Created: 5/7/1957

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

DiemrounoN? ji. - .White National Security Council

%Department ol Department of. Operation!ommission

Federal Bureau of> IaF >



the soviet atomic energy program


This estimate supersedesndo,

This estimate was prepared and agreed upon by the Joint Atomic Energy InteUigence Committee, with footnotes by the Navy member, which is composed of representatives of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, Air Force, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Joint Staff and the Central Intelligence Agency. The FBI abstained, the subject being outside of its Jurisdiction.

A group of expert consultant* working with the Joint Atomic Energy InteUigence Committee have reviewed this estimate and generally concur with it. The estimate, with footnotes, was approved by the Intelligence Advisory Committee


table of contents










Uranium Mining

Economic Factor* Affecting the Sonet Nuclear Program .


Production Reaclors

Plutonium Equivalent Production



Nuclear Testa

Current Weapons

Future Weapons









Figure I Atomic Energy Activities .ollows iv

Figure IV 5

Table I Program

Table II Significant Soviet Research and Prototype Reactors . 16

Table III Estimated Time Schedule of Soviet Nuclear Power

Table IV Uranium Ore Production in Terms Ot Metric Tons


TabicUranium Slug


TabicSoviet Production of

TableUsey the Soviet Power Program

TableEquivalent Production to

Table X Estimated Production of Plutonium by the Soviet


Table XJ Estimate of Total Plutonium Equivalent Production . 29

Table XII Estimated Fissionable Materials Available for Weapons

Table XIII Evaluation of Soviet Nuclear. 31



A. Trend Of Ttte Soviet Atomic Energy Program. There is substantial evidence that the USSR is continuing to expand steadily both its military atomic energy activities and its program for the non-military uses of atomic energy. (Seeor geographical locations.)

total of sixteen nuclear testsdetected sinceone-half (Mt) and threeThis is in contrast withof nineteen tests detected)

are being made by theincrease its uranium ore andsupply which is already capablea very substantial atomiceffort. Although we estimate aSoviet program for thefissionable materia! production,of such materials willthroughout Uic period of thistoimiting factor inthe size of many military andprograms.

ubstantial nuclear power program is still envisoned by the USSR, its initially announced goals have apparently been reduced during recent months toward more realistic objectives.

'See footnoteageor Uir position ol Uie Directorl tnleiltCencr-


In general, non-military applications are being fosteredroad base both within the USSR and in international programs that reach all countries within the Soviet Bioc and that endeavor towith Uic West in the courtship of all significant neutral powers.a)

The USSRroad scientific base in the nuclear sciences and is competent to continue making important progress not only in areas of fundamentalbut also in improving nuclear weapons and integrated weapon systems. In experimental nuclear physics. Soviet capability, now estimated to be second only to that of the US, will conUnue to improve. )

We estimate the Soviet atomicprogram will continue to enjoy the very high priority that has been accorded to it in the past

B. Raw Materials. We estimateetric tons of uranium (in terms of recoverable metal) were mined6 in the USSR and its satellites, of whichetric tons were obtained in EastThis total quanUty is more than adequate lo support current fissionable materials output as calculated in this estimate. Substantial uranium oreexist within the Soviet Bioc and particularly the USSR, and the exploits-

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Uon of these resources, as well as of other raw materials essential to atomic energy activities, is being steadily expanded.)

C. Plutoniumf


D.urof Soviet productionas shown in Figure IV) prior tore


Soviets appear to have been accumulating raw materials in quantities too great to be accounted fortable annual pluto-nium production rate, even when theof an expandingndeasonable reserve program aro considered. There is also directwhich suggests continuedof Soviet production reactor capacity. The Soviets have, moreover, employee Plutonium liberally in their weapon tests.

nd Table


ur estimate of probable current and future Soviet plutonium production is based upon estimated Soviet uranium ore procurement, assumed stockpiling practices, estimated heavy-waterestimated site construction time schedules, deductions and assumptions on Soviet production reactor designs, and

J Startinge assume thai all new plutonium production capacity will come from the power reactor[

'The Director of Naval Intelligence does notIn the figure* contained herein foraled produeUon. He does not believe that moreg of weaponSS were available InHe does not believe that Intelligence available as to barrier Improvements, litlIlia Uon of electricity, and assumptions made justify the increased produeUon set forth. He belicTti. ir present methods, utilizing Improvedor produeUonrea cumulative stockpile by mid-lM7 will beg.0 kg bynd0 kg by mld-lMT These values are consistent with the limited vieJS tn the weapon test program

However. If new metnoas oi produeUon wereUtuted which could be effectiveI the quanUUes could be radically Increased after that date.

The Director of Naval Intelligence does not concur In the estimate of production

I 0

he believes that the esUmaled cumula-Uve production of plutonium wouldQ0 kg throughand. byg through rald-IMI0 kg through mid-1MT.

The Director of Naval Intelligence believes thai the plutonium produced In the Soviet nuclear electric power reactor program might be utilized as fuel in that program, leaving insignificant amount* available for their weapons stockpile This Is consistent with Soviet statementsUie power program and with availablenlclllMiuT



based on quantities of barrier procured2 for their gaseous diffusion plants, as well as information fromGerman scientists on barriermethods and barrier quality and allows for moderate Sovietlant design and compressor efficiency as indicated by these sources. Thisof increased Soviet capability has been extrapolated into the eriod as an assumed gradualin the efficiency in utilization of electric power. The productionromoas beenby applying estimated plantm terms of utilization of electric power to the average electric powerto be available for Isotope )

E. Nuclear Weapons Progress. 1with the first Soviet nuclear test conducted inotal ofests have been detected^

)t is significant that f

There has been evidence during the-pastonths of development and testing of nuclear warheads in guided missiles)

that the USSR is makm^aeffort toariety ofnuclear weapons, particularly those employing thermonuclearTest activities6 extended throughout the entire year, from 2untilecember, and included nine detonationsV

Jin general,

we anticipate that the USSR"wil[ beof producing improved nuclear weapons of the range or yields andrequired to support itsrequirements F

]ln addition, seven tests have been conducted during the first four months


F. Nuclear Electric Power Program.he Soviets are engagedomprc hensivc reactor development program which will permit them to keep generally abreast of world progress in this field. They have had one small prototype power reactorapacity of five electrical megawattsn operation sincehich although inefficient, has permitted useful experimental studies in power reactor operation. a)

ecent information indicates the USSR has revised the time scale andits ambitious nuclear power goalegawattsegawatts of electrical power under its Sixth Five-Ycar. (See Tablehis reduced plan is still quite substantial, but is withinigh priority effort. The USSR emphasizes that this program is oriented toward making future nuclear power economically competitive withpower costs. The Soviets slate that some of the plutonium produced could conceivably be recycled in theirbut we estimate that this pluto nium will be allocated by the USSR lo weaponseginninghe nuclear power program will consume significant quantities. However, we do not believe this loss of fissionable material to the Soviet weapons program will exceeder cent of thevailable to the USSR at

Seeo: Uie pout ion of the Di feeloi OlIniellieencc any time during the period (See Figure IV)a)

G. Nuclear Propulsion Capabilities.e believeuclear propulsion reactor suitable for naval and marineis currently underWe estimate that:uclear propulsion reactorurface shipwill be installed in8 and that the ship will undergotests in8 oruclear propulsion reactorubmarine could be availablend (c) that by the time these ships complete operational tests, the Soviets could undertakeariety of surface ships and )

here is no evidence of Sovietdirectly identified to nuclearfor aircraft or guided missiles.frequent references to the feasibility of aircraft nuclear propulsion have been made during the past year, both in news papers and magazines and statements by some of the highest officials in the USSR. We estimate that: (a) the Soviet aircraft nuclear propulsion reactor program is probably now engaged in development and testing of reactor components and sub-systems; and.eactor system suitable for nuclear propulsion ofaircraft could probably be available to the Sovietsc) the USSR has. at most conducted basic research oncomponentsissilereactor system. )

H. International Activities. The USSR has continued its role as an activein international atomic energy activities including scientific and the negotiations to establish an International Atomic Energy Agency. The Joint Nuclear Research Institute,at Dubna near Moscow, was created6 to serve as the focal point of Sino-Soviet Bloc technical coo|>cration. for furnishing swimming pool type research reactors, particleradioisotopes and technical training of personnel to Bloc countries are continuing and delivery of the actual reactors is scheduled Inplans have been announced forof power reactors with Soviet assistance in Czechoslovakia, EastHungary and Rumania. Aid agreements have been reached with Yugoslavia and Egypt, similar to those with Bloc countries, although difficulties have arisen in implementation of the Yugoslavian agreement. We estimate that the USSR will continue to make offers of technical aid as well as assistance in the construction of power stations both within the Bloc and possibly to non-Bloc countries, and that the USSR has the capability of fulfilling suchThe Soviets allege that they will impose no restriction on the use orof nuclear materials in their aid program. )



1 While the exact extt'nt of Soviet capability in the atomic Held remains uncertain, thenature and some of the details of the Soviet atomic energy program can be assessed with fair reliability. Available evidencethe existence In the USSR of:igh priority, extensive atomic energy primarily directed toward military application, which is continuing to expand; (b) an ample uranium ore base on which to cany out this program;ubstantial stockpile of fissionable materials,roven capability for the establishment of nuclear-electric power stations;apability, so far believed to be unrealized, of utilizing nuclear power for propulsive purposes, (f) roven capability of producing explosions in yield rangesew kilotons up to several megatons and of employing both fission and fusion principles

2 Reliable evidence indicates thai Sovietplanning includes the employment olweapons for offensive air operations, in support of ground and naval operations, and possibly air defense. At least twice3 there has been military participation in the Soviet nuclear weapons test programof both weapons effects tests and military maneuvers.

3 Our knowledge of the status ol tlie Soviet atomic energy program as of the endG ts derivedonsiderable volume ofEvidence received since our laston the Soviet atomic energy programrimarilythe mining of uranium ore. its transfoi-mation Into uranium metal, the pioduction of plutonium. rcseurch on reactors and Isotope separation methods, the first Soviet gaseous diffusioneparation plant,power available to gaseous diffusion plants, further testing of weapons, andtraining and indoctrlnation in atomic warfare


II HISTORY ANDhe Soviet atomic energy program started in0 with the formation of aon the Uranium Problem attached to ihe Presidium of the Academy ofSSR. Members o( this commission were representatives from various laboratoriesto be major contributors on the Beginning in late the Ninth Directorate of the People's Commissariat of internal Affairs (NKVD) was organized to make concurrently preliminary studies In nuclear phytic* with special attention to atomic energy, 4 it became responsible [or uranium mining in the USSR. and.Int recruited moreerman and Austrian scientists lo work in the USSR on atomic energy problems at several laboratories subsequently built for thisse.

nirst Chief Directorate was created nnd attached lo the Council of Ministers, and was given the responsibility for lhe erpansion of the entire Soviet atomicrogram. L. P. Beriya was the responsi ble member of the Council of Ministers and thus exercised over-all direction of policy and drew Into the program the best talent and leadership of the nation. These leaders, for the most part, retained their old positions along with their new responsibllllles Byto lhe program representatives of many diverse organisations such as theof Internal Affairs, the Ministry of tho Chemical Industry and many others,of the high priority necessary to imple ment the program was attained 50 Uie First Chief Directorate gradually took over the responsibilities of the Ninth Directorate of the NKVD until in0 the Ninth Directorate relinquished the last of its functions, control of the German scientists, and was dissolved

fl The growth of the Soviet atomic energy effort necessitated its major0 Al thisecond Chiefwas formed and also attached to the Council of Ministers The First Chief Direc terete relinquished lo Ihe SeroiKi Chief Direc torate control of mining, to include the development of new uranium deposits, the concentration and refining of uranium both inside and outside of the USSR. This freed the First Chief Directorate to concentrate on Uic production of fissionable materials and the manufacture of weapons Supply,and other services common to both directorates were apparently placedody serving both directorates, thus another chief directorate was possibly formed

his organizational structure apparently conUnued unUI the arrest of Beriya in At Uial time, the Ministry of Medium Machine Building was organized with V. A. Malyshev as the minister and this newgradually took over the functions of Uie Chief Directorates, except for Satellite mining operaUons. This latter activity was made subordinate to the Chief Directorate of Soviet Properly Abroad, Ministry of Foreign Trade and itrobably stui under lhe Ministry of Foreign Trade for administration but is clearly subordinate to the Ministry of Medium Machine Building for operational matters. Late3 Malyshev waseputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers. How-ever, inolonel Oeneral A. P.rominent and leading figure in Uie program from its beginning, wasMlnbter of Medium Machine Building and elevated to Uic position of Deputyor the Council of Ministers. Thus, he replaced Malyshev as over-all policy director and manager of day-to-day operaUons of the entire Soviet atomic energy program. In Deavenyagin died and hisappointeds Mikhail O. Pervukhln. who has been associated with lhe atomic energy program since its begin nlng and was most recently the Chairman of the State Economic Commission for Short Term Planning.

8 InASS announced the forma lionew Htomic energy coordinating body, the Main Administration for the Use of Atomic Kncrgy attached to the Council of Mm titers Yefrlm i' Siavskiy is head of this new AdmmiUratKm The Main AdmiitiHtaUon

ww crealcd to fulfill severa, functions: tocooperation between the USSR and other countries in the non-military uses of atomic M^ to makp "tensive use of atomichCooperation with the industrial ministries and to resolve problems connected with this application- to design reactors for power stations andatom powered engines for use in trans-porlation; to build and operate experimental reactors; to coordinate research in nuclearhe production and use of radioisotopes and the eilect of radiation on metals; to supply laboratories withequipment such as counters, reactors and accelerators. The Main Administration Is also responsible for the publication ofand technical works on utilization of atomic energy and for holding exhibits on peaceful uses of atomic energy both In the Soviet Union and in other countries

II appears, then, that therelear-cut division of responsibilities between theof Medium Machine Building and the Main Administration for Use of Atomic Enerrv (See The Ministry continues with its former functions for all produeUon aspects OT llW atomic energy program, while the Main Administration supervises the application of peaceful uses of atomic energy within the USSR and the cooperation of the the USSR with other countries in these matters. Tlie Academy of Sciences Is apparently used toand conduct supporting research for both the Ministry of Medium Machine Building and the Main Administration.





op medi


machine buildi







between ministry of medium machine









cience and technology continue to beencouraged by the Sovietand emphasized In their educational system. Scientistsrivileged group held ID high esteem. Soviet research personnel arc concentrated in support ot heavy Industry and military development fields

oviet manpower and capability in basic scientific fields necessary for supportom-prehensive nuclear energy program areand competent. Within the nuclear energy field weroad scientific base which is competent to continue to makeprogress not only in fundamental fieldsapability for developing better nuclear weapons and applications loweapons systems.

Vncfcar Physics. We estimate the present capability of the USSR in experimental nu-clear physics to be second only to that of me construction of high-energy particle accelerators such asillion electron volt (MEV) synchrocyclotron andlectron-volt (DEV) proton synehrolon have been the most Impressive Soviet accom phshrncnla nuclear physics However, these accelerators arc merely impressive in size since they are essentially scaled-upof US accelerators. Research workusingEV machine has been competent but uninspired. Construction of theKV machine was completedfi and it became operational

he Soviets revealed several highly original Idea* for particle accelerator designs which have not been Incorporated in operating accelerators. Some of these may nave stemmed directly from Soviet research effort on conu oiled thermonuclear reactions It appears that there is effective exchange ofbetween the accelerator and thermo nuclear groups

M Controlled Thermonuclear Research So "el research In the application of controlledreactions for the production of Pewtf wasrevealed in5 at the

Conference of the Academy of Sciences on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy. Subsequent reports describing parts of the Soviet effort reveal that the USSR has the technicalrequired lo support an effective re-search program in this field. Thework is quite creditable and Indicates an appreciable effort and manpower The Soviets have stated that while they have not attained usable energy fromthermonuclear reactions, this research is continuing. We estimate that the USSR will not produce usable power fromprocesses for many years

15 Instrumentation The USSR is appar enlly developing and producing therequired to support their nuclear energy program. Instruments viewed at in-ternational conferences and trade fairs,mostly auxiliary instruments, appear to be well designed and gave evidence ofworkmanship. Several Satellite nations are producing various instruments to Soviet specifications that ore being delivered to the USSR in quanUty for use In nuclear energy and other programs

he cajwbiiities of soviet nuclear physi-cists for developing integrated instrumcnta-lion equipment for nuclear research areadequate for support of the Soviet nuclear energy program ppears thai the USSR lags the US somewhat In lhe develop menl of such equipment as nuclear resonators neutron time-of-flight spectrometers,counters and scintillation counters However, the Soviets have developed anpholomultiplier lube, which is ancomponent for scintillation counters Also, the Soviet mass spectrometer.o have good versatility and toodern, well engineered instrument

omputer The USSR hasonsiderable technical competence for the development of high speed digital computers Such computers play an important role in the solution ol many problems in nuclear physics and lhe design of nuclear weaponsomputers, designed and con stiucted hy the Soviet Academy of Sciences.


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have been notably omitted from pub-hcatlon and discussions. Soviet research in nuclear chemistry will keep up with world progress and has the capability to adequately support the Soviet nuelcar weaponsetallurgy. The USSR has placed added emphasis on metals in its Sixth Flve-Year Plan articular, production of lithium, beryllium, rirconium. nickel, and other metals essential to the atomic energy program is to be increased many fold. Special efforts are to be made to increase the purity of metalsuseful nuclear properties Basic re-search for this phase of the program has already been Initiated and papers have been pub,ished on the application of the Iodide method for producing extremely pureand rirconium Mention is also made of the separation of hafnium from zirconium and other methods for separation of This work strongly suggests suitability of these metals to nuclear applications The continued interest of the Soviet Union In molten salts systems containing such elements as lithium, beryllium and thorium furthera broad base of research possibility for reactor purposes.

oviet fundamental metallurgicalscientists display outstanding ability and have produced some original concepts during thc last year. We estimate that the Soviet capabilities in metallurgical research will continue to support adequately the Soviet atomic energy program.


activity Inedical sciences increasedigh plteh. This work is largely radiobiological in substance but could provide improved therapy for mass atomic casualties as well as health physics criteria for peaceful utilization of nucleario-medical research concerned with the nuclear energy program of the USSR isa large-scale enlargement and consoli dation. This is evident by the recentof journals dealing almost exclusively with biomedical aspects of nuclear energy and the scheduled early completion of several

major researchhis research has become an integral part of the Five-Year Plans of the Academy of Sciences.

hift in research emphasis lias beenin the health physics field by some excellent work on toxicology or certain melals connected with the nuclear energy program and biological effects of loniang radiations and radioactive aerosols. We estimate that the Soviets will keep pace with world progress in such fields as prophylaxis, therapy ofsyndrome, and biochemical,Immunological and systemic effects.

health physics standardsthe Geneva Conference and stated indoctrine arc more restrictive thanthe Western World. Cases are knownthese were not rigorously adhered to.


Reactor Technology. Thea comprehensive reactor program andexcellent capabilities inScientific intelligencethat the Soviets have operatedplutonium produeUonSoviet full-scale production reactordeveloped directly from agraphite reactor experiment.

oviet research on reactors hasboth well known types and some of original design This program includes studies on nuclear fuels, moderators, coolants, fuel elements and structural materials Soviet physicists and engineers connected with their research reactor programigh degree of technical competence. They have demonstrated that they do not necessarily follow Western practices and are competent to take independent approaches, as illustrated by the original design of the fuel elements for the existing Atomic Power Station reactor Published Soviet research on advancedsuch as liquid metals and molten salts, as well as research on hlgh-temperature mod. erator materials reveals the existence of an adequate ex|>crimenUI base lor development of advanced nuclear reactors

experience gamed by the Sovietsreactors, research reactors,extensive experimental programpotcnUal in advanced reactorfor continued support of thepower reactor developmentIs part of the Soviet Sixth

Reactor Development indicates that the design andot thearked the advent of thepower program. (See Tablereactor, completedavethe capability of testing, underconditions, proposed fuelsystems, and structural malefor the development or newaddition, the Reactoras the prototype lor the first 5reactor (criticalhichthe Soviets with experience Inpower plant operation Thestated that they are constructing aBMW graphite-moderated,reactor which will be an expandedofMW power reactor

eactor with ordinary water as thewas first designed1 andseveral years later. Thisilowatt swimming pool type reactor togetherilowatt version completedas provided the Soviets with facilities to determine valuable data, required for the development of the large pressurized water reactor. This lype or reactor is also used for the testing of new shieldingand configurations

ollowing the plutoniumhe Sovietsilowatt plutonium fast reactor, criticalhich is cooled with mercury Anilowatt version is scheduled for7 and wilt provide operational experienre with sodium cooling These re-

1 KMW iKlcctricsla u. donate iheai power All otheruruu andfle.*nalc thermal or hni

actors will provide the facilities to obtain data necessary for the developmentastbreeder reactor. The Soviets havethai two power reactor pilot plants ma utilize sodium as the coolant One willlutonium fast breeder and the other will be sodium-cooled andilowatt heavy-water researchplaced in operationnabled the Soviets to obtain experience necessary for the construction of heavy-water moderatedtype reactors. This research reactor appears to have been modified sometime4 to permit the Soviets to conduct feasibility studies on gas cooling of heavy-water moderated reactors. The heavy-water rractor has been modified to operateigher power ofilowatts, and this reactor will undoubtedly be used in the development of any gas-cooled. heavy-water moderated power reactor and in thethorium breeder The homogeneoiis thorium reactor willeavy-water slurry of uranium oxide as the fu*L

easibility studies on boiling -waterand measurements of the thermal con ductivlty of gaseous films in boiling water were conducted5 This research was augmented by information obtained by the USSR at5 Geneva Conference In Peaceful Applications of Atomic Energy, and provided background necessary to theof the proposed boiling-water reactor.

he beryllium and beryllium oxide mod-crated reactor which went critical in4 has undoubtedly enabled the Soviets to determine the feasibility of using thisin future reactor developments While we have no knowledge of Soviet plans to use this moderator, it is possible that they may decide to use beryllium and beryllium oxide In future power and propulsion reactors due to tbe high temperature characteristics of thisf they canolution lo the UK-rroo-mechanical problems involved




I If!;

o 7



ll 1

1 ii I I

I- I



v. soviet nuclear power reactor pro-oram

he nuclear power program of the Sixth Five-Year Plan adopted6 included agenerating capacity oflectrical megawatt* (EMW) to be inby the end. Further Information indicatesotal0 EMW was being considered as the goal over the next twenty-hve years. This program, if achieved, wouldajor Impact on future fissionablestockpiles bothonsumer ofndroducer of plutonium. During the8hese stations wm provide experience in nuclearmass production of fuel elements and fuel processing. This plan, as repeatedly slated by high ranking Soviet scientific per-sonnel. was to construct seven different types

" re*clOTS m *

hree of these reactor types were to be Incorporated in four, or possibly five power stations. All were to be full-scaleotynes. Four experimental reactorsmall capacity, which have been described and scheduled for construction, will round out the Soviet reactor development program.

e believe that this original program calling forMW ofpower capacitys very ambitious and probably could not be achieved during this tune period evenery high priority effort, it callsarge capitaloncerted construction program, andsolutionumber of difficultengineering problems

Thereood Indication that the USSR now fully realizes the difficulties involved in carrying out the original program and plans to reduce0 goalMWMW. This reduced Soviet Five-Year Plan for nuclear power still is substantial, but one which is much more attainable.

ln connection with the release ofon their reduced program, the Soviets have stressed that it is oriented towardfuture nuclear power that iscompetitive with the conventional power costs in the Urals and European USSR. an analysis of information on theof the large-scale prototype reactors involved Indicates they arc designed tosignificant amounts ofuantities equal to the amountonsumed in the reactors The Soviets further state that this plutonium could conceivably be recycled as subsequent charges in the reactors. However, relative. plutonium has an even greater valueeapons program thanowerprogram. Therefore, we believe this plutonium will be allocated by the USSR to weapons stockpiles.'

38a. The original Soviet plans for nuclear power include the construction of powernear Moscow. Unlngrad, Voronezh, and in the Urals There is no firm Information as to which specific reactor is to be installed at any of the locations except Moscow. These plans included the construction of thetypes of power reactors:

a.MW pressurized water reactors apparently have been designated for the first station to be placed in operation near Moscow In (See Table in.) The seed-core enrichment concept is planned to be used In this type of reactor with the fuel loading con-sisting of aboutilogramsnriched UO- andetric tons of natural UO,. It is planned that these reactors will be of the pressure vessel type and will use stainless steel clad fuel elements. However, whether theIn the third station (see Table III) will utilize zirconium cladding or not will depend on the success the Soviets hare in developing suitable production techniques. We estimate that the third station will employ this type of reactor and will become operational at the end

b. The second station willMW graphite-moderated and water-cooled reactors which stem directly fromW station at

lootnotcageor thr poiluon ot the Director ol Naval Intellieence

Obninskoye and is expected to operatenriched uraniumhermal-to-electrical net efficiency ot

c. Recent evidence indicates thatMW heavy-water moderated gas-cooledeactor Included in the original Sixth Five-Year Plan has been omitted from the revised plan. This reactor was to have operated on natural uranium as the fuelhermal-to electrical efficiencynd would have requiredetric tons of heavy water It is not known whether the plans for this reactor altogether mCre'y deferrcd or

d. Four experimental (pilot plant type) ro nctors0 EMW each are also included In tho revised plan. These reactors are slated to be of the followinglutonium fastomogeneous thorium-breedera boUing-water reactor;odium cooled, graphite-moderated reactor. It is not known whether or not thesee used, as originally planned, toom-posite experimental atomic power station

i a



ranium Mining. Much quantitativeIs available on mining and oreIn East Germany. Someinformation is available on the other Satellites, notably Chechoslovakia, Rumania and Bulgaria, but information on the USSR is limited to knowledge that mining is taking placeumber of areas. (Secc estimate thatetric tons of uranium (in terms of recoverable metal) was rained6 in the USSR and its satellites,etric tons of which came from East Germany. The total figure is subjectonsiderablesince we hare no quantitativeon internal Soviet production for which we havealue well within their capabilities. The estimated cumulative ore production6 is more thanto support the fissionable materialestimates.

uture Uranium Ore Procurement. The US Geological Survey estimates that the Soviet Bloc has several hundred thousand tons of uranium ln medium grade ore deposits and an even greater quantity ln low grade Many of these reserves are within the Soviet Union and could be exploited by present ore recovery methods. If It Is assumed that the present estimated rate of expansion of ore production (see Table IV) is maintainedeasonable estimate of Soviet Bloc ore production would be as tabulated below. We estimate that the actualproduction will not be less than three-quarters of the values shown and orecould be considerably higher if desired. This estimate of Soviet bloc ore produeUon will adequately support the estimatedof natural uranium through2 Other Raw Materials. There is evidence that the Soviet atomic energy program hasores of thorium, zirconium, and other elements useful in atomic energy activities.

















Although little quantitative information Is available, we believe that requirements for atomic energy purposes would representmall percentage ot the supplies of these elements available to the Soviets.

Economic Factors Affecting the Soviet Nuclear Program. Economic Intelligence was studied to evaluate the characteristics,and growth of the Soviet nuclearFirst, industrial studies were made of some of the basic materials flowing into theluorspar, nickel powder,cement and steel to determine their availability to the nuclear program. Second. Soviet budget allocations were studied asof the size and growth of the nuclear program.

Commodity Estimates. In all of the few cases where an evaluation has been made the estimated nuclear production requirements for particular commodities never exceedsupplies available for this purpose. To the contrary, available supplies of fluorspar and nickel powder sufficiently exceedproduction requirements as to suggest the possibilityarger Soviet nuclearthan has been estimated herein.

Budget Allocations. Available Soviet atomic energy budget information does notefinitive evaluation of the size and rate of growth of nuclear analysis of the data indicate that tlie Soviet atomic program could belarger than estimated herein Ina preliminary analysis of possible cumulative nuclear investment allocations for the0 substantially exceeds estimated capital costs based on the physical size ol the program indicated by all other intelligence.

ranium Metal Production information obtained from returned German scientists, used in conjunction with data on calciumund timetables pertaining to Soviet uranium melal plantsairly reliable estimate at Ihe amount of uranium metal ready for reactor use nianufacluicd each year up through Analysis of thisindicates that: (a) the first metal suitable for reactor use was made at Elektros-tal inb) this planta pacity ofetric tons of uranium metal slugs per month by0 and probablyons per month by the middle of that year, and (c) production lines ofons of slugs per month each went into operation at Glazov, west of the Urals, in9 andnd at Novosibirsk, in central Siberia, in1 ando information Is available on subsequent activities at these plants or at other possible uranium metal manufacturing facilities In the Soviet Union.

n the absence ofranium metal plant Information thc subsequent production lias been estimated on the basis of uranium ore procurement and an assumed ore reserve program. The USSR hastate Reserve System1 In order lolanned reservearge number of essential raw materials and intermediate commodities to serveulwark against cither economic or military events. Soviet uranium orehas exceeded uranium ore requirements by an amount which can be best explained in terms of the assumptiontate reserve to offset possible loss of supply. Comparison of the uranium ore estimate with independently derived estimates of uranium usage in the Soviet atomic energy program3 strongly suggests that60 annual uranium ore procurement was kept atalue as tohree year reserve at allmttcrn which isrepeated in thc procurement of other materials for the atomic energy program.3 uranium metal production has therefore been estimated from the uranium ore procurement estimate on the assumptions that the three year reserve was maintained in the0 period and that reactoi tails were the sole source of feed for uranium Isotope separation plants aftern the table lipjnw, the uranium metal production foruse has been estimated irom plantup tond from the ura mum ore estimate thereafter


Heavy Water Early0 the Soviets began the conversion and installation of equipment at the Chirchlk NitrogenIn Central Asia to provide for theof by-product heavy water for atomic energy uses. Simultaneously. Germany was exploited for heavy water, research results, equipment, ond research personnel. Aboutonstruction of production facilities to use the water electrolysis-catalyticmethod was started at five other plants. Construction was also startedeventh plant at Aleksin which used the sulphide-water exchange method. Limited production commenced at Chirchik7 and at Aleksin in Most of the other plants began producing90 By7 work was underwaylant al Norilsk ln far north Siberia using the ammonia-water exchange system. This plant probably did not begin heavy water production until No other heavy water plants have been Identified in the Soviet Union Thus, although eight separate plants are now believed to be in operation, we estimate their annual heavy water production to be only aboutetric tons per year.

he following cumulative estimate of heavy water produced in the USSR isto be reasonably accurate upfterhe values given pro'b ablyinimum level ofraphite The Oeneva and Moscowon Atomic Energy and evidence from returned Oerman scientists have established that at least four Soviet research reactors,their first one, used graphite as aor reflecting material. Statements. Kurchalov. an important figure in Soviet reactor development, and Information fromGerman scientists Indicate clearly that the first Soviet plutonium production reactor was also graphite moderated. The details of the manufacture and procurement of reactor graphite was still obscure, but it was appar enUy available as early

ithium. [


German scientists worked during their "cool-mg-ofr' period on the electromagneticof lithium isotopes but they report that the project was undertaken at their ownand excited no Soviet interest ft is prob-able that the Soviets arcore econom -icai method of separating lithium isotopesroduction scale. Their Interest both in the procurement of lithium ores and of mercury in the0 period suggests that they may be using the mercury amalgam method Wc have no valid information on winch lo banetimate ol the amount of enriched lithium that might be available nt any time, for


weapon use. We believe, however, that the quantity will be sufficient to meet

hethc timetable of initialis well supported by Informationprimarily from returnedThese data also permit agood estimateased upon likelyand gaseous diffusion plantEstimated Soviet productions based upon (a) estimates of

.electric power available for uranium isotope separation and (b) estimated operatingof the Soviet uranium isotopeplants.

first Soviet gaseous diffusionseparation plant was built atIn the Urals In the two yearsthe springnd came Intoduring the latter halfof details of this plant haveby returned Germans. [

iThecapacity of this barrier and the overall plant efficiency were poor. It was evidently designed lo producerams per day. but In actual operation only turnedaterial.

} This plant was reported to be still operating3 probably producing small quantitiesaterial which could have been enrichedn Uic much larger com plex built in theeriod at this site.

here is evidence that9 on to thc present time there hasrogram to increase Uie basic efficiency of plant design. The corrosion and inleakage problems which were serious9 were solved adequately by the end Meanwhile plant con

footnote J. pace z. tot tne pouiion ol th* Director ol Naval Intelligence.

struction. with newer designs incorporated, continued at Verkhnefvinsk. and constructionew site north of Tomsk in central Siberia started


lthough Initial plant expansion at Vcr-khneiviruk1 was designed for depletiononcentration in the tailings, evidence from Uie German scientists Indicates that it was operated% at leasturthermore, In view of the fact that there is an abundance of uranium oreto Uie USSR, and that It is morefrom Uie standpoint of both kilograms of product per MW of electric power input and total quanUty of output to strip toie latter value has been used in allalculations. The consistency of all necessary assumptions on plant design with the available evidence was established using basic gaseous diffusion theory. These studies establish not only thai Soviet plants aredifferently from US plants, but that lhe Soviets havevanced their state of knowledge In the fiel of gaseousHowever, Uic limited knowledge on the rate at which many of the design improve meats investigated by the Soviets wereInto Uie operating plantsa degree of uncertainty in the estimate*lant upcrating efficiencies

ur estimate of the Soviet gaseous diflu-sion program fromos based

Jas well as on barrier fabrication methodsarrier quality parametersby returned Germans, and lakes Into account the Soviet improvements in plantreported by returned Germans andincreases in compressor efficiency. (See Tabicccording to this estimate, the Verkhneivlnsk Complex producedor the1 weapon test anda production rate of about fourper day by3

e estimate thai byhc Soviets had achieved an improved and fairly efficient gaseous diffusion process, some four (A) times rrwre efficient than their earliest efforts. This evidence of increased Soviet capability has been extrapolated into theeriodradual Improvement in the efficiency of utilization of electric power. These Increases in elhcicncy can be predicted with someot reliability during then terms of the application of improvements which the Germans helped develop Beyondhis extrapolation is an assumption of gradual progress achieved ^hrough Improved barrier and compressors.


onsiderable amount of infoimaiion on the generation and distribution of electric power in the Urals area has become available during the past year. The most important new evidence indicates that the majority of thc power generated at the Nizhnyaya Tura power plant is being sent southward toward Verkhneivlnsk This leaves the function of the large atomic energy site near Nirhnyaya Tura in doubt and strongly suggests it does not manufactureowever, the estimated electric power available to isotope separation for the current periodan be calculatedan degree of accuracy This calculationade byfrom the total power available in areas of probable Soviet gaseous diffusion plants that power estimated to be required for other industries, for export to other localities, and for local non-Industrial uses

GO. Our estimate of future electric power al-kxauons to Isotope separation is fundamen-tally based on the assumptions that thewill have expanding requirementshroughoutGC period and will implement thc production programto meet these requirements While these assumpUons are consistent with available in formation, thc extent of the actual expansion will depend on future Soviet decisions and ae-lions which cannot be accurately predicted, and our estimates must have wide ranges of possible error. In arriving at these estimates, consideration was givenariety of factors such as the planned future availability ofpower In regions of known isotopeplants, the difficulties lhe Soviets are having in expanding their economy at the currently planned rate, and current evidence icflectlng requirementsor military and nuclear electric power purposes.

he electric power estimated to befor isotope separation7 was arrived at by carrying forward the sameof new generating capacity devoted to gaseous diffusion isotope separation as thai utilized in the. The result, ing valueW for the period fromos consistent with thc midpoint of the range of electric power esti mated lo be potentially available al that tune for isotope separation near Verkhneivlnsk and Tomsk, and in the Irkutsk Oblast. Theexpansion in the succeeding six years0 MW, for example, is less than thc total power to be available from the new. gianl Hraisk Dam, In the Irkutsk Oblast This value Implies lhal7 in thc legion from east of Lake Baikal to the western border of the Urals, gaseous diffusion plantsf the available electrical energyt the energy from generating capacity instilled6 Ho*ever, this value is onlyf the total planned electrical energy develoj>ed by the USSRat year.

The uncertainty in the cumulativeofroduction throughs shown in Table VII, is large butdocs notactor ofne half to twice the stated quantity. However, the estimates of future produeUon could be substantially greater or smaller thansince these figures arc based onof future Soviet capabilities and plans, and some of the latter may not yet have been decided by the Soviets themselves.

equirements ot Power Program. 'Ihe amount% equivalent) which the Soviets will sacrifice from their available weapon reserves has been obtained by eatl-matlng tho fuel requirements for each planned reactor. The fuel requirements wereby utilizing the intelligence data wher ever possible supplemented by operational In-formaUon obtained from known reactors of the same type. Soviet statements havean expansion0 megawattsor purposes of calculation, wc have assumed an average expansionMW per year for the first sue years of the expanded nuclear power1

63a. In Table VIII. the annual fuelhave been appropriately allotted on the basis of assumed Soviet practice to provide an indication of probablen the power reactor program. The cumuIaUvc estimatequivalent presented in Table VIII as expended or tied up In the nuclear power reactor program is subject to considerable variation depending on Soviet plans for different reactor designs, the date each reactor Is placed in operation, and the method and schedule of fuel re-proceaslng.

roduction Reactors. There is evidence that construcUon on the first soviet produc-



Dale Mid-Year




Annua! Aware Ekclri* IW Available lo



Latlmalrd Atmgcof BlltHlD/KG


lUUniaicd on Stream Time iii %




55 "lOO






Cumulative ProdueUon


- 1

at*fn, Um<,fimmm olP

% Of IK.. l ^tlx

*finu toouom, to |

rakoaor iCarH turner inlnmHm



) Oi.




' I



initialor each Urge>aj caleulated u. I- equw.Wll-Wi.

niMl conwaipUooy each Urgemm cilcutaud to be equivalentilo-grama. Tho rcqulierticnU ol lheMat ion* are very tinoll and therefore arc not in-


Uon reactor started early7 near Kyshlym in the Urals and that it went into operation abouttatements byGermans and from I. V. Kurchatov strongly indicates that this reactor was similar In some respects to the early Ilanford models. The reactor reportedly was water cooled and graphite moderated, usedetric tons ol uranium, and hadertical fuel channels, it probably developedegawatts of heat power initially but may later have been raised to much higher power levels as has been the case in US experience. Thc urgency of thc Soviet program during this period is perhaps reflected in the fact that construction of this reactor wassome six months before the USSR's first research reactor (also graphite moderated) went critical In the late summer

here is informationeavy-water moderated reactor went into operation at Kyshtym sometime towaid the endonstruction of this reactor probably began about the same time construction was Initiated on thc heavy water research reactor which became operational In9 at the Thermo Technical Laboratory in Moscow

Continuing Soviet production of heavy water indicates that subsequent heavy-waterreactors must have been built, but

Tind the availability ofmetal2 both indicate that9 reactor construe Uon in the Soviet Union was not limited to heavy water reactors alone.

hc exact schedule of reactor construction8 is not known. Deductions fromuranium metal availability, heavy water production, and site timetables suggest that five or six production reactors wereat Kyshtym byf which two or possibly three were heavy-waterThere Is evidenceecondsite went into opera Uon in the area of Krasnoyarsk, probablyhcavailability of uranium metal and heavy water3 and lalcr suggest that two or three large heavy-water moderatedhare been builtresumably In the Krasnoyarsk area.

nitially thc separation of plutonium from uranium and fission producls was done by an oxldalion-reductionco-precipltalion process which differed somewhat from that Initially adopted by thc US. It was planned to recover uranium as well as plutonlum. since themetal plant at Glazov was designed to process reactor depleted uranium as partial feed material. Soviet and German research on solvent extraction and other methodsthat the Soviets may have latera better process However, Sovietin solvent extraction methods at5 Geneva Conference on Atomic Energy, and their subsequent publication of ratherstudiesolvent extracUon method suggest that they may still have been using their initial process as late6

6fl. Plutonium Equivalent"

"Bee rootnoleaneor the position of the Director of Naval


^Ihe Krasnoyarsk area, of central Siberia and

]The extensive use of Plutonium In soviet nuclear tests,6 thermonuclear tests, whileon technical grounds, suggests that the Soviets would have increased the production of plutonium equivalent

ssuming that Uie Soviet* expandedequivalent production aftert is difficult to tell when this expansion took place. F


vidence from various aspects of theatomic energy program suggests, however,ignificant expansion of Sovietequivalent production has taken place sometime since Sovietof raw materials for fissionable material production, particularly uranium ore and fluorspar nas continued to Increase. this procurement Increase docs not necessarily indicate corresponding and pro porUonal Increases in fissionable materialthe quanUUes of raw materialaccumulated are not consistentonstant level of plutonlum production, even when the estimated large Increaseroduction sinces taken into There is also evidence that aSoviet production reactor site was built in


ur estimate Is based on the assumption that the Soviets gradually expandedequivalent production beginning4 The estimate has been derived from estimated uranium ore procurement and assumedpractices; estimated feed practiceseparation plants; estimated heavy water and uranium metal production-site construction time schedules;and assumptions on Soviet reactor designs and[_

] The accuracy of Uieestimate of plutonlum equivalentla particularly dependent upon theof Uie reactor irradiation time estimate the uranium ore estimate, tho use of reactor tails only in separation plantsnd Uie estimate of uranium ore stockpiling

ur estimate of Soviet plutoniumproduction is baaed on an expanding pro-gram[





P Hill)

r -i









the reactor operating cycles, however, the shorter the cycle the greater the operating

Uted that theproduced in the power program couiu conceivably be reprocessed and utilized asfuel to an attempt to make the nuclear power program as self-sufficient as possible with regards to fuel. It is believed that this concept was discussed for its psychological effect but that It would not be adopted because Plutonium is more valuable in the weapons program* The major impact of the nuclear electric power program on future fissionable material stockpiles, eitheronsumerrroducer of plutonium,1 upon the results of the planned programives the estimated total installed electrical megawatts and the plutonium production of the nuclear power program



^ 'ootnolc. Jotoailioti of (I* Dirextor of Naval laURlrea**.

Harare Plutonium Equivalent Production Wc estimate that Ihe USSR will continue toigh value on plutonium equivalent and toonsiderable eflort to produce large quantities of it. The Soviet productionas been estimated on the same basis as foreriod. Starling9 we assume that all newequivalent production capacity will come from the power reactor program.

Plutonium Production by Power Reactor Program. F

The suitability ol the plutonium for some types of weapons will decrease with an Increase in the duration of


The estimate tabulated below includes plutonium from both production and power reactors. It must be recognized that theabout future Soviet planslarge errors into the future production esUmates and that these errors increase rapidly as the estimate is extended into the future. It is not believedeaningful numerical range of this uncertainty can be given after

footnoteareor the position of the Director ofntHliccncc.

he Mm known Sovietin tritium was revealed by the publication in8omprehensive review of the literature on tritium bytall member of the Soviet atomic energyReturned Germans report that2 tritium was available for research in their laboratories.thanum which is found in thorium-bearing minerals and was needed for the Sovietseparation chemical plant. Germanat Elektrostal were also required toa process for the production of pure thorium oxide. Subsequently, thc USSRconsiderable thorium

nthe only

certain productionrom thoriumresearch quantities mentioned atand Moscow Conferences onThere has been no detectedof

and i! appears probable that the Soviets are not making Important quantitiesor weapon stockpiling at present The interest In thorium breeder reactors in their power reactor programossible future weapon utilization of thc material

uture Fissionable Materials Available for Weapon Uses. The estimated cumulative quantities of fissionable material available for weapon uses arc tabulated below. The amounts have been calculated by deducting


We estimate that tritium availabilityould not be moref the tot-'il plutonium equivalent and afterhat trttium production be limited% of production reactors' undf powercapacity for plutonium production.

" Active Soviet interest in thorium bearing minerals started aboutith thc formationpecialfor their exploitation. Although part of this interest lay in the requirement for lan-

"For planning purpose* the productionam .ol muum iso lhe producuonrru of plutoniumplanning purpose* toef

Ol. ro.uita.lefU tooue:ion ol iol pi-jionium

top cDonur

the estimated produeUon thoseof fissionable material estimated to meetuclear test expenditures, and to mccl the Inventory and fuel requirements of research und power reactors. No deductions hove been made for production reactorsfuture nuclear tests, propuLiion applications of fissional materials, or materials lied up in weapons manufacturing pipelinesajor nuclear propulsion program were undertaken, this would require substantialof fissionable materia)


uclear Tests. The first Soviet nuclear test was conductedt the main Soviet proving ground in the vicinity ofand was followed by tests6otal ofests have been delected



4 Nuclear Tests. Sevenhe first, which took place near Totskoye. we estimate to be an airdropuclear weapon as partilitaryand weapons effects test. The remaining six tests occurred at the main Soviet proving ground in the vicinity of Semlpalatinsk. All tests of this scriesilotons or less.

S1 Nuclear

S Nuclear Tests. Five nuclearoccurred5n5 was the only Soviet nuclear explosion known to date to have occurred under water. The JOEest yieldedilotons, and Is considered to have been the airburst^


3 Nuclear Tests. Theemonstrated that the USSR wasto supplement the1 by the addition of bothweapons and

Jletonated or.ieldedilolons

evelopment ot great significance washe airbunt on5hermonuclear weapon which yieldedegatons.^

"]lt marked the eflective beginningoviet mnlti-megaton nuclear weapon capability. Another lest.ay have been detonated at ft high altitudef


6 Nuclear Tests6 Soviettests are particularly significant. Tests extended throughout the entire year,ebruary untilecember, anduclear


nd JOEere air burst testsegatonsr

7 Nuclear Tests. 7 tests beganetonation on7iles NNE. of Kapustin Yar! This air burst yieldedilotons. The

facts that the testelatively low air-burst, was detonatedoviet guided missile test center, but not on thc ballistic missile test range, and was completelyfrom any previous nuclear testsuggest the testuclear warheadissile, possibly an air-to-surface type. The next test, which was conducted7 at the Scmlpalatinsk test site, yieldedT, was an alr-burst.f

3pril, fiveoccurred in fourteen days. All of the tests took place at the Semlpalatlnsk site. These tests occurred too late to permitanalysis prior lo publication of thisPreliminary Information indicates the yields were as follows:pril,T;pril,T; (c)T; (d)pril,T; and (e)T.


direct information is available on the specific nuclear weapons types In the USSR stockpile However, Soviet nuclear tests have indicated that several types ar weapons have been proof-tested, and such weapons types are probably Included In the present stockpile.

In Table XIV are listed the estimatedand future Soviet nuclear weaponscapabilities The characteristics of the weapons estimated to have beenhave been derived from the nuclear test data making reasonable specific choices of yields, diameters, weights, and quantities of fissionable materials in cases where the test dataange of possible values. The characteristics of the other weapon typesto be available to the Soviets at the present Ume have. In general, been derived from the proof-tested weapons, other tests, and substitute designs which are considered to be well within Soviet capabilities

urrent Fission Weapons. II is estimated that the current Soviet nuclear weapons stockpile could contain fission weaponsf" considered that, because ol the simplicity ol design, weapons of this type could now be available in stockpile^

Current Thermonuclear Weapons.

G nuclear testsumber of thermonuclear devices, and weapons based on these tests could become available in7 period.


igh-Yield Missile Warheads. Ine have estimated that the Soviet guided mtc^b- program has design and successfullyissileange ofilesEI* ofautical miles We have estimated that this missile canarheadounds This Soviet requirementound warhead has been ennsideri'd indala from thermonuclear


un-Assembh/ Weapons Although the USSR is not known to have tested nuclear weapons employing gun-type assembly, il is

ny prediction of future Soviet weapons development must be made by extrapolating estimates of present Soviet capabilities and by evaluating the estimated militaryof the USSR and the ipparanthe Soviet nuclear test program As in oui assessment of earlier Soviet weapon designs. US nuclearchnology in', been useduide in evaluating lutuie Soviet weapons capabilities, in order to ponnil tough esti mates ol UH' capabilities nl lln- USSR m

eriod. C

Boosted Nuclear WeaponsC

weapons win be


replaced In the stockpile by more efficient and economical designs as these become available Consequently, the composition of the USSR nuclear weapons stockpile at some future date is extremely uncertain.

urare Thermonuclear

cnd "pen the successful application of tritium gas boosting, fj

This technique will permit the developmentdiameter thermonuclear weaponsof prc-initlation proofthe more efficient use of fissionablein. .

since tritiumto radioactive decayalf-lifeyears, we estimate that productionof large quantities of tritiumbegin until the Soviets have achievedtest of the gas-boostingproduction

be limited by the stockpile of tritium available at the time of production, and calculation of Uie stockpile quantities of these weapons should be limited by the quantities ofurrent production duringeriod. Since the production of tritium In reactorsjs competitive with production of





uclear Weapons Developmento have no basis for estimates of Sovietweapons development in theeriod. In general, we anticipate that the USSR will be capable Of producing nuclear weapons of the range of yields andrequired for support of Sovietrequirements. Q

3dditionide variety of fission weapons, including very small low-yleldwill be available to meet various

Requirements for Continued Testing tn the Soviet Nuclear Weaponshc Soviet lest program has already provideddata for the rapid andariety of nuclear weapon types The majority of theoviet nuclear detonations detected by the US appear to have been primarily weapons development tests, although military interesteapons effects tests is evident in the Totskoye test4 and the Novaya Zemlya underwater teste believe that the Soviets willin significant numbers, only weaponstested design principles. Majorin weapon design, which result in significant changes in anticipated yield, or new weapons designs and concepts willbe tested before stockpiling.

Thermonuclear Weapons Tests. Eight or nine of theetected Soviet nuclear tests probably Involved detonation ofweapons or devices with thermonuclear weapons design principles

*ON 11S. HMMt Moratofiu. On The Soviet Weapons OevelopnierK Pro* tarn. In



oosted andield Weapon Tests. Increasing the efficiency ot utilization ofmaterial in low-yield weapons by the

called "boosting,"

Additional low-

yield nuclear tests will probably be considered desirable to verify the reliability of suchweapons when adapted to specific


pplication of Nuclear Propulsion forby the USSR. There is no evidence of Soviet activities directly identified with afor nuclear aircraft propulsion.the Soviets have made Increasinglyreferences to the feasibility of aircraft

nuclear propulsion during tlie past year Theseranged from popular discussions in newspapers and magazines to statements by some oi the highest officials In the USSR. It is believed that the amount ol discussion permitted on this subject reflects Sovietthat they will be able toractical system of aircraft nuclear Some of the research known to have been conducted by the USSR could applyto nuclear propulsion for aircraft It Is assumeduclear propulsionresearch progrnm for aircraft began when it was realized by the USSR that certaincould be utilized for this purpose. We estimate that:

The Soviet aircraft nuclear propulsion reactor program is probably now engaged in development and testing of reactorand sub-systems.

A reactor system suitable for nuclear propulsion of subsonic aircraft could probably be available to the Soviets

ntelligence indicates that the USSR has considered the feasibility of nuclearfor missiles At least preliminary design studies have been conducteduclearsystemuclear reactor program for missile propulsion has not been Identified. The Soviets have openlyaper describing in generaleactor system for missiles which appears to be technically sound. We estimate that the USSR has. at most, conducted basic research on develop mental components for. Naval and Marine Application* ofPropulsion by the USSR The Soviet Union exhibited an interest In nuclear ship propulsion as early8 Publications and statements56 have confirmed Uiis interest, winch has been extended to in elude nuclear-powered submarines, large cargo ships, tankers, factoryships, and the highly publicized icebreaker now under construction at Leningrad There is no doubtuclear propulsion reactor suitable lor naval and marine applications is currently under construction On the basis of the current stale ol Soviet reactor research and development, (he status of the Icebieaker construction, together with related time scales derived from US experience, we estimate that :

A nuclear propulsion reactor lor aship (Icebreaker) will be installed innd thai the ship will undergotests in8 or

A nuclear propulsion reactor for acould be available for installation

(e) That by the time these ships complete operational tests, the Soviets could undertake the constructionariety of surface ships and submarines.

lie reactors employed in the first sur face ship and submarine will probably beressurized water type and use enriched fuel. The Soviets have considered other types of reactors for propulsion purposes,the liquid-metal, the gas-cooled, the fast breeder and the homogeneous-boiling types. The first two mentioned could be adapted to surface ship propulsion In the near future we believe that the Soviets could construct one or both these types of reactors for surface ships he reactor most likely lo be usedubmarine propulsion syslem is the pressurised-water type. Soviet reactor engineers have slated that homogenc-ous-boilmg water reactors may be the best type for marine propulsion This typecould be adapted to both submarine and surface ship propulsion0


lOfi Soviet Aid to Bloc Nuclear Research. The Sovicl Union has continued in her role as an active participant In international atomic energy activities. The program of atd to the Bloc (Uie furnishingW. slightly enriched, swimming pool-type research reac tors, particle accelerators, radioisotopes and tcchnical training of personnel) as announced in5 is still In progressof the physical facilities to house theis underway in the Bloc countries De-livery ol the actual reactors is scheduled7 flloe scientist* have gone to Ihe Soviet Union (ot training and Soviet scientists have come to the Satellites Uo lecture on atomic

energy for peaceful purposes. Shipments of radioisotopes have been made to all of the Bloc countries. Exhibits similar to the one displayed at the Geneva Conlerenceave been sent by the Soviet Union lo several of the Satellites. These exhibits have also been sent to India, Sweden and Yugoslavia.

Soviet Offers oj Power Reactors. The Soviet aid program has been expanded loassistance to the Satellites in theof reactors for the production of electric power. Chechoslovakia, EastHungary and Rumania have reported plans for Soviet assistance In the constructionW reactors within the next five years.

The Joint Nuclear Research Institute. The Joint Nuclear Research Institute, located at Dubna near Moscow, was createdC to serve as the focal point of Sino-Soviet Bloc technical cooperation in nuclear energy. The primary functions of the Institute appear to be: (a) to coordinate and guide jointand experimental nuclearhc Bloc, (b) to exploit the potentialities of thc Bloc nuclear scientists, (c) to train Blocin the use of equipment such as par tick acvlerators and experimental reactors; and (d) to minimize the attraction for Bloc scientists In participation in non-Communist nuclear research centers. All Sino-Soviet Bloc countries have membership in the newThe dominating role of the Soviet Union Is reflected by the physical location of the Institute, the control exercised over thc activities, and the annual financialto thc operation and expansion of theSome ot the Bloc countries haveconcern that membership in the Instl tule will result in Soviet domination over the direction of any research and Bloc set entists will not be free to follow projects of their own choosing. It has been publicly slated that participation in the work of the Institute will be open to non-Bloc countries

oviet Atd to Non Rloc Countries The most extensive aid agreements to uon Bloc

countries have been made with Yugoslavia and Egypt. Yugoslavia isW research reactor and other technical aid similar to that given to thebut negotiations concerning terms for delivery broke off without agreement ingypt is toW research reactor, research equipment, trainingeological suivey lor uranium on. Inhigeharuember of the Japanese Joint Committee for Atomic Energy was informed by Ncsmeya-nov, President of Academy of Sciences and Sluvsky. Chief Main Administration for Atomic Energy, that Japan could receive atomic reactors, atomic fuel and otheraid if formal agreements concerning technical Interchange between the USSR and Japan would be concluded. In thesethc Soviet representatives reportedly stated that they have no intentions of attach ing to their technical aid any conditions as may restrict or encroach upon the rights of the other party. There has been no evidence ol any actual negotiations between the Soviet Union and the Japanese government having taken place as yet. The Soviet Union has made general statements both from Moscow and in speeches in New York at theon the Statute of the International Atomic Anergy Agency, criticizing control provisions of the Statute and of US bilateral agreements as imposing political andconditions inconsistent wilh therights of nations. While terms on which tho Soviets supply nuclear materials have not been published, the Soviets allege that they Impose no restrictions on the use of the material or its disposition Limited offers of training and supplies of radioisotopes have been made to India. Iian. Indonesia. Lebanon, Syria, Thailand.Greece.and Burma. Soviet moves in the Western Hemisphere have been noted in steps being taken to obtain an exchange of Mexican professors and studenU The Soviets have also attempted to provide Chile with nuclear research equipment thiough the United Nations TechnicalAdministration. Offers of material and aid, thus far rejected, have been made to Norway and Austria.

Moves Directed Against theoY the Soviet moves In Internationalln the atomic Held have beento counteract5 the Sovietsonferencepeaceful uses of atomic energyan attempt to detract from the Unitedsponsored Geneva Conference inIn6 the Sovietsectorial BodyUses of Atomic Energy to includeEast and West European countries andStates. The announced purpose ofwas to foster interchange ofprovide mutual assistance in theof atomic energy. Thisime when West Europeanwere considering the EURATOMEC plans and appears to liave been anto cause dissent among thecountries involved in theOEEC discussions. Tho JointInstitute might be considered toEast European counterpart to CERN,European Institute at will have far moreavailable to lis members.

Conferences andto the West. Attendance of Sovietat international conferences andSoviet scientists to Western countriesto increase, ln addition toin Western meetings the Sovietsconferences in the Soviet Union withto the West. The mostthese was the USSR Conference onPhysics In6 in which USfree-world scientistswere two particularly significantmade to the West during the pastfirst was Kurchotov's visit loin6 where he openlySoviet work In the field ofreactions and. inconsiderable details of the Sovietprogram. The second wasvisit lo Sweden In Hisof controlled thermonuclear reaction experiments were more revealing than tlie statements made by Kurchatov.

International Atomic EnergySoviet Union played an active part inConference on the Statute of theAtomic Energy Agency held atNations headquarters In NewSoviets made no constructiveto the Statute of the Agency; theireffort was toecord in favor of

Red Chinese parUclpation in the Agency;

technical aid being free of any conditions which infringe on the sovereign rights of the recipient; andlace for Soviet Satellites in tlie management of the Agency. Although the Soviet Union voted for the Statute as finally adopted by the Conference onhe Soviet Union has made nofor support of the agencyromise in its note of5 to supplyg of fissionable material. Their principal Interest appears to be the propaganda and political aspect of the Agency's activities.

of Unrest In the BlocIs not possible as yet to determine theot the impact that the Polish anduprisings will have on Sovietto the Bloc. Therovides forSoviet atomic energy assistance,for continued and expanded supplyuranium ore lo the USSR. Inhas been evidence of dissatisfactionpartungarian official with theasked for the research reactor,the official as obsolete. Nevertheless,State Investment Plan forthat the research reactor will beduring the year. Poland hasovertures to the United States forThis is the first such move by aAnother exampleorealtitude on the part ol Bloc nationsIncreasing interchange ol scientificIhe Satellites and between Blocand Yugoslav scientists

e estimate that the Soviet Union will continue lo participate in international atomic energy affairs. Her aid to Blocand offers of aid to non-Bloc countries will continue for political and propaganda purposes.9 thc Soviet Union willmake further offers of aid in theOf atomic power stations to non-Bloc countries when its first full scale plant goes into operation.

Original document.

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