Created: 7/16/1957

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The toJlowinv istUliigsnce oraonUaliO'u participated tn Ike preparation ol Ihu estimateThr VeM.-nt Intelligence Agency and the tnteUtginc;he Department* et State, the Armti. theet. the Air Force. The Joint Stuff, and thctrgij Comnitlion.

Occurred Ol bjt the


oncneirnny ne,rs the Speciall Side. lhcf Slop. Intelligence. Department of theie Director o/ Nazal Intelligence; the Amilimt Chiel ot Stag, Intelligence. USAF: the Depaly DirectorInlttVgctxi, Thelag, ana the Atomic EnergyRepresentative tn the IAC. The AiSUIant Director. Fee,-rat Bureau ol Investigation, abstained, Ihe auo}ect be-ng av!$iae Ol his iurisdiclion.



his estimate was disseminated by ihe Central Intelligence Agency, This copy is (or the information and use of Uie recipient indicated on thc front cover and ofunder his jurisdictioneed to knuw basis. Additional essential dissemination may be authorized by the following officials within their respective departments:

a. Special Assistant to the Secretary for Intelligence, for the Department of


Chief of, for thc Department of the Army

of Naval Intelligence, for thc Department of the Navy

of Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force

Director for Intelligence. Joint Staff, for the Joint Staff

of Intelligence, ARC. for the Atomic Energy Commission

to the Director, FBI, fur the Federal Bureau of Investigation

li. Assistant Director for Collection and Dissemination. CIA, for any other De-

partment or Agency

his copy may be retained, or destroyed by burning in accordance withsecurity regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency bywith the Office of Collection and Dissemination, CLA.

hen an estimate Is disseminated overseas, the overseas recipients may retain Iteriod not ln excess of onehe end of this period, the estimate should either be destroyed, returned to the forwarding agency, or permission should beo: thc Torwarding agency to retain It in accordance with2

DISTRrBUTION: Whit* floiue Security Council Department of Stiite

: It

oard .'Uomie lir.ergy Commission Ftwlerat Bi.reait of InvcstlgaUoa



Page Nos.





Active Air


Weapons and




Early Warning. Ground Controlled Intercept, and

Ptre Control

Other Electronic

Strength and

Other Factors Affecting Air Defense


Logistic Support and

Personnel and

Commend and




Soviet Estimate of the Air and Missile Threat to the Bloc

Trends in Interception and Kill





Page Nos.

Trends In Early Warning and Intercept Control Capabilities .

Trends in Other Elements of Air Defense Capabilities . . .


Impact of Air Defense

of Air Defense Equipment: Characteristics, Strength,




To estimate the scale and nature of Sino-Soviet Bloc air defenses, and probable trends and capabilities through


This estimate is made within the framework of our previous judgments that the USSR does not now intend to initiate general war deliberately and is not nowfor general war as of any particular future dato. It is based, moreover, on athat the USSR is reasonably assured that the US and its Allies arc not now plajining the deliberate initiation of general war. The estimate assumes that these conditions will prevail throughnd that neither domestic or international political changes nor unexpected technological breakthroughs which would alter the general trends in Bloc and Western military capabilities will occur during the period. It also does not consider any change in military force levels which might resultisarmament agreement.

The estimate does not concern itself with the detailed strategy and tactics that might be employed by US and Allied forces in attacks against the Bloc, nor docs it attempt to evaluate in detail the kill probabilities of Bloc air defense weapons against attacking aircraft or missiles. Likewise, the reduction in Western offensivewhich might result from an Initial Soviet attack, and the reduction in Sovietcapabilities which might result from the initial phaseeneral war, are not estimated.

An esUmate of Soviet air defense capabilities over the next five years is subject not only to the usual uncertainties inherent in future projections, but to additional uncertainties arising from the probable emergence during this period of significant guided missile capabilities, both offensive and defensive, in Western and Soviet forces. On the basis of presently available evidence, the impact of these developments onair defense programs during the period cannot be estimated with confidence. Fairly broad margins of error must therefore be presumed to apply to the later years covered by the estimate.



We believe that air defense willto beigh priority in the Sino-Soviet Bloc Primary emphasis is placed on providing defense in depth for key administrative, industrial, andcenters within the USSR. All Bloc forces with capabilities for air defense are integrated into the over-all system.)

At present, the principal elements of over-all Bloc air defense strength are large numbers of fighter aircraft, earlyand ground controlled interceptand antiaircraft artillery weapons. Bloc fighter strength now totals0 aircraft, virtually all of which are high-performance jet fighters. Of0 fighters in Sovietow have at least limited all-weather capabilities. The USSR has made great strides in radar development, and large numbers of modern radars are now in operation. Bloc AAA weapons are capable of high rates of continuously-pointed fire against high-performance aircraft from low altitudes up to0 feet.

A significant addition to Soviet air defenses has been the introduction of guided missile systems. Surface-to-air guided missile installations arc nowin the Moscow area, and there is some evidence that Uiey are underat Leningrad. Air-to-air guided missiles could probably now be employed with certain Soviet fighter types.

The areas of high concentration of Bloc air defense weapons and associatedinclude that portion of European USSR from thc Kola Peninsula to the Caspian Sea, East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Maritime and Sakhalin areas of the Soviet Far East. High defense concentrations are also at some specific locations outside these areas, such as Tashkent, Novosibirsk, and

The principal current weaknesses in thc air defense system are: its limited all-weather fighter capability; thc low traffic-handling capabilities ofand control components; the probable inadequacy of radar height-finding capabilities at high altitudes and inadequate low altitude radar coverage; deficiencies in fighter armament; and the limited early warning time available in Bloc border areas.

Large passive defense organizations contribute to the Bloc's over-all readiness for air defense. We believe, however, that the general population Is inadequately prepared against large-scale nuclear )


following air defensein general to the Bloc's air

a. Against penetrations conducteddaylight and in clear weather, at altitudes betweennd0 feet, the capabilities of tho system arc greatest. 0 feet they



begin to diminish, and0 feet would fall on* markedly; at altitudeseet, they would also bereduced.)

penetrations conductedand under poor visibilitythe capabilities of the systemconsiderably reduced. (Paras.

varied penetrationaltitude stacking,decoys, and electronicthe capabilities of thesystem would bedisruption)

The approaches to Moscow are by far the most heavily defended area of the Bloc. Moscow's defenses includeet day and all-weather fighters,ntiaircraft guns, and someurface-to-air guided missUe sites. The Moscow missile system, which couldimited number of nuclear warheads, can probablyery high rate of fire against multiple targets at altitudes up to0 feet.defenses are thus estimated toigh capability to engage large-scale attack under all-weather conditions, but they probably remain vulnerable to very low altitude attack.

Thc amount of warning time availableignificant effect on the air defense capabilities of the various areas of the Bloc. Moscow and many other targets in thc interior could now be provided with more than one hour's radar early warning of attack by present Western aircraft types. The more limited early warning time available in Bloc border areas would reduce the effectiveness of

the defenses of even heavily-defended targets in such areas.

USSR is currently capableand seriously disruptinglong-range radiois also believed to have anfor jamming Westernand bombing radars. On theoperational Bloc air defenseequipment is vulnerable to


There will probablyignificant change in thc composition of Soviet air defense forces during the next five years, primarily because of the influence of guided missile systems. As suitablemissiles and associatedbecome available inarge portion of the medium and some light antiaircraft artillery guns willbe phased out of the defenses oftargets in the USSR. At present, we can estimate only that the USSR willnot increase its present numerical fighter strength, andecision will probably be taken to begin cutting back the number of Soviet mannedsome time late in the period. The numerical strength of Satellite andCommunist AAA and fighter forces will probably continue to be augmented, largely with older equipment retired from Soviet service.

Significant developments in Bloc air defenses will probably include: theof fighter aircraft with higher performance and better armament,air-to-air guided missiles and un-guided rockets, some possibly equipped with nuclear warheads; an increase in the proportion of all-weather fighters in


operational units; the advent of new surface-to-air guided missile systems suitable for defense of static targets, field forces, and naval vessels, and their availability to additional major Soviet cities and industrial areas, as well asunils; extensions of early warning and ground controlled intercept radar ranges, and the availability of sufficient radars to provide nearly complete early warning coverage of the Bloc; increases in the traffic-handling capacities ofand control components.)

hese developments will considerably increase Bloc capabilities for all-weather defense against Western manned aircraft and cruise-type missiles. Nevertheless, at thc end of the period, warningailable to Bloc targets in peripheral areas will probably continue to bc deficient for

fighter interceptors and marginal formissile defenses against the highest-performance Western aircraft and cruise-type missiles. The Bloc will continue to have difficulty in opposing very low altitude attacks.)

In the field of electronic counter-measures, the advantage ls likely to fluctuate between Lhe offense and the defense. However, we estimate that through the period of this estimate, Bloc air defense electronic systems will still be subject to progressive disruption byemployed diversionary tactics,saturation techniques and other countermeasures. )

We believe the USSR will not bc able to place ineapon system capable of successfully interceptingmissiles by



he Soviet, lenders probably believe that thc security ol the USSR from air attack rests primarily on their overall political andposture. They hope to avoid situations which could leadestern attack and they hope that their offensive strength will deteruch sltu^'lnn* "rise. They are also trying tn reduce the US threat by political and diplomatic action intended to deny use of the overseas bases which are presenUy essentialull-scale US attack on the Bloc. Finally, if Uie Soviet leaders estimated Uiat war was imminent, Uicy would probably attempt to strike the first blow at Western nuclear capabilities In order to reduce the scale of an initial assault on the USSR. Nevertheless, they almost certainly recognize that these measures may bc Inadequate in themselves to Insure the security of the USSR,

and Uiat they must therefore strive toigh level of air defense ln case war should occur.

oviet concern with the air defensebecame apparent early in the postwar period, when the Soviet leaders evidently came to appreciate that the primary military threat Uie USSR faced was from growing Western nuclear striking power. Air defense programs were consequentlyigh priority.of this is found in theet fighter force, Uie earlyof an extensive Bloc early warning screen, the continuing effort to modernize the air defense system and Uie periodic andair defense exercises. It is alsothat the Bloc's air defense system has been organized and equipped so as to provide defense in depth for key Soviet administrative, industrial and military centers, with con-


less emphasis placed on the defense of less essential strengths especially those of thc Satellites and Communist China. Wethat Bloc air defense programs will continue to be conducted within this broad policy framework during the period of tills estimate.


OPERATIONALhere has been no basic change In thc organization of Bloc air defenses sinceof our last air defense estimate., inn Uie USSR, tlieof Defense retains responsibility forair defense measures, while civil defense is handled by the Ministry of Internal Affairsach European Satellite. Communist China, and North Korea have independent air defense systems modelled after thc USSR's and Integrated into an over-all Bloc system. Wc believe that this Integration docs notunified command of Bloc air defense forces as such, but there are establishedof communication for the transmission of air defense operational information.

Active Ait De'cnic

ithin Uie Soviet Ministry of Defense, thc agency with primary responsibility for active air defense of the USSH is PVO Strany, literally Anrialr Defense of the Country. whose commander-in-chief is believed toeputy Minister of Defense. This agency, with headquarters in Moscow, preparesair defense plans involving all appropriate dements of th; Soviet srmcd forces, and is responsible for the integrated training and combat effectiveness of the elements of PVO Strany. Throughout much of thc USSR,control of the air defense function Isby PVO Stranyystem of air defense districts, corresponding generally in size and importance to the majorand military areas of the USSR and grouped under two major regionalThe principal regional headquarters is at Moscow,econdary headquartersfor the Par East Ls probably located

at Khabarovsk. Within the Soviet Fleets,Districts, and major fiekl commands outside the USSR, there arc air defense staffs which coordinate their operations with PVO Strany.

he forces utilized in the Soviet air defense syslem include not only those directlywith PVO Strany, but also appropriate forces from other components of the armed forces. Forces directly associated with PVO Sfrany include Fighter Aviation of Antiair Dcfcnse (IAtatic antiaircraftgun units, static surface-to-air guided missile units, and air observation, warning and communication (VNOS) elements. Forces from other components which are utilized for air defense include tactical fighters. AAA. and VNOS elements in Soviet Militaryand Groups of Forces; elements ofFleets Including fighter, radar, and visual observer (SN1S) untts and naval AAA; as well as elements of the MVD. These variousare integratedunctioning air defense system by the various district and higher headquarters of PVO Strany.'

Posiive Defcwo

he passive air defense of Bloc military forces is apparently Uie responsibility ofcommanders, supported by the chemical and other technical services. The civilfunction is directed by civil defense (MPVO) directorates In the various republics of the USSR, under close policy guidance from thc MVD in Moscow. MPVO personnel plan, program and enforce local air defense policies and maintain liaison with appropriate elements of the armed forces. They utilize existing civil agencies, such as health and fire departments, to implement passive defense measures. Tlie MPVO ls believed to prepare thc over-all plans for the civil air defense training and Indoctrination programsbyarge paramilitaryorganization.

1ore detailed description of lheorganization of the Soviet air defense system, aa well as Its administrative organization, seeanuary IMC.


oviet Jet fighters have clearly beenprimarily for the interceptor role,by especially good climb and high altitude capabilities. At present. Bloc fighter forces are equipped with several models of Jet Interceptors: the FAGOT, five versions of the FRESCO, the FARMER, and two versions of the FLASHLIGHT. While all these areas day fighters, FRESCO *'D"imited all-weather capability and only FLASHLIGHT "A" and "C" are primarily all-weather fighters. All currently operational Bloc Jet fighters have combat ceilingson the order0 feet or higher; combat ceilings of the FRESCO "C" andand FARMER are on the order0 feet Without external fuel tanks. FRESCO "C" and "D" are estimated to be capable of climbing0 feet altitudeinutes from take-off. FARMER, the USSR's firstfighter, Is probably capable of reaching this altitudeinutes. The speed, climb, and altitude capabilities of the heavier FLASHLIGHT all-weather fighters areto be somewhat lower than those of the latest operational day fighters.*

A disadvantage of currently-operational Soviet fighters appears to be the relatively low muzzle velocity and rate of fire of their rather large caliber guns. Older models are equipped with gun sights with manual range input, but more recent models probablysights with radar ranging. Thols believed to be capable of employing alr-to-alr unguided rockets or guided missiles.

Airborne Intercept Radar. There Isevidence of the employment ofintercept (AI) radar in the FRESCO "D" and FLASHLIGHT aircraft Against an aircraft7 site, wc estimate that the AI radar In the" hasi nautical milesnd. at present. TheAI radar is believed to be much more

'For dcla(led estimates of thc performanceof Soviet fighter aircraft, see Annex B.nd 2.

effective, with search and track capabilitiesndn.m. respectively.*

performance of known Sovietis considered reliable, but itcannot be depended upon to provideIdentification in combat and thcprobablyowMost operational Bloc fighterswith IFF transponders.

Antiaircraft Artillery

The principal medium AA gun nowIn Soviet and some Satellite staticIsm. gun, wliich is employedemote control system and off-carriage fire control radar and director. This system is considered capable of continuously pointed fire against high-performance aircraft atand high altitudes up to0 feet. Within the USSR, it probably has entirely replaced the World War II modelm. gun in static defenses, although an improvedof Uie latter is still used in tactical defense of field forces. Sincehe USSR has also produced limited numbersm. gun. This weaponr continuously pointed fire upeet, but Its slow rate of fire and the relatively long time of flight of its projectile outweigh ils altitude advantage.

For mobile defense and low altitude coverage. Soviet units are equipped7 mm. automatic AA gun with both on-cairl.igc optical sighting and off-carriagefire control equipment. This weapon ls believed capable of engagingaircraft at altitudes up0 feet under all weather renditions. In Soviet units them AA gun Is rapidly replacing Uie obsolete, manually-operatedm. gun. The USSR alsoamily of single, twin, and quadruple barreledm. AA machine guns. While manual operation of these guns would limit tracking and aiming against In-

'The AI ranges Givenail-conereach towards the target aircraft. Much greater ranges could be obtained if broadside approaches were made, although It Is not known whether the Soviet fire control systems can takeol such Increased ranges.


targets, they eouldigh volume of barrage fire for short periods.*

hile we have no direct evidence that thc USSR is employing proximity fuzes ln its AAA ammunition, their development has beenSoviet capabilities for some time and large quantities could be available at any timethe period of this estimate. It is alsowithin Soviet capabilities to havean unguided surface-to-air rocket. Some work on such rockets was reportedlyin the postwar period on the basis of German designs. We have no evidence thatroject was carried to completion, and Soviet interest probably laggedthe successful development of surface-to-air guided missiles.

Guided Misiitet

n the Moscowystem of someurface-to-air guided missile sitesotal ofaunching pads has been constructedhe sites are arranged in two concentric rings with radii of approximatelynd. from the center of the city. All sites arc probably now operational. From observations o' these sites and their "YOYO" guidance radars, missiles, and other associated facilities, we estimate that the USSR now possesses asystem capable ofound nuclear or HE payload to asystem altitude0 feet and horizontal range ofts guidance system ls probably of the command type with

'For detailed ntlmstti of Soviel AAAsee Axmm* 3

* For detailed descriptions of estimated Soviet surface-to-an and alr-lo-nlr guided missiles, see Annex D. Table 4.

'This ranee represents our estimate of thecapability ol tlie system It probablyaximum horizonanee ofjn. when II first became operaUonal In 1BSS. for adescription of thb system, see. -Soviet CapablUUrs and Probable Kroerarns In the Guided MissileI Muchor appropriate nuclearcapabiliUes. see.tomic Energyimited distribution.

a CEP at maximum range ofeet, orommand and semiactive seeker typeEP of abouteet WeUiat the guidance system at each site probably has the capability to track and engageargets simultaneously. However, Uie present guidance system has limitedIn azimuth, requiring at leastites to* protecUonarget with aboutercent overlap between sites.intelligence Information gives someUiat Uie lower limit of its alUtude capability may beeet. *

hile there is no direct intelligence to Indicate successful Soviet completion of an air-to-air guided missile, our assessment of Soviet capabilities In Uie field leads us to estimate Uiat5 the USSR couldhave had inystem, capable ofpound HE payload to arangeEP ofeet.ystem available by Uiat date would probably haveimplifiedsystem using passive Infrared horning, and would therefore be limited to use in tail-cone attacks under conditions of good weather at engagement altitude.

ecently acquired intelligence indicates lhat2 Uie USSR had under development an air-to-air missile guidance receiver of Uie beam-rider type. We esUmate Uiat ifdevelopment were pursued, the USSR could probably now have an alr-to-alr system employing this type of guidance inuse.issile would probably be capable ofpoundaximum range ofith enr of abouteet. It would befor employment only by all-weather fighters, and the FI.ASHLIGHT is estimated to be the most likely present carrier.

Early Warning, Ground Controlled Intercept, and Fire Control Radar

ccurate evaluation Of radar detecUon capability has proved extremely difficult even where all technical factors are known. Thc lack of much significant data on Soviet radars, and the wide variation in circumstances of


employment, requires the use of rather wide brackets In estimating detection ranges. In addition, in order more clearly to define the nature of the estimates tn the followingwe set forth the assumptions under which they were made:

the aircraft will present lessecho area to the radar.

standard radar propagationwill exist.

because of various degradingencountered under operationalthe radar will achieve significantlytheoretical maximum ranges.

the target aircraft Is abovehorizon.'

F-BCSi'r Alralli

ID Mil



arly Warning Radar Ranges. While many types of radars arc employed for long-range early warning in the Bloc, those in most widespread use at present are the TOKEN. GAGE, DUMBO, and KNIFEREST. Under the assumptions listed above, wc estimate that against currently operational Western bomber and fighter-bomber aircraft, approaching at altitudes between the radar horizon and their combat ceilings, reliable detection by Bloc radars will probably occur within therange brackets:

Uc Aircraft





CI Radar Ranges. Tlie significant Bloc GCI radars arc considered to be the TOKF.N, either alone or with ROCK CAKE height-finder, and the GAGE with PATTYCAKE liclghtflndcr. DUMBO and KNIFEREST are

' The radar hortson la directly analogous lo the opucalelow which objects cannot be seen due tu Iho curvature of the earth. Thus for any giver, heluhta ol radar and target thereaximum range beyond which detection wUl not occur under standard propagaUon condition* To Illustrate,adar sited at sea level In an arec. tree of terrain obstrucUoni. thc radar horizon will be at aboul ITO nm. againstM ft attitude, but will decrease lo aboul.ntgell. alli-ludc.

y mmm


occasionally used for GCI work, but their performance is Inudeouate. Assuming the same conditions as In the case of the early warning radars given above, we esUmate that reliable GCI operaUons could beginwithin the following range brackets:

Dize Aire ran




GCI positioning Ls dependent upon theto obtain accurate altitude InformaUon. Available Intelligence does not permit an ac curate assessment of the holghtfindlngof these radars, although Uie TOKEN apparenUy has rather poor heighUlndlngfor altitudes0 feet. The recent appearance of new helghtfindcrsthat the USSR Ls attempting to correct this inadequacy. Actual control ofcan be accomplished only within the range at which the radar can track the Bloc tighter. The use of transponder beacons in Interceptors would permit them to bc tracked to approximately Uio GCI detection ranges for bombers, but we have no firm evidence that ave Bloc is employing IFF equipment for this purpose. Wc estimate that thc tralTlc-handling capacity of any one Soviet GCI site is limited to six simultaneous interceptions under dose control.

AA Fire Control Radar. The WHIFF fire controloviet version of the USs in general use with Bloc AAA units,ewer set. the FIRECAN. has appeared recently. Other models of na-Uve design are believed lo be available in minted quantities In Hungary and possibly Czechoslovakia. Current Bloc fire control radars have effecUvc ranges considerably In excess of the ranges of thc guns with which Uicy arc employed;. tn the case of the WHIFF. Accuracy is estimated at plus orils In azimuth and elevation and plus or minusards In range.

Other Bggftvafc Equipment

Communications. Soviet electronicsand development establishments are


of providing communicaUonaequal in quality to that of the West. Until recently, the standard alr-to-alr and air-to-ground communications equipment forfighters was an improved versionorld War II high frequency (IIP) radio system, supplemented2 by four-channel very high frequency (VHF)There are indications that aVIIF system may now be available for some Soviet tactical aircraft There is as yet no indication of thc employment offrequency (UHF) systems for air-to-air and air-to-ground communications.

ground-to-groundUSSR employs all standard systemsmilitary and civil defense needs.high-speed radio-telegraph, andcommunications network are Inuse In European USSR and thcbecoming gradually less dense inand eastern areas of thethe past few years, the USSRbeen using UHF relay equipmentup tooicen East Oermany, this typeis probably functioning In annetwork linked lo other Bloc

Automatic Computation and DataEquipment. Air dclense data handling capabilities would be greatly increased byanyariety of data link systems known to be available to the USSR, including television link equipment which could beto transmit data very rapidly or even to transmit pictures of complete status boards. The USSR is known lo have developedcomputers, which could piay an lutfaa-tant role in these systems. With Eastassistance, the USSR is also developing automatic data handling devices suitable for air defense purposes. We have no evidence that lhc above types of equipment are In current use in the Bloc air defense system.

Radio navigation Equipment. For the major portion of its air navigation, including approach and landing, the Bloc relies upon radio homing aids. Groundsets and oinnibcacons are now In use.

and we believe that GCA landing aids are being installed at key fighter fields. There is evidence that the development of more precise navigation and landing aids, including distance-measuring equipment. Is under way.

lectronic Countermeasures. We believe that at present the USSR has an appreciable capability for jamming Western bombing and navigational radars at frequencies up0nd possibly higher, andfor Jamming at thc lower frequenciesused In Western long-range radioResearch is now beingon magnetrons and probably traveling wave tubes, suitable for Jamming In thefrequencies, but wc know of noequipment utilizing these tubes. Known types of Soviet radio and radar equipment,acquisition and target-trackingare vulnerable to jamming. Theof present Bloc radars is increased by the concentration of their frequencies,In the three narrow bandsc/s.c/s. The USSR is aware of the effectiveness of countermeasures against radar, and is capable of developing devices wlUch would render its radars less vulnerableamming andWe arc unable to estimate the extent to which such devices have been developed or are presently incorporated into operaUonal equipment

passive electronic interceptestimated to be capable ofelectromagnetic signals throughfrequency spectrum from HF upoooumber of passivewith this estimated capabilityidcntlllea along the borders of Eastand Poland. There Is alsoairborne and shipborne electronicis being conducted by Uie USSR


large quantities of air defenseavailable to the Bloc are deployed pri-

detail* ol the estimated sUenjth and de-plormcnt of Bloe air defense equipment, see Annex n,. and Annex C, Map 1.



In defense of key Soviet static targets and military forces, with proportionately much smaller quantities allocated to other Bloc nations. Total Bloc Jet fighter strength fors estimated atf which more0 arc inunits,re in Europeanunits, andre in Asiaticunits. Operational Bloc AA guns are estimated lo total0 mediumand0 light weapons, of which almostercent are in Soviet units. With regard to the quality of weapons provided, the USSR has likewiseolicy of satisfying the needs of its own units, especially those within thc USSR, before those of other Bloc nations. Por example,ercent of total Soviet Tighter strength is now believed to comprise fighters with at least limited all-weather capabilities, other Bloc nations have been supplied with these aircraft in only nominal quantities and none are believed to havem AA gun. which has been Issued to Soviet unitsas been issued in small quantities to certain of the East European Satellites and toChina within the past two years. With regard to early warning radar, however, high quality equipment has been Installed on the Satellite borders to provide additional warning time for key Soviet targets.

ighter aircraft of the USSR areIntoegiments. Of these,re in IA PVO with air defense as their sole mission, whilere in tactical aviation and about G5 in navalwith air defense as one of their missions. In addition, there at" RS fiphtpr regiments in European Satellite forces andn North Korean and Chinese Communist forces. The USSR has replaced lhe piston aircraft in its ground attack regiments with Jet fighter types. There is evidence lhat upon their re-equipment these regiments Initiated training in interceptor operations, and Ihey are now considered as tactical fighter regiments,of performing both ground support and air defense missions. Our estimate of the number of Soviet aircraft and regimentsfor air defense has been Increased consid-

erablyesult ol this development, but we do not believeeflects any continuingtrend in the total numerical strength of the Soviet fighter establishment. Atthe bulk of operational Soviet fighters are FRESCOs; other Bloc fighter forces are now almost completely Jet-equipped, although largely with older types.

The areas of greatest concentration of Bloc air defense weapons and associated equipment Include Uiat portion of European USSR from the Kola Peninsula to theSea. East Germany, Poland.and the Maritime and Sakhalin areas of the Soviet Far East. Throughout most of these areas, aircraft penetraUng Bloc air space would bo within range of Soviet fighters at all times. The heaviestof IA PVO fighters are in the Moscow, Baku, and Leningrad areas, which account for over two-thirds of estimated IA PVO strength. Somewhat lesser concentrations are elsewhere in European USSR and In the Sverdlovsk. Tashkent. Novosibirsk, Lakeand Khabarovsk areas. Criticalareas in Europe, Uie Black Sea Coast, and Uie Soviet Far East are defended by significant tactical and naval defeme forces.

Moscow Is by far the most heavily defended area in Uie Bloc. Of Uie estimated totalA PVO Jet fighters,. or about one-third arc basedadius. from Moscow, with Uie greatestbelieved lo be on the westernto the city. Moscow is the only Bloc target now known to be protectedurface-to-air guided missile system. The Moscow missile sites are deployed so as to providepp)nj. coveiage of targetsin any quadrant, between about. and. from the center of Uie city. Still closer to Uie city are AAA defenses which may total moreuns, thc bulk ofm guns, but includingm andm guns. Theseare served by high concentrations of radar sites, fire control, and communications equipment.

Areas of significantly less dense airconcentraUon Uian those described in


nclude Albania. Bulgaria,Rumania, moat of central and northeast Siberia, and thc Interior of China. The areas. of the coast of China and North Korea arc well-equipped with airforces but are severely limited in all-weather capability. Portions of thePeninsula and Uie Arctic littoral have some air defense capabilities.

esUmate Uiat there arc atrime operaUonal earlyGCI radar sites ln Uie Bloc,early warning andtypes In various combinations.are supplemented by approximatelyradars. Early warningajor portion of theCoverageenctraUng targetor more radars simultaneously canbe achieved throughout most ofUSSR, thc Satellites, and theareas. Gaps ln peripheral earlyradar coverage appear Inand the Soviet ArcUc coastand the Chukotski, alUiough thereflect gaps In Intelligence"


Air Facilitiei

defense requirements have playedrole In determining Uiescope of airfield development in thethe past few years. ConstrucUonair defense bases and improvement ofones has been undertakenorndBloc fighter forces.has been on the construction of long,runways with well developedWhereas early runway constructionfighter fields was generallyeet, the more recentlyfrequently have been upummary ofirfieldsBloc wlUi long, permanent surface run-

estimated Bloc radar coverage, see Annex C, Map 2.

ways is given in the tablef these fields are currenUy being used for air defense operaUons.

Minimum Runway Lengths (feet) *






table, referrlne to runway lengths only. Is not to be takeneasure of the capabilily or the fields to handle sustained militaryor operaUons under all weather conditions.

In addition, there areloc airfields with runwayseet In length which could be utilized for fighter operations under reduced safety margins.

geographic distribution of theseis generally consistent with thegreatest and least air defenseinbove.airfield development work has beenIn certain of Uie lessDevelopment of the airfieldSouthern China opposite Formosa hasprogress for the past three years andConsiderable improvementfacilities has occurred lns the result of aconstruction program.number of airfields in the Arcticfor air defense operations is stillthat thc extent of fighterthat area would be governed by thecondiUons imposed by the utilizationbases.

looiihc Support ond Maintenance

estimate that the Soviet supplytransportation network, and localare adequate to meet immediateneeds In many areas, since mostinstallations, airfields, and radararc located adjacent to populatedmain transportation andlines. There are indications Uiatprocedures are exacting and care-

TOPC hi:

supervised and maintenance ofis believed to bc good to excellent. Our evidence on Soviet electronic equipmentthat it is generally reliable and well-maintained.

Jet Fuel. Although we lack Information on thc exact location of fuel storage points in many areas, and on the amount of fuel actually stored, we esUmate Uiat operational Bloc airfields have an average capacity to store sufficient fuel0 days sustained combat operations. OperaUonal Soviet jet fighters are flown an average ofours per month, and wc believe lhat this Is due In partolicy of allocatingquanUties of fuel to reserve storage, and in some areas lo transportation

Jet Serviceability. We estimate Uiat for present Soviet jet fighters, an immediate serviceability rateon Uie order ofercent could be achieved without special stand-down, this serviceability rate could beIncreased toercenteriod4 days. Thereafter, serviceability rales could be maintained at aboutercenteriod of four to six months under sustained combat condlUons, and would then declineercent. Under extreme weather conditions and in areas not served by adequate transportation, such as In the Arctic, the above serviceability rates would be reduced.

Personnel and Training

e estimate that at present there are in the Blocillion military personnel engaged in active air deiensc iune-Uons, cither as their sole mission or as one of their missions. Of these, morerc Sovietn general, we believe their technical skills and training lo bealthough we have Insufficient evidence to permit an assessment of Uie training of certain categories of personnel, notably those

serviceable" aircraft Is one which Is fully prepared io perform lis assigned combat mission.

reakdown by area and (unction, see Annex R. Table 8.

In thc air warning services. Trainingin the Satellites and Asiatic Communist nations are generally lower than those in Uie USSR. Throughout Uie Bloc, however,requirements are probably fulfilledriority basis in accordance with thcplaced on air defense. The rate of attrition due to personnel turnover is believed to be low.

n the USSR there are aboutlight training schools for fighter pilots, which prob' ablyotal ofilots per year. Fighter pilots are believed to acquireours' flying Ume before reporting to an operational unit; aboutours as pilot candidates In DOSAAF andours as student pilots In military flying schools. Unlil recenUy, this training was in trainer-type aircraft, but at present Soviet training establishments have anet fighter aircraft or tactical types, which are being used for prc-operatlonalStudents receive little gunnery or nlght-flytng training. We believe there is noschool as such for the training of fighter pilots in the Bloc.

oviet fighter pilot has beento an operaUonal unit, he probably averages only0 hours' flying time perhe details of the currenttraining program of Uie IA PVO are not known.raining goals were to acquire fully thc technique of interception and destruction of large hostile air formations, but these goals probably now includeand destruction of single aircraft and small formations. Instrument training is conducted in operational units. Night flying has Incieased considerably and the standards have probably been raised, but we believe they are probably below US standards.

The training of Soviet AAA officers Isin several basic and specialist schools, Including an AAA academy which holds advanced courses for battery and higher level commanders Training for enlisted men Is conducted in unit schools. Thc annualcycle for AAA unils includes range firing,

"US flBhtcr pilotsours per month.



firing exercises, and combined training and maneuvers. Combat firing exercises are conducted twice yearly, and jet aircraft are known to have been used to tow targets for such exercises Combat alerts are conducted throughout the year. During these alerts, units in garrisons must be manned and in tegmental march formation in less than two hours. When on the march, automaticcrews must be able to firerom the wheels or wilhineconds by pulling off the road and putting the gun into firing position. Medium gun crews areto be able to deliver fire within 50

Command1 and CoordinaUon

he size and complexity of the Bloc's air defense organization, together with the vast area over which it must function, hasthc USSRormidable control and coordination problem. Within the Soviet PVO organization alone thereargeof control centers at various echelons,aboutVO district control centersubdislrlct control centers andfilter centers for analyzing andradar and visual warning information. In addition, control centers probably exist at each fighter division headquarters and atAAA organizational levels. Over-allof thc operations of the various air defense components is accomplishedommunications syslem which, in many areas, probably includes parallel land-line and radio links between early warning sites. GCI sites, and control centers. In those areas where land-line or point-to-point radioare lacking, thc traffic-handling capacity of the system is probably limited to aboul five simultaneous raids at one reporting site.

t is probable that early warning sites channel their reports through the subdlstrict filter center to the district control centers. Coordination between local air defense forces is probably accomplished on an information basis at the subdistrKl level, but majordecisions probably occur al the district level. Al thc same time, inlormatkm Ispassed laterally between district head-

quarters and vertically to Moscowocal situation, the fightercommander probably has the authority to commit as much as thc alert flight, buteneralecision to commit larger forces probably would be madeigher echelon.


hc USSR has devoted Increasingto thc passive defense of both military and civil personnel and facilities since the Korean War period. Sovici military andpassive defense programs give attention to the problems of defense against nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare. Theseare participated in by large segments of both the civilian and military populations. While selected control elements of thcmay now have up-to-date protection available to them, wc believe that thc general population is inadequately prepared against large-scale nuclear attack.

CO. Camouflage and Deception. Bloc ground forces are accustomed to night operations, and camouflage of field forces and facilities during maneuvers is routine ln their tactical doctrine and training. It must be assumed that the USSR ls aware of the techniques used by the Germans during World War II, such as the construction or simulation through radar camouflage of false cities, factories, etc However, to date there has been no evidence of such deceptive

rend toward somewhat greater dispersal has been evident in Soviet military forces In recent years. Revised ground force tactical doctrino stresses the need tooncentrated target for asime as passible, emphasizing the rapid concentration of forces, timely seizure of objectives, and rapid redlspcrial. Thenavy is believed to be engaged in some programs which will permit greater dispersal, including thc development of additional base facilities and thc construction of mobileunits such as submarine tenders and fleet tankers. Current Soviet practice Is to base one to two ait regimentsield, and


and revetment areas are generally located relatively close to Ihu landing strips. However, dispersed parking areas are now being added at some airfields. The estimated availability of both permanent and natural surface airfields is such that no more than one regiment would probably be based at anyieldrtlme.

We have no evidencepecific Soviet' program for Uie dispersal of governmental and Industrial installations. Some dispersal Is occurring naturallyesult of the In-dustralization of additional areas. Thedecentralization ofcontrol may have some bonus effectassive defense point of view, although present Soviet decentralization plansdo not include Uie most critical defense industries To date there has been no public mention of evacuation or dispersal of thepopulation tn the event of war.

Underground Installations and Shelters. Underground military command posts and niter centers have been reported ln Hungary. Bulgaria, and East Germany, and we assume that such installations exist in major defense centers elsewhere in the Bloc. Some airfields are equipped with underground storage and repair space. Our information is insufficient to detennine the extent of these facilities, but they are probably not widespread.

The incorporation of air raid shelters Into newly-constructed buildings began in the USSR In Uiendajor national program at the Ume of the Korean War. In most masonry apartment dwellings builtt has been standard practice to include cellar shelters designed to beand to withstand complete collapse of Uie building. This program probably nowsome degree of shelter for roughly one-sixth of the urban population of the USSR, and this proportion will probably rise to roughly one-third by the endnthere are shelters in factories andbuildings.

Most exisUng shelters were not designed for protection from high-yield nuclear There are Indications, however, Uiat the

newer building shelters are of heavierSo far as is known, there has been no new construction of large underground shelters separated from buildings. However, the Moscow and Leningrad subways arcfor use as shelters, and Vladivostok, Baku, and Sevastopol have retained and Improved elaborate tunnel systems constructed during World War IL

raining. Passive defense against airis Included In training programsthe Soviet military forces. Field manuals and pamphlets published for troop Issuedefensive measures for nuclear,and chemical warfare. Soviet maneuvers have included defensive tactics against such weapons. Troop training stresses proper use of protective equipment, and fieldprocedures, as well as discipline with regard to contaminated areas, water, andThe current Issue gas mask is believed to afford adequate protection againstof known BW and CW agents.

ivil defense training in the USSR has been intensified8 and especiallyhen recruitment in the civilianorganization (DOSAAF) was stepped up and air and chemical defense courses wereompulsory part of DOSAAF" These courses, probably in conformity with standards set by the MPVO,eneral knowledge of civil defense, including alarm signals, types of attack, gas defense and decontamination, first aid. and firemeasures. Within Uie past several years. Soviet authorities haveimited amount of InformaUon on Uie effects ofweapons, and elementary nuclear and biological defense instruction has been added to the DOSAAF training program. Field demonstrations are conducted and air raid drills arc prescribed, but there is no evidence Uiat drills have been conductedull-scale, city-wide basis.

" DOflAAr-'. wliose total membership Is esUmated to be overillions, has primary unlU charged with organizing "self defense- croups InInstitutions, collective and state farms, machine tractor stations, schools, and dwelling unlU throughout the USSR.


he USSR publicized amovie entitled Antlatomic DefensePopulation. This ls the first tune aSoviet (Urn has pictured aexplosion. Widespread disseminationfilm was urged.


estimating the future developmentBloc air defense system2 wca number of considerations Into(a) the intelligence available onorganization, weapons,ase line from whichthe possible future design and scalesystem: (b) the requirements which wethe Soviet leaders would probablyan air defense system in the light ofof the probable threat posed byaircraft and missile capabilities;vailable on current Bloc researchprograms and our estimateBloc's scientific and technicaldevelop new weapons and equipmentfuture requirements; (d) theavailable and thc costSoviet leaders would have to takein building their future airThese considerations, takenprovide the basis for our estimate ofair defense programs where directis still lacking. This estimate ison our belief that the Sovietcontinue loigh priority to


n the basis of information we believe they can acquire by overt and covert means. Soviet planners can probably estimate fairly accurately the general performancequantities, and world-wideol the weapons and delivery systems the US and Its Allies could presently employ against the Bloc. Within reasonable limits, they can probably anticipate the dates at which new US and Allied attack capabilities will They recognize that the Bloc is geo-

graphically surrounded by Western air power and Uiat US heavy bombers and US and Allied medium bombers, using inflight refueling as neccesary, could reach any target In Uie Bloc on two-way missions from existing overseas or continental US bases. In addition, they are aware Uiat many of Uie important target areas in Uie Bloc can be reached by Western light bombers, fighter bombers, and carrier aircraft operating from widely separated bases. Thc great area of uncertainty for the Soviet planners undoubtedly is the planned employment of Western weapon systems.planners almost certainly estimate Uiat in the event of general war during Uie period of this estimate, Uie US and Its Allies would possess great flexibility in scale, dlrecUon. and tactics of atiack.

he USSR probably recognizes that at present Uie gravest threat posed to Uie Bloc is that of nuclear attack by manned bomber, fighter-bomber, and naval attack aircrafthigh and medium altitude horizontal bombing and low altitude toss or loftOf Uie moieS and Allied aircraft capable of striking the Bloc, the great majority arc capable ol attacking between, very low altitudes and0 feet, at speedsmall number of these aircraft have better performanceSoviet planners would probablyattacks in peripheral areas by Jet fighter-bombers capable of altitudes up to0 feet and speeds upmall part of the current threat would be guided missiles, including short range ballistic missiles and ground and naval launchedcruise-type missiles with alUtudes up to0 feel and ranges up to.

he USSR would probably estimate that inime period. US and Alliedwould include delivery vehicleshigher speeds and altitudes. While thc capabilities of most attacking aircraft would probably be within the limits set forth ln the preceding paragraph, Soviet planners would probably anticipate Uiat2 severalwould have considerably greater altilude and speed capabilities, ranging up to about

-TOP flEOltW

feet antihile they would probably expect some decrease In the total numbers of Western mannedduring the period, they would alsou marked Increase in both the numbers and types of guided missiles. They would probably estimate Western missile capabilities2 to include several thousand long- and medium-range ground and naval launched cruise-type missiles and decoys, including some with supersonic speeds and altitudes up0 feet, large numbers of short-range ballistic missiles; large numbers ofmissiles and decoys with ranges. and greater; and small numbers of IRBM- and ICBMs.

oviet planners would have to assume that high-yield nuclear payloads are nowinto the US weapons systems which could be employed against the Bloc, and that there willontinuing increase In thc maximum yield capabilities, versatility,and numbers of US stockpileIn addition, they would expect continued improvement in US and Allied weapon delivery capabiliUes under all weather conditions,capabilities of attacking aircraft to defend Uiemselves against IntercepUon,employment and sophistication of electronic countermeasures and penetration aids, and further Increases ln US inflightcapabilities.

oviet planners almost certainly recognize Uiat.uccessful defense againsthigh explosive attack can be achieved byigh rate of attrlUon onforces, attack employing high-yieldweaponshatir defense systemigh probability of denying access to vital targets. The present defenses of Moscow suggestoncept of denial of access has been adopted for the Soviet capital. In Uie light of expected increases in theof Western delivery vehicles, especially in speed and altitude, and In Western weapon yields. Soviet planners probably consider that Uie size of Uie target danger zoneie area around any given Bloc target into which denial of penetration must be sought) will increase as the period advances. Thus, their

programs for thc development and deployment of Bloc air defense equipment will probably aim to achieve successful interception nnd kill at Increasing distances from vital Bloc targets. Moreover, Soviet planners probably recognize that their air defense system must be capable of protecting Bloc air defense bases andground installations In order to insure Uie sustained defense of viUI target*.

oviet planners will have toine degree of judgment in evaluating weapon system utility as new offensive and defensive systems are developed by bolh sides in aof rapidly-changing weapon technology. In many cases, choices will not bc clear-cut and complementary air defense weaponwill be Justified. Moreover, during this period poteniial Western attacking forces willide variety of weapon systems, of which Uie bulk will be existing or improved models of currenUy-operational aircraft and missile typesmall percentage will bc IRBMs and ICBMs. In view of present trends In Bloc air defenses and Uie wide diversity of Western atlack capabilities and methods, we estimate that during Uie time periodin this estimate Uie Bloc will continue toixed force of air defensesystems.


figfiler Aircraft "

n order to oppose theWestern aircraft, the Bloc will need to have In operation by0 fighters with speed capabilities ofnots and combat ceilings of0 feet. InBloc fighters will need to be provided with improved AI gear, armament, fireand communications equipment, but at the same time must achieve high rates of climb lo alUtudc. Prototype day and all-weather fighters displayed by Uie USSR in6 appeared to emphasize highcharacteristics at Uie expense of rel-

"For detailed estimates of performanceof Soviel lighters, see Annex B.nd 2.


short combal radii. We estimate that new Soviet fighters will probably be Introduced Into operational units as follows:he FACEPI.ATF, day fighter, which may be entering production now;heday fighter, andew all-weather fighters. Of these all-weather fighters,9 model will probably be an Improved version of the FISHPOTbut no known prototypes can bewith the new all-weather8

Based on an analysis of the prototypesund on estimated Soviet capabilities in aircraft development, we estimate that all these new fighters will have combat ceilings of at0 feet, will be supersonic, and will bo capable of climbing0 feetIn four minutes oraximum speeds ofnots will probably be achieved by day fighters8 and by all-weather fighters2 all-weather fighter will probably be capable of operating at altitudes up0 feet and of climbing0 fect In less than twoost of the new fighters will probably beof employing guided missiles, ungulded rockets. Improved guns, or combinationWe estimate that the effective range of operational AI radar will not Increaseover that now estimated for thc FLASHLIGHT (see. but thatperformance will be improved.

We believe that the primary emphasis in the USSR's present fighter programs is onflghLers with improved performance characteristics, ralhcr than on increasing the numerical strength of the Soviet fighter force.

"Climb Ui altitudes nearer their combat ceilings, using military power, would require considerably longer time, (or example, at military power, the FA CP PLA TK would require S3 mlnuUa to climb0 feet, aa compared with0 feel On Ute other hand, at maximum power. FACEPLATE'S tune to eliinb0 feet would be onlylr.ulej. buir-aullanl ucrtnee in combat radius

"All characteristic* given are those catiinuled for clean configurations. If rockets or missile* were mounted externally, or If external fuel tanks were employed to Increase combal radii,would be significantly reduced.

During the period of the estimate, the number of all-weather fighters in Soviet units will probably Increase rapidly, but the USSR will probably also consider thc day fighter to be of continuing value because of Itsgreater reliability, ease of maintenance, and lower cost, as well as its capability for dual employment in air defense and tactical support missions.On the basis of probable Soviet requirements and productionwe estimate that byhe Soviet fighter force might have approximatelyercent of its strength in all-weather fighters.

With regard to the over-all number of manned interceptors to be maintained lnoperational units. Soviet plannersconsider that as suitable surface-to-air missiles and associated equipment become available In quantity, the number of fighters required for air defense missions will decrease. Other factors which might contribute to adecision to decrease the USSR's numerical strength in manned interceptors Include the probable Increase in thc destructive power of individual interceptors as improvedand fire control systems becomeand lhc increased demands on Industrial capacity resulting from the advent of more complex fighters. At present, we canonly that the USSR will probably notits present numerical fighter strength, andecision will probably be made to begin cutting tt back some time late In the period of this estimate. On this basis, we hold estimated Soviet fighter strengthat0 aircraft throughecognizing that the timing of thedecision will depend largely on the USSR's actual progress in the guided missile field.

European Satellite and Asiaticfighter forces will probably continue to increase In numerical strength during the period. Our future estimates are basedon recent evidence that Increases have been made in both thc authorized and actual strengths of some fighter regiments In the Satellites and China. There Is also evidence that the Chinese Communists are nowhird regiment per fighter division. We brlicve that these developments may represent


trends. In addition, it is probable that Satellite ground attack regiments will convert to tactical ]et fighter regiments with dual mission, following the recent SovietThe bulk of any Increase in fighter strength in these countries will comprise older models retired from Soviet forces as the USSR introduces higher performance aircraft into Its own units."

geographic distribution of Blocwill probably change somewhat duringwith more fighters becomingthe presently less well-defended areas.USSR, as surface-to-air missiles areInto thc defenses of criticalfighter forces near these areas willbe deployed outward In order tomore effective employment of bothmissiles.

Guided Missilet

Soviet planners probably believe thatmissile systems, particularly surface-to-air systems, offer the greatest potential forfinal penetration to high-value targets by aircraft and cruise-type missiles. Moreover, of present weapon systems, the surface-to-air missile alone has thc potential forinto an antiballistic missile system. We therefore believe the USSR willtrenuous efiort to develop, produce, andsurface-to-air missile systems.

To oppose high altitude attack by US and Allied aircraft und cruise-type missilesalr-to-surfacehe USSR would require improved surface-to-air systems during the period of this estimate.ltitudes of0 t'eet and horizontal ranges. wouldbe required. On the basis of limitedon Soviet development programs and our assessment of the state of the guided missile art in tlie USSR, wc estimate that the USSR is probably capable of developing and placing In operaUon duringme period surface-to-air systems which could deliver nuclear or HE warheads to these hori-

"For numerical csilmatcs nf future Bloc fighter strength, sec Annex D, Table S.

zontal ranges and to considerably greaterBoth land-based and shipbornewill probably be developed.

Moreover, we esUmate that Sovietwould probably have been Interested inuidance system capable oftraverse for static and mobile employment with0. missiles.technically feasible altcrnaUves formissile guidance systems and the relative cost per unit of various solutions to* guidance problem, we estimate that the USSR would probably haveommand-type system permitting the use of fire-units considerably smaller than those at Moscow, butower traffic-handling capability per guidance radar. We estimate thatystem could be operational

The low altitude limit of the currentsystem will probably remain about the same as at present, and low-altitude coverage will probably be required to supplement both this system and the more advanced high-altitude systems. For defense of staUcfield forces, and naval vessels, the USSR now requires low-altitude surface-to-aircapable of Interception at horizontal ranges out to aboutncreasing to abouts the period advances. Wc estimateow-alUtude system capable of carrying an HE warhead could probably be placed in operaUon'* but that its maximum horizontal range during thc period2 would probably be about.

To improve thc kill capabilities of Bloc fighters, improved all-weather air-to-airmissiles will probably be developed. We estimate that8 thcouluhave in operation an all-weather missile

"For drlallcd estimate* of missile performance characteristics, see Annex Q, Tableornuclear warhead capabiliUes, see, PartSoviel Atomic Kiicrgyimited distribution.

Is the view of Uie. Assistant Chief of SUIT, intelligence, USAF, lhe USSR would beto have an effective all-weather, land-based, low allltudo surface-to-air missilein operational use prior to iMO-IMl. Sec his footnote to NIEaragraph 62

ne itfif

capable ofpound HE warheadaximum range ofndystem capable of delivering aor HE warheadaximum range. if launched0 feet could probably be available

Although we have little knowledge ofinterest or activity in the field of unguid-ed air-to-air rockets, we estimate that the USSR could employ them with interceptors during the period. Unguided air-to-air rockets with HE warheads could now be available; thc USSR probably has thc technicaltoarge-caliber unguided atr-to-alr rocketuclear warhead.

The required performance characteristics of an antiballistic missile system are not fully known. Considering the necessity toill before the missile enters thc targetzone. Soviet planners might establishsystem performance requirements for initial interception at altitudes upeet and horizontal ranges out toith much greater system detection and tracking ranges required. While an antimissileprogram will almost certainly bewith great vigor by the USSR, we do not believe it will bc able to place inystem capable of successiully intercepting ballistic missiles during thc period of this

Wc estimate that scries production ofguided missiles is now underway, and that thc USSR will probably produce such missiles in large quantities. Jn the Moscow area there arc four and possibly six factory-type facilities, at present In'different stages

completion, which appear to be partial fabrication and final assembly plants for sur-face-to-air missiles. In addition, there is some evidence that surface-to-air launching sites are under construction near Leningrad, and there have been unconfirmed reports of missile sitesew other locations. Other Ihan the above, wc have no current intelligence on Soviet programs for the production oremployment of air defense missileConsidering air defense missilesigh-priority element in an over-all Sovietprogram, we believe lhat the USSR mighl

produce, byufficient missiles and guidance equipment to accomplish anprogram about as follows: <a> equiptatic and mobile missile units with ground-launched missiles of thc Moscow type; (b) equiptatic and mobile missile units with higher-altitude, longer-range(c) equiptatic and mobile missileith low-altitude missiles; fd) equip aboutruisers andestroyers with surface-to-air missiles; and (e) equip all Bloc all-weather fighters and some Bloc day fighters with air-to-air missiles or unguided rockets of various types. "

e believe the surface-to-air missilearound Moscow topecial case dictated by thc special importance of thc city lo the USSR. Considerintj the restricted azimuth coverage of individual sites and the great expense of theixed installations, we do not believe that Moscow-type surface-to-air defenses would be deployedimilar level of defense in any additional Soviet areas, except possibly Leningrad. During the next year or two. it is probableewcritical areas in the USSR will be provided with relatively high levels of surface-to-air missile defenses, employing missiles of the current Moscow type. Thereafter, the most critical areas will probably be supplied with improved systems,arger number of critical areas, as well as field units,and naval vessels will be provided with lower levels of surface-to-atr defense.any more of the major Soviet cities andareas, as well as military forces and

vie- of his estimateaterdate for the low-alUludetftierti IinK. believes that Um ussr uhave produced sufficient missiles to equipas ITS units byee hisparagraph IS.

"These estimates are based primarily on aof Sovielesourceand Industrial capacily lo produce air defense miullp systems as part of an over-all Soviet military program. For further detailsuller description of Iheemployed and lhe uncertainties involved, see SJESoviet CapabiliUes and Probable Programs in the Oulded Missile2

i 'P

will probably be provided with surface-to-air missile defense against manned aircraft and cruise-type missiles. It isthat some major Satellite targets will also be so defended.

limited number of nuclearnow be incorporated into Sovietmissiles. We estimate that somesurface-to-air missiles, andlarge caliber air-to-air rockets orwill be so equipped during thcthis estimate However, thcof fissionable materials, andneeds, would imposethe number of air defense weapons

Anii-Aircrafi Artillery

thc availability andadequate numbers of guided missiles,will probably continue to placereliance on AAA. particularly fordefense. It is possible that aGatling-type gun ofe developed for low-altitudeguided missile systems becomegreater quantity, the USSRarge proportion of Itssome light AA guns, transferring themBloc nations.



speeds of currently operationalare sucharge proportionSoviet target areas. Includingnow be provided with more thanearly warning by ground-basedon the Bloc's borders, and somebe provided with at least twoOne of the most seriousair defense planners face is thein warning time that will resultspeeds of Western offensive deliveryincrease. Even assuming maximumradar ranges. Soviet plannersestimate thatoscowsubjected to aircraft attack with onlyminutes' early warning fromand that even the deepest interiormight not be assured of two hours' warn-

ing by such radars. The problem of adequate warning against aircraft attack is already critical In the case of important Soviet border targets such as Murmansk. Leningrad, Odessa. Baku, and Vladivostok.Moreover, warning time for all areas will be reduced radically when Western weapon systems include long-range ballistic missiles, against which the USSR ls unlikely to have effective defense systems

M0 Knot Attack

oviet early warning requirements can be expressed as ranging from full warning, based on thc time required to alert and effectively employ the maximum serviceable air defense forces, to alert warning, based on thetime required to effectively employ those air defense forces maintained in an alert We are unable to Judge accurately the amount of time" the USSR would require for full warning, although we believe It might be at least two hours. However, during tlie period of this estimate, the alert warningfor Soviet fighter interceptors would probably beinutes, to permit fighters in two-minute alert status to make straight-line Intercepts In the least possible time against high-altitude aircraft headed directly toward the fighter base. For surface-to-air missile units in five-mfnutc alert status,1 minutes' alertwould probably be required to permitengagement at maximum missile range. The required performance characteristics of associated radar equipment, basednot attack0 feet7not attack0 feetould be about as follows:

Opposed by. missile

not Attack

Opposed by Interceptor

Opposed bym. missile

Opposed. missile

Early Warning GCI Range RanRe (njn.)





'For esUmated current and future warning lines, sec Annex C. Map 2.


on observed trends and estimated Soviet capabilities in radar development, we estimate that reliable early warning detection ranges7 size aircraft at high altitudes will probably increase from thc TOKEN'S present capabilities.nd that reliable detection ranges will.6 slse aircraft, reliableranges will be on the order. by the end of the period. The reliable detection capability of Soviet OCI radar7 size aircraft will. at present.nd6 size aircraft.oviet GCI radars will probably be capable ofhclghtflnding up to the combatof Western bombers and cruise-typein operational use at that time. Wethat, through the period, theseradar capabilities can probably meet the alert warning requirements for those areas where some defense in depth Is availablereas where radars and defense weapons can be stationed forward of the targets to be, and for peripheral areas as well,against the highest-performance aircraft and cruise-type missiles. However, for theof targets on the periphery of the Bloc against the highest-performance Westernand cruise-type missiles, the alertcapabilities of ground-based radars alone will probably be deficient for fighterand marginal for surface-to-air missUe

A further increase in Bloc warningcould be achieved by the employment of airborne eaily turning systems, and there is some evidence that the USSR is engaged in the development of such systems. We also have some evidence that individual Soviet cruisers and destroyers in the Baltic and Black Seas have been involved in air early warning exercises. Although we have nothat airborne early warning or radar picket ships are being employed as asegment of the Bloc's early warningwe estimate that the USSR will probably employ these methods for extending early

warning coverage in atew areas by

number of operational Blocand GCI radar sitesotal ofythat time, all prime early warningprobably consist of an air searcha heightflndcr, supplemented by asthree gap-fillers providingAll GCI sites will probablyone air search radar and twoM As improved radars are Introducedthe heavily-defended areas of the Bloc,will probably be deployed tocoverage is now sparse orthc end of the period, the Bloc willhave complete ground-based radar cover-

. age, with the exception of China's southwest border and some inland portions of Siberia, west-central China, and Mongolia.

control of interception willimproved by increases in thecapability of communicationsimproved GCI equipment estimatedperiod will probably have acapacity of aboutimultaneousThe limitations imposed bycommunications equipmentbe reduced by conversion toVHF. This conversion willcompleted in Soviet forcesin thc Satelliteseit possible that air-groundwill be developed and


Facilities. Considerable emphasisto be placed on airfieldthc Bloc. Most newly-constructedwill probably have runways in excessfeet,rogram of extendingwill probably be pursued lo keepthe Introduction of higherWc estimateighcontinue lo be placed on airfield construc-

etailed numerical estimate, see Annex D, Table 6


In the northern and eastern peripheral areas of the USSR. Airfield development will probably also occur during the period In the Industrialized areas of the USSR lying along thc Trans Siberian Railroad north of Mongolia and Manchuria, but with considerably less emphasis than in the Arctic areas. There will probablyonsiderable improvement In the POL situationith some Increase in airfield stornge capacity.

ommand and Coordination.the period of this estimate, major effortswill probably be directed toward Improving Bloc capabilities in regard to air defensecommand reaction, and coordination. Ground-to-ground communications capacities will be increased by the extension of land-lines, microwave relay systems, teleprinter links, and possibly scatter communications.imited automatic data-handling capability will probably exist In the more critical areas. Despite such technologicalcommunications saturationwill continue to exist. Increasedfor air defense controllers at the lower

echelons may result from the requirement for rapid local command reaction.

CM. Bloc ECM capabilitiest that Ume the USSR could have equipment capable of Jummlng at frequencies up0ndhigher, although Its effectiveness cannot be esUmated. The USSR could also develop devices to enable missiles to home on electronic emissions. To decrease vulnerability toSoviet radars will probably employfrequency spreading during the period, and other antijamming techniques arcnow under development. Land-lines and microwave links will bc used increasinglythe period. Nevertheless, defensivesystems will conUnue to be susceptible lo ECM, and in this field it is expected that the advantage is likely to fluctuatehe offense and Uie defense. Wc esUmate Uiat through thc period of this esUmate. Bloc air defense electronic systems will sUH beto progressive disruption by properly cm-ployed diversionary tactics, decoys, saturation techniques, and other countermeasures.

Annex A




The coats of the air defense programs which we have outlined in the DISCUSSION have been measured in aggregate terms. While we recognize that monetary calculations of Soviet military costs are only approximations, they do permit the establishment ofmagnitudes with which to weigh theImpact of the estimated programs. Such calculations also serve as an indication of the priority and effort which would beand the possible effects on otherand Industrial programs. We estimate that the total annual cost of Bloc air defense programs would be aboutillion3 billions)isingeak ofillion2 billions)nd then declining somewhat toillion1 billions)1hows how total costs are allocated through time and by principal air defense function.

Thc estimated initial and operating costs72 are detailed iny subcategories of programs. The annualcosts of Bloc air defense programs would rise from aboutillion rubles7eak of approximatelyillion rubles1 and then decrease somewhat to aboutillion rublest should be noted that total Initial costs exceed tolal operating costs. Because the guided missile program startsow case tiieru IaHTJ large ratio of Initial to operating costshis ratio for other programs varies somewhat from year to year according to thc quantity of equipment introduced Into the air deiense system.

Thc over-all impact of these costs may be Illustrated as follows: if the total of all Bloc

1 For convenience ol comparison among estimates, mi rubles are used throughout this analysis. Thc dollar expenditures are based on priceexisUng In Uie USS.

military expenditures remains In conformity with lhal estimated inheallocated to air defense programs would rise from aboutercent of the total7 to aboutercentfor military programs other than air defense would have to decline somewhatour previous estimates. If, on the other hand, expenditures; for these other military programs remain as previously estimated, the result would be an Increase of about sixIn our estimate of tolal Bloc military expenditures

ost of thc research and development, specialized equipment, and highly trained manpower needed for the air defense of the Bloc will have to be provided by the USSR. Initial Soviet air defense expenditures would increase sharply0 and operating expenditures would Increase by more thancrLcnt (seehe air defenseof thc USSR are estimated to constituteercent of total Sovietf total Sovicl militaryremain at the levels estimated In, air defense programs would take an increasing share of the tolal. reachingercentf Soviet military programs other than air defense were maintained at previously estimated levels and additionalwere provided to accommodate the air

'Military expenditures by Use USSR during theere estimated In. "Soviet CapabiliUes and Probable Soviet Courses Of Action"ince correspondlne agreed estimates of theexpenditures of other Bloc countries do not exist, tentative estimates have been made far the purposes of the above paragraph Even should such lentaUve estimates prove to beIn error, the conclusions arrived at would not be materially altered, sinceby tht USSH are estimated toercent of total Bloc air defense outlays (see


defense programs,1 allocation to air defense would beercent of total military expenditures, compared with theercent estimated In.

defense programs would thusappreciable burden upon the Bloc'sWe believe that the cost would beto require either some diversion ofresources from other militarypreviously estimated, or an Increase Inexpenditures.

Electnd Telecommunication Equipment

electronics requirements for airarc very great, Involving anercenthese requirements would absorbportion of the output of theand telecommunication equipmentof the Bloc throughout the period,the fact that this industry Is growingrapid rate. Satisfaction of the demandsair defense programs would permitincreases in electronics productionmilitary. Industrial, and civilianWe do not believe that fulfillmentrequirements would offer suchas to make these air defense pro-

grams impossible. We are certain, however, that some quite difficult choices will have to be made among military programs, industrial automation, and consumer goods during the period of this estimate.

OIiiri Equipment

n examination of Soviet Bloc industrial facilities available lo fulfill air defenserequirements reveals no otherrestrictions. The total poundage of required fighter aircraft and enginewould increase about one-thirdhese demands are within the capacity of thc industry. Similarly, with thc possibleof electronics, the guided missileprogram is believed to be within thecapacity of the Bloc. Although thc air defense programs would not require major portions of the supply of basic materials, fulfilling their requirements would Impose further pressures on thc already tight supply of such commodities as steel and construction materials. Manpower limitations seemto place any general restrictions on the program, although some qualitativemight develop In the precisionskills.




n1 rubles)


Missile Programs




& Warning Programs



eneralized estimate of those portions of reserve, militarized MVD research and development, and nuclear energy costs which would properly be chargeable to air defense. Tne overwhelming bulk of Ihese outlays are ln R, and D. and nuclear energy costs.

nnex A

nnex A




1 rubles)

Initial Costs


Si Warning


Initial Costs



St Warning


Opera ting Costa



Considered as an Initial cost Item for purposes of genera) analysis, since the overwhelming bulk ls In R.nd nuclear energy costs.




(Cidea^lrt tn accordance with USIA Spec except that fuel reserve* are reduced toaximum of JO sunutes maximum endurance at sea level and aircraft operate at altitudes permiuine maximum radius)

Maximum3;ced ratal

Set Level

Combat Celling (ft)'

Combat Radlai (nni


Armament Oun*


Outdei lamies


Dar niftier

m lx37rr.rr.


mmm and


4 AAV.

FLASM-Lioirr c

All* weather Fighter

m and









andm or

m or


m ar.d




mm m








Il hU




nnex b



of projkctilb




5 mm AA




m Automatic AA0

m AA

m AA Gun MI950

m AA

B55 In)



m AA






e.ooa it







fire control









pm fjarrel






TOP i It 'I1-



I; I

: !






8 S

$ s



4 (Cent.)














U to

u :c

Range Aeeuraey (Ids. and Speed"



uclei: or HE




Arprc x. Gross Weight




Passive Infrared homing. Beam-rider.

emlacUre homing


Tall-cone attack In good weather.

All-weather See para.



evaluate thii program ts probable, with varying degrees of confidence concerning detailed characteristics. The only missile for whleh our estimate li supported byurrent IntclliEer.ce ls thehich Is now In operation in the Moscow area. For further details regarding the systems summarised in this Uble, hbSoviet CapablUUe* and Probable Programs ln the Oulded Missile2

'These are arbitrary designations for convenience of reference, as used In.

' Except where otherwise indicated In the Remarks, the date given Is the earliest probable time at which one or more series produced missiles could have been placed In Lhe hands of trainee personnel, thusimited capability for operational employment. See.

1 Payload Includes explosive devicets associated fuzing end firing mechanism. For appropriate Soviet nuclear warhead capabilities, see, Part l. Soviet Atomic Energy Program,imited distribution.

'It Is the view of tha Assistant Chief of StafT. Intelligence, USAF. that tha USSR would be unlikely to have an effective all-weather, land based, low altitude surface-to-air missile system In operational use prior. See his footnote to,Does not Include speed of launching aircraft,

' Based on newly-acquired Intelligence, we estimate that an alr-to-alr missile of this type has been under development and could probably be Inuse now. The questions of Its first operational capability data and Its relationship to other alr-to-alr missiles In thc estimated program are ur.der study.


nnex B




All-weather Subtotal





All-weather Subtotal




All-weather Subtotal


ij Day

All-weather ALL TYPES



Annex B





Prime Early Warning1





c.ige and other new types

rt lit finder Tjjjej HOCK CAKE and


Fire Control Types AAA

lssllc guidance systems'

Miscellaneous Types Lend-lease. Japanese, oldcs types, etc.

At went most prime EW sites consist of one token ana onethat2 each early warn.nB *lte will consisttype radar and one hclghUlndcr.

At nresenk most OCI sites consist of one TOKEN and one miscellaneous type,

& Esfe saws sreanaarJ^aaas

miscellaneous lend-ease and Japanese

iVsrtalKncd especially tor the gap.SmatS numbers toronsist entirely of YOYO guidance systems.








Centra! USSR'


Central USSR *

Eastern USSR'


Forces ln Eastern

not estimated




not estimated






Northern, Leningrad, and White Sea Military District*.

Includes Baltic, Belorcsslan, Carpathian, Kiev. Odessa, and Tiurtc Military District*

Includes Moscow. South Ural. Volga. Voronezh, and Ural Militaryncludes North Caucasus and Transcaucasus Military Districts.

include* Siberian and Turkestan Militaryncludes Far East and Transbalkal Military District*.

' Include! Soviet forces stationed In Mast Germany, Poland. Hungary, and Rumania.

and AAA figures include Albania, Bulgaria. Rumania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia. Poland, and East Germany. Fighter figures Include all but Hungary, whose lighter forces are believed to be inoperative at present

here are believed lo be four piston fighter regiments operational ln the Bast Oermar. air establishment at present. "Fighter and radar figures Include Communist China and North Korea. AAA figures lneiud* Communist China. North Korea, and Vietn addition, there Is believed to be one piston fighter regiment operations! In Communist China at present.

tpOP on on IDT-


nnex B



Fighter Avtatlon

Antiaircraft Artillery





Air Defense Control

and Warning

Includes fighter elements of IAacticalersonnel) and Navalersonnel).

' Includes AAA troops In shore establishments of naval fleets.

' This function Includes air defense headquarters staff, district staff, districtcenter and administrative personnel, as well as rada: earlyround control Intercept and communication personnel. In addition, the Bloc's air defense system Is served by visual observer personnel who are not Included In these totals.

Original document.

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