Created: 7/12/1955

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The followingrganlsalkmi participated in the preparalion of thii ttlxmnU; The Central Intelligence Agency ana) the intelligence argan'talnnt ot the Departments of Stale, ine Army. the Navy.Air Fortr, and Tbe Joint Staff

Concurred in by iht


oouly itiS. Concurring trert Ihe Special Aautent. Intelligence. Department of State, the- Atstitant Chief of. Depa-tmeit of the Army, the Director of fatal InteUigence. tht Director of IntelUgence. VSAT; and thc Deputy Director for Intrlhgenrt, The Joint Staff. The Atomic Energy CommlsHott Hepreientatiie to the IAC. and the Assistant to the Director, fedtralnotsUgation, abstained, the rubfect bring outride of their junidiciion.






estimate wu disseminated by the Central Intelligence Agency Thislor the iolormation and use of the recipient indicated on the front cover and ofunder his Jurisdictioneed to know basis. Additional essentialbe authorized by Uie following officials within their respective departments:

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D18TR1BCTI0M: White Hoase

Hstlor-sl Security Council Deputaent cf State Department of Defense Operations Coo reuniting Board Atoxic Energy Commission KcdrnU Bureau of Imcillgutlon



To estimate the capabilities of Sino-Soviet Bloc air defense, and probable trends


estimate docs not concern itself with the detailed strategy or tactics that might be employed by US air forces tn an attack against the Sino-Soviet Bloc, nor does it attempt to evaluate the killof the Bloc air defense weapons against attacking aircraft or missiles. It should also be recognized that many of the deficiencies of the Bloc air defense system are common to aU air defenseand should not necessarily beas weaknesses unique to the Bloc.

epresents the probable Soviet appraisal of thc US air threat and Bloc re-

quirements to meet it;the present strength andof the Sino-Soviet air defenseand Section III estimates thefuture trends of Bloc Air Defenseeconomic capabilities of the Bloc to support Its air defense system. The estimate in Section 1X1 Is based on thethat neither domestic orpolitical factors nor unexpected technological breakthroughs will alter the general nature of weapons programs as now envisaged in the Bloc and the West.


Air defenso of the Sino-Soviet Bloc has been undertakenigh date have revealed twoareas of air defense concentrations. The most importantuge areaall of European Russia and the European Satelliles. In this area isaboutercent of the Bloc fighter establishment with associatedartillery and radar. Themajor area is the Soviet Far East, in which is concentrated abouter-

cent of Bloc fighter strength. Thus aboutercent of Bloc air defenseare concentrated in critical areasonlyquare miles of thc total Bloc area0 square miles Outside of these main concentrations local defenses existew chosen areas but large portions of the interior and certain border areas may have little or no active air defense., Map UI)

The Sino-Soviet Bloc has largeof air defense forces and weapons of which the fighter aircraft unitsappear to be the most formidable. The Soviets have made great strides in radar development and have largeof both obsolescent and modernequipment We estimate thereotal ofen activelyin air defense in the Bloc and that the Bloc has an authorized fighter strength of0 mcluding0ighters are assigned to Fighter Aviation ofhe remaining fighters assigned to other organizations also have some air defense responsibilitiesmultiple mission" concept., Map III)

The USSR has an integrated passive air defense organization under Uie control of theew cities have extensive underground installations. However, we believe the passive defense system does not greatly affect over-all Soviet aircapabilities. )

Present Over-all Capabilities

daylight bomberaltitudeslear weather, we believe thatare now capable of inflictinglosses against piston bomberslosses against0 feetcapability would begin0 feet it would fallUnder circumstances ofvisible contrails, these capabili-

' Actual strengthstimated toercent of authorized ITOStE) strength but Taries considerably as new aircraft are phased ln.

ties would, on the other hand, beincreased. Primary limitations would then be the numbers and individualof fighter interceptor aircraft available. , Appendix C)

Although its all-weather air defense capabilities are increasing, the Bloc could offer only limited resistance underof poor, Appendix B)

AA gun defenses are most stronglyaround Moscow and other areas of strategic importance. They can provide continuously aimed fire up to0 feet under both good and poor visibility conditions. However,deployed AA guns probably will not be capableigh percentage of kills at these rMximum altitudes or very low altitudes, even though controlled by modem fire control equipment., Appendix C, Map III)

Although there is no conclusivethat surface-to-air guided missiles have been produced and deployed, wethat the USSR now has someguided missiles, probablyin the Moscow area. These could considerably Increase the killagainst Allied bombers even in bad weather. )

Against multiple-pronged penetrations utilizing altitude stacking, diversionary tactics, and electronics countermeasures, we believe the Soviet air defense system is susceptible to serious failures.

Against forces penetrating peripheral defended areas at high speed andaltitude the effectiveness of thewould be very low.

Future Over-allhe objectives of Bloc air defense planners are almost centalnly to: (a) develop andin quantity equipment capable of combating thc Western air attacks; (b) rapidly improve the training of airunits; (c) develop betterfacilities; (d) improve thc airfield network; and (e) improve the air defense organization. In meeting thesethe Sino-Soviet Bloc will probably emphasize the development of guided missiles, supersonic all-weather fighters, and improved radar equipment. (Paras. UO-lll)

In accordance with these objectives, we believe that Bloc air defenses will be substantially strengthened during the period of this estimate. Considerable numbers of fighters of new types will be introduced into operational units,older types; there will be asignificant increase in the proportion of all-weather fighters. Improved radar equipment will be available, and early warning and QCI systems will beinto areas which are at present wholly or partially uncovered. New andantiaircraft artillery will comeuse. Guided missiles with nuclear warheads will probably be developednd will become increasinglyin air defense. Theseand particularly the latter, will greatly increase the kill probability against Allied air attacks and willthe problems of such attacks.)

'The estimate* inre based on lhe assumption that neither domestic andpolitical (actors nor unexpectedbreakthroughs will alter the general nature of weapons programs as now envisaged In Uie Bloc and thc West Gee also SCOPE note above.

Despite these improvements, wethat Bloc air defenses would fall considerably short of providing airof the scale and nature required by the probable Western air capabilities.)

The estimated Bloc air0 wouldubstantial but not impossible burden on the Bloc economy. We believe the cost would be such as to require either aof resource from other military uses or an increase ln total militarysuch as would probably lead to some reduction In the rate of growth of the economy. Fulfillment of the electronics requirements of the program would be particularly difficult., Appendix D)

Defense Capabilities by Region

The estimates of regionalarc based upon available evidence at this time. In those areas where there isomplete lack of evidence on air defense, we have assumed that airare weak. However, it isthat air defense forces anddo exist in these areas.

European Satellites. Air defense of thc European Satellites (except Eastinsofar as it depends uponforces is estimated to be generally inferior to that of critical regions within the USSR. The Satellite air defense forces are generally poorly trained and equipped with obsolescent aircraft and equipment and they would be incapable of meeting air defense, requirements or of preventing transit of Western bomber forces enroute to the USSR. Underconditions at altitudes

0 feet, they could inflictdamage on attacking bomberunescorted by fighters. Thesewould be Increased to the extent that Soviet air defense forces wereto these areas.

Soviet Far East. The concentration of radar, antiaircraft artillery, andin the Soviet Far East make it one of the best defended areas of the USSR The Kamchatka and the Chukotski regions are less well defended than the Maritime Provinces of the Far East but do haveadequate early warning radar. Because of the operaUonal difficulties and the limited fighter and AAA forcesin these areas, only limitedcould be provided. We believe the air defenses of these areas will bestrengthened between now0 but will still be below that of the Maritime Provinces.

Kola and Leningrad Areas. These areas are considered to be relatively well defended in terms of forces andRadar coverage extends eastward from Kola to approximatelyEast longitude, but the density of radar in the eastern part of this area Is probably not as great as In other critical approach areas. Wc believe it will be considerably strengthened during the period of this estimate.

Baltic-Central and Western USSR-Black Sea. These are the most heavily defended regions of the USSR. Theportion of Fighter Aviation of Airlarge concentrations of AAApossible guided missile sites, all of the fighters of the Baltic and Black Sea fleets, and thc bulk of the Soviet tactical air forces are located In this area. It is

estimated that continuous tracking of hostile aircraft can be accomplished throughout this area since theof radar sites Is greater than our assessment of actual requirements.

orthorthSubstantial air defenseexist in North Korea, Manchuria, and North China. Along the extreme south-em coastal areas the air defenseare less and in the Interior areas are virtually nonexistent. Early warning capabilities are being extended southward along the coast. Air defenses arebeing expanded In the Shanghai-Canton-Chan gsha area. The size of the entire region makes the development of an air defenseask of great difficulty and expense. Consequently we believe that the air defense to bethe region during the period of this estimate will remain considerablyto that attained by the USSR itself.

Other Arcns. As far as is known, there are virtually no air defense forces available along the northern Siberian coastline and very few forces or radar sites in central Siberia. We estimate that practically no air defenseexist In this area except around local critical target areas along therailway. In like manner, the southern borders of the Bloc in Central Asia also appear to be practicallyWe estimate that earlyradar lines will be established along these borders0 and that all air defense forces will be increased.we do not believe the USSR will be able totrong air defensein these areas0 due to the size of the areas and the many problemsto operations and logistics.



Soviel Estimate of tho Air Threat to the Bloc'

The intensive buildup ot Bloc, andSonet, air defenses since World War II Indicates that the USSR Is acutely aware of the threat posed to the USSR by Western nuclear air power. The Soviet plannersthat the Bloc ts geographicallyby US and Allied air power to such an extent that from present or programmed overseas bases, the major portion of thc Bloc can be reached by US medium bombers on two-way unrefueled missions (See Mapnd that US heavy bombers, or refueled medium bombers, can reach anywhere in the Sino-Sorict Bloc either from overseas or from ZI bases. They also probably esUmatearge portion of the Bloc can be attacked by refueled fighter bombers, light bombers, and by carrier aircraft, and that US air strikes could penetrate the Bloc at any point

Warnfn" Times. Due to thc fact that the Bloc ts almost surrounded by US bases and the fact that US carriers can operate In waters adjacent to Bloc boundaries, theof achieving adequate warning mustextremely difficult to the Soviet planners. This problem will become more difficultthe period of this esUmate, since the speed of US aircraft Ls increasingore rapid rate than the Increase In range of early warning radar (Seehus,inimum of two hours' warning can be achieved by the Bloconsiderableof their land area ln0 they would "not be able toaximum of two hours' warning of attack by aircraft even for the central area of their territory unless

'This Soviet estimate of thc US air threat la based upon information available to the USSR In open sources such as newspapers, magazines, and officials releases.

their early warning zone were extendedtheir frontiers atautical miles.

ircraft. The USSR probably estimates that during this period the Bloc could beby Western jet and piston aircraft with radii of acUon upautical miles, speeds upnots, arid operaUonal alUtudes up0 feet Based upon their own experience and upon knowledge of US organizational goals, production capabiliUes, budgetary considerations, and aircraftUie Soviets could probablyairly accurate esUmate of the numbers of US aircraft which would be available for strikes against the Bloc. We believe that this estimate might be approximately as follows:


Piston Bombers

Jet Bombers


Piston Bombers

Jet Bombers

Jet Bombers

Fighter Bombers

Patrol Bombers


or probable Soviet estimate of performance characteristics of alrciafl andand dates of availability for operaUonal use.)

uided Missiles. The Soviets probably could not estimate with any accuracy Uie numbers of guided missiles which could be employed against them during the period of this estimate; however, they could probably arriveairly good estimate of missile availability In terms of total production and, in some cases, order of battle. On this basis, they probably esUmate Uiat US and Allied stockpiles would Includeew long-range missiles and several thousand of the smaller types. They would probably esUmate Uiat the following general categories of guided missiles might be available for use against them:


MUM Range




Short-Range SSOM Medium-Rangeong-Rangeous-Rangeong-Rangeong-Rangelr-to-Surfacclr-to-Undcrwater OM SO

They also probably estimate that some of these missUes could be launched from naval vessels and that several carriers, cruisers, and submarines will be equipped for such

Aircraft Armament and Electronics. The Soviets probably estimate that US bombers will have: (a) improved radar-sightedguns with automatic fire control; (b) air-to-air rochets; (c) air-to-air(d) airborne radar detection andequipment;elf-containedsystem to operate over all types of terrain and under all weather conditions; (f) unproved bombing-navigational radar; and (g) defensive radar for detection and fire control.

Bombs and Warheads. The Sovietsestimate that all strike aircraft could carry either nuclear or conventional weapons; however, delivery tactics, dictated to some extent by the characteristicspecifictype, would fix the limits of the yields of nuclear weapons which could be utilized. Dive or toss-bombing could be employed for the smallest-yield weapons, loft-bombing for medium-yields, and high altitude horizontal bombing for high-yield weapons.

Scale and Direction of Attacks. The Soviets probably estimate that the USgreat flexibility ln methods andof attack. They probably estimate that the scale and direction of attacks might(a) simultaneous attacks from allby several hundred aircraft; <b> sustained attackseriod of several hours from one direction only; and (c) widely separated sustained attacks by Individualfrom all directions and at all altitudes

up0 feet. They probably wouldattacks against the Bloc by medium bombers from bases in the US, UK, France, Italy, Greece, Spain, Turkey, North Africa, the Philippines, Okinawa, Japan, and Alaska. Land-based fighter-bomber aircraft could be launched from bases ln some of these areas and from bases ln other forward areas, such as South Korea, Formosa, and West Germany. (Seettacks could also be made by heavy bombers and refueled medium bombers from bases In the US and Canada, and from such forward base areas as Guam, Greenland, and the Azores.

The Soviets might expect air attacks launched from carrier task forces operating ln the Barents Sea, the Norwegian Sea, Uie Mediterranean, and in the western Pacific. They probably calculate that carrier task forces could. miles from their coast lines In these areas which would allow penetration by carrier aircraft to distances upautical miles.

The Soviets probably expect guidedto be launched against Bloc targets. Medium-range missiles could be launched from overseas bases and naval vessels; short-range missiles from forward US overseas bases, surface ships, submarines, and aircraft; and possibly long-range (intercontinental) guided missiles from bases in the continental US and Canada.

Probable Air Defense Requirements to

Meet Estimated Threat

ntroduction. The requirements for an effecUve Bloc air defense system have been considered in the light of: <a) thc probable Soviet appraisal of Western capabilities for attacking Uie Bloc; (b) evidence of Uie type of air defense system already developed by Uie USSR; <c) US air defense experience andand (d) Uie estimated characteristics of such Bloc air defense equipment as radar, aircraft, and AAA weapons- Many of Uie problems Inherent in thcefrlcient functioning of an air defense system have not beenIn arriving at these requirements.we believe the air defense requirements

stated herein constitute the most probable objectives of Soviet air defense planners through the period of this estimate. Any great Increase over the requirements stated might be considered too costly and any large decrease would probably be considered too risky by Soviet authorities. Although it Ls possible that the Soviets might plan an air defense system entirely different from the one envisioned tn these requirements, present Soviet air defense trends Indicate that the chances favoring this would be slight

Detection. During the period of thiswe believe the Soviet Bloc willequirement for an early warning system which will allow detection of all types ofand nonbalUsuc guided missiles atup0 feet In terms of thespeeds of attacking aircraft and awarning time ofinutes, theat which early warning is required from Bloc frontiers will varyautical miles for present aircraftautical miles for aircraft and missileso meet these requirements, the Soviets would have to (a) extend their early warningbeyond their present boundaries in certain areas by the use of early warningand picket ships, and (b) generallytheir present capabilities by use ofradar equipmentreater number ofheoretical minimum ofarly warning radar sites would bo required to provide two rings around the Bloc.

Tracking, Reporting, and CommandIn order tooordinated picture of the air situation in the responsible control centers and to provide continuousinformation on specific targets, radar coverage would be required in depth to the major target areas. In addition, andata processing and control system would he required to meet the demands for more rapid evaluation and transmission of data. This requirement would necessitate atCI radar sites ln the Soviet Bloc, together with greatly Improvedfacilities ln general,otal ofiles of landlines or other secure communications channels and an automatic

data handling system. To permit efficient command reaction at ailighlyair defense organization permitting prompt general direction of all passive and active air defense units would be required. However, the critical nature of the tunein air defense requires that many of the operational decisions heretofore made by major commanders must be relinquished to lower command echelons. This would be highly dependent upon Individualand initiative and wouldigh level of Individual and unit training for all air defense organizations.

Identification. The Soviets willequirement for an IFF system which will provide Identification of friendly aircraft under all conditions.equirement would necessitate,0 IFF sets for equipment of operational aircraft.

Engagement and KM. In view of present trends In Soviet air defenses, the Sovietscertainly estimate that they could not rely upon one weapons system alone, and that several would be required for an acceptable capability for Interception and kill under night and all weather conditions. To meet these needs, they will have to greatly improve the performance characteristics of theiraircraft and AAA weapons. Defensive missiles will almost certainly be required for use against enemy supersonic aircraft ond missiles. Defense against low altitudewill require missiles (guided and un-guided) in large numbers In addition toautomatic weapons. The Soviets would probably estimate the following as Blocweapons requirements for air defense of the Bloc during the period of this estimate:

AW Fighters Day Fighters Ught AAA Weapons Heavy Antiaircraft Guns Short-Ranae SAOM Alr-to-Alr Oulded Missiles Rockets or Missiles (for low altitudes)

ir Facilities. There are nowirfields ln the Bloc suitable for fighter opera-

Hons. However, the Soviets probably consider many of these fields unsuitable to meet air delense requirements through the period of this estimate. They probably estimate that many have to be improved and that new fields have to be constructed ln peripheral areas and Ui highly important defense regions. They mightotal ofirfieldsf whichould be needed for air defenseor other operational requirements.


Soviet appreciation of the growingair and nuclear capabilities ls reflected ln the intensive postwar buildup of Soviet air defenses, and thc high priority and greatallocated to this effort. Postwar Soviet air defense doctrine was greatlyby the USSH's evaluation of US/UK wartime strategic bombing. Western and Oer-man scientific developments such as radar, >et aircraft and guided missiles, and the air defense systems developed by the Germans and the Western Powers. Since the war the USSR has seen the vast growth ln the USand delivery capabilities. From Its evaluation of these developments has emerged new air defense concepts geared to the facts that the US and Ita NATO allies are the chief potential enemies of the USSR, and that the most Immediate critical threat they pose to the USSR lies in their extensive capabilities for nuclear air attack.

To meet the postwar air defenseof the USSR, the Soviet plannorsupon an Intensive re-equipment and reorganization program. Jet Interceptors and ground radar equipment were the first major oew items to appear In quantity. At thc same time, the Soviets recognized the need forantiaircraft fire control equipment, air defense guided missiles, an improvedfor employment and control of air defense forces, and an airfield network suitable for use in air defense.

oviet doctrine Is now clearly showing thc nipact of nuclear warfare considerations, rhis problem has been under intensive study it Soviet High Command level and in Soviet

staff academicsnly recently, however, have the Soviets begun toto the armed forces and the civilinstructions for dealing with nuclearThis action became discernible during the latter half3 and has been more prominent4 andwarfare considerations are now apart of Soviet military doctrine.

rganization of Air Defense

The organization of Soviet air defenseessentially the responsibility of local commandersoresystem of air defense was instituted with appropriate headquarters and geographicThe Ministry of Defense isfor active air defense measures whileair defense prograrnmlng is handled at the ministerial level by the Chief Directorate of Local Air Defense which is subordinate to the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD).

PVO STRANY. The agency within the Ministry of Defense primarily responsible for active air defense ls PVO STRANY, literally "Antiair Defense of thcVO STRANY appears toajor operational headquarters coequal ln status with thc two other ministry-level commands: Long-Range Avialion and Airborne Forces. Itsiseputy Minister of Defense for Air Defense and directlyto thc Minister of Defense. Through the various air defense regional commanders hc has operational control over fighterAA artillery, and communications and warning units assigned or made available to PVO STRANY. However, these units remain administratively subordinate to theirground, air, or naval services as shown In Chart I. For example, the fighter units of PVO STRANY are administrativelyto thc headquarters called Fighter Aviation of Air Defensehich Is In turn administratively subordinate toof the Air Forces of the Soviet Army.

Responsibility for aif defense hasremained under ground force officers, and the CINC Of PVO STRANY has tradi-ttonally been an artilleryman. The air forces.

hole, have not achieved independent status in the USSR as they have in many Western nations and the IA-PVO hasunder the command ot ground force commanders at most operational traditionally commanded by an air officer but it is believed that operaUonalflows dlrecUy from the CINC PVO STRANY to the Commanders of Air Defense Regions rather than through tne IA-PVO commander.

The forces of PVO STRANY are probably unified at Uie regional defense level under regional air defense commanders. Wetnat the air defense regions correspond generally with tne major industrial andareas of the USSR The commanderegion probably controls all units of control and warning, IA-PVO, and antiaircraftforces assigned to PVO STRANY as well as other elements of the Army and Navy having air defense functions in his region. In addition, he probably coordinates Uie air defense activities of Uie passive defense units, the border guards of Uie MVD, and the ground observer units. He appears to beajor control headquarters for coordination and control of all air defense activities in his region. There are probably two such headquarters: one In Khabarovsk and one in Moscow. Lower organlzaUonal levels of PVO STRANY have probably been unified below the regional air defense level into subregional organlzoUons. Operational channels of responsibility are believed to be as Indicated In Chart U.

The Soviet Navy Ls responsible for Uie defense, including air defense, of Uie seaUie coasts, and major ports and naval bases of Uie USSR. The PVOof the Navy, operating within Uie various fleets which exercise regional control, receives top level direction from PVO STRANY. There are also PVO departments ln Uie headquarters of the .Air and Artillery Forces of the Soviet Army in Moscow which are believed tocoordination wtth PVO STRANY. PVO headquarters elements also exist at each Group of Forces and Military Districtand at subordinate levels for Uie pur-

pose of coordinating air defense activities in the ground and air units of the Soviet Army In the field.

The European Satelliles, North Korea, and Communist China have Independent airsystems modeled after Uie USSR's and Integrated into the Soviet system. The major control centers are located In thecapitals. Thus early warningcan be passed laterally among Uie Satellites or the air defense regions of thc USSR as well as vertically to Uie central air defense control headquarters In Moscow.

Air defense of Soviet militaryin thc Satellites and occupied areas Is Uie responsibility of Uie respecuvc Groups of Forces and is provided from the antiaircraft artillery, tactical air armies, and earlyunits assigned to these commanders At present Uiere ls litUe evidence of unifiedof Soviet territorial and Satellite airforces, as such, although operational control channels and possibly command channels for air defense are probably in the process of establishment at Uie present time. By the Warsaw Agreement ofombined military command for the USSR and European Satellites was established under Marshal Konev with headquarters in Moscow. This combined command wOl almost certainly provide an administrative framework for more effective control and Integration of airforces.

Air Defense Personnel. Sino-Soviet Bloc active air defense units are estimatedersonnel:

USSR Hut Aviation' 0 0

PVO Reflons and

ControlVO llq. and Adm.

Ground Observer


Radar Installations 0 0 0

ee paceor footnotes.

In addition, there are substantial numbers of full-time local observers and passive airpersonnel; all men and women between tbe ages of IS andre subject to this service-Bloc Fighter Organization, Strength, and Equipment

rganization. Fighter aircraft of the USSRegiments ofre in tacticaln IA-PVO, andn the Naval Aviation. In addition there areegiments in the Satellite Army and Fleet Air Forces andn the North Korean and Chinese Army and Fleet Forces. Geographic distribution of fighter regiments Ls estimated as follows:

Sovietof Regiments

Northwestern USSR




Far East



Zone Austria

Bloc Units




he IA-PVO. Those fighters known to be under PVO STRANY arc assigned to IA-PVO,

Footnotes from) and fighter elements

of TacUcal Air Armies, Military District Air

Forces, and Naval AvtaUon. 'There ls insufficient evidence to permit further

subdivision by geographic areas.

with an authorized strength estimatedircraft. The baste operational unit of IA-PVO is the division made up normally of three regiments. The division is the basic command echelon for control of actualoperations. The divisions in turn ore subordinate to air armies or unidentified fighters formations.

The remainder of Soviet operational fighter aircraft are assigned to units of (a) the tactical air armies and military district air forces, and (b) Naval Aviation. These forces operatemultiple mission"which includes on air defense role.

Strength and DeploymentThe estimated over-all authorized (TO&E) strength of Bloc fighter forceshile actual strengths are estimated at0 fighteroviet fighter forces with an authorized strength0 constitute overercent of thc total Bloc fighter TOAE strength.

The largest number of tighter units in the Bloc are deployed ln the Westernost of thc principal target and approach areas to the USSR are covered by presently deployed fighter forces with the exception of the North Central. North Eastern, and Central Asian border areas. Distribution of authorized (TO &E) fighter strength within the Bloc is as

Jet Piston


western FronUer


and Approaches

Central FronUer


Baikal Area

East Area



Actual aircraft strengths_average approximatelyercent of TO&E. although this variesas new aircraft are phased ln. (Seeor estimate of strength by year.)

'Sec Map HI for deployment of air defense

Soviet fighter forces arc nowwith Jet fighters and the keystoneprograms elsewhere ln the Bloc lsof fighter forces with JetAt present, only SO piston fightersstrength) remain in the EuropeanPoland is completely equipped withThereeorganization ofGerman Air Force4 but littleln strength and no Indication ofof Jet training. In the FarChinese-North Koreanstrength IncreasedoTOiE aircraft strengthuring the periodesult of aredeployments, thc bulk of the Chineseare now concentrated ln thearea, and the forces ln Manchuriareduced.

Present Bloc fighterprimarily equipped with two types ofwhicherformancebe used for air defense: FRESCOand three versions of FAGOTthese are all employed as daysome of the FRESCO'S are nowAI (Air Interceptor) radar. Thecould also carry AT radar but It Isthis conversion will be made. (SeeC for performance characteristicsfighters. >

(H. Both of the above types ore armedmombinationmm guns. All of these gunselatively low muzzle velocityt./sec. The FAGOT is equippedun sight which lsto the4 with manual range input Some models of the FRESCO are equipped with this sight but it is also probable that some have sights with radar ranging.

wo new fighter types have recently been observed in considerable numbers. Both were twin jet swept-wing fiphters of which one. the fLASHLlOHT, Is probably an all-weather fighter and the other, the FARMER, appears to be capable of level flight speeds in excess ol Mach I. Both of these aircraft areto be in serial productionew of

each are estimated to be ln operationalFARMER is believed toadargunsighL The FI^ASHJJOHT isto be equipped with twom. It ts also possiblemodels cany alr-to-alr rockets. Thcsystem of the FLASHLIGHTincludes an airborne Interceptprobable search ranges upnd lock-on ranges up to 10

The over-all effectiveness of presentInterceptor forces is probably limited by the number of AJ-equipped Interceptors, the low cyclic rate and muzzle velocity of the guns, and tho limited fire conlrol capability. In addition, the FAOOT Is limited to some degree by undesirable flight characteristics at high speed and by low duration of fire. The FAGOTood degree of effectivenessvisual Intercept conditionset bombers. The FRESCO and FARMER will be more effective against Jet bombers due to their higher speed, ability to Initiate diving attacks, and greater stability at higher speeds. The AI equippedwill be considerably more effective than the earlier AI equipped fighter (possibly FRESCO) against Jet bombers under all weather conditions duo to better armament, and better fire control and AI search

Airborne Radar. There is considerable evidence of employment of AI radar andsightings tend to confirm that lt IsIn the FRESCO and almost certainly Is Installed in the FI-ASHLIGHT. WcIt could also be installed In the FAGOT. Although there is no evidence of tall warning radar on Soviet fighters, we estimate they could be so equipped. Present SovietIFF SHO equipment is similar Into the US MARK HI system Itto operate insideC band

or perfotmanee characterises of Bloc fighters.

*A1 radar rangesnder study and areto, revision.

*Sooor estimated number inuniu

employed by the MARK HI butulse groups compared to six for the MARK UL This set when combined with the interrogator res ponder "FISHNET" willeliable identification system butow traffic handling capacity. This system could be used to extend the GCI range control of fighters. Soviet naval IFF com-paUblc with "FISHNET" has also been

Antiaircraft Artillery

The Soviets continue to place considerable emphasis upon AA artillery. Technical and administrative control of AAA units isby the Main Directorate of Artillery Forces of the Soviet Army. However, the commander-in-chief of PVO STRANYarge number of AAA units under hiscontrol, and probably coordinates the efforts of AAA elements attached to ground, naval, and air components which contribute to the mission of PVO STRANY but are not subordinate to It. Operationally, AAunits probably come under the control of the PVO commanders of the regional and sub-reglonal headquarters as do units of IA-PVO. Warning Information from radar aites is passedontrol center and pertinent AAA fire direction center which alerts theystem of zones from the control center Is set up, so that wtienertain line AAA Is alerted for action.

AA Guru. Two significant post-Worldevelopments in heavy AA guns have been gun. now standard, was first observed in Moscowt may be operated manually or by remoteA new heavy gun of atmm caliber was first seen uncovered In5 May Day parade In Moscow. It is estimated to have an effective celling of00 feet with conventional projectiles. Despite Its altitude advantage overmm gun. it Is possible that the latest heavy gun may not be widely used, particularly ifquanUUcs of guided missiles become available ln the near future. (See Appendix

C for operaUonal perforrnance characteristics of AA guns.)

m AAas Uie standard Soviet heavy weapon9 untilmm gun appeared. Althoughobsolescent. It Is stUI deployed widely throughout Uie Soviet Bloc both ln the PVO and in field divisions. These guns arc being turned over to secondary and Satelliteas soon as they can be replaced withmm. We estimate thatmm gun. director, and associated "WHIFF" radareapons system can engage subsonic aerial targets within the range of the gunimilar fire control system probably will be used with themm gun.

Proximity Fuses- The Soviets ore fully capable of developing Uie necessary electronics components and vacuum tubes for use hi proximity fuses. They have acquired many thousands of late model American VT fuses. During the period of this estimate, they should be able to produce quantities of proximity fuses for use in Uie air defense system

Automatic Weapons.un has been Uie standard Soviet lightweapon but it is now being replacedm automaUc weapon.m probably will be encountered in increasing numbers In tho Satellite forces as It Is phased out of Soviet units.m automatic Is designed to engage subsonic aircraft upeet. The angular tracking rate is not known. It Is considered likelyadar-director fire control system has been provided in addition to on-earriagesights for all-weatherechanical on-earriage sight would limit Its effective celltng toigh cyclic0pm. perm mulUbarrcl automatic gun is expected toa standard low altitude antiaircraft weapon.

Tlie standard machine gun assigned to Soviet AAA units has beenm. but it too is being replaced. Tne replacement weaponra machine gun which ia available in single, dual, and quadruple mounts.

a sittipt,

Soviet searchlightscmSome diameterprobably have radar units asof the mount.

Rockets. During World WarSoviet forces used ground-to-groundfor defense against low level aircraftbut with little effectiveness. in developing unguided rocketsdefense was probablythe availability of German scientistsdevelopments which were exploitedWorld War II. Theermanrocket designed for strategicformed the basis for Soviet wo-stage, high-level rocketby Germans in the USSR,has also been reported, and wcthat lt could be ovailable nowquantities. Barrage-type rocketsagainst low level attacks could be ln aof development and possibly availablequantities irefor un guided AA rocketsodification of that nowm AA guns.

Strength and Deployment. It Isto determine the allocation ofMoscow ls apparently the firstsupplied with new weapons. As theyavailable In greater numbers, theyto other Important areas ln theUnion and finally to the SatelliteThere Is some indication thatare now strengthening AAAoccupied airfields ln thc EuropeanThe lack of adequate AAAsuch airfields haseficiency ofSoviet defenses. We estimate thatnow has0 operationalincludingmmm guns,mguns. There are large stockpiles37mmm AA guns.

AA guns are deployed ln someofre In Sovietln European Satellite forces, andnBloc forces. In addition, lightare deployed throughout the armed for-

ces of tlie Bloc in regiments of AAA divisions, AAA regiments and battalions of line divisions and corps, and batteries of heavy tank and self-propelled gun regiments. (Fordeployment of AA guns, see,.

Missiles. Based on thefacilities, and personnel connectedWorld War II developments andon subsequent activities InIt is estimated that the USSRhave an Improved version of thewith the following characteristics:yards,0 feet,radar mid-course guidance system withterminal homing,0 pounds. This wouldthe kill probabilities againsteven in bad weather. In Julyinstallation was sighted ln the Moscowmay haveuided missilesite Betweenndore such sites haveIn the Moscow area plus one inarea.

than these Installations thereevidence available concerning actualdeployment of guided missiles for airat thc present tune. Nevertheless,that the Soviets do have someguided missiles ln operationalthc present time and that they couldair-to-air missile.

Control and Warning

Thc USSR has unwarning and control system, althoughmeans by which the variouslevels are Integrated or the preciseof units are not known.Ls probably exercised fromthe headquarters of PVOcontrol and warning organization ofprobably corresponds to theand subrcgional PVO organization andover-all coordination of AAAforces, and control and warningvarious levels.


In addition to warning units of PVO STRANY. tactical air elements of the Army ind Navy have their own organizational radar which is operated for the control andof their respective forces. For air defense purposes, these radar units are also available to PVO STRANY and are probably integrated at the same geographiclevels as the control and warning units. Each air division also has Its own divisional GCI radar for control of interceptors, which results ln considerable duplication of radar and probably accounts to some degree for the high radar density in many regions. Probably one of the greatest weaknesses of the Soviet air defense system hasack of adequate decentralization of command responsibilities below the regionol or subregionalcausing duplication of radar and loss of time ln command reaction. At fighters ore largely controlled by the drrisional radar but the Soviets are probably now In Lhe process of decentralizing to permit control of interceptions by Individual radars.

quipment. Soviet radar has steadily improved from the native World War II PEG-matjtW radars operating In theC band.9 the DUMBO radarwhich was essentially an Improvement of thc earlier Soviet World War II radars.ovicl version of the US antiaircraft tire control radaresignatedegan to appear inew Soviet EW and QCIeam radar designated "TOKEN" similar to the US AN/CPS-6B. was first observed.wo different EW type antennae arrays were observed in the USSR and indesignated "CAGE" andeight-findingdesignated "PATTYCAKE" appeared at the same tunc.ew EW radar designated "KNIFEREST" and operating onC began to replace the older "DUMBO" radar andew antenna, designatedas identified as an IFFwhich. Ln conjunction with thc airborne transponder SRO. forms an IFF systemto the MK in system used by theIn World Warll.

he following estimate of Soviet radarLs based largely on the composite characteristics of the DUMBO, TOKEN, and KNIFEREST radars, which are in mostuse at the present time. We estimate that the capabilities of the Slno-Sovlet Bloc early warning radars are such that thealtitude coverage extends0 feet and may extend to0 feet,on factors such as range, size, and aspect of target. The ranges at which Block EW radars provide coverage0 percent probability of detection are estimated to fall within the limits indicated In the following table:

EARLY WAR(nauUcil miles)




The ranges at which Bloc radars provide GCI coverage are estimated to fall within the limits indicated In the table below. To effect interception at bomber detection ranges.fighter aircraft would require transponder beacons Ln order to permit tracking the Soviet fighters as well as the intruding bombers. The USSR has the capability to utilizebeacons.


Altitude (nautical miles)



Jet Fighter

Numbers and Deployment. The Bloc has carriedassive postwar radarprogram. At present it Ls estimated lo have operationalarly warning and GCI radar. Including no lessOKEN types andf the new GCI radars. In addition, wc estimate they now haveire control radars andur-

face IFF interrogators. Tlie early warning and ihlpboard OCI radars have beendeployed throughout the Bloc with theconcentration being in the EuropeanWestern USSR, and the Maritime Provinces of thc Far East. In theadar chain extending from the Barents Sea to the Caspian Sea provides radar coverage of the Western USSR and tho EuropeanIn the Far East, radar coveragefrom the Bering Straits area south to Hainan Island ln the South China Sea with the exceptionew isolated gaps. In the course of normal operations, Soviet naval units provide Incidental extension of this early warning chain. (See,or deployment of radar by region.)

Observer Posts. The USSRwhat is believed toeryobserver system, which consists ofobserver units (SMS) manned bynaval personnel and the VNOS. aagency within thealso operates radar) andSatellite organizations. The exactof observation posts operated byis not known.


Organization. The precise nature of the Soviet communications system is not known, but on the basis of the Northnetwork, both landline and radio communications are employed between early warning stations, airfield OCI stations, and control centers. More modern UHFls now known to be in use ln some areas.

In order to accomplish the controlnowledge of the air situation within and adjacent to the airregion or aubregion ls necessary, and it is therefore probable that the earlystations channel their reports, perhaps through subregional centers, to the regional control' centers where major operationalore made. Filter centers are probably employed in conjunction with subregional centers to coordinate the visual and radar information and eliminate duplications or erroneous information. Control centers prob-

ably exist at thc regional and subregional headquarters and at the Central PVOIn addition, control centers are probably required at each fighter division headquarters and at all AAA organizational levels.

ommunications pertaining to hostile alr trafflc are probably reported from the early warning radar site to the subregional, and area headquarters. Coordination between local AAA and fighter forces is probablyon an Information basis at the subregional control center, perhaps byof liaison personnel. Major command decisions, however, probably occur at thccenter with decisions being passed down to the AAA and fighter units through the fighter control center. At the same time, information .Is probably passed laterallyregional headquarters and vertically to the area headquarters. We estimate that there are approximatelycontrolin the Soviet Bloc air defense systemof the following:

Area Defense

Regional Control

Subregional ControlControl Centers USSR Control Centers


Divisional Control Centers


ir-Ground Communications Equipment. Until recently, the Soviets primarily utilized HF equipment for air-groundThe standard communicationsin Soviet fighters was an improved version of World War II equipment. Wethat this equipment has beenbeginning2 by four-channel VHF equipment. Tbe ground equipment has been employed ln mobile trucks containing one or more transmitters and as many as four receivers, covering the low, medium, and high frequencyHF transmitterC now has been added to this system. To date there is noof changing the air-RToundto UHF.

Qround Communications Equipment. Tot ground communications, the Soviets useand high speed telegraph, radio,teletype, and facsimile and multiplex radio telephone for both military and civil needs. The land lines are mainlyIn European Russia, thlruiingnorth of Moscow, Leningrad, and In the Southern Urals, and East into Siberia which has only one main route with severalbranch lines. High, medium, and low powered transmitters for high speedand ordinary voice communications in the low. medium, and high frequencyC toC range arc scattered thickly through the European Soviet areas. They provide the sole means of rapidIn many areas which are sparsely settled or where climatic conditions make itor difficult to maintain land lines.

While there is no evidence of Soviel use of scatter techniques in long distancesystems, there are strong Indications that they are aware of the usefulness of these techniques, and their advantage of lowerto jamming and intercept. Wethat the USSR haa the capability tosuch systems and may have them in current operation.

During the past few years, the USSR has been using UHF relay station equipment. This equipment provides up tooiceubcarriers. It may be used ln mobile Installations for extreme flexibility or may be sited at permanent locations. Operational ranges up to aboulautical miles aredepending upon the Intervcnuig terrain. Recent reports indicate this type of equipment has been installed in East Germany and is functioning in an air warning net which is believed to be linked to Installations In other Bloc countries.

Automatic Computation and DataEquipment. Soviet equipment known to be available for this purpose includes land lines, low. medium, and high frequency radio links, multichannel microwave radio links, and television or broad-band radio links. This TV link equipment could be employed to transmit data very rapidly or even transmit

TV pictures of complete status boards-.of data for transmission by any of the above mentioned systems would greatlydata handling capabilities. Computers would play an Important role Inystem. The USSR ls developing, and may now have In operaUon, automatic computation and data-handling devices.

Navigation Equipment. Theore placing heavy reliance uponairborne radio direction finding aidsmajor portion of their air navlgaUon,approach and landing. Sovietterritory and airfields are weUwith ground direction finders,and rotating beacons.exist for more precise navigationaids. There is considerabledevelopment work being accomplisheda more precise localizer In the UHF band and incorporating equipment. Ground located finding facilities aretandard landing procedurewhichedium frequencybeaconarker beacon at each RecenUy several OCA type radarssighted at some airfields. Wewill be mode at key fighter fields.

Electronic Countermeasuros

Active Jamming Equipment. TheSoviet capability for seriously disrupting Western long rangend radio navigation systems givesigh capability for jamming such radioand navigation systems as may be used In an air attack against the Soviet Bloc. Research is now being conducted onsuitable for jamming Inand, as well as Uie decimeter ranges but we have no information of any equipment Uiat utilizes these magnetrons. Thoapability for electronic Jamming up0 megacycles and possibly0 megacycles,

Passive Ccnintermeasure Equipment. We have evidence of extensive Soviet Interest in thc electronics intercept and analysis We also have evidence that electronic

reconnaissance is being conducted by theWe estimate that the USSR will make extensive use of chaff in electronic warfare. The Soviets have also indicated interest in antlradar coatings and at least one German scientist concerned with World War II radar camouflage may still be in the USSR.

Sower Vulnerability fo Electronic Counter-measures. The Soviets are aware of thc cfiec-tlveness of countermeasures' against radar and have the capability of developing devices which would make their equipment lessto jamming or spoofing. It Is not presently possible to estimate the exent of development and/or current incorporation of such features In operational equipment Known Soviet low and high frequencyequipment, ground and airborne, is susceptible to the usual types of jamming. Their employment of VHF for air/ground communication would make jamming more difficult. Increased Soviet employment of highly directional microwave point-to-point communication equipment has also greatly reduced their vulnerability to jamming.

Conventional Soviet radio navigation aids such as omnidirectional landing and route beacons are individually susceptible to long-range Jamming. All other systems or aids known to be used by the Soviets, suitable for fighter operation, are vulnerable to both spoofing and jamming. The active andelectronic missile guidance systemsto be in existence are also allto electronic countermeasures.

Air Facilities

the last several years, theput great emphasis on airfieldparticularly ln perimeter areas.airfield construction has beenthe Khabarovsk Vladivostok areato the Chukotskistrengthening the perimeter networkRecent construction activitiestaken place ln thethe Baltic States. Southandeneralof airfields along the Far Eastand the construction of better facilities

al civil airports have also been noted. It is believed that runway construction inside thc Soviet Union has been extensive in recent years, and apparently minimum requirements for concrete runways at home bases have been standardizedeet for fighters and light bombersor medium bombers.

In nearly all areas of probable operations, there appear to be adequate networks offor tlie employment of present Bloc fighters forces. Thc principal exceptions arc ln thc northeastern and north centralareas. In the northeastern area,operations at the present time would probably still entail the use of substandard fields even though airfield construction has been in progress in the Chukotski arean the north central area, additional Improved airfields would also be required even though some airfield construction has been carried out along tlie Arctic coastline in the past few years. Thus, for optimum aircoverage, extensive additional airfield construction in these areas is required through the period of this estimate.

The existing airfield net in the European USSR and Satellites affords an adequate fighter base capacity for present aircraft, butajor war bases ln some sectors might not provide sufficient flexibility of fighter forces for air defense ln addition to meeting theneeds of other types of aircraft The need for greater flexibility ln certain areas ls apparenUy recognized by the Soviets, since new airfield construction is still taking place ln the Satellites, where Uie number of major airfields increased4 from. There are at presentddiUonal airfieldsconstruction, of whichre In Poland. Three new runways were added In Eastand there are Indications Uiat more will be builtork continues on Gross Dollln, the new airfield near Berlin, with0 foot runway. In Czechoslovakia, four long grass strips have been added, bringing Uie total of this type to nine. In several of Uie Satellites. Uiere have been signs ofof former grass landing grounds and two of Uie "forest lunding grounds" ln East


were used tor the first time in

stimated availability ol airfields ofeet In length ln the Sino-Soviet Bloc is as follows:

Soviet Western FronUer


and Approaches

Central FronUer



East Area




Support, Maintenance, and Training

The technical supply system is wellto meet Soviet air defense requirements. Since antiaircraft Installations, airfields, and radar stations are located adjacent toareas and main transportation andlines to most areas, the major Soviet problems of logistic support arise in connection with the peripheral areas,the northern and northeasternareas and in Communist China, North Korea, and North Vietnam where adequate transportation facilities do not exist. These problems lie mainly in the transportation of parts, and In the availability, transport, and storage of Jet fuels.

Very little information Ls available on the exact location of jet fuel storage points or the amount of fuel stored. It Is known that jet fuel in large quantities Is stored at theat regional distribution points, and at air army central fuel depots. In addition, limited amounts of fuel are stored on the operaUonal airfields. The over-all availability of Jet fuel is believed to limit the amount of flying accomplished at the present time to seven hours per fighter pilot per month. We believe this limitation is probably due to: (a) transportation deficiencies; (b) Increaseddue to rapid bulld-up of Soviet jet forces; (c) the allocation of considerable

quantities of jet fueleserve storageand <d) limited base storage facilities.

Is lackingompleteof Uie Soviet military aviationsystem as It affects fightercertain llmltaUons aremaintenance system Is highlycontrolled, with rigid definitions ofresponsibiliUes which might beand subject to breakdown in time ofrequirements arc excessivepersonnel are not used in Uiemanner. On Uie other hand,of training of technical personnelbe good and technical manuals areHistorical evidence IndicatescapabiliUes during andafter World War II werethan those of Uie US. Since Uiatappears to have been slow butprobably Influenced to aby Uie retention ln Uie servicemaintenance specialists and Uieof Uie jet fighter which is easier to


Is estimatedurrentrate for preseni Jet fighters on Uie orderpercent of assigned aircraft can benormal operaUng conditions. Forfighter units an initial maximumrateercent could bea complete or partialrate could be maintained for Uie firsttwo of Intensive operaUons but woulddecline lo aroundercent throughor seventh day. followed by atoercentInitial maximum serviceability ratedefense fighters would probably bepercent since these forces are held incondition untilcommitment, the serviceability ratefighters would probably drop belowtactical fighters due to recovery atbases, causing increased logisticproblems. As new andall-weather fighters are Introduced, Uiemaximum serviceability rate will beconsiderably, probably to around 50



extreme cold weather conditions In the Arctic areas, serviceability rates of all types of equipment will be considerablyeven though the Soviets have designed their equipment for low temperatures and have wide Arctic operational experience. Not only Is maintenance more difficult, but the logistic problem is magnified by increased requirements for heavy clothing and special ground equipment, such as heaters andshelters. This, together with the fact that the Arctic areas are usually not served by adequate transportation facilities and tlic fact that morale is generally lower willlimit maintenance and serviceability rates.

Maintenance Soviet electronicsts similar to Western equipment and consequently maintenance problems arecomparable. Our knowledge of theof Soviet electronics equipmentthat it is reliable and weU-maintaincd. Soviet equipment has also been designed for use under wide temperature ranges.Soviet equipment which has been tested has been found to be within current US Joint Army-Navy (JAN) specifications.

Intelligence currentlyis insufficient toatisfactoryof training of air warningmore informaUon ispilot training in the USSK.pilot ls believed toours of flying time LnTo this could be added thetime of aboutours whichreceive prior to entering theIn the past Soviet and Satelliteto operational units with onlyhours flying time In trainer typehaving flown tactical aircrafthaving received gunnery orexperience. At the present time,the Soviet training establishmentstotal ofet fighter aircraftbeing used for pre-operationaltype of training is also carried out tolesser extent in some

Union Voluntary Society lor CooperaUon with the Army. Aviation, and Fleet.

Soviet lighter pilots receive only about seven hours flying time per month afteron operational unit. We believeighter-pilot schools exist ln the USSR which probably produceilots per school each yearotalilots. Jet training, however, has been increasingly conducted by theflying schools and by operational units.

The current training program of thcunits ls not known. However,available0 Indicated that the training goals were to acquire fully theof Interception and destruction of large hostile air formations through coordination of ail sir defense weapons. We estimate that these goals now Include interception andof single aircraft and smallof Jet bombers as well as largeNight flying was known to be limited0 to nights when the natural horizon was visible and probably averaged around six hours per pilot annually. Although the night flying standards have increased considerably since that time, they are still probably well below US standards.

We believe that there is no instrument school available aa such ln the Air Forces of the Soviet Army, other than that for theof bombardier-navigators tnng-Range Aviation. Instrument training for fighter pilots Is conducted In operational units.

In general, training in the European and Asiatic Satellites is patterned after that In the USSR, but the standards are believed to be lower.

Passive Dcfonso

Passive air defense isout by the civil organization knownMPVO which Ls subordinate to theconstituent and autonomousthe Soviet Union has Its own MVD andof the MPVO. However, thehove little independence andpolicy and administrative guidanceAll Union MVD In Moscow. Theis well integrated in the governmental


structure of major cities and industrial areas vulnerable to air attacks. Existing civil agencies such as health and fire departments are utilized to Implement MPVO measures. City officials rather than MVD personnel are responsible for directing local air defense activities. MVD personnel actually enforce local air defense policies as formulated in Moscow.

Deception. In Korea, false road convoys were employed at night to lure United Nations aircraft into flak traps or hanging cableDummy aircraft, airfields, and Held guns were also noted. To date there have been no observations of camouflageass area basis such as construction or simulation through radar camouflage of false cities, factories, and lakes. However, thesewere used by the Germans during World War II, and It must be assumed that the Soviets are aware of this potentiality. Some sites have been observed in the USSR and In some of thc Satellites which may be dummy airfields, but no replicas of large elaborate airfields have been noted.

Aircraft Dispersal. In combat areasWorld War II, the general Soviet practice was to avoid high concentrations of aircraftarticular field. Thc necessaryconcentrationsiven sector was achieved by using satellite fieldsajor airfield. The current practice ofnatural surface airfields even wherehard surface runways are availablethat thc Russians are still dispersal-conscious. Furthermore, the ability to usesurface airfieldsremendous assetispersal concept even though someand operational problems may beByass take-off technique, the Soviet air forces have demonstrated an ability toegiment ofatural surface field within aof.thrce minutes, although several hours advance notice may have been given. Apractice of the Soviet air forces is to base one or two fighter regiments at one field.wartime, in areas subject to air attack, lt is probable that no more than one fighterwill be based at any one field.

Underground Installations. Somecities such as Vladivostok, Baku, and Sevastopol have retained and improveddefensive tunnel systems constructedWorld War II. Some airfields in the Far East are equipped with underground storage space and repair shops, and there have been several reports of underground hangarin Germany, Poland, and Rumania.-Underground command posts and filterhave been reported in Hungary andand it Is assumed that similarexist in major cities and defense centers throughout thc Soviet Bloc. Extensiveinstallations for the protection of population groups are believed to exist inew major cities.

Training. Passlvo defense against air attack is included In training programs throughout thc Soviet forces. Field manuals and pamphlets are published for troop issue, and defense against chemical attack isin school curricula. Recentin East Germany have included defensive tactics against atomic weapons and indicate that Soviet military leaders are aware ol the problems of survival In atomic warfare. There Is no known organization within thc military forces charged solely with bacteriologicaldefense but it Is probably that the military medical organization has thisTroop training stresses discipline with regard to avoiding water, foodstuffs, and areas of contamination. Thc current issue gas mask is believed to afford adequateagainst BW Aerosols.


Bloc, and particularly the USSR,its intensive efforts to Improveair defense system ln order tothc growing Western Thc objectives of the Bloc air

"The estimates In this seetlon are based on the assumption that neither domestic or inter-naUonal poliUcal factors nor unexpectedbreakthroughs will alter the general nature of weapons programs as now envisaged in the Bloc and the West.

defense plannersillcertainly be to: (a) develop and produce in quantity equipment with performance characteristics capable of combating the Western air threat; (b) rapidly improve the training of air defense units; (c) developcommunications facilities; (d) improve and Increase the number of airfields; and (c) improve their air defense organization.

o meet these objectives wouldask of such magnitude as toajor effort duringeriod. Achievementigh degree of effectiveness wouldery large scale program of research,and production in order to keep pace with Western developments. If our estimate of their analysis of the air defense problem is sound, the SovieU will probably seek to do the following:

all-weather interceptorairborne intercept equipment ablefrom low altitudes0 feetspeeds betternots;

Improved AA rockets and

an early warning systementire Sino-Soviet Bloc: to provideas for outiles fromat altitudes up0 feet;

airborne early warningassociated equipment;

a more effectiveand provide more land lines;

evelop an Integrated automatic data handling system;

g. Continuously train personnel to operate all elements of thc air defense system;

li. Improve and enlarge existing airfields and construct new airfields;

L Modify the command policy of the air defense organization to permit operationalat lower levels;

j. Improve range and altitude capabilities of GCI radar; and

k. Develop countermeasures equipment to render hostile navigational and bombingineffective and to prevent Jamming of thc radar and communications equipment of the Bloc air defense system.

Trends in Strength and Equipment _

New Fighter Types. The USSR will probably introduce additional new day and all-weather fighter types during the period of tins estimate as Indicated ln Appendix B. As these new fighters are phased in, the older types will be dropped from the order of battle so that all FAGOTS will probably be replacede estimate the FRESCO willbe further developed. If not so already, by thc Installation ofb. thrust engine and will continue to be used throughout the period of this estimate but ine believe the Bloc will have both day and all-weather fighters with speeds upnots, time to climb0 feet of about two minutes, and combat ceilings up0 feet (Seeor estimated performance characteristics of new fighters.)

Over-ail Fighter Strengthc estimate that there will probably beodest Increase in authorized Bloc fighter strength from050ar more significantwill probably take place ln theof all-weather fighters, which we estimate will grow5stimated totaltrengths by year are as follows:11









mall Viet Mfhh Air Force wiU be developed during tbe period of this estimate.

" For strength by type and phasing tn of aircraft,Appendix B.

uture Radar Coverage. On the basis of observed trends ln Soviet radarand deployment, we esUmate Uiat Uie USSR will gradually replace many ot Itsradars with improved radars.0 lhe range coverage capabiliUes of Soviet EW and GCI radars will probably be Increased by as much asercent (within propagation limits) over Uie ranges listed In Uie table ln7 size target EW coverage will probably extendeet0 and GCI coverage could extent to as much0 feet,

stimated Soviet air defense programs0 would provide operaUonal radar as follows:

and- MJd- Mid- Mid- Mid- IPSO 7 8 9 0


MC Types






Priority deployment of Uie radarabove will probably be made to Uie West-em and Southwestern fronUers of Blocfrom Murmansk to Uie Caspian Sea, ln Uie Maritime Provinces of Uie Far East, and

perhapsew internal areas. As improved equipment appears in these high priorityUie shift of presenUy available TOKEN types to lower priority areas now covered by obsolete equipment, will also result ln Uieof detection capabiliUes in those areas. As Uie average detection range ofradar ls Increased by Uie build-up of TOKEN strength and Uie Introduction ofradar types Uie general disposition of Uie equipment may be expected to spread in order to realize the full advantage of UieIn range capability.

pread should enable morecoverage to be afforded Arctic areas where penetrating aircraft enroute totarget ureas might be expected to enter Communist territory. Increased detecUon coverage of the south central USSR border area adjacent to Iran and Pakistan might also be anticipated, and an increased flow of radar Into China Is also to be expected. We believe that6 sufficient TOKEN radar will be available to provide complete coverage In the area between Hainan Island and Shanghai. Tracking faculties to back up thc improved coastal detection capability will probably appear firstoneiles inland from thc coast, and in the vicinity of Important inland cities such as Hankow and Changsha.

adar Deployment. Estimateddeployment of Bloc early warning and ground control intercept radar is as follows:

Eastern Europe Soviet Western Frontier Soviet Northwest Moscow and Approach South Central FronUer Ural

Siberian Baikal Far East

Manchuria. China. Kore* TOTAL

Number of Radar

gimp HhcflfiT

Considerablein Soviet air defense communications ls probables the USSR hasconsiderable technologicalhis field. Automatic data handling equipment may be used in some critical areas although we consider it unlikely that the USSR will have an Integrated country-wide system In operation

Antiaircraft Artillery. The Sovietsstill plan to place considerableon AA artillery. We estimate that Uie following new weapons will become available

low-yield nuclear warhead,aximum effective range on tne orderautical miles.

ir-to-air guided missiles may become operational as fighter armament during Uie period of this estimate. Although there is no evidenceoviet air-to-air missile program, lt Is estimated Uiat the USSR now has the capability toissile with thecharacteristics: range, ln Uie orderards varying with release aJUtude.Infrared homing,ounds,ound warhead. Such

Muzzle RateVertical Effect. Velocity Range Ft. Ceiling Ft Ft. Bee. KPM


SO nun IHO 0

per barrel

Unguided High- per

Level Rocket over to per

(Zenith) 0 0


Dnfulded Low-Level Rocket May appear0

Estimated deployment of AA guns0 ls as follows: (See table on

Guided Missiles. It Is highly likely that the USSR will place Increasing reliance on guided missiles for air defense. we esUmate that series production could beginurface-to-air missile with terminalaximum effective range0 yards0 feet altitudearhead on Uie orderounds. The km-yleld nuclear warhead probably available for this missile8 would greatly increase the kill probability as well as the problems ofomcUme0 the Soviets couldurther improved surface-to-air missile wiUi terminal homing equipment, a

NBSoviet CapablUUei andPrograms ln the Guided MissUe4etailed estimate.

a missile would be limited to tall cone attacks under generally fair weather conditions at the attack alUtudc. The FRESCO could beto carry four such missiles with Infrared homing and be operaUonal now. During Uie, Uie range of this missile could be Increased to0 yards and might not be BBgfted to tallompletely new air-to-air missileemlacUve terminal homingarhead of aboutounds and an effective range of0 yards varying with release altitude could be ready for series producUon. If this missile does not appear until Uie latter part oferiod, an active homing head could be




* s


* m


o o

as s s S3 g




8 8





j j

robable Future Guided Missiles for Air Defense. Characteristics of Soviet missiles that could be available during the period of this estimate are as follows:

c estimate that the cost of theair defense program of the Sino-Soviet Bloc will be about1 rubles5 and about1 rubles

Type Missile






Warhead Weight (lbs)



leas than

iK or nuclear


Weight (lbs)



8 nm




ScmlacUve radar -Coming

Ac'.ite radar homing

Bemlhomlng head

Terminal homing

Terminal homing

We estimate that the USSR might have moreurface-to-air missile sites

Countermeasures.capabilities ore alreadywill probably Improvefor example, that0 thchave Jamming equipment lnfor frequency ranges up through

Economic Impact of Air Defense Program

of Airhethe air defense program which we havethe Sino-Soviet Bloc leaders willundertake during this period, hasin aggregate terms. While wethat money calculations of Sovietcosts and capabilities are onlythey do permit thcof reasonable magnitudes with whichthc economic significance of theSuch calculations also serve as anof the priority and effort whichrequired and the possible effects onand industrial programs.

hows how the total cost of the Sino-Soviet Bloc air defense program is allocated through time and by principal air defense function. Of these totals, approximatelyillion rubles5 andillion rubles0 would be Initial costs while the remainder would be operating costs.

he Impact of these costs may beas follows: If total Bloc militaryconformrevioushe cost of this air defense program would rise from aboutercent of the total5 to aboutercentxpenditures for other military programs would have to decline accordingly. If. on the other hand, expenditures for these other military programs cud not diminish, but Instead rote

Mllliarv expenditures by the USSR during theere esUmated InSoviet CapabiliUes and Probable Soviet Courses of AcUon throughublished ITince corresponding agreed estimates of tho military expenditures of other Bloc countries do not exist, tentative estimates have been made for Uie purposes of the above paragraph. Even ihould auch tenUUve estimates be proved to be considerably In error the conclusions arrived at would not be materially altered.

at the rate previously estimated tor totalexpenditures by the USSR alone5 percent increase0, thewould be an increase ofercent inBloc military expenditures over the period. (See Figure 2)

The burden of the air defense program would not fall equally upon all countries of the Bloc, however. Specialized Industrial equipment and trained manpower for thc air defense program would have to be provided primarily by the USSR itself, with theof Czechoslovakia, Poland, and perhaps East Oermany and Hungary.

This air defense program woulda substantial but not impossibleupon the Bloc economy. We believe that the cost would be such as to requireiversion of resources from other military uses, or an increase in the total militarysuch as would probably lead to somein the rate of growth of the economy.

Electronic Equipment and PrecisionThe electronics requirements for the estimated air defense program are very great. Taken together with other military and essential civilian demands they woulderious strain on the Bloc electronicsEstimates of future performance ln this industry are necessarily somewhat tenuous. It appears highly likely, however, that the Bloc could not carry out the estimated air defense program without (a) divertingequipment from other militaryor (b) expanding the electronicto the limits of feasibility. Thc latter course would be the more difficult because the rate at which military electronics production facilities could be expanded might be less than the rate applicable to thc electronic Industry ln general. We do not believe that fulfillment of electronics requirements would offer such an obstacle as to make the estimated air de-

fense program imposslUle;we are certaln.Tiow-ever, that it woulderydifficulty.

A further limitation ln the air defense program may well exist In the precision mechanism sector in view of the tolerances involved and the skilled labor required. For example, the estimated number of gyroscopes required for new equipment3 was0 of which approximatelyercent were for aircraft use. and few of thesewere of the degree of precision and miniaturization necessary for use in guided missiles. By comparison the estimated air defense program will continue to demand at least as many gyroscopes for aircraft use and, in addition, estimated air defense missilewouldyros00

Other Equipment. An examination of Soviet Bloc Industrial facilities available to fulfill air defense procurement requirements reveals no other apparent restrictions.the total poundage of aircraft and engines required to be produced for theprogram would Increase substantiallyhese demands are within theof the Industry. Similarly, the increase In guided missile production required Iswithin the present economic capacity of the Bloc. For other air defense weapons, the production Increases required are considerably less than for aircraft and guided missiles and are well within the capacities of the present armament industries. Under currentof supply, basic materials required for the air defense program arc apparentlyerious problem to the Bloc. Manpower limitations seem unlikely to place any general restrictions on thc program, although some qualitative problems might develop in the precision engineering skills.






Speed at Specified Altitude iknoWil)

Combat RadU (nm)

or Warhead Wt. (Ids)

















0 low alt.


Missiles Tactical SSOM Short-Range SSOM Air-to Surface


In Mach No.






Speed at Specified AlUtude (knoW/ft)

Combat Radii


or Warhead Wt. (lbs)





Medium-Range SSGM 0

in Mach No.



Combat Radii (run)

Same as7

Aircraft unproved FA POM

improved VP(L)

0 low alt.






Long-Range SSGM Long-Range SSGM Long-Range Ballistic SSGM



Speed In Mach No.





Only those weapons with higher performance than those5 are shown.

' Only those weapons with higher performance characteristics than those7 aro shown.

4& gVlT ITi






Total Day



otal Fighters











FAOOT0 lb. thrust)

FAOOT0 lb. thrust)

FAGOT0 lb. thrust)


0 lb. thrust)


(with0 lb. thrust)

FARMER' Twin Jet


Rate of climb at Pea level


Time to altitude



Maximum speed at' sea level (kta)



Combat celllnj;



Combatadius without external fuel



Combat radius with external fuel (nm)



combat welEht

use of afterburner for climb and combatmln. with external tanks


Time to climb0 ft (mln)

Maximum speed-sea

(knots) Maximum speed'


(knots) Maximum speed1



Combat celling (ft)

Combat radius (am) <wiu> external fuel)

Combat range (nm) (with external fuel)


New Daj)













ocket* or

m guns0 RPMir-to-air guided missiles

Fireange only radar with automatic computer


S" RoekeU or

m gunsPM or

4 alr-to-alr guided missiles

Fire Control-Al radar with search range upm and lock on range upm.

Da; and All-Weather9

ame as7 daj and AW fighters.

FireI radar with search range up to and lock on range upm.


Estimated Performance of OperationalAA Weapons



(RPM) Pro] Wgt (lbs)








iter barrel

fuses could be employed with weapons ofm or larger


(estimated lo appear

Target type


Max track range

Max search range


calculation ol costs of the air defense program outlined in Section II of thisincludes all items which can be directly charged to the Bloc air defense program over the period of this estimate. In estimating the cost of this complex air defense program, it was necessary to distinguish between initial costs and operating costs. Initial costs are those that occur only once duringrogram and Include such items as base facilities, major equipment, spares for stocks and pipeline, initial training, andOperating costs are thosewhich recur regularly, representing the consumption of fuel and maintenance spares, the provision and support of personnel,'and the replacement of equipment. However, three types of initial and operating costs were specifically omitted from the calculation. The first type includes costs incurreduch as drone aircraft and some radar. The second type Includes costs Incurred infacilities and services used for otheras well as air defense, such as common-use air bases and the superior commandFinally, certain costs of warheads were not Included because nuclear warhead costs were not available.

In order to reflect changes ln weaponand the composition and numbers of operating units, cost data were organized and summarized at the smallest practicalmilitary unit. For scheduling, we have taken thc number of unitsissiles, AAA, and aircraft) estimated to be deployed atas the average number of units operating ln the air defense system for that year. It is assumed that the Initial costs were Incurred the year previous to the first full operatingnitial costs of the units for eachof major equipment and equipment spares were estimated, giving consideration to the lower costs associated with the volume of production implied in this estimate. It was assumed that trained operating units were the goal of the program. As soon, therefore, as

sufficient major equipment became available from production, on operating unit wasfor activation and provided with aset of special and organizationalInitial stocks, and personnel

This activation schedule became thc basis of phasing the Initial system costsime pattern. The cumulative total of the various types of units activated form thc basis for working up the operating costs. Thecosts, reflecting the consumption of fuels and spare parts, the maintenance of the establishment and the replacement of major equipment were then applied. During the period of the estimate some primary operating units will be deactivated. In such cases thc air defense system is credited for those Items that could properly be carried oyerew unit provided with higher performance major equipment.

The estimated initial costs of the program40 are detailed iny sub-categories of programs and similar detail is presented for estimated operating costs In Tablet should be noted that the initial costs exceed total operating costs. Because thc guided missile program must startero base thereery large ratio of initial to operating costs ln the early years. Thc ratio of other programs will vary from year to year according to the quantity of initial equipment introduced to the air defense

Inhe air defense program Isin terms of the economic sectors upon which the program must Impinge for the satisfaction of Its requirements. From the standpoint of Investment goods the important item in the table ls the amount of totalprocurement which amounts toillion rubles5 andillion rublesut another waytf the currently estimatedillion rubles of militarygoods procurement5 Is for the air defense program. Asuming that the current level of hard goods procurement for military

programs other than air defense will not de- would have to Increaseercent5 cUne In the aggregate over the period of this0 to Implement thc required air defense estimate, military hard goods procurement program.


o-8ovlct Bloc Air Defense- Program InlUal40

1 Rubles




Armament Program


Engine Program



and Control Program




Gun Program

Control (Heavy Gun)

Gun Program

Control (Ught Oun)


Oulded Missile Program



Table 2

Estimated Stno-Sovlet Bloc Air Defense Program Operating40

1 Rubles






Armament Program

Engine Program


and Control Program


Oun Program

Control (Heavy Oun)

Oun Program

Control (Light Oun)

Oulded MissUe Program



Estimated Sino-Soviet Bloc Air Defense Pnxuirmcnl by Sectors or40

1 Rubles

and Engine Procurement

Missile. Procurement



Electronic Procurement'

Metals, NEC


Industrial Procurement

and Construction Material


and Services




' Electronic procurement such as ground radar. AAA Ore control, and ground guidance equipment, which: Included In other procurement categories.

Original document.

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