YUGOSLAVIA REMAINS ADAMANT IN DISPUTE WITH MOSCOW (W/ATTACHMENTS)

Created: 3/1/1957

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

UGOSLAVIA REMAINS ADAMANT IN DISPUTE WITH MOSCOW

Comment on:

his speech to the Yugoslav parliament

ebruary, Foreign Minister Popovic

-PQR OPFtC'IAtr clearly affirmed his country's refusaldown in its dispute with the USSR,

US Emb BelgradeebIV OFFICIAL

buttrong desire to carry on good state relations with the Soviet bloc countries. Popovic characterizedin the period since World Warnflicting "incomparably greater damage to the cause of socialism than allconspiracies putmplying that Belgrade mlfht now step up its Ideological attacks, he pointed out that itssilence had been misinterpreted by Moscow as weakness.

Popovic decried Moscow's withholding of investments promised to Yugoslavia. He observed thatSoviet attitude toward Belgrade was engendered in large part by Moscow's disappointment in its expectations thatwould Join the "so-called Socialistn contrast Popovic observed that in spite of differing political systems, Yugoslav co-operation with the West was becoming stronger, and he praised "precious" American economic aid.

The foreign minister's statements onworld problemsore even balance between East and West than did the Yugoslav view

^|has suggested that Ihis. along wilh Popovic's failure to endorse the Soviet position on German policyecent press interview, mayhreat to Moscow of withdrawal of support on international issues andint to the West that Yugoslav positions may be revised in its favor.

Mar 57

Intelligence9

CENTRAL FILE COP/

UGOSLAVS SUPPORT KADAR REGIME Coroment op:

Several recent actions by the Yugoslav government indicate that It intends to support the Kadar regime in Hungary for the present. Onanuary, aspokesman announced0 credit andfacilities in mutual trade exchange" had been granted at the recent request of the Hungarian government. He said Hungarian-Yugoslav relations were "normal" and implied that Belgrade was no longer pressing the issue of the Soviet abduction of ex-premier Nagy last November.

A new Yugoslav ambassador is about to depart forost vacant since shortly after the Nagy kidnaping, and Hungary hasew man for its post in Belgrade, vacant since late October. The Belgrade press gave tentative acceptance to the program outlined by Premier Kadaranuary, despite its heralding ofharsh policies and close allegiance to Moscow.

Most Yugoslav Communist leadersrecognize thatarsh program by Kadar will maintain Communism in Hungary at present, even though this view conflicts with Vice Presidentpeechecember, with its implied condemnation of the Kadarand its extolling of the workers' councils as the only true socialist force in Hungary. The Yugoslavs may feel thatore liberal regime can evolve in Hungary.

Belgrade's attitude toward Hungary may also be in part designed to counter the Soviet bloc ideologt-cal criticisms of the Yugoslavs as "revisionists.1'

anIntelligence8

8

FUcn,v

IB EmbPresident Vukmanovic-Tempc has

,ncials that all Yugoslav eco-

reUtion8hlPfl Russia are slow-

WLprobablyirect at-

., ten>Pt to apply pressure on Yugoslavia. He specifically mentioned Soviet performance on the credits toertilizer plant and the USSR-East German Jointly sponsored aluminum plant. Tempo does not expect an economic blockade such as occurredowever.

The Yugoslav Foreign Ministry official in cha^eojeconormf affairs. Vladimir Velebit.

anuary that the USSR had intimated it wanted to postpone its Investment credits for two years Velebit thought this may have been partly caused by th-heavy demands on Soviet production from China and thehe also feared it may be for purposes of politicalon Yugoslavia.

of Soviet economic pressure on

Ml . have come only from Belgrade

omciais, who may want to impress the United States with its continued need for Western economicere haselay in trade negotiationsut several recenttrade agreements with the Satellites have called for anIn trade.

. The total Soviet foreign economic program,

including recently increased aid to Eastern Europe, ie eUll quite small in relation to total Soviet resources. In theithout politicalt

ssr would exert heavy economic

mBefcnda^mtajyga wiuing l0reaj(yugo_

Jan 57

Intelligence Bulletin

98

old lhe fell

/ t?

aja, could have been accomplished th tough Ihscouncils, 'vhich representedo-rallst tthukwlM *he Viida;-had displayedlStratOd ay tbe violation ol thc agreement en Sugy. and he clearly implied thai theight tverrtually dropppcrt foi KX'iar lsas 'heir acqu-.esounce in trie Soviil

appsrently intended1

of It! ambassador to JjudsjMs; to put prtiii.r4 or. th* Sovietvir Hungary,ur,uing tho es-cSii.Tgt Ol notes witi: tii? <adai gc*'trnint?ntheta

auction.

3 2 5c

"central' file COPY.

tOM IM. Vii XL

UGOSLAV ARREST OF DJILAS

Comment on:

(fbis

20NOVOT UFl'WIAA. TISE nWT.Y

The arrest in Belgrade onovember of former Yugoslav vice president Djilas may be designed to counter any Soviet criticism during the current Belgrade-Moscow controversy that Yugoslavia is norue supporter of world Communism. Belgrade presumably foresees an increasingly difficult period in ita relations with Moscow following Tito's critical speech ofovember and Pravda's rejoinder onovember.

Djilas' detention arose from theIn the American press of his article which described the Hungarian revolt as the "beginning of the endhere have been no signs of serious unrest in Yugoslavia in the wake of Hungarian events, but Djilas Is presumably viewed by the regimeatural rallying point for those forces opposing the Belgrade CommunistTito stated in hisovember speech that Yugoslavia is "united andut "we must not allow variousand elements to speak all sorts of nonsense."

Djilas was purged4 for advocating greater freedom in Yugoslavia and was arrested in5 on charges of conspiring against the state when he called for the establishmentwo-party system in Yugoslavia in an interviewestern correspondent. He was at that time given anlSjriMyisentejice, but placed on probation for three years. |

Nov 56

Intelligence Bulletin

8

5 YUGOSLAVS CONTINUE TO SUPPORT NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS IN POLAND AND HUNGARY

Emb7 Oct 56

US Emb8 Oct 56

ron ornciAL

TBE OMLiY

ow that the Tito regime is continuing its support of changes in Poland and Hungary. The Yugoslavs are somewhat critical of the failure of the Kadar-Nagy forces to act sooner against the members of the old Rakosi group that remained in power, but believe the Hungarianis in tune wilh the demands of the masses. Belgrade asserts the Hungarian leaders must carry out their new program decisively if they are to hold popularindicating that Nagy would have lo live down the fact that he had called for the intervention of Soviet troops.

A high Yugoslav Foreign Ministryonctober said that the Nagy government is still taking "halft should take in representatives of all Hungarian mass organizations, even possibly the Social Democrats. He felt that Poland and Hungary may in certain respects go beyond Yugoslavia* but Yugoslavia "can learn from their experiences."

The Yugoslav press appears somewhat sensitive to the reaction its views might cause in Moscow. It has reported without comment the intervention of Soviet troops.

Oct 56

Intelligf ce Bulletin

12

F COPY

L. YUGOSLAVS ADMIT SERIOUS DIFFERENCES WITH TrTElfflSfl

on:

US Emb Belgradeept 56

High Yugoslav officials now admit that the Soviets have been undermining Yugo Slav relations with the Satellites,

jueoslav foreign undereptember that the atti-

tude OiSoweTpartybossKhrushchev in his talks in Brionl had been an uncompromising reversal ofhParty congress doctrine, on the "many roads toWhen Tito threatened to publish their respective positions, Khrushchev invited him to the USSR to discuss tjieir differences with the Soviet leaders. Prica added that the Soviet leaders apparently had expected that Yugoslavia would return to the Soviet fold and were now worried about the effect of their policy of liberalization in the Satellites. Molotov and others had always opposed the policy and the great majority of the Soviet presidium and central committee, including Khrushchev, now support Molotov's views. Prica , stated this had createdide gap between SovietfS Yugoslav Ideas on socialism that it could never be bridged.

LHLt^LUlHi concludes that this opment, if as described, mustitter blow to Tito,predicted fundamental changes in the USSR in justifying

foreign policy.

of the extent of the ideological

differences, any durable Yugoslav-Soviet compromise is unlikely, although both sides will try to avoid another open split.

Tito's visit to the USSR, despite theWestern reaction he feared would result, indicates that he feels he must make every effort to protect Yugoslavia's, growing prestige in Eastern Europe.

OctIntelligence3

c.

TITO REITERATES CRITICISM OF CERTAIN SATELLITE LEADERS

Titopeech on his return

JuneBelgrade onune said further seli-

crlticism on the part of "individualin some of the East European countries was necessary before Yugoslavia could conclude agreements similar to those signed with the USSR and Rumania. He alluded in particularcertain reserve" on the part of the individual Eastern European leaders, who "find it hard to say what must be said and who think that their prestige will suffer if they say it."

remarks are presumably directed at

the Communist leaders of Hungary, Bulgaria and Albania who, in the Yugoslav view, still have not madeaccommodation to Belgrade's new relationship with Moscow.

uneIntelligence4

SECRGT

UGOSLAVS PLEASED WITHHONGRESS DEVE LOPMENTS :': -

Emb Belgrade

a* Feb"56

The, general reaction in Belgradeh Party Congress is favorable.

"The Yugoslavs nesm

now tobelieve that the USSR has definitelythe '. -principle of different roads to socialism. Thearticularly .approve thecondemnation of Stalinism andreference-to parUamenUry methods as a'Imeans of achieving socialism. They conclude that the

Soviet 'threat" is no longer imminent if in fact it exists'ii* *'

observes-

that'in spite of Yugoslav efforts to minimize Lqfficials.the importance dfTitoVmessageto the Soviet Congress, the-Yugoslavs regards of majorugqslavT'oreign Ministry official denied thatthe; message indicated anything with regard tohich4ieet" been established.

Comment .; evelopments at the Soviet partyappear to haveong way

towardremoving the obstacles that Yugoslav leadersin the way of re-establishing official ties with"party/-' '

' -V*

V The Belgrade press has applauded practically all the proceedings innd cited ^them as ;proof of the Yugoslav view that the Soviet leaders have. set their countryew orientation.

officials have maintained that it is now the West that is "inflexible" and the Soviethat is showingparticularly through its.generous offers to Belgrade.

Feb 56

.Intelligence Bulletin

4

1 A-

I

ITOS MESSAGE TO SOVIET PARTY CONGRESS Comment on:

Yugoslav presidentebof greetings to the "com-

Df FILIAL UCT QtttJT rades" at the Soviet party congress

the first public response by the

ugoslav Communist Party lo Soviet overtures for inter-party ties. His message calls for "all progressive forces in the world" to strengthen themselves to prevent new wars, praises Soviet economic progress, and makes approving references to the visit of the Soviet leaders to Yugoslavia.

Tito, at the same time; appears to 'one note of caution in his message. He mentionsa gradual approach to improvement In Yugoslav-SovietIs the best one for the restoration of trust andand provides for the possibility of eliminating "allwhich could prevent the strengthening of our

Preliminary Yugoslav reaction to the Soviet party congress has been gratification thai many Soviet views are now similar to those of Yugoslavia. Belgrade has probably gained particular satisfaction from the statement by Khrushchev that socialism could be attained throughmeans, since the Soviet leaders, when in Belgrade, are reliably reported to have rejected the Yugoslav concept that .socialism can be attained through evolution.

m

i

m

eb 56 ^Current Intelligence Bulletin . Page 4

Original document.

---

---