NrE
96
SECRET
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NUMBER
CAPABILITIES AND TRENDS OF SOVIET SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
Submitted by the DnUICTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE Thr. tolloaAng tnteWgeace crganUattorxt participated to the preraratlon of thla estimate: Thc Central Intelligence Agency and tn, Intelligence orsantictiom at the Department,tate, tneliehc Air Force. Tha Joint Staff. JS tiU iMUc Energy
Cxmcxrmi in bjADVTSOBIffit. Concurring were the
/nlcWipcncr. Department of Stale; the AuUtant Chin, of Staa Intelligence. Departmenthehe Director el Havel Intelligence; the Director of Inteltlgenee. USAF; the Deputy Director for Intelligence. The Joint staff; and tZ Atomic Snargv Commission RcvesenlcUtt to th, tAC The Autitant Director. Federal Bur ea*Inpoitlgatlcm. abstained the JUWccf being outride of hit frildkUon.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Paragraph
I. Administrative Factors
Basic Attitude of the
Planning and
II. Resources
Financial
Distribution of
Quality of
Research Faculties arid
Collection and
Satellite and Chinese
Foreign Aid
Quality and
Some Future Trends
Planning
Distribution of
Capacity for
Appendix A: Capabilities ln Major Fields
Nuclear
Medicine and
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
Paragraph
Appendix B: Industrial Technology
Military Development Lead
Appendix C: Capabilities Related to Weapons Development
Nuclear
Guided
Aircraft and Related
Ground Force
Naval Research and
Electronics and
Chemical and Biological
Weapons
Appendix D; Scientific Manpower
UCII JOT
SKCBET
CAPABILITIES AND TRENDS OF SOVIET SCIENCE' AND TECHNOLOGY
THE PROBLEM
To assess current capabilities and trends in Soviet science and technology and to estimate future potential in this field.
CONCLUSIONS
and technology arefostered by the Soviet regime, as instruments of the Communist program and particularly as means for developing the physical power of the state. Soviet education heavily emphasizes scientific and technical subjects, and scientistsrivileged group held in high esteem. Strong financial support has beenfor Soviet research and product development. We foresee continued high emphasis on science and technology.)
The USSR has about four-fifths as many living scientific and technicalas the US. We believe that the USSRlightly greater number of scientific and technical graduates than
1sed In this estimate to denote thc natural sciences including auch fields aabiology, and theand health sciences. Tha estimate Is, however, on sclenUflc capabilities related to naUonal power, and moat or the detailed discussion In ItsIs devoted to the physical sciences and their Ipplratlona
has the US actually employed in scientific and technical positions of all kinds,igher proportion in physical sciences and engineering. This comparison of present numbers may be misleadingeasure of relative scientific and. strength, as it docs not reflect, among other factors, the broader USof scientific and technical personnel who hold no degrees. Our estimates for the next five years, however,igh rate of increase In Soviet scientific graduationsonsiderable increase in the supply of technicians having sub-professional skills.; Appendix D)
he USSR probably devotes only about half as many man-hours to research as the US does,onsiderably smaller proportion of these to research in the physical sciences and engineering. Soviet research personnel, on the other hand, are concentrated in support of heavyand military development, while
2
large percentage of those in the US are working in the consumer goods field. Existing studies do not permit anycomparison of the magnitude of the current effort of the two reaearch establishments in support of programsrelated to national power.; Appendix D)
Tlie Soviet scientific effort, closelyin line with state planning and party direction, has been focussedon the buildingtrong industrial base and the development of modern weapons, to the relative neglect of other fields. Although close research controls and the high priority of military-industrial development will continue, we believe that increasing Soviet scientific resources will permit greater flexibility, and that individual initiative will bebasic research in new fields will be undertaken, and more scientific and technical effort will be allocated to agriculture and the consumer sector of the economy.
The quality of Soviet science andas measured by personaltraining, research facilities, and achievements varies widely. In all these aspects, the best in the USSR compares well with the best In the Western world, but the average, though good, ia stillWestern standards. In general,is high in fields related to military and heavy industrial development, where some outstanding advances have been made. We believe that the uncvenness in the quality of Soviet science andwill gradually diminish.; Appendices)
In priority fields the USSR Isless dependent on foreign research and development.ew policy of acknowledging foreignand encouraging maximum use of foreign experience has been adopted in order to make Soviet scientists fullywith developments in the West and to take advantage of the possibilities of international scientific interchange. We believe that this policy, which has been accompaniededuction Ininterference with scientific work, will be an aid to further Soviet progress.
The Soviet foreign technical aidwill probably be selectivelySoviet scientific and technical resources will almost certainly betoontinued andexpanded program of scientific and technical aid to underdevelopedwithout serious detriment toprograms.
We believe that the USSR will continue to make important progress in thesciences, probably breaking new ground in physics, nuclear physics,and electronics. The poorof Soviet biological-agriculturalwill almost certainly be improved.ppendix A)
industrialto become more uniform inPor the immediate future, wethat the over-all level of Sovietwill remain below that of thethc most modern Sovietbear with those in theand technology in the consumer
goods field will almost certainly continue to lag far behind.B)
n the military field, significant Sodvances are probable in electronics applications, nuclear energy, guidedand aeronautics. We estimate that thc USSR will continue to show capability not only Ln developing new Individual weapons but also in organizing theof integrated weapons systems.ppendix C)
n at least some strategic fields, the best Soviet scientists arc estimated to be as gifted and competent as the best in the West and must beimilar potential for wholly new discoveries. However, we believe fewer technological breakthroughs in the sense of successful attacks on recognized barriers are likely to occur in the Soviet Bloc than in the West because the West has more first-rank scientists and scientific resources.
DISCUSSION
ADMINISTRATIVE FACTORS AFFECTING SOVIET SCIENCE AND TECHNOIOGY
Basic Altitude of the Regime
The Soviet regime has consistently placed great stress on science and technology, ln part because Its Marxist Ideology Is materialistic and most of Its leaders have been convinced that science ls the key to progress,eans for developing thepower of thc USSR As one of the state's most valuable tools, science and technology are geared to planned objectives and subject to close administrative control. They have been directed preponderantly toward the buildingtrong Industrial base and the development of modem weapons.
Despite an impressive tradition ofresearch In prerevolutionary Russia, the Soviel regimeechnologicallystate and was forced to borrow heavily from thc West. As the intensiveprogram gained momentum, however, the premium placed on strengthening native scientific-technological capabilities wasin increasing Soviet technologicalUnder Stalin Soviet scientists were Jargely cut off from direct contact with the* rest of the scientific world, to the detri-
ment of Soviet scientific progress. Morehowever, Soviet leaders haveand taken steps to overcome theeffects on their scientific development of this extreme insularity. They havethat scientists must learn from abroad, as well as from Soviet experience. They havear wider and more systematic dissemination of foreignew policy of encouraging contacts and exchanges between Soviet scientists and their professional counterparts outside the Communist sphere. These changes from the restrlcUve policies of the Stalin period have probably stimulated creative work tn many fields.
cientistslass constitute one of the privileged groups within the USSR. Theya high social position and are well paid. In addition, many scientists receive large monetary prizes, honorary awards, and other benefits such as houses in town and country, limousines, paid vacations al exclusive resorts, and special stores in which to shop. Since the death of Stalin, Soviel scientistsew degree o! personal security and professional freedom from ideologicalwith their work, and relations between tlie scientific community and thc regime have improved.
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Academy of Sciences. All Soviet research institutions are administered by the state and there is no organized private research in the USSR The heart of scientific endeavor In the USSR is the Academy of Sciences, which has affiliates and associated academies inf thenionhe academies are working institutions with research andfacilities, and employ aboutercent of all Soviet natural scientists, Including much of the best scientific talent. Their attention is focussed on theoretical work, although some applied research Is also performed. The academies take an Important part innational scientific objectives. Inresearch with other Institutions, and in selecting and training promising scientists. Membership In the academies Is generally based upon high professional standards and is achieved through election by Academyafter nomination by scientific groups.
Ministerialn addition tounder the academics, therearge number of research institutes underministries. The emphasis In these is on applied research and development mof the industrial, military, or otherof each ministry. We estimate that these institutes employ about two-fifths of all Soviet scientists, who concentrate heavily on research and are relatively free of otherFacilities range from plantengaged in the more routineproblems of Individual plants to large research institutions serving allarge part of their respective ministries andof the type of basic research normally found in the academies. For example, under the Ministry of Aviation Industry there ts the Central Aero-Hydrociynamics Institute (Tsomparable In the scope of its work to
'Tne Academy ot Sciences. USSR. Is directlybo Ihe council of Ministers, USSR, and the Union Republic academies are responsible to the councils of ministers of their respective Union Republics (see organisationn addition to natural science asin this paper, the Academy and Its afiul-Bua are also responsible for similar activities In th^hamanlUes. law. and social sciences.
our National Advisory Committee forlaboratories, where both basic and applied research are conducted. The ministerialcategory also Includes the Academy of Medical Sciences under thc Ministry of Public Health, and the Academy of Agriculturalunder the Ministry of Agriculture.
Educational Institutions.War II, higher educationaldevoted Increasing attention toboth theoretical and appliedhalf of all Soviet scientists arein such institutions. Since theyprimarily with teaching, theyproportionately less time to researchscientists employed by thc academiesinstitutes.
Planning ond Control
Administrative Control Soviet scientific research and development, like other Soviet activities, is subject to centralized planning and party control. On the basis of established broad plans, each research organization works out its own annual program and coordinates It with appropriate bureaus of the Academy or ministcnal directorates. The preciseand extent of party control Is not known, but all scientific organizations are known to have party units, which probably participate in developing the research programs as well as exercise general supervisory andfunctions In addition, researchare subject to approval by operational planning agencies such as the State Economic Commission for Current Planning.
The effects of the attempt to applyprinciples to scientific enterprise are mixed. The large size and diversity of the total scientific effort complicates theof research plana. Moreover, research planning Is compartmentalized byorganization and In practice therereat deal of duplication.artial remedy, in the past year the Academy ofhas set up committees toimited number of specific activitiesvarious ministerial Institutions and the Academy.
The general Soviet tendency to ovcrplan-ning and excessive bureaucracy is likely to hamper the enterprise, crcativeness, and cross-fertilization which contribute so heavily to progress In .scientific inquiry. Constantfor fulfillment of planned goals may also tcnd'lo lower the quality of Soviet scientific output. While failure of fulfillment is notpunished, it ls an invitation to criticism and possibly serious consequences. Meeting planned schedules sometimes leads to poor quality workendency to undertake only easily-accomplished projects. The Soviet government has recently attempted to make scientific plans more flexible in order tomore initiative and responsibility.
On the other hand, the Communist Party and the Soviet state have powers ofand command which are unparalleled In free societies. For projects of high priority they can make personnel and resources rap-Idly available without the normal play ofdemands common in other countries, and can exert pressure at all levels to expedite these programs at the expense of those ofpriority. Soviet accomplishments In thc nuclear field, ln weapons development, and in Industrial technology demonstrate that the Soviet system is capable of concentrating its scientific potentialighly effective way ln fields of primary concern to the state.
Degree of Ideological Control. Before thc death of Stalin theretrong tendency to apply ideological tenets in the evaluation of scientific hypotheses and to judge thea scientific theory by the political authority of Its proponents. Scientists were required to accept such doctrines as that of Lyscnko in biology on the inheritance ofcharacteristics, and to reject suchas those of the resonance bond inand Heisenberg's uncertainty principle in physics. These dogmatic requirements probably hindered research to some degree, but do not appear to have caused serious harm except In some of the biological sciences, where Ideological interference was more pronounced. Ath Congress the Communist Party reiterated ils intention to rid Soviet science of "cliqmy jindnd the demotion of
Lysenkohanging atmosphere. Wc believe that during the next few yearsinterference ln scientific research will further diminish.
M. SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL RESOURCES Financial Support
The Soviet government classifies research and development expenditures in two main groupings: (a) the financing ofdentineestablislimcnts, and (b)utlays for "mastering theof new products" and for technicalandhe first group is believed to cover primarily research andin the strict sense of the term, which includes basic and applied research and its application to new uses up to the point of design and production engineering. Funds appropriated for this purpose are included in the Soviet budget category concerned with expenditures on education, health, and social welfare. The second group (productincludes design and productionexperimental production, testing, prototype production,ariety ofactivities; funds appropriated for these purposes are not explldty indicated in the Soviet budget.
Announced expenditures for scientificestablishments5ubles. The plan for tbe present year calls for an Increase6 billion rubles, which isercent greater than the amount allocated1 (eight billionver thc last few years these announcedhave increasedlightly greater rate than the gross national product, and nowabout one percent ofHowever,
government expenditure* for research and development, in categories compamble to lhe Soviet -scienlific research1 billionN and arc expected lo be6 Milton Inhe Utter figure Isercent of US ONP. It Is roughly estimated Uiat lb* comparable US nongovernment expenditure la about equal to there figures. Thus. toUI U8 expenditures In these categories are probably aomewhai more than one percent of US ONP.
Ci r. t
Is not known whether these expenditures cover all outlays tor scientific researchproductonsiderable portion of the explicitly indicated funds is probably devoted to military research, butamounts for research on military projects may be Included elsewhere in thebudget Consequently, total expenditures on research and development in tho strict sense may be larger than the amountappropriated for "financing of scientificestablishments."
c have no direct Indication of the size of Soviet product development expenditures. The only available Indexatio between these outlays and "research establishment" costs lies in US military experience, wherofalling within the Soviet concept of "product development" are probably at least equal to those the USSR would label as "financing scientific researchf this one-to-one ratio Is applied to Soviet expenditures In both military and noruruli-tary fields, itotal for all Sovietand development expenditures on the order of two percent ofhis procedure for estimating product development costsery rough one and would yield onlyresults even if research expenditures proper were known with greater certainty. Although the allocation6 billion rubles for product development might accountarge part of the undisclosed scientific costs in6 Soviet budget, there remains some uncertainty on this point. Hence, ourof total Soviet research and development expenditures is probably on the low side.
any event, past trends andplans give reason to believe thatsupport will continue to bethe scientific and technical effort In the
USSR.
Educational Institutions
expansion of Soviettechnical manpower reserves is assured
'No attempt Lt made to arriveomparable percentage for the US because of the difficulty of ^estimating US nonmllltary productexpenditures.
by the Soviet educational system. Thisconcentrates heavily on trainingtechnicians, and skilled labor.ear school system, which, In terms of classroom hours, is roughly equivalent to theyear system, la underThe Soviets have announced that0 years of primary and secondarywill be universally available.
believe the average graduate ofyear school to betrained In the elements of scienceaverage American high schoolin mathematics and otheremphasized (comprising moref total course work In the uppertraining Is Improving, and the ratioto teachers la decreasing. graduates of the greatly enlargedschool must now enterthe curriculum has been changed tovocational subjects such asand practice farming.
Soviet educational systemlevels of special schools Inyear school. At the lowestshort-term factory and trade schoolslabor skills. At the next levelroughly comparable toschools In the US, whichhree or four-year periodpeople who have finished seventheyear program. Therelekfinikurm on the Junior collegeoffer training to theyear school graduates who dohigher educational institutions.administered by thc MinistryEducation but supported by thcother ministries, train personnel forIndustriesarticular
nly graduales wltliears ofare admitted to higher educationaland competition for entrance is keen. Selection Is by competitive examination. There ts some evidence of favoritism,for entry Into Moscow University, but this probably has slight effect in the scientific and technical fields. On the whole, the USSR has
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7
highly effective system for selecting the most promising young students and sending them on to higher educational Institutions. Finally, students arc channeled into fields of study in accordance with the needs of the state, by means of propaganda, draftquotas, and stipends which varyto priorities of fields. Under Soviet law, all graduates of higher educationalare subject to State directioneriod of at least three years following graduation.
educationalnd are administered or havecontrolled by the Ministry ofAbout two-thirds of allof higher Institutions are inand technical fields. About half ofinstitutions specialize in trainingand technical personnel, andthat is roughly equivalent tofor thc average US Bachelor ofdegree. There are three general typesoffering such training:
engineering andwhich offer instruction for afour to six years to prepare specialistsfields as machine building,and agriculture. Most Sovieteducational institutions are of
technical institutions, whichand one-half years training in aand slightly broader fields oftechnology such as metallurgy,and civil- engineering.as engineers and productionThere areuch institutes.
offer much broaderof study last five years.the teaching profession or becomescientists. There areniversities.
in these institutions arehigh, and thc over-allis similar to that in the US.science and technology possess goodbackground, although theirgenerally appears to be inferiorof their US counterparts. Only in*ofZthe biological sciences, particularly
in the agricultural field, docs the presentof Soviet higher education in science and technology appear to be decidedly below US average standards.
the post-graduate level, therenstitutions authorised to conductfor the Kandtdat degree, and GOthese are authorized to acceptthe higher degree of Doktor. Both ofare conferredpecialthe Ministry of Higher Education.degree requires al least threegraduate study, two foreign languages,dissertation. In the physical sciences,and some of the health sciences,training roughly equivalent tolower than that of the USn some ot thc biological sciences,in agriculture, however, the Kandidalcloser to the US master'sdegree of Doktor has no exactthe US.
Manpower*
the USSR has slightly lessas many living college andin all fields of study, bothnonscientlflc. as the United States,relative emphasis on science andraises the number of Sovietscientific fields to more thanercentUnited States total. Moreover, sincecitizens have less opportunity toprofessions other than those for whichtrained, we believe that the USSRmore graduates actually employedand technical positions than theAppendix D,f these, thein the physical sciences andis somewhat higher in the USSR,the US. (See Appendix D.nhand, many Soviet scientificemployed in scientific andare believed lo performwhich in the US would be handled
iscussion of the basis for estimates of scientific manpower, and thc probable accuracy of these estimates, see Appendix D.
number of scientific graduatesboth tlie USSR and the Untiedwartime losses and rapid postwarwhich In the United States,the veterans education program,peak0trends In the physical sciences andheavily favored the USSR. Innumber graduating In these fields roseTJS, but was still only slightly morethe number of Soviet graduates.D,
Soviet holders of the Kandidat degree in scientific fields are estimated to total0 (including several thousandn the physical sciences and engineering, where thc degree requirements arc comparable to those In the US, the USSR has0s against0 Ph-D'sc's In the US. (See Appendix D,f greater significance than anyof present totals is the fact that in the, the number of Kandidat degrees granted per year in the USSR has more than doubled, whereas the number of Ph.D'sc's granted per year In the TJS has remained about the same. (See Appendix D.
Although considerable progress has been made during the past decade In training the skilled technicians and mechanics also needed In modern technology, thc USSR Is not as well supplied with them as are Western countries, where broader sections of the population have acquired mechanical skillsonsiderably longer period. The USSR Is currentlyits training program to Increase the supply of such technical personnel.
Distribution of lhe Scientific Effort
theillion Sovietin scientific and technicalslightly more than in the UStheto be used for technical work incontrol testing, inspection,etc. Only. or fewerpercent, arc engaged In research and_The comparable US figure IsD,
n terms of man-hours devoted to research as opposed to teaching and administration, we estimate that the USSR uses only the equivalent ofull-time scientists for research of all kinds, only about half the research effort of the US. The US alsoonsiderably greater proportion of its research scientists in the physical sciences andthan the USSR. However. In the USSR therereat concentration ofeffort in support of heavy and military-related Industries,arge part of US research Is In support of consumer-related Industries. Hence, tho comparison ofalone is not an Indication of the extent of effort of the two scientific researchIn support of programs relatedto national power. Existing studies do not permit any accurate comparison on this subject
Of the total Soviet research .effortby tbe equivalent ofabout one-fifth is devoted to basic research, divided about equally between the physical and biological sciences.In the allocation of basic research effort among fields of potential application make lt Impracticable to define the proportion of basic research which supports military and heavy industrial programs as against other possible applications.
In terms of distribution among Sovietaboutercent of the totaleffort ls conducted by establishments of the Academies of Sciences,ercent by higher educational institutions,y thc ministerial institutes, wherescience and development work areTho Academies stress basicand perform aboutercent of the work In this area, with educationalhandling aboutercent and theinstitutes aboutercent
Oualily of Scientific ond Technical Manpower
quality of Soviet scientific andmanpower is good but uneven. Asmall group of older scientists,closely associated with prerevolutlonary
t-
has continued much of the best of Russian scientific tradition. Among persons outside this group, quality tends to vary according to age. since standards of higher education, low until thes, have improved considerably during the lastears. In many fields, there is no apparent difference in quality from the Western level-In the USSR, as in the West, scientificare madeew brilliant individuals; and the work of the best Soviet scientists is generally comparable to that of their Western counterparts, in broader areas ofand technology thc average quality ofpersonnel remains below that of their Western counterparts because of the large number of persons less well trained in earlier years.
Research Facilities and Equipment
he USSRarge number ofand institutes engaged In research and development in science and technology.Identified withifferent Soviet institutes, departments of higherinstitutions, laboratories and research stations was received In the USacilities appear generally adequate, though perhaps In many cases cruder than those of the West. Among major institutions recently observed, the Institute of Epidemiology and Microbiology (Gamaleya) of the USSRof Medical Sciences had facilitiesto those of US National Institute ofand Infectious Diseases; an important Soviet electronics research complex atnear Moscow, resembles In manythc US Army Signal Corps Engineering Laboratories at Ft. Monmouth: and thcHigher Technical School (Bauman) has laboratory facilities comparable to those of the best US colleges. The facilities of average Soviet institutions probably compare much less favorably with average US institutions than those cited, but we estimate thatfacilities are sufficient for effective utilization of Soviet scientific manpower.
e believe that although programs of routine priority may stillonsiderablef scientific Instruments and equip-
ment, those of major importance are little hampered In this respect After Worldhe USSR at first drew heavily ondesigned or produced in theSatellites and the West, but made rapid progress inative instrument industry, gradually introducing improvements on foreign design and designs of its own.orders for East German optical andinstruments, at first thc mainstay of Mil'. East German Industry, have declinedery modest volume for the past two years.
oviet industry now produces rapidlyquantities of many kinds ofsome of them showing considerable originality and excellent design andnotably In the electronics and optics fields. The USSR is known to have several advanced high-speed electronicortion of Sovietrequirements is still filled by Imports, and some specialized instruments willin the future to be obtained from the Satellites or the West, thc establishment ofew instrument factories called for in the Sixth Five-Year Plan will probably make the USSR substantially independent of outside sources
Collection and Dissemination of Information
he USSR's acquisition of foreignand technical information is many-sided and constantly expanding. Foreign books and journals are purchased throughabroad, and through libraryThc Library of the Academy ofIn Leningrad exchanged literature with0 scientific Institutionseceivingublications during the first half-year. Since the death of Stalin the USSR has Increased its efforts to establish direct contacts with Western scientists.oviet representatives attendedcientific or professionaland Western groups were invited to attendcientific congresses in the USSR. Collection of information is also accomplished by espionage operations, and we believe that
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some cases the USSR has gainedfrom such operations.
The most obvious exploitation ofBloc scientific-technical knowledge has been in military equipment, especially nuclear energy, electronics, guided missiles, andThe USSR exploited equipment which it received under lend-lease or which fell into its hands during World War II. In the Korean conflict it acquired many US items of recent design. It also benefited greatly in postwar years from the transfer of German scientists and technicians into the USSR, and from the declassification and release of information by the US and the UK, particularly in electronics and radar. Western technical and tradeparticularly those of the United States, continue toealth of detail concerning the development andof new military equipment, and are readily available to the USSR. These factors have saved several years of development tune in some fields.
The USSR currently assists researchby an extensive program for tlieand exchange of both foreign and domestic scientific information. Scientific and technical meetings and conferences are held frequently. Numerous scientific books, Journals, and monographs of domestic and foreign scientific Information as well asabstracts, and indexes are now readily available. The Alt-Union Institute ofand Technical Information of theof Sciences publishes monthly abstract journals surveying several thousand Soviet and foreign journals, and also weeklybulletins for industry. Thus, at least in high priority fields, Soviet scientists have access to the full range of publishedscientific research.
A considerable portion of Soviet research, including military and other sensitive projects, Is not published in open literature. This restriction probably does not seriously hamper the dissemination of information among those persons having an obvious and direct need to know. However, secrecy denies usefulto investigators in related fields and UiusThampers general scientific progress. This
problem was recognized at theh Congress of the Communist Party, whereof secrecy restrictions on scientificwas urged wherever possible.
Utilization of Satellite and Chinese Resources
Germany and Czechoslovakia, andlesser extent Poland and Hungary, provideincrement in scientific andmanpower and facilities to the totalat the disposal of the USSR.is strong in pharmaceuticals,instruments, optical equipment,fibers; Czechoslovakia inequipment; and Hungary inand pharmaceuticals. On the otherChina, because of anof scientific and technicalfacilities, is unlikely to contribute toscience for some time but onrain on aggregate BlocAlthough Satellite scientificcapabilities are growing,importance to the USSR is likelybecause of the increasing Sovietcapabilities.
Foreign Aid Programs
The USSR has been sending substantial numbers of scientists, engineers, andto other Bloc countries, includingChina, since World War II. Sincehe export by Soviet Bloc countries of scientific-technical personnel lonon-Bloc countries has been rapidlyboth In numbers of persons, which now total several thousand, and in theof recipient countries involved. Blocaid has been concentrated mainly in Egypt, Syria, and the South AsianIndia, Burma. Afghanistan. Pakistan, and Indonesia. Communist China's first offer of any magnitude was made to Cambodia in
In addition to sending technical personnel abroad, the USSR has for some years been providing scientific and technical education at its own institutions to substantial numbers
t-RT-
11
Cninese Communlsl and Satellite students. More recently, .similar educational facilities in the USSR have been provided for students from countries outside the Bloc. The Sixth Fivo-Year Plan calls for continuation andof the educational aid program.
USSR assists Satellite andnuclear energy programs. Itaid to non-Bloc countries inbutew firm agreementsmade. The USSR would be capablereactors and related equipment,providing training programs for
III. QUAUTY ANO ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE SCIENTIFIC EFFORT
the physical sciences, publishedis of high quality and indicatesauthors are well Informed onin their specialties. Itstrengthumber of fieldsand theoretical mathematics. Insciences Soviet capabilitiescomparable with those ofnations, and the USSR hasof the most comprehensive programsof the countries participating In theInternational Geophysical Year. Infield Soviet scientists have doneoriginal work, for example Inand In combustion studies.somewhat behind the West in workrubber, fibers, and plastics.research Is generally on athat of the West In fundamentallags slightly In some practicalespecially In thc light alloy field.the USSR is closely behindin fields where equal effort hasIn medicine and the biologicalquality ranges from very good inresearch to low. though improving.andajor effortunder way lo overcome thein developing aids to agriculture andhusbandry. (See
quality of Soviet industrialIs much more uneven than that of the pure sciences. Even In tlie priority field of
heavy industry, while the best plants and products arear with those In the TJS, the average Is somewhat below the USThese differences within the USSR, as well as differences between Soviet andpractices, appear to lie leas In theof new techniques than In the extent to which universally known techniques areas for example in the Soviet emphasis on certain oil extraction procedures, in the lag in Soviet steel rolling and finishingand In thc USSR's thus far highly selective application of automation systems. Soviet success In shortening In some Instances the development lead time on militaryappears to be due to adrriliustrativerather than to any technologicalIn areas of secondary priority, aseavy electrical equipment, development is largely concentrated on the exploitation of Western experience, and Soviet technology generally lags behind the West by several years. In areas of low priority, as In theof textile, canned goods, and footwear production, Soviet technology Ls far behind. Insufficient development of farm machinery and mineral fertilizers, along with unsound practices In seed and stock selection, have contributed to the persistent lag in Soviet agricultural production. (See
he qualitative capacity of Sovietond technical resources, however. Isby current achievements in thefield. Thc high calibre of. nuclearis evident from the relatively early dates at which nuclear and thermonuclear explosions were achieved. The Soviet guided missile program Is extensive and welland Soviet plans for earth satellite launchings arc similar to those of the US. Aeronautical research In the USSR lsequal to that in the US, with excellent capability In theoretical aerodynamics and Improving competence in its applications. In hydrodynamics Soviet theoretical research has been equal and In some respects superior to Western research. However, thc lack of an experimental research program has ledailure to apply its results. Military end-products show effective adaptation andof complicated foreign equipment
designs, and the latest advanced electronic equipment, in particular, appears to bethe result ot Sovicl research andMore important, Soviet scientists have demonstrated thc ability to develop and produce modern weapons systems of native design (Sec
IV. SOME FUTURE TRENDS IN SOVIET
SCIENTIFIC PROGRAMS Planning and Control
he basic framework of Soviet planning and control of science and technology will almost certainly continue along present lines. However, the directives of thc Sixth Five-Year Plan emphasize the need for closerbetween scientific research andapplications. Thc recently publishedof the Fifth Five-Year Plan noted that "insufficient contact with production work Is an important shortcoming in the work of many scientificuch criticisms have been repeatedly voiced in thc past, and do not appear torastic shift. Nevertheless, in thc ministerial institutes, there will probablyontinuing trend in the direction of such closer ties to. industrial application. While research and development programs will remain under strictcontrol, it is probable that programs will be more flexible, affording more scope for individual initiative and encouragingand institute directors to assume greater lesponsibilitlcs for direction of their programs.
n the other hand, with respect to the USSR Academy of Sciences, its presidentat the Twentieth Party Congress thai steps are being taken to free tlie Academy and higher educational institutions from routine industrial problems so that they will be able to concentrate on "the most important and fundamental tasks of science and on scientific research in new directions which are little investigated but show muchn view of his subsequent statement that "thc direct satisfaction of current productionIs not thc only or the mainoviet scientific researchers in iMe top scientific establishmentsreer rein in probing new channels
of investigation, though still within theof the national economic plan and in accordance with the principle that theof science is service to the state.
Manpower
s yet there have been no Indications that Soviet rates of growth ln scientific andmanpower will slacken, and Soviet plans call for increasing the numbers of graduates and post-graduates. Reasons for thishigh rate of expansion are to be found in the needs arising from the rapidlySoviet economy, in tlie belief of Soviet leaders that further increases in scientific and technical manpower will improve economic productivity, and in the Soviet intent to chair lenge the West in economicf present trends continue, the numbers of Soviet scientists, engineers, and technicians will increase, in the periodmore rapidly than in the US, and by1 aggregate Soviet manpower In these categories would be about equal to that of the US. The number of Soviet scientific and technical graduates per year will probably continue to increaseeveling offeriod thereafter, in part because of the low birth rates of the World War II years. (See Appendix D,
In the engineer category, we cslimate that the Soviet supply will be generally adequate to carry out internal objectives, and thatnumbers could be employed in export industries and in scientific-technical missions abroad without significant detriment toprograms. On the other hand, because ol increased demands for nonprofessional technical personnel, the deficiency in this category will continuelthough it will be significantly reduced by thc large training program designed to produce such technicians. Similarly, because of increasing demands within the Bloc, as well as demands created by Soviet technical aid programs in non-Bloc countries, we believe that shortages or scientists will continue through this period.
As thc large number of postwar graduates tain experience and assume positions ofthere shouldeneral rise in thc
13
of research. The Increase in numbers will permit greater research coverage, and with more attention paid to fundamentalin the Academy, ad hoc research will become less necessary In supplying answers to specific problems. The utilization ofgraduates and post-graduates will almost certainly become generally more effective as subordinate training programs produce an Increasing number of technicians.
Distribution of Effort
he USSR will continue to give very high priority to research related to Uie development of weapons systems. Up to thc present time, the Soviet leaders appear to have concentrated their highest-grade scientific resources Inand basic Industrial fields at the expense of other areas of the economy, and we believe this policy will be continued when necessary for the attainment of priority goals.Soviet scientific resources, however, will probably make lt possible for the USSR to devote greater efforts to basic researchhindering military development Inmore resources will probably beto scientific effort in those fields which until the present have had relatively lowwcluding agriculture, public health, and consumer goods.
he Soviet technical aid program willcertainly expand In countries already receiving Soviet technical aid and willbe extended to other countries. Wothat the USSR will continue to expand Its technical aid programelective basis In thc underdeveloped countries of Eurasia and Africa and In Latin America. Sovietand technical resources will almost certainly be adequate toontinued and moderately expanded program ofand technical aid to underdevelopedwithout serious detriment to domestic programs.
Capacity for Future Advances
yc-believe that the USSR will continue to make Important progress in the fundamental sciences. It is likely to break new ground in
several fields of physics, nuclear physics,and electronics. It Is expected tourrent weakness In theof theoretical mathematics to otherThe lag behind Western science in certain fields of metallurgy, such as theof light alloys, will probably beThe poor quality of Soviet biological-agricultural sciences will almost certainly be improved. (See
In industrial technology the USSR also has the capability to make Importantover the next few years, in part through the further development anduse of special-purpose tools andtechniques. While Soviet Industry Is at present characterised by sharp contrast* In technology, the high growth rate of the economy and the introduction of moreproduction techniques tend to Indicate that the gap between "best" and "average" performance may narrow considerably In the future. (See
The prospects for Soviet scientific and technical progress are particularly greatthe high priority military and related fields. Por example, significant advances areIn electronics applications, nuclearguided missiles, and aeronautical research and development We have no reason to doubt that despite the Increasingof modern equipment the USSR will be capable of continuing the successful design and development of modern weapons systems for Its ground, naval, and air forces. (See
n many fields of scientific endeavor, the likelihood of major Soviet advances beyondlevels of science and technologybreakthroughs"mustbreakthrough" may compriseholly new discoveryuccessful attack on recognized barriers to the application of existinge believe that first-rank Soviet scientists and engineers have the capability for such advances, and Soviethas shown itself able to develop new ideas and to realize their military orpotential when priority is sufficiently
14
In at least some strategic fields, the best Soviet scientists are estimated to be as gifted and competent as the best In the West and must beimilar potential for "Wholly new discoveries. However, we
believe fewer technological breakthroughs in the sense of successful attacks on recognized barriers are likely to occur In the Soviet Bloc than In the West because the West has more first-rank scientists and scientific resources.
APPENDIX A
SOVIET CAPABILITIES IN MAJOR SCIENTIFIC FIELDS
The present capabilities ot the USSR infields of physics are generally corn-parable to those of the leading nations of the West. While the scope of Soviet research In physics, in terms of range of problems under investigation, is less than in the US, itsin areas given greatest priority ishigh. For basic knowledge in fields of lower priority, reliance has been placed on the published work of foreign scientists.
The USSR has shown particular strength in theoretical physicsheory of quantum electrodynamics and elementaryolid state physicsnd low temperature physicsirstobservation of second sound In liquid helium, and Landau's theory ofe believe that in these fields the USSR will continue to concentrate its efforts on key problems and will make significant advances.
We estimate that, Lf presentecade the USSR will have achieved equality with the US In scope, mag-ltude, and quality of research In physics and that the number of active Soviet physicists will exceed that of the US. Emphasis has been given thus far to theoretical aspects at the expense of the experimental, but, asof physicistsetter balance will probably result. Facilities forwork should be adequate to support research programs.
Nuclear Physics
capabilities of the USSR inresearch are estimated to beto those of the US. Work in highhas been of good quality andthough probably not equal to that ofCosmic ray research has been ofhigh quality andar with that
of thc US. In the low energy region the USSR has also shown considerable competence. Neutron physics research, for example. Is also comparable to work performed in the US.
During the last year the USSR hasthat Itumber ofjmhro-cyclotron, the largest machine of Its type In existence, which was allegedlyew years after Its completion9 to attain Its present energy,ev. The USSR also announced that it expected lo complete0 Bev proton synchrotron; tills would be the largest accelerator In the world. The US Is presentlyix Bev proton synchrotron, thc largest currently operating; higher energy machines will not be completedowever, the US has more accelerators of lower capacity than has the USSR and is therefore able to carryreater volume of research In this field.
The USSR has recently organ!red the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research, which has as its announced purpose InternationalIn solving the most Important problems of contemporary physics. The newwill incorporate the Laboratory ofProblems and tho Laboratory of High Energy Physics (sites ofev andev accelerator,he Jointwill alsoaboratory ofPhysics which will include ancomputer department, and aof Neutron Physics which willigh neutron flux experimental reactor. An accelerator for multtcharged Ions will be built Also being considered are cosmic rayand other facilities. All facilities of Uie Joint Institute will be located In the USSR. Representatives from all of Ihe Soviet Bloc countries have signed an agreement toin this InsUtute. and lt has beenthat membership will be open to non-B'oc countries.
believe that establishmenthiswill resultomewhat betterattack on nuclear researchwith greater stress onIt will also provide increasedfacilities for both Soviet and Satelliteat an advanced level In highThe Joint Institute programto focus attention on the USSR ascenter of nuclear physicswe are unable to predict withfuture Soviet progress in nuclearrapid gains in this field in thethat Soviet nuclear physicists willto furnish strong support to allnuclear energy programs.
Mathematics
scientists display outstandingpure mathematics, and have achievedrecognition in nonlinearprobability theory, and topology.top level mathematicians arefewer in the USSR than in the US,lag in numbers will probably belessened in the nextearsthe emphasis on mathematicsthe last decade. Soviet weaknessestheoretical mathematics toof science and technology maycorrected by the growing emphasisthe results of mathematicsInto high priority areas such asdevelopment Thus Soviet over-allcapabilities may be brought closeof the US.
Astronomy
science of astronomy appears to berapidly in the USSR under ancomparable to that devoted to it inAlthough Soviet astronomicalis not as fully developed as thatUS. astronomical facilities have beensteadly. Soviet literature intouches on all phases of the scienceemphasis on work in stellarof variable stars, solar physics,of minor planets, and cosmogony.'In which Soviet astronomy is slgnlfl-
cant ly behind the US is that of astrophyslcal observations for the determination of physical and chemical properties of stars and nebulae,
work in positional astronomycontributions to geodesyillustrate the full exploitationwhich contribute to the moreof points on the earth andlong-distance target positioning.arc emphasized for their importanceinterpretation and prediction ofphenomena, as in long-rangeclimatic trends, especially in polar andareas.
Geophysics
Soviet capabilities In the geophysicalincluding meteorology, hydrology,geology, and terrestrial and arctic geophysics, are generally comparable with those of leading Western nations. Among the geological sciences, the USSR has maintained outstanding capabilities in engineeringpermafrost research, and geochemlcal and geological mineral prospecting methods.geophysical research conducted on ice floes in the Central Arctic and at manystations has materially aided shipping operations along the Northern Sea Route and could bo of great importance for militaryin the Arctic area.
The USSR has one of the mostand well-planned programs of any of the countries participating In theGeophysical. The USSR will probably intensify its central Arctic research, and alreadyarge and well-equipped expedition in the Antarctic. During the next few years the already high Soviet capabilities in geophysics will almost certainly be substantially increased throughand analysis of the voluminous datafrom IGY activities, which will befor thc first timeorld-wide scale.
The USSR is currently engaged in thc development of earth satellites for research at very high altitudes and we believe that Its
1 Radio astronomy Is treated under electronics. In paragraphelow.
i-^'
-.sac.
will be intensified during theGeophysical Year. Research of this nature Is likely to enhance Soviet capabilities for further development of guided missiles and result in increased knowledge in many fields' of geophysics. Rockets and guidedcurrently estimated to be within Soviet capabilities could also be effectively utilized ln gathering upper atomsphere data.meteorological advances could resulturrent Soviet program involving thc use of high-speed electronic digital computers In weather forecasting, and from highand weather control research that will probably receive high priority.
terrestrial geophysics and geodesyIs expected to expandparticularly during the IGY.advances are possible in Sovietof the precise size and shape of thecould increase Soviet capabilitiestarget positioning.1advances in terrestrial geophysicsin the development of asystem for missiles, and offor aerial gravimetric surveys.
Chemistry
Chemistry. Soviet organichave contributed significant originalon the synthesis of organicthe high quality of this work it isthat the USSR has Iho capability toon programs of research andto produce new liquid fuels,and lubricants. Sovietorganosilicon components is conductedchemists and offers promisenew materials, though it isthe US. Soviet products andindicate that US developments areclosely, and that advantage is taken ofworld-wide literature on themany fields, the Soviet economy hasorganic chemical research, andfields Soviet scientists appearremain somewhat behind the US.
' Thrs subject will be discussed in greater detail In lhe forthcoming5 SS. Soviet Program* and Capabilities In Oulded MUsltes.
Physical Chemistry. The USSR hasimportant research on combustion, flame propagation, and detonation,in advance of Western rcsoorch. Soviet physical chemistry is strongest in the study of fundamental mechanisms of combustion and reaction In the well-developed field of basic combustion chemistry, further advances are probable which will be of use inchamber design or in the selection of pro pellants. Thc USSR has for many years had both outstanding scientists and many workers generally versed in reaction kinetics, theof free radicals, and the behavior ofhydrogen, nitrogen, and oxygen systems at elevated temperature.
MacromoAecidar Chemistry. Soviet scieny Lists have demonstrated their capability to do basic research In macromolecular chemistry, and their level of technology Is only slightly behind the West in such fields as synthetic rubber and plastics. In the field of synthetic fibers, current Soviet practice is to rely on the European Satellites for research andAlthough the USSR once led the world in the research, application, and production of synthetic rubber, it has recently depended on published Western technology for suchas oil extended rubber, low temperature polymerization, and ds-polylsoprene.
In the field of plastics, development and application efforts in the USSR have followed closely tlic pattern set by the West, though use has also been made of East GermanTho USSR has been slow to adapt for general use much Western information on the newer and more important plasticsoly-amides, polyethylene, polyesters, fluorocarbon polymers, andnd has attempted to acquire plants and know-how from the West. Despite considerable research activity in thc field of macromolecular chemistry, we believe that Soviet technology will notthat of the West during the next several years.
High Energy FueU. The USSR is known to be interested in boron hydrides and other compounds as high energy rocket fuels. On the basis of present knowledge we estimate that the USSR is In an early stage of basic
13
related to the synthesis andproperties of boron hydrides. If adequate priorities were given, the necessary engineering technology could be developed to produce boron hydrides as rocket fuels. Research on hydrazine hydrateighfuel has been carried forward to thestage, but there is only limited evidence of any other extensive activity related to high energy chemical fuels.
Metallurgy
Soviet fundamental metallurgical research is generallyar with that of the West, and has developed some original concepts. In physical metallurgy, Soviet metallurgists have been very active in the theory of elasticity and plasticity and its application to Industry. Considerable research has been performed on creep and relaxation of metals at elevated temperatures. The theory of dislocations has been applied to the study of fatigue orof metals under cyclic stress.Impact and notch brlttleness of metals have also been given considerable attention.
Soviet metallurgy is presently devoted chiefly to meeting the requirements of heavy industry and the military forces. The USSR has an extensive ferrous metallurgicalprogram in progress to increase the productivity of related industries and tonew alloys to alleviate the problemsby shortages of certain alloyingResearch on high temperaturefor aircraft applications, while closely parallel to that of the West, indicates Soviet competence, particularly In alloy
In the field of light alloys, the USSR will probably continue to exploit Westernand magnesium research, but it will probably make increasing effort towardwork in this field. Soviet publicationsthat the USSR is fully aware of the military and industrial significance ofmetal and its alloys, which are ln the pilot stage of production. The USSR has probablyriority to research on titanium in view of its application, forto aircraft and guided missile compo-
nents. Research on ceramic cutting toolhas been outstanding though present Soviet materials are somewhat brittle.
Elecironics
The USSRell balanced andprogramumber of basic science areas which contribute significantly toresearch and developmentcrystallography, semiconductors, andn addition, extensive and capable work Is being done on theoretical studies and experimental research in areas whichmore Indirectly to electronics research and developmentnformationn other fields of basic science, electronics Is extensively usedool ln bo to* instrumentation and in control applications. Recent Soviet radar designs reflect original work of high quality.
In phases of basic electronics research in which the USSR and the West have equalthe USSR is closely behind the West; and ln at least one case In which the USSR has made special efforts, ln communications theory dealing with noise studies. It now leads. We estimate that over the nextearsscientists will be capable of makingfurther advances in the electronics field, and will be generallyar with the West in most areas.
Communications Theory. Soviethave investigated the probability theory, correlation analysis, and information theory in an endeavor toomprehensiveof communications The range and depth of published native research isar with unclassified research on the same topics In the West. The type of researchthat considerable classified research on novel communications techniques, such as squirt transmission and noise modulation, as well as speech encryption devices and band reduction systems, may be under way. While no specific information is available on the USSR's progress on these techniques. Itsresearch effort is probably alsoto that of the US. Wc estimate thatprogress will be made in applying communications theory to such fields as data
transmission, data handling, andOne significant result may be the achievement of communications systems which are at once secure, reliable, and of high capacity.
adio Astronomy. Soviet researchIn radio astronomy are believed to be comparable in quality to those of the West. Significant work lias been performed In the detection of weak signals In radioand In meteor studies. This workthe attainmentigh level ofproficiency which could have direct applications in military fields of microwave radio reception.
Medicine and lhe Biological Sciences
he USSR has made Impressive progress in medical research, and Its work In this field is more advanced than In most of thebiological disciplines. In the field of hematology, the USSR has developed one of the world's largest and most complete research organizations for the study of blood. Itsand plasma extenders. Important advances have also been made in biophysics, epidemiology, rad lob to logy, and physiology. Major strength has been displayed to Soviet research on the physiology and functioning of the central nervous system. In certain sub-fields of Soviet microbiological research, such as those related to genetics and biochemistry, tho quality of work Is low, though Improving.
he major problems Investigated byclinical scientists will probably continue to be those of heart disease, cancer anddiseases, and those related tohygiene. In the more fundamental areas of the medico-biological sciences the emphasis probably will be on using developments In the physical sciences for further research on the basic nature of living matter, disease, and radiation damage. In the aggregate, wethat tlie USSR Is now somewhat behind
the West In clinical research but will advance at about the same pace as the West.
Agricultural Sciences
or several decadesscience wasery lowIn the Soviet Union, and progress was much slower In agriculture than In any other major segment of the economy. Research In agricultural science was further restricted during the last decade of this period by Ly-senko's Influence. Currently, however, Soviet agricultureonsiderably higher Present efforts to send agricultural specialists to the US, recent widespreadof US research findings, published statements by Deputy Premier Matskevich on the superiority of US agricultural research and technology and direct observations made In the USSR by US agriculturistsallthat the USSR is attempting to make Improvementselatively low base of agricultural research and technology.
he Sixth Five-Year Plan calls for aof grain output, withercent of the Increase to be achieved by Increasing per acre yield through utilizing the results of research and technology. Evidence indicates thatemphasis will be placed on improvingtechnology, on development andof herbicides, new insecticides andon developing disease-resistant and high-yielding varieties of crop plants, onof vaccines and antibiotics fordiseases, on food technology, especially preservation and storage methods, and on methods for improving livestock quality. In addition, the USSR will almost certainlyto striveechnologicalin photosynthesis research In thc hope of developing techniques for synthesizing food, in summary, Soviet progress inresearch and technology over thc next five years may result in substantial means for improvement of the Soviet food supply.
APPENDIX B
SOVIET CAPABILITIES IN SOME IMPORTANT FIELDS OF INDUSTRIAL TECHNOLOGY
Industry has demonstrated afor adapting and introducinginto the rapidly expandingbase of the USSR. To ahowever, Soviet progress haspossible by duplication or adaptationmachines and methods already in useWest. Soviet industry iscontrasts In technology, since neware not generally extended toas quickly as in the moreIndustries of leading Westernwhile the best Soviet heavyis in some cases as good asin the Western world, the averagebelow average practice Inesult of this, over-allin the USSR is only aboutthat of the US. This weakness,relatedumber of factors Inthe scientific and technologicalthe USSR We estimate that (or thefuture, the over-all level ofSoviet industry will remain below thatUS, although In its most modernwill bear with thatUS.
Petroleum Technology
technical literature andsenior officials of thc Ministry ofUSSR, indicate that modernmethods lor locating anddeposits have been in use foryears. In addition to gravitational,and seismic methods already in use,method (probably utilizingwas introducedthat the theoretical developmentmethods of petroleumthe USSR Is approximately on the same
level with that of the West Although the Soviets are among the leaders In the field of geochernical exploration for oil, they appear to be several years behind the West in the efficient use and the relative extent ofof olher modern techniques.
Soviets seem fully cognizant ofadvances in the techniques ofthroughout the world.of technological success, however,times nothing more than references totechniques which have beenyears In the US. Two examples ofare hydraulic fracturing of thestrata to Increase the flow ofthe well, and contour flooding asrecovery system to Increasefrom fields where strata pressuresThe Soviets are currently claiminghi developing new drillingWhile It is true that certainarc far more widely applied Inthan In other areas, this use seemspeculiarities distinctive to thethe USSR rather than any greatadvance
Steel Technology
steel making technology lsa par with that of leading Westernthc US. Results obtained byof technological advances tometallurgical processes have hadImpact on product quality andIn the Soviet steelmost new steel plant technology isto all advanced industrial nations,now engaged in building up ItsIn an effort to compete with thequantity production, is incorporating new
techniques on an ambitious scale in its newly constructed plants.
Thc Magnitogorsk and Kuznetsk plants and several others arc thc equal ol the best ln the US .in terms of output of iron and steel per unit of productive capacity. Investment for technological improvements at these plants, above all ln the furnace facilities, has been unstintedonscious effort to outstrip the best plants in thc world and to serve as models for other Soviet steel works. Output perat Magnitogorsk is twice the average for the Soviet steel Industry.
The application of new technology tosegments of Soviet ferrous metallurgy has varied markedly. The Soviet effort has been directed primarily to blast and open hearth furnace processes, and on highalloy steels, widely used In military end-item production. In comparison, rolling mill and finishing line technology has lagged. The failure to broaden the range of finishing equipment has resulted in less variety ofproducts to serve specific applications than in the US.
Automation and Mechanization'
systematic knowledge aboutUSSR has at least kept pace withA survey of the Soviet Industrialof automation to date shows thathas placed priority on selectedapplications. The literatureSoviets are not satisfied withto date. It Is apparent that aexisting automatic lines were set uptogether existing machines byof various types. Thusclaims of achievements inonly the elimination of hand labor
'For the purpose of this seeUon, automation Is defined as the automatic direction, regulation, and control of industrial operations or processes by physical or chemical meant This Involves not only mechanisation of materials handling, but also automatic programming and regulationet of operations and the automaUcanalysis, and correction of errors, so that acceptable end-Items are produced In Quantity with reduced human observation and
by mechanization of materials handling and use of individual semi-automatic ormachines. In the production offor motor vehicles, including trucks, automation and mechanization haveextensively ln both countries, with the USSR lagging behind the US In the extent of application for the most part.
During the recently completed Fifth Five-Year Plan, antifriction bearing output in the USSR increased greatly, partially through the establishment of semi-automatic lines. The first fully automatic line for roller bearings with new specially designed tools andtransfer equipment between machines went into operation latehis line is set up to take forged partsbc-lncb1 diameter conical roller bearing and to perform automatically all the operations ofgrinding, heat treating, testing,lubricating, and packaging.
During the period of the Sixth Five-Yeardditional semi-automatic lines are to be established using existingPlans for construction of fullylines are not known. The indications are, however, that the USSR is counting on automation and mechanization to Increase the productivity of labor. Soviet ability tostandardization and to control design changes is inherently favorable to theof automatic production mothods.
Military Product Development Lead Time
In at least some areas of militarythe USSR has translated developmental results into initial series production in times shorter than those achieved by the US. For example, Soviet lead time, in this phase, on the BISON jet heavy bomber appears to have been substantially shorter than that for thchis appears to have been true in other cases of aircraft development as well.
Whore the USSR has succeeded inlead time. Its success appears to have been due more to design choice,illingness to assume risks than to any inherent scientific and technological
superiority, in general, components of even tne latest Soviet air weapons systems are of less sophisticated design than similar US equipment, it appears that thc USSR makesractice to use existing tested componentsaximum extent Inajor air weapon system, in order to reduce the complexity of the over-all development
oviet aircraft and otheride range in the quality of the various parts and components. Thoseof the system that are critical to Itsare usually equal in quality tocounterparts. Less critical portions may be designed and constructedanner that results In lower levels of quality than those required In thc US. We believe that the Soviet philosophy ls to obtain weapons "good enough" rather than "best In allhe result of this philosophy Is the acceptance of small reductions in performance If those reductions effect significant savings In time and effort.
oviet success In reducing lead time in air weapons systems has also been due to an ability to follow through without delay on high priority projects, andillingness to take shortcuts and risks such as thoseupon starting series production before all features of the prototype have beentested and evaluated. In many cases, series production has been achieved more rapidly by holding design changesinimum, by using as few different materials as possible, by limiting the design of parts andto the minimum loads and functional requirements, and by designing to maximize the use of semi-skilled labor and to eliminate bottlenecks In capital equipment and scarce skills. This procedure with Its attendant risks, while generally rewarding to thehas not always met with completeIn the case of the BISON, recentIndicates that, probably at least in part because of production difficulties, there has been substantial delay In achieving high-volume output after the Initiation of series production.
23
APPENDIX C
SOVIET SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL CAPABILITIES RELATED TO WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT
Energy
of the Soviet nuclear energyare discussed in1 In brief, the USSR hasability to produce fissionable materialsfor the military and researchthe nuclear energy program and tovariety of air-deliverable nuclearyieldsew kllotons to theIt has also demonstrated acapability for nuclearand operation. The announcedelectric power program forof electric power0 ls ofmagnitude but could bea very high priority effort.of reactors for aircraftapplications probably will not besome time. It Is also improbable thatwill produce economical powerprocesses for many years.
Guided Missiles
Information on Sovietcapabilities will be presented innow scheduled to be publishedo summarize briefly, wethat the USSR is engaged in anguided missile program and that Itmissile systems in all categoriesalr-to-surface, surface-to-surface,in at least limited operationalmissile testing facilities are believedwell-equipped, modern, and operatedpersonnel. The USSR lsbe well advanced in the development ofguidance and control and ofWe believe It possesses, or isthe necessary data for attacking
'The Top Seciet version of this estimate Is
the aerodynamic, structural, and guidance problems of Intermediate-range andballistic missiles. We also estimate that thc USSR possesses the basic scientific capabilities, technical skills, and otherrequired lo develop, build, and launch an unmanned earth satellite vehicle.
Aircrcrft and Related Weapons Systems^
Soviet literature indicates that in itsaspects aeronautical research in the USSR ls generally equal to that in the US. The new and varied aircraft types observed in the USSR In recent years give evidence of sound practices In applying theseresearch capabilities, and indicate that the USSR has probably achieved betterof airframes and engines than the US has. On the basis of Soviet research papers, the characteristics of current aircraft, and recent observations at the Zhukovskry AirAcademy, we believe the Soviet airdevelopment effort Is not restricted by lack of research facilities or high-quality
The USSR has an excellent capability in theoretical aerodynamics over the entire speed range. For example, its boundary-layer specialists are second to none. We have seen evidenceigh capability in theaspects of transonic and supersonic aerodynamics. We have not yet seen evidence that this capability has been applied as well as in the US, but recent observations indicate that rapid progress Is being made In theof advanced aircraft Some Soviet aircraft, particularly fighter and light bomber types, show evidence of advanced transonic or supersonic concepts, although there arelhat some of the present operational and prototype aircraft are unstable at high speeds. We believe lhal the USSR will nar-
24
the gap and may equal the West Intheoretical aerodynamic knowledgethe next Ave years.
wo significant features of Soviet aircraft propulsion work to date have been thcoflb-thrust axial flow turbojet englno powering the BISON and BADOER bombers andQ-equlvalent-shaft-horsepower turboprop engine powering the BEAR. Improvements In both theseare probable in the next several years, and In addition, we estimate that Soviettechnology has progressed to the point where a lb-thrust turbofan engine could appearajor factor inturbojet engine development has been simplicity, dictated by the desire to obtain thc necessary engines in thc shortest possible time. We believe future turbojetefforts will probably emphasize basic technical improvements In axial flow engines. Thc existing Soviet design for axial flowpermits great flexibility in this eflort. particularly with respect toeight-thrust ratio of less. necessary for the design of aircraft for extended supersonic flight.
experimental work onfuels, reportedly Includinghas taken place in the USSRpast five years. Although little Isthis Soviet activity, we estimate thathas the capability to develop withinyears an aircraft fuel system usingcombination of petroleum andor high energy fuel exclusively.
Ground Force Weapons
Soviet research and developmentin ground force weapons hasnew and improved designs whichin weapons and other items ofin the lasl few years. Thc primaryobjective In thc development offorce weapons is to Increasemobility for ground troops. In thiswe estimate that over the next fewwill be able to develop newto* fill thc few existing gaps inweapons systems, such as certain aelf-
propelled artillery types and antiaircraft weapons for defense against low altitudeIn vehicle design, we believe Itthat Soviet experimentation with gas turbines for automobiles has been or soon will be extended to military vehicles. Sovietwith light-weight, high-strength metals and alloys suggest that these materials will be used to decrease the weight of military equipment Further development of known Soviet capabilities In both solid and liquid rocket propellant could lead tofield and antiaircraft rockets,advances may be made In ammunition design.
Naval Research and Devolopmenl ^
For about Uie lastears, Sovietresearch In hydrodynamics has been equal to. and In some respects superior to. Western research. Only recently, however, have there been enough model basins and oUier research facilities for an adequatehydrodynamics research program to supplement theoretical research.the failure of naval architects in some cases to Incorporate refinement* ofreflects the lack of an adequateresearch program.
In the structural design of ships, Soviet theoretical work has been superior to Western work. Advances in the structural field have now become dependent on empirical research, however,ack of intelligence on Soviet structural test facilities and programsus from deterrriliiirig the present status of tho USSR relative to the West
research in the field ofengineering has been voluminous,Soviet naval diesel engines arederivations of Western designs. Therehowever, that the engines Inof the postwar Soviet submarineshigh-speed types, possibly ofA sizable amount of researchpublished on naval gas turbines andplant has apparently beenno shipboard gas turbinebeen detected to date. Although Soviet
scientists continued German World War II developments in closed cyclesubmarine propulsion plants, and also did extensive workecycle diesel, we believe that progress in nuclear propulsion hasbeen sufficient lo permit the dropping of these two projects.
Soviet design of conventional propellers has been generally similar to US and Western practice. An original and probablyadvance was made inoviet academician announced his theory of "supercavitatlng" propellers. Although we have no mlormaUon permitting an assessment of Soviet progress ln super-cavitating propeller development, we believe that research on such propellers is continuing.
Naval Ordnance. The results of apostwar research and developmentin naval gunnery have become evident in warships built or modernizedyroscopicaliy stabilized fire control directors and gun mounts have received specialwith apparently successfuloviet capability to provide servo-mechanisms, computers, and associated electronicfor modern automatically loaded guns with automatic tracking against air andtargets is evident. While refinements to these systems will continue, naval guided missiles for AA defense also may be developed for use in large vessels and new naval
IS. The Soviets have thc scientific knowledge which would enable them to developacoustic, magnetic, and pressure devices for use in underwateragnetic mine recovered in) was judged to be very good andnowledge of advanced World War II concepts. In the field of torpedoes, the Soviets have apparentlya high-speed long-range weaponydrogen-peroxide propulsion system;orpedo could be fitted for pattern-running.0 there has been evidencerogram for developing an acoustic hom-Ing_hcad for an electrically driven torpedostimated thateapon is now available for operational use.
capabilities in the theoreticalof acoustics related toarc believed to be excellent.and development ln this fieldsupported by thc Acousticsthe Academy of Sciences. Unclassifiedin Soviet journals revealthe acoustic principles underlyingSOFAR, and thc recent awarding ofof Sciences prize for research onhydro-acoustic emanations ofthat the USSR attachesthis field. Available evidence does notan estimate of the degree of Sovietin applying these principles.
Electronics and
During the last five years, the USSR has made great progress In electronics research and development In the initial years after World War n, Soviet electronics was heavily dependent on copying from the West.some recently developed electronicappears to be primarily the result of native research and development, Indicating that the Soviets have achieved considerable independence in this field. They haveand put into production many types of radar and other electronics equipmentto the latest Western designs inuse. Significant advances are believed to have been made in such militarilyfields as electronic countermeasures,guidance and control, high-speed digital computers, and airborne intercept radar equipment Although the development of proximity fuzes is within Soviet capabilities, we have no evidence that it has taken place.
Radar. Someypes of Soviet radars have been reported during the past five years, including advanced types for air, ground, and naval use. Many older ground radar sets are still in use, but are rapidly being supplemented by more advanced types which shouldsome of the previous deficiencies, forin height-finding. There lsevidence of advanced native Sovietand development in naval radar,for surface and air search and fire control applications. For example, thc SEA
NET air search radar appears to be andesign based upon native effort The airborne intercept radar set In the FRESCO "D" fighter, although of comparatively short range, has complex search and tracknot similar to those of any other known radar, and the FLASHLIGHT is equipped with an airborne intercept radar which is probably different and considerably larger than that of the FRESCOethat Soviet research and development capabilities In the field of radar will becomparable with those of the West over the next few years.
Communications. Soviet electronicsand development establishments are capable of provlcling communicationsequal In quality to that of the West. Although to date Soviet communications equipment designs have been conventional, with little indication of miniaturization,Soviet advances in semiconductorand In the development of transistors should permit the design of lighter, morecommunications equipment. Improved Soviet competence in television research and development will probably resultreaUy increased Industrial and military use of
Woirfpafion. In Uie development of air navigation equipment, the USSR has relied rather heavily on convenUonal andInstruments, the principles of which have been proven through wide use by Western nations. Improved airborne navigatiooal aids, including automatic astronarigallon andomnirange systems, will probably come into more extensive use during the nextyears. Future Soviet techniques for long and short range air navigation are expected to be adaptations of well-established basic theory for Uie most part.
Electronic Countermeasureshe USSR has devoted substantial efforts to thc development of electronic counlerrneasures equipment since the end of Worldnd we believe thai ECM activities will almostcontinue to receive priority1 The USSR is currently employing groundbascd. sliipborne. and airborne signal
detection equipment, probably extending from the very low to Uie microwave frequencies. We believe that Soviet researchers haveUie potential of antlradar coating and arc continuing to extend their efforts In this direction, but wc believe that thesewill be only partially successfulevidence ls scarce, we believe that Uie USSR Is devoting considerable effort to the development of active Jamming equipment In many forms for Uie entire usable radioIntelligence reports reveal that Soviet scientists are aware of the recentof the carcinotron, which has great(ties In the development of highlyJamming equipment, and that they have directed that development work be done on lt In East Germany. Although CHAFFhave been known since World War II, Uie USSR has only within the past year or so become actively engaged In developingfor Its production, dispensing, andemployment
Although Intelligenceon Soviet work In Infrared is scanty,the USSR's military Infraredthe development of equipmentdetection systems, guidance,and fuzing systems for missiles, andnight vision equipment forInfrared communicationprobably in use by Soviet ground andat the present time. We believewill remain approximately on athe US In Infrared research and overseveral years could surpass us inemployment of certain applicationssuch as terminal guidancemissiles, If the necessaryallocated to them.
Chemical and Biological Warfare
Warfarehe USSRwell established CW research andprogram which wc believe to beThc program probablydevelopment of more effective nervescientists have also conductedphosgene oxlme, tabun.compounds of the sarin
Oft T
27
and sulfur-containing organopliosphorus compounds of the "V" agent typo. They are probably conducting research on psychochem-ical agents. Research to increase theof older known gases Is also probably being conductedimited extent.
have evidence of Soviet research(applicable to dissemination ofand smokes under fieldacetylchollne-cholinestcraso enzyme(essential to an understanding of thoand physiological action ofand the development of antidotessurface chemistry (applicable toof toxic agents from theand identification of industrial(applicable to detection devices foraluminum soaps (usable asIn fuels for flamendIndustrial poisoning. Theof this research will probably addto Soviet CW capabilities.
Warfareshows that the USSR almosthas an active BW research andwhich encompassesand possibly anUcroplittle is known, however, aboutand magnitude of this program,Its offensive aspects. Theof at least four humantularemia, plague, brucellosis)two animal diseases (foot and mouthrinderpest) are believed to be underas BW agents. The USSR hasresearch and development inhave direct application to BW,aerosol production,air sampling forand storage of micro-organisms.fields, Soviet scientists are consideredcompetent and their research is ofvalue to the defensive and offensive
aspects of BW. The USSR also possesses the facilities, scientific personnel, materials, and experience In related fields which could be used for the mass production of BW agents. Future Soviet BW research and development probably will be on suitable agents andof dissemination.
developments In the field ofsuch as the vaccines ofand anthrax, are of potentialto the BW defensive capabilitiesUSSR. The USSR probably willemphasis given to medical researchfields which will improve Sovietcapabilities.
Weapons Systems
addition to its capabilities forIndividual weapons and items ofthe USSR has shown the capacitycomplete weapons systems, byintegrating individual developmentsand complex programs usingscientific and technical skillsood example Isdevelopmentodern airwhich noweries of Jetequipped withmodem early-warning and groundequipment, communications andequipment, radar-directedartillery, and surface-to-air guidedSimilarly, Soviet development of anuclear-air offensive weaponsnot only the long-rangebut also air-deliverableand facilities for refueling theaircraft In flight In general, weSoviet weapons systems developmentare well advanced and comparewith those of the West. Despitecomplexities of modern warfare,that the USSR will be capable ofthe successful development ofsystems necessary for up-to-dateand naval forces.
i)
CIENTIFIC MANPOWER ESTIMATES
appendix presents data in graphic form comparing Soviet and US scientific and technical manpower as lo numbers of living graduates from higherield of employmentnnual rates of graduation, bynnual rates and distribution of higher degreesumbers employed in research and teaching, by field and place of employmentrojected annual rates of graduationnd trends (for the USSR only) In the number of living scientific and technicaln the Interpretation of the graphical data the following points should be borne in mind.
Personnel statistics are not by themselves accurate measures of national scientific and technological strength. Thereumber of factors, some of which are discussed in the body of this estimate, which must also be noted. Among these are the number of non-professionaUy trained individuals working In professional positions, the general utilization of'scientific and technical manpower,the availability of technicians to support the professional scientists and engineers, the stage of development of the economy and general technological level of the country. These are factors which arc not amenable to numerical treatment but which neverthelessreat bearing on the comparativeand technological strength of nations.
The data used in the calculations for thc USSR are drawn from open Soviet literaturestatistical year books published upnd postwar journals and newspapers. The following considerations support thc reliability of the Soviet data:
from the prewar statisticalhave proved consistent in othersubsequently ascertained facts.
manpower figures inhich was classified by the USSRby the Germans and laterwell with the Information whichappeared In open Soviet
since the war, whileare consistent with prewar trends.
While an analysis of the Soviet Statistical Handbook published6 has not beena preliminary examination reveals no significant discrepancies with the data used in the calculations.
The Commission of Human Resources and Advanced Training of the NaUonal Research Council and Uie Department of Health,and Welfare supplied most of Uieupon which the US figures are based. Some adaptations and extensions of US and Soviet materials have been made in order to reduce them to comparable categories.
The data for both Uie USSR and the US are, in some places, estimated or incomplete.the postwar period upata for the USSR have become Increasingly scarce, while for the US Uie reverse is true In breaking down raw data Into more useful form and In supplying data to fill gaps In certainor for certain years, statistical methods have been used. The numerical data onand technical personnel are believed to be correct within plus or minusercent
G. While every effort has been made to arrive at comparable categories of scientificin the US and USSR, there are inevitably differences In Uie definitions of corresponding
conn-
29
In the two countries which make exact comparison difficult. For the purposes of the breakdown among scientific fields illustrated in Figures,hc sciences have been categorized as follows:
a. Physical sciences and engineering
Physics
Chemistry
Mathematics
Metallurgy
Astronomy
Meteorology
Geology and geography
Engineering (mechanical, chemical, civil, electrical, etc.)
Other fields based on physics,or the earth scienceseismology)
(agronomy, animalforestry, entomology, etc)
Other biological sciences relatedlant genetics)
sciences
Medicine and medical sciences Dentistry and dental sciences Other fields supporting health and sanitation (excluding nursingbasedear curricula) Other biological sciences relating to healthpidemiology) Persons ln residual fields of biology not clearly associated with agricultural or health sciencesicrobiology) have beenequally between these two categories.
Figure 1
RELATIVE SIZES OF MAJOR GROUPS OF SCIENTIFIC MANPOWER
AS OF
6
Figure 2
CONflDCNTIAL-
NUMBER OF GRADUATES ACCORDING TO FIELD OF EMPLOYMENT
CONriPCNTIAL
AS OF6
GRADUATING PER YEAR FROM HIGHER EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
ACCORDING TO
iflJO 'M 'Ja M 'U 'VO M ii
M -ml M KM II M
NUMBER OF PERSONS HOLDING HIGHER DEGREES AND DISTRIBUTION WITHIN SCIENTIFIC FIELDS
AS OF
COfrfl OENT-rAfc-
COHriDrHTIAt
-COHfWCHTIAl-
NUMBEH OF SCIENTISTS IN RESEARCH AND TEACHING
Figure 7
DISTRIBUTION OF SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS ENGAGED IN RESEARCH AND TEACHING
AS Of
By Place- ol Employment
By Field ol Employment
COMriPCMTIAL -
NUMBER OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL GRADUATIONS PER
see-He too
'SO
tie
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Original document.
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