96
TRAGKDY IN HUNGARY
Since tbe so-called thaw in the Soviet Union, Moscow bas beenangerous game with Its Eastern European Satellites.
World War II,tbe USSR installedregimeselt of Satelliteinsisted on Satellite loyalty topolicy and Satellite contributioneconomic and military aims. it enforced this policy with an through local Communists backed byor threat of Soviet military force.
a year ago, Moscowrogram"liberalisation" in tbeliae witb tbe general "de-Stallzation"USSR and tbe so-called "peacefulpolicy.
involved risks because people in mostSatellites, especially Poland andstill overwhelmingly anti-Soviet and.
first serious sigo of trouble caae atof June in the Poznan riots for "bread
situation we recognized asevaluation of tbe situationaid:
"Even though the Kremlin is assumed to intend retaining real control over therecent more flexible policies have set in motion certain social and political trends toward independence, personal freedoms, andgovernments wblcb may become irrevers-ible, short of forcible repression."
II. This explosive situation began to rumble ominously in Poland onndctober.
A. ough Communistationalist Communist ratheroscowman who bad been purged byto power. He denounced the bad economic conditions in
Poland, particularly lo agriculture, mlDing, and housing, and Implied that the Soviets and Communist bureaucratic inefficiency were to blame.
was very"equality" and "nationalPoland, plus political "democratization."
flew to Warsaw and flirtedidea of crushing Gomulka and hiswith military might. (Later asaid the USSR could have crushedflies but showed great restraint.)
the strong anti-Soviet overtonespopular demands, Gomulka insistedwas loyally Communist and friendly
Soviet Union decided to play ballappeasing Polish nationalorder to keep Poland In tbe bloc.
Tbe powder train set fire by Poland's successful bid for "independence" spreadowderHungary.
A. We had long known tbe Hungarians were
violently dissatisfied with their Communist
regime, its subservience to Moscow and the economic mess io tbe country.
a hard-line Stalinist, wasMoscow in July, probably to pleasesuccessor was another Moscow
Communists still kept pressing for
a more "liberal" political and economic line. We had many intelligence reports indicating development of this move away from Moscow.
surge of popular anti-Soviet,feeling in Hungary arose withindays of the Polish defiance of Moscow.
the Hungarian revolution began on 23
he revolution started with peaceful but highly
emotional mass demonstrations by students, laborers, white-collar workers and off-duty troops. A. Organized to show support for Polish leader Gomulka's defiance of tbe USSR, tbeledemand for the return ofnationalnd tbeof Soviet troops.
Tbe demonstrations became violent during the night ofctober and
security police clashed with tbe crowds.
the Hungarian leadership panicked, called in Soviet troops, and announced aand party reorganization with Nagy as premier.
Open fighting between Soviet troops (elements normally stationed in Hungary as well as some from Rumania) and "insurgents" continued in Budapest.
A Soviet massacre of unarmed demonstrators in Budapest onctober intensified tbe bitterness of the nationalist opposition. Fighting continued for four days and
the losses were heavy on both sides.
statues of Stalin, Russian symbols such as tbe hammer and sickle, and Soviet bookstores were destroyed.
The fighting spread into the provinces. Host of tbe Hungarian army Joined tbe insurgents. 1. Revolutionary councils composed of both
Communists and non-Communists formed In
all regional areas.
V. ovember, aa uneasy coalition between the multiple "revolutionary committees" and tbe Nagy regime took over, with the revolutionaries clearly having the upper hand.
A. Nagy promised to meet more and more rebel demands.
Initially he granted "liberal" Communist demands for increased living standardsreater role for the workers.
As certain demands were met, additional ones were levied by the regionalcouncils and by forces within Budapest.
Nagy promised an cod to security police, immediate negotiationsoviet troop withdrawalirtual "declaration of independence."
B. Id addition to the basicIndepeDdeoceoviet troopan increasingly large number of Insurgents called for:
1. An end of all symbols of Soviet control
and their replacement with national symbols, for example the Kossuth coat-of-arms.
the liquidation of the Communist security and secret police.
a coalition government.
free elections, and
freedom for Cardinal Miodszenty.
continued pressure frompromised all these demandsOctober, although dodging the dateSoviet troop withdrawal and tbe dateelections.
ctober had pledged whatbe tho absolute limit allowed bya "national Communist" state.
ctober Moscowiberalization" in tbeoffering to negotiate the withdrawaltroops from Budapest.
The USSR admitted past errors in handling the Satellites and
stressed co-operation among tbeof Communist countries. It seemed tbat the patriots had won.
Hungary, in face of thispolicy, the non-Communist elements
continued to grow in strength at the national and regional levels. g. ovember Nagy went past the point of do return:
He declared Hungarian neutrality and asked for UN protection.
At the same time Nagy announcedHungarian withdrawal from the Warsaw pact.
Tbe revolutionaries controlled large areas of thetbe presence of SovietNagy was committed to policies, which, if implemented, would haveeutral and non-Com-muoist state.
VXi The Soviets were faced witb two alternatives: accept the situation or suppress the Hungarian nation by military moons. At this precise time, the Anglo-French ultimatum to Egypt captured World attention. Tho Soviets decided to crush the revolution. (Who knowsoviet leader or two lost position or poweresult of this fateful decision?)
troops began to maneuvercutting off thecircling Hungarian airfields,Hungarian cities and military
units.
the while, negotiations sputteredthe withdrawal of Soviet troopsand subsequently from Hungary.
dawnovember, Soviet unitsBudapest and other cities.
military leaders were arrestedmiddle of negotiations with tbetho withdrawal of thoir forces.
bat morning, the Soviets hadof Budapest and captured Nagy andministers. Resistance continued,and as lateovember, in several regional areas.
newnder Janosproclaimed by the Sovietstheir attack.
troops stationed in Hungary0 men (two divisions).
When hostilities began, these had beento approximatelyof sevenSoviet troops stationed ln Rumania and tbe USSR. H. Soviet repression bas been rutbless and brutal. Atrocities have been reported.
According to unconfirmedumber of Hungarianas prisoners ofbeing deported to the USSR.
Officials of the American legation ln Budapest witnessed the Soviet slaughter of women and children. Tbe legation reports tbat despite protests of Western diplomats, Soviet troops burnedhildren's clinic while storming one rebel stronghold.
VII. Although tbe new Communist government ln Budapest claims it is going ahead with "liberalization" and independence on the Gomulka pattern in Poland, It is clear that tbe regime rests entirely on Russian bayonets.
In essence, tbe Soviets haveatellite andonquered province. Tbey will almost
certainly have to run itilitary government for want of enough Hungarian Communists sufficiently traitorous and sufficiently daring to do the job* Large-scale transportation of elements of the population to central Asia, as took place in Baltic republics, is possible. And tbe suffering of tbe surviving Hungarian people this winteresult of the destruction and breakdown of all normal government and economic functions (already half-wrecked by Communist mismanagement) will be intense.
VIII. In Europe outside Hungary, the most telling
effects have been the destruction of the myth of "peaceful coexistence" and the "new era" of sweet reasonableness on the part of the Kremlin. The hopes that grewearalf after tbe Austrian peace treaty and the Genevahave been rudely shattered, according to reports from most European and some Asian capitals. Communist Party members in Western Europe are tearing up their cards. In Paris, the partyand the office at its newspaper
(L'Humanite) were gutted. Woolly fellow-traveler Nenni in Italy, prone to collaborate with the
raunists, are denouncing them. Also the Daily Korker in New York.
As for the Satellite armies, the Soviets now know that after ten years of investment, they are as likely to fight against them as for them. Thus the line in Europe is sharper than ever before: on theSoviet-Russian military might; on tbegreater awareness of the realities of the Communist menace; and the present Soviet regime has taken off the mask.
Original document.
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