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SPECIAL
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
PROBABLE REPERCUSSIONS OF BRITISH-FRENCH MILITARY ACTION IN THE SUEZ CRISIS
Z*tmtXXed bp DEI
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The following tntrUlcenct organUatlon* participated Inattan of (AI*Ae CmtmirlJifme* Apmcv tnttUteevce organisations of tht Departments of(Ac Navy. (Af Air Force, and The Joint Staff.
Conenrred tnbftha INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
oncurring acre (A* Special Astlstant. Intelligence. Department of State; tha AnUtant CMtl ol Staff. Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence; the Director ol Intelligence. USAr; and the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Jotnt Staff. The Atomic Energy CommUrlon Representative to the IAC. and tha( Director. Federal Bureau of Mnejfloorlori, oOJtclned. ths ntWect berno outride of their jurisdiction.
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PROBABLE REPERCUSSIONS OF BRITISH-FRENCH MILITARY ACTION IN THE SUEZ CRISIS'
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the probable repercussions, in the Middle East and elsewhere, of amove to resolve the Suez crisis by military action against Egypt.
THE ESTIMATE
Assuming that the British and French use military forceypt. It will-probably be after they are confronted by another direct and major Egyptian challengesuch as Eiiyptlan denial of their transit rights through the canal or violence against their nationals. They would consider that such an action would improve their chances of Justifying the use of force before world opinion.
We do not estimate In tnls paper thein the Middle Eastritish-French acceptanceeaceiul settlement. The VZ and French governments, however, have almost certainly estimated that awith Nasser on the principle ofcontrol of the canal would greatly weaken their position ln the Middle East and Africa, They may believe that use of force would produce less undesirable consequences than wouldompromise. Therefore, even without further provocation, they might resort to force if convinced that negotiations were not going toromptsatisfactory to them. In thesethey would attempt to document Nasser's refusal to negotiate auch aand to dramatize It before world opinion as Justification for the use of force.
'This eiuJnate does not consider the auesUon of whetherUsh and French will Lakerr acuon acainitndleaUons that they may do so. however.surnclenl to warrant this estimate of (he probable repercussions of the action if It should occur.
The Impact Within Egypt of British-French Military Action
Barring the unlikely prior entry ofnumbers of Soviet personnel forduty, British and French forces now In the Eastern Mediterranean could probably attain their purely military objectives in Egypta very few days, withinours, they could probably seize key points along the Suez Canal by amphibious landings ln the Port Said area and airborne landings near Iimallla and possibly elsewhere. However, It wouldbeeek before military control of the canal could be assured, and in any case Egyptian execution of prepared demolitions and other blocking operations ln the canal could not be prevented. The time required to remove obstructions from the canal cannot be foreseen.
If the bulk of Egyptian forces remainsalong the Israeli border, British-French forces could quickly capture Cairo and other main centers in northern Egypt, andEgyptian military opposition could probably be overcome within three or four days after the initial assault. If there had been redeployment of Egyptian forces from the Sinai, the operation might takeeek toays.
Nasser might put poorly organised andIneffective forces Into the battle, and attempt abo to organize civilians for passive resnlance-arge scale, hi order Lo drama-
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tize thr plight of Egypt, and to stir upworld Indignation against the British-French action.
Despite the probable early cessation ofmilitary operations, rioting andof property would probably occur InAlexandria, and other cities. There would probably also be substantial guerrilla activity by elements of the regular armed forces and by Nasser's "Army ofost of this activity would probably be suppressedew weeks and essential order main-tained throughout most of Egypt.small-scale but widespread acts ofsnd terrorism would almost certainly continue, and Egyptian restlveness underoccupation would be manifest to the world. Nasser would probably seek tothis resistance and toasis for UN or other international action bya government-ln-exlle In one of the other Arab or Asian states.
Even If effective security were established, the British-French occupation would almost certainly have to be prolonged. It would be extremely difficult, although probably notto find Egyptians willing to assume the responsibilities of government underauspices and to meet British-French terms on the canal Issue. Moreover, it iscertainovernment thuscould not long continue In office once British and French troops had been
Arab World Reaction
military actionwouldiolent-tar reaction throughout most of theAnti-Western demonstrations andaffecting US installations andbe likely In most major populationThe local authorities would probablyor unwilling to restore immediatethough this might be less true inand Iraq, where security controlsstrong. Rioting would probablyserious in West Jordan. Amman, andwhere anti-Western feeling Isand security controls tenuous.
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anti-Western manifestations wouldencouraged by the USSR andand by Nasser as long asand other propaganda facilitiesEgyptian agents, assistedextent by local nationalists, wouldwidespread sabotage of WesternThose attempts wouldmost successful along the pipelines andpipeline terminal areas of Syria,Lebanon, erlth the main efforts beingInitially against the Iraqlines. Some damage might alsoto oil Installations in Iraq. SaudiPersian Gulf, and Aden, despite thethe local authorities to prevent IL
Virtually all the Arab governments would make gestures of solidarity with Egypt and would publicly protest the violation ofsovereignty and independence. Syria, for example, might shut down the IPCIn this Initial period the chances would be about even that Nun would feel compelled to withdraw Iraq from the Baghdad Pact.of their personal feelings, all Arab leaders would feel It necessary to make such gestures to avoid having popular emotion on the Suez issue turned against them.while most of the leaders of rtherArab governments would probably beglad to see the end of Nasser, thiswould be offset by their concern over the reoccupatlon of an Arab state by Anglo-French military force. Notwithstanding Arab League or other agreements, however, the other Arab governments would almostnot commit their regular military forces in support of Egypt and indeed would not be able to do so to any significant extent
How far the Arab governments would goerious break with the West would probably depend on how successful Nasser and his supporters were in maintaining andresistance to the British and French. If. contrary to our estimate, the organized military resistance of the Egyptiansonsiderable penod, the popular rioting and demonstrations taking place In other Arab countries would probably remainigh pitch. The governments of most of these countries would probably countenance.
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perhaps organize, acts against Western personnel and Installations and lendto the Egyptian cause. The governments of Jordan, Libya, and Iraq would almostrenounce their treaty relations with the UK if they had not already done so. The situation ln some of these countries mightso disastrous for Western Interests as eventually to require Western militaryto restore and maintain order.
n the other hand. If as we estimate,organized resistance collapsed ln aof days, we believe that while the Arab leaders would continue vociferously tothe Western action and to proclaim their support ofumber of factors would incline thematter of expediency to refrain from acts seriously damaging to Western interests. Political leaders ln the oil producing states of Saudi Arabia and Iraq, andesser extent the pipeline states ofSyria, and Lebanon, would be aware of the danger of losing their oil revenues. The leaders ln Jordan would probably beconstrained by the Israeli threat to their country, and by their dependence on Western subsidies. In addition, with theof time there would be some decline throughout the Arab world in the position of those elements which had relied on Egyptian encouragement, example, or subsidy, and an Increase In the relative strength of their local rivals. Thus some of the elements of theto the Nuri regime in Iraq would beyptlan-suppurted forces In Lebanone weakened. In Jordan, the latent strength of the refugee-Palestinianand the Internal divisions ln theestablishment would continue tothe goven-ment, but the threatoup by pro-Egyptian antimonarchlca) extremists would probably recede. Over the course of time the violent manifestations of popular emotionalism would gradually subside, and the danger of new riots and demonstrations would lessen. Nevertheless, popularand anti-Western feelings throughout the area would remainigh pitch for aperiod, and the danger ofor other acts of Individual terrorism
against those suspected of undue partiality for the West would continue almost
While the various Arab governments would probably adjust themselves to the changed alignment of forces In the area,they nor the Arab people would beto the occupation of Egypt or to theof any other Arab country should such become necessary. Basic antlcolonlal and anti-Western tendencies would be greatly reinforced and resentment of the continued presence of Western power elements In the Middle East would be intensified, even though violent manifestations were temporarily
During the crisis most Arabs wouldregard the USSR as the friend of Arab nationalism, the enemy of imperialism and colonialism,ighteous opponente use of armed force against weaker nations. The political and moral appeal of the USSR, already strong In some elements of the Arab world, would almost certainly increaseWe believe that this Increase would only be offsetlight degree by thethat Soviet arms and political support did not save Egypt from foreign occupation. On the whole, the Arabs would become more susceptible to Soviet influence.
Effectsossible Coup in Syria. In Syria, the possibility exists of an attempted coup by conservative and pro-Iraqi forces,with British encouragement, orof an attempted coup by leftist Egypt-oriented military elements and the ArabResurrectionist Party. Action bywing would touch off counteraction by the other. The outcome ofonflict wouldavlly on Its timing:
a. Under present circumstances In Syria, if the conflict took place prior to the British-French militaryonservative move would have backing by Iraq and Turkey,including the use of Iraqi military forces now deployed within striking distance ofIn the latter case the move wouldubstantial chance of success.of Its outcome, an attempted pro-Iraqi coup would widen the spilt within the Arab
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It successful. It wouldlow to Nasser's prestige, and might consequentlyan Egyptian reaction which would Incite or be used to justify British-French military action against Egypt.
b. However, at the time of and shortly after British-French military action against Egypt, anti-Western feeling would probably be too strongonservative pro-Iraqi coup toexcept possiblyie result of outright military action by Iraq. The Iraqimight wish to launch such action, but popular feeling ln Iraq would regard It asEgypt's difficulties, and In the face of such sentiment the Iraqi government would be unlikely to go ahead.
The Role of Israel
We consider it highly unlikely that the Israeli government would take advantageritish-French military operation against Egypt to launch unprovoked major attacks on the Egyptian forces ln Sinai or against any of the other Arab states. Despite probablefor action on the part of IsraeliIsraeli government leaders would probably feel that, with the most seriousthreat to them already being taken care m: by others, the possible gains of militarywould be considerably outweighed by the political risks involved. In particular, the Israeli government almost certainly recognizes that the Western powers could not let lt get away with such an attack If the West wished to prese.Te any standing with the other Arab states.
However. If there shoulderious breakdown of Internal control in Syria orwe believe the Israelis would probably take the opportunity to seize the demilitarized areas and to achieve some minor rectification of boundaries. We do not believe It likely that they would make major seizures of territory. In any event, Israel wouldtrong military posture along Its borders and would probably respond promptly to anyReaction
The USSR would take vigorous action both directly and in the UN to exploit the
adverse reactions in the Arab-Asian world to the Western action and to make capital of its support of the Arab cause. It would seek to organize collective moral, political, andsupport of Egypt and might dramatize the Issue by covertly Inciting civil disturbances ln colonial areas. It would probably offer with greater expectation of success further aid to other Arab nations now dependent upon Western sources of income. By intensive agitation of the Issue of Westernit would endeavor to make it costly for any Asian-African leader to Identify himself with the West. It would also exploitfor causing friction among the Western allies, particularly between theand French on the one hand, and West Oermany and the smaller NATO countries on the other.
the USSR, either directlyIts Satellites, would probably beto furnish materiel and possiblyspecialists and technicians toopportunities for doing so would bethe British and Frenchuickvictory. If the military action Inbe prolonged the USSR or Itsmake statements and militarycalculated to alarm European orwe do not believe, however,would go to the length ofmall scale. We believe thatwould not directly participate lnin Egypt. However, thedevelop lnay that thebecome more closely Involved: forthrough the stopping or seizure byir French of Soviet shipping inwaters, or the capture of SovietEgypt
Effects on the North African and Cyprus Situations
successful demonstration of Britishmilitary power in Egypt would, ata time, considerably bolster theprestige of the British and Frenchat home and their powerthe Mediterranean. The morale ofIn Algeria and Cyprus would be lowered.
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Egyptian political and material support for the Algerian rebels would be ended. Thus, the British and French might gain anto move towards settlements in these areas on terms they would presently regard as meeting tteir minimum conditions. In other countriesMorocco, Tunisia, Libyathe basic situation would probably not bearretted, thoughime there would probably be difficulties in relationsthese countries and Western nations.
General Free World and UN Reactions
British-French military action against Egypt would provoke strong adverse reactions within the Afro-Asian area and in many other portions of the world as well. We believe that the bulk of Afro-Asian opinion would overwhelmingly consider mere Egyptianto accept International supervision orof the canal as an inadequatefor Western military Intervention.It is possible that many Afro-Asian countries mlght_condone some Egyptianwith Western shipping through thelearly undertaken in retaliation against Western economic harassment.the adverse reactions In the Afro-Asian world would be considerably reduced If Nasser without provocation had demonstrablythe flow of canal traffic, few of the Afro-Asian leaders could publicly condone the use of force, which would beeimpositlon of "colonialism" on Egypt. India In particular would almost certainly take the lead In moves forof the Western action.
The reaction of Western European nations would be mixed. Although most wouldbe relieved to see the canal removed from Nasser's unilateral control, those with economic Interests in the Arab-Asian world would wish to avoid too close an association with the action for fear of Jeopardizing their econondc and political position in that area. There would bc considerable concern lest the British-French move lead to Increasing Soviet Involvement and henceangerous rise in East-West tensions.
the probable event of appeal toGeneral Assembly by the USSR, India,we believe that Egypt'sobtain support from the Sovietalmost all Arab-Asian countries. Theof Latin American countries andWestern European countries wouldheavily by the nature ofprior to the British-French action.had mevely rejected the Londonproposals, enough of theseprobably vote against theposition so as toAat least for condemnation. Even Ifimpaired operation of the canal orhad taken place against Westernthe British-French action wouldvigorously In the UN.
Effect on the US Position
A decision by the British and French to go ahead with military operations against Egypt would pose serious problems for the US regardless of whsi portion it took. Should the US openly throwts lot with theand French, op. without committing troops, it would* invJ' most If not all the risks and drawb.-'v, 'irmP-edesort to force. Throughan world It would be< the tit" itand "lmperlalL.n" andged'.th havLng been hypocrit'eal in lis initial esp-risal ofn addition, the dangers of -see against USandould be enhanced, with TAP LINE probablyajor target. King Saud would almost certainly act toviolence and sabotage against ARAMCO Installations and personnel and by virtue of his dependence on oil revenues would probably seek toreak with the oil company. Thus he would probably not interrupt oil operations. However, he would be under some compulsion to show disapproval and might demand Immediate withdrawal of the US Air Force from Dhahran.
A US effort to disassociate itself wouldsome opportunities for efforts atand localization of the conflict.serious problems would also ensue:
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British and French mightto US refusal formally towith the venture, but they wouldsympathy and diplomatic support inconsidered toefense of vitalinterests. Moreover, lt would befor the US to avoid an openof approval or disapproval during
the US came out sharply againstandonsiderable strainImposed, at least temporarily, on USwith Its principal allies. Moreover,opposition, unless It extended, fora vote of condemnation In the UN,unconvincing to large segments ofofficial opinion, particularly in theworld. Some might even believenoninvolvementose resultingsecret agreement with the UK andthat the US could have preventedmilitary action if It hadto do so. Among those whononinvolvementarge anda majority element In thewould probably attribute the USgner< to support 'hi, British'lection /carrrther than to any real sympathyfor the rights andthe ex-colonial nations.
thoughm USpersonnel, and Interests wouldsomewhat reduced, they would still besince much of the Arab popularwould be IndiscriminatelyIts efforts to remain aloof, thethereby be forced to consider thedelicate question of directto safeguard US lives and
Longer Range Implications for the West
ven though the more violent of theof Arab-Asian emotionalismritish-French military move against Egypt
would sooner or later subside, the Western action would be so deeply resented thatnationalist and anti-Western feelings would be magnified for years to come. This Is not to say that the use of military force against Egypt would of Itself fatally weaken the Western position in the Arab-Asian area. Much would depend on the length, severity, and mode of termination of the occupation of Egypt. Much would also depend cn Western success, under the circumstances, in finding leaders willing and able to cooperate with the West Use of military force against Nasser would remove the chief organiser ofpressures against the West ln the Middle East, and lt might temporarily check the erosionInevitable In the long runof the Western position of special privilege ln the area. However, lt would also probably cause the nationalist attack on this special position to rebound later with increased vigor, and by reviving Arab-Asian fears of colonialistwould make more difficult theover tlie long run,ormal and mutually advantageous relation with the Arab-Asian states.
hroughout the underdeveloped areas of the world, this deepened suspicion andof the West would provide newfor the Communist powers,Ti* had substantial sucrwsab-Asian rations lhat they are willing to extendnd supportasis of full equality. The Sino-Sovlet Bloc would almost certainly take full advantage of these opportunities to extend Its economicof the area, to Increase Its diplomatic and cultural ties with the Arab-Asian nations, and to spread the concept that tho interests of the underdeveloped nations lie more with the Communist powers than with the West,
' Asbove, it Is beyond the scope of tola estimate to weigh the consequences of no( using military force againstfompromise setUement with Nasser.
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