BOOK REVIEW: THE LABYRINTH

Created: 9/1/1957

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OA WSIDRICAL REVIEWELEASE IN fljtl r

STUDIES IN

INTELLIGENCE

A collodion ol articles on tho historical, operational, doctrinal, and theoretical aspects of intelligence

All suicmcnu of fact, opinion or analysis expressed in Studies in Intelligence are (hose of

the authors They do not necessarily reflect official positions or views of the Central Intelligence Agency or any other US Government entity, past or present. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government endorsement of an article's faciual statements and inicrprctations.

CRITIQUES OF SOME RECENT BOOKS ON INTELLIGENCE

BYRINTHTBE MEMOIRS OF HITLER'S SECRET SERVICE CHIEF. By Walter ScheUenberg. (New York: Harper.

A nimble, detached, and cynical mind aided Sch ell en berg in avoiding entanglement in the mysticism and ritualisticwith which Himmler and Heydrich had Indoctrinated the leadership cadres of their SS Elite Guards,the other handimplicating him In conspiracies against the regime. By nolind adherent of the Fuehrer, his boast to have on occasion registered dissent from some ofmore outlandish "intelligence" schemes, can be believed. Among the bund, Sch ell en berg was one-eyed. His specialas chief of the regime's foreign Intelligence servicehis critical faculties, enabling him toore timely and accurate grasp of the obstacles In the way of Germany's quest for world leadership.

Schellenberg was an avowed protege of Hlrnmlers and of Heydrich's. The formerrotecting hand overuntil the bitterircumstance aiding Scbellenberg's phenomenal luck In surviving the vagaries of the Third Reich. It may be said that heebt of gratitude to Himmler by painting him In The Labyrintheak rathericious man. It is difficult to visualise In Schell en berg'sof Himmler the protagonist and executorarefully planned program of mass exterminationcale the modem world had not heretofore witnessed.

The Labyrinth throws Into relief one salient aspect ofn berg's personality: his exceptional dexterity to theation of power factions within the leadership of the Nazi Party without ever becoming too cloeely Identified with any one of them.andy introduction Into the techniques forThe Labyrinth can be recommended.

et

Only toward the'end'. when there was Uttlf rnore^oSchellenberg decide to take calculated risks The Bernaaottt episode, though abortive, was handled by Schellenberg with some of the daring and Imagination that stemmed from despair.

While his rank and position doubtlessly affordeda vantage point from which to observe Germany'sdrift toward defeat, he was frequently found wanting In the Intellectual equipment needed to project events, which he correctly observed,ramework of global developments. The outline of peace terms which he presented to Hlmmler at Zhitomirurprising degree of naivete in gauging the temper of the world powers ranged against Germanytheir willingness to accept Germany's ascendancy in the European concertermanent arrangement he took blithely for granted.

On the other hand, some of Schellenbcrg's more visceralturned out to be sound, for example those reflected In his assessment of Britain's determination to fight to the end. He clearly perceived the folly of Hitler's policies in the occupied parts of the Soviet Union and vainly raised his voice in protest.

Not having read the complete manuscript of Schellenbergs memoirs, it is difficult for me to pass Judgment on whether or not certain notable omissions should In fairness be blamed on Schellenberg rather than on its publisher. The translation from the German is mediocre, and regret must be voiced that the final editing Job. which would have benefited fromwas not entrustedan of the calibre of Trevor-Roper. In the circumstances, the reader in search of trueabout the Inner workings of the German Secret Service, should be cautioned to beware, because The Labyrinth Iswith factual inaccuracies and naturally suffers from Its author's bias. What it conveys at best Is an episodic studyuman behavior under conditions of strain Inflicted by afor supremacy within an oligarchy untrammelled by human laws of ethical standards and dedicated to the methods of genocide and terror to maintain its sway.

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Contrasted wiO^raostaf the Nasi blogTapTues. as%ll asritten by leading men of the Third Reich who claimed to hare

belonged to the opposition, it lacks the whining self-righteous-ness, the posture of injured innocence, and frantic endeavor to blame the next guy, the shameless alacrity in throwingthe ballast of longstanding friendships, the perfunctory expressions of horror at the crimes committed by the Nasi regime, which make the perusal of most of them such achore. In my talks with Schellenberg. which took place5 in the Military Intelligence (MI) Interrogation Center atound him to be personable, adaptable, and yet not devoidertain dignity in facing up to the prospects of being called to account for some of the activities in which he had been engaged. He did not go out of his way to pinon hu former associates, nor did he pretend that his efforts to bringegotiated peace were motivated by considerations otherlear realization that Germany's game was up.

Schellenberg makes passing reference to his interrogation by the British service.atter of fact, he had been subjected to an exceedingly painstaking debriefing, backed up by abody of detailed data at the disposal of the so-called Counter Intelligence Waroint British-Americanrepresenting probably the most competently operated repository of counterespionage data the world had ever seen. The British report on Schellenberg was up to the customarily nigh professional standards of their services, especially in the field of Intelligence reportage. Eveneading of the Schellenberg report can beewarding professional experience, although most of the Incidents It relates are devoid of contemporary significance.ay It represented ain the field of counterespionage. Inasmuch as neverIn modern history had an opportunity offered to perform an autopsy on the remains of the Intelligence services. feated world power. ;

years have dimmed my recollection of some of the

details of the Schellenberg Interrogationo recall that the British Interrogator poked fun at Schellenberg's rather

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romantic concepts ol the Brttgah^ecret ServicefttKh

inaccuracies of some of the factual data with which he triedup his views. m somewhat Inclined tocandor on that score. After all, the Veolostill have rankled with them; the interrogation reportin the version made available to us wasuncommunicative concerning that Incident. Inhim about the aftermath of the Venlooundto go Into any detail. Since my brief did not callalong thosebstained from exertingtherew the possibly erroneous Inference thathad requested him to restrainassingconcerning the results of the Stevens-Bestm. Incidentally, prepared to believe histhe abduction of Stevens and Best was contrary to hisregarding long range exploitation of the link to theservice, and that be acquiesced In participating in theonly with great reluctance.

In the chapter on The Reichttrxhr and the Red Army little

being added to the already known. The analysis given In John w. wheeler-Bennett's Nemesis of Poweruch more

authentic ring. My own opinion, conjectural at best. Is that

tbe purge of the Soviet command had been in the cards for

some time, that the deception practiced by the Oermans was

reeognixed by Stalin as such, but that it came In very handy

to garb the purge of Tukhachevsky and his associatesloak of legality. The rifling of the German General Staffs archives is unlikely to have yielded more than official datato the various transactions which, with the fullof the Kremlin, enabled the Reichswchr to avail itself of the logistic support of the Red Army in secretly rebuildingadres.

In tbe chapter on Active Espionage, ScheUenbergSoanovaky espionage case without adding anythingreasons best known to the publishers, the names of

principals are not spelled out In full) After the end of the war Soanovaky returned to West Berlin, and it Is fair to assume

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that he resumed* Is ertlwnuWuviufe this^

of the Polish Communist services.

The investigation of the Beer Cellar Explosion fails to provide an answer to the pivotal question, who actually engineered It? It has never been satisfactorily explained why the Nazisthe opportunity of putting the allegedan named Elser, on show trial. In fact Elser was never brought to trial but put away in the Dachau concentration camp where he suffered death Just before Germany's surrender. The actual criminal Investigation was conducted under the aegis of Amt V, the Criminal Police Division of thealked after the war to Krirnlnalrat Hans Lobbcx, who had been In charge of the investigation and who claimed that Elser's guilt had been proven beyond peradventure: he too was unable to shed light on the identity of the actual instigators.

The chapterapanese-Polish Conspiracy does scantto the scope and success of the collaboration between the Japanese Intelligence Service and elements of the PolishOnadeta. the senior representative of Japanesein Europe, Is referred to as "The Japanese Ambassador inlthough the position occupied by him was that of Military Attache. (The report of his interrogation should be considered required reading for anyone Interested In the Japanese modus operandi.)

Schellenberg makes passing reference to Colonel Ronge, the chief of the Austrian Secret Service. In the days or the Austrian Empire known as the KaiserllchKocnlgliche Evidcnxbuero. At the time Schellenberg met him Rongeistorical relic, having been the bead of the Austrian counterespionage service since before World War I. His name at that time becamewith the uncovery of one of the Okhrana's most brilliant and successful espionage operations, the recruitment of CoL Alfredigh-ranking Austrian staff officer,ussian

espionage agent Ronge broke this casetoo late,

; prevent the Russians from getting their hands onplans. Many Austrian, Czechoslovak, and Polish Intelli-

gence officers counted themselves among Ronge's most prised pupils, and the enlistment of his services by the Germans is

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switched sides at the time of the Anschluss was Colonel

General) Lahousen de Vlvremont, who promptly Joined the Abwehr (militaryt was he who had thetoopy of Canaris' diary, produced it before the Nuremberg Tribunal, and rendered testimony which implicated Field Marshall Keltel and General Jodl in the perpetration of war crimes.

ScheUenberg devotes one paragraph to Operation NorthpoU, which contains nothing new. Northpole undoubtedly ranks among the best counterespionage operations undertaken by the German services and it brought In Its wake one of the most serious setbacks suffered by the Allied side in the silent war.

Schellenberg's account of Aktion Bernhard, the RSHA's counterfeit enterprise, sheds significant light on his accuracyeporter of facts and the extent of his truthfulness Infacts that might conceivably implicate him in the very practices for which he castigates Kaltenbrunner, Mueller, and Melsinger. The true story underlying "Aktion Bernhard" has been toldarefully documented article in the7 issue of Harper's Magazine, entitled "The World's Greatesty Murray Teigh Bloom. The reader isto study that article and In its light assess Schellenberg's veracity In stating that "the most skilled engravers to Germany were draftedworn to secrecy, and set to work to three shifts." No doubt ScheUenberg knew better.

How much did Schellenberg's organization effectivelyto its operations targeted against the USSR? In go-tog down the list of Amt VPs major exploits, the reader will be arrested by the claim that through one of Its centers direct con-nection had been established with two of Marshall Rokosovsky's General Staffave seen no mention of this alleged

penetration in any other pertinent debriefing, oubt

enture the guess that this alleged

i! It fn effect existed except in the imagination of a

was controlled on the other end.

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behind Soviet lines, constituted the main effort of Amt VI directed against the territories of the USSR still under Kremlin control, particularly the Caucasus. After the Germanthe British service undertook what looked to mearefully planned roundup ofUSSR and Far Eastkey personnel headed by SS Sturmbannfuehrer Hen gel-haupt, which made it rather difficult for us In the field toirst-hand assessment of the efficacy of "Zeppelin" in terms of its Intelligence productivity. (Needless tom not suggesting that this Information was purposely being withheld from us.) Conceptually, the operation depended on theof Illegal entry Into territory in which the organs of the NKVD reigned supreme; It is fair to assume that the Soviets countered "Zeppelin" with an equally massive defense taking full advantage of the enormous manpower reserves of theirsecurity service. Schellenberg In his description of "Zeppelin" concedes that the NKVD succeeded in inflicting sizeable losses and in undermining it from within, aided and abetted by the treatment the Germans were meting out tominorities The defection of Colonel Rodionov. if true, would testify to the high quality of the NKVD's countermeas-ures. More likely than not RodionovussianService (RIS) infiltree ratherisaffectedof the Germans, as Schellenberg wants his readers to believe.

The next operation mentioned by Schellenberg. the very important center taken over from the Abwehr,act one of the legendary operations of Worldts principalshite Russian General namedhiteIntelligence operator named Ira Longlnong record of Intelligence work under the aegiseavily penetrated White Russian emigre organization tn Yugoslavia,ew named Kauder, alias KlatL The operation had beenby the chief of Abwebrstelle Sofia, Colonel Wagner, alias DehUus. It eventually moved to Vienna and thence to Salzburg Just one step ahead at the advancing Soviet nrmlea. During the war the Allies had effectively monitored and de-

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_.coded Ml

BJatt's control It had never *neen possffi^ however, tothe traffic allegedly being transmitted from the USSRwell-placed sources, and consequently tbe Alliedserious doubt as to the authenticity of thealthough Its outstanding quality appeared tooutright fabrication. After tbe war, the Britishoperating on the hypothesis that Ira Longin. andKlatt also, were in fact high-level Soviet agents,determined attempt to break the case but failed tofrom Ira Longin or his associates- Thisthe fact that the British have never beentheir conviction that the Intercepted material was indeception and that, toward the end of the war,used the Klatt channel lo launch items of majorTbe British cited the operationlassicalof RIS deception and as an illustration of Sovietto sacrifice whole divisions for tbe purpose ofthe validityontrolled channel. TbeStaff and especially Its chief, Generaloberatunreserved trust In the reliability of the materialby the Klatt combine; Guderlan In person, at aspecifically called to decide the fate of Klatt and hisstated In emphatic terms that the General Staffwant to be held accountable for the consequences shoulddecided to Liquidate the net

In the chapter on Operations o/ the Secret Service,claims that Germany was exceptionally successfulwireless defenseoasting that "atwe had at least sixty-fourstationsto Moscow (oronsider It next toarriveeliable estimate of the relativeefense system without an equallyestimate of the total strength of activetiers operating from soO under German control Also,factor of the Incidence of Soviet triples among theurely statistical approachauge of

German successes quite meaningless. Suffice It to say- v% , ,

ET

the German services were able toad re of Experts in tbe field of counteringperations, who were able toumber of outstanding successes. Amt TV, (Gestapo) rather than Schellenberg's organization, scored heavily In this field. Source material on this subject Isin the debrleflng of Kopkow. who was in charge of the responsible branch In Amt IV. One of the best Amt IVIn the field was an Austrian named Sanlta, whom the Soviets abductedienna hospital only to return him toew years later.

The Case of Richard Sorge, as related by ScheUenberg,proves that ScheUenberg has since Joined the ranks of those who suspected all along that Sorgeoviet spy.refers to him as an associate of "the TVth Division of the MVD" although It is pretty well agreed by now that he was an agent of the Soviet Military Intelligence Service (BV).

In the chapter captioned At War with Russia, ScheUenberg commends PTerode Heereepartment of the Oberkom-mando des Heeres (Army High Command) serving asand evaluation center for all military Intelligenceon the Soviet Union, which was headed by General Oehlen, as "doing excellent work in the correlation andevaluation ofhis accolade appears of more than historical Interest In the light of subsequentsince historically speaking. Fremde Heere Ost formed the nucleus of the Bundesnachricbtendienstith General Gehlen as its first head.

Of some interest Is Schellenberg's description of hiswith SS Sturmbannfuehrer Melsinger, one of theof Amt iv. who at the tune of Germany's surrender served as Police Attache with the German Embassy Inover designation designed to conceal the identity of bis parent organization, the Gestapo. Like SS Gruppenfuehrer Helnrich Mueller, the chief of Amt IV, Melsinger had coma up through the ranks of the old Bayrischean bear out ScheUenberg'a rather graphic description of the man, having seen him to OberurseL He waa eventually turned over to the Poles, who strung him up. In this context It may

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be well to comment

"the RSHAor the most pert Bavarians endbackbone of Arot IV consisted of Bavarians of the

of Mueller and Melsinger. Kaltenbninner. the last head of the RSHA, was an Austrian from Una. Prussians of theof Die-tils, Glsevius, and Krimtnalrat Heller In the end wielded little influence.

I found the discussion of Mueller particularly

because It dwells on the existence of left-wing tendencies among the SS leadership. In this context Schellenbergto quote remarks made by the chief of Amt IV which Schellenberg construed asecided change In Mueller's outlook toward possibilityeparate peace withm unable to place my hands on the sourcebut It has been seriously contended that, through the device of the Rote Kapelle (Red Orchestra) was able toignificant segment of the Gestapo.

The French end of the doubling operation, involvingChef Treppcr himself, had been placed in the careKrtmlnalralepresentative of Amtranch of the Gestapo. From alland his associates handled the operation with great skillaccording to some with too much of theso the allegation runs, the build-up materialthe Moscow Center in the end provided the Sovietspretty accurate reading of German capabilities andtn France, The school of thought which in effecta Soviet triple operation found sustenance in theof Pannwlts and his rumored apprehensionSoviets. (Pannwlts has in the meanwhile returnedImprisonment,ompetent interrogation willserve to shed light upon some of the hiddenthe Red Orchestra compromise.) Mueller himself,the last days of the Battle of Berlin in Hitler's .

in the Reich's Chancellery, likewise disappeared from sight, participating in the sortie of Bormann's group. Schellenberg'a belief that Mueller joined the Communists merely repeats the essencepate of completely unsubstantiated rumors to that

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llies ^rnede several vain atternp*ts*'atoviet help in locating Mueller's whereabouts if he was still alive. The only official reaction came from the Soviet Military Attache In London who, obviously In order to stave off further Allied Importuning, queried themtraight face as to the correct spelling of Mueller's first name. That effectively ended the Allied search.

The chapter on the Assassination of Heydrich was obviously written without the benefit of hindsight. As It turned out. Himmier, who "had made up his mind that the whole affair was staged by the British Secret Service, and that the three assassins had been dropped by parachute near Prague for this special purpose" was on the right track. Schellenberg. who suspected Himmier and Bonn arm, was wrong. NoIs made of the frightful revenge wreaked by Heydrich'a successor, Relchs Protektor Hermann Prank, on the village of Lydlce,

The personal relationship between Schellenberg and Admiral Canartsuriously ambivalent one. It would have been Interesting to hear Csnaris' side of the story. There can be few doubts that Canarts felt personally attractedoung SS officer, not cast In the common mold of an SS thug and quite obviously treating the older and more experienced man with considerable deference. Had Canarts been alive to ten his story, he would undoubtedly have dwelled on the many patent advantages to be derived from staying closeanking official of Hitler's secretan known to be In the confidence of both Heydrich and Himmier.on the other hand. Is bound to have derived considerable professional benefit from his talks with Canarts and aid In sorting out his own untested Ideas on the future complexionnified German Intelligence system. In his biography, Schellenberg stays Just short of admitting that it was hewho engineered Canarts' downfall. His description of the events leading up to tne'Admiral's arrest and his own role in the actual detentionasterpiece of double entendre. Without ever frontaOy attacking the former chief of Germany's military Intelligence service, ScheUenberg manages to convey

principled toady (tears at Heydrlch's funeral "Afterreat man. averiend Inraitor

Germany,ottering old fool (the tearful embraces tncheuenberg'i surmise that Himmier wasin staring off Canaris' execution Is unsupported by any other facts available to me. Some light has in the meanwhile been shed on the circumstances surroundingexecution in the trial against SS Standartenfuehrer Hup-penkotcn. the last head of Amt IV B, who Implemented the order. Kaltenbrunner, the chief of the RSHA, whom Ion this matter inisavowed all directin the execution, but referred to the contents of the famous diary kept by the Admiral as Irrefutable evidence of his treasonous activities. There can be no doubt thatwas privy to the plot ofh of July, without lending It much active support, and that the activities of General Osier had deeply Implicated him. Since the end of the war an attempt has been made to vindicate Canaris, casting him In the role of the actual rnalnspiing of the German resistance. This, in my estimation,atently incorrect assessmentan who, in spite of many decent impulses and anclear perception of Oermany's ultimate doomime when Hitler's power seemed to have reached Its zenith, failed to measure up to the exigencies of true greatness.

In passing, Schellenbergairly accurate appraisal of prevailing conditions In the Abwehr, pointing to Canarts'for 'over-Inflating his organization, indiscriminately enrolling serious workers and dubiouseeblyreforms and then allowing them to peter out. He fails to mention that In those very respects his own organization, the foreign Intelligence branch of the RSHA, Amt VI, could hardly be set uphining example, and that the subsequent merger of the two organizations brought no tangible, .

There was no love lost between Schellenberg and Dr.

Kaltenbrunner, the new chief of the RSHA who In IMSby Hitler personally to step into the position -

"

himself to discussing the professional rivalries betweenand his nominal superior In essentially personal terms,

making no bones of the fact that he would have liked toa secession of Amt VI from the main body of theclearly perceived that ScheUenberg posedthreat to his position and was not about to allowintelligence service to be wrested from hismerely hints at this by complaining that"sought to surround himself entirely witha carefully conceived strategem whichin his own organisationizeable blocofficial* whose first loyalty belonged tohimself. They consisted for the most part ofof the old Austrian Nazi underground who, Likecame out of hiding at tbe tune of theIntellectual leader was the redoubtable Dr.who has publicizedook entitled "The Secretmight be referred to as the Austrian contributionGerman intelligence effort. The division of Amtdealt with operations in Southeastern Europe boreVI E. Under the powerful aegis ofsoon became one of the most favored elements of theused by him also asermanan espionage apparatus within an Intelligencelisting the professional exploits of his organization,makes no mention whatsoever ofhich, forplayed an Important part in the overthrow ofregime in Hungary, replacing It with the Arrowand its leader Szalary. ScheUenberg may befor nottaybebind operation In tbeorganized byersonnel, which never came tobecause of the supervening collapse of Germany.more prominent RSHA officials representing thecould be found Skorzeny, whopecial depart- concerned with action-type operations, and theIn commandpecial task force gatheringin occupied countries and channeling them into extcrml- . .

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lated attempt at establishing his own channel to the Allies by means of contacting the office of Allen Dulles, representative of the Office of Strategic Services In Bern. Kaltenbrunner, from the moment of his capture by American troops In5 until his demise at the endope, insisted that his classification as war criminal was the resulterrible misunderstanding; while It was true that In his capacity as chief of tbe RSHA he was also In charge of Amt IV, the executive arm of Germany's genocidal program, in actual fact the chain of command had completely bypassed him, with Mueller directly taking his orders from Himmler, Inning severalad with him shortly after his capture he plead with considerable eloquence that his overriding concern had been intelligence, more specifically the conduct ofIn Southeastern Europe. This story he repeated sothat in the end he may have come to believe Schellenberg's account certainly falls to support it.

The merger of Amt VI and the Military Intelligence Service, the Abwebr, came about in the fallhe affair was solemnizedeeting in Salzburg over whichpresided. During an Interim period the basic structure of the Abwebr had been left intact, affiliating Ituasi self-contained operating branch named Mil Amt to the main body of the RSHA and placing It in the chargeareer General Staff Officer, Colonel Hansen, whoIt soon appearedwas not equal to the task. Hansen was arrested after theuly attempt, andas Canaris correctly surmiseda wealth of lncilroinating material was found in his files. The arrest was likewise carried out byact which he fails to mention. Hansen was found guilty of treason and hanged. In the summer4 the amalgamation of the Abwebr was completed, and Its various tasks were divided between Amt VI and Amt IV B. Schellenberg's account. Is incorrect tn stating that the folio wing tookTrom' the middleook over Canaris' Military Intelligence Department, incorporating Its various tasks in departments IV and VT of the Counterespionage organization." In actual

the designation of HI P. was Integrated with theservice of the RSHA, Amt IV B. and was thus not placed under ScheUenberg After the surrender of Germany, this factource of unpleasantness to the oldrowd, who found themselves lumped together with theGestapo and exposed to Its odium.

Out of the blue, the name Dr. langbehn Is thrown Into the debate. First, Dr. Rersten mquires whetherhad frequent conversations with him, and subsequently Himmler begs ScheUenberg "to improve his relationship with Langbehn asn the chapter on Peace Feelers, the reader is told that Dr. Langbehn had been negotiating with Allied representatives In Switzerland and that he had done so (or was alleged to have done so) with Schellenberg's blessing. In the chapter on The Downfall of Admiral Canariscomplains that Mueller and Kaltenbrunner had tried In

to denounce ScheUenbergritish agent In connection with the Langbehn affair. To the uninitiated reader the story as It stands is meaningless. ActuaUy the Langbehn incident deserves less cursory treatment. The relationship between langbehn and Himmler in fact represented Himmler'a first sub rosa contact with the German resistance movement which In

led to the abortive July attempt. Himmler eventually withdrew his support from Langbehn and permitted him to be executed. It has been alleged that the growth of the antl-Nasi resistance movement and the surprisingly ramified strength It displayed during the critical days of4 cannothave escaped the vigilance of the Gestapo. Atthe argument runsboth MueUer and Himmler must have beet) cognizant of Its scope and of the nature of Its plana. Some such thought may have crossed Hitler's mind when he entrusted the Investigation of theuly plot to Kaltenbrun-

ner rather than to Hlmrnler. It would have been- /

to learn the fun story. If we can assume that ScheUenbergV. -.

In possession of aU the facta There are Inook some oblique references to the fact that Himmler was loath to have ScheUenberg concern himself with Canaris'

*

what puzzled by Hlmmler's solicitude for the Admiral's fate. Quite conceiYably there may hareide to Hlmmler's extra-curricular plans and activities completely unknown to Schellenberg.

SchcUenberg's persistent attempts to win over his protector, Himmier, to an active exploration of possibilities to negotiate peace with the Allies, culminatingalk with Himmier In Zhitomir which Schellenberg describes, naturally colored his quest for intelligence. Operation "Cicero" and the intelligence it yielded, in the sight of Schellenberg, served their principal purpose by demonstrating the turn of the tide to Oermany's detriment Schellenberg makes no mention in this context that, In order to derive maximum benefit from the total of the German tatelUgence product, he co-opted into Amt VI Dr. Glselheristorian of vast experience, whom heto prepare intelligence summaries. Theseput out at Irregular intervals, were known as Egmont Bench te. They were given the highest classificationistribution confined to six officials of the Third Reich, among them Hitler, Kaltenbrunner. Himmier. and Rlbbentrop. Their underlying purpose, as clearly understood by Wlrsing. was to buttress the Schellenberg thesis of the necessityegotiated peace. In reconstructing some of the reports as originallyby him (no originals have beent was clearly revealed that the "Cicero" material formed the backbone of the Egitumt Berichte.

A few comments regarding Scbellenberg's personal record may be In order. He came up through the ranks of the old Gestapo. Beyond reasonable doubt, be acquired first-hand knowledge of the methods applied by that organization Inconfessions. Those methods were quite prevalent and by no means spontaneous.atter of fact, the orderly German mind had in factureaucratic term for the practice of torture which can be found In numerous officialvertchaerftem ftwitfted to give credence to Schellenberg'a aversion to such practices, and the Incident described as evidence of this may have occurred.

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btTact that hflrlcte'taa nialfiffly unbleroished

one should be attributed to luck rather than to predisposition. Had Schellenberg been ordered by Himmier to take over the commandn SStrongly doubt that be would have staked his career and possibly his lifehe Chief of Amt V. Krlmlnalratrofessional criminologist with no Nasi background, waso the command of an Einsatzkommando and is alleged to havelarge-scale liquidation of Russian civilians behind the Germanchellenberg presumably would have done the same, Ifchellenberg's role In bringing about the release and exchange of Jews In German captivity Is not in contradiction to this analysis of his character. His errands of mercy were part and parcelold-blooded deal in which the imprisoned Jews were mere pawns. He must havelear appreciation of the fact that any further large-scale atrocities would merely lead to an intensification of Allied punitiveand that by means of serving as an "honest broker" in putting across those transactions, heood chance of extricating himselfhare in the collective responsibility which hisspecially his great protector Himmier. hadlear recollection of discussing with Schellenberg the odious role played by Himmier in theof what may go down as world history's most colossal crime, without evoking more than an expression of polite doubt whether or not those crimes were politically sound. The reader is bound to carry away the same impression after reading the chapter on Operation Zeppelin.

Summing up my impressions of Theall toIn It* narrative any significant contributions to ourof the principles of Intelligence tradecraft, let alone -their application. Amt VI neveroherent and practicable system of intelligencehe merger with the more experienced Abwehr came too late .to redound to. benefit of Amt VL Especially In the leadership bracket, the absence of experienced personnel was calamitous. Also, the leading men of Amt VI, and this particularlyhe case of Schellenberg, were forced to spend an .

" SBf^ET

136

amount of time tn protecting' their rear. Special missions, such as the grotesque plan to abduct the Duke of Windsor, monopolized time and effort which could more usefully have been deployed against truly important targets. The fact that Amt VI was unable to shed Ita close Unship with Amt IV, the dreaded Gestapo, militated against its effectiveness hi enlisLing the support of elements In disaccord with the excesses of the Nazi system and limited the circle of its operatives to party zealots and SS fanatics whose radius of understanding of world affairs was circumscribed by Nazi doctrine. Germany'sbrought about the complete obliteration of what hasbeen described as the "SS-Staat" and of its coercive organs. Ita practices and concepts have not been bequeathed upon the intelligence service of the Federal Republicitting epitaph for the organization and the men who operated it would thus be: "Spurloa vtrsenkt"

Ctuktow Gallaghes

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