Created: 12/1/1956

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Notes on Some Aspects of intelligence Estimates

Harold D. Kehm

1 ISSUE: Winter.



A collection ol articles on Ihc historical, operational, doctrinal, and theoretical aspects ot Intelligence.

All statements of fact, opinion or analysis expressed in Studies in Intelligence are those of

the authors They do not necessarily reflect official positions or views of the Central intelligence Agency or any other US Government entity, past or present. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government endorsement of an inkle's factual statements and interpretations



by Harold D. Kehm


EMBERS ol the intelligence community will obviously find useful reading in the articles by Abbot Smith and Col.hese studies deserve the attention of other groups as well. They are of particular value to military commanders and planners and to their civilian counterparts in both government and private life. The executive and the planner are the prime consumers of the Intelligence product. Furthermore, since they and not the intelligence officer are ultimately responsible for action taken, they are and should be the sharpest critics of that product.

These consumers, therefore, need to understand the various kinds of approaches which the intelligence officer can make to his problem. In consultation with him, they should develop an agreed approachembodying doctrines either as discussed In our military and other staff manuals or possibly as modified by Ideas developed In these papers.

Business executives and planners were mentioned above along with military and government officials because study of modem business organization and practice makes It quite clear that the more effective enterprises engage In Intelligence activities In one form or another.

To bring out the parallel with national and militarywe may note that business intelligence comprisesinformation concerning such matters as: the actual and potential users of the goods and services the business produces; the actions and plans of competitors; related goods and services; and other factors which bear on the production, marketing, and use of the product. Among the "intelligence

See below,or review of Col tfirtlaod's article.



activities" In which most business organizations engage we can Include market analysis, research and development, and the collection ol general business Information.

Market analysis Is essentially an Intelligence activity, for It covers not only what the product may or might do but also what other firms and products may do or are doing. Credit Information on firms and Individuals is perhaps the most direct form of intelligence used by business.

Research and development is an Intelligence activity in the sense that it yields information on which to gauge the value of one's own product as veil as that of actual and potential competitors. Research and development have become sothat investment analysts now consider the size and quality of this eflortan important factor in determining the valueecurity."

Finally, no business of any stature can plan without giving atuick glance at political, economic, and sociological data. It Is inconceivable that either Ford or the UAW4 planned5 without considering international affairs, the domestic political situation, and the sociological "climate" which might make it propitious to raise the Issue of theannual wage. The tremendous growth in the number of trade and commercial publications is an indication of the interest in business intelligence Information.

This is not the proper place to pursue this matter further and discuss whether or not business would improve its lot by openly recognising its intelligence requirement and organising more specifically for it It is useful to note, however, that Worldaught business leaders the value of the line and staff principle of organization and that World War II has already given them clear object lessons in operations analysis and on research and development. "Businessfull-fledged, may well be the next important step.

It has seemed worthwhile to mention this point because we want to go along with Mr. Smith who believes that military



Intelligence doctrine has application In nationa?'p61icyIn fact, we want to go further and assert that the basic conceptsnecessarily all the detailed precepts andapplication to any form of human activity: political, economic, sclentlflc, or sociological.

There is some reason to suspect that both Mr. Smith and Colonel Kirtland have misinterpreted or misunderstood some of these basic concepts. We propose to deal with theseas they come up In our discussion of the two papers. At this point, it Is useful to cover one matter which both seem to have failed to keep clearly in mind. It is the fact that both the Intelligence officer and the commander (or policy-maker) are In the estimating business.

The Intelligence Function and the Command Function

The Intelligence officer Is the "expert" on the enemy.he is charged with giving the commander, the staff, and subordinate commands the best information andon the enemy situation. The end product of his estimate is enemy capabilities andlet us not forgetwhere available informationasis for such judgment, the relative probability of adoption of them."

*nd Principles of Strategic Intelligence, ACFeb.

As Smith puts it: "We are told that It Is the funcUoo of thenot of the intelligence officer, to decide what counteraction to adopt against enemy capabilities and to Judge what the succen of such counteraction may be."

Thisull-time job, particularly when one considers that the intelligence officer must also continuously provide his commandIn addition, assist In providing subordinate, adjacent, and senior commandswith the Information and Intelligence they require for their day-to-day operations as distinguished from that needed for estimates. It Is for this reason, rather than any slavish devotion to doctrine that, as Mr. Smith pointsome persons hold that the inteUl-


gence officer should not deal In the capabilities and lines of action of his own side. Mr. Smith is correct In sayingome persons oppose this from wrong motives, but that Isault peculiar to the military. It should also be pointed out that many plannersupercilious view of Intelligence and intelligence officers. They fancy themselves equally competent in intelligence matters. Indeed, most of them an, but the reverse is also true. Most intelligence officers are fullyplanners. Since eachull-time job. however, each needs to tend to his own knitting to get the job done well. There needs to be, and in good commands there is, continuous close liaison al all levels In the intelligence and plans sections. Historically it is true that many commanders have leaned as much or more on their Intelligence officers in planning matters as they have on their planners In even more cases, after the whole staff was thoroughly Informed about the enemy, the* of the Intelligence officer appeared to be less prominent It is noteworthy that this usually occurs on the side that is winning orreponderance of force When things are tight, the Intelligence officer is In great demand and, we might note, his neck is way out.

We noted above that the commander also makes an estimate. His estimate takes the enemy capabilitiespresumably as developed by the intelligence officerand. In tho light of each capability, studies each line of action open to theto determine the one that best accomplishes the mission. He determine* the lines of action open to him by having full information about his own forcestheir position, condition, morale, supplies, supporting forces available and so on Just as the Intelligence officer contributes the information about the enemy, so many other staff officers contribute this other information which the commander roust have toound decision.

Let us then keep clearly in mind that, in military usage, the intelligence estimate sets forth the enemy capabilities. Tbe commander, for his part, uses that estimate in conjunction

with other information {there mayogistics'estimate. an ' '

air estimate,ndinal "policy" estimate tothe line of action which will best accomplish his mission.

The Military Theory of Capabilities

Many of the difficulties which Mr. Smith points out in the application of military usage In the field of national policy stem from the fact that in the national field we do not have the same common understanding of staff and commandthat obtains In the military. This Is true both because the "staff" in national policy affairs, thoughegreeislose parallelilitary staff, and because many of our policy-makers are not experienced in or familiar with staff functioning.

Against this general background, we can now. examine Mr. Smith's advocacy of the concept of "gross" and "net"and his contention that war-gaming should be used to improve the usefulness of our intelligence.

In reference to the first matter Mr. Smith points out the need to recognize that enemy capabilities are one thing when we study them In the light of one of our own actions and quite different when we consider them In the light of another.

To Indicate these differences he uses the expressions "gross capabilities" and "netse of these terms brings to mind the ideaixed measurable quantity like the gross income of General Motors and, similarly,netis like OM's net Income. It is quite clear thatoncept is not accurate.

Pursued to the logical end, gross capabilities would beas It were,acuum. Such capabilities have no practical meaning, both because they are limitless (without opposition the Soviets can do almost anything) and because there arc no true vacuums in world affairs.


dltions change, the capabilities change. Theyoving picture,till photograph. The Soviet "net capability" toeripheral war In Thailand Is one thing if Thailand has the political and other support of Burma and the SEATO states andifferent thing if it does not have suchIndeed, the timing and*extent of such support changes the "netn military usage capabilities are always what Mr. Smith callshe intelligence officerthe enemy's capabilities asiven time and in the light of givenhis idea is readily applicable in national strategic intelligence

What Mr. Smith calls gross capabilities could perhaps better be thought of as "basic" .capabilities. For example,officers can readily estimate that9 the Soviets couldtockpileydrogenounds of atomic artilleryntercontinentalrmy divisions,ajor naval craft, and could still meet the Industrial requirements of their civilian economy, provided they give no more than the current level of military aid to Red China and the Satellites. On the other hand. If they curtailed production of equipment for the Red Army and Navy they could contribute more to the armament of China and the Satellites. These are capabilities. They are basic capabilities to produce or take general action not normally subject to Interference. Further analysis and research can develop what, under various assumptions, the Soviets can do with these resources and thus can determine their capabilities to act. Perhaps It is this distinction that Mr. Smith has in mind when he speaks of "gross" and "net" Even if this Is the case we would still be loath to accept the concept because, in the general sense of the term, even such "gross" capabilities

quotations from DictionaryS Military Terms lor Joint Usage, cited by Mr. Smith; also tbe description used at the Strategic Intelligence School.


are "net" Rather than adoptmVmlsleadlnggrou" and "net" we seem to be better off if we stick Just toand understand it to apply, as In basic military doctrine,tated set of circumstances.

The second point in Mr. Smith's thesis that we wish to examine is the matter of war-gaming. He laments the fact that accepted practice frowns on ha Ting intelligence officers war-game the plans of their own side. We do not concede that this "frowning" Is as prohibitively effective as Mr. Smith contends. To the extent that It does exist. It is directed against the idea of having the intelligence officer play both sides. This Is logical. The Intelligence officer cannot be "expert" on his own resources and plans as well as on those of the enemy. As pointed out earlier, the latterull-time Job. To the extent that he^thumps for joint wax-gaming by Intelligence and plans personnelevice to assist inthe usefulness of intelligence estimates, however. Mr. Smith is emphatically right

War-gaming for this particular purpose is not used as widely In the military as it might be. But the concept of war-gaming for other purposes with all staff elements participating is well established. It could easily be used In the more complex field of national estimates.

War-gaming has been modified radically in recent years with the employment of advanced mathematics and electronicThese techniques leave much to be desired in the military field and many of them could, at the current stage of development, be used toery limited extent in reference to the "Imponderables" of national policy affairs. The more conventional type of war-gaming, on the other hand, could certainly be used across the board and with every possibility of making our Intelligence estimates more useful.

Mr. Smith's observation that national policy-makersore complex problem than military leaders la valid, and It has an Important bearing on the activities of the Intelligence


* Both US and British strategic planners had long before beeson such plans. We are here considering the more nearly tacUcal planning

services which support them. The national policy-maker mustreat variety of "capabilities" which interact on each other. Forociological change in Germany may have an important repercussion in the political capabilities of France. Furthermore, It Is always difficult to determine the "facts" in many areas of interest. The military leader usually knows how many and what kinds of guided missile squadrons, atomic bombs, fleets, and army troops he and his opponent have The political leader is always far less certain about his "forces" and those of his allies. There Is even moreabout the resources the enemy can bring to bear. To Illustrate, we can be sure that Khrushchev's advisers haveeadache estimating how effective the Satellites and Communist China really are and what assets the West will actually apply in various situations. Inield, therefore, there can be no one "net" capability. There are as many "net" capabilities as there arc variant situations. Mr. Smith appears to think that intelligence officers should compute these "net" capabilities by their own efforts. It would seem more logical that they should be worked out In conjunctionand we do not mean concurrencewith the planners. Intelligenceand planners must sit down together and thrash out all the angles. This is precisely what happens in an efficient military staff in time of war. The formal estimates ofappear onlyadical change in one's own or the enemy situation takes place. For example, after "Tbet Army Group conducted an extended and more or less "conventional" campaign to gain the Rhine. It was obvious that crossing that formidable obstacle would call for different types ot action and support An estimate of the situation was essential." This, in turn, meant thatforecasts and estimates had to be produced. At suchew "stock-taking" is in order. At other times, day-to-day close coordination by the working intelligence officers

and planners,heck on mterpretatlons of majorby the senwr Intelligence and plans officers, la the best modus operandi. It keeps all concerned aware of enemyapplicable to the prevailing conditions.

In the nationalimilar condition could obtain. the lines of demarcation in staff organization are not as simple and clear as in the military. Instead of overall planners like those in the Joint Staff or in an international staff such as the Combined Staff Planners of World War n, we have political planners Inilitary In Defense,In agencies like OES. propaganda in USIA. etc. Each of these has some form of intelligence support of its own These Intelligence agencies are tied together by CIA for national purposes and planning Is brought together In the NSC. there isast amount oft should be noted that this statementescriptionondition; It Is not to be construed as an unfavorable criticism. This is not the occasion for such criticism: and It la by no means certain that highly centralized planning and Intelligence would be best, or even better, for the country. Here, we want simply to note that close Integration ofInto planning Is difficult because of the decentralized planning and operating mechanism in the USreat deal of informal coordination on the working level does take place. This Is all to the good and should be encouraged. This complexity of organiratlon and operations In the national field resultsreater need for formalized estimates and Is, inustification for the use of the war-garnlng principle. However, with all due respect for the skill, wisdom, and Judgment of our intelligence community, we should not leave war-gamingasis for decisions to them alone. Tho danger here Is at least as great as It Is to have the planners do it alone. We have suffered on both the military and the national plane from an unwillingness (or inability) to accept and understand available intelligence. We need not repeat such gross errors.


With little ot no'taforrilflron ofrufijVrr^^, he Intelligence officer can still tell the planner what resources he enemy can haveuture date and the general kinds of ction he can Initiate with them. If the commander and planner want to know what results the enemy can achieve with these resources and actions, the Intelligence officer must have knowledge of his own resources and plans.

Applying this notion to the current situation, we can expect national intelligence officers to tell us what resources the Soviets will have for peripheral wars9 without much guidance as to our own resources and national plans and policies. But they can tell us where and with what likelihood of success the Soviets can use those assets only If they know the opposition which the Soviet action is likely to meet. Joint war-gaming would provide such interchange of information. It should makeealthy interplay between Intelligence and planning and probably result in Improving both.

Estimating Enemy Intentions

In Colonel Kirtlands paper weore restricted and therefore more specific subject for consideration. He objects to what he describes as "unrealistic resistance" to the use of intentions-analysis as opposed to capabilities-analysis inestimates. He holds that we need to consider both By inference, he is most directly concerned with combatHe makes clear, however, that his conclusions apply to strategic intelligence as weU.

After analyzing what Colonel Klrtland has to say. we can agree with his main thesis that both intentions and capabilities need to be considered. However, be has not hedged hiswith essential safeguards and his arguments against the "capabilities doctrine" contain very serious weaknesses. We will review these arguments and then develop our own conclusions


In order to evaluate Colonel Kirtland's contentions. It li important that weommon understanding of the meaning of "the capabilitieshe burden of this concept Is thatombat Intelligence estimate, theofficer should present to the commander his best estimate of the enemy's capabilities rather than the enemy's Intentions. The doctrine goes further: It holds that the commander in his estimate should consider each of the lines of action open to him In the light of each of the enemy capabilities In arriving at his final decisionourse of action. It is Important to keep In mind that the doctrine has these two aspects: first, the Intelligence officer is to determine capabilities: and second, the commander should make his decision only after considering off the capabilities,

An elaboration of this doctrine which Is too often forgotten Is thats expected to give the commander hisas to the relative probability of the exercise of any of the enemy capabilities, where there is evidence to supportonclusion'

Earlier doctrine had held that the task of the Intelligence officer was to estimate the mission of the enemy and, from that, deduce the lines of action the enemy might take and then to determine their effect on the courses open to his own side. This doctrineefined form of guessing as to the enemy mission and encouraged consideration of Intentions In the deduction of enemy lines of action.

The new capabilities doctrine was developed after Worldecause it was felt that earlier doctrine introduced too much clairvoyance into military problem-solving (which Is what decision-making reallynd that It came too near urging officers to guess the worst the enemy could do and to stake everything on that It was believed that theill ties" system was more "scientific" and more nearly In accord with the facts of life. This conviction was Illustrated

FM St-f.


at the Command and General Staff School, just before World War II, when one of the instructors "clinched" the argument In favor of basing estimates on capabilities by showing that In Worldon Kluck had changed his mind four times In one day and actually issued three different orders.

A concomitant of the acceptance of the capabilities doctrine has been the growth of an attitude that anyone who advocates basing estimates on enemy intentions Just hasn't been brought up properly. To advocate the use of Intentions-analysis has come to be considered the equal of advocating mind-reading or the useuija board. Advocates of Intentions-analysis like Colonel Kirtland object more to this antl-lntentlonsthan to the capabilities doctrine per se.

In marshaling support for the thesis that our doctrine needs review and, in particular, needs to give more consideration to Intentions, the critics tend to make some amazingand to neglect some crucial facts. We agree that our doctrine needs recasting but we must. In fairness, keep the record accurate and logical.

Colonel Kirtland's objection to current doctrine is based on three main points: first,ationommander mustreponderance of force if he bases his decisions on capabilitiesecond, "the resulting decision Is alwaysnd third, the enemy's potential capabilities are not adequatelyWe will examine each of these points in some detail.

* The third point Is paraphrased because tbe actual statement Isy precise. However, subsequent explanation makes clear that It menus what has been said here.

The statement that the capabilities doctrine is useable only when youreponderance of force is clearly erroneous. Itery practicable doctrine when you are on the defensive and even when you are the huntedursuit. To hold otherwise is like saying you cannot use the principles of artth-


me tic when you are

that matter, any other doctrinegives you ain such cases, but that is the picture you mustan adverse situation, the doctrine is designed toline of action would have the least adverse result.words, it indicates the course of action which wouldnose

The second criticism, that application of the doctrineresults In conservative action, isarge extent true; but It is true because, in matters of life and death, leaders generally tend to be conservative. Usually they should be. The criticism is justified only to the extent that the going doctrine makes It easier for leaders to be conservative, This is particularly true when officers take the view which an allegedly bright and "successful? officer (he Jatertar) expressed when he said:each my officers to select the line of action which gives them the best chance against what they figure is the enemy's most dangerous capability."

It is this use of the capabilities doctrine that brings on the criticism of conservatism. Actually Iteversion to the older doctrine. It is. inorm of intentions-analysis because the user assumes that the enemy williven capability. Such use does not condemn the doctrine itself, any more than the fact that some men get drunk Justifies the condemnation of all whiskey. Current doctrine holds that the commander shall select the course of action which, in the face of all the estimated enemy capabilities, insures the most effective accomplishment of the mission. This is not the same thing as saying that he should select the one that gives the greatest certainty of accomplishing the mission. Clearly, the most certain course might be the most bloodylightly more risky line of action would be less costly and mightthe missionhorter time or have some otherThe selectionine of actionalancing of costs and gains under the various possibilities. It also calls


for what Is known as "militaryo matter whether

we use capabilities or Intentions, the decisions will reflect that <


The third argument Is that use of the doctrine preventsof potential capabilities, meaning those that develop between the time the estimate is made and the action takes place. This, of course. Is woven of the very flimsiest cloth. The doctrine is based on the use of capabilities which the enemy will have at the time of the action for which one is planningnot the capabilities at the time the decision Is made It is the capabilities forecast for the action-time. If one accepts tne argument, he must also accept tbe conclusion that if intentions were used in the analysis, one could not use forecasts of intentions On this score, then, one would be as badly off under, one system as under the other.

One other serious error In Colonel Kirtlaod's paper that we must bring out Is the failure to show that Army doctrine has for years made clear that In strategic Intelligencefrom combat intelligenceboth Intentions and capabilities are considered. Official doctrine and teaching at the Strategic Intelligence School and at Army schools have emphasized this point at least since World War TJ.

The Role of Intentions In Intelligence Estimates

So far we have been concerned with showing that thepresented against the capabilities doctrine are not very good or conclusive. This is not the same as saying that we are trying toase against totenUons-analysliwe do not Intend to do so. We will weasel but, we believe, with good reason. We agree that use should be made of both capabilities and intentions in developing estimates, but we hold that one must be equally objective and "scicnUnc" ineither of them.

Having noted that the common arguments against theconcept are not too decisive let usew of the weaknesses of that system and indicate some of the strength*

of the intentions

The faults of the capability system are two-fold First it tends, as Colonel Rutland points out, to cause Intelligence officers to include remote possibilities as capabilities. They forget that the doctrine calls for the consideration of only those capabilities which bear on the accomplishment of one'a own mission. Second, and despite strong language to the contrary In Army training, the doctrine seems to justify lasy intelligence officers to feel that they have done their bit when they have made one forecast of capabilities. This is most unfortunate. Intelligence officers must keep capabilities under continuing study to narrow them down. "For example, In September3 the predicted capabilities of the Germansis the Normandy landings wereiven order. As time went on. the Allies developed certain techniques and equipment and new forces became available. On the Axis side. Italy was knocked out of the war. and the Germans committed some of their forces In new areas. Consequently, the enemy capabilities changed continuously so that by4 they were far more limited than could possibly have been predicted inHAEF intelligenceon-tinuoui spotlight on these capabilities during this period. So It should be in all operations. The good Intelligence officer keeps on the ball as long as there Is time to Influence his own side's line of action. In many cases the situation develops so thatoint the enemy has only one capability. Thisat Falaise and in the Ruhr. Eventually, the Germans could no longer disengage their forces. They had to stay and fight This Idea was also Illustrated In Generaltatement to the effect thativen tune he could no longer influence the course of the Juggernaut that became the Normandy assaultonsiderable period he had only one capability. Just how long theas useful


by keeping labs on that has not been made clear. Ourdoes not emphasize this concept as clearly and firmly as It should.

As we have already noted. Worldtartlingly effective case to bolster the capabilities doctrine. Similarly, the Civil War and World War II give us particularly fine cases for defense of intentions-analysis. In the Civil War. opposing commanders often knew each other personally. They used this knowledge in their planning. They knew the training,and personalities of their opponents and, hence, could determine the line of action the enemy was most likely to take.ense, of course, this too is an assessment of capabilities but there is no point in splitting any unnecessary hairs. In ordinary language, such an evaluation resultsrediction of Intentions. Thererey zone where capabilities slide into intentions, but for our purposes, we will lean to theside and call the borderline cases intentions.

The World War II support for intentions-analysis is In seme ways even stronger. It stems from the fact that the Japanese tendency to fight to the death was so effectively ingrained that,ery marked degree, capabilities to take other lines of action were not meaningful.esser extent this same situation applied In the European war where Hltlerlam molded capabilities.

One canery good case for the contention that enemy intentions should properly be considered under the capabilities doctrine because theyactor in the combat efficiency of the enemy. To accept such an interpretation without clearly labeling it, however, would simplyay of getting around the intent of the doctrine and have the disadvantage of not calling intentions by their true name.

Experience in all walks of life shows clearlyailure tohorough study of one's opponent to determine his motivations and his mental and psychological reactionsasis for estimating his future action Is worse than


unwise. The press Is full of stories that theIn this field and has attained greatoncomitant of progress In brain-washing andmatters generally. In our teal to make surewill make commanders and Intelligence officersande may have gone so far thattended to overlook the obvious. Certainly, the*

makeup and attitude of the enemy Is asfact" as is his training, his morale, his organ iratton, or his weapons. Surely then It is logical to consider Intentions. Equally surely, It Is important to do so objectively and to know what you are doing. If you are an intelligence officer, It Is most Important that you alert your chief to the fact that you are considering Intentions.

In the discussion so far we have used examples and.

tions in the purely military field. The conclusions are valid In national intelligence as well. In fact, Intentionsationovernment can be determined with more accuracy than those of an Individual commander. These Intentions are shaped by many clearly observable facts such as past actions, sociological conditions, cultural characteristics, Internalpressures, economic circumstances,ost of others. The British exploited their understanding of GermanIn both World Wars and it was not uncommon to hear their Intelligence officers use such expressions as: "tbe Hun

Is sureand "the German probably appreciates."

They personified the enemy government and high command. On tbe other hand, the Germans seem consistently to have missed the boat They clearly either did not or could not evaluate US and Russian national Intentions properly in either of the World Wars. The evaluation of national intentionsa more comprehensive field of thought than does the evaluation of the Intentions of an enemy commander. Bow-ever, the task is no more difficult Even If It Is, It must be done

because the rewards for success and the coats ol failure are"

great to permit neglecting the job.


Where does all this get us? It seems to Indicate that, as Colonel Kit Handroper doctrine would be to Include both capabilities and intentions in all estimates as we now do In the strategic estimate. However, we should expand the principle to Include Insurance that staff and command training will impress on all concerned that they need to apply the most rigid tests to all evidence bearing on intentions and thatbased upon them clearly show that this Is the case.

Since all concepts and doctrines wind upform" ol some sort, we might as wellroposal on that score, too. In the military field the solution is easy. All we need to do in the commander's estimateis toaragraph on "enemyhe Intentions paragraph need berief statement, either to the effect that there are no reliable indications of enemy intentions or that certain statedindicates an Intention to exercise one or more of these capabilities.

In the intelligence estimate, we need merely Insert that "combat efficiency" Includes knowledge of enemy personal characteristics which shape orajor influence on his actions. In addition, we shouldaragraph on enemy Intentions similar to the one suggested for the commander's estimate. This one should also present the critical evidence upon which the estimate of intentions is founded.

etailed analysis of combat intelligence doctrine is warranted at this Juncture because, as Mr. Smith points out, so much of the concept and procedure of combat intelligence has found its way into ihe national strategic intelligence process. The additions to military command and Intelligence estimates which we have proposed here could be paralleled in our training for national strategic intelligence.

Our current doctrine probably goes too far in playing down intentions-analysis. Going all out the other way would cer-


talnly be worse. It would encourage clairvoyance and, In addition, might discourage the continuous effort to seek for new Indications of capabilities. The stress on measurable physical facts Is justified. While we are making important strides in understanding and measuring motivation and mental processes, we are not yet far enough along in that field to measure intentions as precisely as we can capabilities and, as Colonel Klrtland notes, the danger of deceptionery real one. Even so, since decision-making is so inevitably bound up with consideration of the personal element, It is the better part of discretion, and of valor as well, to consider Intentions. They are so often the sparkplugs of human action.

Original document.

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