USSR could,ajor effort, haveincreased the capacity of thc air bases in the Kola, Chukotski,and Kamchatka areas.)

If the USSR did in fact increase the capacity of these base areas and elected to use the above areas as staging bases it could initially launch against the US, all medium and heavy bombersf all were committed to unrefueled missions, thus maximizing the number of mission aircraft,ight reach target areas, not considering combat losses. However, exercise of this maximumwould involve the expenditure on one-way missions of most of the Soviet Long-Range Aviation. )

We consider it more likely that il tanker aircraft were available the USSR would employ them, even if it resulted in substantially fewer mission aircraft. In an optimum initial strike, the USSR might launchankers and

ission aircraft Of, about one-half might be launched from the Kola-Leningrad area, one-fourth from northeast Siberia, and one-fourth from interior bases.ight arrive in target areas, not considering combat losses. Even under theseabout one-third of the total Soviet long-range bomber force would be launched on one-way missions. Aof these mission aircraft wouldbe used for electronicor diversionary tasks.)

If byhe USSR decided to use only BISONS and BEARS in an initial attack on thc US, it couldombers, without usingbases. Of thisould arrive in target areas, not considering combat losses. To achieve target coverage of the entire US, inflight refueling or one-way missions would have to be employed. )

Assuming the scale of attackbove, and the commitment of all heavy bomber aircraft against the US, the USSR wouldediumleft,f which would beavailable for attack against key US overseas installations and military forces or for other missions. We also estimate that8et light bombers will be available for attacks on targets within their operational )


the period of thisthe USSR probably wouldmethods of attacking thc US or US

installations overseas concurrently with or immediatelyurpriseair attack. The. USSR iscapable of employing submarine-launched guided missiles with nuclear warheads against targets in coastal areas and they could now have several long-range submarines equipped with guided missiles It is also technically capable of attacking some US overseaswith ground-launched guidedup to rangesiles. Inthe USSR could employ amphibious, airborne, and ground forces and could attack US installations with standard CW agents and nerve gases.

attack on the USsabotage, biological warfare,of nuclear weapons, couldagainst specially selectedkey US overseas installations,capability exists forsabotage, and

USSR could launch bothconventional air attacks andattacks against US navalSubmarines also could attackcornmunications and carrymining in the shippingto US and allied harbors )

n conjunction with any Soviet air attack on the US and key overseasand forces, the USSR would probably employ ground, airborne, and amphibious forces simultaneously with or immediately after thc initial attacks Soviet ground forces, particularly in Western Europe, alreadyigh capability for attacking allied forces and

instaliattons located in forward areas. The additional employment of airborne or amphibious forces would enable the

Soviet ground forces to attack other forces and installations behind theareas. )



uclear Weapons* Thc Soviet atomicprogram, directed primarily toward the production of nuclear weapons, will continue to receive special emphasishe USSR had tested by the endmall and medium-yield weapons and has employed thermonuclear boosting principles to produce an energy yield upilotons of TNT.4 test series showed stockpile types In the medium-yield range and extensivein the small-yield ranges, but there was no further development ln the large-yield range. During the immediate future, the types of weapons stockpiled will probably have the general characteristics andpowers of weapons already testedthe quantity of the large yield type that could be produced would probably be Within thc limits of technologicalas of the endoviet military requirements will govern the aUocation of available fissionable material to various types of weapons, with consideraUon probably being given more to operational requirements than to Uie largest total energy yield attainable.

n order to provide an example of Soviet stockpile capabilities, we have assumed that: (a) one-third of eaUmateds uU-lized in large-yield0b) two-thirds is uUlizcd lnT) composite weapons; and (c) thc remaining plutonium Is divided equally betweenT) and small-yieldT) weapons. For purposes of com-

'See, Restricted Dala, "The Soviet Atomic Energyated5 for details of Soviet nuclear energy program, and specifications of types of nuclear weapons todetermination of the aircraft types ln which they can be employed.

par Linn this allocation of fissionable material is carried throughf the Soviet stockpile were allocated In this manner it would be as follows:"



Large-yield0 KT)0weapons IS

owever, due to conUnued Soviet nuclear progress, other allocaUons of fissionablemight become more likely toward The USSR will probably continue work on larger-yield weapons as well as on smaller-yield and small-dimension weapons. We estimate lhat byhe USSR could have weapons with ranges of yieldsT0 KT or more. Such developments would permit more flexibility in thc use of nuclear weapons. Assuming such progress on Uie part of the Soviets, one of thc ways in whichS weapons stockpile could be divided would be as

Large-yield weapons (SCO0 KT)weapons

Small-yieldo S

here Is no direct information on theof Uie Soviet control organisation and facilities for storage, handling, and dtstrlbu-Uon of nuclear weapons. However, wethat Sovicl nuclear weapons will be handledpecial organization within the

In view of the range of error applicable to the esUmate of Soviet fissionable materialthe actual figures for the end5 may be as much as one-third lower or higher ihan the figures given above. Uncertainty Increases as estimates are projected Into the future and the actual figure foray be as low as one-half or as high as twice the figures given In Uie table.

Ministry of Defense and will be stored atew large reserve-stockpile storage sitesarge number of smaller sites. These small sites will probably be located at or nearguided missile sites, and other delivery vehicle installations tn advanced areas.

Radiological Warfare. It is mostfor technological reasons, that the USSR will be able lo stockpile militarily significant quantities of radiological warfare weapons during the period of this estimate.the significance of radioactive fall-out following large nuclear explosions should be considered in connection with Sovietto produce explosions in thc megaton range.

Biological War/are. The USSR Is inof all thc necessary basic knowledge [or the production of most BW agents anddissemination devices. If the Soviets chose to do so, they would be able to produce BW agents and devices for dissemination in adequate numbers. Although there is some evidence to Indicate the USSR Is engagedW program, agent production has not been identified either as to location or type. Since It is not feasible to stockpile largeof most BW agents In prolongedmost operational requirements would have to be supplied directly from production facilities.

Chemical Warfare. We assume that thc stockpile of standard agents and munitions accumulated during World War II has been maintained and will be available for use.indicated that Uie Soviets could have been producing at least one of the nerve gasesnd we estimate that the USSR ii capable of employing nerve gases.


Strength of Soviol Long-Range Aviation

nng Range Aviation will have an estimated over-all authorized strength (TOAEjircraft,ULListon mediumADGERet medium bombers.

ISONet heavy bombers,EAR (turbo-prop heavywin-engined piston transports. Theactual strength oi this bomber force inillADGER, and up toISON andEARll units are based in Western USSR except tbe 3rd Long-Range Air Army, with anstrengthircraft, which Is located in the Far East.

No substantial change In-the authorized strength of0 bombers) is expected between now ande estimate that the USSR will probably not introduce into operational units throughny bomber types which have not already appeared either in units or in prototype stage.

The appearance during April of as many asISONS at rehearsals for the May 1st air showignificant Increase in Soviet heavy bomber production over thatestimated. The BISON was first seen inflight in the spring4 and consideredrototype at that time. With theof BISONS and BEARS at this time, we conclude that production go-ahead on the BISON occurred abouthc first production model was produced ln the first quarternd approximatelyill have been producedresent evidence indicates that it is being produced at Plant No.nt Is estimated that the USSR couldaximum peak rate ofer month at this plant byt is more probable, however, due to problems associated with supply of equipment,and training of personnel forin operating unitsroduction rate of0 per month would be initiated.

It is also possible that other plants could now be producing Uie BISON ond that the

'Throughout this estimate, estimated actual strengths have been used5 whileigures have been used forctualstrengths should be considered In arriving at Soviet attack capabiliUes. However, theof actual aircraft lo TOfcE Is subject lovariance and cannot be accuratelyfor future years.8 actual strength will probably equaltrength.

planned production rate could be as higher month Similar analysis of BEAR production has not been made at this time. The USSR could have up toISONS andEARS In operational units bynd, based upon tentative producUonbyould haveISONSEARS ln operational units.

0 20


LOO too


'There La no firm on the planned balance between the types and categories of long-range uircraft or on their future authorized organltauonal aircraft strengths; the above figure* represent our estimate of Lhe mostway In which Soviet Lone-Range Aviation would be proportioned during Uie period and is predicated on thehat no change will occur In the total authorised number of aircraft In long-range units; tb) that the BEAR turbo-prop heavyurrently In series production; and (c> that thc USSR Isa major aircraft producUon effort to Lhe developmenta&slve InterconUnental attach capability.

nflight Refueling. We have nothat the USSR has ever employed in-night refueling. However, iiiflighttechniques do not Impose seriousproblems and the USSR has had access to the wartime techniques and equipment employed by the US in this field. It is known to have evinced interest ln Western demonstrations of refueling techniques, and refueling methods have been discussed intechnical literature. It Is thereforeto consider thc effect of Inflightwhen assessing the maximumranges of Soviet bombers.leet of tanker aircraft,of mission aircraft fuel systems, and appreciable training Ln their operational use would be necessary before missions Involving inflight refueling could be conducted. The establishment of tanker units would require thc conversion of bomber types or production of new tanker aircraft. The new turbo-prop

aircraft sighted in the fly-by rehearsals could probably be utilized in this role. Since BULL strength in operational use ls estimated towith the introduction" of Jet bombers, numerous BULLS would be available forto tankers. We also estimate that the USSR will have developed by the endour-engined Jet transport which could readily be modifiedanker aircraft.

Characteristics of SovietThe radii-ranges and otherdata which are estimated for thebomber types* are given in Tables Iappearing on

Base Areas for Air Attack on the US

all, there areperationalin thr Sino-Soviet Bloc withindicated below:



JXX T 53 W

European Sulrlllten Communist China and North Korea TOUU

Of these, approximatelyre estimated to be part of thc base structure of Soviet Long-Range Aviation, which includes home bases, command and/or training bases, factoryand testing and development bases. Most of these bases are concentrated ln theportion of the Western USSR.

serious gap exists In currentof runway development at .ui fieldsas home bases for operationalAviation units equipped with BULLaircraft However, in areasairfields development can besuch as the European Satellites, thehave shown themselves fullyrunway requirements and havemore than adequate runwaysimilar construction practicesUSSR, wc estimate that concreteat BULL home bases, have beento lengthsrunways would permit take-off0 foot obstacle attake-off weights.


ESTIMATED PERFORMANCE OP SOVIETIRCRAFT (Calculated In accordance wllh OS mlUUrv mission profiles)*







lb.refuel *


Speed/Altitudeax speed b. Target speed

Combat Calling'








a m





estimates of performance characteristics of the BEAR aircraft are not available allhough pre Bmmary estimatesombat radius/rangeautical miles and an optimum radlui

ludet<l aximum

' The BULL could be modifiedanner similar to theonversion to Increase Ils range. However, wc have no IndlcaUons that Ihis has been or will be done.

improved IJADOKR performance Is based upon estimated Installation of Improved engineshrust0 lbs.

upon csUmaled installaUoni of JMI^ttnst engines. Previous estimates Indicated thesewould not be available6 The Director of Intelligente.lrves enginehas probably kept pace wiih the aircraft, and0 lb thrust engines could be available al tne present lime

radius/range estimates baaed upon the use of compatible tankers.

altitude at widen rate of climbt/mln. can be maintained al the end of the given combat radius of tbe ;i


ESTIMATED MAXIMUM SOVIET LONO-RANGE AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCEODIFIED MISSION PROFILE1 (Calculated in accordance with maximum US military mission profiles except that fuel reserves are reduced toaximum ofinutes loiter at sea level, and aircraft operate at altitudes permitting maximum radius/range.)






bul /Radius Range (run!









fiH " 0

'Firm estimates ol performance charactcrisUcs of lhe BEAR aircraft are not available althoughestimatesombat radius/rangeautical miles and an optimum radiusautical milesDOD lb bombombat altitude0 feet and aspeednots0 feet.

'The BULL could be modifiedanner similar to theonversion to Increase Its range. However, we have no Indications that this has been or will be done.

'The Improved BADGER performance is based upon estimated Installation of Improved engineshrust0 lbs.

'Based upon estimated Installation0 lb. thrust engines. Previous estimates Indicated thesewould not be availablehe Director of Intelligence, USAF, believes enginehas probably kept pace with the aircraft, and0 lb. thrust engines could be available at the present lime.

radius/range estimates based upon the use of compatible lankcrs.

altitude at which rate of climbt/mln. can be maintained at the end of the given combat radius of thc aircraft

Estimated maximum target0 ft/mln. rate of climb) for the BISON and BADGER on one-way missions, one hour of fuel remaining, bomb load aboard and with maximum power, are as follows:



ny modlficalian of Ihiswould be required for the useheavy bombers or BADOERThe BISONbs is estimated toground run ofeet,feet to0 foot obstacle;ross take-off weighta ground run ofeet,feet to0 foot required for BEAR Isless than that required for

to the range limitations ofbomber aircraft, the launching ofNorth Americae limited to operations stagedor more of six base areas withinterritorythe Chukotskithe Kola Peninsula, the CentralKamchatka area, the Leningradthe Baltic-East German area. EvenJet heavy bomber would have tofrom these areas in order toUS targets unless refueledor employed on one-way missions.exist in all of these areasAviation units are stationedIn the Leningrad area. Therearkevidence toirmof the capabilities of individualthe forward staging areas particularlysuitability for long-range bomberHowever, we believe that some ofIn the forward staging areasleast minimal facilities foroperations.

ajor construction projects would beIn all Soviet potential forward staging areas (except the Baltic East German area) to Improve present staging capabilities forstrikes. It is estimated lhat. with only thc construction facilities andnow available in the area concerned, byhree new airfields suitable for such operations could be developed In thc Kolaningrud nrcas and two In each of the other forward areasChukotski, Central Arctic, and Kamehntka. Minor Improvement of

support facilities at already existing potential staging bases in these areas could also beout simultaneously without detracting from the construction effort. In the Baltic-East German area, only minor additionaland development of air facilities would be required.

Chukotski Peninsula. As tht result of runway construction believed to have been carried out at several airfields within the past two years, we believe at least four* airfields probably now have runways adequate, for staging medium bombers and at least one oi these Is suitable for heavy bomber operalions. Military air units are based on some of these airfields but none arc subordinate to Long-Range Aviation.

Air operations in this area arc madeby several factors. Construction of permanent-surfaced runways suitable for bomber operations is difficult (here and in the Central Arctic) owing to the permafrost problem, but the USSR has almost certainly learned to solve this difficulty throughsoil studies and experiments conducted since World War II. They have alsoused ice and snow-impacted runways. Cold, wind, snow, and fog. prevalentthe area, also tend to make operationsandhc lack of modern navigational aids hampers operations, but there arc some indications that the USSR is steadily Improving its operational potential through Installation of modern radiofacilities In addition the USSR has an ever-increasing fund of Arctic experience which could be applied to staging operations In this area

The status of base logistical supporirequired to stage long-range strikefrom the Chukotski area is unknown. The area Is accessible only by air and sea and supply problems would be difficult.the USSR Is considered capable ofthe necessary supplies The area's staging potential could be. increased by using construction facilities already available toexisting faculties or develop newNo additional construction units and equipment would be required In the area

to build two additional concreteeet In length, between now and

ola Peninsula. The Kola Peninsula has at least five bases believed adequate foroperations of medium bombers atgross weights, provided the Sovietsa reduced safety margin on take-off for the BULL. One other airfield isto be suitable for use on anbasis, but Its extremely isolated location, plus Its apparent lack of recent development or utilization, argue against Ils use as abase. At least four of these airfields would be adequate for heavy jet bombers at maximum take-off weights If reduced safety margins were accepted. runways can be constructedthe area without difficulty as it.Isfree of permafrost. Prevailing climat-k'conditions,estrictive factor on air operations, are relatively more favorable than ln other regions of the Soviet Far North.

he status of base logistical supporirequired to conduct long rangestrikes from airfields In this area isbut it ls considered that logistics would notimiting factor of consequence. Supply routes by rail and road are open to the Kola Peninsulaear-round basis,logistic support of large-scale airwould still pose difficulties underweather conditions. Moreover, the staging potential of the area could beby using already available airfieldunits to Improve existingfields, or develop new Installations. No additional construction capabUlty would be required in order to build three additional concrete-surfacedeet in length between now and

entral Arctic. Firm Information as-to the exact status of airfield development in this area is lacking, but airfield construction has been ln progress sincethe program was carried out for the Directorate of Polar Aviation of the Northern Sea Route Administration, the airfields built are estimated to have atimitedcapability for medium and heavy bomb-

ers. However, climatic conditions andsupport factors are relatively unfavorable. Five airfields are known In this area andfields probably exist.

eningrad. This area contains ut least three home bases of Long-Range Avialion units equipped with BULL aircraft which arc presently suitable for heavy jet bomber Willi available construction units already In this area the base potential could be increased without difficulty since fiveairfields in the area have concrete runways ateet In length, and ll other airfields have runways In excesseet. inimum of additionalthese fields could be made suitable for jet heavy bomber operations. None of these additional bases, however, are known to be associated currently with Long-Range Aviation operations. Operations from this area by long-range aircraft would offer the advantageemperate climate and good logistic support. If overflight of thearea were to be avoided on anstrike against the Unitedog-leg ofautical mUes over the Kola Peninsula area would ber

amchatka-Sea of Okhotsk area. Four airfield! in this area have runways which would permit ground runs of ateet. One of these airfields is consideredfor medium bombers at maximum gross weights, provided reduced safetywere accepted for BULLS. However, the other three could be used by BULLS withtake-off weights and by BADGERSlower safety margins were accepted. For this reason long-range eapabililies from this area are estimated" to be extremelybui facilities could be developed tomedium und heavy bomber operations by

altic-East Cermany. Poland and the Soviet Zone of Germanyotal of at leastirfields from which medium and heavy bomber operations could be mounted against the US and US bases inisadvantage of this areaase for air attacks on North America

is that great circle routes from the area to thc US pass over friendly nations. In addition, it would be more difficult to maintainof preparations for attacks than in other forward base areas. However, climaticare most favorable and there are no logistics problems. This base complex is served adequately by all types of

Climatic Suitability of Staging Areas'

SO. Chukotski Peninsula. The leastconditions occur during November through March. The most favorableoccur at all stations during the spring and early summer. The weather in theIs highly favorable weather during the summer months. Only those areasto the Chuckchee Sea or which lie along the Bering Sea coastelatively high percentage of unfavorable conditions during the midsummer months.

ola Peninsula. In general the mostconditions occur in the late spring and early summer. In late summer and early autumn conditions are favorable at mostexcept those adjacent to the cold waters a' the White Sea. During May throughconditions are favorablef the time at ail locations. In winter conditions ore slightly less favorable due to the more frequent occurrence of low ceilings and poor visibilities. Extremely coldare relatively infrequent, less thanercent at any station

entral Arctic. This area has by far the most unfavorable weather of all the areas

' In order to estimate the seasonal suitability of average weather conditions ln potential stagine areas, lhe percentage frequency of occurrence of those conditions which would seriouslyor altogether prohibit the mass movement of aircraft Into or out of the staging areas was computed. Two condition* were selectedasis for analysis:celllng/vislblllty lessile;emperatureV. The occurrence of either of these con-dlUons was considered toltuaUonfor staging operaUons. althoughoperaUons could be carried out successfully ln temperatures below -JOT wllh adequate

considered. Bad weather occurs mostIn the cold months of the year,through April, whenoercent of all hours are unfavorable. Even themonths arc not entirely favorable due to the high frequency of fog in the coastal belt. However, locations somewhat protected Irom the sea would probablyuch higher percentage of favorable conditions than the coastal airfields now cxistini: The major handicap to winter operations arises from the frequency and persistence ofcold temperatures For example, at Tiksi overercent of all observationsJanuary record temperatures lower thanF.

Leningrad. Thc stations in this area have the most favorable weather during the late spring and summer, when aboutoercent Of the time is favorable for operations. Even during autumn and winteroercent of the weather ts favorable at allThere appears to be little difference between nighttime and daytime weatherduring September, October, andDuring these mouths reduced visibility sometimes occurs during the early morning hours, but this condition obtains in only four to six percent of0ccur less than fiveof the time at all stations.

Kamchatka-Sea ol Okhotsk area. The weather in this area is relatively favorable for air operations. Throughout the year the weather on the east coast of KamchatkaIs the most favorable In the entire area. In the Magadan area the best weather occurs during thc early spring and autumn.

Baltic-East Germany. The stationsin the Baltic coastal area are mostfor air operations during April through August, when favorable conditions occur aboutercent of the time, both day and night. The least favorable period is during the winter. December through March, when the frequency of favorable conditions drop to aboutoercent. However, theconditions occur most often during the night and early morning hours. Midday and midafternoon hours remain favorable for


abouto DO percent of the time. Very low temperatures are extremely rare In thLs area.

Other Factors Affecting Soviet Bomber

Capabilities Against tho US Ml. Navigation- The USSR has available through open sources virtually completeand navigation data on North America and its approach routes. It Is even probable that ln the eventurprise attack certain Western electronic navigational aids would be available during at least part of the flight. Similarly, meteorological reports. Including profile data at all altitudes, are regularly broadcast in the United States and Canada in simple cipher. We estimate that Soviet Wind-bombing and navigational radarls capable of equal or better performance than the US World War II equipment which the USSR acquired. It Is also possible that clandestinely placed navigational beacons may be used for aircraft homing. TheSoviet training program points toimprovement ln air crewn addition to thc basic navigational skills of pilotage, dead reckoning, celestialand radio navigation, it Is believed that Soviet Long-Range Aviation is receivingin the use of more advanced systems and techniques. Although wc have no evidence of long range training flights atdistances, some Soviet crews arecapable of navigation to the mostassigned targets while all trained Soviet crews are probably capable of navigating with sufficient accuracy to reach such targets as major US cities and industrial centers.

M. The bombing proficiency of Long-Range Aviation units ls believed to be below thc standard of thc US SAC. We believe they are currently able to achieve CEP accuracies ofeet for visual bombingeet,O feet for radar bombing from the same altitude. There are indications that training standards are being raised and we believe that bombingwill be materially increased byesult of better equipment and improved training Radar bombing CEP accuracies

8 with Jet bombers are estimatedeet0 feet against well defined targets andeet al the same altitude againit difficult targets.

Availability and Abort Rate.of Soviet aircraft, although below US standards, has Improved since World War II. We estimate the USSR is now capable of achieving in the forward staging areas arate ofercent for an initial, deliberately prepared surprise-attack against North America and of Increasing this rate toercent bywing to greater use of jet aircraft and Improved operatingat forward bases. The serviceability rate for long-range bombers Is estimated at aboutercent for sustained operations. Cold weather operations would probably cause some reduction in the foregoing figures. In addition, some ol the aircraft taking off would abort and fail to reach target areas forother than our air defense activity. The allowance for aborts and losses from all(including use of marginal bases, grossin navigation, mechanical failure,ther than combat attrition Is estimated at aboutercent for nonrefueledor refueled missions.

Replacement Rate. No appreciableof BULLombers are believed to exist al the present time. Those which are phased out of operational units with the introduction of new Jet bombers will become availableeserve unless converted for tanker use or other special purposes. There will be no appreciable reserves of any of thc new bomber types introduced during Uieof this estimate.

Weather Forecasting. The USSR has for years devoted considerable emphasis to both short-period and long-period meteorological forecasting and hasigh degree of success. We believe Uiat It has thecapability to support long-range airThis capability plus extensivein meteorological research in thenorthern latitudes, weather reporting facilities in Siberia and on ice Hoes in IhrArctic basin, und constant access toNorth American weather reports und


forecasts should enable thc USSH to predict both route and target weather withaccuracy. We estimate that Sovietin upper air research and ln the more complex phases of meteorologicalare somewhat less than those of the US; however, the Soviets have the technical capability to overcomeew years.

lectronic Countermeasures. The USSR has had access to several types of World War II US defensive radar and to some USequipment. It ls apparently well aware of the tactical advantage lo be gained by jarnmlng defensive radar andWe believe thai thc USSR is nowcapable of producing limitedof ground based and airborne jamming equipment to cover frequencies0 megacycles and, by use of ground-based equipment, to seriously disrupt long-range radio communications between the US and Its overseas facilities. Between now andhe USSR will probably further Increase the effectiveness of Its jamming equipment a; well as thc proflcJaWfJ and BOH ber of its trained personnel. The USSR has probably already produced sufficient counter-measure devices to equip some aircraft for jamming or spoofing defensive radars and ground/air fighter control communications in use at the present time for tlie defense of North America. The effectiveness of Soviet

countermeasures will depend on their degree of success in analysis of signal radiations and in other means of obtaining technical data on thc defense radar that will then be in use. Use of Jamming equipment probably would require the employment of extra aircraft equipped specially for this purpose.

Factors Affecting Air Attacks Against Key US Overseas Installations and Military Forces

In addition to thediscussed above, the BUTCHER

nd BOSUNet light bombers are capable of carrying out attacks on many key US overseas installations and forces abroad. The BUTCHER ts thelight bomber of thc Air Force of theArmy. Thc BOSUN, currentlyin Soviet Naval Aviation, is believed tospecial features to carry out naval missions such as torpedo attacks and mine-laying as well as bombing.


Air Force of Soviet Army

Naval Aviation

Total "

he USSR may alsoan Improved Jet lightwin-turbojet awept-wing bomber.the performance of BUTCHER and










New Jet Light Bomber


Combat Radius/Range (nm/nm)




Max. SpdyAlt.

ow level attack

ea level

ea level

BOSUN may be improved during the period of this estimate by lhc Installation of higher-thrust engines.8 wc estimate that BOSUN will have been phased out ofservice and replaced by eitheror the new light bomber.

lno-Sovlet airfields previously mentioned in paragraphre all estimated to be suitable for Jet light bombers. Wethat this large number of airfields would permit light bomber attacks against most key US overseas installations and forces. (Secrom bases In East Germany.Jet light bombers on two-way missions could reach the entire North Sea area, thc UK and its northern and western approaches (including therance and its west-em approaches, and northeastern Spain. From bases in Hungary these aircraft could reach into the Mediterranean up to an arc drawn southwest of Sardinia and Sicily. From the southern USSR, they could reach an area north of an arc Crete-Isracl-Kuwalt. Jet light bombers based In the Vladivostok and Dairen areas could reach all of Japan. To reach Okinawa and Luzon on two-waythey would have to stage from bases in Communist China.

From bases in the USSR, the BULLf modified, on two-way missions could reach key US Installations in the UK. Western Europe. Iceland. Greenland, the Azores. French North Africa. Libya, theEast. Japan. Okinawa. Alaska, Guam, and the northern Philippines. To reach keybeyond these areas, BULLS would have tp resort to inflight refueling or one-way missions. Jet medium bombers from bases Ln thfo USSR could reach alL the above areas except southern Greenland (marginal againsthe Azores, Guam, and UieJet heavy bombers on two-wayfrom bases ln the USSR could reach key US installations in the UK. Western Europe. Far East including Okinawa. French North Africa-Libya, the Philippine and MarianaMiddle East. Greenland. Iceland, and the northeastern coast of Labrador, the Azores, and Alaska. The BISON could reach the Panama Canal on one-way unrefueled

missions. The BULL and BADGER could reach the Panamo Canal on one-way mission only if inflight refueling were employed.

Bombing Accuracy. The factors discussed in paragraphor long-range operations apply equally to Soviet air attacks against key US installations overseas. In addition, radar bombing by BUTCHER jet lighthas been carried out using equipment with characteristics similar to the USype radar. BUTCHER units in Eastare known to have practiced bombing at night and during instrument weatherand other Jet light bomber unitsalso carry out such training. Wethat Jet Ught bomber crews could achieve, st the present time, CEP accuracies on the ordereet for visual bombing0 feet,eel radar bombing from Uie same altitude If the SHORAN type navigation systemomb control system,angeautical miles from the groundbombing accuracies of about plus oreet could be achieved. Soviet ground Are control radar (similar to thc US) could be used with appropriate modifications torecise short-range bombing system (similar to Uie UShis system wouldangemiles.

Availability, Abort Kate, Replacement Factors. The factors previously discussed for long-range bombers apply generally to lighterviceability rale ofercent byor Initial attacks from areas other than thc forward northern bases, is considered possible because of the better (acuities and logistic support in these areas. The sustained serviceability rate for Jet light bombers is estimated to be aboutercent No reserves of jet light bombers are believed to exist at present, nor is an appreciablelikely to be built up between now and

Counter measures. The Soviet ECM capabilities previously discussed apply also to bomber attack* against key USinstallations. However, Soviet require-

merits tor ECM would probably be less because of the less elaborate defenses around most of these installations and the shorter timesto penetrate defenses before targets are reached. Space and weight limitations would probably preclude present Soviet jet light bombers from carrying ECM equipment (except for chaff) in addition to bomb loads. However, thc USSR has the technicaltoet light bomber with both passive listening and active jammingequipment and probably have someequipped for this purpose.



Present Soviet capabilities for air attack on the continental US are limited by thesmall numbers of operational heavy bombers and the relatively undeveloped base facilities in forward areas. They are also probably limited by the lackeveloped Inflight refueling capability. The forward base capacities will continue to be important during the period of this estimate, but as the number of BEARS increase, thc forward base capacities will be less Important inthe number of aircraft which could be launched at one time, in an Intercontinental attack. The increase in numbers of the BISON and BEAR heavy bombers, continued Long-Range Aviation training programs,of an Inflight refueling capability and extensive improvement of the forward staging areas would resultubstantial increase in Soviet capabilities for attack on the US by

Base Capacity. The USSR has theof launching Its entire long-rangeforce against the United States from bases within Soviet-dominated territory. However, at the beginning of the period this could be done only if bases in the Baltic-East German area were used in addition to those within the USSR. This area isikely choice for initial strike operations, because of the probable loss ot surprise during overflight of Western territory and thc greater likelihood


lhat preparations in this area would beHowever, should the USSRreattacks after an initial surprisestrike, this base area might be used. Use of thc Central Arctic area Is also believed to be severely limited because ofunfavorable weather conditions and logistic problems, but might be used for smallof aircraft. The Leningrad area is also unlikely to be used for initial strikes5 because of the problems Involved in either overflying or by-passing Scandinavia.the forward bases believed to be the most likely Soviet choices for mounting initial attacks on the United States in the early part of the period are in the Kola Peninsula, Chukotski, and Kamchatka areas.

8 the USSR could increase the capacity of these three forward base areas to the point where, together with bases in the Leningrad area they could simultaneously launch the entire long-range bomber force. If tankers were used for refueling operations, the number of strike aircraft which could be launched from these areas would be reduced. The employment of inflight refueling with the BISON would permit the useumber of interior bases, particularly In the Leningrad area.

Aircraft. The principal aircraft used for attempting intercontinental strikes betweenndould probably be the BULL, BEAR, BISON, and BADGER. At the beginning of the period the BULL medium bomber would probably be the principalused for this purpose. It wouldcontinue to be so used, until the BISON and BEAR appear in strength, because of range advantage over the BADGER. Wethat thc Soviets would employ thcmedium jet bomber only lor specialoperations under circumstances in which the use of high speed and highagainst particular targets wasdesirable.5 BADGER would require inflight refueling even for one-way missions for coverage of the most important industrial areas of the US, but thc improved BADGER expected in units8 will prob-

ably have adequate range on one-way missions to cover these areas without inflight refueling.

ntil the development of inflightthe USSR will be limited, exceptmall number of BISON and BEAR missions to two-way missions against the extremeportion of thc U8 even with modified BULL aircraft or to one-way missionsboth BULL and BADGER aircraft. Inflight refueling would permit the recoverymall -number of BULLS launched from theregion against the northwest portion of the US. However, even inflight refueling would not permit two-way BULL strikes against the major portion of USn the other hand, provided modified BULLS were available and varying bomb loads were employed, the BULLne-way mission without refueling could reach virtually all US targetsombination of strikes launched from Western and Eastern USSR staging bases. (See Mapsrom theseareas. Inflight refueling would permit the use of the present shorter range BADGERne-way mission to virtually all US (See Maps

n the latter part of the period, the USSR would almost certainly place chief reliance on the BISON and BEAR for intercontinental attacks. On two-way missions withoutfrom the Chukotski area, Uie BISON could reach targets roughly within an arc through Minneapolis, Denver, and Los Angeles. From the Kola Peiiinsula the BISON could under the same condition barely reach Uie northern Up of Maine. Employing refueling andto avoid over-flying Alaska and Canada. BISONS on two-way missions from thearea could reach Minneapolis,and lower California. On the same type mission from the Kola Peninsula, the BISON could only reach within an arc through New York and Ottawa. On one-way missions the BISON could reach all of Uie US and the Caribbean urea from either of these

'Only once-refueled missions have beenbecause of the problems Involved wIUi twot Is possible that toward thc end of the period the USSR mightapability for twice refueled missions.

areas. If dog-legs were not employed toover-flying allied territory, BISONS on refueled two-way missions could reachall targets In the USombination of missions from Uie Chukotski and Kolaareas. On Uie same type mission from bases in Uie Leningrad area, the BISON could cover thc arc: Minneapolis-Chicago-Richmond. If dog-legs were employed from these bases only the Boston area could be reached with BISONS on two-way refueled missions. In general, the BISON will permit much greater flexibility in Uie choice of bases and tacUcs. Particularly advantageous would be thc ability to employ compatible tankers from interior bases. However, in order to hit all targets in the US wiih BISON type aircraft on two-way missions, the USSR would have to employ inflight refueling and forward staging bases.

The BEAR turbo-prop heavy bomber on two-way refueled missions0 pound bomb load could strike any point in the US from interior bases, provided direct greatroutes were flown. On two-waymissions the BEAR could reach any point in the US except that portion south of an arc through Corpus Chrlstl, Atlanta, and Norfolk from Uie Chukotski area, but from the Kola area could reach only north of an arc through Seattle, Chicago, and Richmond. From interior bases in the Leningrad area, on two-way unrefueled missions, Uie BEAR could reach the North Eastern part of the US as far south as New York, provided direct great circle routes were flown. If employed on unrefueled one-way missions they could reach any point In the US. (See

Staging.0 hour flight would be required to move BULL aircraft from Far East home bases to Chukotski area bases and about three to Ave hours from Western USSR bases to the Kola area. Flying times for BADGER or BISON aircraft would be about half as long. Wc have almost no recent firm evidence on the status of.servlclng and fuel storage facilities or the availability of tank trucks al most of the forward bases.thc Soviets arc fully capable ofthese facilities if they do not already have

them. For example, we believe thc USSRuel truckallon estimated capacityumping rateallons per minute. Careful preparation could permit the Soviets to refuel luccessive elements of the bomber force at forward bases, which would reduce time on the ground and the number of refuel* Ing trucks and servicing personnel required. When BISON and BEAR bombers appear in service in large numbers we estimate that the USSR will have available refueling equipment more compatible with the requirements of these aircraft. In order to service largeof long-range bomber aircraft at staging bases In forward areas It would probably be necessary to increase present stocks of POL and servicing equipment and to establish or

increase weapons stockpiles at the various

Weather. Weather and climaticin the far northern staging areas wouldonsiderable impact on the tuning and magnitude o! attacks on the US. During cold weather, the need for high speedand heated hangar space are among the critical problems which would be magiiified as numbers and size of aircraft Increase The coordinated launchingarge-scale attack composed of elements from widely separated base areas would be complicated by varying weather conditions at such bases.

Tlie low temperatures of the Arctic region pose some special problems in the handling of atomic weapons. However, virtually all of the components of nuclear weapons are better able to resist the effects of cold weather than are the delivery aircraft, and provision of adequate shelters and equipment tothe undesirable effects of cold weather on the bombsuch simpler problem. We estimate that thc USSR can successfully store and assemble atomic weapons for use at Arctic bases under any weather conditions which will permit the operation of bombers. The problem of storage could also be largely eliminated by storing the bombs in rear areas and moving them to the advanced bases as needed, although such un operation would introduce additional tuning problems

ethods employed by the USSR for achieving effective operation of aircraft under cold weather conditions are generallyand believed to be-effective. Init should be noted that aircraftis improved by low ground temperatures ln Arctic areas where the higher density of cold air increases engine thrust and Increases airfoil lift so that take-off distance may be reduced or maximum gross take-off weights increased.

Ettimated Intercontinental Striking Force inithin the limits of baseaircraft performance, and operatingthe magnitude of strike forces which the USSR could launch would vary according to the method of employment of the various types of aircraft. Various methods ofare open to the USSR and it Is not possible to predict which they might choose. The figures in the tables below forndepresent, therefore, merely an estimate of optimum striking forces designed to reach targets throughout the USortion of strike aircraftombination of refueled and unrefueled

Despite tlie lack of evidence that the fields in the forward staging areas are developed for bomber operations, that long range bomber units are stationed in these areas, or that training has been conducted In these areas, we believe thatajor effort, the USSR would be capable of mountingstrikes from these areas lnn order to achieve maximum surprise wethat the USSR couldimited number of heavy bombers, using only interior bases but in order to achieve optimum sizeurprise attack, the airfields in the Kola. Kamchatka, and Chukotski areas would have to be used. In order to estimate the optimum striking force inaveimited Soviet inflight refueling capability despite the lack of evidence that one exists. Wc havelanning-factorankers for each refueled bomber. Under thesewe estimate the optimum USSR strike capability would be as follows:


Arrive in



Betweenndircraft were allocated lo each staging base on tlie bulleasonableof lis capacity.

'Maximum aircraft which could be launched from above bases, assuming an estimatedrate of aboutercent. This serviceability factor has not been considered tn movement from lhe home base to the staging area Some of the aircraft launched would probably be used for ECM and diversion.

Based on an estimated allowance for aborts and losses from all causes other than combatof about JO percent for nonrefuclcd mla-slons andercent for refueled missions.








Two- Two- Way Way Unre- Re- fueled fueled fueled Launched 40 0






stimated Striking Force inByhe capacity of the forwardareas could be greatly Increased. We have also estimated that by this timeISON Jet heavy bombersEARheavy bombers will be Inuse. In addition, wc estimate that byhe USSR couldubstantialrefueling capabilityubstantial number of heavy bombers could be launched from interior bases ln Initial attacks, In which casenlngrad base area could also be used for some of thc heavy bombers making initial surprise attacks on the US. Under these circumstances, the optimum Soviet strike capability would probably be as follows:


Arriving on On Base launched Target Area


Assuming use of the Kamchatka, Kola,andbases Tor all aircraft except the BEAK which would bo launched from Interior

that thc USSR has no present inflight refueling capability, or that the USSR will attempt to maximize the size of an Initial strike force by replacing tankers on forward bases with strike aircraft, theof aircraft reaching the target area could be increased to an.

If the USSR elected to utilise allbases, including those in thc Baltic East Gorman and Leningrad areas, and thus lessen its chances of achieving surprise it couldaximum of5 In an Initial attack on the US. However, the great bulk of these aircraft would have to fly one-way missions. WeIt almost certain that the USSR Iscapable of employing one-way missions. Noi considering combatight reach target areas.

"Maximum aircraft which could be launched from Uie above baseserviceability rate of about BS percent exceptlightly hlcher rate from thebase area since aircraft would be operatingome base rather than staging forward. Some of thelaunched would probably be used for ECM and diversion.

'Based on an estimated allowance for aborts and laws Irom all causes other than combatofercent for nonrefuclcd missions andercent for refueled missions.








hould the USSR attempt to maximize the size ol the initial strike force by replacing tankers on forward bases with strike aircraft and launching all missionsne-waybasis (or two-way unrefueled basts wherehe estimated number of bombers arriving in target areas would be. not considering combat losses.

of Attack Preparations. Atthe prc-strlke preparation necessarya maximum scale attack fromstaging areas might requirenly minimumbe required, providing that duringa major effort was undertakenbase facilities and training,equipment of the Long-Range Airthese circumstances, It might notnecessary to undertake such finalas the movement of additionalequipment.


the USSR launched thcscale of attacks against the USthe tables above, it would havercattacks, attack in other areas, andabout the following number ofbombers: *

erviceability rate ofercent /inndercent inoncombat attrition rate ofercent, the number of bombers reaching target areas wouldnn

figures were derived by subtracUng the estimated number committed for aUaek against the US from estimated actual total strength innd tn

estimate that inhehaveaximum of aboutlight bombers, which could be usedagainst the many key USforces overseas within theirByhis number of Jetis expected to increase to. For maximumof attacks by light bombers againstdistant targets considerableto forward bases would be required.


oviet guidedresearch and development programto exist. It is within Sovietto develop and produce numerousmissiles within the period of thiswe have no firm evidence thathas these weapons available inquantities. The number ofavailable for guided missiles willupon the allocations to otheron the bases of requirements andpriorities. We believe that thenow have an improved versiononballistic pulse-jet wingedwith ranges upautical miles,ofpoundsEPthree nautical miles withRadar track-radio commandcould be providedangemilesEPautical milesachieved if the missile is launchedbases or one to two nautical milesfrom submarines. Thesenow be equipped with nuclearUSSR also could now have anof thcith ranges upnauticalarheada CEP of two to three nauticalmissiles could be launched frombases In Communist territorykey US installations.

etailed study ol eulded missiles see. "Soviet CapabillUes and ProbatteIn the Guided Missiles

nd turbo-jet typenuclear warheads could besubmarines, we have no Armthe USSR haa converted anymissile launching. However, Uieof launching such missiles fromhas been proven by Uie US and thisdelivery capability could be ansupplement to nuclear attacks byWe estimate that Uie Sovietshave several long-rangeto launch guided type missiles.

addition, the USSR Is nowof attacking targets within therocket-propel led glide bombslong-range aircraft. These bombshave nuclear warheads. However,bombs would be limited togood visibility conditions, and arange ofautical miles. Inan improved versionange could become available. mall glide bomb launchedbombers could be available bywe have no evidence of Sovietthe matter, it is possible that such abe available as early as

USSR is capable of havingin theodified fora guided missile.issilea maximum rangeound warhead,EP of tenmiles with Inertial guidance.tracking guidance thc range wouldtoautical milessingle guidance stationEP onof one nautical mile could belaunched from submarines, suchbe used to attack targets withinof the guidance system, thethr missile, and the operating radiussubmarine.

"The estimated dales given In2 andre thc earliest probable years during which small quantities of missiles have been produced and placed in the hands or trained personnel of one operaUonal unit. These dates could be one to two years earlier If an intensive effort of the highest priority were undertaken and If no major delays were encountered.

estimate that7 (or atpossible date,he USSRIn limited operational.use singleguided missiles capable ofautical miles carrying aandEP of threenauticalhis missile couldwith nuclear warheads.

Delivery of Nuclearhave no evidence as to any Soviet plansfor clandestine delivery ofweapons against Uie US. Uie period of this estimate thebe capable of producing nuclearcould be smuggled into Uie UScomplete assemblies or as componentsubassemblies. These could rangeweapons (equivalentTNT or less)ewto larger-yield weapons (possiblyUie equivalentillion tons ofless than ten thousandsize could range from Uiat of aenough to lit Into the luggageof on automobile to that of acase large enough to contain an All of these weapons could bebreak downumber ofand readily transportabledesigned toelatively lownot require much labor orlor assembly. Somewhat moreand training would be required toweapons designed to give high yields,assembled, they would be moretransport It is conceivable that onlymaterial. In small pieces, needinto the US, since otherbe fabricated or procured In this This scheme, however, wouldadvance planning andsupervisory personnel withand familiarity with the US sourcescomponents, and would take ato carry out It would probablya reduced yieldiven amount ofmaterial. It would also incur a

:For further InformaUon pertaining toof possible similar missiles of loneer ranpc see.

substantially greater security risk than the clandestine introduction o( all components.

the known limitations ofof physical detection, the USSRIntroduce Into the USonsiderable number ofby clandestinearietyof clandestine delivery suggestAssembled weapons could beapparently friendly aircraft, detonatedholderchant ship, or sown asmines by submarines andmerchant ships. Either componentsweapons could be brought Indiplomatic Immunity, smuggledor sea frontiers. Introduced throughimport channels, or brought in asawaiting transshipment.

selection of the method ofand of transport and assembly withinwould depend on the Soviet objectiverisk of detection which the USSR wasto accept Satellite agents and-flips could be utilized for suchcould Communists in olherare atommunists0 in Canada together withof other persons belonging tolabor unions and frontcould be Instrumental in clandestineagainst the US. Inraffic center forNorth and South America givingfrom other countries access toborders. Although these Communistof other countries could be used, itIf thc Soviets would incur the riskthem in surprise clandestinethe US prior to overt military attack.

n Introducing nuclear weaponsinto the US. thc USSR would have to take inlo account not only the estimated chances of detection, but also thcof such detection hi forfeiting the clement of surprise in any intended overt attack and provoking US counteraction. As Ihe number of weapons clandestinely introduced werethe risk of compromise would This increased risk would be less a

function of US capabilities for physicalthan of the scope and complexity of thc clandestinearticularlyas larger numbers of Soviet agentsInvolved. Consideringreach of security, the USSR would probably be unwilling to risk the use of even selected and trained agents In such numbers as would be Involved In the clandestineof large numbers of nuclear weapons. Wc conclude, therefore, that, althoughattack with nuclear weapons could occur against specially selected targetsupplement to overt delivery by air. the use of large numbers of such weapons wouldbe precluded by security considerations.

landestine Use of BW and CW Weapons. Most biological warfare (BW) agents are pe-cularlly adaptable to clandestine utilization, slnco the Introduction of small amounts of BW agents would be difficult lo detect. Even small-scale employment of biological warfare agents against livestock could be highlyBW attacks against key personnel concentrated in selected buildings could also be effective. There ts little likelihood thatantlcrop BW operations could beout clandestinely.

agents are not easily adaptableuse. They are easilyby their Immediate effects, and itwould not be feasible to build upsupplies or to procure the meansin the required areas for theiragainst large populationmost practicable use would beIn key Installations, but evenbe difficult


by Ground and TacticalMany key US installationsas those in Western Europe, theFar East, arc subject to-atlack byand tactical air forces. Suchhowever, would aimost certainly bepart of thc over-al) Sovietthese areas, and It would be impossible to

separate thc specific scale of attack on key US installations from the over-all scale of Soviet campaigns.11

The peacetime establishment of theArmy probably will continueand supporting troops which can be expected to be combat readyay.his force can be expanded toine divisions. These forces would be capable of overrunning large areas ofEurope, the Middle East, and the Far East. However, toigh capability for destruction of most key US installations in these areas the Soviet Army probably would have to be reinforced ln peripheral areas or employ airborne or amphibious forcesround attack. It Isthat for air support of these attacks inhe USSH will have an actual strength ofombatIn thc Air Force of the Soviet Army and Naval Aviation. Of thisre Jet aircraft. Forombat aircraft in operational units is estimated atf0 will be jets.

Navalarge portion of thc Soviet submarine forces would probably be employed against US naval forces, especially against carrier task forcesuclearcapability. In addition, Sovietforces could, at least Ln the initial phases of an attack, inflict serious damage on US overseas communications by attacks on shipping and offensive mining of theto harbors and ports of the US and its allies, and could develop the capability to launch mass destruction weapons by missile against US or key overseas targets within range. We climate that the Sovietforce, currently consistingand long-range submarines, willbe strengthened by the addition of aboutong-range submarines0 annually6nd uboutimited modernization of older classes (including Installation of snorkel).

"See. "Soviet Capabilities andCourses ot AcUon Throughor Soviet ground and tactical air capabilities

and by the probable adaptation of submarines to missile launching. We also estimate that by the endaximum effort, as manyf the long and medium-range submarines located in the Bal tic-Northern Fleet and Pacificndespectivelycould be made available for attacks againsi US naval forces, theUS, and key Installations overseas. Byhese numbers could increase toespectively.

he capabilities of surface naval forces for attack on the US are low. The Soviet surface fleet Is geographically divided, lacks advance bases and does not possess aair arm. Sporadic raider operations are possible, but the surface Meet in general, lacking aircraft carriers, is unsuitable for transoceanic naval attack on any significant scale.

mpntbtous Attack. Because of the lack of aircraft carriers and long-range vessels suitable for amphibious warfare, large-scale Soviet amphibious attacks will be limited to areas where air cover can be provided from Communist-controlled territory. However, amphibious raids by submarine-borne forces for the purpose of attempting thc destruction or neutralization of key US overseasare possibleadiusiles from Soviet submarine bases.assault Against the continental USAlaska) Is beyond Soviet capabilities. In assaults against Alaska, certain restrictions would be imposed on the Soviets by (a) the limited number of landing beaches;onditions: (c) problems ofand maintaining lines of communications, (d) the difficulties of maintaining adequate logistic support; (e) the limited capabilities of the Far Eastern fleet; and (f) theof maintaining adequate air cover. These limitations would restrict amphibiousin Alaskaroops In the assault phase It is more probable, however, that amphibious operations would be limited to actions up lo battalion'size with limited support weapons.^Amphibious attacks against key US overseas installations, except in the Far East, would probably be limited to am-

phibious raidsb marine-borne forces. "Amphibious attacks In force up to six divisions could be made against US installations ln Japan, Okinawa, and Formosa providedair cover was available.

irborne Attack. The USSRrained paratroopers in an estimatedirborne divisions, plusrained airborne reserves. Theof these forces to seize and destroy key US installations overseas would be substantial in certain areas but is limited by theof transport aircraft It ls estimated thathe USSR will haveransport aircraft in the various components of the Soviet Air Force. InIt may have built up its helicopter force toircraft We also estimate that the Civil Air Fleet will be operating atransports during the period of thisIncluding some four-engine types. UUliring only those aircraft belonging lo the Aviation of Airborne Troops, the USSK can now liftell-equipped and well-trained troops with one dropay orOO with two dropsive-day operation the Aviation of Airborne Troops can liftroopson whether one or two drops are executeday. This hit capacity can be Increased by0 troops forircraft borrowed from the Civil Air Fleet or the military air forces. This capability could be Increased during the period by Uieof four-en git icd transports. Because of transport aircraft performance limitations, the USSR will not be capable of launching major airborne OperaUons against the conti nental US during the period of this estimate. However, smell, highly-trained assault groups probably could be delivered to some targets In the US.

VII. SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR SABOTAGE OTHER THAN BY CLANDESTINE PIACEMENT OF WEAPONS OF MASS. The USSR Is capable of subversion,and widespread sabotage in the US through thc use of existing subversive ele-

ments and the placement of foreign agents. Sabotage probably would not be initiatedarge scale prior to an all-out attack on the US since such efforts would nullify theof surprise, If identifiable with Uie USSK. Large-scale sabotage of USIndustrial, and communicaUonsand military installations could bewith and immediately followingattack by the USSR. Communist party members and adherents are capable ofsaboteur units or teams of varying sizes equipped with small arms and other suitable material which could strike at especially selected and widely separated targetsand without warning. Whether such attacks would be timedurprise military atlack or carried out after such an attack would be dependent upon Uie Soviet appraisal of Uie relative advantages of such action.

capabilities for subversion,and widespread sabotage attacksoverseas bases are greater thancontinental US. because of Uiepercentage of Communistpolitical discontent, and lacksecurity measures in certainIn numerous other countriesalmost certainly havefor serious acts ol sabotage. Theot these countries are experiencedoperaUons and sabotage effortslarge-scale military attacks couldreduce the capability of USoverseas.


Probable Soviet Strategic Objectives in Anode on Ihe US ond Key US Overseas Installations

foregoing discussion of Soviethas assumed an all-out Sovielthe US and key US overseaswithout consideration of otheragainst which some of thesebe employed. The actual initialol Soviet effort against various objectives

in evenl oi general war would depend upon the over-all strategy ol the USSR. In deciding upon this strategy, the Soviet leaders would be Influenced by the followinghe power of the US is the main support of Free World opposition to the Communist Bloc. The USSR would probably calculate that If US war-making strength could be sulli-clently reduced In the Initial stagesar. Soviet chances for ultimate success in awar would be virtually assured.

chief Immediate threat to theevent of general warS nuclearThe Soviet rulers havetheir sensitivity to the danger ofair attack by thc high priorityhave given to the development ofdefenses. Despite the substantialachieved in building up thesels unlikely that they would regard theircapabilities as adequate tonumbers ol attackingreaching strategic targets in the USSR.

major proportion of facilities,and forces which togethernuclear capabilities Is located In theUS. Soviet destruction of allinstallations and forces overseasa capability for employingwould handicap but would notthe deliveryery substantialof nuclear weapons on targets withinAt the same time, Sovietor neutralization of US nuclearlocated ln the continental US wouldthe deliveryubstantialnuclear weapons from those USand forces which possess astrike capability. Consequently.would probably calculate thatdestruction or neutralization ofoverseas installations and forcesin thc US would be essential.

leaders also must realizeUS forces and installations, as wellof US allies particularly in Eurasia,formidable obstacles to Soviet successthat would occuror Immediately after the initial attacks.

n view of thc above considerations it is likely that thc USSR in attacking the US and key overseas Installations and forces, would have the following major military objectives: (a) to destroy or neutralize US capabilities for nuclear retaliation: (b) to deliver such an aitack on urban, industrial, political, andtargets in the US as would prevent, or at least hinder, the mobilization of lhe US war potential and its projection overseas; and (c) to inflict such destruction on us overseas installations as to hamper or .prevent USand logistical support offorces. We believe thai these Sovietwould remain the same throughout the period of this estimate although Soviet gross capabilities for achieving them willthrough

ill.-Implications of Soviet cQarts to achieve surprise. An attempted maximum Sovieton the continental US, key overseasand forces overseas, involvingof all or most of the capabilitiesln this estimate, would requirethat would almost certainly result in the loss of surprise. If the USSR attempted to maximize surprise lt would probably be forced to accept thc following major(a) no large-scale mobilization ofunits; (b) no large-scale redeployment of Soviet air, naval, or ground forces toperipheral dispositions; and (c) no unusual movement of Soviet air, naval, or ground forces ln such areas as would be likely to indicate the Imminence of attack.1*

n planning an attack on thc US and key US overseas installations and forces, theestimate of the success they would be likely to achieve against various targetwould not necessarily be lhe determi-nent of the priority ol their attack. This priority would most likely be determined by their estimate of the necessity for destroying or neutralizing the foremost threat to their securitya nuclear air attack by US forces. The initial Soviet attack, therefore, would

" For complete discussion of the problem ofsurprise, seescheduled for pub-lieaUon in.

probably be directed primarily toward those areas and against those forces which comprise the US nuclear strike capability. It Is not likely that they would take prior actions against other target systems and thus risk losing the advantage of surprise which they would require for successful attacks against the primary threat, although simultaneous attacks against such other targets would probably be made.

Probable) Methods of Attack Against tho US

uclear Attacks by Aircraft. In view of thc desirability of achieving both maximum surprise and maximum weight ln any attack on the US, we believe that thc USSR would place chief reliance on nuclear attacks byIt is probable that such attacks would receive the highest priority because of: (a) the limited capabilities of conventional naval, ground, and airborne forces for neutralizing US nuclear capabilities; (b) the securityInherent In the delivery of thclarge numbers of nuclear weapons by clandestine means; (c) the Insufficientof other methods of delivery ofweaponsarge scale; (d) thedevelopment of other mass destruction weapons, or handicaps to their large-scale use.

uided Missiles. Guided missilesa growing delivery capability. While no intercontinental missiles capable oftho US are expected to be available during this period, guided missiles might be launched from submarines against US ports and other targets within range. In addition, air-to-surface missiles might be employed late in the period for terminal attack on tlie mostdefended targets.

f Act Methods of Attack. The Soviet rulers might employ other methods ofthe US concurrently with or Immediatelyurprise nuclear air attack by ulr-crafl. Clandestine employment of sabotage, biological warfare, or nuclear weapons might occur against specially selected targets.

Probable Methods of Attacks Against Key US Overseas Installations and Forces

The USSR woulduch wider range of capabilities for effective attack on key US insUUations and forces overseas than on tho US Itself because of the shorter ranges, greater possibilities for clandestine action, and ability to employ varied methods ofHowever, attacks on US naval task forces would present many difficult problems, including location and weapons selection.

Western Europe and the Middle East. Attacks on the majority of key USIn these areas (except Uje_ UK and.hich do notuclear strike capability, would be carried out primarily by ground and tactical air forces concurrent with or subsequent to the initial attack onJUSdelivery capabilities. The USSR has the capability to launch attacks on these areas from Soviet-controlled territory withouttheir forces, but might elect to carry out at least partial mobilization to increase their chances for success of the operations.

Overseas Installations.Japan, Okinawa, and Formosa, USIn other areas would be subjectto air attacks. Sufficient Sovietbombers are now available inoccupied by or under the InfluenceUSSR to permit large-scale: attacks onin lhe UK, Turkey, and UieAttacks ln considerable force couldby amphibious and airborneJapan. Okinawa, and Formosa.installationsiles ofbases might be subjected toraids and guided missile attacks byfarces. Virtually all overseasare subject to nuclear attacks byIn addition Uie USSR possessesof making attacks on selectedinstallations by special smalland could mount large-scaleon Installationsautical miles of Soviet bases.

ikelihood of Change in Primary Methods of Attack through We estimate

tnif sir pi? ft

gross capabilities for attack willconsiderably byesult of Improved aircraft, on enlarged stockpile of nuclear weapons. Increased naval strength, Improved guided missiles, and greaterof ground forces due to introduction of nuclear weapons. However, the choice of primary method of attack will be unlikely to change materially because Soviet capabilities

for large-scale nuclear attack by aircraft will probably continue to be greater during this period than Soviet capabilities for use of any other weapons system against the Is estimated that byhe USSR will probably have substantiallycapabilities for use of guided missiles, particularly against US coastal areas and key installations overseas.



From lhe Chukotski


From the Chukotski


From the Kola


Original document.

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