Created: 7/9/1957

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Submitted bv the DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of (Ai* estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the Intelligence organizations of the Departments ol State, the Army, the Navy, tne Air Force, The Joint staff, and the Atomic Energy Commission.

Concurred tn by Ihe INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEEoncurring were the Special Assistant,Department ol Stale; the Assistant chief ol Staff, intelligence. Department oj the Army; the Director ol Naval Intelligence; the Assistant Chief ol Stall, Intelligence. USAF; the Deputy Director for Intelhgenee. The Joint Stall; and the Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the IAC. The Assistant Director, Federal Bureau ol investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of hit lurisdictian.


estimate wu disseminated by the Central Intelligence Agency. ThUfor the Information and use of the recipient Indica tod on the front cover and ofunder his Jurisdictioneed to know basis. Additional essentialbe authorized by the following officials within their respective departments;

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of Intelligence. USAF. for the Department of the Air Force

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of Intelligence. ABC, for the Atomic Energy Commission

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Director for Central Reference, CIA, for any other Department

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lafonnattQH 'l/ftc tin %BUUi Im

DlffTRrflDTION: Willi* Bow

NaUonal SecurityarIraeat of state DeparUnent of Defense Ope rations Coordins Hoard Atomic Energy Couuntwloti FederalOf Investigation



To assess the steps being taken in Communist and non-Communist countries to acquaint the people with the implications of nuclear warfare; and to estimate: (a) the effects over time on human attitudes and behavior in foreign countries of aawareness of growing capabilities for mutual aniiihilation in the event of nuclear war; (b) the probable attitudes of people in foreign nations toward the initiation of general war by the constituted leaders of nations, or members of power blocs,mutually destructive technological capability; and (c) the effects of growing nuclear capabilities on the policies of Communist and non-Communist states.


the non-Communist world there is public fear of biological effects of tests and of the consequences of nuclear war. Consequently, there is strong popular pressure for banning tests,trong and growing opposition to theand use of nuclear weapons. At the same time, thereelief, mostin informed and government circles in Western Europe, thatof nuclear weapons is essential for defense or to enhance national prestige.

Although the threat of nuclearhas increased desires forin some countries, theeffect in the NATO area thus far has been to reinforce belief in the need for

mutual security efforts backed by the deterrent force of thc US. Confidence in western deterrents has served to prevent any material increase in theof non-Communist governments and people to Soviet threats. Nevertheless, the unprecedented prospect of totalin general war has tended to make governments more hesitant topolicies involving risk of war with the USSR. )

uture developments in weapons de-livery systems may greatly increasesensitivity to the .nuclear threat, and will almost certainly accentuatetendencies in the western world to caution and compromise in international relations. The USSR will combine threats

and inducements in an attempt to exploit this situation and to underminealliances and the will to resist. Over the longer run such efforts might have some success. We believe it more likely, however, that the governments and peoples ot the NATO area will continue to recognize that the threat ot war can best be limited and their securitythrough adherence to thealliance system. )

increasing awareness o! theof nuclear war hasthe chances In both Western

-'Europe and Japan of an almosteffort to stand aside in the event that the US and the USSR appeared to them to be on the verge of war,if important European or Japanese interests were not directly involved. If time were available, as would be unlikely in the eventurprise Soviet attack or in the.pventast moving crisis in Europe itself, and if neutrality appeared to be feasible, some NATO governments might take whatever steps they could to keep out of the war. )

believe that both the SovietCommunist leaders recognizecapability to conduct effectivenuclear warfare againstand therefore desire to avoid They would not be deterred, how-

over, from military action such as the Hungarian intervention to-main tainover territories presently held by the Bloc. Nor would they be deterred from local aggression under circumstances in which they were confident that the West would not react in ways involving major risks of genera! war. They maythat future increases in Sovietcapabilities will further reduce the chances that the Western response will be such as to involve such risks. In the near-term future however, it is iikely that the Sino-Soviet Bloc will continue to abstain from local aggression of the Korean or Indochinese type because of fear that the US might intervene and use nuclear weapons locally and thereby defeat the aggression or require expansion of the warfare by the USSR. )

he USSR would be seriouslyabout the development of annuclear capability in Western Europe, and might even make explicit threats to discourage the stationing of IRBM's on the continent orombined nuclear capability in Western Europe. However, we believe that it would not attack to prevent these developments, continuing to fear USand that its basic response would be an intensification of its own arms build-up. )



ew governments in the non-Communist world have made systematic efforts totheir people with reliable or detailed information of the effects of nuclear weapons.

Most non-Communist governments appear to believe that it is impossible to develop andefense against nuclear attack. In this situation they have been unwilling to spend much money on civil defense programs or to accept the possible risks of creating additional popular fears by laying before the

r t

the facts about nuclear weapons. The major exceptions are Sweden and,esser extent, the UK, where thc governments have taken the lead, through civil defense agencies and public statements, ln providing thcwith information concerning the effects of nuclear weapons. In the USSR and thearefully controlled release ofdesigned touclear civil defense program, has been underway'

Despite the general lack of deliberateefforts to foster greaterof the nuclear situation, lt Is likely that thc public in much of theworld has developed fairly accurateknowledge regarding the possibleof nuclear warfare. In areas other than thc UK and Sweden where there has been much informed debate, publicor knowledge of detailed aspects of nuclear effects and of the complicatedposed by nuclear developments is largely dependent on the content of popular media. Such sources have carried an increasing body of Information and comment on the nuclear situation, some of which Is reliable and some of which is biased, subjective, or even patently dishonest.

In anyumber of specificover the past year have served topopular concern, to increase the flow of Information concerning the nuclearand to bring nuclear problemsbefore the public as Immediate Issues of national policy. Most recently thethermonuclear tests added new Impetusorldwide debate on thc biological effects of radioactive fallout. The British White Paper dramatically drew attentionide range of implications of nuclear weapons,the destructive effects and thcof tlie defense andew debate on strategy that promises to continue for many months. The publicity accorded thc development of advanced weapons andsystems and public statements andthroughout the free world about fallout

'Seeore detailed discussion of Government familiarization programs.

dangers have also centered public attention on the risks of nuclear operations. Tliewarning notes dispatched by the USSR served to underline the destructive possibilities of nuclear war and in combination with other developments brought sharply before thesuch questions as the desirability ofof nuclear weapons and the relative advantages of alliance and neutrality.esult of these developments, public awareness and understanding not only of the physical effects, but also of Uie biological, poliUcal, strategic, and economic implications ofweapons have probably Increasedln the non-Communist world.

Popular reaction in the non-Communlst world to growing nuclear capabilities ls most definitely manifested in strong and growing opposiUon to Uie testing, manufacture, and use of nuclear weapons. The recent vigorous opposiUon to thc testing of nuclear weapons appears to be more directly related to Uie immediate concern over possible biological oflccts than to Uie more general fearuture nuclear war. Marked apprehensions exist umong the people of Western Europe and to an Intense degree in Japan thatconcentrations of radioactive materials are already being absorbed by plant andlife. These apprehensions are in many cases supported by the findings of somescientists, and will probably result in Increasing pressure on governments to ban testing even outside Uie contexteneral disarmament agreement. These attitudestesting and producUon. together with thc general fear of nuclear war, arcrowing pressure for progress towardamong the great powers. The Communists are vigorously exploiting this sltuaUon.

Apart from Uie foregoingrowth hi Uie fear of Uie consequences of war, there are few clear popular attitudes on Uieposed by growing nuclear capablliUes. Even thc "ban the bomb" sentimentelief, particularly-within informed circles in Weslern Europe, that In present circumstances nuclear weapons in Western' hands arc essential to deter Soviet aggression


to discourage pressure or blackmail. There isrowing tendency among West-em European countries to believe thatof nuclear capabilitiesecessary attribute of national security, prestige, or both. At present, these trends in opinion are most evident in thc UK, France, and Sweden. The British program of developing nuclear capabilities has been supported by both major parties and thc general public. Publicfor the acquisition of nuclear weapons is growing in France. In Sweden aU parties, except the Communists, advocate domestic production of these weapons. Theseare likely to become more widespread but might be checked if nuclear weapons are limited by effective international control. *

Popular opinion in West Oermany Is now strongly opposed to domestic production of nuclear weapons; in recent months it hasnearly as strongly opposed to theof German forces with nuclear weapons, as well as to the provision of such weapons to allied forces ln Germany. Many Germans feel that the acquisition of nuclear capabilities would end all hope of localizing and limiting any conflict that might develop hi Eastor Berlin and that'll might constitute an additional obstacle to reunification. On the other hand, there is some support for Adenauer's position that NATO and Westshould have both conventional andcapabilities on the grounds that national security and national prestige require German forces to be equipped with the best weapons obtainable. Discussion of the issue has been Intensified by the current election campaign,lear test of popular attitudes is not likely at the polls In September.

Public opinion in Japan remains strongly opposed to the entry of US nuclear weapons and would not at this time permit theto undertake any serious efforts to develop its own nuclear weapons.

Although the developing nuclear situation has greatly increased the fear of theof war, the popular view is that thc

'Seeuclear Weapons ProducUon In Fourth CountriesLikelihood and Consc-nucnefs. IS June lfli7.

chances of general war are no greater, and may be less, than in the prenuclear era. In fact, because the consequences of general war now appear so totally disastrous, thereidespread tendency to discount itsNevertheless, the public strongly desires to minimize all risks, and pressures areagainst adoption of measures involving risk of war.

In Western Europe, nuclear developments have raised serious doubts among the public as to the possibility of defense or survival In thc event of generalhis has given impetus to pacifist and third force thinking. There has also been some public pressure for disarmament and relaxation of tensions, often without critical regard for the' consequences. Nevertheless, most evidence indicates that Europeans do not believe they can dispensenified approach to security. The fear, previously widespread among Europeans, that the US might provoke general war by trigger-happy or inflexible policies appears to have declined, and there continues to be recognition that the security of Europeprimarily on the deterrent effect of US. nuclear power. If,-however, thispower should appear to be losing itsthe underlying, fear of the USSR and of war might come to the surface and alternational policies.

Japanpecial case in that public preoccupation with the horrors ofwar combinedopular hope that neutrality will enable Japan to avoidhas reinforced popular pressures for the withdrawal of US forcesodification of thc existing defense agreement However, these views are offset to some extent by the belief In influential circles that Japan needs the protective cover of US power.

Nuclear developments do not appear to haveignificant role in local attitudes towards SEATO or thc Baghdad Pact In the neutralist states, and particularly in India, nuclear developments have gnly served tothe desire to stand apart from alliance systems.

It is difficult to discern any clear-cut public attitudes loward the relationship be-


tween the existenceuclear stalemate and the likelihood of local wars. Peopleto hope that If local wars occur, they can be fought with conventional weapons, but doubt that they will if Important interests of thc two great nuclear powers are Involved. They appear to believe that the use of nuclear weapons inituation would add greatly to the chances of thc war becoming general, and they are not comforted by distinctions between "tactical" or "strategic" use or by the British idea of "graduated deterrence."

In (he Bloc

n the USSR It Is almosi certain that the top leadership has an understanding of the possible effects of general nuclear wareneral appreciation of tho problems ofIt is likely lhat some of thishas by now filtered down to substantial numbers of responsible party officials,military personnel, and intellectuals. The general population has been told no more than that hydrogen bombs are "several times" more powerful than the Hiroshima bomb and that radioactive fallout presents someHowever, thc general public has been assured that although nuclear weapons In the hands of the "Imperialists"erious threat, the USSR la so strong that anywould invite extinction. Malcnkov's statement4 lo tho effect that nuclear war would mean destruetfon of all civilization was not played up to domestic audiences, and was in eflect repudiated by other leaders. The people are frequently exposed to theline that nuclear war would result In the destruction of capitalism and victory for the "forces of socialism andven though it is admitted that the costs ofwar would be very great in all countries.

n the Eastern European Satellites,only the top military and political leaders have an adequate understanding of the changes that nuclear weapons have brought to modern warfare. Even more than in the USSR, Satellite domestic propaganda except in East Germany has minimized thepower of atomic weapons, and provided almost no information about hydrogen weap-

ons. General pubbc knowledge of the dc-structlveneas of nuclear weapons Isprobably at no lower level than ln the USSR since at least Bulgaria andare known lo have undertaken extensive civil defense training programs, and ln most of the Satellites Western Information tsmore accessible than In lhe USSR.

Communist China the tophas acquired reliable. If notInformation on nuclearan understanding of thenuclear weapons have brought toprobably does not extend beyondstallpper echelons of the party,of thc urban Intelligentsia.tlic leadership almosi certainlyUiat the US has the capability tomuch of Communist China's modernthey have stated, and mayChina's large area and agrarianUie country less vulnerable thanto nuclear attack. In support of"ban the bombs" drives, Uieof Communist China has beenconsiderable propaganda concerningpolicies. However, little specificconcerning nuclear weaponsmade available and It Is likely thatof thc population is largely unawarepossible effects of nuclear warfare.


In the Non-Communist World

in ihe case of certain specificIn the area of defense policy,difficult to isolate and weigh preciselyof nuclear weapons developmentspolicy. Many of thc elementspostwar world situationtheIncompatibility of Communist andobjectives, Uie reduced powerWestern Europe as compared with theUie USSR, and the postwar emergenceand neutralist forces In thewould have existed withnuclear weapons. In many other


the existence of nuclear weapons is but oneumber of ingredients entering into the formulations of governmentaland policies.

Governments and peoples have been slow to realize the full Implications of the nuclear weapons situation, and the process ofnew policies to cope with the changing situation is still In the early stages.process ls complicated by Uie very rapidity of technological developments in the nuclear weapons field, which leaves humanand governmental policyonUnu-ing state of uncertainty and confusion wlUi respect to thc possibilities and requirements of Uie nuclear era. However. Uie primary fact about nuclear weaponsUiat theyincrease Uie potenUal destrucUveness of warsIs clear to all governments. Also clear Is Uie fact that military power tsIn thc hands of two states.

Since Uie rise of the USSRuclear power, possibly Uie most Important over-all effect of the nuclear weapons situaUon on national policies of most non-Communisthas been to diminish popular and official willuigness to pursue policies involving danger of war with the Bloc. For example, weUiat the British and French decision to withdraw from thc Suez operation was partly influenced by concern over possible military involvement with thc USSR. This trend has contributed to thc tendency, particularly in Europe, to define more narrowly thoseconsidered vital.

Thc nuclear situation, and particularly Uie growing capability of Uie USSR to launch highly devastating attacks, even against the US, is having profound effects on the military policies of European states. The admission of Uie British White Paper on Defense that "there is at present no means of providing adequate protection for Uie people of Uiis country against thc consequences of anwith nucleur weapons" and itsthat the UK musl develop Its own nuclear deterrent if it Is to conUnue an independent national existence have served to Intensify the public discussion of some of Uie problems involved.

Some of lhe reasons for lhe Britishlo cut investments ln conventional forces and to concentrate on deterrent strikingwere domestic, le. Uie poliUcalo be derived from promises that defenseould be reduced and conscription terminated. Of equal or greater Importance, however, was the reacUon against Uie situaUon in which Uie security of Uie UK, like that of all other non-Communist powers, depends preponder-anUy on Uie US. British leaders probably do not envisage Uie development of suchcapabillUes as would free them entirely from reliance on tho US. bufthey would like to develop thorn enough to increase theirwithin Uie alliance and elsewhere. In addition, there has been present an element of concern that Uie US will graduallyIts forces from Europe and, as Soviet capabilities against the US Increase, become less willing to employ its full force against the USSR in Uie event of Soviet attacks In Europe.

Similar considerations haveradual change in the atUtudes of theof Western Europe towards Uieand use of nuclear weapons. TheispostUon among Western Europeanagainst Uie use of nuclear weapons In local conflicts has been rapidly losing ground to Uie view Uiat the West cannot hope to -match Soviet convenUonal forces and that tactical nuclear weapons are necessary for any modern military force. The opportunity to obtain dual-purpose weapons (weaponsof being used with either conventional or nuclear warheads) has In general beenby European governments. France in parUcuIar. has drawn up plans for the reor-ganizaUon of Its armed forces in anticipation of thc introduction of nuclear weapons. While Uie West German government lsirm public position pending Uie September elections, it has tacitly accepted thc NATO policy of storing nuclear weapons infor the use of NATO troops and is known to favor tho eventual equipment of German forces with tactical atomic weapons. The introduction of nuclear weaponsore delicate matter in Norway and Denmark. The Danish government has declared It will not

Wm tt

now accept nuclear warheads on Its territory; Norway made their acceptance dependent on parliamentary approval.

hc process of adjusting individual and NATO strategies to the developing nuclear situation is placing some strains on the Serious problems, including the issues of acquisition and manufacture of nuclear weapons, disarmament and Germanand the proper balance of conventional and nuclear forces will continue to complicate allied unity. Events tn Hungary haveWestern European confidence in theof tbc US to assume serious risks of Soviet counteraction, despite relief in many quarters that the US did not make thean occasionhowdown with the USSR. Many Europeans probably feel that over the longer run the US may withdraw from Europe or greatly reduce Its forces there and rely almost exclusively on the strategy of long-range nuclear retaliation. Thisasic concern of the French government and also partly account* for the violent German reaction lo rumors that US forces would be withdrawn from Europe.

For the moment, however, and probably for some time to come European governments will continue to recognize their need forsolidarityis the Bloc and for adefense effort Involving the US nuclear deterrent. Although neutrality has genuine emotional appeal in Western Europe and the sentiment has increased recently In the UK it finds little direct reflection In currentpolicies and has not affected theof the alliance.

Outside of Europe, the pattern of effects on government policies Is diverse. Thegovernment recognizes the need for the nuclear deterrenttabilizing influence in world affairs, and the Soviet threal has enhanced the closeness of the CanadianWilli the US.

In Japan, nuclear developments haveto the desire of the government lo modify defense arrangements with the US In order to increase Japanese control over the activities of Japan-based forces. Some gov-

ernment and military leaders are interested In the development of Japanese nuclearHowever, tbe general fear of and revulsion against militarism and nuclear war dating from the experiences of World War II will retard any change in Japanesepolicies concerning nuclear weapons. In deference to Japanese desires, the US hasommitment to seek Japanese consent before bringing any nuclear weapons into Japan.

India and other neutralist states,developments have reinforcedefforts to foster internationalagreement and arguments againstof nuclear weapons.

In Iho Sino-Soviet Bloc '

believe that theajor factor ln lhe plansof the Sine-Soviet Bloc. Sovietthe destructive nature ofand the problems and prospectThey evidently believe thatconflict with the US woulduse of nuclear weapons. Soviethave recently warned that it wouldto keep small wars small, andhave stated that any local use of nu-weapons would be likely to lead lonuclear conflict While theselocal war may reflect Soviet doubt aspossibilities of limiting conflict, theydesigned toeterrent andeffect.

e believe that both the Soviet andCommunist leaders recognize the USlo conduct effective and devastating nuclear warfare against thc Bloc, anddesire to avoid general war. They would not be deterred, however, from military action, such as lhe Hungarian Intervention, to main-lain control over territories presently held by tho Bloc. Nor would they be deterred from local aggression under circumstances in which they were confident that thc West would not react In ways involving major risks of general war. They may believe that future Increases in Soviet nuclear capabilities will furtherthe chances that the Wcslern response

will be such as to Involve such risks. In lhc near-term future It Is more likely that the Sino-Soviet Bloc will continue to abstain from local aggression of the Korean or Indo-chlncsc type because of fear that the US might Intervene and use nuclear weapons locally and thereby defeat the aggression or require expansion of the warfare by thc USSR.

If local conflicts do nevertheless occur Bloc powers probably would refrain fromthe initiative In thc use of nuclearhoping thereby to reduce the chances of expanded conflict and to place the onus for such use on the West. If the US Initiated the use of nuclear weaponsocal conflict, the USSR would not necessarily conclude that thc US intended to expand the conflictlimit The USSR might then believe that it could respond with nuclear weapons in the same local area of conflict without forcing an expansion of thc conflict Into general war. The USSR would recognize, however, that use of nuclear weapons by both sides wouldincrease the chances of the local conflict sprcndlng into general war.

Soviet policy3 has Increasingly reflected an appreciation of the dangers to the USSR of nuclear warfare and the desire to avoid it. Thc desire to reduce the risk of nuclear war has, since Stalin's death, been one of thc important factors underlyingefforts to reduce international tensions. Concurrently, the Soviet leaders have sought to avoid any appearance of weakness, any agreement which would endanger theirmiliiary position In Eurasia, and any stabilization which would hinder theof Soviet influence through political and economic means. They have continued to reorganize and adjust their armed forces for nuclear warfare. In order to counter the growing US nuclear capability, they havea continuing buildup of theirdelivery and air defense capabilities.

The Soviet leaders were aware of thedirection of Western defense policythe British White Paper was published, out thc more recent developments pointing to lhe West's increasing reliance upon andof its nuclear power have evidently

sharpened their concern. This hasresh round of -Soviet warnings to numerous powers urging that to permit the basing of nuclear weapons could only lead to national destruction ln the event of war. However, the USSR has not threatened any specific reaction to the precise act ofnuclear weapons.

arring the conclusionomprehensive disarmamentreater nuclear threat to the USSR will develop in the future, not only In terms of Uie destructive explosive tonnage which can be Inflicted on the USSR, but In terms of the speed with which lt can be delivered and the Inadequacy of prospective air defense systems to cope with the delivery vehicles. The Soviet leaders almost certainly estimate thatew years IRBM's will be deployed within range of Important Soviet targets. We believe that this development will disturb Uie Soviet leaders profoundly. They willigorous diplomatic and propaganda campaign to prevent It, possibly even including explicit threats of force against countries stationing such weapons in their However, they will probably recognize that they could not Intervene by actual use of force, in Western Europe and in most other places,ubstantial parallelIn their own capabilities, withoutgrave risks of actually provoking general war which wc believe the .USSR desires to avoid.

USSR almost certainly desires toUie burden of the arms race and maytoegree of inspectionpreviously unacceptable to it.wo believe that thc implications ofnuclear capabilities are not likely into cause the USSR to accept thecontrol and Inspection systeman effective comprehensive


present trends continue, and therecomprehensive disarmamentweapons of varying types andsupersonic nuclear weapons deliverywill become standard equipment, not

only In the US, the UK, and the USSR, but to some degree in most of the advancednations of the world. Much of the 'world will live under the threat of nearlydestruction.

Populations and governments may become Inured to the threat, like people living on the sideolcano. New rules for international conduct, tacitly accepted by the great powers, may be developed to avoid direct clashes of interests or pressing for advantage in areas where Interests are less clearly defined.may remain relatively firm and steady as recognized shields against blackmail and coercion.

An association of Western European states could probably develop substantial nuclear capabilities withinears. Such ahcouldhird center of world power, friendly to, but independent of the US. *

Another possible development over the longer runradual weakening in support for the NATO alliance without corresponding increases in the military strength of European countries. As weapons continue to multiply and as missile delivery systems advance there mayreat increase in popular sensitivity to the nuclear threat and tremendousparticularly ln the non-Communist world, to reach agreement on disarmament and other measures to reduce tension. The USSR, being less restrained by public opinion, might be able to profit by the psychological mood of the non-Communist world andcombine threats and inducements to undermine Western alliances and will to resist

Up to now, however, the nuclear power of the USSR and threats involving the use of this power have not in themselves had an adverse eflect on Western alliance systems. The threats which have been made against various European powers over the past few years attempt to exploit fears of association with nuclear weapons and suggest that such association will mean extinction In the event of war. Most governments have failed to be affected by these lactics, feeling lhat lhe risks of association with the US and thc develop-

'Scc NIEaraRraplis

mcnt of nuclear capabilities are less than the risks of helplesshen acountry develops what It considers anuclear capability, its susceptibility to Soviet nuclear threats will probably diminish.

These firm attitudes probably concealuncertainties, both ln the public mind and among political leaders, as to possible and desirable courses of action ln the event of imminent general war between the US and the USSR. The increasing awareness of the destructlveness of nuclear war has probably increased the chances of on almost Instinctive effort in bolh Western Europe and Japan to stand aside in the eventthe US and the USSR appeared to them to be on the verge of war, particularly If important European or Japanese interests were not directly involved. However, the Western European states would be unlikely to succeed in avoiding Involvement In the event that hostilities between the two great powers came suddenly and without warning as the resulturprise SovietIn this case, the USSR would use any means available to destroy US bases on the continent and in other European and allied areas. European countries would not have time to negotiate the withdrawal of US forces or to declare their neutrality.

Thc situation might be quite different, however, if tensions developed over localincluding situations in which the US and the USSR were not initially parties, andhreat of general war developed more slowly. No NATO state would probably feel obliged, initially at least, to participate If war should break out over Taiwan. On thc other hand,ocal conflict should develop ln the Middle East which threatened Westernoil supplies, the UK and perhaps some other NATO countries would probablyeven at risk of Involvement In general war. However, If it appeared that both thc US and the USSR might become directlyinituation in any area, the Western European powers would probably make every effort to limitithe scope of thc conflict, working through the UN andto resolve the Impasse or local conflict. Nevertheless, if these measures appeared to

fail and an all out conflict between the US and the USSR appeared Imminent, theurge fur survival would be Immensely strong. If they came to believe thatwas feasible, some NATO governments might demand the withdrawal of US forces or take other steps that they believed would keep them out of the war. Irrespective of NATO commitments.

hreat of Imminent war would also pose serious problems to the Slno-Sovlet Bloc As we have stated earlier, the leaders of the USSR and Communist China understand thenature of nuclear war and desire to avoid substantial risks of general war.they would attempt to prevent local conflicts from spreading Into general war, the

threat of such war would probably not cause them to withdraw from any local conflict or other crisis situaUon involving Immediate threats to the interests they deem vital.opinion would probably not be permitted to develop lnanner as toirect effect on policy.

owever, it Is not at all certain whether cither the USSR or Communist China would commit Itself fully to Uie other in Uie event war with the West appeared imminent. In particular, Chinese Communist leaders would certainly consider the advantages of avoiding involvement In Uie event thc USSR became involved with Uie US and NATO over some issue not of direct concern to Communist China.




L Only the governments of Sweden, Norway, andesser degree the UK. among the countries of the non-Communist world have made any systematic effort to familiarize their peoples with the probable effects ofwarfare. While nearly all countries in Western Europe have civil defense planning staffs, and some have programs andinvolving the participation of substanUal numbers of the populaUon, litUe has been done to tackle the problems of thc postwar, nuclear age. Lacking an agreed doctrine and the means for effective civil defense in the nuclear era, most governments appear to be placing their main hope in Uie strategy of deterrence or in neutrality. They feel Uiat large investments In civil defense wouldaste of limited resources and thatto familiarize thc population with the possible efforts of nuclear warfare would only serve to create additional fears and pressures which would complicate Uie conduct ofpolicy.

UK. In the UK. uncertainty within thc government over both military and defense policy, lack of resources, public apathy, and concern about possible public reaction has prevented the adoption of any substantialto inform thc public about nuclear effects. Instruction and training In dealing withattacks have been given lo manyof the large civilian defense corps (which liasolunteer members)raft "Householder's Handbook" has been withheld from circulation.

The Home Secretary Is consideringfor nuclear civil defense, but the White

Paper on Defense issued Inhat no basic decisions have been reached. The programsa holding operaUon, to keep Uie existing civil defense organlzaUon ln being, tofor necessary warning equipment and research, and to work on emergencyand on settingallout warning and monitoring system.

West Cerman. Although planning on civil defense against both atomic and non atomic warfare had been In process as earlyimited efforts by the government of west Germany to familiarize Its people with the probable effects of nuclear warfare have been undertaken only since the latter halft Uiat time after public Interest In atomic warfare and civil defense had been at least temporarily increased by NATO militarysuch as "Carteraftfor the establishmenthree-year Civil Defense Program costing0 was introduced inlo the National Parliament. To stimulate Interest In thethe German Ministry of Interior in6eries of public "Civil Air Defense Days" designed to familiarize theat large with both the effects ofwarfare and Uie posslblllUes for defense and protection therefrom Details on the functioning ot this program are lacking.

Despite such Indoctrination efforts, passage ot the Civil Defense legislation had not been completedlthough ilsinlo law Is expected shortly. The principal road-block has 'been the failure to obtain agreement on apportionment of the program's cost between the federal and state governments. Thb inability to reach agree-

appenoix a

in turn reflected both poUtical andapathy stemmingeneralto think about anything connected with war. An additional impediment was tliewidespread acceptanceecond Inference drawn from the "Carte Blanche" exercise, contrary in nature to the effect cited above: that atomic bombs would inevitably be used In any major conflict and that there might be no effective defense against such atomic attack. Hence governments funds should not be wasted on an expensive Civil Defense program or diverted from other usesangible return, such as housing construction.

France. The French government has made virtually no effort to familiarize the general public with the probable effects of nuclear warfare. Although the framework of anorganization for civil defense exists in the Ministry of the Interior, its efforts have been largely confined to planning and the training of official personnel. An evacuation and dispersal plan for the civilian population was reported near completion In6 but instructions on Its implementation have apparenUy not been released as yet .to theAs far as ts known, there have been no civil defense drills with public participation, involving problems of nuclear warfare. The Interior Minister,ack of funds,in6 that "nothing ofhad been done regarding measures for protection against nuclear arms. Other items have received higher priority for government attention und financial resources. Another Important reason for the lack of publicity given to civil defense is governmental concern that thc French public might be alarmed by strong official emphasis on thc effects ofwarfare.

Italy. Italy has taken almost no steps to familiarize ils people with the probableof nuclear warfare. Thc onlyreceived by the general public has been through articles occasionally published by newspapers and magazines giving accounts of American and British bomb tests, andestimates of the destructive powers of the new weapons. Civil defense measures

are almost nonexistent, and the reasons for inaction arc in general those found throughout Europe. Government specialists arc frankly confused about what can be done to rninimize uie danger to the populace and are reluctant to waste resources onThey prefer to let the USin this field.

weden. Swedish authorities haveextensive programs to familiarise the Swedish people with the probable effects of nuclear warfare,art of Sweden'sdefense planning* Most of these programs are carried out by Jhe civil defense organization which employsull-time officials and inwedes (outotal population) participate. Swedes of boUi sexes between Uie ages of IS andeceiveours ofear and could be conscripted foroursin civil defense schools. The civil defense program was started during World War II and has concentrated on Uie construction of air raid shelters, planning Uie evacuation of population centers, and the training ofand stockpiling of essential equipment. Civil defense officials seek to place theavailable InformaUon before their personnel and Uie Swedish people through civil defense courses, periodicals, pamphlets, and booklets.ivil defense officialsooklet, entitled "If War Cornea" to everyopies werehich besides instructions on other defense matters and attempts to bolster morale, gaveon measures to be taken for protection against atomic attack nnd its effects and for evacuation from urban centers. One of thc eight civil defense corps ls trained in gas and radiological protection

9 Information on uie effects of nuclearhas also been distributed by otherof Sweden's naUonal defenseincluding the Home Guardie privately-sponsored People and Defense (FolA ocftnd other privateorganizations such ai- the Red Cross. Swedish authorities have established aagency lo sample public opinion on such matters as knowledge ol, nnd consideration of



effectiveness of. civil defense measures and to plan for wartime measures to counterpropaganda and bolster naUonal morale.

The Swedish people appear toonstructive manner to thcInformaUon and civil defense programs, jrobably becauseeneral belief that deep ihelters and other measures offered realistic nays of bettering individual and naUonal chances for survival. However, thc advent of the more dcstrucUve hydrogen bomb hasdoubts, even in Sweden as to Uie value of current civil defense measures and It Is possible Uiat Uie government will begin to limit its Information program.

Japan. Japan's leaders have beento take the political risks Involved ln any officialination of Information about thc lmpllcaUons of nuclear war. Moreover, the government appears to share to adegree Uie popular view thatwarfare would have catastrophic results for Japan, beyond any power of Japan toConsistent with this view and with the popular revulsion to the thought of war. the government has made public no program for defense against nuclear attack, nor forcivil defense measures.

In this situation, the Japanese public has been subjectteady stream of highlyand frequcntiy misleading pressof nuclear effects. The tentative, limited action of the government toore objective and responsible attitudethc nuclear problem has to date had but little effect

ndia. Tlie Indian government has no civil defense program and no programspecifically to inform the population about the probable effects of nuclear warfare. However, ln the process of furthering itsagainst nuclear tests, the government hasengthy document in which Indian scientists outlined Uie dangers ofblast and their possible genetic effects. Such data together with numerous public and parliamentary speeches by Nehru and other leaders have served to familiarise someof the population with the general nature of nuclear effects. The popular reaction has

been one of horror, perhaps because ofIn which the information haa

Sino-Soviet Bloc

SSR. Thc USSR has guardedly released Information on nuclear weapons effects to the Soviet publiche initiation of an InformaUon program4 apparenUyUie beginning of training In atomic civil defense5 and the resultingfor greater understanding ofeffects. The Information program has attempted to avoid any "scare" aspects and until recently has been Intended for Uieand those active ln civil defense rather than for Uie general public.

The dissemination of nuclear effectshas been largely accomplished through specialized military, paramilitary, and civil defense publications. Mostreaches Uie Soviet public throughof the Voluntary Society forwith the Army, Aviation, and Fleet (DOSAAF) and through civil defense manuals and during the course of civil defenseAs many asillion Soviet citizens may now have received instruction Inatomic defense.

Although Soviet citizens have beento semi-technical data on nuclearweapons construction, and nuclear effects, much of Uie data on effects has been given in terms of "nominal" weapons. The articles which have appeared Ln5 to prepare readers for the introduction of defense instruction against fallout have not contained sufficient data toull picture of Uie possible area or persistency of radioactivity created by the hydrogen bomb.

Hydrogen bombs have been described merely as being "more powerful" thanbombs The Soviet Army newspaper, Krasnaya Zvezda. carried an article In6 In which Lhe reader^was gingerlywith the proposed tactic ofcivil defense equipment to shelter areas In the periphery of target centers, bul the


population has not heard reference to any need or plan for moss evacuations. It would probably take an alert reader, even among the subscribers to specializedto piece these bits of informationand to derive the full Implications in termsairly accurate picture of theeffects of nuclear attack.

lillo limiting the type and detail ofdisseminated, the government has taken pains to emphasize that the USSR has good air defense capabilities and that ancivil defense will reduce the damageuclear attack.

The amount of Information concerning the effects of nuclear weapons revealed to the average citizen of the USSR ls obviously not determined on the basis of informationbecause Soviet scientists and leadershave rather full Informationfrom weapons tests. Neither can the average citizen's limited information beto security restrictions. Certainly, far more material on nuclear effects hasln overt US publications than has been made available to the Soviet worker. This Information could be reprinted In the USSR without disclosing "statet appears lhat the release of limited atomicto the Soviet public is based on "need-to-know" and that the degree of need or certain specific Information Is determined according to thc requirementsivil defense program already decided upon.

Nuclear effects information available to the Soviet public has been closely coupled with the civil defense means available orCommitted so farolicy of shelter in cities for the general population.

the leaders of thc USSR have avoided giving the full picture of weapons effects. The un-tenability of the el ties or the. need for heavier shelter has been obscured and the issue of general evacuation and defense againstfallout has never been raised publicly.

Communist China. The Chineseregime has made no effort to familiarise the civilian population with the probableof nuclear warfare. Lacking anycapabilities of Its own or any effective defense for its populous cities, the regime has attempted to minimize the effectiveness ofweapons, and to assure the population of Soviet superiority In nuclear developments. The Chinese people have been assured that preventive measures to Increase persona! safety are possible, but only the mostcivil defense Instructions have been issued through mass communication media.

The regime's failure to undertake aprogram of familiarization oneffects probablyesire to rninimizc the power of the US, and topublic faith and confidence in China's strength. Moreover, the regime probablythat the resources necessary to explain nuclear effects and to undertake the necessary civil defense measures would, in view of the widespread illiteracy, low educational levels and vast expanse of the country, requireof time, skilled personnel, andin such quantities as tn seriously affect the entire economic program.

Rather than create fears and doubtsCommunist China through familiarization measures, the regime apparently tends to count on the deterrent effect of Soviet nuclear capabilities and to concentrate on theof basic industrial strength.

Original document.

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