SPKCIAL NATIONAL IirrnJ-IGKBCS ESTIMATE JOUfr ATOMIC EHHBGT TJBEUJOBKX CCKMTPT2S
EFFECTEST MOHATORIUM Off THE SOVIET WEAPOHS DEVELOPMENT PROGKAH
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This estimate was prepared and agreed upon by tho Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Comlttee, which la coDpoecd of representatives of the Department of State, Amy, Navy, Air Force, the Atcadc Energy CoesilBBlon, the Joint Staff end the,Central Intelligence Agency. The FBI abstained, the subject being outside of its Jurisdiction.
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SPECIAL NATIONAL INTEJJJGEPCK ESTIMATE
OittTORIUM ON THE SOVIET WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM
THE PROBLEM
To assess the Impact of effective total or limited nuclear test moratoriums on the Soviet nuclear weapon development program.
CAUTION
Por the limited purpose of this estimate, we have assumed that any moratorium entered Into WILL be effective and we have NOT examined the very important questionoviet violation of such moratorium could be discovered and proven. Wo have NOT considered the possibility that the USSR would advance its nuclear weapons program byoperations against the US and UK developmentserioduclear test moratorium.
The reader's attention is called to the limited scope of this estimate. It deals only with the effects of two types of test limitations on the Soviet nuclear weapon development program. It does not address Itself to the other aspects of the overall problemest moratorium, or to the problems raised by entirely different types of test moratoriums. While the estimate presents reasonable conclusions which are applicable to the consideration of types of moratoriums baaed onotal prohibition of tests or limitation of test yields, the estimate is not intended to be, and should not be, usedeference for consideration of other possible types of moratoriums, suchimitation on the number of tests, or on the amount of fission products produced.
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1. Introduction
a. In estimating tba Impact of test moratoriums on tbe Soviet nuclear weapons development program, we have considered moratoriums of tbe two following types:
A total moratorium on all nuclear weapons tests, regardless of the type of weapon or tho yield.
A limited moratorium prohibiting tests of weapons yielding greaterilotons, regardless of whether such yields ore achieved by fission reactions alone, or in combination with thermonuclear reactions.
Consideration of these two types of moratorium encompasses most of the weapon development problems which will bo faced by tho Soviets In evaluating the many proposals which could be offered.
third type of proposal which has receivedboth in the OS andoratorium on the'hydrogen/thermonuclear bombs'"has not beenIn this estimate because of the difficulty ofacceptable definition of the term "hydrogen/tbermcwclcarit le recognized that the popular definition is synonymoushigh-yield weapon, this proposal has, in principle, been1.
otal ofoviet tests,using both fission and thermonuclear reactions have beentoots have achieved yields rangingow kilotons to about
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two dogatons THT equivalent. Based upon the evidence froa these tests end the conclusions derived therefrom, we have endeavored to estimate the impact of two selected teat moratoriums on the future Soviet nuclear weapons development program. We have assumed that during the periodoratorium the Soviet Union would continue its weapons development activitiesigh priority basis in order to be in the strongest possible position upon termination of the moratorium either by mutual agreement or unilateral action.
2. Effects of Total or Limited Horatoriuc on Soviet Development of Lev-Yield Weapons (Less than lCOKT"
Approximately one-third of the Soviet nuclear weapons tests detected have involved the detonationevice or weapon yielding less thenT. We have estimated inhat the current Soviet nuclear weapons stockpile Includes low-yield (lessT) weapons,
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a. Total Moratorium
otal ban of nuclear weapons teato, existing email-dimension, low-yield weapons could probably be Improved In efficiency and in yield, and the diameter night be somewhat reduced.
otal moratorium, successful application to low-yield weapons of the principle of boosting would be difficult. In particular, lt Is probableependable gas-boosted weapon could not be stockpiled without testing.
It ia highly improbable that air defense weapons could be optimised in the absence of nuclear toots. The Soviets, under the conditions of this moratorium, could not be certain of the most efficient use of their fissionable material stockpile. Since large numbers of this type of weapon must be stockpiled for adequate air defense aystems, future Soviet air defense capabilities would probably be Impared, perhapserious extent.
We estimate that nuclear warheads, capable of delivery in bombs end missiles could, without nuclear tests, be adapted for use In artillery shells, depUi-bcebs, penetrating bombs, torpedoes, demolition charges and clandestine operations.
Some experience In boosting and In development of low-yield weapons might be obtained from smell teats (less thanT) which might escape detection.
b. Moratorium on TestaKT Yield or Over. Jto effect.
3- Effects of Total or Limited Moratoriug on Soviet Development of Elgh-Ylold0 KT and Orer).
The Soviet nuclear test program has Included tests of two types of high-yield weapons: (a) weapons typified by tests JOB0 KT) and JOE0nd (b) the weapons tested In JOB6 MT) and JOE XXIVT).
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J Soviet scientists haveubstantial degree of technical competence and apparent self confidence during the development and testing of high-yield wcapona. a. Total Moratorium
(1) General: With the detonation of JOB XXX and JOE XXXV, the Soviet nuclear weapons development program has reached the point whore the fabrication and stockpiling of multi-megaton weapons con be accomplished by tho extension of techniques which led to theof these tested weapons. If the preliminary evaluation of JOE XXIV Is confirmed, the yield ofT weapon could probable
bo increased toT, and even possibly higher, without further testing.
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this moratorium, these weapons with yields greater thanT might be of questionable dependability and not of optimum size and weight.
(2) High-Yield Missile Warheads: otal testSoviet development of high-yield missile warheads would be impeded. Although some progress is possible, attainable warhead size and weight would force an upward revision of payload requirements of presently estimated missiles. However, if the missile accuracy could be materially improved, the ability to use lower-yield warheads would lessen the effectotal moratorium.
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b. Moratorium oa TestsT Yield and Over
Under this nuclear test limitation,of nuclear weapons In the yield range0 MTwith considerable confidence by means of componenttesting. Development of very high-yield weapons,roceed with greater confidence than in the complete absencealthough even in this case, the reliability and yield ofwould be uncertain and the optimum size and weight couldattained.
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J Even lighter warheads might be obtained with sacrifice in yield. The influence of this test limitation on the missile development program would be less than that experiencedotal prohibition but warhead deolgn would still not be optimized.
ft. Effects of Test Limitations on Soviet Weapons Effects Information.
At least two of the Soviet tests, JOBTotakoye)nd JOE XVII (underwater)ere accompanied by rather large scale weapons effects programs. The program undertaken in connection with
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JOE VTII woo very extrusive and probably resulted In acquisitionarge amount of effects data. Thle experience, together vlth other effects measurements which may hare been conducted at development tests, and together with OS published Information, should furnish the Soviets with sufficient data on weapons effects and scaling lows for determining the effects of any yield weapon within acceptable but not necessarily desired accuracy, under almost all detonation conditions. However, underT upper limit it is estimated that this knowledge vould be refined to an extent that would allow more effective employment of weapons in any environment.
5. Impactoratorium on the Soviet Buclcar Weapons Scientific Establishment.
Realization of tho major developments discussed inill require the best effortsarge number of highly skilled scientists. Because of the substantial material awards and recognition for Soviet scientists, and the type of economy and political control, wc estimate that tho best efforts of the necessary scientists will contlnuo to be available to the weapons development program.
Original document.
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