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CONTENTS
Page
Summary and
I. Introduction , j
il. Developments in Managerial Reform . . . .'
of the Managerial Structure
and Reduction of
of .
of Central Operational Controls .
Ministerial Changes.
and Union-Republic Ministries
in Ministerial Status .
Azerbaydzhan' Ministry of the Petroleum Industry
as an Example of the Recent Reforms . '.
of the Petroleum Industry'
in Azerbaydzhan Before Creation
. of the New Ministry .
of the Azerbaydzhan Ministry
' of the Petroleum"Industry . .
Changes Under the New Ministry
of the Reforms .
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Appendixes
Pace
Appendix A. Decrees end Orders of IheMinisters, USSR,Managerial
Appendix B. Ministries Changed from All-Union
to Union-Republic Status in
Appendix C. Methodology . 41
Appendix D. Gaps in
Appendix E. Source
.,
Following Page
Figure 1. Changea in the Organization of theof Trade,
Figure 2. Changes in the Organization of the
try of the.Timber Industry,
Figure 3. Changes in the Organization of theof Light Industry (FormerlyIndustrial Consumer Goods),
Figure 4. Changes In the Organization of the Petro-. leurn Industry in Azerbaydzhan SSR,
CIA/SC/RR
(ORR
RECENT REFORMS IN SOVIET INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT*
Summary and
Since the death of Stalin the USSR hasumber of administrative reforms for the purpose of increasing managerial initiative and efficiency. Growing manpower shortages have led to the attempt to transfer personnel from administrative tojobs in order to improve the ratio between white-collar and other workers. The reform program has included streamlining managerial structures and reducing staffs, simplifying plans and planning procedures, delegating more control over operations to enterprise management, and transferring several ministries from All-Union to union-re public status.
The national planning process was simplified by reducingthe amount of detail referred from lower administrative levels to the central specialized agenciesGosplan, Gosekonom-komissiya, and the Council of Ministersfor approval. Much of this detail now is included only in Soviet ministerial plans and not in the over-all economic5 the plans of many chief directorates and enterprises also had been simplified. Thesemade it possible to transfer certain functions andfrom higher to successively lower managerial levels. Ministries began toore important role in planning. however, did not begin to assume an authority comparable to their responsibility for plan details and plan formulation until6 Plan was being formulated, and even then their actualstill was small.
* The estimates and conclusions contained in this report represent the best judgment of ORR as
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Aa in planning, the relaxation of central operational controls first became noticeable at the ministerial level, which received increased discretionary authority to schedule production and die-pose of resources. Following this, the powers of enterprise " R" managers were increased, and recently they wore given the right within specified limits to change technological processes, to alter internal tables of organization, to carryover wage funds into eub-sequent plan quarters, to spend working capital for repairs, to dispone of surplus materials, and to accept independent purchase orders from other enterprises and organizations. These changes may bo expected to improve Soviet industrial management.
Another development in the relaxation of central operational control has been the establishment of regional centers of authority through the change ofll-Union ministries to union-republic status.* In the industries concerned, important regional centers of production are now under ministries at the republic level. Many responsibilities formerly dispersed among several independentin the field aa well as in Moscow have been thus broughtingle local authority. Moreover, many staffs andcentral and local, were either eliminated or consolidated.
* The reorganization of these ministries from All-Union to union-ropubli status moant establishing subdivisions of them in one or moro re-*publics and, consequently, increasing the authority and responsibility of these ropublics while simultaneously decreasing the centralapparatus in Moscow. In the US, for example, if the national government wereive the State ofertain degree of operational control over the Tennessee Valley Authority, the change would be roughly analogous to this organizational change in the USSR.
The establishment of union-republic ministries resultededuction in the supervisory apparatus of the parent ministries and the transferumber of functions and powers from Moscow to the republics. This decentralization>had less to do with policymaking than operations, where the delegation of responsibility is substantial.
Tho newly created ministries in the republics are, in fact, handling more and more of the administrative details required in theof production.
The attempt to reduce certain central controls has brought the Soviet government face to face with the difficult task of stimulating lower level initiative without undermining discipline, ofense of participation among managers without giving them the right to challenge basic policies, and of encouraging managerial reform without allowing an unreasonable (from the central point of view) amount of freedom of action. Consequently, agencies outside of the formal managerial hierarchy, such as the State Bank, the Ministry of State Control, and the Communist Party have been directed to intensify their surveillance of industrial management. This may partly offset the liberty of action granted to ministries and plant directors by the reform measures.
I. Introduction.
Beginningeforms in Soviet industrial management were gradually introduced which, by the sunamerad developedroad program for the correctionumber of shortcomings. This program stresses the following:ccelerating technologicalore rational geographic distribution in Sovietaising labor productivity, not only bymeans, but also by revamping the whole wage andsystem;eforming the industrial planning procedure in order to eliminate waste and inefficiency.
The importance which Soviet leaders attach to these policies is indicated by the fact that they have been incorporated within the Sixth Five Yearnd that several high-level agencies have been created to supervise important aspects of the program. The production targets of the Sixth Five Year Plan are based on the
expectation that this program will help to increase output in the existing facilities toegree that the achievement of plan goals will be" -: -*
Soviet leaders have publicly recognized since the death of Stalin that serious defects in industrial planning and managementesult of overcentralization during the war and theperiod of reconstruction. On many occasions they have publicly acknowledged that these practices tended to discourage the initiative and flexibility of management at the production level and to divert substantial resources and personnel to unproductivein tho staffs and departments of the administrative management hierarchy. The reform program was designed to correct this situation.
The program of managerial reform attempts to cut down on wasteful administrative practices and to decentralize certainfunctions. Detailed central planning for specificand local areas, the central hiring and firing of personnel for the lower levels,eneral lack of sufficient authority on the part of managerial officials below the Council of Ministers levelfrom ministers to plant managersave, for example, received particular attention.
Soviet decentralization may involve two distinct approaches. First, the authority to make certain decisions may beorganizational unitshat is, -Junctional decentralization. inister in Moscow, for example, may delegate some of his powers to the head of one of the chief directorates of his ministry. Second, the decentralization may be primarily geographical in naturefor example; the Minister of Ferrous Metallurgy. USSR, may delegate some of his decision-making power to the Minister of Ferrousin the Ukrainian SSR. Decentralization would then result in the establishment of more than one policymaking center for setting targets and controls for lower organizations. These centers of policy would have at least limited power to establish and pursue divergent procedures if not policies.
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In current Soviet usage, decentralisationimited concept which is applied to operational management more than to broad policymaking. igh degree of contralizedhas been the guiding principle of the Soviet economy. In the absence of the price systemoverning factor in investment determination in the USSR, the central determination of investment policy is the indispensable substitute. The technique of allocating investment from Moscow makes necessary the centralof both procurement and sales of goods and commodities. Soviet officials therefore give no consideration to the theory that the contra! government should relinquish its power to issue guiding directives on economic planning, to allocate resources, to establish basic plan quotas, to select managerial personnel, to organise checks and controls over plan implementation, and to order measures for removing shortcomings in production. The Soviet system is based on the assumption that basic policy decisions concerning the allocation of resources as well as the power to establish economic targets and to supervise their execution will continue to bo theof the central government. Intermediate or lowerlevels are not being given the authority to establish or pursue economic targets which differ from those established by the central authorities. Lower Soviet managerial organs, however, are being given somewhat greater discretion in determining how the economic resources under their control can be, used to fulfill plan quotas.
The current Soviet approach to managerial reform is thus an attempt to setocal area of authority more compatible with local responsibility in the production process. Soviet leaders now hold that the central authorities should concern themselves only with central or major responsibilitiestherwise, they srewith administrative detail-and the managerial hierarchy is complicated and confused. By permitting managerial personnel at the scene of operations to decide more of the detailed questions in the formulation and implementation of production plans and by restricting higher officials to the solution of fundamental problems, it is expected that greater efficiency and flexibility in management, increased productivity, and more efficient use of resources will be achieved. The methods employed to achieve improvement involve,ealignment of the existing balance between direct and indirect controls ratherundamental change in the system of Soviet management.
11. De-velppments Managerial Reform.
A. Simplification of tbe Managerial Structure and Reduction of Staff.
Soviet policymakers have attempted to eliminateadministrative links between the central and the local,levels of industrial management and towithin the ministries which perform similar functions. have tried to reduce the number of workers engaged inand clericallaborate organizationaloverstaffing were criticized even under Stalin, but thefeature of the new regime's program is mat it isall levels of the managerial hierarchy to
The administrative weaknesses which have been mostattacked in the USSR are the following: onfusing,ministerial chain of command extending downward from the minister through the chief directorates, regional directorates and associations, combines, and trusts to the individualreat number of sales and supply organizations at all levels of the hierarchy; and numerous and varied central ministerial departments, all of which have hadin directing fieldin such matters as construction and repair.
* For serially numbered source references, see Appendix E.
Simplification of the structure of the higher echelons of control was the first step taken to correct these deficiencies.he Minister of Finance, Zverev, announced by4 that ininistries and departmentshief directorates and independentupplyffices, and numerous smaller subdivisions weree also claimed that the administrative staffs of the Soviet ministries and departments had beenercent2/
Alsoncreased attention was given to theof republic ministries and directorates and ofthe local governmental apparatus. 7/
The establishment of union-republic minis-
nesignificant consolidation of authority in the geographic areas concerned and notably reduced the number of independentand support organizations operating as separate entities.**
Simplification of the managerial structure made it possible to reassign some administrative personnel to productionouncil of Ministers decree of0 (under Stalin)ercent reduction in the administrative staffs andwage funds of all organizations. 9/ 3 the new leaders ordered anotherercent reduction in adrninistrative-management personnel and expenses. Personnel released from administrative assignments were to be transferred to directactivity. 45 there were indications that these decrees were being enforced and that reductions were being made in both administrative tables of organizations and wage
* See Appendix A.ee III and IV, pp.elow,uller discussion of this development.
The effectiveness of the Soviet drive to transfer managerial personnel to production jobs is rathor difficult to appraise. Lateulkov, Chairman of tho Council of the Union of the Supreme
Soviet, USSR, indicated to the Yugoslav ambassador that theof persons released from the state apparatusillion. There were, howevor,hat administrative personnel releasedorganisation found similar jobs elsewhere, and thecarried out by abolishing unfilled positions or bytitles without changing the functions of the employees concerned.racent report indicates that salaries of administrative andclasses in the USSR are being cut drastically in orderresistance to the government's policy of In his budget speech to theininister of Finance Zverevin theearhe number ofin the administrative apparatus of enterprises,and organizations had been reduced by, atsavingillion rubles. - .
B. Simplification of Planning.
.. .
Soviet leaders have sought to improve planning by directing the specialized planning agencies to concentrate on fundamental problems of economic development and the current operation of the economy and by relegating to lower managerial levels thefor detailed planning. This directive was implemented by dividing tho old State Planning Committee (Gosplan)5tate Economic Commission (Gosekonomko miss iya)tate Planning Commissionhich were made responsible for short-term and long-term planning, respectively. The responsibility for the economy-wide planning of production specialization wasin these new planning agencies. They were also given the task of improving the general distribution of productive forces in the The State Economic Comrnission was directedtrict control over timely deliveries and inter-departmental In this manner these specialized agencies were made immediately responsible for specific planning problemsto important phases of national economic planning.
Simultaneously, planning responsibilities of less general significance were transferred to intermediate and lower managerial
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level*. Beginningn effort wti made to simplify the national plan and to reduce the amount of detail referred to the central planning authorities for approval. In line with this policy, the number of products listed in the national plan for industrial productionor example, was reduced to one-third of the number included in3 Plan. Thiseduction Between45 Plans alone, the list of products was reduced byercent. Specific items eliminated from the production plan include industrial products consumedingle ministry and not in short supply, products of region* or republics intended primarily for local consumption rather than for regional economic development, and goods produced by small subsidiary enterprises such as those attached to construction organisations or departments of workers' The national plan continues to include all products not produced in sufficient quantity to meet the demand of all sectors of the economy.
Similar reductions of detail were made in other sections of the national plan. 45 the total number of detailed eatimatoa included was reduced byhe state supply plan, for example, no longer lists products manu- ' actured and conaumedingle branch of industry ormall number of consumers. Categories of allocated equipment and the list of organizations for which allocations are prescribed were Likewise, limits* for manpower and the wage fund were set for ministriesholeinimaly basic branches in the labor plan Only the wage fund and the number of laborers wereetails related to such matters as on-the-job training were eliminated completely.
The capital investment plan was simplified by redefining above-limit projectshat is, projects which require special approval from the Council of Ministers because of the size of the expenditure involved. Before the reform, projects-costing above tho range ofoillion rubles, depending on the type of project, required specific approval from the Council, but now tho range of expenditure not requiring Council approval haa been raised from the previous level tooillion rubles. Thisin permissive expenditure reduced the number of above-limit
projects byercent The expenditure limitconstruction projects requiring Councilillion'toillion'rubles in5 Plan, andwas eliminated from the Apart fromhowever, plans for the regional distribution of newand the sire and type to be built still require
Details eliminated from the national plan are nowat the ministerialower level. Theubstantial increase in the planning prerogativesministers. In recognition of this fact, they werenumber of specific'powers. With the consent of thendustrial ministers may now changetheir subordinate units .in the various republics, krays,of the RSFSR to produce specific types of products,amending the over-all Ministers may alsofinancial plan for production of individual itemsimitercent of the total authorized amount,formally; changing theirn addition, they havegreater discretion in reallocating the working capital oforganizations, transferring credits, and determiningneeds for capital repair of fixed assets.
'x - x-:
* The State Economic Commission would now presumablyfor changing, current production plans.
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.Ministerial control over the planning and utilizationlabor, and financial resources similarly has beenwith4 Plan, allocations of materials and suppliesministries, were consolidated, and the latter determined theiramong lansimilar practices with respect to manpower. Only theof laborers and their wage fund was-specified centrally,ministry deter mined, its own needs forand other categories of personnel within the generalits labor plan.
The Central Committee of the Party and the Council of Ministers, by Decree No.2ranted enterprises the right to participate in formulation of Five Year The official line for many years has been to urge enterprises toore active role in drawing up Five Year Plana, but previously no effort was made to provide them with the powers necessary for effective participation. The new policy of simplifying planning was also extended to the enterprise level. The ministries wera in- tructcd to reduce the number of forms and details in the annual technical-industrial-financial plan of enterprises. Moreover, the procedure for ratifying the enterprise plan was improved. nowraft plan to the ministries which contains estimates and proposals relating only to basic factors such-asin monetary and physical units, the number of workers and employees, the wage fund, and the projected increase in labor32/ The draft is signed by the director, by the secretary, and by the chairman of the plant, party, and.trade union committees, respectively. The latter two officials may formally dissent from tho recommendations of the director./ After the basic goals of the plan have been approved, the details of the complete technical-industrial-financial plan are worked out by the enterprise and approved by the director. The final plan is then sent to the minis-trios ior control purposes. .
Enterprise directors have aTso been granted the right.to establish and change internal tables of organization and, uponof their plants' customers, to modify quarterly production plans for finished items, except thoso which are mass
The implementation of planning reforms has proceededslowly. National considerations necessarily take precedence, and in dealingumber of local problems the Soviet government is still somewhat reluctant to relax central controle. By Orderfor example, the Council of Ministers, USSR, restricted the authority of Soviet ministries and departments and of councils of ministers in the republics to redistributeand to chango the volume of capital investment in approved annual/ The order specified that in the future such changes
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could be made only on the authorization of the Council of Ministers, USSR. As recently asaburov, head of the State Economic Commission, indicated that overriding nationalfrequently have caused the Council of Ministers to alter the more narrowly conceived ministerial decisions and36/
In spite of these restrictive tendencies, however, thehas been on carrying through the transfer of'planningfrom the Council of Ministers and the planning commissionsministries. The latter now exercise greater control over theand allocation of resources to subordinate organizations.also have been urged to show greater initiative innew powers. In4 the Minister of Finance,criticized rninistries for referring to the Council ofquestions which they had the authority to decide for themselves:the XXth Party Congress inaburov made-the but indicated that he thought the situation-was
The-success of the planning reforms at the enterprise level, however; is more uncertain. In4 the Minister pf Finance, USSR, acknowledged that excessive detail and supervision still characterized the planning process under manyarticipants in the Industrial Workers Conference in the spring and summer5 and in the July session of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party similarly complained thatof action of enterprise managers was still unduly restricted.
The high-level emphasis on compliance with the mana-
gerial reforms accelerated the planning process, and6 Plan was ratified by the Council of Ministers as early as
c- Relaxation of Central Operational Controls.
The immediate objective of the current managerial reforms ie to diminish excessive centralization not only in planning but also in many types of managerial control. The new approach is tothe freedom of action of agencies and persons engaged in the direction of production. This applies to ministries, which now exercise greater control over their supplies and manpower, as well as to directors of individual enterprises.
Inumber of key industrial managers were caUedeeting of the full Party Presidium for consultation on the position of enterprisen the following month, some of them (apparently with the support of key Soviet leaders) complained vigorously about lack of powersational conference of industrialheir principal complaints wereby Bulganin In his report to the July Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, as follows:
At present the director of an enterprisehave the right to spend funds on theof organizational technicalwith the introduction of advancedand rationalization proposals. He .isof the possibility*of acquiring, onof turnover funds, inventoryrequired for production. Thethe director of an enterprise regarding of personnel lists and the utiliza-
tion of the wage funds allocated for this purpose have been excessively restricted. The directorlant cannot independently accept and execute orders placed by other organizations even in those cases when some production sections of tho plant are not working to capacity and the order could be executed without harming the basic program of the enterprise. There are other questions as well which at present have been removed from theof the directorowever, should be given the right to decide them.
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A restriction of the rights of directors ofresultsowering of their responsibility for the state
Bulgahin also emphasized the need for increasing the authority of foremen, and the Partyesolution stressingecessity forhe powers of directors, heads of -shops and foremen'inpecial commission was set up toew statute dealing with the powers of enter- rise
The high-level interest in this problem has alreadyconcrete reforms. By Order9prilof Ministers, USSR, empowered enterprises toand The enterprise manager also hasto accept from other enterprises and Organizationspurchase orders which cover the -production of goodsraw materials and stocks of the customers or fromproduction waste of the enterprise, provided that their useinterfere with the production The enterprisenow change technological processes in the production ofparts, on condition that this will not resultin anof quality, an increase in production costs,hangetechnicalinally,has been authorized to alter the structure andshops and other internal divisions within the general limitslabor plan, to carry over wage funds from one quarter toquarters of the same year, to spend working capitalrepairs up to the limitubles, and to exercisein using assigned funds.
The introduction of additional reforms can be expected as work progresseslanned Statute for the Rights of Enterprise and Trustoviet management analysts recently have suggested more far-reaching reforms. They stress the need for removal of restrictions on the freedom of enterprise directors to
* As late as5 the special commission on thewas* still preparing the.
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introduce technological improvements on their own initiative, for even with his new powers the enterprise director may spendcapital for such purposes only upimithis proposal, however, may encounter resistance, forestriction clearly indicates that Soviet leaders are reluctant to weaken central control over investment.
Soviet analysts also have proposed that the sharpbetween fixed and working capital should bo abandoned and that enterprise directors should be given much greater control over their free working capital and should be permitted to usefor investment or capital repairs without "petty tutelage" by financialt also has been suggested that ministries should be permitted to reduce the production plans of enterprises in order to make up for initial losses incurred in introducingchanges. Other regulations which have come under attackhe exclusive right of ministers to authorize the transfer of dismantling ofhe right of financial organs to fix wage rates,he former mandatory limits on tables ofand wage funds for enterprise administrative
The broader implications of this problem are discussed in an article which points out that reforms can have little practical effect unless ministries and other supervisory organs are prohibited from interfering with the legitimate"activities of enterprise directors. Theherefore, maintains that such superiors should have no authority to restrict the exercise of initiative at the enterprise level unless explicitly empowered to do so by the Council of57/
It has also been pointed out that enterprise directors are not offered incentives commensurate with the initiative expected from them. They do not receive higher remuneration for producing high-quality as against low-qualityoreover, although encouraged and sometimes even forced to improve production methods, they are penalized if the experimental introduction ofresults initiallyrop of the annual production figure below the plan quota. When the annual plan provides for theof technological improvements and corresponding savings
in production costs, enterprise directors.have to bear theif the anticipated savings do not Thus they have to assume the full risk involved in technological progress without being offered corresponding rewards in case of success.-Another practice which does not stimulate managerial initiative is that of transferring above-plan profits from efficient enterprises to enterprises making little or no;profits.
Possible, solutions to these shortcomings are being Withxespect to the practice of draining off above-plan profits, it has been recommended that ministries be prohibited from altering the working capital of plants after the plan has been finally approved and amended. It has also been suggested that the redistribution of, enterprise funds should be carried out or supervised by appropriate-financial organs other than the.
Implementation of the now policy of reducingof managerial control has proceeded somewhat slowly. practices of the kind which have been widely criticized continued to prevail until, quite
H 'Tho-*cnanges already introduced, aovret le.
mo aiieiniun given oy rop soviet leaders to new proposals for im-and the inclusion of managerial reform in thethe Sixth Five Year Plan, however, indicate that Sovietto carry through the new policy. ':
Soviet leaders are aware of the risks involved in relaxing central controlslanned economy. Increases in theauthority of intermediate and lower management obviously arry with them the danger that decisions may be influencedegional or local rather than national considerations. Moreover,elaxation of central controls may mean .that top administrators will not.be cognizant of actions inconsistent with broaderbjectives. For these reasons, measures lo-tighten surveillance by control agencies, outside of the ministerial'hierarchy have"
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accompanied the above reforms. tate Committee of the Council of Ministers on Technology (Gostekhnika) was created in5 to oversee the introduction of automation and other technologicaltate Committee on Labor and Wages (Gosudarstvennyy Komitet pa Voprosamarabotnoy Platy) was established to superviseevision of work norms and the wage and incentives system.
Many of the existing control agencies also have beento exercise greater vigilance in enforcing state economic directives. In his speech to the XXth Party Congress, Khrushchev urged the Ministry of State Control, USSR, to improve itsover the execution of Party and governmentarty committees repeatedly have been directed to give more attention to production matters and to the implementation of central policy In the Gor'kiy Motor Vehicle Plant, for example, the Party committee forced the management to review6 Plan three times in order to find means of increasing production
Trade unions and the banks have also been directed to exercise greater vigilance over lower level managers. Gosbank, for instance, by the Decree ofas been given greatly increased monetary control over enterprises. Among other things, Gosbank may now imptfae severe penalties onenterprises which fail to fulfill their profit plans. By the same decree, Gosbank has also been given more control over the inventories of
These actions show that the aim of Soviet leaders is to achieve better organized and more efficient agencies and methods of control by relaxing some central controls, but notomplete abolition of control from Moscow. Central determination of basic policy has been maintained, but participation in tbe decision-making process has been widened, and when particular circumstances have made it desirable, there hasubstitution of local for central decision--making. By this approach, Soviet policymakers may reasonably expect to increase managerial flexibility, to stimulate
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the initiative of intermediate and lower management, to reducecosts, and generally to improve Industrial efficiency. Although higher officials have shown some reluctance to relinquish some of their power, and the tightening of external controls such as those exerted by the Ministry of Finance, Gosbank, and Goskontrol may somewhat offset the effects of relaxing central control, the Soviet leaders apparently expect to carryrogram of reform in the relationship between central ministerial control and local ministerial or enterprise management.
Ministerial Reorganizations.
The reforms in planning and operational management have been accompanied by organizational reforms at the ministerial level. They have been essentially of two typesnternal administrative simplification and change of tho basic structure of ministries from All-Union to union-republic. Three Soviet ministries underwent rather extensive internal reorganization These were the Ministries of Internal Trade, the Timber Industry, and Industrial Consumer Goods. The objective was to improve the administrative structure by making it more simple and flexible and to delegate more authority to lower echelons of management. In addition, oviet ministries had their status changed from All-Union to union-republic. The chief purpose of this type of reorganization was to transfer some of the functions of the parent ministry in Moscow to the republic level.
A. Internal Ministerial Changes.
* See Figureollowing
In4 the Ministry of Internal Trade wasin order to simplify its structure, to eUminate superfluous departments, and to decentralize some of its operationalpowers. The accompanying chart* describing the changes within the Ministry showsumber of chief directorates,and offices were abolished or reformed, into fewer It is noteworthy that those organizations apparently best suited to republic control (department stores, delicatessens, and the like) have been so relocated. Before the reorganization.
CHANGES IN THE ORGANIZATION OF THE MINISTRY OF TRADE,
I0-S6
1
directorates and offices existed for various commodities such as tobacco and salt. Many of these organisations have beenand the functions of several others have been transferred to more appropriate existing units (such as placing the educational establishments under the Directorate of Personnela logical move). ollowup to this reorganization, virtually all trade enterprises subordinated to the central ministry were transferred to tho jurisdiction of the republics and to the local governments.
In theonths4 thereumber of minor reorganisations within the Ministry of the Timber and Psper Industry. These changes* involved transfers of some subordinate units both within and outside of the Ministry,onsolidation of some organisations, the reduction of some ad-ministrative-managoment staffs, the abolition of some directorates and departments, and the regional decentralization of several units from Moscow to the field. This regionalizationesult of the censure of the Minister of the Timber Industry for maintaining chief directorates in Moscow which should have been located in the field.
* See Figureollowing* See Figureollowing
Late4 and early5 the Ministry of Industrial Consumer Goods was reorganized because of complaints that it had superfluous intermediate links of administration, that its managerial activities werend that its technical guidance of enterprises was inadequate. For example, in one oblast,ubles worth of flax fiber were said to have been procuredrocurement apparatus0 rubles to Theesulted in the' dissolutionumber of directorate! and subdivisions. The management personnel of fhe Moscowwaa reduced more thanercent. umber ofwere consolidated and simplified, and some local industry was removed from central control and placed under local70/ Since these extensive reform measures did not put an end to criticism of the Ministry, in5 it was broken upinistry of Light Industryinistry of the Textile71/ Evidently many problems within the industry persisted,
and on6inistries were again joined into 1of Light Industry. The reorganizing decree noted that,exceptions (artificial fiber, artificial leather, andfabrics, and enterprises producing machinesnterprises of the Light and Textile "Minis triestransferred to the jurisdiction of the appropriate ministriesrepublics. .
The chief objective of the reorganizations discussed above was to improve managerial efficiency. The main techniques used for this purpose were the abolition of superfluous and parallelorganizations, the reduction of the'central ministerial apparatus, the transfer of some centrally controlled organizations to the control of republics, and the clarification of the managerial chainof command within the ministries.
B. All-Union and Union-Republic Ministries.
Apart from the aboveetermined effortmade to decentralize some Soviet ministerial functionsthe status of several All-Union ministries to;
Soviet ministerial organization consists of three The first is the All-Union. Historically it hasof the heavy or basic industrial category, such asof Heavy Machine Building, Defense Industry,and Shipbuilding. Some ministries engaged in basichave also been of the All-Union typeexamples are the of.Foreign Trade and of .Transportation. Theare highly centralized, and most of theircontrolled directly from Moscow, althoughew subordinate field. .
The union-republic is the second type of Soviet ministry. Unlike the All-Union, the .union-republic ministries have sub-.ordinate or counterpart union-republic ministries in one or more of the Soviet republics. The union-republic Ministries ofunications and of Agriculture, for example,'have subordinate
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CHANGES IN THE ORGANIZATION OF THE MINISTRY OF LIGHT INDUSTRY (FORMERLY MINISTRY OF INDUSTRIAL CONSUMER GOODS), 3
ministries in alloviet republics. The basic purpose of this type of ministry is toess centralised administrative setup with more operational control exercised by republic-operatedso as to improve the operation of the industry concerned and toettor utilization of local resources.
The third category is the republic ministry. Theseare roughly similar in most republics and usually handle such functions as education, social insurance, local industry, andeconomy. The republic ministries have no counterpart on the national level and are only members of the councils of ministers of their respective republics. The authority of this form of'ministry was enhanced by the Soviet decree on decentralisation ofn which one All-Union ministry (River Fleet) and two union-re public ministries (Justice, and Automobile Transport and Highways) wero abolished at the national level. epublic Ministry of the River Fleet was established in the RSFSR, with directorates to be formed in other republics where appropriate. The function of operating the legal institutions and authorities of justice was turned over to the republic ministries of justice (in effect, the union-republic Ministry of Justice's counterpart ministries in the republics were transformed by this decree into republic ministries). Presumably, functions of the former Ministry of Automobile Transport and Highways which do not deal with roadbuilding (there ishief Directorate of Road-building attached to the Council of Ministers,ave been taken over by the republics.
C. Changes in Ministerial Status.
Since4 the status ofll-Union ministries has been changed tone union-republic ministryas been changedhief directorate attached to the Council of Ministers, USSR; and two union-republic ministries (Justice and Automobile Trans pott and Highways) have been abolished at the national level. In this period of time, no union-republic ministry was changed to All-Union. The ministries changed from All-Union to union-republic status are Communications, Ferrous Metallurgy,
See Appendix B.
Nonferrous Metallurgy, the Coal Industry, the Petroleumeology and Mineral Conservation, Construction, Construction of Metallurgical and Chemical Industry Enterprises, HigherPaper and Wood Processing, Procurement (now Grainand Construction of Coal Industry Enterprises. The stated reasons for the change in the status of these ministries were to further tho development of the republics, to decentralize and streamline the central governmental apparatus, and to solve some -of the longstanding problems in certain functions and areas of the According to the most recent decree, tbe altera- ons were feasible because there are increasing numbers of experienced managerial and technical personnel now at tho republic
Some additional factors were involved in the change to union-republic status of the Ministries of Communications, FerrousNonferrous Metallurgy, and the Petroleum Industry, as follows:
The Ministry of Communications was convertednion-republic ministry in4 after two internalhad been undertaken34 for thoof consolidating and simplifying, the organizationalne reason given for tho change was that the Ministry was over-centraiised toegree that itshVver-all operational efficiency One of the weaknesses criticised was the lack of authority given to "authorised agents"the top communications officials in each republic. For example, kray and oblastof communications were controlled directly from Moscow instead of being made subordinate to the authorized agents of their respective Other structural and operationalof this Ministry included inflexibility in supplemental financing and confusion of chains of command in personnel81/
The change in the status of the Ministry of Communicationswas caused largely by the realisation that the communications sector of the economy had developed its techniques and capabilities to the point where strict central control from Moscow could be partly
Under the new setup the union-republic Ministry in Moscow will still exercise direction in all important matters, but it will delegate to the republic counterpart ministries minorduties, such as organization of the lower level units and control of the day-to-day operations of local enterprises and facilities. Personnel complaints, requests for housing andand many of the duties previously performed by the authorized agents will be assumed by the republic The change in the Moscow Ministry's status led to the delegation of minorfunctions to the republic ministries. The maintenance of centralized operational control is essential because the trunk-line facilities of the communications system intersect all of tho political boundaries of the country. Centralized control also is important from the point of view of national strategic policy, the need for standardization of system and procedures, and the re-quirementiof uniform manpower training.
The two ministries in the metallurgical industry were also changed to union-republic status because of criticism of overcentrali-zation. Following the conversion of tbe All-Union Ministries of Ferrous Metallurgy and Nonferrous Metallurgy to union-republic status inubordinate Ukrainian Ministry ofMetallurgyazakh Ministry of Nonferrous Metallurgy were established. .
Before this change the metallurgical industry waswith the Ministry in Moscow supervising manythe activities of its field units. Relatively minor mattersthe failurelant to receive reducers for washinganother plant, the lackpecialistertain plant,request to detach workers were all referred to Moscow for84/ f " "
'The establishment of subordinate Ministries ofCoal, Communications, Paper and Woodthe Light and Textile Industries in the Ukraine has-and planning and financing practices by reducingof the Ukrainian Council of Ministers and of local
Thus new union-republic ministries and somecounterpart republic ministries have been created;that many subordinate units in various industries (coal,oil, iron, steel, meat packing, dairy products, textiles,materials, and motor and communications facilities)transferred from central to republic jurisdiction and thatenterprises had been placed under republichese measures have brought about someof decision-making power which in turn should stimulateinitiative and more realistic planning and financing ofmanagerial units, thus expanding and improvingof the '
IV- Azerbaydzhan Ministry of the Petroleum Industry as an Example of the" Recent Reform*.
Serious shortcomings in the management of theindustryajor factor in the decision toMinistry Of the Petroleum Industry, USSR, from All-Unionstatus and toounterpart MinistryPetroleum Indus try inufficientexists on this reorganization toase study which isto be reasonably descriptive of the operations andof recent Soviet managerial
. Organization of the Petroleum Industry in Azerbaydzhan Before Creation of the New Ministry. *
* See Figureollowing
' Before the new Ministry of the Petroleum Industry in Azerbaydzhan was established, the various units of the petroleum"
top sLawr
industry in that area were supervised by several organizations which were on about the same administrative level. Each of these organizations was subordinate to the All-Union Ministry of the Petroleum Industry! USSR, and reported directlyhiefin Moscow. The Azerbaydzhan Refining Associationor example, controlled all refining activities in Azerbaydzhan and was directly subordinate to the Chief Directorate of Refining (Glavneftepererabotlca) of the Ministry of the Petroleum Industry, USSR. Thirtoen refineries and plants and the AzerbaydzhanRefining Construction Trust (Azneftezavodstroy) wereto Azneftezavody. Similarly, the old Azerbaydzhan Petroleum Association fAzneft'),which directed field activities in oiland extraction, was subordinate to the Chief Directorate of Extraction in Western Areasn Moscow. Subordinate units of Azneft1 included organisations or Associations "for Offshore Extractionxplorationonstructionhe Offshore Construction Trusthe Electrical Installation Trustndetroleum trusts. The petroleum trusts consisted of oilfields and so-called independent
Several other administrative organs in Azerbaydzhan had the same relationship to the Ministry of the Petroleum Industry, USSR, as Azneftezavody andhey included the Petroleum Machine -Building Trusthicn was subordinate to the Chief Directorate of Petroleum Machine Buildinghe Territorial Construction Directoratehich was subordinate to the Chief Directorate of Petroleum Construction (West)he Gas Trusthich wasto tho Chief Directorate for Gasnd the
* In this discussion, Azneftezavody and Azneft' have been described in some detail in order to illustrate the general organizational pattern of the oil industry in that area. The fact that other organizations have not been described in similar detail is not intended to indicate that they were administratively inferior or subordinate to the above.
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Tor rircK-ciJ
Technical Supply Trusthich was subordinate to tho Chief Directorate for Technical Supply"
Under this system, associations, directorates, and trusts in Azerbaydzhan were subordinate to different chief directorates in Moscow, and managerial coordination was poor at both the central and the republic levels. An additional complicating factor was the existence of three intermediate administrative levels between the All-Union Ministry of the Petroleum Industry, USSR, and thein/ This cumbersome structure resulted in obvious inefficiency. Some trusts, although in charge ofilfields, engaged in so much administrative work that their field operations had to be reduced. The subordinate oilfields and plants in turn experienced an exceedingly heavy administrative burden, especially with respect to reporting and Trust and oilfield staff and production officials spent an inordinate amount of time in negotiations for local services provided by units subordinate to different supervisory agencies. These difficulties were further aggravated by frequent chunges In orders from chief directorates in Moscow. The Chief Directorate of Petroleum Machine Buildlngi for example, reportedlylant's production scheduleimes in theonths
B. Organization of the Azerbaydzhan Ministry of theIndustry.
The Azerbaydzhan Ministry of the Petroleum Industry was established in4 and was made responsible for allions of the union-republic Ministry of the Petroleum Industry, USSR, in that area in an attempt to remedy the condition describedhe organisations formerly in charge of refining and industrialbecame chief directorates of the new Ministry, and new Chief Directorates for Inland Extraction (Glavasneftedobycha) and Offshore Extraction (Glavazmorneftedobycha) were set up toextraction activities. The latter two directorates took over theetroleum/trusts' and prospecting trusts which Were formerly subordinate to Azneft' and reorganized them into field
The former Azerbaydzhan Territorial Construction Directorate retained the same designation under the new Ministry and now supervises the Offshore Construction Trusthe.Refinery Construction Trustnd the Building and Assembly Finally, several former organizations were converted to Directorates for Petroleum Sales, Capital Construction, Geology, Workers' Supply,Supply, and
C. Operational Changes Under the New Ministry.
The changes in Azerbaydzhan simultaneously centralized authority in that area under the local Ministry of the Petroleum Industry and decentralized to that Ministry some of the control previously exercised from Moscow. This pattern illustrates an underlying concept of the reform program that strong local authorityecessary condition for the relaxation of control from the center. In line with this concept, the reorganization in Azerbaydzhan abolished parallel operating levels, established clearer lines of subordination, amalgamated or eliminated various construction organizations and supplyeducedstaffs, and greatly simplified the relations between service, staff, and producingoreover, at least six former associations and trusts, including Azneftezavody (nowhich previously reported to as many chief directorates in Moscow, now formally report only to the Azerbayd-ahaiuMiniatry, .which in txirn report* -oparentMinistry of the Petroleum Industry. USSR, in Moscow or tochief directorates of the latter- Local administrative responsibility was thus unified,ore rational structure was created.
By4 the Azerbaydzhan Ministry was inoon it began to assert its right to be the channel through which administrative questions concerning units of the Azerbaydzhan petroleum industry should pass, I
Kit
r
elatively satisfactory division of planningbetween central and republic authorities apparently ia being achieved in the Azerbaydzhan petroleum industry. By simplifying plan details the Moscow Ministry has confined Its control largely to important questions of policy and to regional plan allocations of national totals. Local planning activities and those problems which relate more to operational considerations than to broad plan targets now are handled increasingly by the Azerbaydzhan Ministry. This Ministry, with the consent of tho republic Council of Ministers and the' central planning agencies, may change plana approved forunits (upimit ofercent of the plan for petroleum products Set for the republichole) without formally changing its plan or budget./
The planning of supply programs was also simplified by tho general management reforms introduced in the USSR.
esult of the necessity for central allocation of resources in the USSR, the Chief Directorate of Supply of the Moscowhas continued to play the major role in procurement activities.
1
Decentralization has not proved toanacea, however, and-criticism of the managerial situation in the area continuedome time after the establishment of tbe new5 Plan-fulfillment announcements in the Azerbaydzhan petroleum industry indicate that real progress had been made. In5 the Azerbaydzhan Minister of the Petroleum Industry announced triumphantly, that5 all branches of the industry had reduced production costs below tbe planned leveln the firstonths of the year, costs had been reduced byillion rubles. He also indicated that the plan for increasing labor productivity had been overfulfilled byercent an absolute increaseercent over5 levelnd that the annual plans and Five Year Pl*nsa)ready had been/ Subsequent announcements indicated that in the final tally the Ministry fulfilled5 Plan for gross pro- uctionercent and its plan for increasing labor productivity/ The Minister further stated that thepreviously criticised had been rectifiedonsiderable
-
extent. The formation of the Azerbaydzhan Ministry and themeasures to relax centralization in management wereimportant factors in these successes.
V. Significance of the Reforms.
The steps thus far undertaken to improve manageriala recognition by Soviet leaders that effectiveentrally planned economy callsasicthe division of responsibilities between the various levels ofhierarchy and not merely piecemeal efforts todeficiencies. The specific measures adopted havea rational approach to the problem of improving the systemplanning and administration. Considerable progressmade with respect to simplification of economic plansprocedures, partial decentralization ofand authority, and improvement of the over-all or- structure. y
Available evidence indicates that the planning3 have been implemented in several important The simplification of the national plan and the concomitant reduction in the amount of detail referred to the centralave'in considerable measure been carried through. Thisat each level has been accompaniedorresponding transfer of planning functions and responsibilities from higher to successively lower administrative levels. Although the assumption of additional planning powers by the ministries was realizedrogress toward increasing the role of the enterprise in planning has been slower; Only in the formulation of6 Plan were therethat enterprises were working out details of annualndustrial-financial plans on their own responsibility. There is also evidence that some use was made of the new right ofto participate in the drafting of Five Year Plans when the Sixth Five Year Plan was prepared. The actual influence exerted by enterprises, however, was still rather negligible.
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Developments in decentralisation of operational control have paralleled those in planning. Increased freedom of action was first manifested on the ministerial level and took the form ofontrol over the scheduling of production and the disposition of resources. It was not untilowever, that firm progress was made toward increasing the powers of enterprise directors. During tho remainder of the year the latter were given more freedom in directing production operations. They may now, within specified limits, change technological processes, alter internal tables ofcarry wage funds over into subsequent plan quarters, spend working capital for capital repairs, dispose of surplus ma-terials and supplies, and accept independent purchase orders from other enterprises and organizations. The reforms alreadyand those now in the offing are expected to improve the whole structure of enterprise management.
Reorganization of the ministerial structure in several Soviet industries4 has also improved the internal management of the industries. This has resulted in simpler and more rational organizational structures, more clearly defined responsibilities in ministerial chains ofimited decentralization of the Moscow-centered decision-making power,eneralof administrative costs. Industrial management has measurably benefited by these changes.
The most important single organizational innovation has been the conversion ofinistries from All-Union to union-ropublic status. Its announced purpose was to "bring administration closer to production" byumber of ministerial functions and establishing responsible centers of administrative authority in the republics. In line with this, policy, ministries have beenin republics which are important production centers for the industries concerned. This has resulted, at least to aome extent, in reductions in the supervisory apparatus of the Moscow ministries and in greater freedom of operational action for lower level
* The various managerial reform measures undertaken in the USSR are expected to result in increased productivity asby the rise in output of the Azerbaydzhan petroleumfollowing the limited ministerial decentralization in'that republic.
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APPENDIX A
AND ORDERS OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, RELATING TO MANAGERIAL REFORM
of Decree or Order
?
401
?
Date
35
64
13
95
3
533
Subject oi Decree or Order
Expanded the right! of ministers of the USSR Granted to ministries certain rights toequipment Granted to ministries and departments of the USSR and the union republics and to the enterprises and establishments the right to finance certain expenditures throughfromepublic, and local, budgets4
Expanded the rights of ministers
Granted the Ministry of Procurement certain rights to organise some local organisations of its ministry
Expanded rights of managers
Granted to enterprise directors the right to sell surplus material and supplies
Reduced the administrative staffs ofand subordinate organizations
*
Number of Decree or Order
of Decree or Order
4
5
5
5
5
6
4
an increase in the amount for financing above-limit capital investments Changed the procedure of state planning and
financing of uniondecentralization indecentralization indecentralization indecentralization
Changed the status of some ministries)
All-Union to union-republic, placing a>
of enterprises under the jurisdiction of
union republics and authorizing further:
creases in the rights of ministers of thei
republics'
Restricted the authority of ministries
departments and of republic councils of
ters to redistribute appropriations and to change the volume of capital investment in approved annual plans.
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APPENDIX B
MINISTRIES CHANGED FROM ALL-UNION TO UNION-REPUBLIC -STATUS
IN THE USSR
of Change
444444456
6
66
Ferrous Metallurgy
Nonferrous Metallurgy
Coal Industry
Petroleum Industry
Communications
Higher Education
Paper and Wood Processing
Geology and Mineral
Construction ofand Chemical Industry Enterprises
Construction ofEnterprises
Procurement (now Grain Products)
Republics with Counterpart Ministries
Ukrainiankrainian
Belorussian and Uzbek
Azerbaydzhan
All
Ukrainian Ukrainian Kazakh. .
Kazakh, and Ukrainian
Ukrainian
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BLANK PAGE
APPENDIX C
METHODOLOGY
This report began with the charting of Soviet objectives in the managerial reform movement. Within this framework theof the movement were analyzed on the basis of both official public announcements and covert intelligence sources.
' Si
BLANK PAGE
APPENDIX D
GAPS IN INTELLIGENCE
Several gaps exist in the available information concerning recent Soviet managerial reforms. With respect to basic Soviet policy, the deficiency isatter of detail. The general character of the improvements already introduced or scheduled is known, but information concerning many of the specific details of policy directives is not yet available.
Information concerning the effectiveness of the managerial reforms already introduced, however, is much less satisfactory. Twelve ministries have been changed from All-Union to union-republic status, but only in the cases of the communications and the petroleum industries was concrete evidence available concern-ine the operations of the newly created union-republic ministries.
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BLANK PAGE
APPENDIX E
SOURCE REFERENCES
Evaluations, following the classification entry and designated "Eval.ave the following significance:
Source of
ocumentary
-
by other sources
-
reliable
-
true
-
reliable
-
true
-
reliable
-
-
usually reliable
-
false
-
reliable
-
be judged
-
be judged
"Documentary" refers to original documents of foreignand organizations; copies or translations of such documentstaff officer; or information extracted from such documentstaff officer, all of which may carry the field evaluation"
Evaluations not otherwise designated are those appearing on the cited document; those designated "RR" are by the author of this report. No "RR" evaluation is given when the author agrees with the evaluation on the cited document.
-
-top srritrjL_
i;]yReport (USSR and Eastern-Europe),
OFF IKft*; Eval. RR 3.
Joint Committee on Slavic Studies. Current Digest of the
Soviet Press, vol6. U.
Eval. RR 3.
10.
11.
, Specific Personnel Reductions at State Reserves and Trade OrganizationS-jJ-
S. Eval. RRR 3.
Moscow. , C. Eval. RRDD Summary, Data on USSR Consumer Goods Industries8.. OFF USE. Eval. RR 2.
Eval.
U.
York Times, U. Eval. RR 3.
FBIS, Dally Report (USSR and Eastern55. OFF USE. Eval. RR '
4 OFF USE. Eval. RR' DD Translationhe System'of National Economic Planning Indexes, OFF USE. -Eval. RR 3.
. "The Reappraisal ofoviet Studies, volo. U. Eval. RR 3.
-
21.
22.
23.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
FF USE.,.
DD Translation* USE. Eval. RR 3.
OFF USE. Eval.DD Translation,OFF USE. Eval. RR 3.
bid. ,
.. OFF USE. Eval. RR OFF USE. Eval. RR OFF USE. Eval. RR. 9. OFF USE. Eval. RR OFF USE. Eval. RR 3.
trengthening the Apparatus
16.
oi Soviet State^ Administration, p. R. Eval. RR 3. FDD Translation,rF USE. Eval. RR 3.
.. OFF USE Eval. RR 2.
OFF USE.
1 FDD Translation..FF USE. Eval. RR OFF USE. Eval. RRtate, Moscow. Dsp,val. RR 3.
1?
33.
34.
U.. OFF USE. Eval. RR 2.
| FDD Translation,.
"OFF USE. Eval. RR 2.
1 0raining Personnel in the
of Initiative and Businesslike Methods, p.FF USE. Eval. RR 3.
Dozortscv, V. A. "Pravovoye polozheniye promyshlennogo predpriyatlya" (The Legal Position of the IndustrialSovetskoyeravo, no 8,. U. Eval. RR 2.
Pravda, U. Eval. RK 3.
-
7'OH
.. OFF USE.eval. RR 2.
| FBIS. Daily Report (USSR and Easternupplement, pt U. Eval. RR 3.
OFF USE. "Eval. RR 2.
< 'IS, Dally Report (USSR and Eaatern
Eval. RR 3.
OFFval.9. 2.
| FBIS. Daily Report (USSR and Eastern0 OFF USE. Eval. RR 3.
Ibid. . OFF USE. Eval. RR 3.
Davie, op., aboveK volo.
U. Eval. RR 3.
so. r '
y .
DoEortaev,, above).
. Ibid.
.. 1. OFF USE. Eval. RR 3.
State, Moscow. ,. 1. OFF USE. Eval. RR 3.
Dosortsev, op., above).
Ibid.
U. Eval. RR 2.
-
sccacT^
63.
64.
65.
66.
op. U. Eval, RRop..
Davis, op.,. U. Eval. RRp.. U. Eval. RR
Dozortsev, op.
CIA. CIA/RR. Soviet Implementation of the Driye for Automation, C.
FBIS, Daily Report (USSR and Easternupplement, pt OFF USE. Eval. RRravda. U. Eval. RRbid. , U. Eval. RRzvestiya, U. Eval. RR 2.
] FBIS, Daily Report (USSR and Eastern OFF USE. Eval. RR4 OFF USE. Eval. RR4 OFF USE. R 3. OFF USE: Eval. RR 3.
|,. OFF USE. ^Eval. RR 2.
Summary OFF v"
Sayetskaya torgovlya, U. Eval. RR 2.
I FBIS, DailySSR and Eastern4 OFF USE. Eval. RRDD Summary, above).
Ibid.
State, Moscow. ,val. Doc.
1 ""BIS,Daily Report (USSR and Eastern OFF USE. Eval. RR 3.
-
1 UI'
FDD Summary, abova).
Pravda, U. Eval. Doc. Ibid. , U. Eval. RR 3.
I FBIS, Daily Report (USSR and Eaatern. OFF USE. Eval. RRKhrushchev speech)
| } OCI, Current Intelligence Digest,R 2.
U. Eval. Doc.
CIA. GIA/f rganization and Functions of the Soviet Ministry of Communications,
.
. 2.
CIA. CIA/ ^RR.. TS CIA. CIA/RR. Change in Status of thery of Communications.
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TOP CfiCKEI
89.
CIA. CIA. CIA.
FBIS, Daily Report (USSR and Eastern OFF USE. Eval. RRzvestiya,. 1. U. Eval. RRakinskiy U. Eval. RRcftyanoyc khozyaystvo, no U. Eval. RR. 2. U. Eval. RR 2.
55. C. Eval. RR 2.
54. C. Eval. OFF USE. Eval. RR 2.
90. Hakmskiy rabochiy, U; Eval. RR 2.
Ncftyanoyc khozyaystvo, no U. -Eval. RR 2.
:
Bakinskiy U. Eval. RR 2.
Pravda, U. Eval. -
Bakinskiy rabochiy, U. Eval. RR0 U. Eval. RR 2.
U. Eval. RRravda. U. Eval. RRzvestiya.. 2. U. Eval. RReftyanoye khozyaystvo. no U. Eval. RR 2.
-
Eval. RR 2.
Bakinskiy rabochiy, U.
9. Eval. RR3. Eval. RR9. Eval. RReftyanoye khozyaystvo, no U. Eval.
khozyaystvo, no'. Eval.
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' top iKfrnrr.
Daily Report (USSR and Eastern OFF USE. Eval. RRetty ano yc khozyaystvo, no.
U. Eval. RRir, AFOIN. 2. U. Eval. RR0. U. Eval. RR | FBIS, Daily Report (USSR and Eastern OFF USE. Eval. RR 2.
-
jfJCtt/.T-
OFF USE. Eval. RR OFF USE. Eval. RR 1 EBIS, Daily Report (USSR and Eastern OFF USE. Eval. RR4 OFF USE. Eval. RR 2.
State. Moscow. OFF USE. Eval. RR U. Eval.. Isvestiva.. 1. U. Eval. RR 2.
} I FDD Summary,ata on USSR
Extractive Indus tries. C. Eval. RR' | FBIS. Daily Report (USSR and Eastern OFF USE. Eval. RRbid. , OFF USE. Eval. RR6 OFF USE. Eval. RRbid., OFF USE* Eval. RR0 OFF USE. Eval. RR0 OFF USE. Eval. RRravda, U. Eval. RR U. Eval. Doc.
Original document.
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