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In lutira Europe continue "outstrip Bovlet policy, andwithdrawalroops from Hungary, Euwanta andtoo little too late.
Sorlat leaders desperately trying regain Influence.
to avoid coarproailslafij self-initiated "liberalisation" progxaa.
may haveonly way to stop snowballing throatin Santera Europe.
both action and appearance Soviet laadara confused and In rush char. In recent conversation, hlaatad Polish and Hungarian
difflenities oa their excessive rata of industrialisation, claletlng USSB had warned then on this.
told Bohlan onat Soviets co-aid have "crushedflies" bat had shown grsat raatraint. ConversationSoviets seriously considered force la Poland.
told Boh1en that Hungary illustrated whatgroup" could do, that aaases rarely took anytheir own.
III. Atearing of Soviet leadera haa read like fever chart.
October, tbey subdued and quiet at reception. and depressed; Khrushchev lacked usualand especially kfolotov more at ease.
ctober, they appeared considerably betterthey bad reached presidium docislon on Hungary,
C. Onctober, BOiruebcbev, Bale*Bla, Holotov and Kagonovlca aotloo*bIt noreconnected with Soviet troop* withdrawal froa Budapest. XV. These eurface eignerain appeared only recently, but aerica
unsuccessful atop-gap actions alae* itmir have refleoted inoreneinn; desperation and weakneeB,
Oct Soviet declaration on relationsalmost to capitulation.
Soviet leaders did not intend It to be capitulationby
groat enphaala placed oa Warsaw pact aa neoeasary to protect Ceaouanlat system.
Pointed ami salon of laat Germany froa Hat of countries where continued presence of Soviet troops subject to negotiation.
Oct declaration unlikely to loflaenoe course ofamong both Coetatunieta and nontenants lata ln Poland
1. Kagy, for example, has now called for withdraws! froan Warsaw Pact.
V. Soviet leadership thua faced, at best, with glust prospect of Pollen and Uangarlanlikely to be comunicated to increasingly reatlve Eaat Germany, aa veil aa other Satellitea.
ugly picture pats considerable strain on Sov
onct saw no obvious sign of dissension.
C.;. However, additional set back far sovietexample, possibility of setback In Bearbo final straw. TI* Khrushchev snd Bulgaaln sore subject to criticism than stolotov, who opposed Bastsrs European policy, or Kaganovlch.
n Party Presidios sight via supportleadership wanting aaintaln firm control border areas.
But Zbukov, Inct talk with Bohlea, stuck to party line, indulging: is mixture untruths, hall' truths, soae elements fact on Hungarian situation.
Ahukov also attempted assume "soldier "s" attitude la defense Soviet troops In Hungary. Stated he not politicianj function of Army was to oarry out orders.
elentents of support for opposition.
la port ant members economic bureaucracy who base future bloc development on oloser integration Soviet and Satellite economies.
Stalinist elements.
depends on whether flrst-strlag(withIn Central Committee and among provincial partyandunited.
Original document.
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