TOP SECRET--
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE . 6
THE SOVIET ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM
.OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Intemgence organization*'participated In
.reparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligencend* the intelligence organizationsepartments-' State, the Army, tne Navy, the Air Force, The Joint StagAtomic Energy Commission.
Concurred in by the
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORS COMMITTEE
oncurring were Vie SpecialDepartment of State; the Assistant ChiefIntemgence, Department of the Army; the Directorintelligence; the Director Of Intemgence, OS AT;Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff; end
Director, FcderalBureau of Investigation, abstained,
y'3^the-subject being outside of they jurisdiction of hit Agency.
T.Jorthedissenting views
0/Director of Naval Intemgence and the Deputy Director for intemgence. The Joint Staff.
TOP SECRET
*i'r
NATIONAL IlfTELUGEJtCE ESTIMATE JOINT ATOMIC ENERGY INTELIJGENCE COMMITTEE
THE SOVIET ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM6
Tills estimate was prepared mid agreed upon by the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, with footnotes by Navy and Joint Staff members, which ifi composed of reproocn tat Ives of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, Air Force, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Joint Staff and the Central Intelligence Agency. Tbe FBI abstained, the subject being outside of its jurisdiction.
A group of expert consultants working with the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee have reviewed this estimate and generally concur with It. The estimate, with footnotes, wnn approved by the Intelligence Advisory Committee
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T?
F FIGURES AKD TABLES
PAGE
Figureof Soviet Atonic Energy Activity Locations
TABLE ISoviet Production of Fissionable 5
TABLEResearch and Power
TABLE IIIEstimated Uranium Ore
TABLEMetallic Uranium Slug
TABLEHeavy Water
TABLEProduction To
TABLE VIIEstimated Cumulative Soviet Production of
TABLEUnclear Tests
TABLESoviet Bloc Ore Production In Metric
Tons Recoverable
TABLESoviet Production ofor
All
TABLEPower Reactors
TABLEAtomic Power
TABLEUse ofn Tbe Soviet Power
Reactor
TABLEPlutonium Production From Power
Reactor
TABLEOf Total Plutonium
TABLEOf Availability or FissionableFor Weapon Uses
-ill-
INDEX OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE Number
TIE fOVIKT ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM
PAGE
FIGUREof Atonic Energy Activities
In the USSR
SUMMARY
PARTtatue of the Soviet Atomic Energy Program As of tho End5
I. Introduction
II. General Scope of
III. Nuclear Material
IV. Nuclear Weapon
PARTrobable Gov let Capabilities5
I. The Future Fissionable Material Production
U. Non-Military Uses5
IV. Future Weapon Development and Test Activities ..
III. Nuclear Propulsion Program5
'
THE SOVIET ATOMIC EKHtGT PROGRAM SUMKARY 1/
I. SIGNIFICANT DEVKL0PMK?)T5
A highly oignlflcant development since the publication of5 estimate, van the airburet on5hermonuclear weapon which yieldedegatons. It la highly probable that thla marked the effective beginningoviet multi-megaton nuclear weapons capability. Fran tbe above and other testa we estimate that tbe USSR la developing endersatile group of nuclear weapons ranging from very lev-yield warheads to high-yield thermonuclear weapons.
In addition,esult of new evidence, we have revised our previous eotloatoa of Soviet production ofpwardactor of about four. 2/ This revision together with the
ovember teat leads us to the estimate that the USSR nowignificant aulti-megaton weapons capability and willajor capability in the near future. Our plutonlum production estimates are about the same aa those in last years estimate.
3- Tbe Soviets have displayed considerable progress in nuclear electric power reactor development. Me estimate they are capable of meeting the ambitious goals of the Sixth Five-Tear Plantf of installed nuclear electric power capacity by the endut this achievement willery high priority effort. The state of their realtor technology also indicates that the USSRapability for developing propulsion applications.
1/ The Director of Naval Intelligence does not concur in tbe figures contained herein for the estimated productionnd for the estimated production of plutonlum These figures are believed to be too high in view of the following considerations: (Footnote l/ continued on next page).
2/ Sec Footnote to Paragraphage 3-
II. PHODUCTTOH OF FISSIONABLE HATETflALS
1|- . The firsto tope separation plant employed the gaseous diffusion process; was located at Verkhneivlnflk In the Urals, and was put into partial operation beginning inQ. This plant did not initially attain ita designdue U> corrosion problems. In-leakage of air, and rather poor barrier.[_
2 The nature of thin work and tbe results attained Indicate both an understanding of gaseous diffusion processesophistication of engineering design. On this basis we estimate that the Sovietsonsiderable increase in the over-all efficiency of their gaseous diffusion However, our limited knowledge of the rate at which many of the design improvements investigated were incorporated in the operating plantsegree of uncertainty In the estimates of plant operating efficiencies.
X/ (Footnoteontinued from Page 1)
assumption that all unaccounted-for electric powerthreesotope separation Bitesutilized by the Soviets for productiondiffusion is not justified by the evidence. plant'efficieney in the estimate of isotopebased on assumptions as to barrier availability andstripping of tailings, operatingdrive Improvement, and aGsociatedassumptions cannot be supported by the Office of*
expansion of plutonlum production9 restsassumption of Soviet capability to place in effectplutonium-power reactor program ofand complexity. There Is no evidence thatual-purpose reactor which willboth power and plutonium simultaneously. of Naval Intelligence believes that years ofand development will be necessary before thisbe achieved.
The Director of Naval Intelligence believes that for planningore practical magnitude of cumulative quantitiesould beange below that of the1 lower limit of this estimate.
0 i i li T
5- Our estimatesroduction have been obtained by applying estimated plant efficiency in terms of power requirements per kilogram of product to the average electric power estimated to be available for isotope separation in the areas of possible Soviet gaseous diffusion sites. The uncertainties connected with both of these factors are sufficiently large thataximum the Soviet gaseous diffusion capacity could approach the feed materialsof the uranium ore supply which ls estimated to greatly exceed for several years the feed requirements for both the estimated plutoniumrograms. On the otherroduction could have been much lower than that estimated. If less electric power were consumed or the plants did not operate at the efficiencies estimated. Thus the uncertainty in tho estimate of cumulative Soviet productionp6 is very large but probably does notf the estimated, values. Our estimate ofroduction is subject to many variables which are dependent primarily on Soviet plans and decisions and ls therefore less reliable than tho estimate of6 cumulative production. (See Table I) 3/
Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
believes that the new intelligence does not adequately support the estimateumulative production The estimate of efficiency of Soviet isotope separation operatione is composed of scent specific intelligence information and uncertain assumptions as to when certain improvements were made in Soviet plants. Due to the many, varied and complex uncertaintiesore practical figure for planning purposes ofroduction5 would be one in the lower range of uncertainty, approaching theower limit.
The same reasons,ack of intelligence on Soviet plans and programs in the atomic energy field, lead him to conclude that the estimatevailable bynd subsequent dates reflects projections and extrapolations under very uncertain conditions, ratheralid figure for planning purposes.
The above conclusions are applicable throughout theof this estimate whenever estimatesweapons fabricated from this metal are discussed.
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TJ
6- Production of Plutonium and Estimates of 3ovlet PIntoniub production arc booedarge body ofincluding the amounts of uranium metal available for Plutonium production J"
J and the timetables of site construction and avallabiUty of materials. Much of the Information is ofature that it gives only an idea of the total reactor power available to the USSR. Ho distinction can be made as to
this Power used for the production of. tritium, or any other isotope which the USSR may desire. Therefore production estimates are hereafter given in terms of plutonlum equivalent.
III. HON-WEAPONS PROGRAM
7- During tne pastignificant amount of information has been published on the non-military aspects of the Soviet atomic energy program. This release began with the Moscow and Geneva Conferences and propagandized those phases of atomic research and development In which the USSR seeks to rival the Western nations. It is encouraging the Interchange of scientists and nuclearin the "peaceful uses of atomic energy".
8. The Soviet nuclear electric power program, which Is of considerable magnitude, appears designed tolaim for world leadership, to produce fissionable materials, and to gain experience toward future economically competitive electric power. The Soviet Union is engaged in design and development ofozen types of reactors ranging in power fromlectrical megawatts for the production of electric power as part ofive-Tear Plan. This program, which callsotal capacityegawatts of electric power, is within Soviet capability but willigh priority effort for its One small reactor began producing electric power from nuclear energy in* and has been given wide publicity by the USSR as the "first in the world". This reactor, while Inefficient, is useful for experimental studios of power reactor operation. The announced Soviet nuclear electric power program will require an increasingly greater percentage of the totalvailable but will producey-product plutonlum ornd tritium.
9- The Soviet program of atomic aid to the satellite nations, announced inroposes the construction of research reactors and supporting facilities in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Communist China and possibly in Bulgaria and Rumania. The amount of fissionable materials required for this research program wouldegligible drain on the'estimated Soviet fissionable material stockpile. The completion or this Soviet aid program, which was probably undertaken primarily for its political value, will not give the satellites the capability to produce weapons on their own.
10. On the basis of known Soviet reactor experience we estimate thoy coulduclear propulsion reactor suitable for surface ship or submarine application. We have almost noon the Soviet aircraft nuclear propulsion reactor program but
estimate that lt probably will not progress beyond the research phase priorS- Assuming this propulsion progress, the amount of fissionable material required to support the program will not subtract appreciably from the material estimated to be available for weapon production.
IV. NUCLEAR WEAPON PROGRESS
11. esult of the airburst' altitude) onbelieve that the Soviets are now beginning to stockpile thermonuclear weapons with yields ofT. Since the fabrication of megaton weapons probably did not commence until aftert is unlikely that the Soviets could have moreew of these weapons by the beginning
1
USSR is now capable of Increasing the yield of the
5 type weapons to aboutT by further developmental advances. Future developments will probably lead to increasing the nuclear efficiency, yields, and dcliverability of high yield weapons, We estimate that prototypes of high yield missile warheads could be tested.
interest in low-yield, small-dimension weaponsestablished by their military doctrine and by the largelow-yield weapons or devices detonated in the test5 It is estimated that tho USSR now has
a small-diameter warhead using an implosion system of low efficiency, with yields in the range of loss than one kiloton to ten kilotons. Improved efficiencies, which will permit more widespread use for air defense, are expected
ik. The Soviets conducted their first underwater atomic test near Novaya Zomlya onew phase in their continuing development of atomic weaponsariety of military usee. The underwater test opens new vistas into the development of atomic weaponsariety of naval uses, resultingignificant increase in the over-all Soviet atomic warfare capability. The significance of the test can be compared to tbe Totskoye explosionU which was an airdroptockpile weapon as partactical military exercise.
Y-
l B4
estimate of fissionable material availableumber of estimates of weapon stockpiles,account diversion of fissionable material for The limited availability of fissionable materialprevent the USSR fromignificant stockpile ofweapons; however. It would limit the Soviet's capability
to produce significant quantities of low-yield weapons of the types they have tested which would be suitable for tactical and air defense use.
evidence Indicates that the USSR isand will continue toersatile familyweapons. We cannot determine with any degree ofprobable number of nuclear weapons allocated to eachsince these will depend on strategic and other factors.
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-
ISISCUESIOH FART ORE
STATUS OF THE SOVIET ATOMIC EHERCY. PR CORAM AS OF THE EKD5
I. rKTKQix;cTio?f
the exact extent of Soviet capability in theremains uncertain, the general nature and some of thethe Soviet atomic energy program can be assessed with Available evidence establishes the existence inof: igh priority, extensive atomic energydirected toward military application, which isexpand; (b) an ample uranium ore base on which to carryubstantial stockpile of fissionable materials;
roven capability for the establishment of nuclear-electric power stations;apability, so far believed to be unrealized, of utilizing nuclear power for propulsive purposes; (f)roven capability of producing explosions in yield rangesew kilotons up to several megatona and of employing both fission and fusion principles.
v
Reliable evidence indicates that Soviet military planning includes the employment of nuclear weapons for offensive airin support of ground and naval operations, and poaalbly air defense. At Least twice3 there has been militaryin the Soviet nuclear weapons test program indicative of both weapons effects tests and military maneuvers.
Our knowledge of the status of the Soviet atomic energy program as of the end5 is derivedonsiderable volume of evidence. Sufficient details are available toeasonable foundation for quantitative assessment. Information obtained by technical means on Soviet plutonium production continues to bewithin the Holts of Its probable error with information obtained through other sources. Information concerningroduction does not permit as reliable an estimate as in the case of Plutonium production, but important new Information has been developed during the past year. Evidence received since our last estimate on the Soviet atomic energy program primarily concerns the mining of uranium ore, its transformation into uranium metal, the production of
plutonlum, research on reactors and Isotope separation methods, the first Soviet gaseous diffusioneparation plant, electric power available to gaseous diffusion plants, further testing of weapons, end military training and indoctrination in atonic warfare. Information received end analysis made since the publication of the last estimate require substantial upward revision of the estimate ofvailable over that given in5 estimate.
II. GENERAL SCOPE OF THE PROGRAM
A. History and Organization
The Soviet atoaie energy progran started ic0 with the formationomffiission on the Uranium Problem attached to the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences, USSR. Members were representatives of various laboratories expected to be majoron the problem. In latethe Ninth Directorate of the People's Commissariat cf Internal Affairs (RXVD) was organized to make preliminary studies in nuclear physics with special attention to atomic energy. b It became responsible for uranium mining in the USSR, and, beginning intwith moreerman and Austrian scientists to work in the USSR on atomic energy problems at several laboratoriesbuilt for this purpose.
Inirst Chief Directorate attached to the Council of Ministers was created and given responsibility for the Soviet atomic energy program. As the responsible member of the Council of Ministers, L. P. Beriya exercised over-all direction of policy and drew into the program the best talent and leadership of the nation. These leaders, for the most part, retained their old positions along with their new responsibilities. Theto the program of representatives of many diverse organizations, such as the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of tho Chemical Industry, and cany others assured the high priority necessary to implement the program. 50 the First Chief Directorate gradually took over the responsibilities
of the Ninth Directorate of the KKVD until in0 the Ninth Directorate relinquished the last of its functions, control of the German scientists and was dissolved.
the steady growth of the Soviet atomica major reorganization took place early At this
time the Second Chief Directorate attached to the Council of Ministers was formed and took over the mining, concentration and refining of uranium as well as the development of new uranium deposits. Its responsibilities originally extended to mining operations outside the USSR; however, satellite mines now appear to be subordinate to the Chief Directorate of Soviet Property Abroad, Ministry of Foreign Trade. The First Chief Directorate was thus free to concentrate exclusively on production ofmaterials and manufacture of weapons. Supply, personnel, and other services common to both chief directorates were placedeparate body serving both directorates; this body was possibly formedhird Chief Directorate.
23- This organizational structure apparently continued until the arrest of Bcriya in At that time the Ministry of Medium Machine Building was organized, and V. A. Malyshev was designated as minister. Subsequently he waseputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers and apparently succeeded Beriya as director of over-all policy for the program. In5 Colorel General A. P.rominent figure in the First Chief Directorateeading figure in the program since its beginning, was appointed Minister of Medium Machine Building and elevatedeputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, thereby replacing Malyshev as over-all policy director of the program.
2hw in6 TASS announced the formationew atomic energy coordinating body, "Main Administration For the Use of Atomic Energy" attached to the Council of Ministers and responsible for insuring the "large-scale use of atomic energy in all branches of the national economy" and developing "cooperation between the Soviet Union and other countries in the peaceful uses of atomichus it appears that the Ministry of Medium Machine Building will retain most of its former functions while the coordination and supervision of the application of peaceful uses of atomic energy throughout the Soviet economy will new fall under the control of this new organization.
B. Soviet Technical Capabilities in Nuclear Energy
25. The USSR has demonstrated considerable technical competence in the independent research requiredomprehensive nuclear energy program as evidenced by data obtained through our scientific detection system, the papers presented at the Moscow and Geneva international conferences on the peaceful uses of atomic energy,
information obtained from returned German scientists, and Soviet scientific literature. The Soviet papers presented at international atomic energy and other scientific conferences provide valuableof some Soviet accomplishments in the general areas of nuclear physics, metallurgy, research reactor design, reactor engineering, instrumentation, and biological and medical aspects of nuclear energy. These conferences also provided opportunities for personal contact between US and Soviot scientists which aided in theof Soviet professional competence. The USSR has excellent senior scientific leaders and the Soviet educational system graduates competent younger scientists, substantial numbers of whom devote at least part of their time to research in the basic sciences.
High speed computers play an extremelyrole in many aspects of an atomic energy programin the design of new weapons. The USSR now possesses afor computer research, and the Soviets haveexistenceumber of digital computers. One ofigh speed device comparable to some of thecomputers in the US. This machine was Another is the URALonsiderablyslower machine. ery large machine, the STREIA, is known
to exist, but this has not yet been announced publicly. of both the URAL and tho STREIA is scheduled to be initiated shortly, and the USSR hao agreed toRAL type machine to India. In addition tomall digital computer was seenniversity in Leningrad.
Physics. The papers presented at the Geneva Conference by the USSR reflect creditable work in nuclear physics. Many of the fundamental physical constants measured by Soviet scientists acroe weU with those reported by other countries. There is apparentlyittle less emphasis on classical nuclear theory in the USSR than in the United States, and Soviet papers on various aspects of theoretical physics demonstrated considerable competence in this field.
Soviet high-energy physics research is quite Impressive andogical outgrowth of the long standing Soviet interest in cosmic ray physics. The USSR has an active group working in the field of high-energy physics and high-energy particle accelerator design. ev synchro-cyclotron of the Institute of Nuclear Problems of the Academy of Sciences is
TOP
the largest machine of its type in the world. 0 Bov proton synchrotron will also he the largest machine of its type in the world if it reaches design energy when fully operational. Design studies0 Bov strong-focussing synchrotron are now in progress.
Papers presented at internationalscientific literature and other collateral information reveal
a high degree of technical competence. Research work dealing with isotope separation, tracer techniques and rare earth chemistry is found in widely scattered papers under the guise of seemingly unrelated scientific investigations. Reports on research and development have been notably omitted in certain fields of chemistry. Soviet security is probably responsible for the lack of informationconnected with atomic energy chemical processing and production.
The Soviet Union has ain the special metallurgy required to support aatomic energy program. All of the metalsuse in the most up-to-date designs of US reactors areto be available in the USSR and to have receivedattention by metallurgists known to be associatedSoviet program. The methods of manufacture, the puritymetals involved, the types of alloy systems underand the published reports of effects of radiationproperties suggest that the Soviet Union is wellin knowledge of the behavior of metallurgical materials
for construction of power reactors. The combination of fundamental scientific research on heat flow and high temperature alloys of certain types appears to present some background for support of an aircraft nuclear power program.
Reactors. Soviet papers on nuclear reactors presented at international conferences indicate that their reactors are of creditable designs but have few original features. (See Table II) The First Graphite Reactor, described by V. S. Fursov at the Moscow Conference, is very similar to the first US.
The Heavy Water Research Reactorersatile design suggestiveeactor used to study the properties of heavy water reactors. It was conceived, designed6 and constructed
bjt -k
33- The Laboratory of Measuring Instruments began designater-moderated water-cooled reactor This design,to graphite moderation inecame the Reactor Physical Technical (HPT). The PPT wa6 used in2 for tests of the fuel elements of the Atomic Power Station reactor and now isuel element design for tbe first large Soviet atomic power station reactor. The original light-water moderated and cooled reactor design was uaedeactor built at Moscow University.
3*i. The Past Reactor and the Hydrogenous Critical Experiments were operated at very low power to provide data for reactor design. Experiments with these low-power reactors provide evidence of Soviet capability to construct the power reactors of similar design referred to in published statements on the Sixth Five-Year Plan atomic power program.
35- The Atomic Power Station reactor, probably the first Soviet experimental power reactor, was probably designed0 and came into operationb. It is, according to the USSR,rf of useful power. The Soviete indicate that there has been little fuel element failure in over one year of operation but refused repeatedly to discuss fuel element construction during the Geneva Conference. It would appear that this reactor, while inefficient and certainly not elaborate, is useful for experimental studies of power reactor design.
TABLE II
USSR RESEARCH AND POWER REACTORS
-
36. Controlled Thermonuclear Research. Soviet interest in the application of controlled thcn-onuclcar reactions for the production of power was revealed at the Moscow Conference. on Soviet activity in this field indicates that tbe USSR has the technological competence required to support an effective research program directed toward the achievement of controlled thermonuclear reactions. Tho Soviets will probably not produce economic power from thermonuclear processes for many years.
37- Instrumentation. The USSR is producing the Instruments required touclear energy program. The instruments used with Soviet reactors appear to be adequute and serve their purposes well. The Soviet nuclear instruments generally lack versatility and appear to be dcs!gr.ed for specific Jobs. On the other hand, the Soviet mass spectrometer, MS-h, appears to have good versatility and toodern, well-engineered instrument. Auxiliary instruments shown nt the Geneva Conference exhibited considerable evidence of standardization by the Soviets. The USSR instrument exhibit at Geneva ulso revealed considerable attention to biological and medical applications for use in therapy, diagnosis and health protection. Some component ports, such as photomultlplier tubes, appear to have serious weaknesses which may have Impeded Soviet instrumentation progress. Soviet health physics instrumentation, on the other hand, is judged to be adequate.
36. Biology and Medicine. Considerable Soviet emphasis has been placed on mi-dicine relating to the treatment of casualties which might bo caused by nuclear explosions. The work Is under the direction of the Medical Research Council, Chief Medical Directorate of the Armed Forces, Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Health. Preliminary preparations have been made for the treatment of mass casualties caused by nuclear explosions. Experimentation is in progress on the use of novocainc blocks and "sleepo immobilize the patient to improve the chance for recovery from severe skin burns. arge number of protective drugs found beneficial against exposure to radiation In animal experiments by Western investigators have also been tooted by the Soviets, but only one, cystincamine, was found promising by the Sovietsrophylactic. Other techniques such as bloodinjection of bone marrow emulsion, caroteneid polyenes, and the use of antibiotics have been widely investigated by Soviet medical authorities. Several original Soviet antibiotics have been broadly propagandized but remain untested In the West.
39- Soviet health physics standards discussed at the Geneva Conference und stated in military doctrine are more restrictive than those of tbe Western world. The conservative health physics standards probably are not adhered to in the USSR and may have been presented toropaganda advantage.
Compared to US standards, Soviet radiobiologicalis less sophisticated but is directed along parallel lines. An exception is the Soviet emphasis upon theeffects of radiation, particularly at low levels of exposure.
Materials and Resources
Mining. Much quantitative informationon Soviet uranium prospecting, mining and orein Bast Germany, and somewhat less onand Rumania. Much lean information is availableactivities within the USSR. The estimatedup6 is more than sufficient to supportmaterial production estimates. We estimate thatof approximately WJOO metric tons of natural uraniumof recoverable metal) was mined5 In the USSR andincluding Fast Oermany. This figure is subject touncertainty because we lack sufficient evidenceSoviet efforts. etric tons ofare estimated to have come from East Germany. Thisis considered to be subject to an uncertainty of notplus or minuser cent. Estimated annual uraniumand cumulative uranium stockpiles are given in Tableof uranium mining in the Sino-Soviet Bloc are shown1.
Raw Materials
is evidence of Soviet atomic energy interestexploitotion of heavy sand doposits which arc known tozirconium, and other elements useful in atomic Substantial quantities of the metals mentioned above
are available, and it is believed that such quantities as are required for atomic energy purposes would probably representmall percentage of the total Soviet capacity for producing them.
TABLE III
ESTIMATED URANIUM ORE PRODUCTIOK* (Metric Tods Recoverable Metal)
BED
-
_
-
-
-
-
-
-
TOTAL
TOTAL ND5
* Much quantitative information is available on mining and ore enrichment in East Germany; somewhat less is known on Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Rumania; and much less on these activities in the USSR, Poland, China and Korea.
B 0
Stocks
pre
Nominal
-
-
-
-
-
-
.
-
-
'
III. RUCLEAR MATERIAL PRODUCTION
Metallurgy Plants. Information obtainedpast year from returned German scientists, used indata on calcium production and timetables pertaining tometal plantsairly reliable estimate ofof uranium metal ready for reactor use manufacturedup Analysis of this Information indicatesthe first metal suitable for reactor use was madeb) this plantapacity ofetricuranium metal slugs per month by0 andonth by the middle of that year; and (c) production lines of
ons of slugs per month each went into operation at Glazov, west of the Urals, in9 andnd at Novosibirsk, In central Siberia, innd
expansion could have occurred at any2 without our knowledge, since the evidence onbase uranium metal production estimates essentially ceases The estimate given below is
TABLE IV
METALLIC URANIUM SLUC PRODUCTION (Metric Tons)
Preceding
Heavy Water (DpO). Early6 the Soviets began the conversion and installation of equipment at the Chirchik Nitrogen Combine in Central Asia to provide for the production of by-product heavy water for atomic energy purposes. Simultaneously, Germany was
exploited for heavy water, research results, equipment, and research personnel. About> construction of production facilities to use the electrolytic-catalytic exchange method was started at five other plants. Construction was also startedeventh plant at Aleksin which used the hydrogen sulfide-water exchange method. Limited production commenced at Chirchik inand at Aleksin inJ. Most of the other plants began producing9 0 work was underwaylant at Norilsk in far north Siberia using the ammonia-water exchange system. It probably began producing3 and may haveubstantial output by
k6. The following cumulative estimate of heavy water produced in the USSR is considered to be reasonably accurate uput after that time the error may be considerable.
TABLE V
HEAVY WATER PRODUCTION (Metric Tons)
END
DoO
Cumulative
Graphite. The Geneva and Moscow Conferences on Atomic Energy and evidence from returned German scientists have established that at least four Soviet research reactors, Including their first one, used graphiteoderating or reflecting material. Two returned German scientists assert that the first production reactor also was graphite moderated. The details of the manufacture and procurement of reactor graphite ore still obscure, but it was apparently available as early asThe exact specifications of Soviet reactor graphite are not known, but Soviet grade> available9 for mercury arc rectifiers in tonnage lots,aximum ash content ofa value well within the range used for reactors in the United States.
W' Production Reactors. There Is evidence that construction on the first Soviet production reactor started earlyear Kyshtyra in the Urals and that it went Into operation abouteturned German scientists asserted that the first Kyshtynreactor was graphite moderated and my have been air cooled. The urgency in the Soviet program during this period is perhaps reflected in the fact that construction of this reactor wassome six months before the USSR's first research reactor (also graphite moderated) went critical in the late summer
+WBS Qlso rePorl^econd production reactor
at Kyshtym went into operation sometime toward the endt was heavy water moderated and construction must have begun at about the same time construction was initiated on the heavy water research reactor at the Thermo Technical laboratory in Moscow, which became operational in.
exact schedule and type of reactorsare not known. There may have been insufficientto permit aU subsequent reactors to be heavy waterthat the existence of other types of production reactors Evidence indicates that0 construction started
iutonium production site near Krasnoyarsk In mid-Siberia. The Novosibirsk uranium metal plant was probably built to provide materials to Krasnoyarsk and other Siberian sites.
Initially the separation of plutonlum from uranium and fission products was done by an oxidation-reduction-co-precipltation process which differed somewhat from that initially adopted by the US. It was designed to recover uranium as well as plutonlum, since the uranium metal plant at Glazov was designed to use depleted uranium as partial feed material. Soviet and German research on solvent extraction methods indicates that the Soviets may have lateretter process.
The Soviets have probably been operating enriched or spiked reactors in their production program for some time in order to supply the tritiumor stockpiling weapons of the Mgher yield types tested3 This could have been done either by modifying existing reactors or by constructing new reactors specifically designed for the task. Research on the Moscow Reactor Physical Technicalnd on the Soviet Atomic
1 Prided experience and information essential to the design of enriched production reactors.
53. Tritium- The first known Soviet interest in tritium was revealed by the publication in8 of ereview of the literature on tritium by M. B.taff member of the First Chiefeturned Germans report that2 tritium was available for research in their laboratories. This is consistent with the probable use of tritium in the high yield tests3
Active Soviet interest in thorium-bearing minerals started aboutith the formationpecial directorate for their exploitation. Although part of this interest lay In the requirement for lanthanum chemicals for the Soviet plutonium separation chemical plant, German scientists at Elektrostal were also required torocess for the production of pure thorium oxide. Subsequently, the USSR acquired considerable thorium
^ tbe only certain productionrom thorium was the research quantities mentioned at the Geneva and Moscow Conferences on Atomic Energy.
55. Plutonium. Estimates of Soviet plutonium production aro basedarge body of information including the amounts of uranium metal available for plutonium production,!"
nd the timetables of siteand availability of materials.
TABLE VT
PLUTOKIUM PRODUCTION TOKilograms)
Production
56. Much of the information on which the plutonium production estimates are based is ofature that it gives only an idea of the total reactor power available to _tne USSR. No distinction can be
mode as to the portions of this power used for the production of, tritium, or any other isotopes which the USSR may desire. Therefore production estimates are hereafter given in terms of plutonlum equivalent.
57. During tho last year, considerableon the first Soviet isotope separation plant has been obtained from returning German scientists. This plant, which employed the gaseous diffusion process, was located at Verkhneivinsk in the Urals and was put into partial operation abouthe plant employed flat plate barriers of high permeability and operated at low pressures. Although we believe this plant was designed for the productionrams per dayt produced initially considerably less thangrams per day ofmaterial. The failure of the plant to achieve its design performance is ascrlbable to corrosion problems, in-leakage of air, and rather poor barrier.
JQ. There is evidence that the Soviets put into operation at Verkhneivinskore efficient gaseous diffusion process. This processreater number of stages and employed the tubular nickel barrier developed by the Germans. Also the operating pressure was appreciably increased. He estimate that this process was in operation in time to producesed in the Soviet test of
59- here have been substantial increases In electric power capacity near Verkhneivinsk and other Soviet atomic energy sites. The fact that the power capacity increases cannot be accounted for In terms of non-atomic use, the magnitude of the increases, and other evidence lead to the conclusion that the Soviets expanded their isotope separation capacity at Verkhneivinsk and other locations. umber of methods for isotope separation were investigated in the Soviet Union concurrently with the development of the gaseous diffusion process, the available evidence indicates that gaseous diffusion was the only process adopted for large-scale production.
6o. C
J
table vrr
ESTIMATED CUMULATIVE SOVIET PRODUCTION OF URMmw^ V
of
aterial
Kilograma
0
Woo
* Plant operating only last few months of fiscalf
J
The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff believes that the new intelligence does not adequately support the estimateumulative production The estimate of efficiency of Soviet Isotope separation operations is composed of scant specific intelligence information and uncertain assumptions as to when certain improvements were made in Soviet plants. Due to the many, varied and complex uncertaintiesore practical figure for planning pirposes ofroduction5 would be in the lower range of uncertainty, approaching thoower limit.
IV. NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS
63. Tbe first Soviet nuclear teat was conductednd was followed by test series5 In theetected
(See Table VIII)
6k. 9ielded approximatelyilotons
four explosions of3 test seriesthe USSR wus seeking to supplement the1 by the addition of both high-yield weaponsweapons. hermonuclearon3ilotons (theof this device woo reduced from0 KTafter re-evaluation of the data with the aidfrom more recent teats). The thermonuclearin this device was lithium deuteride.
J
explosions occurred ineries. took place near Totskoye and was an airdrop of aas partilitary exercise. Tho remaining sixat the main Soviet proving ground in the vicinity All yielded leesllotonsQ
67. 5 test series consisted of five nuclear detonations. One of these, onas the first Soviet nuclear explosion to occur underwater. ovember test yieldedilotons and is considered to have been an airdrop testeaponized version of the3 device.f
ighlydevelopment was the airburst onovember of awhich yieldedegatons. It is highlythis marked the effective beginningovietweapon
68. The Soviets conducted.t least three nuclear tests priorpril. All of these were of low yield
p
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1
1
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i
PART TWO
PROBABLE SOVIET CAPABILITIES5
I- THS FUTURE FISSIONABLE HATERIAI PRODOCTIOH PROGRAM
Soviet capabilities to expand fissionable materialare believed to be primarily dependent upon the over-all effort they are willing to devote to such expansion rather than on the availability of raw materials such as uranium ore. The estimate of future fissionable' material production is baaed upon the assumption that tbe USSR will continue this program at the present high priority; however the relative emphasis given to each fissionable material is dependent upon Soviet decisions, plans and requirements. Therefore the estimate must be considered to have very wide margins of possible error.
Uranium Ore Procurement. The US Geological Survey estimates that the Soviet Bloc has several hundred thousand tons
of uranium in medium grade ore deposits and an even greater quantity In low grade deposits. Even if these estimates were twice as high as actual Soviet ore reserves, the Soviet Bloc could double or triple its present ore production without recourse to less economical ore recovery processes than they are now using. If it is assumed that the present estimated rate of expansion of non-German ore production# per year, (see Table III) continueseasonable estimate of Soviet Bloc ore production would be as tabulated below, using median figures ratherange of possible values. It is unlikely that the actual cumulative production will be less than three-quarters of the values shown and ore production could be considerably higher if more uranium ore is needed. This estimate of Soviet Bloc ore production will adequately support the estimated expenditure of natural uranium through
TABLE IX
ESTIMATED FUTURE SOVIET BLOC ORE PRODUCTION IN METRIC TOMS RECOVERABLE URANIUM
Production
Cumulative Production (Rounded)
Annual
Uoo
10c
0
Uranium Isotope Separation. Future Soviet production ofas been based upon projected estimates of electric pover available for urunium Isotope separation and of average operating efficiencies of tho Soviet uranium Isotope separation plants. It Is not believed that the Soviets will continue to Increase the efficiency of their gaseous diffusion plants at the rate they nre estimated to have achieved during05 period. The poor efficiencies of early plants left much room for improvement during that period, and the abundance of ore permitted tbe more efficient, from the standpoint of kg product per MW electric power consumed, minimal stripping of natural uranium. If the estimate of Soviet Bloc uranium ore production is essentially correct, the Soviets may not need to stripails concentration until some yearsowever, in view of the Soviet practice of maintaining large uranium ore stockpiles it was assumed that the tails concentration decreusedl and Thus, although further improvements in Soviet plant design can be expected, the power expended for the assumed additional stripping of tails will counteract the benefits gained through improved technology. Thus the estimatedroduction could be considerably greater or smaller than given, if either the derived plant efficiencies or the electric power made available for Isotope separation should be significantly different from tbe estimated values.
g 0CHK'j'
TAME X
ESTIMATED SOVXET PRCCIJCTIOH OfALL PURPOSES 5/
yeBr of
Equivalent
(Kilograms)
750
* Plant operating only last feu months of fiscal year.
Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
believes that the new intelligence does not adequately support estimateuoulative production The estimate of efficiency of Soviet isotope separation operations is composed of scant specific intelligence information and uncertain assumptions as to when certain improvements were made in Soviet planta. Due to the many, varied andore practical figure for planning purposes ofroduction5 would be one in the lower range of uncertainty, approaching theower limit. (Footnoteontinued on page
?
72- Power Reactor Pro from. The very large electric power reactor program announced for tho Sixth Five-Year Plan and the still greater expansion indicated as plannedillajor impact on future fissionable material stockpiles bothonsumer ofndroducer of plutonium,nd tritium.
a. The Sixth Five-Year Planeactor generating capacitylectrlcal megawatts in operation by the endnd further Information Indicatesotal0 electrical megawatts is being considered as the goal over the next twenty-five yearn. Analysis of Soviet public statements on the Soviet Power Reactor Program provides the estirate of the Soviet nuclear electric pcwer program given in Table XI. It is considered that the announced Soviet program forlectrical megawatts of nuclear power0 Is possible of attainmentery high priority effort, but the specific reactor program in Table XI requires the solution of several difficult engineering problems.
b. Academician Kurchntov outlined the Soviet plan to construct seven different types of expsrimental power reactors in the. Throe of these reactor types ore to be incorporated in four, or possibly five, power stations. All ore apparently to be fullscale prototypes. Four small-scalereactors were also described. These would tend to round out the Soviet reactor development program. The Soviet Five-Year Plan nuclear power programubstantial one, working toward the future when nuclear power would be economically competitive with conventional power costs In the European USSR. During the90 the USSR proposes to put into operation
y (Footnoteontinued fromhe same reasons,ack of intelligence on Soviet plans andhe atomic energy field, lead hin. to conclude that the estimatevailable bynd subsequent dates reflects projections and extrapolations under very uncertain conditions, ratheralid figure for planning purposes.
The above conclusions are applicable throughout theof this estimate whenever estimatesr weapons fabricated from this mcLul are discussed.
five large power stationsO electrical megawatts eachto accumulate experience in: nuclear engineering,of fuel elements, and fuel processing. Theseare outlined in Table
c. The USSR has Indicated in some detail the dosigns of the proposed craphite moderated, water-cooled reactor typo andype. The water moderated
?,T "Pchli&tly enriched uraniumpressurised system has many favorable features. However,to be formidable technical difficulties in theen appropriate pressure vesseleactor of thisfVrOTth. announced lndlCaWd hOU pro^e
oDPrehenaive outline of the planned Soviet nuclear electric power program is not available. However, it ls estimated that the general objectives of this power program are:
to be "first In thenstalled nuclear electrical kilowatt capacity.
to produce fissionable materials.
to gain experience directed toward future achievements of economically competitive electric power.
e. These objectives lead to the conclusions thatelectrical aegawatts) will probably
EaJSKS rower (optimized for Jiutonium production) or for optimum power production. These larRe rower reactors will be full-scale developmental prototypes for thT^
reactswater-cooled
reactor station and possibly the two water-moderated and cooled reactor stations, utilizing high cost fuel (enriched uranium) will probably be optimized for power production. The dual-purpose reactors would employ low cost fuels such as natural uranium. It
ilJTSE'heiSovietBgas-cooled, heavy
water-moderated reactor and the unspecified fifth station iypo
^nr.^P tC?IUD productlon- distribution would minimize the enriched uranium requirements and maximize the plutonium
production from the Soviet pover program. The cost of heavy water would tend to keep the utilization of heavy-water type reactorsinimum. In addition, the Soviets may not, owing to technical difficulties, be able to develop water moderated and cooled reactors of the planned capacity. Therefore, it is possible that they may substitute for this reactor type in order to meet their total announced power output, other types of reactors such as graphite-moderated, gas-cooled reactors, optimized for plutonlum production, thereby further Increasing estimated over-all plutonlum production. The possible range of installed electrical capacity devoted to each major type of reactor is given in Table XII.
TABLE XI SOVIET POWER REACTORS
Of Stations
type Large Scale Stations
ooled
Uranium
ater-cooled (similar to Atomic Power Station of Acad, of Sciences, USSR)
Uranium
gas-cooled,
Pilot Plant Stations
Fast Plutonium Breeder
Homogeneous Heavy-Water Thorium Breeder
Sodium-cooled, Graphite-moderated
Boiling Water
Enriched Uranium
Enriched Uranium
'i'i ii W.
TABLE XII USSR ATOMIC POWER PROGRAM
Stations
Electric
Power
(Electrical megawatts)
00 EMW per reactor)
Dual Purpose Stations
Plutonium Production with some power Low coot fuel (natural uraniumeed core)
Optimised Power Stations
Power production with some plutonlum High cost fuel (Enriched uranium)
Pilot Plant Stations
Experimental
MW per reactor
aoo-iuoo
EMM
73- equirements of Power Program. Lacking precise information we have estimated* equivalent) sacrifice by assuming that approximately half of the reactors utilize enriched) with fuel requirements approximating those of the graphite moderated, pressurized light water cooled reactors similar to the best known current Soviet power reactor type. On this basis it has been calculated that the* equivalent) inventory, including feed on hand and beingwould be0 kilogramsegawatts of generating capacity. hermal efficiencyas been assumed on the basis of stated Soviet desire to Increase thehermal efficiency of the Obainskoye reactor. Theurn-up has been calculated byurn-up factor
-
kilogramsquivalentlectrical megawatt years. The use of these asGumptions and calculations leads to the following table ofxpenditure. The cumulative estimatequivalent presented in Table XIII as expended or tied up in the nuclear power reactorubject to considerable variations, depending on Soviet plans for different reactor designs and variation in pipeline Inventory requi resents. If tbe Soviets install more than one-half of the announced electrical power capacity in natural uranium reactors, then the quantityequired would be reduced. The pipeline inventory requirements utilized in this estimate, although based In part on Soviet statements of fuelare tight. ore flexible or generous pipeline inventory or difficulties being encountered In the separation process could almost double the total inventories outlined. Thus, the actual quantity tied up in the power reactor program could vary anywhere from about one-half to approximately twice the values presented.
TABLE XIII
ESTIMATED USE OFH THS SOVIET POWER REACTOR PROGRAM
Data
Total EMW
Installed
EMW in
Enriched
Reactors
necycling Systems in
Expended or Tied-up in gramseactor program Equivalent (Kilograms)
9900123456
0
0
0
125
of Polonium which can be produced in calculated since SttSd. i characteristics of the reactors to be'PeCiflCunder which the USsTviU
carry out its progran,. An estimate of plutonlum to be produced
nstalled" clpa^r
-ill be"^L8 tJkatof the !for Pcver production. Table XIV givestotal installed electrical megawatts andlSSa*
ska sr
to optimized power reactor^
TABLE XIV
ESTIKATfiD PLUTOim* BgOjCHgTTIfTTT nHACTOR PROGRAM
(Kilograms J
Date
Endidididididididid 66
Total EMU Installed
400
0
Annual Plutonium Production
0
Plutonium Production (Rounded)
0
r.
75- Plutonium Production. The present Soviet plutonium program is estimated to be capable of producingilograms of plutonium (or equivalent in tritium and/orer year. It is estimated that this program has been expanding for the past four years at an average rate ofilograms per year added production capability. It is assumed that this expansion rate uill continue on the average throughhen it is estimated that significant plutonium production from the power reactor program will first appear. It is further assumed that further expansion of plutoniumfacilities will be limited to the production capability of the power reactor program after On the basis of these assumptions the following plutonium production may be predicted.
TABLE XV
ESTIMATE OF TOTAL PLOTONIUM PRODUCTION (Kilograms)
Production
10
25
115
330
700
2kO0
76. Future Fissionable Material Production. The estimate of future Soviet availability of fissionable materials for weapon purposes is tabulated below. Thestimated available for weapons is the estimated total production ofinus the estimated use ofn the Soviet power reactor The "plutonium" estimate represents the estimated total of plutonium equivalent from both production and powor reactor programs. Our estimates ofnd plutonium production are subject to many variables which are dependent on Soviet plans and decisions and are therefore less reliable than the estimates of the cumulative production up
TABLE XVI
ESTIMATE OF AVAILABILITY OF FISSIONABLE MATERIALS FOR WEAFQK USES
{Kilo-ran;^;
vailable Cumulative Plutonium lent Availableeapons
-
IT. 'SES
Power Program
77- The Soviet nuclear electric power nrorram, which is of considerable magnitude, appears designed tclaim for world leadership in this field. Tho Soviet Union is engaged in design and development ofozen types of reactors ranging in power fromMW for the production of electric power as part ofivc-Year Plan. This program, which callsotal capacity ofegawatts of electric power, is within Soviet capability, but willigh priority effort for its achievement. One small reactor began producing electric power from nuclear energy in, and has been given wide publicity by the USSR as the "first in thehis reactor, while inefficient, is useful for experirtiental studies of power reactor operation. The Soviet nuclear electric power program, assuming continuing expansion, will require an increasingly greater percentage of the totalvailable, but will producey-product plutonium ornd tritium.
International Atomic Energy Activities
70- Beginning inhe USSR hasore active role in international atomic energy activities and haseadiness to use its atomic energy resources for political objectives. Within the Bloc the USSR has" entered into agreements to supply Communist China and each of the European satellites, except Albania,esearchMev cyclotron, radioactive isotopes, and technical training. The agreecoents call foresearch reactorhermo kilowatts to the Chineseheoio kilowatts reactors to the others. Details of the agreements are not known, but it is indicated that raw materials will be sent to the USSR in return. Radio Prague announced in5 that an atomic power station will be built in Czechoslovakia with Soviet help during the secondear. Establishmentoint Nuclear Research Institute in Moscow was announced on All members of the Sino-Soviet Bloc will participate and it was announced that membership would bc open to non-Bloc nations.
79- Outside the satellites, the USSR has agreed to provide assistance to Yugoslavia inesearch reactor and in training Yugoslav technicians. Limited offers of training andassistance have been made to India, Egypt, Indonesia and Iran. Slightly enriched uranium in research reactor quantities was offered to Norway in
There has been increased Soviet participation inmeetings during the past year. The USSR participated in the United Nations Conference on Peaceful Uses of Atonic Energy at Geneva. In5 the Soviets invited scientists from the Free Worldonference in Moscow on the peaceful uses of atomic energy.
in5 Premier Bulganin announced in Geneva that the USSR was prepared to contribute fissionable material to an acceptable International Atomic Energy Agency when established.
In6 the USSR agreed to the draft Statute of the proposed International Atomic Energy Agency along lines proposed by the US -
announced Soviet program of atomic aid tonations, proposed inhouldI. Construction of research reactorsbe completed in East Germany, Czechoslovakia,Communist China and possibly in Bulgaria and Rumania.
It is estimated that the program may be expanded to include reactors capable of producing electric power on an industrial scale Further offers of aid to nations outside the Bloc can also be expected in order to gain political advantage.
Ill- NUCLEAR PROPULSION PROGRAM5
research in application of nuclear reactorspower generation and in the production ofis applicable, at least in part,uclear Versions of the pressurized-water, thegas-cooled and the homogeneous-boiling types of reactorsadapted to some types of nuclear propulsion.
&k- Liquid and Gas-Cooled Reactor Experiments. In2 the first 'loop" for testing fuel elements of power reactors with water cooling under high pressure was completed with the test reactor
operating at full power0 KW. Later, two loops were started to investigate constructional elenents of reactors with water cooling under high pressure and with liquid metal cooling. Two additional loops were then placed in operation to test fuel elements of the nuclear power reactors with air and water cooling under working conditions. These lust two loops were probably started in3 ork. For these reasons,k is taken as the date of completion of the feasibility study of this type reactor.
Bogogenirojs Boiling Type Reactor. The paper the Soviets presented at Geneva on this type reactor appears toecently completed typical feasibility study for electric power. Research and develojxsent of this type applies equally well to reactors for nuclear propulsion on well as for breeding. Xn view of this fact, It is reasonable to suppose that tbeeasibility study was completedeactor used for electric power could very closely coincide with the corresponding completion datetudyeactor for nuclear propulsion.
Applications of nuclear Propulsion by the Soviet Havy. The USSR exhibited on interest in nuclear propulsioi for naval transports as early Publications56 hove confirmed this interest In nuclear powered transport ships and also mentioned submarines and ice breakers. ive-Year Plan callsork on the creation of atomic power installations for transport purposes: To build an ice breaker with an atomic The ice breaker is stated to be of theP0 tons displacement class. The pressurized-water, liquid-metal, gas-cooled or homogeneous-boiling type reactors could be adapted for use in naval propusllon units. The tine necessary touclear propulsion unit for surface vessels is considered to be somewhat shorter than the time required to develop one for submarine propulsion. It is not known if or when any of those types of reactors will become available for use in nuclear propulsion. It Is estimateduclear propulsion program began about the time the USSR realized that suitable reactor types were feasible. On the basis of this estimate and Interpreting the research that Is known to hove been taking place In the USSR
It Is estimated that:
a- uclear propulsion reactorurface ship could be produced
b. uclear propulsion reactorubmarine could bc.
67- Application of Nuclear Propulsion by the USSR Air Force. There is no evidence of Soviet Air Force activities related to nuclear propulsion for aircraft other than the6 statement by E. P. Slavsky, Director of the Main Administration For the Use of Atomic Energy, that the Soviets "have every possibility of building, in the not too distant future, an aircraft with an atomic motor". Some of the research known to have been conducted by the USSR could apply appropriately to nuclear propulsion for aircraft. It is assumeduclear propulsion program for aircraft began when it was realized by the USSR that certain reactors could be utilized for this purpose. No information is available on Soviet development of nuclear proulsion systems for long range ballistic missiles. It is estimatedircraft nuclear reactor propulsion program, to date, probably has not progressed far into these and probably will not progress beyond this phase prior to
Applications of Nuclear Propulsion. Therea few press discussions concerning the application offor automobiles and trains; evidence indicatesapplications arc not considered seriously by the USSR
at this time.
IV. FUTURE WEAPON DEVELOPMENT AND TEST ACTIVITIES
Future Soviet weapons development and test activities must be estimated by extrapolating present Soviet capabilities, as revealed by the USSR's test program.
We believe that the Soviets will only stockpile significant numbers of weapons which are similar but not necessarily Identical with those tested. Major improvements in weapon design
or anticipated yields will probably be tested before stockpiling.
91- Possibility of Multi-Megaton Experiments. With the detonation of JOBhermonuclear weaponegatons, the Soviet nuclear weapons development program has reached the point where fabrication of multi-megaton weapons may be accomplished
by the extension of techniques which led to the development of this weapon. ulti-megaton weapon may occur in any of the future Soviet test aeriee for the purpose of optimizing weapon design and of diversifying weapon types. However, unless radical design changes arc Involved, the absence ofest will not preclude the Soviet stockpiling of multi-megaton weapons on an emergency or provisional basis. In general, future Soviet nuclear weapons teats will probably be directed primarily toward the development of smaller-dimension and higher-yield weapons to Increase the flexibility of weapons delivery systems.
92. Requirements for Continued Testing In the Soviet Kucleur Weapons Program.The Soviet vtn program has already provided sufficient date for the rapid and successful developmentariety of nuclear weapons types. We believe that the majority of theoviet nuclear detonations detected by the US have been primarily weapons development teats, although military interest in weapons effects tests is evident in the Totekoye testnd tbe underwater test near Novnya Zemlya
Possible Effectest Moratorium on then our view, further development type tests would bc considered desirable by Soviet scientists for the purpose of optimizing existing weapon designs and would be necessary to establish the feasibility of now principles of design. However, wo believe thatest moratorium were imposed the Soviets could satisfy, with acceptable but not optimized nuclear assemblies, their major military requirements for weapons, including warheads for all types of missiles, without further nuclear wcapona tests.
E>
Original document.
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