APPROVEDATE:5
76
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
(Supersedesnd)
probable developments in north and outh vietnam through
submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organisations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.
Concurred In by the
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
ononcurring acre the Special Assistant,Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, VSAF; and the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative toC and theDirector, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.
v.
f'li
1
COP? HO '* ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OrTE
table of contents
Paragraphs
DISCUSSION
I.
LL NORTH VIETNAMCURRENT SITUATION AND
Internal Political
Economic Policies and Courses of
DRV Military
DRV External Relations and
Relations with the
Policies Toward South
Policies Toward Laos and
Policies Toward Other
TH. SOUTH VIETNAMCURRENT SITUATION AND
Internal
Foreign
IV. THE OUTLOOK IN
Probable Communist Courses of Action Toward
South
Trends In South
PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH AND SOUTH VIETNAM THROUGH
the problem
To analyze the current political, economic, and military situation in North and South Vietnam and to estimate probable developments through
conclusions
believe that the CommunistRepublic of Vietnam" (DRV) will, not attempt an open invasion of South Vietnamarge scale guerrillaeffort during the period of thisbecause of the danger of US orSEATO counteraction and because such action would prejudice Blocon peaceful coexistence elsewhere. The Communist regime will almostremain in firm political control throughout the period of this estimate, despite some passive resistance andeconomic difficulties. It will require continued large scale Bloc aid to make even limited progress towardelf-supporting economy. The DRV army will retain the capability ofthe total forces of South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.
In South Vietnam, the trend toward political stability and popular confidence in the government will probably continue,RV invasion, large scaleaction, or the death of Diem.such contingent developments as intensified Bloc support for DRVor reduction in Diem's international support could stimulate greatersubversive pressure, weaken the South Vietnam government's confidence, cause some loss of its public support, and revive opposition efforts forwith the north.)
Progress toward resolving basicproblems will probably continue slow, but economic conditions in South Vietnam are not likely to have serious adverse political effect* during the next year, as rice production, rubber exports, and large scale US aid provide reasonable living standards. )
All significant sect resistance in South Vietnam has been eliminated, but0 armed Communistsommunist political network scattered through the villages continue toerious internal security problem. The effectiveness of tlie South Vietnam army will probably improve gradually as more units are released from security missions for training, but byt will still be unable toRV attackrolonged period. )
discussion
Under the terms of4 Genevaon Indochina, the area of Vietnam north ofh parallel was placed under theof the Vietnamese Communists. The French assumed responsibility forof the Armistice provisions in the area south ofh parallel, but neither the French nor the Diem government has acknowledged responsibility for implementing the political settlement envisaged In the Final Declaration of the conference.
The UK and the USSR, as co-chairmen of the Geneva conference, met In London in April and6 and reaffirmed support/ for the political settlement foreseen atbut implicitly approved postponement of its implementation, including the nationwide elections. The co-chairman called upon all parties to preserve the status quo andthe International Supervisory and Control Commission <ICC) to continuethe Armistice. Thus no steps have been taken to bring about unificationolitical settlement In Vietnam, and the partitioning of Vietnam has been tacitly accepted by the Geneva conference powers for an indefinite period of time. In the meantime, theregime in the north and the Diemin the south have been developing their own institutions and preparing for anperiod of struggle for control of Vietnam.
URRENT SITUATION
AND TRENDS
Communist Party of Vietnamcalled the Viet Minh) and itsapparatus, the "DemocraticVietnam" <DRV) continue to exerciseeffective control over the estimatedinhabitants of North Vietnam.critically lacking inpersonnel, the Communista large number of experiencedworkers and lias made considerable progress in developing an effectivemachine. It has strengthened itsdespite severe food shortages, continued passive resistance to its internal policies, and tho gradual reduction of its prospects for early domination of all Vietnam.
Ho Chi Minh continues to occupy aposition among Vietnameseleaders, despite some de-emphasls of his public role. His prestigeationalistisignificant factor in the altitude of many people in South Vietnam andAsia toward the Vietnamese Communist regime. Power relationships at the levelHo are not clear, but party Secretary Truong Chinh, Premier and Foreign Minister Pham Van Dong, and army commander Vo Nguyen Giap appear to share top levelWc have no evidence of policy or personal differences among these three men or of the existence of "pro-Chinese" and "pro-Soviet" factions in the party.
The regime's primary concern In the past year has been to develop more effectiveover the people and the economy and to deal with such immediate problems asmalnutrition, widespread disease, famine, tightening of the party apparatus, and the development of the armed forces. Although violence and Intimidation have been employed selectively, the Communists have so far refrained from the publicized,terror employed in Communist China during the consolidation period. Strenuous efforts are still being made to rally popular support behind front groups on the basis of nationalist and unification slogans. The most important of these is TheFront which is designed not only to mobilize support in the north for Immediate reconstruction tasks but also to attractin South Vietnam for Communist efforts to unify the country.
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The Catholic population ofppears to be the main center of passive resistance to Communistand DRV control. The Communiststo have recognized the special nature of the Catholic problem and, probably with an eye both to reducing opposition andthe evacuees in the south, have moved slowly to restrict church activities. At the same time, they are attempting to weaken the hold of the clergy over the communicants by various means including visits of "puppet" priests from Eastern Europe. To date Uie Vietnamese Catholic hierarchy appears to have been fairly successful in maintaining Its position among Uie Catholic population.
The substantial ethnic minorities, who live outside the river deltas, have an ingrained dislike for all Vietnamese and there have been some Instances of armed opposition by Uie tribal groups of north and northwest Tonkin. To Integrate these minorities politically and to lessen their opposition to Communistthe DRV has established "autonomous administrative areas" nominally controlled by tribal dignitaries loyal to the Communists. In any event, Communist mililary andforces are capable of eliminating any active resistance In the north.
Economic Policies and Courses of Action
he regime Is moving gradually to extend Its control over all aspects of the economy, but It has not yet attempted detailed over-all planning, Uie nationalization of smallunits and domestic trade, or theof agriculture. At present, the regime is attempting to deal with immediate problems on the following priority:gricultural production;ie transportation network; andxport Industries,oal,phosphates, and textile and other light industries. Thus far Uie regime has notto stress heavy Industrial development and isajor portion of its industrial production on consumer goods.
he regime's major economic problem is to meet the minimum consumption needs of the population while developing aeconomy. Prior4 the annual rice deficit of North Vietnam averagedetric tons.esult of wartime damage to irrigation facilities and anseries of floods, droughts, and insect scourges, the rice deficit in each of the past two years has amounted to atetric tons. With shipments from South Vietnam cutricklehe DRV appealed to the Bloc for relief. However, imports throughof token shipments from Communist China andons of Burmese rice purchased by the USSR, have fallen far short of minimum requirements. In5 the DRV announced that the per capita food consumption In that year hod dropped at times to as lowalories per day.
There will probably be some Improvement in the food situation. The USSR has agreed to accept upons ofrice each yeart is likely that the Burmese will actuallyigh percentage of this figure and that the DRV willajor share of this rice.the spring crop6 will probably again fall below normal because of continued adverse weather, Uie extensive efforts of the regime to mobilize all segments of thefor irrigation repair, reclamation of abandoned land, cultivation of new land, and planting of subsidiary crops should leadradual increase in domestic output.
However, North Vietnam will not achieve self-sufficiency in rice in Uie next few years even with optimum weather conditions. Planned investment to increase the supply of fertilizers, pumps, improved seeds, andimplements appears insufficient toubstantial increase in output In the near future. Moreover, the currentfor redistribution of land will probably depress production.
Rehabilitation of modern industries has gone slowly dueack of raw materials, technicians, and equipment. Coal production5 is estimated to have been0 tons comparedons under Uie French3 and the pre-World War II peakons. The rate may reach
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onsermitting an exportons. By the end6 cement production may reach its former annual rateons. The large textile plant at Nam Dlnli returned to limited production in5 but even when operating at full capacity it will provide only about half of North Vietnam's requirements and it is dependent on Imported cotton.
With Chinese Communist technical and manpower assistance, rapid progress has been made in restoring transportation andfacilities. The rail link from Hanoi to the Chinese border at Nam Quan has been restored and the Haiphong-Kunming line will probably be fully restored this year. This construction will link southwest China with sea transport at Haiphong and the main Chinese rail system at Nam Quan, The line from Hanoi toh parallel is also being rehabilitated and it is possible that sen-Ice south to Vinh will be established by the end of the year. With Chinese assistance, the DRV has also made rapid progress inNorth Vietnam's highwayridge building program6 Is aimed at eliminating most of the ferries on primary roads. Rehabilitation of the Hanoi-Lai Chau route and of roads south from Hanoi towardh parallel will facilitate the movement of troops and supplies to any point along the borders of Laos and South Vietnam. Soviet assistance is making possible the improvement of port facilities at Haiphong which willexpedite the distribution of Blocand economic supplies.
The chronic deficit in the balance ofposition of the North Vietnam area has been deepened by the failure to restoreand Industrial production and by the abnormal requirements for foreign goods and technical aid. The foreign exchange position has also been worsened by the break intrade relations with theeasure of the deficit and of the critical economic situation is suggested by theof Bloc grants to the DRV. Inommunist China granted the sum0 yuan0 at official rates) and the USSRt officialmaller grants have been extended by several of the Europeanubstantial portion of the aid received has been in the form ofgoods.
believe that during the period ofthe DRV will continue towith moderate success, on effortsagricultural, mineral, and lightproduction. The DRV has theto increase exports and tomodest industrial development.least for several years, it will requireBloc assistance to support evenstandard of living and therelittle prospect for substantialto support rapid industrializationnear future.
DRV Military Strength
The "Vietnam People's Army" (VPA) nowotal strength ofen organized innfantry divisions,AA groupment,eparate infantry regiments,order andsecurity regiments. As the VPA continues its evolutionodern force, several more divisions may be organized usingseparate regiments. Although further substantial increases in the numerical strength of the army appeaready pool of semi trained manpower exists amongen now In regional and popular troop units. The recent announcement by the DRVroop reduction probablythe release of unfit personnel since the Armistice.
More extensive training was probably made possible by reduced commitments to Internal security missions and reconstruction projects, and multidmsional maneuvers were reported ine believe that about half of the major combat units are combat-ready and the remainder probably will reach that statusven at its present level of txairung. the VPA is capable ofthe total military forces of SouthCambodia, and Laos.
There were no significant changes in the dispositions of VPA units during the past
year and the largest concentration remains in the Delta region,iles Tromh parallel However, clandestine guerrilla operations, including Infiltration of small units, could be conducted against South Vietnam and Laos without major troop
Vietnamese Communists haveair capabilities at the presentsome air trairiing probably isCommunist China. It is possible thatwill have one or two regiments ofoperationalhere areFrench air fields in Northof which could be used with little orto support sustainedCommunist Jet fighters, and one ofprobably support sustained Jetoperations. The DRV has nonaval organization and coastalon small armed craft and
DRV External Relations and Policies
Relations with the Bloc. Wc believo that the DRV is firmly committed to the policies of the Slno-Sovlet Bloc, even to the extent of subordinating or postponing the pursuit of its local or regional objectives in the interest of over-all Bloc tactics and strategy. The attitude of DRV leadership follows from its Communist world outlook and from the fact that DRV objectives can only be realized with Slno-Sovlet Bloc support.
Despite its close ties with and dependence on Peiping and Moscow, the DRV on occasion acts in less conformity with the Bloc than the Europeanumber ofaccount for this special status. The Vietnamese Communists fought their own fight against French colonialism. The DRV possesses an army and security organization which was developed priorf Sino-Soviet material assistance. The appearance of relative independence created by some DRV actions may, nevertheless, serve to further Bloc interests elsewhere inAsia.
Over the past year, Bloc economic and diplomatic support may not have met DRV expectations. Bloc deliveries of rice have been far below levels necessary to prevent widespread debility in North Vietnam.visit to Hanoi inhe firstajor Soviet official, wasreat public occasion and DRV propagandasome expectation that new aid or economic agreements might result. No new Sovlct-DRV arrangements were announced, however, and in fact Mikoyan departedIssuance of the usual joint communique. The USSR also failed to press DRV demands either for the "strict implementation" of the Geneva Agreements with respect to north-south consultations and elections, or forthe Geneva conference. Theposition, as it developed at the April-May Geneva co-chairmen talks, acceptsof the status quo for the time being. Although the Chinese Communists have been more forthright in supporting the stated DRV position, the Soviet Union has shown noto support the DRV's basic objective of securing control of all Vietnam at the risk of Jeopardizing Soviet policy objectives in other areas or the Bloc's campaign of"friendship" and reducing tensions.
The rather aloof position of the USSR, which increases the dependence of the Viet-namese Communists on Communist China, may be disappointing to the DRV. Someof the traditional Vietnamese distrust of the Chinese probably survives amongCommunist leaders, despite the bond of Marxism, and the DRV may well wish that it could counter Chinese influence with closer Soviet ties.
Substantial differences over policy toward South Vietnam, and possibly Laos, maybetween the DRV and the USSR and Communist China if prospects for an early extension of Communist control to Southcontinue to decline. Even in this event, however, and despite the DRVs potential capacity for independent action, we believe that other considerations would prevail to cause the DRV to continue its loyal adherence to the Bloc.
Policies Toward Soulh Vietnam.full Bloc support for its reunification demands and recognizing that the6 deadline for elections would not be met, the DRV Is now adjusting its policies for the longer pulL The regime's public position that the Geneva provisions must be fulfilled and that nationwide elections must be heldunchanged. However, the DRV is now playing down the demand for earlyof the Geneva conference and increasing its demands for direct north-southThe DRV has accepted the position taken by the Soviet Union at the London talks that the ICC and Joint Armistice Commission should continue their functions despite the dissolution of the French High Command. The DRV has also enlarged the scope of its diplomatic activity to enhance itsprestige and position and to secure the broadest possible foreign support for eventual implementation of the Geneva Agreements.
At the same time, the DRV hasits network of political andcadres in the south. It has continued lis efforts to penetrate the government of South Vietnam and probably Is maintaining contact with non-Communist but antl-DIem Vietnamese, chiefly those now In exile, who favor conciliation with the north. Through use of nationalist themes and frontIt is attempting to retain popularIn the south. Ninety-five thousand men were evacuated from the south In the first few months following the Armistice.RV probably views this groupossible instrument for subversive activity in South Vietnam and some may have been retrained, relndoctrinated, and perhaps even reinfll-trated.
Policies Toward Laos and Cambodia. The Communist rebel movement in Laos, the Pathet Lao, is completely dependent on DRV support and assistance to maintain Itsin the northern provinces. Although the DRV continues to support the Pathet Lao, it has begun to soften its line toward the Royal Lao government. In place of its earlier criticism of the Lao government, the DRV now praises the Lao government's professed adherence to the "five principles ofencourages Laos toeutral foreign policy and to enter Into directwith the Pathct Lao to resolve their differences.
DRV policy toward Cambodia encourages neutralism and the establishment of wider contacts between the Cambodian government and the Communist world. The Hanoi radio has virtually eliminated its previously bitter condemnation of the Cambodian government and is now extravagant In Its praise offoreign policy and its "resistance" to alleged US "plots" to undermine Cambodian independence. Future DRV policies withto Laos and Cambodia will probably reflect the guidance of Moscow and Peiping.
Policies Toward Other Countries. In Its relations with other states in Asia, the DRV has attempted to Increase support for Its position on unification, to further theBloc peace campaign, and to obtaincontacts and recognition. AtNorth Vietnam is recognized by all Bloc countries, but no non-Bloc country hasfull diplomatic recognition. India and Indonesia have exchanged consularwith both North and South Vietnam and Burma has permitted the DRV toan Information Office in Rangoon. The DRV has taken special pains to woo thedelegates to the ICC.
The DRV has severely curtailedFrench cultural activities In Northand the much publicized commercial arrangements have been too restrictive to hold or attract any significant economicby the French. However, the DRV has won French agreement to the establishmentommercial and cultural mission In Paris. Its presence will complicate French relations with Diem and facilitate the maintenance of DRV influence among Vietnamese resident In France.
current situation
iii. south vietnam and trends
Political
uring the past year President Ngo Dlnh Diem's government has greatly strengthened
Its Internal political position in Southa country with an estimated population ofillion. The national referendum In6 established the legitimacy of the Government of Vietnamndthe elimination of Bao Dai as Chief of State andajor political factor in South Vietnam. By the end ofiem reduced Uie Cao Dai and Hoa Hao groups to political Impotenceeries of moves which culminated in the elimination of the Cao Dal army as an independentforce and the capture, trial, andof Ba Cut, the last important active Hoa Hao resistance leader.
n South Vietnam's first national elections,ercent of the eligible voters participated Ineputiesandidates for the ConstituentThe returns gave pro-Diemubstantial majority. Although nearly one-third of the government-favored candidates were defeated, no openly anti-Diem deputy was elected. This was due in part tomanipulation of the election campaign and in partoycott of the elections by most of th* opposition parties. Despite efforts by the Vietnamese Communists and other resistance groups to disrupt and sabotage the voting, the elections generally were calm and orderly. The Constituent Assembly will sitour-year term as the first National Assembly.
The deputies in the Constituent Assembly, which convenedarch, are divided among political parties as follows: NationalMovementevolutionary Workers Partyitizens Rallyovement of Struggle for Freedom; and Independents (including one Daihe NRM is the Diemprimary source of organized political power. Although Information Minister Tran Chanh Thanh Is Its titulararge part of the party is controlled by Diem's brother, Ngo Dinh Can, who controls CentralThe RWP,overnment party, is led by Diem's brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu. While the CR, MSF, and most Independents now support Diem, they contain some members who have reservations about some of Diem's methods and are potential centers ofopposition.
Diem will probably maintain hispolitical position in South Vietnamthe period of this estimate. Thewhich has been drafted under Diem's supervision, gives the President wide powers including the right to appoint the first Vice President and to suspend civil rights during the life of the first Assembly. Diem's personal prestige will probably be enhanced byin internal security and byfrustration of Vietnamese Communist objectives. However, he will continue to face serious problems in attracting additionalsupport for his government, in partof his reliancemall circle ofand trusted friends. While Diem'sof the Assembly during the period of this estimate will probably be adequate to insure adoption of any important measure he wishes enacted, his mcllnation toight rein on the legislature may accelerate theof an active opposition.
The appointmentice President by Diem,ill remove much uncertainty over presidential succcssorship.Diem's death, whether by natural causes or assassination, could result In seriousdisputes in the government and among the major political parties which could strain the new governmental institutions. Ngo Dinh Nhu and Tran Chanh Thanh, key figures in the RWP and NRM,reat deal of political power and would play important roles In any redistribution of power, butof these menide popularTo some government critics andsupporters Thanh symbolizes the more regressive features of the Diem regime. At the moment, Secretary to the President and Acting Minister of the Interior Nguyen Huu Chau appears to enjoy Diem's favor and has grown rapidly in stature and power, but he has no organized political backing apart from his support by Diem and Nhu. Ngo Dinh Can would probably play an important behind-the-scenes role in any redistribution of power, but his lack of national stature and poor
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health would almost certainly rule him outeading contender for leadership. Tran Van Lam, leader of the CR, Is ambitious and enjoys considerable popularity in theprovinces, but his political position is weak. Although the army high command has been trying to keep the army out ofthe prestige and strength of the army would almost certainlyajor anddecisive role in the redistribution ofpower. The numerous anti-Diemin South Vietnam and France wouldattempt to re-enter the picture and their maneuvers would add to the confusion.many of these men are discreditedof their past relations with Bao Dal, the French, or the Communists, and It is doubtful that any of them could musterbacking to gain control.
Economic
South Vietnam Is normally ansurplus area, exporting rice and rubber. During World War II and the civil war periods large portions of cultivated land were abandoned and the transportation andsystems deteriorated. Current rice production is less than two-thirds the pre-World War II levels, and exports5 were onlyons as compared with the prewar annual total of more than one million tons. Current rubber output0 tons exceeds the prewar level by0 tons and rubber has replaced rice as Southleading foreign exchange earner.igh market prices raised the value of South Vietnam's rubber exports4 and to more than half the value of all exports.
Because of the decline in rice exports and the large imports of consumer goods and,esser extent, capital goods for rehabilitation, South Vietnam isarge deficit In Its balance of payments.4 exports coveredercent of imports whileven with unusually high rubber prices,covered onlyercent of imports. At present, US aid is filling the gap and is an important factor in the relatively highof living prevalent in much of South
Vietnam. For the fiscal50 the planned level of US economic and military aid for South Vietnam totaled0 million (not including the value of US equipment already In Vietnam andto thet present the US is financing aboutercent of the GVNbudget,ercent of the combinedbudget, andercent of all South Vietnam's imports.
The withdrawal of French military forces, the termination of France's preferential trade status, and the loosening ofpolitical ties have combined to curtail the scale of French Industrial and commercial activity in South Vietnam. French business interests are withdrawing about as rapidly as Vietnamese restrictions on currencypermit. South Vietnam's Import trade is moving away from France toward Japan and the US.3rance supplied aboutercent of South Vietnam's imports.5 the figure dropped toercent and the downward trend is continuing. In the same two-year period, Japan's share of South Vietnam's imports has increased from three toercent.
The GVN has not yet effectively come to grips with its economic problems. President Diem has stated6 willear of economic consolidation, but through the first six months of the year, GVN attentionto be focused on security and political Issues. Only the most pressing economic problems have received serious governmentand those have generally been dealt with by ad hoc methods or authoritarianFor example the government hasto copeerious threateries of decrees controlling prices and inventories for many items andhigh fines and even the death penalty for attempts to corner the market. Thesehave contributed little to preventingand have aroused the resentment of the important Chinese community.pressures have been held in checkbecause the government has been able, with US aid, toairly high level of imports of consumer goods.
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has been slow in the resettlement of refugees and in the implementation of other measures to increase agricultural production. The limited land reform program inaugurated3 is unattractive to the peasant inwith extravagant CommunistLandlords are objecting to the low rents provided for in the program and theirplus the general lack of officialand administrative competence has led to the stagnation of land reform.
Nevertheless, the GVN has made some progress in building the organizationalnecessary to replace institutions of the French colonial period. The GVN has created an independent nationaloreignoffice, an investment fund, acommercial bank, and ancurrency. President Diem hasestablishmentigh Economicto guide the country's economicand he has made informal reference to the possibilityour or five year plan for economic rehabilitation and development. In addition, government officials nowubstantial import program andubstantial US foreign aidAlthough these new Institutions and economic activities provide an essentialfor further economic progress, they are not yet fully operative or effective.
Though South Vietnam cannot become economically self-supporting so long as It must maintain armed forces of the present size, its economic position could beimproved by economic and fiscalHowever, during the period of this estimate there is little prospect for marked development of South Vietnam's economy orignificant reduction in its balance of trade and budget deficits. Inflationaryare almost certain to continue.the foodritical politicalis likely to be more than adequate for domestic needs. Provided security conditions continue to improve, the GVN will probably give economic problems increased attention during Uie coming year and will probably be able to make some progress toward solution of several specific economic problems. Atoefugees onland has been developed and0 of these have already been relocated. This project will probably be followed byresettlement projects which are likely to reduce substantially the refugee problemUie estimate period. Additional land will probably be brought under cultivation. Some improvement Is likely in tax collection and in handling the problem of FrenchByconomic development planning will probably be well advanced, but concrete results are unlikely within the period.
Military
Current strength of the VietnameseArmy (VNA) isroops. The VNA Is organizedield infantryight infantryirborne,erritorial regiments, 5sect regiments, andssorted combat battalions. Although some progress has been made during the past year, the extensive plans for training and reorganizing the VNA have fallen behind schedule because mostunits have been dispersed with many of them engaged in security operations.VNA weaknesses are an inadequateand technical support system, anchain of command, and inexperience at the command and staff levels. At least six months of uninterrupted training will be nee- lS cssary to bring Uie VNA to minimumeffectiveness at division level. VNA loyalty to President Diem and his policies seems assured. The army's self-confidence and morale are generally good.
When Uie French High Command was inactivated onll previous French-Vietnamese military agreements were terminated. All French combat units have been withdrawn from Vietnam.uly,ew French army personnel remained in South Vietnam, in additionan French military support group for Uie ICC. The Vietnamese and the French are nowconcerning French support for the ICC and the French role in training theforces, particularly air and naval
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The primary US-directed effort has been the trainingietnamese instructor corps and the development of trainingthroughout the Vietnamese army. US personnel are detailed to VNA trainingto units at division level, and to major territorial commands to supervise progress and Implementation of the training program. The US military group In South Vietnam has been held to its pre-Ocneva size despite the near complete withdrawal of the Frenchwhich totaledersonnel prior to the Armistice.an US Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission (TERM) Is being established in South
South Vietnam's embryonic air force (VNAF) has grown only slightly during the past year. Its current strength3 trained officer and enlisted pilotsilot trainees. VNAFlanes, mostly trainer/liaison and transport types. Although the air force Isiston flghter-type planes, it Is unable to maintain even limited flightbecauseack of qualifiedpersonnel. The VNAFimited capability to provide air support to ground troops, artillery observation, air evacuation, liaison, and air lift for paratroop operations. No significant Increase in VNAF capabilities appears likely during the next two to three years.
South Vietnam's navy is under operational control of the Chief of Staff of the VNA and under the administrative commandenior naval officer. Personnel strengthen,arine Corps offficersen. The forces afloat, which have been augmented over the past year by additions from the withdrawing French forces,ubmarine chasersoastal minesweepers (MSCesselsmaller amphibious and patrol craft. The Vietnamese navy haseffectiveness, but it is capable ofriver patrol and minor coastal and amphibious operations. Capabilities should improve substantially In the near futureof continued US aid and Intensiveprograms which include technicalin the US and France.
believe South Vietnam's militaryforces are capable ofgovernment in power against anyarmed opposition now located south of17th parallel. In the event of largeguerrilla warfare supported byof men and supplies from thelarge areas of rural Vietnamwould be lost to government control.event of full scale invasion, theforces at present probably could notfor more thanietnameseadvance to the Ban Meline. If the trend towardsecurity and increased effectiveness
of the Civil Guard continues, it will beto step up training and reorganization of the VNA, thereby improving its capabilities during the period of this estimate. However, byietnamese forces will still be Incapable of delaying for more thanays an advance by DRV forces beyond the Ban Me Thout-Nha Trang line.
Internal Security
The Internal security situation in South Vietnam has Improved substantially during the past year. The sects are no longer asecurity problem for the GVN. Most of the Important non-Communist sect leadersear ago have either fled the country, been killed or captured, lost control of their forces, or rallied to the government. Remaining sect armed bands are scattered and disorganized and probably total no morearious bandit groups will probably continue to cause local disturbances, it Isthat organized non-Communist resistance will virtually disappear during the period of this estimate.
With the sect problem basically underthe Communist underground represents the only serious threat to internal security in South Vietnam. Reports on Communist armed strength In the south over the past year have rangedur best estimate of current strengtho
Jl
withrganized in skeletal company and battalion sized units which could be expanded throughThese armed forces are generallythrough the mountains paralleling the Annam coast and the remote swampy regions of Cochin-China. They are capable ofactions against VNA outposts and ofintimidation, assassination, sabotage, and terrorism, especially in rural areas. They could disrupt north-south traffic throughout Central Vietnam and interfere seriously with provincial and local administration.any sustained guerrilla operations wouldlow of reinforcements and supply from the north.
The Communists have an unknownof political cadres In the south engaged In subversive and propaganda activities.Communist cadres probably exercise effective control over some remotewhere the GVN has not yet attempted to establish its authority, and have somein villages through much of Southover-all Vietnamese Communist political influence In the south appears to haveduring the past year. However, if the Communists decide to exercise their capability for armed intimidation and terror they could quickly reassert political control or influence, at least in some rural areas where GVN authority is tenuous.
During the past year the Communists in South Vietnam have remained generallyThey have passedumber of opportunities to embarrass the Diem regime. Although some cadres and supplies are being infiltrated acrossh parallel, the DRV probably has not sent any large scaleor supply to the south.activity in the south appears toon protecting vital bases and supply caches, developing clandestine paramilitary organizations, androadof infiltration and subversion. While seeking to maintain intact as much of their armed strength as possible, their main activity seems to be an effort to weaken the Diemby subversive and political tactics. Communist directives Indicate thatand subversion of the GVN military and security forcesajor objective. Although there is little specific evidence, they probably have penetrated lower echelons of the VNA, especially the integrated sect forces, andhold positions of influence in somegovernments and village councils. Local Communist groups probably gave some assistance to the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao forces opposing the government. Since the collapse of sect armed resistance it is possible that the Communists are seeking to take over the remnants of the sect forces.
GVN hasivil Guardthe VNA of many static internalduties. Current strength of theis0 menlightly-armed mobile companies. Itsis to maintain law and order, collectand conductat the provincial level inby the army. Althoughand refinement In its trainingwill be necessary before thecan fully discharge itshas shown considerable potential as anfor maintainingan village Self-Defense CorpsDoan) is being organized to provideat the local level.
Foreign Relations
GVN foreign policy objectives are to win recognition as the legitimate government of all Vietnam, to obtain maximum foreignand economic aid and guarantees ofassistance in the event of Communist aggression, and to develop foreign support for its position with respect to the GenevaForty-one nations have recognized Uie GVN. In addition, India and Indonesia maintain consular relations with the GVN.
President Diem consistently hasthat South Vietnam is not bound by4 Geneva Accords and has no legal responsibility for their implementation. He has refused to deal directly with the DRV on any issue and has been steadfast in his rejection of all-Vietnam elections untilprocesses can be assured in NorthHe believes that any consultations or implied recognition of the DRV would have
adverse political effects In the south and could lead to increased internal andpressure for reunificationoalition government with the Communists.
His refusal to permit nationwide elections and to assume responsibilities under theAccords raised the possibility of aof the ICC following the deactivation of the French High Command in April. To deal with this situation, representatives of the Geneva co-chairmen (the UK and the USSR) met In London during April andhe USSR failed to press DRVthat the co-chairmen reopen theconference. Instead, the co-chairmen finally agreed upon identical letters to the DRV and GVN requesting them to prevent any violation of military clauses of theAccords, to insure implementation of the political terms, to submit at theonvenient deadline for direct consultations and for holding all-Vietnam elections, and to give every assistance to the ICC. The co-chairmen requested tlie ICC to continue supervising the Armistice. Theythe French government to continue its good offices in support of the ICC, to reach agreement with the GVN to facilitate the task of the ICC and the Jointnd to preserve the status quo until such new arrangements could be put Into effect.
Despite his past refusals to assumeunder Uie Geneva Accords, In his response to the co-chairmen's message Diem agreed to respect the Armistice and tosecurity for ICC members. He recognises the deterrent value inherent in the presence of the ICC, and appears willing to take action necessary to continue Its function butto avoid the acceptance of any legal obligation under the Geneva Accords.
Franco-Vietnamese relations continue to reflect considerable ill-will and distrust on both sides. Recent causes of friction include disagreements concerning the future status and role of French military training missions, residual military base rights in Southand the equivocal French attitude to ward the Communist regime in the north. The French now exercise little Influence In Vietnamese affairs and there is little prospect for any Improvement In relations In the near future,
South Vietnam-US relations haveclose and friendly during the past year. There have been few evidences ofresentment of Increasing US influence and activity in South Vietnam despiteefforts by tlie Communists and some local French to stir up dissatisfaction on that score. The GVN would like the US to raise the mutually agreed celling on VNA force levels and desires greater autonomy inthe foreign aid program. Diem would also like the US to exercise maximum political pressure, especially on the UK. India, and France, to enable the OVN to avoid any responsibility for the Geneva Accords.
Relations between South Vietnam and Cambodia have been strained by activities of resistance groups in border areas, byof minority groups, by boundaryand most seriously by disagreements relating to traderadeearly6 was removed throughmediation by the US, and by the terms of settlement official representatives have been exchanged for tho first time. The basic causes of friction remain, however. Vietnam does not desire full diplomatic relations with Cambodia because It fears such action would lead to Cambodian recognition of the DRV as well. There are no pressing problems in Lao-Vietnamese relations and South Vietnam'swith the Philippines and Thailand are generally good.
IV. THE OUTLOOK IN VIETNAM Probable Communist Courses of Action Toward South Vietnam
DRV probably estimates thatfor securing control of Southby means short of open attack orguerrilla action supported fromwill gradually diminish with theof time. As Indicated by SovietCommunist performance in the past
JHsT
several months, the DRV probably cannot expect strong support from the Bloc for the "strict implementation" of the GenevaThe lack of strong Bloc pressure strengthens international acceptance of the status quo in Vietnam and increasesin the future in South Vietnam.the DRV may still believe that it could obtain control of all Vietnam tlirough ICC supervised nationwide elections, Viet-
namese
creaslngly doubtful on this point because of their own Internal difficulties and thenationalist stature of Diem. The DRV probably also believes that its covert assets in South Vietnam will gradually decline If the Diem government is permitted toon internal security and economicfree of external harassment.
Despite the declining prospects for the "peaceful" take-over of South Vietnam, we believe that the USSR and Communist China will almost certainly continue unwilling to support open DRV military action against South Vietnam during the period of thisThey are probably unwilling to risk the chance of US or SEATO intervention which would make it difficult to limit theto Vietnam, and probably believe that overt DRV military action would seriouslythe worldwide effort of the Bloc to win friends and supporters. Although the DRV retains the capability to launch anmilitary action against South Vietnam, the chances of such action in the absence of assured Bloc support appear to be extremely
The only remaining course of actionng out some promise for the earlyof Communist control In South Vietnam appears to be the development of large scale guerrilla warfare in the south. In recentumber of reports from sources of untested reliability have indicated that the Communists may have started preparations in both South Vietnam and in the north to begin guerrilla action. DRV allegations of Vietnamese violations of the demilitarized zone alongh parallel and Communist claims of US-Diem plans to violate thecould be propaganda cover for theof guerrilla action against the south.
owever, the possible indications of armed action appear inconsistent with the DR Vson the continued functioning of the ICCwhich isosition to make at least limited observations of DRV activities.guerrilla action in South Vietnam, if it were to be sustained and not to result simply
elimination
of Communist cadres, would require large scale support from the north. This wouldsome risk of detection by the ICC and of Intervention by the US and possibly SEATO. It would also tend to prejudice currentmaneuvers elsewhere In Asia. For these reasons, we believe that the DRV will refrain from Instituting large scale guerrilla action within South Vietnam during the period of this estimate. Communistfor guerrilla warfare In South Vietnam will exist for some time, however, and the chances of their being employed wouldIncrease in the event of any substantial deterioration In the domestic situation in South Vietnamsuch as might conceivably occur on the death of Dlcm. The chances of Communist guerrilla warfare would also be Increased by deterioration of the International aspects of the situation, suchithdrawal of the ICC under circumstances which would permit the Communists to place the blame for this event on the GVN.
he DRV will continue to seek maximum Bloc support for Its objectives and will seek, within the limits of Bloc strategy, to harass and undermine the government In SouthIt will continue to seek direct contacts with South Vietnam, offering economic and cultural exchanges while castigating Dlcm for "blocking" unification. It will continueto penetrate the government of South Vietnam and to improve Its covertthroughout the area. It may attempt to Increase pressureseconvening of the Geneva conference and to unsettle the Dlcm government by fabricating or provokingalong the demarcation line and byof armed strength within South Vietnam.
Trends in South Vietnam
a major Communist effort tothe Diem regimo by renewal ofguerrilla operations, the over-allfor improved security of Southgood. The VNA, as its trainingas more units are released fromduties, probably will be able toextend government authority intoof present Communist Influence.In by-pass Ing theithout evoking large scalereaction will reassure manyand encourage them to cooperateprograms to expose and root outContinued Improvement inwill depend in some measure onability to deal withsocial problems and on thethe administrative apparatus.
If the Communists were lo undertake large scale guerrilla action In South Vietnam, they probably would not be able to develop widespread popular support, especially If the VNA were to register some early militaryThe GVN is being increasingly acceptedationalist alternative to Communist leadership. Public confidence in the GVN, combined with general war-weariness, may have already reached the point where any effort to upset the government by force would leadtrong popular reaction against the guerrillas.
The trend toward Increased politicalin South Vietnam will probably continue during the period of this estimate andDiem will probably continue to exercise effective political control. The trend toward authoritarian rule through the politicalled by Diem's relatives and small circle of trusted associates will probably continue.and neutralization of governmentand men disliked or distrusted by Diem will also continue. Diem and his associates are likely lo exert strong pressures against any opposition in the Assembly. Thus it Is not likely that Diem or his government will meet any serious opposition tn the National Assembly during the period of this estimate; however,onger period theof grievances among various groups und individuals may lead to developmentational opposition movement. The major economic problems will undoubtedly continue and over the longer run may handicap South Vietnam in competition with the Communist north, but economic conditions are unlikely to affect political stability during the period of this estimate.
espite the moderately favorable outlook projected for South Vietnam, the situation contains many elements of instability, and progress will continue to depend on firm USumber of contingentcould create new tensions among the foreign powers concerned as well as between the GVN and the DRV. For example, the steps which Diem is willing to take toward .facilitating the operations of the ICC may not be adequate to satisfy India whoseserves as chairman of the Commission. Should the Commission withdraw, DRVmight well be intensified andCommunist pressures on the diplomatic level would probably increase. The UK might become less firm in its support of Diem'sWeakening of international support forarked increase in Bloc support for the DRV,ubstantial increase inactivity within South Vietnam would probably weaken the government's confidence In its position, cause some loss of publicand lead to renewed efforts by opponents of the regime in the direction of reconciliation with the north.
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Original document.
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