Created: 10/12/1955

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frobahleOF the KFrfTIAN abb deal vith the soviet bloc

(Advance Copy)

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The follwlne lntelllynco orcnr.lintionsIn the pivimotloo of this tttlnctei Tl* Ccutrel Xntellljrnosy Btaa the inlelldrjetice orpwlicUNv* of the Dc>nrtxftts of State, the Amy, the Novy, tho Air Force, and The Joirt Staff.

Concurred In by tlto


oc IP. CoacUrrlrvj W*pecialDepnrtneirt of State| the Aeolotcnt,eportfcnt of tho Aruy; the Director ofthe Directorl licence, USAF; andDirector for Intelligence, The Joint

Energy Cotrdnslou representative to tho IAC,the Assistant Director, rederol Ihu-yon of Invest! jetton, ot stained, tlic subject belTvj outside af their Jurisdiction.






To estimate. In the lljjht of the recent Egyptian orre deal with the Eovlct Bloc: (n) the likelihood of Israeli orhostilities ossuulnG no chnngo In present US policy;he effect of certain possible US courses of action on the situation; end (c) tbe outlook for Soviet exploitation of this and possible slnilor deals with other Arab states.


A. The Soviet -Egyptian ares deal hoa subetont lolly lncruoeed the risk tl>nt Iarael willpreventiveuch Israeli notion ie not lively within the next few weeks. The Israelis will probably



vith to ecterolL* core precisely the manltua> of the threat paced by Soviet Woe uilllDfpienea the Arabrt, to exploit the fovcmhle trend of VeeUtn puhllc opinion, and,portnntly, to dctcntlnc how for lamel cm roelistlc.-illy depend on Moslem and porticuJn.-ly US support in mintninlcg ita territorial Integrity. In tho eboenee of convincing evidence of western dcteniinntloo to preserve the territorinl ctatun quo, there is very roo)thot Israel viU ucderV-rie "preventiveooolbly In the next fevnd It vould alcost certainly be mre wlllin3 to tckc risks wbleh could touchew round of hostilities. An Israelivnr" noy itoxt infom of border mlds whore responsibilities end Intentions my initially bo obscure. a)

Al. If It becoue uisiistohobly cloarth sides thatS was prepared to uee ony doccs necessary. Including nlUtnry force, tocosica, itertain that no "second round" vculd devclcy. However, if the US declined to rpioxontee the territorialoev and noru directn that contained In the Tripartite Declaration, It would be extra jely difficult to cctor Israeli prewntlv* actlrn, sl.icc neither tho Irrnall* nor tho Arabs would be likely to believe thatUS would in fact intervene effectively nfrnlnot lamcl. (Porn. 9)


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that tt Is octunity Irsplcrxctod tho rums dealtoendency toward Ecyptlen idlitanry, andoorvnr ttftt locnl clnshco will develop into lnrtje-ecalepending absorption of willconstrained to avoid scrlovu difficulties with Israel. Owr

tlto longer run, the growthptiaa nilitory ntrencth will* certainly sticulat*Egyptian Interestsecond. round" rynlrjt Icruel. (Parae. 2,

o "eeccnl rcurrl" occur ln tbe near future, Ir.USet events lake thoir coureo, onictoryaliMBt certoln. Under those clrcuuntcincooilttyand hold considerable portico of oil its oeltfibors'bo lirdwsd largely by its lack of reccrvc supplies andof UK intervention If Jordan vcre invaded. Ihanoff" policythe part cf the ICJ would have aneffect on It* poettlon ia th* Arab world nnd vretard

UO efforts to build IcAinpnoaa Mlaolo East defense. )

convincing Indication of US deterolruitlon toin tbe oveot of occression voulA rvossure boththe Arabs vould pc(5nrd It primarilyrucvontce cf

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osont vntttua> Art*uld in tit* lr.crcr.oo, pnrllculrj-lyine Area lalltcryrcod thoale initim of tbe ltkb bolrv; rcotrc.lrx-J.

E. viet oria oldicotalues the

t two nijsreetivc3 in tht Midllo E'Qtt nr. Arr.b-

Ismc'lind tho crcotiro of effectiveofeno.

orranjMiWtOo junior.. It lo litoily toneutralist

tendencies lnab str-tcs, and tj enhance tbe for subversion ami political penetration, ci/nVllitlca of local Altbi-uji uo relievo timt tho BCC

le dotcr.OivjJ to ovoidicnl olijvjnxt with th: s- vlcta,

.'Jlltory oirf acscaulfl dir,ctfe>-xu the DU< idjtt eventually

deurlvjor* cf itcheese Itc wlootatlin* lv)



ffe^Ame Deal ond_lta Military TTpllcotloip

1. Oieptexhcrhe Sovietor Egyptianupply of arm ot torjalr.according toticr.a, includCB JOO Jotheavy" torJio; six not or torpedo boats; arA oul all tcovthcr with receccury spore parte, ft betters andJC-Ws lato be dellrervl by5 oxdonhs oredelivered ot on unspecified corly da to. The KcyptionoDloc tocbrlciano vould be indo cvnllnblo ever

to li .structptiond li arA operotioo.

?. ttttt tbo lilac actually oupplicB tbeae ltofiO, in tenslttr<ry hardware, clot* tbe dealt lurkei gualltotlvo ood ounatltatlve superiority lr. cat hat aircraftloracl, which la olreody inferior in natori of aircraft to the /irab etotcoa-oupj (b) iiirn if leant ly reduce Israel's preocnt nunoricol

su^rlerlty lo tanks; end (c) furnishith imsans of hnresslnj Israel's ohlpvlnji f tlie cquluticntobcblylaced in ov-orrti-ix;ew noivthadcliv-ry. hVwover, ItctiicUd that ever,oudiUuss, ineclvlnj Inrjirciiiinj ttiaolUU OVwr co extended varied, atearc"jcbly be -required ofter delivery beforecf the cqui>-jent could be effectively use* ir. urlt jj-crotiens-

The Effectsraeli Corses cf Action

3. The on* 3colevere royehol^jical blow to Israel, iniraon it will illrake theore cblo ando ctord up to or retaliate njpl-.iot IsrccUitery roiJo, there'vy lcteculRj the likcJio-xd tbst Israel'o actlvictactics will force the Arabs to DQfcoiciiu. it brin;j) .ntetlally closereiectrertvth if Arab idlitrtrywhich Would leave Israel incapable of defendtcelf effectively. Althouji tbe lercolla prcio^ly reeoj-.lse thatlltrry effects if tho em: deel will r. it be Uoxdlately felt, they probably believe that they have only Malted tine tohe




2i. Thceo coral deration? aio alroat certainlypressures oithtn Israelolder and reroto resolve the basic problen. of security enco and forIsraeli sovcrnracnt haa respondedhprcsa'urea onfor covenanting arm aid andpecific securitythere nill alnost certainly bo additionalilhln tho

relatively narrcnr Hilts of its potential resources, to procure arra elsodtcro if they are not available free the US. Israel is aluost certainly c he possibilities ofolutions. Primo iiint&ter-deBlgnnto Den Gurion boa) previouslythat Isn-clorcible ncasureo If necessary to end thelockade of the oca route to "vleth on the Gulf of The Israeli General Staff, whichsoulelon of th* ^pyntinns "roo theeTa, is probably, pressing for ot lo.-at lied, tod territorial advances for tho jfurooaea of elirjnrtlnf. trouble apote and otherwise lnprovlng Tsrrol't position at tactically vulnerable plocca alone, tho border. 'loroover, eonsidiT-ation is prob>My beingo tho nerlts of *uar" while Israol stillecisive rdlit'-ry cfUe.



5- Tho Soviot-Kcyptioii nruo deal has substantially increased the risk tint Israel vlllpreventive war." It le unlikely, hvvcvrr, that Iaraol vinitiate such action in the next few weeks. i coirdttlnc the^flelvco to an outright var policy, the Isroolia vlll probably wleb to deUmlnc Don precisely tho mjiltudo of the thrcct posed by Soviet Bloc vilMnanese to orti to Arobe, to exploit the fDvorablo trend of Western public crlnlcc, end, nore Irn-ortontly, toJIW hcv fax Israel con rccllstlcolly dcpoM oo Western and particularly US support In ixvliitnlninc its territorial intofprlty.

6. Particularly if the prosjects of USWestern ccur.teroctloa In curbing Incidents ore uncertain, we believe that Israel, Ineseut ;ood, will olroet certainly be noro disposed tlnn before the oris deal to take chances In executluc of ito octivlot policies.ove ni^Jit touchew round of large-scale hostilities, whether by dcaljD ox otherwise. Israel's proponed ncvu to force the Gulf of Aanba cdfiht provetepping; stone to wor, aslee on Joracll novo to Intercept oms shlprxrnto tc Ecypt orioa of the work to dlvort the Jordco voters in the derjlli tar lied tone at Jlsr Banal Yocub on the Syrlcn border. ShcuM Icracl find Itself enoOGOCl in mjor clashed with one cf the Arab states it would probably be inerufuiincly disposed to teJbi ndvontay: of the situation to scire the troubled oxen or otherwise itiprove Its tactical position. Should




the iiitorveirtlou of other Arcu otateo apjeor to be In the atCtDQ It woulA probably otteiipt to aiito the initiative ourt Inoingonors1 conflict inevitable*

Co. Hcrcover, In the of ouvlnelnc eviderxc cf Western deterviintJor. to preecive the territorial status quo, there lo very real danger that Iareel will undertake preventive vaxf ocslbly within the lext few ler.tha. *te Egyptian orwi deal, jcrtlcul-nrly if followed uplrllnx deol with Syria, thrvatcuo Ifjoel with an cino race which it cannot afford to sustain with its own resources nrJ which ultitntolyo leave it Insapable of dcfci>:inn itcelf effectively. Ucleeo Israel obtnlrji ccur.ter-vailUvj irnsew ond nore direct OS pledge of proeut ind effective'nllltary intervention to preserve tho atetua quo thom io new provided in the Tripartitet is likely to conclude that war offers the orly way cut. Under euch clrcuosrtnr.eereel it oloc likely to play flowu the poeol-billty of effectivel-rtorventiooreventive wrr by lejwhich the latter would portrayefensive reactto Arab ecerosoion ioaplredod by tie Soviet Unior. and which was accerinaiiied by offer* toiru >ui Israelimay start In tho form of border ralda Wiere reaponaibilitiOB aid Intentions Hay Initially be obscure.

_ S-


jyptiap Ccurocs of Ac tier.

believe that Etypt'a acceptance of Bloc arm hisfar leob by tbouoirtosecond round" than byi (e) to eh ore up oxtxkI forces uorele; (b) by an acute eeuce

of vuliernbillty to Ieroeli Military' otd possible invasion;

airt (e) by lto desire to follow through on its muiouncel

lr*depordence frcri both firoot p'-vor blcea. However, the^eol, esbuclog that it ia actually lnpleuented, /lo UJrcly to etrervrtbon eivleacyater iiiUtrxcyis

lorool olroody nonlfest in the Egyptian (iovenjent's recent tpoi.GorEhlp

of cOLxr.nlu operations In tiie Gaza area* This will increase the denser

that local clashes will develop Into lcreo-sealo ficlitfr^;. For the

iiaj-TUote future, the iVyptfnri refflne will probably feel canatroineil

to ovoid carious difficulties with Zoruol, pending the arrival of the

nev equipiunt ond the trolnirg nf confcat-effective unite. tiovevcr,

evenhio lrterin period the difficulty ofr-yption

local ccesnndera and troops in cheek will probably create increeoed


tbe longer run, tho fu-ovtb of Esyptianwill alnoet certainly stiiwlate acne Egyptiana "second round" ognlaat Israel. Although the HCC re/jiix;concern over the foot that Israeli posaeopior: of the


Kegov cute Egypt off free land coo utlcottca with tho othor Arab states, it hue do territorial onbitlons of its own in Israel, will probablyealthy respect for Isroall ccnbnt cffcctlvvoer.', onddespite its otter-pts to free itself frai dependence on tho West will probably renaln fearful ofsanctions. ASGurrincyyt bel lores itself ip-catly strer^thencd by Soviet ana ond support, it .Tlcht be teppted to mke vor ou letteleano of soliiifinc Its lcodcrehlp in the Arab world. While* the deterrents ix-atloned ore likely to prevent such action, at least in the near future, Bcypt willertainly do Its boat to iryivss tltc Israelis with its will end ability to defend its interests and my therefore cod up with fully os eujQnMlVO and octolicy oo that new btlQQ lursucd by Israel.

CuTsegucnecstrer-2tbardnrj of US Policy Re*prdlnd IntcrverAlcc_

9. If It becone itsustokably clear to both sides that the US was prepared to use any neons necessary, including nilltary force, to halt OiKroeeion, it is olrnst certain that uo "secocd round* would develop. However if the U3 declinedyarantes the territorlol Ltntus quo Inev cod core diroet plcd^ than that contained la the Tripartite Declarationt would be extreocly difficult to deter Israeli preventive action since neither the ievoelic nor tbe Arabs would be likely to believe that the US wuld in fact intervene effectively nrjaliiet Israel.




JO. ccvirclnc lndicctiw: of IW dotcraiontlon t& intervene effectiwjly in the evertijreoaloii would reassure berth sides. Kotothelecs tbe Aroba would rc^oxd it priir,rllya fwrertce cf Israeli's jrcocntnit ion. Over tho longer run, tho conecyt of tho USolice ten, even if bached by the til, wouldource cf incroosinc Arob resecbncirt, particularly if'.rob Dilttory cnpnbilitloB placed the Arabs in tho position of tho ones beirc roatrelMd.

eqwrceeS "Hinds Oft" Policy In Besp^raosr'-cfl At to etc

11, If oacaeseivo lorooll eetlon eh&uld lead ii; the near futuroaecoiiln vblcb the US otoed nolo oirt let oeveliiiier.ts take their ccurce, oil too Archtater, would olirjst certainlyinvolved, and on Isrcell victory would nlnceto Inly be the outcoiw. Ajiioet Arablone, we octlwto that Iereol could now seize oil of Arab-controlled Palestine, portiora of Eiryptldn, Cyrion, and 'irtinneso, territoryto Jcruel, and ooue Joruooiaa territory cost of the Jordan River. Israel would probably have to reckor with UN ictorvoution. Bowevwr, tho is'sot ijjpartont Ifxdtntioiin to IcraeU's ability to cccsoliocto these rplo* would be its cam lack of reserve


suppliestl* jsrobobillty that tl*euae of Its special treaty dbUfssUCMj would feel cm-pelled tc iLterveie, ot least vith olr ond rovol forces, if Jordanroded. yt'c capabilities would be -suhato-rt lolly lir,iroved If Jttuoll cnyloy Soviet Dloc nillt/iry persomeX In ueinj; its new wecp'.nfl efjalatt Israel. Dowevcr, it cpyxtra unlikely that the USSR, under pre oo it circu-wto nces, would be wllliryj to accept the rioks of hostilities with tbe West whichove would Involve. efeot of tlo Arabs would probably bo followederiod cf Clsunler in ore or :urc of the Arabondition which tho USSS would alnast certainly to exploit.

A "Linda off" policy or. the part of the US would have ad extreroly ndverM effect OH Its position in the Arabut would retard US efforts to buildMiddle Knst dcfciae.

Theeal vith Ej-ypt rcpieeerrto the Dost drarntle uovooviet Minpeityj In tha Midola East which has beer,for lan tine. jor objective of this cat-roty. is certoicly to stiffen Arab resiuterce to Western pollclos In the


Ttc, je.rticulorly the efftart* of tbe U8 nod UK to developdefense ai1lUiceocnte end to rct/iln thatr boeea. sl.vJtg cf tbe Ita^doaflyot bos led ArobWestern dcfenee efforts, and fJyrlntho otbci

recipients of Soviet orua offers, hove beer. Egypl'a chiefHwe over, the USSR nlioat certainly appreciatesIK difficultly^ Inefense eyateu viU boincreased: (c) by orr/ bei^itening cf Arob-Iarcell tenalecio; (b) by the Veatorr. rcvera

ha cVvpiitofic of bolnc tho only algniflcatit aourco of ot)'* for tho Arab atotea; ond (c) by invidious cccnxuriaouo in /xeb winds between tho ejectocuinrnd eoay torus of Soviet aid prcrlaedyyt, end the relative handful of inter lei which Iraq, hae been receivlnr;sSfJWr lastondlrvj of the "northaro tier" group trf lartl ..

Turkey, Iraq, the UK, ond roklaten ere now ranters of thla pact.


Ik. In addltloc to Ita ueefulnesa in underidrJog Ucatcrr. dafenoe off carta In tha area, tho USSR probably reouds the ciusfeutrollat tepdenclea, and other Arab atates, if only by veekenliis their dei*ndenco or. the Vest aid increeelnglrdna pever. deelelon to


acceptfrou the Dice Ir. exchange fcr cotton, tocether with

recent acrectento for substantially 1barter trade In

rItaryould probably increase Egyptian reliance on tie

possr ly

Orbit fcr ' I reeds and islntexncee suppllcc

uorfcet fcr Egypt's priory "xp-.rt lieu. Finally, thu Sovietswill tee increased ortuiltlci for subversion DBA political penotratior, rot only thrcuth increased Soviet influence,aohe introduction Ci' Soviet teehnienl oid cccmrclal pero-nuel Jn Me Arab states.

15. t'e believe tint thu ncc io dctertilr-ed to ovoid ruy kird of cl-oe rUcnntnt withvict nice. It Is ncet unlike ly thativlrtrice far Soviet eras in the fern or any Mnd cf political caj.'itne-jts whei. it his been waflUIng to payrice .'ar Ibrterv arris. The saue apprcher-sivs, suaplclcufl oatiooalion that caused Ecypt to rejectith the Westld'le Euot defenseitAtloo will probably work with equal farce aoiinet oiy efforts ofi#i"pec Lai position InShould Ejiyyt tecooe iurreasirclyn tie BlocdUtnrily, and ot the saw tiin wirro laolnted fron tho West, it nijfct eventuolly lose sonc cf its freedai to choose Its oriei.tation.



16. On the other, Soviet chorees ft* footer Ire Kcyiitlon neutroXlsa ore Dore prcuiBiitedio te. Stronc neutrcliol tendencies already exiet within the BCC ond oiocjj Its aupptrtere. Egyptian receipt of Soviet criui eld lo likely to strengthen thlfc ireliiatlon, portlculorly eincc Soviet old will roleebspes ofo to derived frou pin vice off the Soviets ord the West mnl; ot coeh other. Icltlolly ot least, lrdlr^nouo CuiucUtwill he iriproved hy Ecyption aceoptareo of_ Soviet Eloc old.

17* At present, tbe HOC roi;iue probably overeat 1'Titos ita ability to to*lie both the amianae risks oftin Soviet oruo offer. OTio ehcer technical probleno ofi:. -od uiintolnirvj tie relatively nouerr, mterlel Involved, quite rtsttc frm training Egyptian peroouel to use It effectively, will place tie reslro under strcra ctrvailsloao to odidt Greater buobc-roloc teehnlciano and trolnlnj; jerooiirel fur larger perioie then It probably cow tMike will be necessary. cquired theaer will be reluctont to elooe Egypt's doore to tie pcraoueel needed to taiko then uaeful. lorticulsrly if the USSH itself Old the bloc roiueseutatlveoo Eirypt oxa careful



otutcot to ovoid tho CgpoonTOt of hWrtttS political orCcoiiiia, tLlo relucVutcobecccie oven greater. Aid Ifould continue to provoke era frighten the reclr* by oet'tviet policies, on the border, the -Treasures to seek Dlocnd uHitary help would be ;xeat. This, In turn, would Lend tC icerufltot. Soviet borcalnlnr pewer and opportunities forwith eonseoneut Ddvoi:tctfes to lonc-tern Soviet political (Scale. Sliillorly, growinc ccouccdc eeperdonco or. the Clocr amotion cotton, debt five tho USSR increased power iojit either by threotocciv-cte. Tn accord with Its current policy cf relaxation of teveicee, the USSR will rsrixabV be very clrcutapeet iu lto relationeypt inncouroQe Dotius around the periphery cf tho Corxauist Dloc toeutioliot course aa on imxpenslve scd, iidced, profitablef nssurinc tbelr lotlepetdonce ard security.



to? SKtaafr

MptptoiKia cf riocassertion offiaciyn policy" haarofound lupreaslcrArab atates and lrjcror.ccs tbe choncee that Syriaa Soviet one offer. In view of tbe bo ale InstabilitySyrian polltlcol altuutton, the erentcr potential of thoSyrlnr. Ccrvvnlet Party (vhoee loaderienbcrandof leftlat elenoota In the army,of oa Incrcaciroly leftist course In Syria aregreater.

Arubtn'o rcslatcnce to bloc pooetrttion lo(greater than Qyrla'o and tho choncea of lte acceptingEloc oruo aid nay bo crjnsldered less. Hwever, Itsvlth the UK end tho atresia feelinge of the rulincthe threat fron Daahei-lte Iraq azA frori Israeltho Seudl coven* rot to help fiinnce Arab arc* deal*source asrab capobllltleeIeroclBtrtDCtheredinna for becerjouy ouenrjstatoa checked.

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TO? SfidtET


CO. Apart frcn the ii proved proepeeto for locol Ccau-ioU ond the eitcouifiirrent to reutrolier; In the Kiddle East arising frou tho Soviet-ficyptlan ana deal, it Is roeolbla that tho USSR ron In vlev the develotuat of furtherd difficulties U 'he Kiddle East. avjcnicii.eeeftlet 11 '. ln Syria, for euqpeAj would probably brine heavy ^ressuroe on tho US ond UK fron Turkey cnl Irao, to poruit lr.terver.tloc In Syria before the situation be core -irretrievable. Thteonfront the Vcot with tltc choice tl* eithererious lucrraso larab taniOBO or in-neriallli^ tlio XVuibdad Fact otructure. Pur^ierocre, the ovatly lccivotod Oenjer of one xoceo aid anjed couflleteroa resultingthe deal lo likely both to set CM part ofob world OGPi'iot the other cud th* Arch worldrot Israel. The fact that these basic eleavnoe* la effectt crmo-purpooeo to each other lo likelyo odd to theo the prooi^etenl deterlcrotion that vMlA probablyer zuch3 run advor.ta^en to international Coriirtiau tMR would the pursuithe Arab etateo of reutrallot policies. It is poeelble that the USSR will atteurt both to exploitrit of Oenevo" and to disrupt tha Western pooltlon in the Kiddle Boot byfericj concellatton of tho Ecwtiao arus deal la return for US withdrawalhe Dhohran baee and the abaiirtoiiDcnt of British nlUtcry orroruyAfi-nte with Jordan cud Xraq. The USSR nlnht olnoto'iotioc of the Arab-Israeli situationuodrlpcr-

tite (US, UK, France, USSR) pamtMi

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