/A'Soviet decision to go along with Gomulka'a Polish Nationalist
Communist state may be reassessed In Moscow because of events in
ny firmer judgment on this subject must await tha conference
which Is likely to take place shortly In Moscow between Polish and Soviet
Communist leaders. Goraulka may be committed to attend this meeting an
because of bd* apparent promise given that he. would do so if Soviet inilitary forces In Poland returned to their normal stations. Soviet troops did not reachaMs Warsaw.
military Intervention tn Budapest may have been duo to Moscow's
unwillingness toecond humiliation. On the other band It may
have been due to the fact that the Polish revolt neverlear cut
comlnant anti-Communist character although it was clearly against Soviet
in
domination of Polish national life. On the other hand/the Hungarian revolt the rebels were clearly both anti-Communist and anti-Russian and wore unwilling to settleomulka type government represented by Prime Minister Nagy.
Hungarian regime may demonstrate the Inability ol moderateregimes to retain control and this may affoct the situationin Warsaw. Tho circumstances of Soviet military intervention
in Budapest are not yet clear. rightened Prime Ministerew hours, Nagy, called for Soviet help and then when he saw the^pnsequences
. .CHA.-iGC IN CLASS
endeavored to appease the rebolsoffering amnealty against lha retirement of Soviet force* (and one report aald from Hungary). It is evident that the revolt in Budapest tookar more dangerous character than the similar demonstration In Warsaw and the moat serious challenge to Soviet controlatellite country that it baa yet faced. efection entirely different type of situation).
1
Whether the Tito type of national Communism will prove viable in either Poland or Hungaryay station towards greater freedom even If the Russians encourage or support it but without dominating it, is uncertain. Tito who welcomed the events in Poland haa been silent about developments In Hungary and may well view them with real alarm. In my opinion the peoples of neither Poland, Hungary, nor Yugoslavia would in free electionsommunist regime. Neither Hungary noruatk could quickly disengage themselves economically from the Soviet bloc without substantial Western assistance. There would not be, however, any insuperable difficult lea for substituting Western for Eastern sourcea of supply and markets. aabem
China;
There Is some evidence that China has welcomed the developments in Poland. It* position regarding Hungary Is not yet diaclosed but this should be followed closely to see whetherxmythey may not have the first serious rift between China and tho USSE.
Effect on .Soviet Leadcrahip.
For the immediate future in order not to highlight the crisis Soviet leaders will probably strugglo to give an outward impression ofurn now would be an admiaslon of serioue instability and doctrinal bankruptcy. However, Soviet leadership is on the defensive and Khrushchev
la probably hold primarily responsible by his more hard-boiled colleagues
and his policies are probablyxka being subjected to critical review. His
Zhukov might have the decisive voice in the choice of .
days may be numbered. He Is quoted
by the press as having stated that he was against any armed Intervention In
any conflict ol* any sort. "We prefer peace to war throughout the world
and that goes for me personally, too." on't ever want to face the enemy
again, not even victoriously alongside allies, since that would Involve
t
terrible human losses."
Original document.
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