REACTIONS TO POLISH
AND HUNGARIAN DEVELOPMENTS
Europe
Poland nnd Yugoslavia have declared lo favor of the demands of the Hungarianthe Albanian, Bulgarian. Czech and East German regime* having condemned them as Popular sympathytbe insurgents, coupled with unrest, ls reported ln order of magnitude ln East Germany. Czechoslovakia,and Albania.
The Polish central con-mlttee bas publicly proclaimed tbe legitimacy of the demands of tbe Hungarian insurgents, insisting that they are neither antl-socialist nor inspired by Western elements. It has also openly urged the removal of Sovlot troops from Hungary. Public demonstrations ln Poland on behalf of tbe Huogartan workers came close to violence, and the Polish press hasthe misleading Czech press treatment of events in Poland. t
Officials in Rumania have revealedack of agreement with the Sovietof the situation ln Hungary but ln the press have followed the Soviet line. Rumanianwho were in Belgrade for talks with the Yugoslavsdeparted convinced of the necessity of internal reform and they have alreadyew wage and pension scale.
There are reliable reports tbat Rumanian public opinion favors the Hungarian workers, and unconfirmed reports of isolated demonstrations.
InYugoslavia bas sent veteran correspondents ln expectation of important developments--tberelot of disagreement among the top leaders. Publicly, the Czech leaders have been lu castigating tbeand have declared tbat no such developments will be tolerated la Czechoslovakia. The Czech regime Is the only Satellite to have publicly condemned the new Hungarian coalition government.
A propaganda barragethe Hungarianfrequent public meetings called for tbe purpose of pledging loyalty to tbend quick denials of rumored demonstrations, indicateconcernestive citizenry, which has expressed widespread sympathy for tho Hungarian Insurgents. The Czech party reportedly plans to raiseln deference to worker demands. According to press reports, Czechoslovakia has alerted army units and aivad troops to tbe Hungarian border.
Popular unrest, coupled wigs widespread sympathy for the Hungarian insurgents, ls also evident ln East Germany. Party
vVprayed fcr RtfecBa
leaders have made clear tbat disorders will not be tolerated.
Albania and Bulgaria have published only limited and derogatory nevs ol Hungary. There have been unconfirmed reports of isolatedin Albania.
Bulgarian diplomats abroad have reportedly expressed the belief tbat the Hungarian events prove Stalin's policies were correct.
Yugoslavela ls have made botb public ana private Btate-nents of sympathy for the Hungarian rebels. Tito hasIn favor of Hungary's present pollclos of broad liberalization andand, privately, favors the removal of Soviet troops from the country. ublic appeal made by the Yugoslav League of Communists to tbe Hungarian people onctober urged them to bait tbe bloodshed and to support tbe nee government and party. Although thecontained tbe admission that it constituted an in Hungary's internal ffairs, Yugoslavia Justified Its action on the grounds that the revolt threatens socialism in Eastern Europe.
with one of Stalinist
Peiplng
Comsunlst China has taken bo public posltion--ln support of either tbe CSSR oo the one hand, or Poland and Hungary on the other--ln the evolution of new Soviet-Eastern European Although Chinese Coaauniit leaders probably sympathize with Polish and Hungarian efforts toarger degree of independence. Peiplng will almost certainly support Soviet efforts to keep Poland and Hungary In tbe bloc.
Pelplng's nevs reports bave minimized the scale of the "excitement" In Poland and the "riots" lo Hungary. Chinese dispatches from Warsaw bavs noted both Polish Intentions to workew relationship with the USSR and Polishabout the Importance of the "Polish-Sovietelplng's only editorial on the subject thus far denounced American and British statements as designed to "aggravate" Soviet-Polish relations, and emphasised Western speculation that changes in blocwill not be "dramatic."
Tito probably fears that if the fighting continues, the Nagy-Kadar regime will be overthrown by one with Western democratic views, or tbatforces will engage la large-scale repression andthe present government
Pelplng's broadcasts to the Chinese people have suggested that the eventual relationship It would like to see between tbe USSR and the European Satellites ls approximately the one the Peiplng reglmo Itself enjoys. These broadcasts, for example, have noted Polish "concern" over the Khrushchevvisit during the Polish
party central committee's plenary session and I'ollsQfor tbe defense of"nationalt the same tine, tbey bave reported ln detail alleged popular demands tbat the Polish-Soviet "alliance" be tbeor "fundamental principle" of Polish policies.
Some private remarks by Chinese Communist leaders ln September may have bsenby Polish and Hungarian lenders as oncouraglng their vjews oo nntlonsllsm. Chou En-lal is reported to have told Polish party leader Ochab at the Chinese party congress that he appreciated the Polishfor Independence and that the Kremlin should not dictate to Poland. The presentparty leader, Janos Kadar, was In Peipiog at the same time and might haveimilar conversation. Moreover, Mao TBe-tung ls said to have sentelegram ofafter the latter'a appointment as theparty's first secretary.
It is. questionable,whether the Chinese wished to eocourage either the Poles or the Hungarians to go as far as they have gone in asserting their independence of Moscow, ln this connection, Mao'sto Gomulka has not been published in Warsaw, vfalcbthat Gomulka did notan unequivocal statement of support from Uao.
Regardless of developments ln Eastern Europe, the Chinese Communists themselves willcertainly try to avoid moves which would ham their own relationship with Koscow. Despite Chinese sympathy with tho Eastern European states,
the Chinese Communistcan be expected to continue to act on tbe principles Liu shao-chl said lamaintenance of the Sino-Sovlet alliance ls the Chinese party's "supremeduty."
Asia and the Middle East
Tbe non-Communist press lo Asia and tbe Middle Bast bas welcomed the uprisings ln Eastern Europeictory for tho forces of antlcolonlallsm and Independence, andorerunner to similarin other Satellites. for South Korea andboth of which called for strong action by the free world, official comment has been guarded.
Scutb Korea's President Rhee expressed the hope tbst tbe free world wouldreat crusade" to overtbrow Communist strongholds in Poland, Hungary and other enslaved countrlss, and called oo the United States to oppose any Soviet attempt to suppress the uprisings. Demonstrations, probablyInspired, have been organized to urge an uprising la Nortb Korea. Seoul radio ls broadcasting similar appeals to tbe North. Chineseforeign sinister George Yah announced that his government "stands ready to give support to any movement or action ln or outside the United Nations lo condemnation of the Soviet violation of the principles of national Independence and human rights."
Tbe important Tokyo dally. Aaa hi,stated tbat Moscow'swill afford an excellent opportunity to Judge the USSR's respect for national sovereignty
A nationalist paper in Indonesia, which sometimesNational Party thinking. Interpreted the East European developmentsictory for Tito. It hailed blm as aleader who badew way to socialism,every Comawolst country to develop according to its respective methods and national interest. The same paper claimed demonstration ia the revolts of tbe USSR'sof its allies was food for Indonesian thought. Two antl-CommunlBt dailies saw tbe revolts largely aa liberation movemeutB aimed at Soviet
Indian prime minister Nebru's public reaction to events ln Hungary and Poland has been guarded. Both he and the Indian press, however, seen to interpret them as steps in the "wholesome process ofandehru, particularly, seems likely to take tbeae events as proof of his contention tbat Communist China aod otheroations are not bound Irrevocably to tbe USSR.
India's largest opposition group, tbe Praja Socialist Party, has exploited the opportunity to embarrass the Comsuolsts by reminding the USSR of Itsto the "five principles" of peace and coexistence and by deploring its "flagrant intervention" ln the internal affairs of Hungary and Poland.
The smaller Southeast Asian nations have given considerable press attention to tbe events, but bave made little editorial or official comment. Thepress has expressed strong support for tbe rebel forces in Hungary, and forcefully condemned Soviet military intervention there.
Only tho Communist daily in Indonesia has so far echoed the Soviet line tbat theresulted from US-financed subversive activity. Japan's Communist Party paper, Akahata, atteatpted to refute reports that there exists "so Insoluble factional struggle ln the Communist Party and that the partyundamentalagainst Khrushchev."
The only anti-American comment in the non-Communist press was noted in Yowlurl, Tokyo's third largest daily. It deplored the American move to place the Hungarian Issue before tbe UN. It asserted tbat tbe uprisingomestic issue, adding tbat tbe United States waa attempting to cover up toe "disadvantageousbrought on by Bulganln's message on nuclear tests."
Tbe Turkish press regards the uprisingsavorable sign that Moscow's "formidable power has started It recommends allhelp to thoae revolting against Soviet domination and cantlons the "est not to "lose tbe initiative to tbe USSR In faciag up to the Pollsb Greek comment stresses the tbeme tbat the USSR lsto suppress tbe forces working for grsater freedom In Its empire, and most papers add that this situation demonstrates tbe correctness of tha Greek view concerning aelf-determlna-tlon for Cyprus.
The attention of Arab officialdom to the uprisings bas been diverted byln Egypt and Algeria. The Egyptian government-financed press has playedbedevelopments, and press reaction has been generally mild
and hesitant. Anti-SovietInand Ethiopianthe "Voice ofthe events as tbe"of the end ofin tbe SatellitesGermany.
urope
Tho revolt in Hungary ls almost universally regarded in Western Europe as symptomaticundamental, and perhaps enduring, chango Id theof the Soviet Union with its Eastern Europnan Satellites. Host influential press organs aod politicians urge, however, that no hasty or drastic action be taken by the West that might work to cancel the advances toward freedom achieved by therebels.
The British Foreign Office stated onctober that it does not believe Nagy canto rule In Hungary. British Labor Party leader Gait-skell has publicly expressed tbe hope that tho otherwill follow Lhe example of Poland and Hungary.
In lest Germany,Adenauer has expressed the belief that the uprisings In Hungary and Poland may ultimately]ore coaproalslngon tbe part of theUnion toward negotiations oo German unification. He pledged that no allltary action would be taken against Poland to settle differences over the Oder-Nelsse boundary. The West j
Geraan Socialist opposition has called lor diplomatic relations with Poland aad Hungary andWest German trade with the Eastern bloc.
The Austrian cabinet has appealed directly to Moscowtop Its Intervention andfreedoa" in Hungary,ommunist demonstrations have occurred in Rone and other Italian cities to protest against the Soviet forces in Hungary.
The West Europeanreaction to tbe violence In Hungary reflects the cod-tloulng stresses oa national party unity In alsost every country. The Italian Coaaunlst nowupaper has abandoned Its support of the Soviet line blaming counterrevolutionaries for the violence. Onctober party leader Togllattl cited Hungary's failure to develop Communism oo an adequate national base and to make reforms quickly enough.
In contrast, the French Communists haveigidly Stalinist public The American embassy In Paris reports that onctober, the French Communist press surpassed itself intho Soviet Union and gloating over lhe "defeat" of the Insurgents.
The London Dally Sorkor continues to equivocate on (he Issue, both abhorring thefor Soviet militaryand referring to the Hungarian workers' "Just demands."
11
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Original document.
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