The Hungarian situation: The Hungarian radio onctober admitted" that(Budapest time) limited fightingin certain sections of Budapest, contradicting an earlier broadcast from Hosco* which asserted that tbe "enemy adventure" had been "liquidated" and order restored in the city. Claiming that the situation had improved since earlier in tho evening, the Budapest broadcast stated that "the arred attackers aremere and more isolated in someut adaed that the attackers "have begun to start new actions; they areout surprise attacks ln groups of two or throe."
Soviet and Hungarian nilitary action has included the use of tanks, artillery fire and, in one instance, strafingagainst the "rebel" forces, who apparently haveumber of industrial plants, apartment buildings and public buildings within the city of Budapest. No accurate reports of over-all casualties have been announced, but eyewitness reports appearing in the pressigh casualty rate.
Throughout the day, Kadiohad been under
siege for several hours in theappeals from
party and government leaders, regional party organizations,
workers and front groups calling for an end to the "senseless
bloodshed.' Broadcasts implied that when the fighting ended
the new government wouldrogram of democratization
and equality with the USSR, and prosised that the Soviet troops
who "are risking their lives to protect" the peaceful citizens
of Budapest would return to their garrisons after order is
The Moscow broadcast5 ^Budapesthich claimed liquidation of the attackers, branded the Budapest riotingcounterrevolutionary rovolt" of "Fascist thugs" whothe "forces of foreign reaction." This Moscow commentary, the first Soviet reaction since the fighting began, also alleged that the outbreak "obviously had beeD in preparation for some time."
The fighting ingreatest challenge toauthority yet lo emerge in Instern Europe--may cause the Soviet leaders to returnougher policy in tho Satellites
ct INTELLIGENCET^ fpf FjuyjT-3
generally, and night cause them to reassess ln particular their apparent decision to accommodate Gomulka io Poland. The Soviet decision not to intervene in Poland was presumably based ia parteneral reluctance to compromise so drastically and openly their de-Stallolzatlon campalga and "peaceful coexistence' line. This reluctance may already have been diminished by the necessity for direct Intervention in Hungary. Although threats to tbe Coearunist regime in Poland, aa distinct froa threats to 6oviet cootrol/appear considerably less poteot than those ln Hungary, aoscow^may now revlev Its estimate of the ability of Gomulka and other Satellite 'leaders to maintain order.
The situation ln Hungary outside of Budapest is not yet clear, but there
Original document.
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