THE SOVIET ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM, NIE 11-2-57

Created: 5/7/1957

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ft f-

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iifiiiinii _

lilSTTUDUTlON: White House National Seeuritv Coanell rvparrmeni ofepartment of male Operations CooTdlnallnc Hoard Aiomie Energyrtdcral Bureau Of

s

national intelligence estimate joint atomic energy intelligence committee

THE SOVIET ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM

7

This estimate supersedesndo,

This estimate was prepared and agreed upon by the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, with footnotes by the Navy member, which is composed of representatives of tlie Departments of Stale. Afniy. Navy. Air Force, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Joint Staff and the Central Intelligence Agency. The FBI abstained, the subject being outside of its jurisdiction

A group of expert consultants working with the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee have reviewed this estimate and generally concur wilh it. The estimate, with footnotes, was approved by the Inlelligencc Advisory Committee

table of contents

Page

THE

SUMMARY AND

I.

II. HISTORY AND

TECHNICAL CAPABILITIES IN

REACTOR

V SOVIET NUCLEAR POWER REACTOR PROGRAM

VI. PRODUCTION OF FISSIONABLE MATERIALS

Uranium

Economic Factors Affecting the Soviet Nuclear Program

Production

Plutonium Equivalent

VII SOVIET NUCLEAR

Nuclear

Current

Future

VIII. NUCLEAR

IX INTERNATIONAL

TABLE OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Page

FiEure I Atomic Energy Activities . . . lollotvs iv

Figure IV

'i'?blc I Program

Table II Significant Soviet Research and Prototype Reactors

Table III Estimated Time Schedule of Soviet Nuclear Power

Table IV Uranium Ore Production in Terms of Metric Tons

Recoverable

Tabic V Metallic Uranium Slug

Table VI Heavy-Water

Table VII Estimated Soviet Production of . .

Tabic VIII Eilimnted Usey the Soviet Power Program

Tabic IX Plutonium Equivalent ProductionM7

Table X Estimated production of Plutonium by the Soviel

Power

Table XI Estimate of Total Plutonium Equivalent Production

Table XII Estimated Fissionable Materials Available for Weapons

Table XIII Evaluation of Soviet Nuclear

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

THE SOVIET ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the current status and future course of the Soviet atomic energy program ton the basis of information available from all sources.

This estimate does not take into consideration the impact that any form of nuclear test moratorium or limitation on nuclear weapons production would have on the Soviei atomic energy program.

- rniKliiitir*f th- nrero.;r. PailVnltar:Uv uon*th> allm aUon of nnrkar miitrrlnh to tarl.ni. militaryminVr |irr)nrathHi

THE SOVIET ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Trend Of The Soviet Atomic Energy Program. There is substantial evidence that the USSR is continuing to expand steadily both its military atomic energy activities and its program for the non-military uses of atomic energy. (Seeor geographical locations 1

A total of sixteen nuclear tests have been detected sincefour thermonuclear tests with yields between one-halfamiegatons, This Is in contrastolal of nineteen tests detected during the.1

BTTortS are being made by the USSR to mcrexse its uranium ore and uranium metal supply which is already capable ofery substantial atomiceffort Although we estimate aSoviet program fur the expansion uf fissionable material production, the availability of such matcrinls willthroughout the period of thistoimiting factor inthe size of many military and noil-military programs.)

ubstantial nuclear power program is still envlsoncd by the USSR, its initially announced goals have apparently been reduced during recent months toward more realistic objectives.

. IMS* fn* "h- iroltmn nf thr iMrflor of Naval lntc!lli;?nc.

In general, non-military applications arc being fosteredrond base both within the USSR and in Intel national programs lhat reach all countries within the Sov'el Bloc and that endeavor lowilh the West in the courtship of all significant nculral powers.a)

Tlte USSRroad scientific base in the nuclear sciences and is competent to continue making important progress not only in areas of fundamental re-searcn. but also in improving nuclear weapons and integrated weapon systems. In experimental nuclear physics, Soviet capability, now estimated to be second only to that of llv US. will continue to Improve.>

We estimate the Soviet atomicprogram will continue lo enjoy Ihe very' high priority that has been accorded lo it in theRaw Materials We estimateetric Ions of uranium (In terms of recoverable metal) were mined6 in the USSR and its satellites, of whichetric ions were obtained in East Ocr-many. This tolal quantity is more lhan adequate In support current flssHUiahle matcrinls output ns calculated in this estimate Substantial uranium oreexisl wilhin the Soviet Bloc and particularly the USSR, and Ihc

lion uf these resources, as well as of oilier raw materials essential to atomic energy activities, is being steadily expanded. (Par.

C. Plutonium. In tho pasl our estimates of the production of plulo-nmm have been based on Ihe T

(Pat

of cumulative and annual piuionium pro-it ort ion are givenf"

T

rrcr

Soviets appear to have been accumulating raw materials in quantities loo great to be accounted fortable annual pluto-nium production rate, even when theof ananro-gram andeasonable reserve program are considered There is also directwhich suggests continuedof Soviet produc'ion reactor capacity The Soviets hnve. moreover, employed Plutonium liberally in their weapon tests. In Ihe light of this evidence, wen ate lhat the Soviets have prolKibly

I Par.nd Table

XTTTi

ur estimate of probable current and future Soviet pliilonium production is based upon estimated Soviet uranium ore procurement, assumed stockpiling practices, estimated heavy-waler protllK-lion, estimated site construction lime schedules, deduct ions ami axsumpOmw on 8oviet ptndiwiifin reactor designs, and

I Starling ine assume lhai all new pluloninm production rapacity will rum-heam. Our present and futui'- rsiimatex

D.roduction. Our csli-males of Soviet productionas shown in Figurerior tore

The Dinner'il Naval int'llla-nreml MA-mr In the neuter contained herein furt" do.'* not Ih-llevi* th-il mnrr Ulan Win kitttKMiS lie doe- not believe Hint inteiUeenre available a* tn barrier impruvmteiiu.nl rkruvity. andi.ianv ju-llfj tn- irw-rej^-el praataetlm(orlht*tU za an- me Untied, ii .'iimulatlvi-pH- hy mhl-I'M willHMi kit. near IfifliMI kc by nild-IWII and war MM k<alue, are eminentIheS In the >rapnnocrwa and inmitli the-titii.ii.-j

However, tl new"Ti*"dticlioirin-Milulnl wlikh nmlri be ellrrtive liynuanlltle. rmiltl lie radicallyaflrr lhai dale.

TlieNatale1*4

he4 irfuf-ni-iniISM I

IS.

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ii|toiiliiinhiht. hy mirapuhiiloti. IttiuHnil Ufa* kr. Uinairli I'm-,

l Naval Itil-lllt-nv-prtidueed in the sovietimri'r-artnr prm-rum mWUIt bpI ml In tint pn.yr.iiii,n mill"or theirlllii

i Ift |ram aiad wilh avn

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based on quantities of barrier procured2 for their gaseous diffusion plants, as well as information fromGerman scientists on barriermethods and barrier quality, and allows for mo-erate Soviet improvement in plant design and compressor efficiency as indicated by these sources. Thisof increased Soviet capability has been cxlraiulatcd into theeriod as an assumed gradualin the efficiency in utilization of electric power. The productionromoas beenby applying estimated plantin terms of utilization of electric power to the average electric powerto be available fori

E. Nuclear Weaponsith the first Soviet nuclear test conducted inotal ofests have been detected in which plulonium,nd in one instanceave been used as Ihc fissionable materials. There is evidence that Ihe USSR ison-ceiled effort toariety ofnuclear weapons, particularly those employing thermonuclearTest activities6 extendede entire ycai. from 2untilecember, and included nine detonations.carried out;ossibleof Iho data is that Ihe high-yield weapons detonated at Ihe Semipulatinsk proving ground were deliberately reduced yield versions of more powerful andweapons.1

t is significant lhat: f

JTbT

There nas been evidence during tnepaslonths of development and testing of nuclear warheads in guided missiles.)

|In general.

we anticipate that the USSR will beof producing improved nuclear weapons of ihc range of yields andrequired to support its mill-tary requirements.

/In addition, seven tests have

been conducted during the first four monthsltogether, fivetests wilh yields of from one-half up to about ihree megatons have been

1

F. Nuclear Electric Power Program.he Soviets are engaged in areactor development program which will permit Ihem to keep generally abreast of world progress in this field They have had one small prototype power reactorapacity or five electrical megawatts iBMW I. in operation sincehich although inefficient, has permitted useful experimental studies in power reactor operation. 1

2 Recent information indicates the USSR has revised the time scale andits ambitious nuclear power goalegawattsegawatts of electrical power under its Sixth Five-YearSee Tablehis reduced plan Is still quite substantial, but is withinigh priority effort. The USSR emphasizes that this program is oriented toward making future nuclear puwer economically competitive withpower costs The Soviets state lhat nine Of the plulonium produced could ronceivnbly be recycled In ihciibut wc estimate that thiswill be allocated by the USSR to weapons stockpiles' Beginninghe nuclear power program will consume significant quantities. However, we do not believe this loss of fissionable material to the Soviet weapons program will exceeder cent of thevailable to Ihe USSR at

c*tilftV*Cftf IntrllMrtirr any lime during the period (Sec Figure IV)a>

G. Nuclear Propuhum Capabilities. I. We believeuclear propulsion reactor suitable for naval and maiineis currently underWe estimateuclear propulsion reactorurface shipwill be installed In8 and that the ship will undergolesls in8 oruclear propulsion reactorubmarine could be availablend <c> that by the time these shinsational tests, the Soviets could undertakeariety of surface ships and )

2 Thrrc is no evidence uf Sovietdireclly identified to nuclearfor aircraft or guided missiles.frequent references to tne feasibility of aircraft nuclear propulsion have been made during the past year, both in news-paperi and magazines and statements by some of the highest officials in the USSR We estimate lhal: (a) the Soviet aircraft nuclear propulsion "cactor program isw engaged In development and testing of reactor components and sub-systems; and.eactor system suitable for nuclca- propulsion ofaircraft could probably be available to the Sovietso live USSR lias, alenndiirlrtl basic research oncomponentsissilereactor system. )

H Iniernalional Activities. The USSR has continued its role as an activein international atomic energy activities including scientificand the negotiations lo establish an International Atomic Energy'Agency. The Joint Nuclear Research Institute.al Oubna near Moscow, was created6 to serve as the focal point of Sino-Soviet Bloc technical cooperation.for furnishing swimming pool type research reactors, particleradioisotopes and technical training of personnel to Bloc countries are continuing and delivery of Ihe actual reactors is scheduled7 Inplans have been announced (orofreactors with Soviet assistance mi Czechoslovakia, EastHungary and Rumania. Aid agreements have been reached with Yugoslavia and Egypt, similar to those with Bloc countries, although difficulties have arisen in implementation of the Yugoslavian agreement. Wc estimate thai the USSR will continue lo make oners of technical aid as well as assistance in the consiruction of power stations both within the Bloc and possibly lo non-Bloc countries, and lhat the USSR has the capability of fulfilling suchThe Soviets allege that they will Impose no restriction on the use orof nuclear materials in their aid program.

DISCUSSION

INTRODUCTION

the exact exien'. of Soviet capability In the atomic field remains uncertain, ihcnature and some of ihc detail* of the Soviet atomicop ram can he uuroed with fair reliability. Available evidencethe existence in the USSR of:igh priority, extensive atomic energyprimarily directed toward military application, which Ls continuing to expand;

ibl an ample uranium ore babV nn which In carry out ihis program;ubstantial

nt tariotnbicroven

capability for the establishment nf nuclear-electric power stations:apability,fur believed to lie unrealized, or utilizing nuclear |MWer lor propulsive'l anil it proven capability of producing explosion* In yield raneesew kilntons up lo several megnton* ami of employing both fis'ion and fusion principles

aOriM lhai Kmirl niill-lary planning include* the employment otweapon* for offensiven support of ground aad naval operations, ond possibly air defense Al least twice since IHM llierc has been military participation in Ihc Soviet nuck-ar weapon* lesl proginmof both weapons effects tests and military maneuver*

3 Our knowledge af the status ol llvtomic energy program as of Ihe end8 It derivedonsiderable volume ofEvidence received since our Inst esn-male on llie Soviet atomic energy prognon

(NIEftcon-

rerns llie mining ol uranium oie, lla Imnsfnr-ination Inlo uranium ntetul. lite pimlucllnn of Plutonium, research on reactors nnd laOtOpO separation methods. Ihe firstnseou* diffusion ui*nlinn-2Sa sepamlion plain,power available in gammix dllTuidnfi

esling olomItraining and indoclnnnimn in atomic warfare.

mm*

MISTOCr AND ORGANIZATION

he Soviet atomic energy program siartcd In0 with the formationom-mtssion on the Uranium Problem attached to the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences. USSR Members of this commission wcio rrprfsenlaMvcs from various laboraloim ex-peeled lo be major contributors on theBeginning inhe Ninth Directorate of ihc People's Comniirsanat of Internal Affairs (NKVDi was organi'ml to make concurrently preliminary studies in nuclear phvstc* with special attention to atomic energyH it became responsible for uranium mining in the USSR. and. br-gin-ning Ins. reciuitcd moreerman ami Austriano work in the USSR on atomie energy problems at several laboratories subsequently built for this

Inirst Chief Directorate was created and atutclied to the Council of Ministers, and was given the responsibility for ihe expansion of the entire Soviel atomicprogram. I. P. Benya was themember Of the Council of Minister* and thus exercised over-all direction of policy and drew Into the program the best talent and kndcnhip of the nation Theseor the most part, retained their old positions along with their newyin the programta miiny diverse organizations such as Iheiy oflairs, the Ministry of the Chemical Industry ond manywir-ance of the high priority necessary tn Impie-menl the program won attained. Between ItM and IBM thefatfi Directorate iradnallv took over the responsibilities of llio Ninth Directorate ot Ihe NKVD until in earlythe Ninth Dirreloratr relinquished Iho Inst of Its functions, control oferman scientists, and wns dissolved

he growth of 'he Soviel alnmir onrrgv cfTnrl necrssiliiled lis inni'ir renrganlzfiUim Int Inkecond Chieforatc was formed and also Ml ached In Ihe Council of Ministers. The First Chief Dim;-Imnlc relinquished lo the Serrmrt Chief Dine.

locale control of mining, lo include the development of new uranium de|msils, Ihe concentration and refining of uranium both insKle and outside o< the USSR. This freed tin Firxt Chid Directorate to concentrate on Ihe production of fissionable materials and the manufacture of weapons Supply, per-son nol and olher services common to both directorates were apparently placedody serving both directorates, thus another chid dirrvtorale was possibly foimed

his oiginilwiilonnl slriielurctrciHly continued until Ihe arrest of Benya in3 At that time, the Ministry of Medium Machine Building was organized with V. A. Malyshev as the minister and this newgradually look over the functions of the Chief Direcloiatrs. except for Satellite mining ojx-ratlons. This latter activity was made subordinate to Ihr Chief Dirrelnraur of Soviet Property Abroad, Ministry ol Foreign Trade, and It is probably still under the Ministry of Foreign Trade for administration but is clearly subordinate lo the Ministry n' Medium Machine Building for operational mailers Late3 Malyshev waseputy Cli.liini.in nf thr Council of Ministers.in February IMS. Colonel General A. P.xomincnl and leading figure in the program from its beginning. WM nn-lioinletl Minister of Medium Machine Building and elevated to the |osltion of Deputv Chair-mail nf the Cnuneil nf Minislrrse replaced Malyshev ns ovrr-nll policy director and manager nfcrations nf the enlirr Sovirl atomic rnergy program. InIDAS. Zavenyngin died and Illsnppnlnicdservukhin. who has been assnriaied with Ihe atomic energy program since Itsand was most recently the Chairman nltatr i,ommission for Short Term Planning.

A In April iVai. TASS announced the foimn-linnew alnnili- energy rmmlinnMng Imdy, Ihr Main Admltii.slriil.loii lor Dip Use of Atomlr Energy attached tn Ihc Council of Mlil-bttrm, Wfrlm P. Slnvskiy is head nf this new Administration Tho Main Administration

TS ti72nn

KM*

created to fulliii several functions; locoopentlon between tne USSR and olher countries In the non-tnititary uses ol alomic energy: lo make extensive use ot atomicin tlie national economy in cooperation with the industrial ministries and to resolve problems connected withplieation: to design reactors for power stations and toatom powered engines for use Into build and operate exiierimenlal reactors: to coordinate research in nuclear technology,he production and use of radioisotopes and the effect of radiation on inelals: to supply laboratories wiihequipment such as counters, reactors, and acccleialors. The Main Administration is also responsible for the publication ofnnd technical works on utilisation of atomic energy and for holding exhibits on peaceful uses of atomic energy bolh in the Soviet Union and in oilier countries

] tears, then, lhai therelear-cut division of responsibilities bclwcen theof Medium Machine Building and the Main Administration lor Use of Alomic Energy. (See Table II The Minisliy continues with its former function* for all production aaprcts of the atom it energy program, while the Main Administration supervises the application of peaceful uses of atomic energy within the USSR and the cooperation of Ihe the USSR with other countries in these mailers. The Academy of Sciences is apparently used loand conduct supporting research for bolh Ihe Minisliy' of Medium Machine Building add Ihe Main Administration.

OVIET TECHNICAL CAPABILITIES INENERGY

Science ami technology contimM' io beencouraged by the Sonetand emphasized in thco educational system. Scientistsrivileged group held in high esteem Soviet research jiersonnel arc eoneertrated in support of heavy industry and military development fields

Soviet manpower and capability In basic scientific fields necessary for support of anuclear energy piogram areanil competent. Wlthm the nudcai energy field wcroad scientific base which Is competent to continue to make Im-portant progress not only in fundamental fieldsapability for developing belter nuclear weapons and applications lo inlc-gratcd wcaiions systems.

uelcore estimate the present capability uf the USSR in experimentalphysics to be second only lo that of the US. The construction of high-energy particle accelerators such as) million electron-volt (MF.Vi synchrocyclotron andlectron-volt iBEVi proton synchroton have been the mosl impressive Soviet bccoti-Dlishmenls in nuclear physics. However, these accelerators are merely impressive in sire since they are essentially scatcd-upof US accelerators. ResearchEV machine has been competent but uninspired. Construction of IheEV machine was completed In liiSfi. and It Iwcnme operational in.

IS Duringhe Soviels revealed .several highly original ideas for particle oeeeieratnr designs which have not been Jnrotporalcd inim- accelerators. Some tit these may have stemmed directly from Soviet rr-scarch effort on ennlrolled thermoniH-lrarl appear* that tliere i* rffective exchange nl ideas between the accelerator and thermn-iiuclear groups.

H Cnnlriitlcil Tlicriii'iiiiiclcnr Itctrtmh Sir* vict research In Ihe application nf cmtrrillrd thermonuclear react Inn* for tlie prnttiiclion of power WW first revealed In July 1PM al the

Conference of Ihe Academy ol Sciences on Peaceful Uses ol Atomic Energy. Subsequent reports describing parts of the Soviet effort reveal that Ihc USSR has ihe technicalrequired to support an effectivepiogram In this field. Tliework is quite creditable and indicates an appreciable effort and manpowerThe Soviets have staled lhat while thcy have not attained usable energy fromthermonuclear reactions, this research Is continuing Wc estimate that ihe USSR will not produce usable power fromprocesses Tor many years.

IS. IntlrumcnlaUoti. The USSR isdeveloping nnd producing theirquired lo supjiort their nuclear energy program instrument* viewed alconferences and Irade fairs,mostly auxiliaryppear to be well designed and gave evidence ofworkmanship Several Satellite nations are producing various instruments to Soviet specifications that are being delivered to Ihc USSR in quantity for use in nuclear energy and other programs.

If. Tlie capabilities of Soviet nuclearfor developing integratedequipment for nuclear research areadequate for support of the Soviet nuclear energy program. It appears that the USSR lags the US somewhat in Iheof such equipment as nuclear resonators, neutron timc-of-fllght spectrometers, eoinci-denre counters and scintillation counters. However, the Soviets have developed anplintomulliplicr tube, which is aneomimnrut for. scintillation counters. Also, the Soviet mass spectrometer,nrs to have good versatility nml toodern, well engineered instrument.

nmuHtcK. The USSR hasonsiderable technical competence for the development ol high-speed digital computers Such computer* play an important mle In the .solution nf many problem* in nuclear physic* and the design of nuclear weapons. Tlie RESMomputers, designed andby tho Soviet Academy nf Sciences.

were pu( into opiii.twn inand wen com-parabl" lo tne best computers available in the US at mat lime. The Soviets ate currentlyom|>utet which will have anspeed almost as fast as Ihe US IBM IM. one ol the best in theparrnllv. Ihe BESM andere ihe only high-speed computers in Ihe USSR3 Two other computers, the STItELA and the URAL,by the Ministry of Instrument niiihling and Means of Automation were schcdr'cil lo go Into serial production5 However, as of PUd-IW the Soviets had iirofluecd less than ten STRELA* and still had notRAL computer promised to India In- the end5

eakness in the Sonet computeris found in Its extent rather lhan in II* quality. We believe thnt the Soviet failure In produce large numliers of high-speed digital computers is probably due lo the Academy ol Sciences not making it* experience indevelopment and constructionavailable to the industrial minislrv responsible for mas* production of theseThe developmentew Soviei computer which resembles the US IBMis the first evidence of adequate collalioralion between the Academy of Sciences and theof Instrument Building and Means nt Automation While the Soviets will probably produce enough STRELA and URAL com-(inters to satisfy their immediatearge scale production of high-speed computers probably will noi be undertakentandardized model ol the new computet I* available.

hcmiftru. The Soviet* have revealed through papers presented nt International conferences and open literatureigh degree nf technical compelcnec Infields of chemistry. The onlydirectly related tn their atomic energy program, revealed in the West,een in the uses and applications ofls nn tracers in rlMllraland control meehanLsnw The fouda. mental MnectK of |sotn|ie separations andconcentration tor the Soviet nuclear program have been notably omitted fromand discuss ions Soviei research in nuclear chemistry will keep up with world piogicss and has tin capability to adequately support the Soviet nuclear weapons program

Tlie USSR lias placed added emphasis on metals In its Sixth Five-Year Plan In particular, production of lithium, beryllium, zirconium, nickel, and other metal* essential lo the atomic energy program Is to be increased many fold. Special effort* are to lie made lo Increase the purity ol mrlal*useful nuclear properties Basicfor this phase of Ihe program has already been initiated and papers have been published on the application of the iodide method for producing extremely pureand 7iicontuni. Mention Is also made of Ihe sepatallnn of hafnium from zirconium and other methods fnr separation ofThis work strongly suggests suitability of these metals to nuclear applications. The continued interest of tlie Soviet Union in molten salts systems containing such elementslithium, beryllium and thorium furthera broad base of researchibilllv for reactor pur-wc*

Soviet fundamental metallurgicalscientists display outstanding ability and have produced some original concepts during the last year. We estimate that the Soviet capabilities In metallurgical research will continue to support adequately Ihe Soviet alomic energy program

nd Biaiurja. Soviet research activity in the bio-medical sciences increasedigh pilch. This work I* largely radiobiological in substance but could provide improved therapy for mass atomic casualties as well as health physics criteria for peaceful utilization of nuclear energy.

n>-mcdiral research concerned withnergyof ihcarge-scnrr enlargement andThis isUw recentnee of I'lurnal* dealing almostbio-mi'dn*al tis|jeclx of nuclearthe scheduled eailv completion nf several

X00

major research centers. This research has become an integral part of the Five-Year Plan*e Academy of Sciences.

hift in research emphasis has beenin tlie health physics field by some excellent work on toxicology ofith the nuclear energy program and biological effects of ionizing radiations and radioactive aerosols. We estimate that the Soviets will keen pace wiih world progress In such fields as prophylaxis, therapy of radio-tlon syndrome, and biochemical,immunological and systemic effects

oviet health physics standards discussed at Ihe Geneva Conference and staled indoctrine aie more restrictive than those of the Wesicrn World. Cases arc known in which these were not rigorously adhered in

IV. SOVIET REACTOR DEVEIOPMENT

nc'ear Realtor Technoloaii. The USSRomprehensive reactor program and has demonstrated excellent capabilities in reactor technology Scientific intelligence techniquesthai Ine Soviets have opera led reactors for plutonium production8 The first Soviet full-scale productionpimrrnlly clcvelopei directlyrude, low-powerctor experiment

oviet research on reactors liasboth well known types and some of original design. This program includes .studies on nuclear fuels, moderators, coolants, fuel elements and structural materials Soviet physicists and engineers connedcd with their research reactor programigh degree nf technical competence. Tliey have demonstrated thai 'hey do noi necessarily follow Wesicrn practices and are comiietent to take independent approaches, as illustrated by the original design of the fuel clement* foi tlie existing Atomic Power Station reactor Published Soviet research on advancedsuch as liquid metals and molten salts, as well at research onmaterials reveals the existence of nn adequate es|-eriment.il base for develo-imenl of advanced nuclear rearlnr*.

The experience gained by the Soviet* from production reactors, research reactors, and their extensive experimental prr.gramotential in advanced rcaetor technology adequate for continued support of Ihepower reactor developmenl program which is pari or Ihe Soviet Sixth Five-Year Plan

SucUar Reactor Development Htitoru. Evidence indicates lhai Ihe design andof Ihe Reactor Physical-Technicalarked the advent of the Soviet developmental power program. 'SeeTabichis reactor, completedave Ihc Soviets the capability of testing, under actual reactor conditions, proposed fuel elements, cooling systems, and structural materials necessary for ihe development of new reactors In oddlilon. ihc Reactor Physical-Technical arled as the prototyjic for Iherawer reactor (criticalhich has provided Ihe Soviets with experience in nu-clear power plant operation. Tlie Soviets have slated lhai they areMW graphile-rnodrtatcd. water-eoolcd jiowcr reactor which mill be an expandedofMW power reactor.

eactor with ordinary water as ihcwas first designed in tOSl and con-structed several years later. This first M0 kilowatt swimming pool typo reactor logetherilowatt version completed inm has provided the Soviets with facilities to determine valuable data required for the development of the large pressurized water reactor. This type of reactor Is alsoor the testing of new shieldingand configurations

ollowing llie plutoniumlie Sovietsilowatt pluumlum fast reactor, critical in IBM. which is cooled with mercurylow-all version Is scheduled for operation7 and will provide operational experience with sodium cooling. These re-

KatW l

llie ebiHie.il ymrr. All oilier power units MM

llierrrwl o* he.it nmavr

actors will provide ihc facilities lo obtain tlalii necessary lor the developmentast plu-<on:um breeder tractor. The Soviets havethai two power reactor pilot plains will utilize sodium as the coolant. One willlulonium fast breeder and the other will be sodium-cooled and graph lie moderated

ilowatt heavy-water researchplaced in ojieration in HUH, iniihletl ihe Soviets to obtain ex'icricncr necessary lor Hie const ruction of heavy-water moderated pro-duc'ion type reactors. Tins research reactor appears to have been modified sometimeM to permit the Soviets lo conduct feasibility studies on gas cooling of heavy-water moderated reactors The heavy-water reactor has been modified lo operateigher power of) kilowatts, ami this reactor will undoubtedly be used in the detrloomcnt of any gas-cooled, heavy-water moderated power reactor and in thethorium breeder. The homogeneous thorium reactor willeavy-water slurry of uiamum oxide as the fuel

easibility studies on boiling-waterand measurements of llu- thermalof gaseous films in boiling water wen- conductedins research was augmented by informal ion obtained by tlie USSR at5 Ocneva Conference inpl>icalions of Atomic Energy, and provided background necessary to theot the proposed bo!iiiig-wnlci rcaclor.

M Tbe bciylhum and beryllium oxidereactor which wentugust IBM has undoubtedly enabled the Soviets lo determine the feasibility ofisin future reactorWhilehave no knowledge of Soviet plans lo use this moderator,ossible Dial they may decide to use beryllium and beryllium oxide in future -power and propulsion reactors due lo the high temperature characteristics of this material, if they canolution to Ihe theimo-meehanical problems involved

n

17

SOVIET NUCIEAR POWER REACTOR

ho nuclear power piogram of Ihe Sixlh Five-Year Plan adopted6e-aelor generating capacitylectrical megawatts (emw)nlivndurther intormalic^otal0 EMW was bring considered as the goal over ihe next twenty-five years. This program. If achieved, wouldajor impact on future fissionable ma terfat stockpiles bothonsumerndroducer of jilulonium During the8hese stations will provide experience In nuclearmass production of luel elements, and fuel processing. This plan, as repeatedly stated by high ranking Soviet scientificwas to construct seven different types of experimentalctors in the. Three of these reactor types were to be Incorporated in four, or possibly five, power stations Alt were lo be full-scale pro-totypes Four experimental reactorsmall capacity, which have been described and scheduled for construction, will round oul the Soviet reactor development program.

e believe lhat this original program, calling forMW' ofpower capacitys very ambitious and probably could not be achieved during this time (icriod evenery high priority effort It callsarge capitalonrrrtetl construction program, andsolutionumber of difficultengineering problems

Thereood indication thai the USSK now fully realizes Ihe difficulties Involved in carrying out llie original program and plans in reduce0 goalMWMW. This reduced Soviei Five-Year Plan Tor nuclear power still is substantial, bul one which is much more attainable

In connection with the release of infornia-Hon on their reduced program. Iheave stressed that it is oricnled tow-aiduture nuclear power thai Is ccomwn-icnlly competitive with the conventional power costs ill Ihe Urals and European USSRan analysis ofhe chaNtC-teristics ot ihe large-scaleeactors involved indicates ihey ore designed tosignificant amounts ofuantities equal to the amount ofonsumed in the reactors. Tlie Soviets further slate lhai Ihis plutonium could Conceivably be recycled as sulisrquent charges In ihe reactors However, relative, plutonium has nn even greatera weapons program thanowerprogram.we believe this plulonlum will be allocated by the USSR to weapons stockpiles."

he original Soviei plans to* nuclear power include Ihe construction of powernear Moscow. Leningrad. Voronezh, and in ihc Urals There is no firm information as to which specific rrwlnr is tn be installed at any of the locations except Moscow. These jilans included the consiruction of thetype* of power reactors

aMW pressurized water reactor* apparently have been designated for the first station In be placed in operation near Moscow inSec Tablehe *ccd<twc enrichment ccncepl is planned lo be used in ihis type of reactor with the fuel loading con-of aboutilograms> enriched UO andetric tons of naturalt is planned thai these reactors will lie of ihc piessure vessel iyjie and will use xlalnJess sleel clad fuel elements However, whether Ihein the third station (sec Table III) will utilize zirconium cladding or not will depend cn the success Ihc Soviets have in devclO|iing suitable product ion techniques. Wc estimate thai the third station will employ this tyjic of reactor and will becomealional al the end

Ii. The second station willMW graphite-moderated amit:tors which stem directly fromW slat ion at.

Hreor Ihr pom Hon nf thef Niivtd Inlrllli-rnei-

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and Is expected lo operate'r enriched uraniumhermal-io-eleclrical net efficiency or Mir,.

c. Recent evidence indicate*HW heavy-water moderaled gas-cooled type reactor included In the oriental Sixih five-Year Plan has been omiltrd (rum Ihe revised plan. This reactor was to have operated on natural uranium as the fuelhermal-to-ekclrical erheiencyv and would have requiredetric tons of heavy water. II is nol known whether the plans for this reactor have been merely ricli-rml or dropped altogether.

d Four experimental (pilot plant0ach are also included inrevised plan. These reaclois are slQled tu lie of ihclulnnium fastomogeneous thorium-breedera boiling-water reactor,odium-cooled. graphite-moderated reactor. II Is not known whether or not these reactors will be used, as originally planned, toom-ixnitcimental atomic power station.

"

VI. PRODUCliON OF FISSIONABLE MAIE-RIALS

ranium Mining Much quantitativeis available on mining" and ore rn-richment in East Germany Sorne quant ita-tire Informationavailable on Ihe oilier Satellites, notably Chechoslovakia. Rumanu and Bulgaria, but information on the USSR Is limited to knowledge that mining is taking pttCCumber of areas. iSeee estimate thatWI met tie tons of uranium nn terms of recoverable mctali was mines, inin Ihe USSR and its satellites,etric inns of xhich came from East Germany. The total figure is subjectonsiderablesince we have no quantitativeon internal Smlel production for wbtch wc havealue well within their capabilities. The estimated cumulative ore production through IfJjfi is more thanto support the fissionable materialestimates

Future Uranium OlV Prucuraiiciit. ibe US Geological Survey estimates thai Ihe Soviet Bloc lias seveial hundred thousand tout of uranium in medium grade ore deposits and an ev.ii greater quantity in low grade dc-pfisits. Many of these iccrvrs are within ihc :'m jet Union and could be exploited by presenl ore recovery methods If il is assumed that the present estimated rale of expansion ol ore production (see Table IVI is. main turnedeasonable estimate of Soviet Bloc ore production would be as tabulated below. We estimate that ihe actualproduction will nol be lews lhan three-ejarlers of the values shown and orecnuM be considerably higher if desired. This estimate of Soviet Hoc orell adequately support the estimatednf natural uranium through

Other Haw Matcnuls There is evidence thai the Soviet atomic energy program has ex-plotted ores of Ibornim. zirconium, and other elements useful in atomic energy activities

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Although little quantitative information iselieve tliat requirements lor alomic energy purposes would represent onlysmall percentage ot the supplies of these elements available to tho Soviets.

conomic Factors Affecting the Sonet Xuclerr Program. Economic intelligence was studied lo evaluate the characteristics,and growth of the Soviet nuclearFirst, industrial studies were made of -jmp of the basic materials flowing into iheluorspar, nickel powder,cement and steel lo determine iheir availability lo the nuclear program Second. Soviei budget allocations were studied asof the size and growth of ihe nuclear program.

Commodity Estimates. In all of Ihe few cases where an evaluation has bien made the estimated nuclear piodurlion requirements tor particular commodities never exceedsupplies available for this purjiose To Ihc contrary, available supplies or fluorspar and nickel powder sufTicienily exceedproduction requirements as to suggest the possibilityarger Soviei nuclearlhan has been estimated herein

Budget Allocation'. Available Soviet alomic energy budget information does noiefinitive evaluation of ihcnd rate of growth of nuclear activities.an analysis of Ihcndicate lhat the Battel atomic -Ktogram ccukl belarger lhan estimated herein Inreliminary analysis of'poss.blc cumulative nuclear invcslmenlor theubstantially exceeds eslimaled capital costs based on llie phy-leal size of the program indicated bv nil olher intelligence.

mninm Metal Pmdnvltnn. Information obtained from returned German scientists, usrd in conjunction with data on calciumandM-riaimng toranium melal plantsairly reliable estimote of Ihe amount of uranium metal ready for reactor use manufactured each year up through Analysis nfndicates that: (a) ihc fiul metal suitable for reactor use was made at Elcktios-lal in; ibi this plant reached aofetric ions of uranium meta. slugs per month by0 and probablyons per month by the middle of that year; ami io production lines ofons of slugs per month each went into opei ullon at Glazov. west of the Urals, in9 andnd at Nososibirvk. in central SilM-ria. In1 ando information is available on subsequent activities nl these plants or at other possible uranium melal manufacturing facilities in the Soviet Union.

n Ihc absence of pOSt-lflM uranium melal plant information Ihe subsequent production has been estimated on the DOM! of uranium on procurement and an assumed ore reserve program The USSR hastale Reserve Syslem1 in order tolanned reservearge number of essential raw materials and intermediate commodities to serveulwark against either economic or military events Soviet uranium orehas exceeded uranium ore requirement* by an amount which ran be best explained in terms nf Ihe assumptionlate reserve lo unset pegafbk loss of supply. Comparison of the uranium ore estimate with independently derived estimates of uranium usage in Ihe Soviei atomic energy program3 sirongly suggest* lhat0" annual uraniumocuremcnt was kejH atalue as totfce year reserve al allattern whirl) isrepealed in ihc procurement nf other material* fnr the atomic energy program3 uranium metal production lui* therefore been estimated from the uranium ore procurement eslimnlc nn the assumption* thai the three year reserve wa* maintained in the0 |ierkxl and lhai reactor tails were llie sole source of feed fnr uranium Isotopeplains afternlhclablc ixiow. the uranium melal production foruse has hern estimated from plantup tond from liveore estimater.

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Soviets began ihr conversion and installation ol equipment al the Chirchik Nitrogenin Central Asia to provide for theof by-product heavy water for atomic energy uses. Simultaneously. Germany was exploited for bean* water, researchequipment, and research personnel. Aboutonstruction of production facilities to use lite watermclhod was started al five other plants. Construction was also sl&.tcdeventh plant at Alcksin which used the hv-drogen sulphide-water exchange method. Limited production commenced ai Clilrchik in 1M1 and al Alcksin inost of the other plants began producing by imfiy7 work was underwaylant al Norilsk In far north Siberia using the ammonia-water exchange system This plnnt probably did not begin lieavy water production untiloolher heavy water plants have been identified In the Soviet Union Thus, although clghl separate plants arc now believed lo be in operation, wc estimate tltclr annual heavy wnler production to he only aboutetric Ions per year.

lie following cumulative estimate nf heavy water produced in ihe USSK Isto be reasonably accurate upfterbe values civilablyinimum level nl

fiO. Gmp'iKe. The Geneia anil Mosc-vfcrenees un Atomic Energy andreiurncd Orrman scientists have established that at least four Soviet research reactors,their firsl one. used graphiteod-crating or ictlccl Ing material. SUtcmenls byurchatov.an important figure In Soviet reactor envelopment, and information fromGerman scientists indicate clearly lhat the nisi Soviet plulonium production reactor was also graphite modcralcd. The details of the manufacture and procurement of reactor graphite was slill obscure, but it was ap-wr-enlly available as early

umber ol Soviet tests liavc used lithium as thermonuclear fuel. I

/*Several

C< rman scientists worked during IhcV "cool-nig-off" period on the electromagneticoflo|>cs but tbey report lhal tlte project was undertaken at their own voll-llon and excited no Soviet Interest. II isthai the Soviets areoremethod of separating lllhlum isotopesroduction scale. Their interest both in the procurement of lithium ores ami or mercury tn theQ periodhai Ihey may he using the mcrcuiy amalgam me-lmd We have no valid information on which to Imsc an estimate of the amount of ciii'ichcd lllhlum lhal might lie available al any lime, for

weapon use. We believe. However, lhai llie quantity win be sufficient to meet

he estimate of the timetable of initialis well supported by informationprimarily from returned German scientists. These data also permit ngood estimateroduction throughased upon likely barrier availability and gaseous diffusion plantEstimated Soviet productionfters based upon lai estimates of electric power available for uranium isotope separation andestimated operatingof Ihc Soviet uranium isotopeplants.

The first Soviet gaseous diflusion uranium isotope separation plant was built at Verkh-ncivinsk in the Urals in the two years.he springnd came Into full operation during the latter halfumber of details of this planl have been furnished by relumed Germans. II operated al very low pressures and utilized flat piale barrier with high permeability. Thecapacity of this barrier and ihc overall planl efficiency were |ioor. It was evidently designed lo producerams per dayul In aclual operation only turnedaterial. The failure Of this initial plant to achieve ils design goal can be ascribed bothoviet overcstima-lion of Ihe performance of their flat plate barrier and to major corrosion and inleakage problems. This planl was reported to be still operating3 probably producing small quantitiesaterial which could liave been enrichedn the much largerbulli in ihcilod al this site

There Is evidence lhatD on to the present lime there hasrogram In increase the basic efficiency of planl design The corrosion and mleakagc problems which were serious9 were solved adequately by the end Meanwhile planl con-

See reluct-l ihe Direrli* of Niv.ilc*.

struction. with newer designs mcur|iorated. continued al Verkh ncivinsk. and constructionew site north of Tomsk In central Siberia started

romo Ihe end2 the Soviets acquired large quantities of fine nickel wire mesh from East German and Soviei plants for use in the manufactureubular barrier designed by German scientists then resident in the Soviet Union. Procurement of this mesh in East Germany was slopped at the end2 but was resumededuced rale6 Thore is evidence thulcontinued within the USSR and possibly in Poland throughout this period. Other barriers noi requiring mesh were developed, and at least one had successfully passed through the pilot plant stage by ihc endhe information on the quality and quantity of barrier made in Ihe2 period is. however, too limited lo serveasis for estimation.

lthough initial planl expansion at Ver-khneivinsk1 was designed for depletiononcentration in Ihe tailings, evidence from the German scientists indicates thai it was Operated% at leuslurthermore. In view of the fact thai there is an abundance of uranium orelo Ihc USSR, and lhat it is morefrom theof both kilograms or product per MW of electric power Input and total quantity of output to strip tohe latter value has been used inalculations The consistency of all necessary assumptions on plant design with the available evidence was established using basic gaseous diflusion theory. These studies establish not only that Soviet plants aredifferently from US plants, bute Soviets have independently advanced their slate of knowledge in Ihe field of gaseousHowever, the limited knowledge on the rale al which many or the design improve-mcnls invest (gated by the Soviets wereinto the operating plantsa degree of uncertainty in the estimales of planl njieraUng efficiencies.

ur estimate of Ihc Soviet gj.-ouu*program from0 tos based on |

well as on hauler sain U'aii^n

methods and barrier quality paraeturnednd lakes into account the Soviet improvements in plant do-sign reported by returned Germans andincreases in compressor cfllcloiicy. (See Table VIM According lo this estimate, the Verkhneivlnsk Complex producedor the1 weapon test anda production rate of about fourper day by

e estimate that byhe Soviets had achieved an improved and faiily efP.cienl gaseous diffusion process, someimes more efficient than their earliesthis evidence of increased Soviet capability has been extrapolated into theradual improvement in the efllclency of utilization of electric power, These Increase:-in efTieicncv can tie predlrted with someof reliability during then terms of the ap|rticattan of improvement* which the Germans helped developeyondhis extrapolation la an assumption of gradual piogres* achieved through improved barrin and compressor*

onsiderable amount oi mtoimaiion on the generation and distribution of electric pOtr in Ihe Urals area has become avaiLible durinc the pasl year The most important new rsidence Indicates that ihc laVjnrMy of Ihe |Xiwer generaUd al Ihe Nirhnyava Tanptinl i* bring sent southward lenrd Verkhncivmsk. This leave* the fimcMoii ol the large atomic energy site near Nizhnyiiya Tura in doubt and strongly suggests it does not manufactureowever, the estimated eletlric power nvnllable in isotope separation for the current periodan be calculatedair degree of accuracy. Thisfrom the total power available in amis ol probable Soviet gaseousthat |xr*er climated lo be required for oilier induslnes. for ex|iorl lolilics. and for local non-industrial uses.

CO. Ourale of future electric powerlo Isotope separation Isbased on the assumptions that thewill have expanding requirementshioughouteriod and will implement Ihe production programto mert these requirements While these assumption* arc consistent with available laVhe extent of the actual expansion will depend on fuluie Soviet decisions andwhich cannot be accurately predicted, and our estimates must have wide range* of possible error In arriving at theseonsideration was givenariety of factors such as the planned future availability of dec-trie power in regions of known Isolnpe sc|wua-lion plants, ihe difficulties the Soviets arc Having in excluding Iheir economy nl the currently planned rale, and current evidence reflecting, icquircmcnlsor military and nuclear electric power piirposes.

Gl Tlie electric power estimated lo befoi isotope sr]kir.il:oti through Ml wa* arrived ai by carrying forward ihc sameof new generating capacity devoled to gaseous diffusion Isotope sojiaralinn a* mm ullh*cil in Ihc. TlievalueW for the period from mid-inno lo mld-lflfil is consistent wllh the mid|xilnt of the ran-ic of electric powerIn br polenlially available at thai, Ilmr fnr isotope separation near Verkhncivmsk und Tomsk, and In the Iikulsk Oblost Tlie in-dicatid expansion in the succeeding six year*0 MW. for example. I* less lhan Ihe lirtal (inwer to lie available from the new, giant Uralsk Dam. In Ihe Irkutsk ObList. Tills value Implies lhai7 in Ihc region from eastkc llaikal to Ihc western border of ihe Urals gaseous diffusion plants* of the available electricalf Ihe energy from generating cu|-ac|ly installed. However, till* value isf the lata! planned eleeliieal energy developed by the USSR in lhat year

The uncertainly In Ihc cuimilallvoofroduction throughsin Table VII. Is large butdoes notactor ofne half lo twice Ihe staled quantity. However, the estimates of future production could be substantially greater or smaller thansince these figures are bused onof future Soviet capabilities and plans, and some of the latter may not yet havedecided by the Soviets themselves.

equirements of Power Program. The amountequivalent) which the Soviets will sacrifice from their available weapon reserves has been obtained bythe fuel requirements for each planned reactor. The fuel requirement* wereby utilizing the intelligence datapossible supplemented by opcrationa'obtained from known reactors of Ihe same type Soviet statements havean expansionegawatt* by IMS For purposes of calculation, wc have assumed an average expansion of GOO BMW per year for the first six years of the expanded nucleai power1

G3a. In Table VIII. the annual fuelhave been appropriately allotted on the basis of assumed Soviet practice lo provide an Indication of probablen thereactor program. Tlie cumulative estimate ofquivalent presented in Table VIII as expended or tied up In the nuclear power reactorubject to considerable variation depending on soviel plans for different rractor designs, the date each reactor is placed in operation, and the method and schedule of fuel

roductionhere is evidence that construction on the flrxl Soviet produc-

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Suviet production o( heavy water Indicates lhal subsequent hcavy-walcrr. actors musl hove been built, but

reactor started early7 near Kyshtym in the Urals and 'hat it went into operation abouttatements byGerman* and fromurchato* strongly indicates lhat this reactor was similar tn some respects to the early Hanlord models The reactor reportedly was water cooled and graphite moderated, usedetric tons ol uranium, and hadertical tuel channels It probably developedegawatts of heat power initially but may later have been rained to much higher power levels as has been Ihe case In US experience The urgency of the Soviet program during this period is perhaps reflected in the laet thai construction of this reactor wassome six months before Hie USSR's first irsearch reactor falso graphite moderated) went critical in ihe late summer

here is Informationeavy-water moderated reactor went into operation at Kvshtvm sometime toward Ihe end. Construction of this reactor probably began about the same time construction was initiated on the heavy-water research reactor which became operational in9 al the Thermo Technical Laboratory In Moscow

/and Iheetal Mi2 botheactor construction in Ihcwas not limited to heavy water

CO The exact schedule of reactor construction8 Is not known. Deductions fromuranium metal availability, heavy mater production, and site timetables suggest that five or six production reactors wereol Kyshtym byf which two or possibly three were hcavy-walcrThere Is evidenceecondsite went Into operation in the area ol Krnrnoyarsk. probablyheavailability of uranium metal and heavy waternd later suggest that two or three large lieavy-watcr moderated le-aclors have been builtresumably in the Krasnoyarsk area.

nitially the separation of plutonium from uranium and fission products was done bytcclpiriaUon process which differed somewhat from that initially adopted by the US II was planned to recover uranium as well as plutonium. since themetal plant at Olazov was designed to process reactor depleted uranium as partial feed material. Soviet and German research on solvent extinction and other methodslhal the Soviets may have lateraram However. Sovietin solvent extraction methods ateneva Conference on Atomic Energy, and tlieir subsequent publication of ratherstudiesolvent extraction method suggest that they may still have been using their Initial process as late

gi/nalc'it PrndtictimiV

unlnnle S.or the position tl the DirectorKnvnl lute III itrncc.

the Krasnoyarsk area ol central Siberia and

Evul tec from various aspects ofnergy program suggests, however,iflcont expansion of Soviet" .anient production has taken oka somclinsinceoviet procure-nienl of saw mnteriabi for fissionable material produv"m, particularly uranium ore and. has ccntinurd to increase. Al-thougl- this procurement increase does not nevess. rily indicate corresponding and pro-|iorIi> .'1 Incrcares In fissionableo-flDCUon. tne quantities of law materialaccumulated are net consistentonstant level of plutonium production, even when the estimated large inciease1 production sinces taken intoThere Is also evidence that aSoviet production reartor site was built in

/The exlensivc use of plutonium in Soviet nuclear tests, particularly in6 tliermonuclear teats, whileon technical grounds, suggests lhat the Soviets would have increased the production of plutonium equivalent.

ssuming thut ihe Soviets expandedequivalent production aftert Is difficult to tell when this expansion took

ur estimate is based on Ihe assumption lhat the Soviets gradually expanded pluto< nium equivalent production beginninghe estimate has been derived from estimated uranium ore procurement and assumedpractices; estimated feed practicesc|iaraiioi. plants; estimated heavy-water and uranium metal production;site construction time schedules;and assumptions on Soviet reactor designs and]""

[The ftrciliacy of the rcxull-

ant estimate of plutonium equivalentis particularlyon theof the rractor irrudiation time estimate, the uranium ore estimate, the we of rooetor tails only in separation plantsnd the estimate of uranium oie .stockpiling

ur estimate of Soviet plutoniumproduction is Ixiscd mi an expanding pro-

iram

IX

I'l.lTOMI MiVAM.NT I'lB Mltr'TI-iX

eactor operating cycles, however, the shorter the cycle the greater tlie operating cost. The Soviets have stated lhat theproduced in the power program could conceivably be reprocessed and utilized asfuel in an aitempl lo make the nuclear power program as self-sufficient a* possible with regards to fuel. It is believed lhat this concept was discussed for its psychological effect but lhat il would noi bebecause plutonium is more valuable in Ihc weaponshe major impact of the nuclear electric powOT program on future fissionable material stockpiles, eitheronsumerrroducer of plutonium. willnd1 upon the results of the planned programives the estimated total installed electrical megawatts and the plutonium production of Ihe nuclear power program.

ra.-tr* Plulonlum Equivalent Production We estimate thai Ihc USSR will continue toigh value on plulonlum equivalent and loonsiderable efloit lo produce large quantities of il. The Soviet productionas been estimated nn the same basis as lorierlod Starling9 wc assume that all newequivalent production capacity will come Irom the power reactor program.

lutonium Production by Potter Reactor rrag

suitability of

the plutonium ror some type* nf weapons win decrease with an increase In ihc duration o'

he estimate tabulated below includes plutonium from lioth production and power reactors ll must lie recognized Dial theabout future Soviet planslarge errors into the fulurc production estimales and Uint these errorsapidly a* Ihe estimate I? extended into the future, ll I* not believedeaningful numerical range of this uncertainly can be given after

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he first known Sovietin tritium was revealed by the publication in8omprehensive review of the literature on tritium by M. B.taff member of the Soviet atomic energyReturned Germans report that2 tritium was available for research in theirhanum which is found in thorium-bearing minerals and was needed for thr Sovietseparation chemical plant. Oermanalre also required toa process for the produclion of pure thorium oxide. Subsequently, the USSRconsiderable thorium stocks.until the appearancen ihe high-yield lest ofhe onlv certain productionrom thorium was the research quantities mentioned at the Geneva and Moscow Conferences on Atomic Energy. There has been no delected weapon useince the3 shot, and it appears probable lhat the Soviets arc not making important quantitiesor weapon stockpiling al present The Interest in thorium breeder reactors In Iheir power reactor programossible future weapon utilization of the material.

uture Fissionable Material* Available for Weapon L'ret. The estimated cumulative quantities of fissionable material available tor weapon uses are tabulated below. The amounts have been calculated by deducting

taiu.i: XII

We estimate that tritium availability up loould not be more lhan lCi of the tola) plutonium equivalent and afterhai tritium production be limitedf produclion reactors' and 5Tb of powercapacity (or plutonium production

ctive Soviet interest In thorium-bearing minerals started aboutith the formationpecialfor their exploitation. Although pari of this Interest lay In the requirement for Ion-

'phnnlnc purposes thrram of tritium It eoiiivalent tnol plutonium

ram

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from Ihc estimated production those quauli-tics of fissionable material estimated tu meetuclear lest expenditures, and to meet the inventory and fuel requirements ol research and power reactors. No deduvlions have been made for production rcactori ex-pOfXlllUrM, future nuclear tests, propulsion appheatlmis of flssionnlterials, or mtiti'i IiiLin weapons manufacturing pipelines.ajor nuclearprogram were undertaken, this would require substantial al-location* of fissionable malcrial

VII. SOVIET NUCIEAR WEAPONS

Nuclearhe first Soviet nuclear test was conductedl Ihe main Soviet proving ground In Ihe vicinity of Srmi-iata-un>k. and was followed bv tests6otal ofeals have been detected In which plutonium.nd in one Instanceove been used ns the fissionable male-rials. As many as nine of Ihe tests may have been directed toward Uir devr-Jopmciil ol thermonuclear weapons

IM9/ Nuclearhe9 test explosion apparently was conducted as soon as sufficient plutonium was available It utilized an all-plulonlnm core,ilo'.ons mf TNT equivalent i. hadiclalivcly low efflci.*ney.etillvesembled the first CS implosion weapon The two test explosions1 demons!arked Increase in the rill-cienev of utilization of iRsiniiable material.

second

re. revealed thai Ihe USSR had been able to pmtluee wetipnnn kilnsram quanlilles.

9 Nuclearbe fourIDAS demonstrated that the USSR wasto supplement the1 by Ihe addition of bothweapons arid low-yield, smaller JOE 4.

device rMonated on V2 AHUM- WM. yieldedilotons The Hicrmnnuclr-ir mn-

Ienal used In tills device was lithium dcutcr-ideJ

uvlvarevenhe first, which took place near Tolskoye. wc estimate to be .in airdropuclear weapon as jiartilitaryand weajmns effects lest. Tlie remaining -ix tests occurred si the main Soviet provini; -round in the vicinily ol ScinijxilaUnsk. All tests of this seriesllotons or less.

S Nvelear TttbX Five nuclear deUma-lions ncviirrrdn5 was Hie only Soviet nuclear explosion known to dale to have occurred under waler. The JOEest yielded) kilolmis. and is considered to have been Hie tirburslersion of theevice,1

I Mgmlicanec washc airrnirsl nil5heimoiiuclcnr weapon which yieldedegatons, II Is highly probable thai thli/

Anarkcd the criecliVe bl'lliliiiiiin

IM muHi-megalnn nuclear weajmn eapalNhty. AnotherJOE IR. may have been rtcl.mahdigh iilliliiilcl

flflfi Nuclear TciOm. The HIM Sovietlesis me lorticulaily significant Tests exlcnrled Ihrnogliuul Ihe entlir year,ebruary unlilfct-nilnT. and Imuclear rVhwi-il Inns.

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testsegatons respec-lively, j

7 Nuclear7 tests began witharlrlon.ilKin.nl7 atiles NN'E. ol Kapuslln Yar. Tills air hurst yieldedilolons. Tlie tacts that tlie testelatively lowwas deloiiiiledoviettest center, but nol on thetesl range, and was complrtelyfrom any previous nuclear testsuggest the testuclear warheadmissile, possibly nn alr-to-surfacc typetest, which was conducted on Hat the Scmi|mlutlnsk lest site, yieldedwas on

3 April, live DHo-nations occurred In fourteen days. All of the tests took place at the Scmipalallnsk site. These tests occurred too late to permitanalysis prior to publication of thisPreliminary Information indicates the vields were as follows:pril,T;pril.T; <c|T. (d)pril.T; and (elT.

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direct information Is available on Ihe specific nuclear weaivwu types in the USSR stockpile. However. Soviet nuclear tests have indicated that several types of weapons have been proof-tested, and such weapons types are probably included In the present stockpile.

In Table XIV nre listed the estimatedand future Soviet nuclear weapon*-capabllllles. The characteristics Of the weapons estimated to have tieenhave been derived from the nuclear lest data making reasonable specific choices of yields, diameters weights, and quantities of fissionable materials In eases where the test dataange of possible values. The characteristics ol the other weapon typeso lie available lo the Soviets nt the present lime have, in generul. been derived from the proof-tested weapons, other tests, and substitute designs which are considered to be well within Soviet capabilities.

Current Fitsmn1 is estimated lhai Ihc cutrrnlut-fear mapm stockpile could containweapons lonsklrrcd llml. Ihvuump of Uir simplicity ol design, weapon* of this type could now br avallaMr in stockpile f

M. (lun-AssrmNUAMIioukIi Hve USSR is nut known In have tested nuclear wr-jmns emphninc gun-type assembly. It Ls

ny prediction of lulurc Soviet weapons devrlo|>menl must be made by extrapolating estimates of present Soviet capabilities and by evaluating Ihf esUmalod militarynf the USSR and the apparent gaps In the Soviei nuclear test program. A* in our asscssnvnt of earlier Srnicl wea|ioti designs. US nuclear weapons tcrhnnlngy has been useduide ill evulual Inff fill ore Soviet weapons eii|Kibllllles. in order In permit roughof theof the USSR in the

withn eonsidcrcO within Soviet capabilities..(

Boostivtcar Weapons.-'j

(depend ii|>nn thenheal iontritium gas boosting.I

weapons winrTiTaYvdstockpile by morend economical designs as llicsc become available Consilient Iv. the composition ol Ihc USSR nuclear weapons stockpile at some future (laic Is extremelyuture ThermnmicUnr Wmpntix.

Tins U'cili.lqlle will permit the devclopniiiil ol smaller diameter thermonuclearie developmentroof weapon* and tlie more efficient use of fissionable mate-rials in low-yield

alf-life ofears, we estimate that production andnl large quanlltiCb of tritium will not be-in until the Soviets haveaiisfiielory test of ihewiustinn technique. Thus prodo-hon off"

lio limited by the sioekpilc or Irilium available at Ihe lime nf produclion. and calculation of Ihe sti-ckpile quantities of these weapons should be limited hy Ihe quantities of tritium in eunent pmdiK-lHfti during the ItlfW-IPOl period Since the produclion of irilium in tractors iscompclillvc with produclion ofil is also assumed that an economy in Ihe use of plulonlum will be practiced in this period for any weapon in whichan replace plulonlum ror Mir fissionable rnrr.

While Ihe llli.il USSR thermonuclear lesi* appear to use pureonium in ihe weapon primary,f composite primariesplutomum or uranium-

35

Pinion Yield Irom Sonet Thermonuclear WtjeptVU. Wc can only determine within very bioad limits the ratio of Ihe fission yield to ihe total yield lor the laigc Soviet theimonu-elear weapon tests. I

uclear Weapon* Developmente have no basis for estimates of Sovietweapons development in theeriod In general, we antiripale lhat the USSR will be callable ot prOdMehag nuclear wenpntuhe range of yields andrequired Im support ol Sovietrequirements /

v,

| In addition to thernio-uclearide variety of fission weapons, including very small low-yieldwill be available lovaiious lequire-mcnls.

equirement* lor Continuedie Soviet Nuclear mftapom Pribram- The Soviet test piogiani has already provided sufTl-clenl dalo for the rapid and successful de-velopmentariety of nuclrarlypcs. The majority of theoviet nuclearelct ud by the US appear lo have been primarily weapons development tests, although mdilaiy inleresl in wcupoiu cflecLs tests is evident ill Ihe Totskoyc lest4 and the Novaya Zemlya underwnlcr lestc believe lhat ihc Soviets willin significant numbers, only weaponslesled design principles Majorin weapon design, winch rrsull in significant chance* In anticipated yield, or newdeigns and concept* willbe fotrll before stockpiling.

ion.Weapon*ight or nine of theetected Soviet nuclear tests probably involved dclonallon ofweapon* or di-vicrs with tlieimonucicar weapons design jirinciples. These lests have provided sufficient design data lo permitstockpiling nf ihermoiiucleor wcai-ms with yields upew megaton* of TNT equivalent. /

i jlS No'

i>fl.est Moratorium

nnvlrliM-vrlooiin'oi I'mitrai"."

M

IS

oosted and Loie-Yicld Weapon Tests.

increasing the efficiency of utilization ofmaterial in low-yield weapons by the addition of fissionableechniqiic called "boosting."'!

A<

Additional low-yirld nuclear RVTJ Will prot>3Dly be considered desirable lo verify Ihc reliability of suchweapons when adapted to specificstems

Vill. NUCIEAR PROPUISION

pplication ol Unclear propahnm lor Air-craft by the USSR. Tticrc is no evidence of Soviet activities directly identified with afor nuclear aircraft propulsion.Ihe Soviets hove made increasinglyreferences to thr feasibility of aircrall

T

piopulMon during ihc past year These have ranged from popular discussions in newspaper* and magazines to slatcmcnls by some ol the highest oflkials in ihc USSR Il Is believed lhat ihe amount ol discussion permitted on this subject reflects Sovietthat lliey will be able touactical system ol aircraft nucteaiSome nf the research known to have been conducted by the USSR could applyto nuclear propulsion for aircraft. It Is assumeduclear propulsionresearch program for aircraft began when il was realized by the USSR that certaincould be utilized for this purpose. We estimate that;

(a) The Soviet aircraft nuclear propulsion reactor program Is probably now engaged in development and testing Df reactorand sub-system*.

eactor system suitable for nuclear propulsion of subsonic aircraft could probably be available lo the Soviets?

ntelligence indicates lhal the USSR has considered the feasiNllly of nuclearfor missiles. At least preliminary design studies have been conducteduclearsystemueh-ar reactor program for mlsxtte propulsion hx* not been idenlifled Thc Soviets have openlyaper describing in geneialcactor system for missiles winch appears lo be leehmcally sound We estimate thai the USSR has. at most, cmiducied basic research oncomponents forystem.

aval and Marine Applications o/ Kh-clcnr Propulsion hu the USSR. The Soviet Union exhibited an inlerest in nuclear ship propulsion as early8 Publications and stmementsnd ISM have confirmed this inlerest. winch lias been exlendcd tonuclear-powered submarines, trans-jroi ts. large cargoankers, factoryships, and the highlyicebreaker now under comtiucllon al Lrnlngiad Tlieie is no douhl lhatnuclear propulsion icactnr suitable for naval and marine applications is currently under construction On Ihe basts oi the current stale of Soviet reaeliir nsearch and development. Ihe status of Ihe icebreaker cons!ruction, together with rrLlime scales derived from US expciience. we estimate thai

uclear jiro|Hjl-uon reactor for aship itcrbrcakri) will be Installed Innd that Ihc ship will undergotests in8 or

uclear propulsion reactor for acould be available for installation

Id That by the lime thesecomplete operational tests, the Soviets could undertake the constructionariety of surface ships and submarines.

reactors employed in the rustship and submarine will probably bepressurised water type and useThe Soviets have considered olherreactors for propulsion purposes,Ihe liquid-metal, the gas-cooled, theand the homr-fccncous-bolllngfirst two mentioned could be adaptedship propulsion in Ihe nearbelieve lhat the Soviets couldor both these types of reactorshe reactorto be usedubmarineis the piessunred-water lype.engineers have stated thatwater reactor* may be thefor marine (impulsion. This typecould be adapted to both submarineship pro|>ulsinn0

IX. INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES

Aid to Bloc Nuclear Research.Union has continued In her role asparticipant in internationalactivities. The program of aid to(the furnishingoW.swimming jiooMyjic researchparticle accelerators. rudloisotopcstraining of personnel)5 Is still in progress.nf ihe physical facilities lo house theis underway in Ihc Hlnc cminltic*.of theclnr* is scheduledniocave gone lo thekm lor training and Soviet scientiststo Ihe Satellite* lo lecluie on atomic

cncrgv for peaceful purposes. Shipment* ol ladiolsQlopes have been made lo all of Ihe Utoc countries. Exhibits similar to the one displayed at thr Geneva Confcrenerave been sent by the Soviet Union lo several of the Satellites. These exhibits hi.vc also been sent to India.nd Yugoslavia.

oviet Offers of Power Rcoctorn. The Soviet aid program has been expanded lo MV cludc assistance lo the Satellites. in theof reactors for the production of electric power. Czechoslovakia. EastHungary and Rumania have reported plans for Soviet assistance in the consl ructionW reactors within the next five years.

lie Joint Nuclear Research /intitule. The Joint Nuclear Research Institute, located at Dubna near Moscow, was created6 lo lent as the focal point of Sino-Sovietechnical cooperation in nuclear eneigy The primary functions of the Institute appear to be: fa| to coordinate and guide joint.in' experimental nuclear research in ihr Bloc; lb) toit the potent ia lilies of Ih. Bloc nuclearci to train Bloc id. enllals in the use of equipment such as par-tide acftcralors and experimental reactois. and Id! to minimize the attraction for Blc-sclentists in participation in non-CommuniM nurlrar research centers. All Sino-Snviel Bloc countries have membership in the new orgunl-Mtlon. The dominating role of the Soviet Union is reflected by the physical location ol the Institute, the control exercised over Ihe nclivllles. and Ihc annual financialto the operation and expansion ol IheSomehc Bloc countries have mill rated concern that membership In Ihewill le* ill in Soviet domination over IIh- direction of any research and Blocwill not be freeMM pTOfrCU nf thtlr ownt has been jmliliely slater) that participation in Ihe wnrk of the Institute willopen to non-Bloc roontrW

miet AhJ tn yon-Bloc Coanfrar* Theextensivecernents tocoonlrtrs have been made wiih Yugoslavia and Ecvpl. Yugoslavia is scheduledIIV rcscarrh tractor and oilier technical aid similar to lhat given lo Ihe Said-hles but negotiations concerning terms for delivery broke off without agreement in early INT. Egypt is tow research meter, research equipment, trainingeological survey for uranium ore. Inhigcharuember of llie Japanese Joint Committee lor Atomic Energy was informed by Nesmeya-nov. Presided of Academy of Sciences and Slavsky. Chief Main Administration for Atomic Energy, thai Japan could receive atomic reactors, atomic fuel and otheraidormal agreements concerning technical Interchange between Ihc USSR and Japan would be concluded. In thesethe Soviet representatives reportedly stated thai they have no intentions nfto their Icvhntcal aid any condition* ui may rcsliicl or encroach upon the rightse ol her party. There ha* been no evidence oi any actual negotiations between the Soviet Unkwt and tlie Japanese government having 1i, ptacr a* yet. Tne Soviet Union ha* made grnrral slalrntenl* bolh from Moscow and Inin New York at Ihc Confer-ence on Ihe Statute ol ihc Internaiional Atomic Aiicrgy Agency, ciilici/ing control provisions of Ihe Statute and of US bilateral agreements as imposing political andconditions inconsistent wiih Ihc tor-errlgn rights nf nations. While term* on which Ihc Soviets supply nuclear materials have noi bi-cn published, the Soviets allege lhat ihey Impose no leslricllnns un the use oi Ihe niatclal or It* disixisition. Limited offers of training and supplies of radio!*olo|ie* have been made lo India. Iran.banon. Syiia. Tliailand. Greece, and Burma Soviet moves in the Western Hemisphere have tiren noled in atefai being taken lo omain an exchange of Mexican professor* and students The Rovk-ts have also atleiri|iled In provide Chile with nuclear research equipmenlnited Nation* TechnicalAdministralkin. OfTer* of material .nid nld. thus far rejected, have been made lo Notwnv and Austria.

Soviet Motes Directed Anaimt the West. Many of Ihc Soviet moves In internationalin the atomic field have been obvious attempts to counteract Weillern developments. In5 the Sovietsonference on the peaceful uses of atomic energy probably as an attempt to detract from the Unitedsponsored Geneva Conference inn6 Ihe Soviets proposed the formationeneral Regional Body for Pcaceful Uses of Atomic Ene-gy to include all the East and West European countries and ihe United Slates. The announced purpose of the Body was to foster interchange of information and provide mutual assistance In the iieaceful uses of atomic energy. This organization was proposedime when West Europeanwere considering the EURATOM and OEEC plans and apjiears to have been onto cause dissent among tlie Western European count ncs involved In the EURATOM and OEEC discussions Tlte Joint Nuclear Research Institute might be considered lo be an East European counterpart lo CERN. the Western Europeanat Zurich The Joint institute will have far more extensive facilities available to its members

International Conference* and Soviet Vint* to the West. Attendance ot Sovietat international conferences and visits of soviet scientists to Western countries have continued lo increase. In addition toin Western meetings the Soviets have called conferences in the Soviel Union withlo the West. Tlie most important of these was Ihe USSR Conference on High-Energy Physics in6 in which US and other free-world scientist* participated. There were Iwo itarlieularly significant Soviet visits made to the West dm Ins Ihe past year The first was Kurchatnv* visit lo Harwell. England, in6 where lie openlySoviet work In Ihe field of controlled thermonuclear reactions nnd. In addition, gave considerable details nf Ihewcr reactor program. The second was Artsimo-rich's visit to Sweden in Hisof controlled thermonuclear reaction experiments were more revealing than the statements made by Kurchatov.

The International Atomic Eneroi/ At/cncii. The Soviet Union played an active port in the recent Conference on the Statute of tlieAtomic Energy Agency held al the United Nations headquarters in New York The Soviets made no ccnstruclivc conlnbu-tion to the Statute of the Agency: theireffort wasecord in favor of o) Red Chinese participation in the Agency; (b> technical aid being free of any conditions which infringe on Ihc sovereign rights of the recipient, andlace for Soviet Satellites in the management of the Agency. Although the Soviel Union voted for the Slalulc aa finally adopted by the Conference onhe Soviel Union has made nofor Npport of the agencyromise in its note of lR5 to supplyg of fissionable material. Their principal interest appears lo be the propaganda and political aspect of the Agency's activities.

Effect* of Vnrc't in the Bloct is notas yet to determine the lull extent of live Impact that the Polish anduprisings will have on Soviet atomic aid to Ihe Bloc. The Soviet-Czech agreement issuedrovides forSoviet nlomle energy assistance, ond also fur continued and cx-anded supply ot Czech uranium on to the USSR. In Hungary Ihcre has been evidence of dissatisfaction on the portungarian official wilh lite price being asked for the icsearch reactor, labeled byofficial as obsolete. NeveithcHess. Ihc Hunsauan Stale Investment Plan7 stales lhal Ihc research reactor will beduring Ihe year Poland has recently made overtures to the United Slates for atomic aid. This is the first such moveatellite nation. Another exampleorealtitude on the pari of Bloc nations is the Increasing lute-change of scientific visits among the Satellites and between Bloc sclen-Uslsand Yugoslav scicnllsts.

e estimate that the Soviet Union will continue to participate in iniernalional alomic energy alTairs. Her aid lo Blocand oners of aid lo non-Bloc countries continue for political and probanda purposes. By ll'a'J the Soviet Union willmake further oilers of aid in theof atomic power stations lo non-Bloc countries when its first full scale plant goes into operation.

Original document.

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