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MEMORANDUMirector of Central Intelligence Decision on Project AQUATONE
1. Present Status: Reflecting the discussions and'decisions of the past three weeks since AQUATONE operations were halted onuly, the following is the present status of the Project.
s at Wiesbaden in complete state of
|S| * readiness with four aircraft operational. It has been advised that no missions will be flown over denied areas until afterugust at the earliest but in the meanwhile infrequent weather missions and certain test missions are being flown over friendly territory. Work isermanent base, originally intended for thia unit, at
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b. as completed training and its deployment
to Adanastart onugust. It should be fully
operational witii iuur aircraft at Adana byugust.
An advance party is surveying available facilities at
Plans are beingand airlift scheduled for the redeployment ofrom Wiesbaden to the Far East beginning about Zl August. (The samowill be used for tho initial deployment ofnd the redeployment of A. ) It ia understood that tho final decision to leave"n Germany or redeploy it to the Far Eaet will not be made until aboutugust and it will remaintate of operational readiness until that date. If redeployed thia Detachment ahould beIn the Far East abouteptember.
The aiBembiyi equipping and traininghird detachment
(Detachment C) ia going forward onMost of'its
senior personnel have already entered on duty and eight pilots have been recruited. The Detachment should be' ready for deployment In the first half of November.
e. esult of slippage in the development of the most advanced cameras and much of the electronics equipment, considerable
Bissell version with changesjj
by General Cabell. )
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development remains to be done. amera cannot bebe operational much before the end of the yearill not be operational until late winter. On the basisplans these development programs and some trainingwillebruary. Thereafterbeing made/toT7be shut down anddevelopment activities will be handled at an Air/subject to decision subsequent tougust./
Required: Byugust it will be necessary
s to resume operations inredeployed promptly to the Far East, or remain inactive ata later resumption of operations or redeployment.
s to start active operationswhen it is operational, fly "probing" missions or remainthan for flying its cover missionsfTawaiting later decisions.
Immediately afterugust it would seem desirable to reviewand development programs in the light of the above decisionsiew to /determining whether or not to/ curtailing- development and procurement /which might be7 no longer required for. this Project. At the same time it would likewise seem wise .to review the requirementhird detachment.
Bearing on theae Decisions: What are here listedbearing on the problem are believed to beestablished and objectively stated circumstances .which in nothe major policy decisions but which do have clearthe form and timing of these decisions.' r..,
_ a. If At is determined that there is no reasonable prospect that/s set going to be used in Europe either at Wiesbaden or along withdana, it ought to be put to work as soon as possible in the Far East /after that determination is madcT.ecision is not made byugust either to let it resume operations or to redeploy it, the opportunityrompt redeployment would be lost and-more-time -would- be- waeted-to-ne-good purpose^
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organization which has been built up to carryhas been designed to conduct operationseriodmoreear. It isermanent organization andto the task of maintainingoutine manner ato be used in the event of war or of unforeseeablein the political climate. Its personnel, both civilian andhave been recruited for short tours of duty, assigneda TDT basis without their families, and every effort has beendevelop the motivation for an intensive temporary undertaking. decision is madeart or all of the capability that hasis to be placedtandby basis, with no prospect ofat any foreseeable time, /we would havo serious problemsthe present organization /from losing/ itsof Its best people, and Its effectiveness.
and procurement are currently goinga scale adequate to support three detachmentsully activea continuous period ofonths. Savings of some millions(part of which would accrue to tho Agency and part to thecould be achieved by prompt cutbacks In these programs. would, however, prevent the development of the fullplanned. Under the circumstances, failure to achlevodecision as to the scale on which and the time periodthis capability will be actively employed ie-bouad-tein the waste of substantial sums as well ae the wasteful tying
up of technical manpower which may be needed in other national security programe.
must be repeated that well-informed technicalthe existing reconnaissance system lessear beforoof interception ofircraft starts to increase, of course be longor before the re_ could be generallyof advanced interceptors^/
4. Conclusions: All of the above considerations argue powerfully in favor of an attempt to secure reasonably clear-cut decisions on the future of this Project by the middle of August. /The most desirable decision is thatoncerted effort against the top priority targets. Failing this, CIA and the Air Force should consider what the probabilities are of eventual favorable action^/ -made-vs-apaBUil-y-oing-to be-used-
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heo-inet -the- Eur^pee*It /can be arguedy ia-difficultte-be&eve-that /no? any facta not now available are required aa the basis forecision or that the passageew more weeks would hot? greatly alter an evaluation of risks to be incurred and benefits to be gained. In particular it is difficult to see what good can come of "probing" missions which will merely alert the defense and stimulate more political protests without accomplishing any really important purpose.
5- Proposed Procedure: In order toecision It isthat two kinds of staff work should be done:
a. pecific plan of operations should be proposed as the desired course of action end-vho-action- should -be-d- in -equally -epeo-if io- te rme- eo- that- ahekt* ie-pweeeAed-to-lhe-polvUeal-autherkieor pecific proposal has been prepared In the formlan for some fifteen missions over the western USSR which would cover tho highest priority intelligence targets. or- practioeJ-pHrpeseere -only
perations- limited- te -China- and-the- -Eu-vopeoo. Satellites
plaeing- of-the-eapabUisy-tandby-baaie^
b. Second, the proposal should be staffed out with the interested military authorities (the Air Force and the JCS) and with the Department of State in the hope that it can bc presented with their To thisilitary assessment of AQUATONE is being prepared by the Air Force and it is believed that supper* will beboth from General Twining and from Admiral Radford on behalf of the Joint Chiofs. It had been hoped that the Secretary of State's views could be obtained well in advance ofugust.
6. Recommendations: It Is strongly recommended:
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a. That the recommended plan of operations over the USSR from the west, tegathe-v-eFRattve-eeursee-of-aeBion, be presented to the Secretary of State at the earliest opportunity and the plan be modified if necessary so as to obtain his concurrence or at least acquiescence.
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kafcin-the-eventepesteps- he-taken- iei-fch-wrth- bo taitojee*e reetaneby-oapab-ilttyi
tion of the
T7 That in the event of his concurrencelan of operations, this be presented to higher authorityoint recommenda-
DC! and the JCS with the concurrence of the Secretary of State.
cc: DDC1
RICHARD M. BISSELL, JR. Project Director
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