IOTFTXinERCE SSTIrUTE TTJRXET A3 AJ* ALLY
To estimate the present situation and probablo davelopnenta In Turkey over the next few yearo, with raurtioular reference to Turkey's strengths and weaknessesember of the Wentern alliance.
urkey hastable and dependable senber
of the Western alliance and has aade ooiuiderBble progress In developing Its economy and strengthening lte Military establiehnent. Nevertheless, Its ambitious pursuit of both eoonoaio development and militaryrednenB simultaneously has produced aeriouB eaonomlo and political Btrains which will probably last for some tins to aosae.
The government haatabillaation program and ln this connection will probably taketo check Inflation and Improve its International payaents position, which willeduction ln the rata of recent investment. It will probably need additional US aeBlstance incident to Its stabilisation program and particularly ln meeting its most pressing financial obligations. Over the longer run, If approximately the recent rate of inveetaent la to be resumed and carried out with some degree of eoonoalc atabllity, continuation of substantial amounta of foreign aid will be required as wall aa currency devaluation and the introduction internally of austerity measures.
We consider it highly unlikely that any major threat to the stability of the Turkish govertmmtntal structure will arise, at least within the next few years. The Democrat Party will probably retain control of the government at least up to8 elections, but will probably suffer some lose of strength and may even feel compelled to drop Prime Minister Mendorea. Over the longer run, eoonoalcwill increasingly change traditional patf Turkish rural life and create new political and aoclal as well as economic strains.
L. These political and economic difficulties will not weakenaeia anti-Soviet orientation. The Turks will continue to regard the OSecessary ally and will almost oertalnly continue
to cooperate with tba OS an major international issues. However, lrTitationa and tenalona In tha OS-Turkish ralatlonahlp vlll ba recurrent. Turkey will be dissatisfied with levels of OS aid and will seek increased OS support for the Baghdad Paot. Moreover, strains ere likely to arise in oormeotlon with the implementation of any program for the stabilisation of the Turkish soonomy.
with the Bloo has increased significantly sincenow aooounta foroeroent of Turkey's foreign trade,to esven to eight peroent If theIs successful, Turkish goods may again become oeajpetitive
ln Weatern markets and the Turks may attempt to reverse the trend of growing trade with the Bloc. However, unless the Free World le prepared to purchase Turkey's agricultural surpluses, there will be little chance ofolicy being successful. Moreover, the Turkish government's preoccupation with rapid eoonoalc development might even Induce the Turks to accept some Soviet aid, though they would almost certainly not do so at the risk of losing OS financial support.
During the paot year relations with Greece have been marred by continuing sharp differences over Cyprus. In time the Turks may reconcile themselves to Cypriot self-determination, provided the rights of the Turkish minority are fully guaranteed, and OK or NATO oontrol of military bases on the Island is maintained.
Despite Turkey's military progress over ths past few years, its forces are still only partially eerulpped and trained. Turkish ability to undertake sustained combat operations would be completely dependent on outside logistic support. Turkey would probably attempt to maintain its present military establishmentutback ln OS military aid. In view of the great eaphaals which both the Turkish poveraaent and the Turkish people have placed oa the militarya major reduction ln OS military aid wouldrofoundly disillusioning effeot.Original document.