ANNEX VIII
VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST VIEWS ONLENGTH OF THE WAR
I. The Anticipated Timing of Victory56
During the first two years following the Genevathe Communists believed that they couldosition of dominance in South Vietnam mainly throuaJithe^^
medium Of political, hor anUf.n; nr.
The Communists apparently believed that their candidates could win the elections and that it would not take long
more, 4 South Vietnam's chances of political survivaliable political entity appeared so slight that the Communists had every reason to anticipate an eventualwhich would permit them to take over even if the elections were not held. ecret Communist partyof4 said that the 'struggle" to assure that the "French imperialists and their puppets" leave the South was targeted for completion "within twond that "despite our impatience, we can accomplish this noost of the other Communist assessments of their situation throughere also highly optimistic and implied that victory was not far away.
Fromohe Communists gradually grew more pessimistic about their chancesakeover under the terms of the Geneva Agreement, as the Diem governmentrefused to agree to an election which it realized the Communists would inevitably win. The Communists were never again so optimistic about their chances after their failure during this era. The evidence shows them inyears to have been much more cautious and vague in their references to the time necessary toakeover.
Captured documents reveal that the failure to hold the elections agreed on at Geneva resulted in deep anddisillusionment in Communist ranks in the South. For the next few years, party leaders in the North and the South cast aboutew strategy to accomplish their Difficulties were increased by the success of Ngo Dinh Diem's regime in repressing the low-level terrorism which had been mounted by the Communists in the hope of weakening and undercutting the Saigon government's position before and during the elections. Communist documents speak-of great damage inflicted on the underground cadreby Diem's operations.
This combination of difficulties, particularly the Diem government's military pressure, led many of the southern Communists to believe thaturn from reliance primarily on political action to reliance primarily on militaryagainst the government would bringommunist victory in the South. Communist documents indicate that there were various strategies put forth by the cadres in the South for insuring the success of military action. One called for concentration on the constructionargebase in the highlands from which the lowlands and the population centers could be threatened. Those who advocated this policy, according to the documents, suggested that the Communists focus almost all their assets on the highlands and delay the solidification and enlargement of theirin the delta until the highlands effort was completed. Others arguedoncentration of effort in the delta to the exclusion of the highlands.
It can readily be seen that debates over strategy as basic as this wouldtrong influence on Communist estimates of the time needed to accomplish their goals, and that such estimates would thus be cast in only the haziest and most indefinite of terms.
Documents indicate that the Communistsountry-wide effort which theoretically would put equal emphasis on military and politicalhe documents give much of the credit for the adoption of this strategy to Le Duan, the present first secretary of the Communist Party in Hanoi. Le Duan went to the Northpparently froa the top leadership position in the South. He appears to have convinced the Communist
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hierarchy in the North that an all-out militaryhould be started in the South. Communist recordsdate the decision to mount an all-out struggle in the South as having been made in8 or.
It was-clear9 that the Communists were alreadya full-scale military effort in thecaptured document stated that "instructions from"department of the party in about May ofthe cadres in the South of the "necessityfull use of the armednd that thestarted to "lay out" the "necessary policies." " the document asserted, "the armedbeen fighting
III. The'Timc Frame and Goals9 -
There are no specific references in any availablematerials as to what amount of time the Communists believed9 would be necessary to accomplish aof South Vietnam, or even to achieve any significant proportion of their objectives.; Language on theof victory in Communist materials of this period was cast in very general terms. roadcast by theinor example, said that the "day of victory" would "depend mainly on the changingf the struggle." Such statementsesire to avoid raising false hopes among the cadre or to makewhich might later prove wrong.--
Analysis of Communist materials, however, does point rather firmlyommunist belief90 that it would take at least five years of all-out military and political action to bring about Communist domination ofhe South. It does not appear that they expected at this time to be in power6 at the earliest. This can be inferred from indications as to what the Communists believed they had to accomplish in order to achieve They fully recognized that they were still afactor in the urban areas, and that in the rural area
their position was still weak.* That the Communists planned to take their time and build carefully was reflectedasic order on the insurgency sent south from Hanoi According to this order, the revolutionary movement was recognized as "still weak thise have the time to prepare any aspect where we are weak.?.
IV. The Initial Deferral of Victory Anticipations
Until2 the Communists appear to have believed 'that they were making satisfactory progress in theof the insurgent movement as originallyy the springowever, the step-up in American military assistance to the Diem regime and the counterinsur-gency programs put into effect by the governmment had begun
*One: example of their.appraisal of their situation was apparent in the interrogationC battalion commander capturede stated that the Communists were at the time devoting nearly all their efforts-to-the- rurale implied that the establishmentignificant urban apparatus to take advantage of the "urban uprising" which the Communists expected would take several more years.
0 captive, the chairmanC district committee in Kien Giang province, indicated that thewould be satisfied if they could make significant strides^ 0 in the elimination of governmentin the southwestern part of South Vietnam.
1 radio message, the Viet Cong leadershipthe opinion that, "depending on how the situation develops" it is "possible" that we will be able in "two or three years" to build up our units so that they "will be able to destroy part of the enemy's forces." of this would necessarily have left them still several years away from an overpowering position throughout the rural sections of the country.
**In at least one instance. Communist cadres were told that the situation was moving as had been forecast by top Communist authorities
to cause increasing difficulties for the Communists, and enemy materials indicate that their estimates of the time needed forictory were stretched out.*
It was" at this point, Communist documents suggest, that the insurgents began to put more emphasis on the so-called .urbaney element in Communist guidelines for success in South Vietnam, but one that did not receive very heavy emphasis in their writings during the first fewyears of the insurgency. In the Communist view, victory could be anticipated as near at hand when the expansion of tha Communist base among the rural populace was combinedeneral uprising of the city populace against the government. This has gradually received more stress in Communist instructions to cadre in recent years.**
document commenting on the period discloses that "at first we did not realize the harm and danger of the strategicnd "consequently the question of countering and destroying them was not properlyhe same document notes that the "increase in directagainst us" resulted in "making the revolutionary war last longer and become more difficult." The revolution could no longer "go smoothlyut wouldong and fierce tug of war."
**An instruction document written inormple, says that the Communists expected the "cities in the South, chiefly Saigon and Cholon, to stir up the revolution and cooperate with the rural zones when opportunity was available." According to the document, tho revolution would succeedcombination of city and rural The Communists would be "unable to overthrow the enemyeneral offensive" by itself, if mounted mainly from the rural areas.
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Communist documents indicated that, byhe Viet Cong felt they were successfully countering Diero's military push and the American effort. However, theyiet Cong expectation that the fighting in South Vietnam still would last longer than the Communists had originally thought. One of the best summaries of Communist views on the war in3 was contained in an article
by the North Vietnamese historian Minh Thuan who had often sized up the progress of the revolution since the era of the war against the French.
Thuan took the position that the insurgency had suffered "many ups and downs and many failures." The initiationarge US advisory/support effort meant that the rebels "had to face the enemy under new circumstances" and could no longerapid and easy victory." Thuan stressed the importance of the appearancegeneral uprising" as an omen that success was around the corner. According to Thuan, the Communists should "keep in mind the appearancere-revolutionary situation" which would come about "only when the broad masses" are ready to "rise up and fight" against the regime. "Decisivee declared, can be achieved "only when this pre-revolutionary situation appears."
Another Communist document of this period indicated that the Communists realized they could do little to hasten the fulfillment of their objectives. In "time tot said, help from the "North" and from the rest of the bloc would give the Communist armed forces the "capability to grow relatively fast." But "thatuestion of time and we just cannot do iturry. All our efforts up to now are just the first steps." Such statements imply that the Communists probably believed they were still at least five years away from victory.*
V. The Growth of Communist Optimism4 and5
*They were also, however, still very flexible andperhaps even more so than One document, in discussing the future, said it would be necessary "to play seesaw with the enemyertain period." If,"enemy strength begins to sag significantly in the process, we will fight against the clock to overcome our weaknesses and rapidly develop our power, especially our military power, hoping to win victoriesecisive
Enemy materials discussing the war situation grewmore optimistics the Communists assessed the political disarray in Saigon and the provinces following Diem's overthrow and the success of their efforts
to counter the increases in US aid to the Saigonanti-insurgency programs. 4 article in the North Vietnamese party journal, for example,that the fighting, "although protracted, will not lastnd "final victory" could be achieved "in the near future."* Thereumber of Communist moves which suggested that they were trying to getosition to take maximum and rapid advantage of the governmentwhich they expected. One such move was an ef-fort to speedily build up Communist main force strength in the area of the III Corps north of Saigon by levying very heavy manpower quotas on the guerrilla units in the delta.
Communist optimism appeared to reach.its height in Although they still carefully refrained fromefinite timetable, they do appear to haveat the time that they were possiblyear or two of victory. This, for example, was the implication of an important article by the chairman of Hanoi'scommittees, Nguyen Van Vinh. vinh's views have long appeared to reflect some of the inner thoughts of the top Communist leadership, writing in the5 issue of the party journal, he argued that theof Vietnam forces had been forced to disperse widely and to use about half of their strength to protect the capital region. The government reserves, according to Vinh, were only about one third as great as the French reserves had been, and thus Saigon would "soon" have to abandon large areas of the countryside to the Viet Cong.
Vinh pointed to the period3 and4 in the war against the Frenchimilarime in which the Viet Minh inflicted the most "decisive" defeats on the French. Vinh seemed to be implyingimilar development might take place in thisevelopment which couldommunist military victory5
*At the4 congress of the National Liberation Front, the Front's presidentnew" period of the insurgency had arrived and the "situation has never been so bright." Inorth Vietnamese DefenseVo Nguyen Giap also saw the war asewith the Communist forces in "an offensive position."
The insurgents, according to vinh, wereto the fulfillment" of their mission "in the coming year."*
Among the lower-level Viet Cong leaders, it appears that the idea was being promoted at this time that the "general uprising" was near. efectoristrict Communistin Kien Hoa Province, for example, claimed thatplans called for the "general uprising and completeof the government" It does not appear that the initiation of sustained US air attacks against the DRV in5 or the landing of US Marine combat unitsorthern South Vietnam in March served initially to dampen Communist optimism.
VI. The Cortmunist Reassessment in
imilar belief that victory might be around the corner was expressed privately by the DRV ambassador to Chinariefing of bloc diplomatic representatives in Peking early During the year, the DRV representative said, Hanoimilitary uprising in Saigon and other towns"ery serious disintegration of the ARVN military forces. The ambassador argued that military unity and morale werecrumbling badly and that some young ARVN officers had attempted to establish contacts with the Viet Cong.
**Giap no longer focused his main attention on thefor the Viet Cong, as he had in his previousbut now stressed the necessity of defending the DRV against US "aggression." This in itself seemed an implicit admission of the major setback dealt to Communist hopes in Vietnam by the direct US involvement.
Byhe weight of the direct US combat effort in South Vietnam had thoroughly disabused theof any hopes of an early victory. Both in public and in private, the probabilityrotracted conflict againajor theme in Communist statements. Nguyen Van Vinh, for example, who had spoken so optimistically intalked in July only of "eventual" victory. General Giap was also more sober in his assessment of the situation in5 than he had bean in The entry of the US, Giap said, hadseriousiap spoke only about "ultimate victory" over the us.
In Mayhe top leaders of the military affairs committee of the Communist party in the South met tothe enemy and friendly situation," eport of that conference has been captured. It indicates that the meeting was dominated by discussions of the growing Americanin the war. Analysis of the nature of the Communist military and political weaknesses set against those of the allies, as discussed at the session, suggests that the party hierarchy must have believed at the time that the Communist position was such that the war could easily last another three and possibly five more years.
Communist materials have continued toan expectation that the war will be indefinitely long and protracted. 6 editorial in the Northparty paper, for example, claimed that the Communists still had confidence in their "final" victory, but admitted that the "enemy has not budged as yet" and his "intention" to crush the "insurgency" "had notnRV diplomat in.Laos, who had just returned from briefings in Hanoi said that the Communists now realized that the US war potential meant "there would be no quick and easyin South Vietnam. Ho Chi Minh reaffirmed this as late as mid-July when he promised that the Vietnamesewould fight until final victory if it took "five, ten, twenty-five years, or even longer."
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