THE NEW LANDS PROGRAM IN THE USSR (IP 475)

Created: 8/24/1956

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

oy lends Prosrea Ii> the

She toplo for djgflnMTOTi today itod "new lands" progrsa, moiim WHira bySoviets la tho aprlng of - tbaK^togZVaaone of the nunarous measure* by tovtet leaders to bolattr asrf^lture, toa lagging sector of the eeoaor-v. Ja the fall* thereoos adtii cf rtporte tad decree* highlighting tbaf &nrlet agriculture. Ccmtineralle publolty was elves by the press to thtuicecwnta,he higher priority given to sericulture by thoae in authority. The decree* Issued In the faXX3 vera primarily devoted to the

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introduction Of Incentive neaenroa to aiioo^rjac peasant pax-tlolpatlon in thetoc^tural pro*artla>VJ^iCAlarly Uvettoo* prociiata, * ^

Then is the apring- flmillr^arffilifrwTiad tho "nor lends" progran, aimed c- .ipBcaosSvdnotiaa farpa^fasi

wWr^fe ^fclA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

fIN FULL

teplsnlshsan* Of

facilitating epeclftlisatloa in other cropa in parte of theorta

ft* lav Laods pxojmt in its original .cope. Involved tba reclamation and seedlns,f I) aUXton hectares, prirariy in yatsihstan and Siberia, andeaser extant in the Srala, Txene-YcdaA, and BsfOl ftnntipit regions. Bovwer la Augusthan Urrwt psoflpeots In the Bev bods loosedev decree vas published relating tbe peal froml^MftWi nsotsrss5 to bLULJob hectares

The treoanaoos) land expanse involved in this project become* sore real vhen vo consider thatillion5 tdlllon acres} Is an area approximatelyto the entire arable area of Canada, Or, oxprewed another vay,illion heatarea la an areareater thffA the. vbeat acreego in icy,-.

Tbe soils in mush of this vest area *re> in general, fairly ml tawfor the production of grain glthougherious problm In aoo* areas. stare Important, hatwvsr, than ths marginal character of soma of the soils is the hasard of oUatte, particularly in the Auaachatdn portion of tbe Km Zands. There is so terrain terrier between the Vev land* and the Central Asiaa deserts to the aoutt or tba Aretio COM to too north, than the day .hot alnds fron Central Asia sweepitastroua drbusha coy recolt, particularly It spring and aonrwr rainfall hat boon light. On the other head, orotic finds may brine snov in August-

AM ttraraai. *nwai ra^nfjfli in tho filbarian portion of to* Rev landa

to Oft* at the ff&aAUR -aneat batt'rft&stng fernnchesTeem* tonches at It is conprally reac^obtri In Canada, that crop cultivation is hBsordflua to rtjlana There the annual raiaeiU averages less thannches. If thisalid, criterion ths rainfall in tho EKtafehstSn portion of the lev Leads Is oertatrOy insufficient, rn thinajor part of the Hov Lands Is being reclBirwd, tea etwraes annual rt^cfBil In general rangesnches at fiutsnal toxaSm at fealr on therargin of the sev Loads.

py lanao feetjrlDS crop 'Wgba. with srolnat)prtanry CBSfc. Oh the basic ofyield nets* the long termyield for tfc* Land* bW bean estlaataa atestscrs per9Shift*maverage yield of about

teftOfio ytoiaofushel* per acre,. yield ofuehftla per Bars*

wla* esnnlIn yields la to be expected In toe Per Lands arear*ct ralselasry extreae flnotoatieo from yoox to year in the ptrrinf. and aurtrlt-nticn of rainfall. This variability In yield*BWjpAgaa by tfee yieldsdnring theears of the program, fix tie first year of ths jrpsrna, aligtatay acre than aUUcaf grain vera sawn In the Sev Lsadg. Onvlns conditions vers unusually favorable, vlth resultant yieldsbout 6oi above ths long toss average,ev Land* production vaa slightlyillion tons. Aboutf the total USSR production. 5 nost of the Sev lands Bufferedrought, cutting yields to an estlcncedtolov ararage. Oms, in spite of moreour-fold increase in grain area, the Rot lands production5 wasll-Uoa tons, about double thata. Ae for6 harvest, it is too early at this date, toefinitive eatlante of yields but all reports indicate tost another good oroo has bean groan In the Bev lands area. The seal ofillion hectares vaa achieved this spring. It la not known she* proportion of this area, la amm to grain but on to* basis5 open coco probably about as million hectosra* is grain. Earlyre that the yields per hectare this year are fibovn-ut probably aonavrtiat belov the excellent yieldsb. Bie cccblnationiseabla grain araa together vlth good yields per hectare probably *U1 result6 RflW Lenin grain production too or three time* as large at that oMaJnad

She nasnltudB of the output that can be expected from the Rev Landseriod of years has been the subject of considerable discussion among Soviet

M

attldaX*. Bjb/ ;pobli8hed OUteacnt* -eft tf^pteted successes, bcvwvcr, are unreelistically OpttolStdo., Sovietataon expected 5ev Zends production toply Bn averageericfi of yearsentoero per hectare wbleh la shout OTa-thlrd hlfiher than the ewUaate* tttox^B> yield tor the OSSHhole for the, On the basis Of en historical yield Arnica for tho Hewentoero per hectare Is .Judged to b* areasonable eatiaate of tha yield thos con be expected la th> Bar lands ever aof years.

aorushnaer he* stated theft hehe bnuuftl (average) output of the flew Zftnda bp be icasectare*ieldcofctixft). Cn thei ejej>erl*Krfl in crop rotations under roygniy^KlcllBi' phya WflX andnaUftioraiilltcn heotareo contlnuoaalyx&tnz'-lxoBillion Sj^Rrts in tbs rotation nysten, but no ssreage eaqgpa^-gr^giaa of this nassltrde has been area isplied by sovietats far, about,rillira heotara* hm.peoh reclaiaed.

Recent fcrict Wttooeati give tea basisore preolse estlsate of potential proOuatioo i#* indicate the current Jntentien toillion bsdfttrea> cat of trtiich, on tho basis of the long-runtxt3 tocllUca fcfitt&reii cruld te grain/ieldentnerscv Zfcd* ffrerW ffodaoUoaotllion tons could bo expected. Otis tcold represent fifceut ID toercent of tha estimated average Uasa production for the four yearrior to the Inauguration of tho Rev tenia prosrm. roes produotiQfto IS Billion tons of grain after deductions: fW seed andet availability for direct ii-no conausptionatUicn torts, die Quantity would supply tbe grain recjireoente offc0 aUlion people.

fiia new lands progran In being inplctseated with the participation ofnchine CraOUr statloue, end on undetermined number of State ttamy InOlnftlrgSt-tfra fornn. Di the initial phase of the prpgrnn thohtyro ofwftJijon tasia fellrMng naehine tractor stations and coUwtlve fans, which nmrtft noat easily exploit the readily accessible land located on their peripherics. Zn the later stages of the progran, however. State itossl^WoeWiaasd en increasingly afflportant role ao that6 state fara grain Aerugo in tbeaddouhXB that' In establishing these new State farafleathoritlca bsvo begBi'^Jjiflwmced by severalhe ratability of the land for large sealo grainaado^gSerlabor rasnuroea in tho region

esire to expand tho state fleeterthus assuring the channeling of vvlarser sMSiulturalhe state iio-iifcuticn cut.

Rgrtmlftuyitft the; Kga land*Wigt'hfpil.aetf.. Initial machinery ;reeulxoswato hav*"keen mo* by heavyagricultural machinery to tbe Bew land* atf deliveries toagricultural areas, end by loans from those nreac- loans of cQHlpaeni have'ceto particularly tEgjortant in facilitating the aerreating eni delivery of grain to con^jsn^tratlon points. The major effect of dsliverlea of asrSculitarsl machinery to ths^&ff lands probably has been to delay the re^enaipment of egrlexdtnre In thearticularly the grain arena, Bhd therefbrsemporarilyorkload on the existing sachlnery park In those6 theprnblra of the Sew Lands program will

largelysoeiBent*

The uauwoMa^-xaq^Creaants .ofrelatively snail, aaounting to

Utincrease In popula-

tion In the Rcvr-licdn area is esiametodillion persona ory

the tcrtttf' the cbsb. :

Some of thb SR*lXn4 laborcro and epeolifldats for tho agricultural labor force

-of tie Ken Lands have been recruited froa pastrya rerersal of the usual procedure in the flovlat IWOtty a> aifssant speech ou*.ln ths Sev lands rnrnshceev spoke of

need to "afcrsflgtoea concrete galdonco to-eooh collective farm and statee stressed: "Va wiot atnd serious people, not those vho already on Thursday ond Friday think what thy fishing Will bothe/ Earring major changes in the Kb* Scnfls acreage goals, tb^rngrfia will notontinuing drain on the national liiaapWer supply. Oaeo laBJAp^nVur re^olrenwnts havend tho shifting of construction workers and other laborers to agriculture has been completed, jsaintetonae ofcor force should not prasttot and: particular problems. *

Although construction expenditures hava baem fairly heavy in the ffav Lands, they do not appear toerloua icgaot on eonstmctdon in other sectors of the Soviet economy, hava been many laga.^h. conatroctlonhortage of storage caased none losses of grate aftern*MA sill cause losseo again this year with tha Xa aenarsl ho^war,ot appear that underfolrill-ment of cu^uacti^ plaas has earlcusly hindered too Hew lands program.

At thatoo program& toe Kev lands region, especially the Kazakhstan portion, was characterisedary low daosity of rollroada. In addition, moat motor reads: wars not suited to yasr-round use. Under such conditions transport orohlaos varapending toe njpsgsioo and iDpraveatentho tronsportotlon

raxa, no ifcfij.

pud

network. o* coot in olume of construction materials, fool, end Kachincry congested the rail systtfO,outbound traffic was snarled in Septeaber end October by the increased loadtcsuI ting from the bumper grain crop. Bus situation was sot as eararo? ttxa to the opening, for tenderer?everal new rail lines In the Hew lands ttfeft* Bbaeror this year tho transportation network again is facedresnndooe pronto* of aorlng tha good harvest, end

lessee nay occur shea grain la stored la hsejatin tho open, asedtlng trauapoit toorout of the area. Kteenovlch recently expressed theguaintlyi "la- are! br "grain fron the virgin lands. This laand joyful offensive- ost receive'this night* grain flow In a p

-tbe ffavlveatd^pTograarelated, but. subordinate to the grain

-

ytwh last smith inIanda Of frnrthstan Jftviswhrher ealdi

"shea vs eareveetttng up the state fans ra geared then to grain production Into oonpllcstfea- the Inlttnl period* Today, we must think about the developaestbreeding In the nav state farms, and tha breading of beef and dairy cattle,poultry." He area inmtlcoeid horBehreedlagoncession to the Kaaskhai wall known that the KhraKha eat horse Gash. Kby then not pay greater attentionbreedlns? ttla most beopen eoopa where Ksxakhe, Tatars

and other nationalities who consume horse flesh, could buy it. Perhaps va should also plan to sail horse flash

The new Lendo program has resulted In increased allocation to agriculture from the stata budget. These Increased expraaitaresj have not caused reductions as compered to previous years, in the allocations for tbe major aoo aguleulnaral sectors or the rest of agriculture*

m relation tp total allocations to agriaultoxe and In relation to total state inveataaot, tbe badges dgenfUtures on tbe Saw fiends are seen to be large but not excessive. Tbe moat easily year of the EevXjShda progran wasn which the plsnned Hew Tends budget expenditures were sgjproxbpatelyof total planned allocations to agriculture. Zn the earn* rear. Saw lands lnrastaent was probably less tnan ef of total planned state Investment (la teras of fixed capital} In the sertlcxaa Economy and less thanof5 total state Investment in agriculture

udgetary expenditures in tha Sew tends should decrease, although sssshSsnlsatlon coatlcueaapid pane

- mo. oro, &lamffl26* Cc>h- 0R>

to nonquota- eppraUol of toe Be*jtogrsza requires consideration of ieraroa separataof -teamplementoticu of tire plan. Ga toe on* band, as an osarple of the vorkloge of lbs Bsrlet rjatrajor cconoolo undertosing,aoggaste aemo gaSSraadfiasaons aa to lrrportaat strengthsoviet soeao-eooiuxal&ay*^ On toe other hand, an exaoi-natlon of tiu program on an eooncntgtnfcicj; raises the qnsstlnat Why vaa toe Sew landstasana* atU,nitiated and Inplemented with such

aaatoj andjwllamaaass o*

Boclo-Scononic

*"'

Breatica the Soviets anhj^etod tbe Sew lands to toe plow is

unparalleled tn hlatory. Barer before" aas&.country extooftBd Its cultivated area

so quickly/ gnxjy sere than too yrars, SO adliion hectares of virgin and

long-faUo* land aara plowed and needed. As pointed cut earlier, thirty million

hectares (ahonh nflS'lona anooat greater than the eeeded

acreage of sheet In tho US fba American expansion Into the Western

areas in toe nineteenth century was not na^prso rapid,Q to,

the decade of tha scat rapid expansion of the US farm area, crop lend harvested

increased about 63 tsOSUm

Sovarol inpqgtant conditions contributed to the speed of tha expansion. Including

the treeless characteristic of much of the area, toe pro-existence of islands of

cultivation, to* gre-flrlatetice of some basAe tranaportactlon facilities, sod the

availability of on BrprcpriBte technology* Central to toe accotgpllahment, however,

una toe abilityighly csntroaisnd aa&annolltoie state to mane (pick decisions,

and toast reaourcea and toe products of modern technology, similar

speed would be IcjcoslMeree, dacantrallsed society in

wlto all toe othar oon&rttoaa Hated aboyjif. ree society, thousands of

Individual* must aakw awoarata daelalona la order for such large amounts of

resources to beand the fiob could not ha done so swiftly.

ito hew lands program also exemplifiestriking fashion toe flexibility

of too Soviet System. AS late as2 Kalenfcov had stated that "toe grain

problem Is aoxwednd Xa Karen3 Ihrushchev opokc of

stepping up agricultural production "particularly in the central densely populated

ohlasts of the coantoy where capital luvaatoante can produce toe greatest economic

returns inOtoe". Tat, by3 the Hew lends program was

by Karontejst expansion of cultivated areas was

Ihe flexibility of Bowie*fr to act swiftly, arises froo tbe estreat evntrftlirniiou ofba: setting: end authority. On the one sand. It nay bo argued toot freoeent obengeo la policyign of irresolution or injudlciotto dsoliBto&S. On tho other htma, howovpr, the ability to shift the direction of aojor pivgicaa rapidlyerirce of etrength-

The Sew landslso provldse an exanple of the ability of the aorlcts toery large programpr aisolocnUmra In the econcwy, although la this OH theprogrna was fcfisialy ooncelvedspd carrtcd out with great speed. Iranhe year of tbo grwrtest latin of the IuibsUjouI in the Sow

.

lands, ths drarts of tha fewo fcuve been sat without seriousther inporhsnt irrognnB. Although tier* hOTo been scon shortages and bottlenecks In tha Pew Iteds ,they hare not been very algniricant, on tha whole. Ton largest part of the necessary lnvestaent has now been rnde, ssd the drain an the oconacy will lo lees in the future.

Hew ESada proal'Sie also provide* ewnples of fiha potential weakness of eentrallxod decdslan neMsg. ociety with highly centralised deciBicn naftlng nay act very oulcily in initiating and carrying out certain proaraao, it rune great ritftea of noting with insufficient inftovaoion* and oaring avoidable mistakesonaeajiancc. SMa anUVimia arises becauseociety lacks tbe balance provided by judgaaeata of zany sands, end nay lack avana of gathering objective evaluationsthoseosition to jodgo bent. HMw weakness haa not produced ooasee^eneea In the Kv lends BO obviooa or so dracatic sts the positive ficccnplieh-ssasssj yet- is tbe long na it may preve declslve.

A eajor saatnasa of the Hew lands program is that it was apparently initiate* and crystal Used In Ite issjor aspaota without any extensive prnli piracy scientific planning- She Se* Xesda area was by no saasak an untoorn region and the Soviets had in the pastftnsldarabla BBxnmt of experience la fanning In thathere la euch evldenco, rarrarthelcoo, that the now progran saa begun without an nda^mte enalysta oTtbe heat proceduree to follow and of the results which could reasonably be expected-

tha attespta of the Sorlets la the early thirties, to extend cultivation tosteppe area, failed, and much of tho snreage was abandoned. Darlnc theyears, the possible expansion of cultivation was the subject of bomtho Soviet press, but there was no appreciable increase In publishedpriorA, andnrntm renamed unsettled. Inof the coateoestiote are still under debate. In the auscwr ofJanuary

ha mooter of State laxae of So^satT 8SR stated that the cueotlon of rota-

debateffi^ttj and bare not yet arrivedresibie Jonjprunca tbe total area, to ba^Jiovad apparently roaalno in doubt.

the statements of Sorlat leaders on tin expected results from the Sev Lands hers been oTeropttolatlo. One experience inr *he thirties could not have provided the basis for their predictions, and It saawaoat unlikely that they are based onsober, eclentlfio analysis- ds haste of Uro prosroa, and toe evident* dleeueced earlier concerning; crnofal, uMatnled IssueeVleads one to avaipeot that toe flowleto say have actually proceeded on ahohreallstlc expectations. It is possible hflsever that tha Soviet lenders do nat.tttxa$feton*ly tholr ova etatemento no to

whan toe ttSmOMjgiy waa the nee- TaadSygrosrari DndertaAana "

3 It xan obvious that the flbvletsvvouldl hare to obtain moreho ffjtore to feed toelr expanding population- Zh addition it becacte evident tbat aaae efforts vera to be cade to tnprovB toe ncnotonoua diet'

de Soviet lenders hod several alternative courses shies they might havenstead of toe Be* lends program to obtain increased supplies of food. Tbcy might have chosen to import mors foodj toeya chosen to concentrate on inoreosine yields (tha niconaiive ablch vsa eaphaslscd in too period isszodlately preceding toe Be* Lends nroffraai& or toey might have expanded toe area, of cultivation by clearing forested Areas-It has not been possible MnShfs stedy to astinate the coste of grain which might have been obtained by these various afcteasnstivee- however, as vlll be tfhovn later, tost* arc reasons to believe that toe Soviet leaders vera not motivated prioarlly by ceOPOgfcQ- Ocnaidcratlons In taaKto. deelalon to develop toe Sev Lands program In toe say that they did develop ilsK

Expansion into ths He* lands vlll yield certain results, sbicb nay be considered to bohtcb would not have resulted faon. toe alternative prograrao suggaatcd above. aVtrng toe arsa of cultivation Into ne* territory the Soviets should reduce the year to year TsrlaMlity In tholr over-all agricultural. sagfeot of too Rev Sands harvests%5 * the Be* Lends yields were exceptionally high shale in toe Dfcrslne yields were exceptionally low. 5 toe position* were reversed, with Hew Lends yields being low end Ukraine yields high.

with the increased expansion of industry Into toe Be* lands and toe other eastern areas, it la poSslhl* that food ttsuapartsstesn oosto will be reducedesult of the Bev prrtn prOdiifffctCB- Bag* ecurringIn Soviet economic discussion. Incase of aver and ttgpftfaa, toe existence of this Internal grain area would be"of ohilcua benefit.

* mm*

tendegraia.fcsnr another obafiasfcerisfcic which apparently reign ad heavily in the daeisloa to nndertoko this jjgtgran rather then alternatives. Exclud-tog the expansion of food imports, noneernatives would have produced rr-salts so euieklyj ana none ofclnllnfelngcirta, would have been nearly

drejatlo.

any tea the gew lands, Proyran Initialed aaa^JtolaBented with Ouch EasteT

ftecea vaa apparMitly of great iirrcrthMo in tho Soviet decision to expend into

the Hew lands. Sola la suggested not only by .their choice of this program rather

thanot also by ths cxt mas baste with which the deolelan was

BppsB ently reached, and tha program tmplsMahted- tha Sonets rushed into toe

Sew lands ao hastilynastlen not easily answered. 8owlet leaders haws aot

publicly addressed tosBSelves to this question. Sney haws alleged, however, that

their decisions to develop toe Bew lends wars; based on economic criteria. Mstskevich

lster of jSsrflsnlture, eade an obo cute end nnalaborated ccsparielon indicating

toat toe cost of grain is leas In the Hewjanda than in other arena Khrushchev

saidil toss* riches, that IS* toe virgin soil, have been unused all toe

" becausewas beyond cor tofoogs* daring toe first decades of Soviet

rule whan va atf^tldloped agricultural machine building.

fireahcev reeent^Mdo,'of Skilled zeajpovor made toe Sev lands

development practical near waereas it was not In the past.

It is doubtful, however, that toe reasons tor toe speedy Initiation of toe

Rev leads program were economic. It la tree that the development of technology sad

increased supplies of machinery and manpower affect toe coats of production of grain,

and can aaae economically feasible toe extension of cultivation on previously oub-

mazginal lends. It la possible that such conditions, along with the conditions of

desand for grain In the Soviet Onion did make en expansion of tbe cultivated area

deslreahle. Owes reasons are inadequate, however, as explanatlona of the sudden

initiation of toe program; and the extremely rapid ccaaiteeot of resources without

ndegoate scientific investigation, the development of technology, machinery, and

the labor force did not take place overnight, and it vaa not necessary to organise

toco and commit then overnight. The great baste might have been understandable

had thereudden end unforseen food crisis- Despite the poorharvest,

hoverer, there van no evidence of any orlals in the Soviet Union- act

1

the Sovlete contlnaed exports of grain in that year. ritical need for grain cannot havs been the main reason for toe rapid lapleoentation of toe program. In. toe turbulent internal situation after toe death of Stalin, it la possible toat political considerations weighed heavily la toe decision. In* progrna vas dranatio, andood probabilitytLoaveil designed to gain popular

attention and approval.

the upenrgo of Hm:

In tbe isomer* and again through the Hew lands area end spoke at He loat no opportunity to boast of 'Best "correct" policy of tbe Party ta, Siberia. last rconth Khrushchev itiovrd as virgin land? Jbr thoesands of years fit- Bar they have been placed; Cccntittee ofParty has rightly

amt.of

n^^ikf^ links between.tha paopio. cnce shxushchev beeada enthuaed over the>

a leogthy trip oonforeoces of agriculture! workers, and to point out the (quote) the program. Qua,esting In X . Such la the povar of the ware lying idle and were no bene-

of our. Tbe Central

V

in. the field of the aerelop-qf the country, end the well-being of the aloes and uabreateble days lateraxa&hatan cohfer-cota of the current wheat supply.

up to now there have been cottolaJfeteV:that by the end of the year in sow towns the production of white bread bad been redaeed and substituted bj rye and gray bread, this yefcr'a harvest lnaorea tat the country eoppltes of tfteot, end

lorars of ^xitwj^^arv^Mo^ &

l-y.

XT sovaa&.aMtBBetftw onprc^fectlon from the 3cv Bands are acceptedriterion, it can be stated -with coaaraarable confidence aba* the program will fall, da pointed cut earlier8 will probably achieve,ons-run besis, as output of approximately one-third the ^redaction that official statements have predicted.

It la possible, however, that official statements are not an sdeotrabe standard forudgment concerningpoBBUlb aacceos or failure of the If, as suggested above, political eej^lduiwtlonB were important in the decision to undertake tha program, then the political- effects eve relevantudgment.

In any case, it may be that the SowfIA leadens do not take seriously their own statement* above expected prodmetincu Sonet agricultural plans ore seldom fulfilled, and are apparently baaed on nafra "planning" concepts, or else contain on exbortatory or propaganda elenent which raises tbe goalseasonable level.

If an appropriate rotation la fallowed* tbe Hew lands will probably add an averageo IB million tons per year (aboutoercent of the avsrago productiono hho USSR supplegnain. Thia grain, in terms of direct coats (labor, fuel, machinery, etc. directly inTolvad in production)

y PBIS, so Ihkfjl ie,/ PBIS,C-7-

VOX probably be aaW expensive than groi&^ducea in tho traditional regions, because yields per hectare will h* lower -lfi>the ffevnd such direct coots

. orecloaoly related to tbe extent oEirOa faraed than they ere to the grain

^produced.

IT tbe Soviet authorities do not davo^Vaoro euitable rotationa for this region than they hare thno far pulOlolsedV they alii not he able to mlntaln yields, end will .run great rlnke of dor eloping axtreae duat coodltiona, which night even forcer atocdouaent of largo arearfi Unless auchcondltloaa

egain* to expeat Iw^^bala abandonment of the

Lands.

or lower than toe long-run average^ depending on the weather and other ecadltlouo affecting production during th^.erop year-

*

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Original document.

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