SINO-SOVIET INTENTION IN THE SUEZ CRISIS (SNIE 11-9-56)

Created: 11/6/1956

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NUMBER 6

SINO-SOVIET INTENTIONS IN THE SUEZ CRISIS

Submitted by the

OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE rhe following intelligence organizations participated in tie preparation Ot this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the mtelltgence organizations ol the Departments of State, the Army, the Naoy, the AU Force, and The Joint Staff.

Concurred in by the

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

oncurring were the Special Assistant, intelligence. Department of State; the Assistant Chiel ol Staff, intelligence. Department of the Army: the Director of Naval Intelligence; lha Director ol Intelligence. USAF; and the Deputy Director lor Iiu'eltlgence. The Joint Staff. The Atomic Energy Commission Heprcsentatice to the IAC. and theDirector. Federal Bureau ol Investigation, abstained, thcbeing outside ol thetr jurisdiction.

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irector of Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force

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DISTRIBUTION. White House

ni or.ru security Council Department of Slate Department of Defense Operations Coordinating Board Mamie Energy Commission Federal Bureau of Investigation

SINO-SOVIET INTENTIONS IN THE SUEZ CRISIS

THE ESTIMATE

Soviet notes to Eden and Molletstrong threats of military action against the UK. France, and Israel Inwith the Suez crisis. These threats are imprecise, however. They do notefinite expression of Soviet intent to take unilateral military action; they stillcall for UN action. Nevertheless, they are clearly intended to imply that the USSK may act alone.

There are several reasons for strong Soviet action in the Sues crisis:

reassert the Soviet position uof Egypt and of antic ol on ialgenerally;

o distract attention, both within and outside the Bloc, from the situation in

damage the Interests and prestigeUK and France and further dividethc Western Alliances;

to re-establish the fear ofof Soviet military forcerimaryin world affairs.

We believe that our previous estimate that the USSR wishes to avoid general warlo be valid.

It Is our present estimate that theill almost certainly not atlackUK or Franceprimarily because such an attack would make general warcertain;

probably not employ Sovieta large scale in thc Easternprimarily because their capabililyso at an early date is inadequate, also be-

cause thc risk of general war arising from such action would be very great;

make small-scale atlacks by airagainst UK and French forcesEastern Mediterraneanfor thecreating further pressures towards asatisfactory to themselves,themselves as the reliableEgypt;

continue to furnish military aidform of materiel, technicians, andto Syria, and through Syria to theSlates, probably on an increasedwill probably send volunteers.

at thc least continue by threatsto create alarm in the West, In ordera UN settlement tolerable lo

5 With respect to the implied threat to thc UK of using "rockets" {presumably guided missiles with nuclearhe USSR is estimated to have the capability of delivering low yield atomic weapons by ballistic missilesautical mile range which could reach the UK if launched from the Satellites.ile missile could reach major Israeli and Cypriot targets but not Egypt Itself. Air-to-surface missiles, and probably submarine launched missiles with nuclear warheads arc also within current Soviet capabilities and couldhreat to all areas. Wc do not believe that the USSR would employ guided missiles with nuclear warheads in theconflict

o attack Israel or Franco-British forces in the Eastern Mediterranean (except those on Cyprus) from present Bloc bases, the USSR would have to use aircraft ofng-Rangc

Air Force, or useet light bombers on missions involving no return to the Bloc.of bases forombers In Syria. Jordan, or Iraq ts an alternaUvebut would involve considerableof logistical support and defense of such bases, especially if they were used foroperations.

ith respect to the Far East, we believe it possible, though It does not at preseni seem probable, that the Suez 'crisis might develop Inay as to cause the Chinese Com-

munists to take advantage of it by an attack on the British Crown Colony of Hong Kong.

his estimate is based on intelligenceup0 hoursovember. In the fast developing situation our estimates of this situation must be kept under constant review. The flow of events will be drastically affected by day to day decision and action of the main participants, including Inthe USA. and the estimate the Soviel Union reaches as to the probable course of action of the USA. and the UK and France.

Original document.

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