LIKELIHOOD OF SOVIET VIOLATION OF AUSTRIAN NEUTRALITY (SNIE 11-8-56)

Created: 11/6/1956

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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SPECIAL

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NUMBER

LIKELIHOOD OF SOVIET VIOLATION OF AUSTRIAN NEUTRALITY

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE IN FULL

Submitted by the DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE The tallowing intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate; The Central Intelligence Agency and the Intelligence organization* of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint staff.

Concurred In by the INTELLIGENCE ADVISORV COMMITTEE

S.c the Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Slaff, Intelligence. Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence; the Director Ol Intelligence. VSAF. and the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Thc Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the IAC. and theDirector. Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subfect being outside of their turlsdtclton.

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LIKELIHOOD OF SOVIET VIOLATION OF AUSTRIAN NEUTRALITY

THE PROBLEM

To assess the likelihood of Soviet violation of Austrian neutrality in connection with developments in Hungary.

THE ESTIMATE

possibility that Austrianbe violated by Soviet forces is raisedfollowing considerations:

to reliable information,Embassy in Vienna burnedof paperovember.

Austrian officials havealthough they do not appear toworried, over the possibilityforces will not stop at thefrontier.

have been Communistthe Austrians arc violating theirof neutrality.

There has been considerable movement of Hungarian nationals across the border from Austria, despite Austrian measures to prevent Hungarians rrom re-entering Hungary.in large numbers apparently fled into Austria and these almost certainly Included military personnel. These circumstances might in Soviet eyesustification for Soviet violation of Austrian neutrality.

Austrian neutrality has not beenby the four Great Powers which signed thc Austrian State Treaty. Austrianhas been proclaimed by Uie Austrian gov-

ernment by constitutional proviso, and the signatory powers have formally taken note of the Austrian declaration. Thus, the USSR could allege that the Austrians had violated their own declaration by giving aid andto Uie Hungarian rebels and byWestern organizations to use Austriaase for providing assistance to the rebel lorces. Underretext, or in alleged "hot pursuit" of retreating rebel forces. Soviet armed units might penetrate Austrian

e believe it improbable that the USSR presently Intends any substantial military movement into Austria, although some border incidenls or minor Incursions Into Austrian territory may occur. We think that theleaders wouldreatbetween preserving Communist controlountry in which their forces were present and the outright invasionree country. They almost certainly wouldthat any major violation of Austrianwould tend to reunite the Western Alliance and would greatly Increase the risk of general war. The possible advantages which the USSR might seeeizure of Austrian territory do not seem to us sufficient to offset these disadvantages.

Original document.

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