SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE PROGRAMS IN THE GUIDED MISSILE FIELD (NIE 11-5

Created: 3/12/1957

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

NIEMutth

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NUMBER

Supersedes NIE4

and ils Supplen.onl5

SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE PROGRAMS IN THE GUIDED MISSILE FIELD

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE IN FULL

DIRECTORENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

h' Orga if1 l-.e

preparation ofr iflff Fnc CV'./'rf tnMlioiiKi Aaenep

the on-if Dircclo- lor. The KnergjtKeiirul huleausubject

CENTRAL INTELJGKNCE AGENCY

DISSEMINATION NOTICE

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

THE -

I. SOVIET MILITARY REQUIREMENTS FOR

GUIDED

Strategic and Tactical

Soviet Requirements for Defensive Missile Systems

Soviet Requirements for Offensive Missile SystemsEvaluation of Missiles versus other

Weapons

Priorities within the Soviet Guided Missile Program

II. FACTORS AFFECTING SOVIET GUIDED MISSILE

Scientific and Technical

Missile Guidance and

Missile

Aerodynamics and

Warheads and

Geodesy and

Soviet Industrial Capability to Produce Guided Missiles .

III. SOVIET GUIDED MISSILE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

Warhead

Surface-to-Air Missile

Air-to-Air Missile

Alr-tO-Surface Missile

Surface-to-Surface Missile

Ballistic

Cruise-type

Earth

Specialized

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Conl.)

Page

ANNEXES

A: OSSIBLE SOVIET OULDED MISSILE OPERATIONAL

AND PRODUCTION

I. Possible

XT. Warhead Considerations Affecting Possible Program

HI. Economic Implications of Possible Program

B: SOVIET SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL RESOURCES

FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OP GUIDED 42

I. Basic Scientific

n. Availability of Technical Knowledge from

Foreign

III. Organization and Control of tho Soviet Guided

Missile

C: SOVIET GUIDED MISSILE TESTING ACTIVTITES

(Limited Distribution under Separate Cover)

D: SOVIET NUCLEAR WARHEAD CAT ABILITIESunder Separate Cover)

M1

APPROVED FORCIA HBTSIHGJIL-REVIEWSOVIET CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE PROGRAMS IN THE GUIDED MISSILE FIELD

THE PROBLEM

To estimate Soviet capabilities and probable programs in the field of guidedincluding earth satellites,1

FOREWORD

This estimate supersedes, Soviet Capabilities and ProbableIn the Guided Missilend its supplement,oviet Guided Missile Capabilities and Probable Programs,some new intelligence has strengthened our previous estimate that the USSR has an extensive guided missile program, intelligence on speciflc guided missilecontinues to be deficient. In making this estimateield whero positive intelligence is minimal, we have employed three interdependent approaches:requirements, scientific and technical capabilities, and economic capabilities. Throughout the entire estimative process, the fullest consideration has been taken of the available evidence of Soviet missile activity, US guided missile experience, and known and estimated Soviet capabilities in related fields.

This estimate is based on previous judgments that the USSR does not nowto initiate general war deliberately and is not now preparing for general war as of any particular future date.

Except where noted otherwise, the operational capability dates given in this estimate are the earliest probable years during which one or more missiles could have been serially produced and placed in the hands of trained personnel of one operational unit, thusimited capability for operational employment. These dates are based on our estimateoncerted and continuous nativeresearch and development program began

Although considerable effort has been devoted toovietand operational program for guided missile systemshe production quantities and time-phasing presented inepresentossible Soviet program, but one which is considered both feasible and reasonable.*

'Un^uldcd rocXew are not Included in this estimate.

the Director of Intelligence, USAP, footnoto to Annex A. paragraph 1.

CONCLUSIONS

CONCLUSIONS

estimate that the Sovietprogram is extensive andvery high priority.)

We believe that the USSR has thescientific resources and capabilities to develop during this period advanced types of guided missile systems, in all categories for which it has military )

We estimate that thc USSR has the industrial base and related Industrialto series produce the missileit will develop during thisHowever, in view of competingthe limited availability ofequipment will seriously restrict the extent and variety of Sovietmissile production untilhereafter, expanding electronicswill probably make thismuch less severe. )

We estimate that the USSR hasfor various sizes of nuclear, high explosivend chemical (CW) warheads, and has the capability tothem on time scales consistent with the missiles in which they would beIn view of competing demands, the availability of fissionable materials will Impose limitations on the extent of Soviet nuclear warhead productionthe period of this estimate.nnex A)

SPECIFIC SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND PROGRAMS

Surlace-io-Air Missiles

We estimate that surface-to-airsystems have one of the highestamong current Soviet military programs. At Moscow, an extensiveof surface-to-air missile sites has been constructed, and ail sites arenow operational. This system can probablyery high rate of fire against multiple targets at maximumof0 feet andhorizontal ranges of about.)

During thc, surface-to-air systems with increased range and altitude capabilities for static defense of critical areas, and with low and highcapabilities for defense oftargets, field forces, and navalcould probably become available for operational employment.he USSR coidd probably have inurface-to-air system of some capability against the ICBM. )

We estimate that series production of surface-to-air guided missiles is nowway in the USSR, and that it will probably produce such missiles in large quantities. Nuclear warheads could now be incorporatedimited number of surface-to-air missiles. We estimate that some percentage of surface-to-air mis-

TOP C RET'

will be so equipped during theof this estimate., Annex A)

Air-to-Air Missiles

a lack of significantwe estimate that the USSRthe development ofand that it could now. rangeof tail-cone attacks inIt is probable that.8issile, capable of employingwarhead, )

Air-to-5urface Missilos

he USSR could probablya. subsonic air-to-surfaceavailable for operational. subsonicprobably be available, and thereevidence thatissileat least final flight. supersonic missile couldbe availableheseprimarily as antishipalso be employed againstwell-defined radar targets. supersonicprobably be available forby heavy bombers. Each oftypos could employ nuclear )

Surface-to-Surface Ballistic Missiles (up. range)

is considerable evidence ofdevelopment of short-rangemissiles, and we estimateUSSR could probably have hadfor operational useith the following maximum

ranges;. These types could be equipped with nuclear warheads. However, the USSR would probably consider CW warheads desirable for certain specific purposes, and might employ HE in the two shorter-range types. , SI, Annex A)

Surface-to-Surface Ballistic Missiles

.. ranges)'

on Soviet developmentleads us to estimate that theprobably haveange ballistic missile availableusee havethat9 the USSRun.ballistic missilendItogical step in thcprogram. We estimateUSSR is developing an IRBM,it could probably have such ain operationoth thesetypes would require nuclearalthough we do not excludeof CW use withfor occasional specialbelieve the USSR would rapidlya considerable number. andnnex A)

Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMi . range)

have no direct evidence thatis developing an ICBM. butits development hasa high priority goal of themissile program. Wethe USSR could probably haven.m. ICBM ready We believe that the

'Dale predicated on first operational unit being equipped with prototype missiles.

T-

TOP OSORET

will seek toonsiderable number of ICBM's with nuclearas rapidly as possible.nnex A)

Submarine-Launched Surface-to-Surface Missiles

e believe the USSR would probably have developed cruise-type missilesand there is some evidence pointing to the existence of Soviet submarines equipped to carry such missiles. The USSR could probably have hadubsonic turbojet missile capableaximum rangeupersonic missile capable of this range could probably be in operationupersonic cruise-type missile capable of ranges up. could probably be operationalhese

missile types would requireigorous program, the USSR might achieve an operationalIRBM system sometime during the., Annex A)

Earth Satellite

he USSR will probablyajor effort to be the first country to orbit an earth satellite. We believe that the USSR has the capability of orbiting,atellite vehicle which could acquireinformation and data of limited militaryatellite vehiclesubstantial reconnaissanceof military value could probably be orbited in the.)

DISCUSSION

SOVIET MILITARY REQUIREMENTS FOR GUIDED MISSILES

Soviet guided missile programoperates within the framework ofand future military requirementsby Soviet defense planners. Whileno direct evidence on the elementsframework as it applies to missUes,it would logicaUy have been basedan appreciation of the USSR's presentfuture strategic and tactical(b) an estimate of the types ofcould be launched against the USSRforeseeable future; (c) operationalfor which missile systems couldto replace or augment othersystems; and. finally, (d) an evaluationprobable effectiveness of missilesweapons systems to perform

USSR has almost certainly beenin determining the scope and priorities

of its missile programs by information on Western, Including US, mUitary programs. This information is probably complete enough to enable the USSR to Judge approximately the time phases In the deveioment,size, and composition of US and Allied offensive and defensive forces. Specifically, the Soviet leaders can probably Judge such factors as the general size of nuclearthc weapons systems into which nuclear warheads have been incorporated, the general progress of air defense programs, and thccharacteristics and availability dates of offensive and defensive missiles.

Strategic and Tactical Considerations

ertain considerations which haveole In Soviet military thinking in recent years make it plausible that the USSR should haveigh priority to the development of missUes. The Soviet leaders have heavily emphasized the development of their nuclear capability, and probably also believe that mis-

TOT B^

will ultimately become the primary means of delivery for nuclear weapons.concern over US and Allied capabilities for strategic air attack has compelled the USSR to place high priority on developmentodern air defense system, in whicharc now an essential ingredient and will ultimately become the primary weapon.the relative geographic disadvantages faced by the USSR for purposes of strategic attack, due to US possessionorward base structure on the Soviet periphery, could be offset to some degree by development of long-range missiles for delivery of nuclear weapons. All these factors probably figuredoviet decision, taken early In the postwar period, toajor effort in the development of guided missiles.

Soviet Requirements for Defensive Missile Sysfoms

preparing their requirements forguided missile systems. Sovietplanners would probably havea picture of thc time-phased threatand foreseeable Westernsystems about as follows:

igh and low altitudeattack by aircraft flying at subsonic speeds and at altitudes up0 feet; in peripheral areas, attack by short and medium range cruise-type missiles; where ground forces would be in contact,by short range ballistic missiles.

I: attack by aircraft employing alr-to-surface missiles; bombing attack by aircraft capable of supersonic "dash" and altitudes up0 feet; attack by long range cruise-type missiles capable of high subsonic speeds and altitudes up0 feet; attack by long rangemissiles.

ttack by supersonic aircraft and cruise-type missiles, capable ofon the order0 feet;by long range ballistic missiles.

USSR would have proceeded onthat high-yield nuclearwarheads could be Incorporated Into any

of the Western weapons systems described above. This assumption would dictate afor air defense missile systemsigh kill probability, and thereforeercentage of nuclear warheads in Soviet air defense missile systems at an early date.

Soviet defense planners would probably have formulated generalized operationalfor both surface-to-air and air-to-air systems capable of countering the threat outlined above. Surface-to-air requirements would probably have Included static and mobile systems for the defense of critical governmental and industrial centers,military centers and bases, major naval forces afloat, and major units of the Soviet Army. Operational requirements for air-to-air missile systems would probably have been based on the need to Increase the killof existing and projected Soviet

Our intelligence on Soviet development of surface-to-air missiles to date indicates that time-phased Soviet operational requirements probably beganoint-defense system capable of interdicting bomber aircraft atup to0 feet. Our estimate of the Soviet analysis of the foreseeable threat indicates that Soviet requirements for airmissiles over the next few years would become much more exacting, including longer ranges, higher speeds, and moreadvanced guidance systems. Later In theigh-priority requirement would emergeystem capableigh kill probability against ballistic missiles.

Soviot Requirements for Offensive Missile Systems

preparing their requirements formissile systems, Soviet militaryprobably would have developedoperational requirements for systemsthe surface-to-surface andcategories. Available intelligenceour belief that the USSR has hadinterest In bothamily ofmissiles.

fO r G RET-

requirements for shorter rangemissiles would probablyderived from the military missions oftargets In direct tactical supportforces, and of attacking otherImportanceilitary campaign.would probably have beenas follows:

* a. Soviet requirements formissiles for tactical support of field forces would have been derived in general from the missions of various echelons of the Soviet Army. From current Soviet tactical doctrine we deduce that operational requirements would probably have been developed formissiles of up to. range forof division and corps operations, up. range for support of field armies, and up. range for support of army

Soviet requirements forrange surface-to-surface missilessupport ol other operations and forof certain additionalbroad strategic significance wouldfrom target systems Including aof key installations of bothamilyn.m. missiles would probably haveto provide coverage for these

equirement mightdevelopedallistic orcapableonger range, bothof certain army "front"for thc neutralization of certaintargets.

the ranges fromsites within the Bloc to targetsnear the Eurasian land mass, Sovietwould probably have developedfor longer range surface-to-surface<a> ballistic missilesrange and of longer ranges upn.m. for peripheral attack missions,thc neutralization of US andand attack on strategic targets in non-

A Soviet army "front" Is rouehly comparableS army group.

Bloc nations on the Eurasian periphery; andallistic missile capable of upjn. range, for intercontinental attack. The possibility exists that interim Soviet surface-to-surface missile requirements might have Included cruise-type missiles in one or more of the foregoing range categories.for specialized naval versions of both cruise-type and ballistic missiles, suitable for launching by submarines or surface vessels, would probably also have been developed.

It is reasonable to infer that the USSR would have developed requirements for air-to-surface missiles to overcome foreseeable improvements in the capabilities of land and shipborne air defense againstaircraft. Generalized operationalwould probably haveissile. range to augment the capabilities of long-range bombers against heavily-defended land targets and large naval concentrations, as well as shorter range mls-siles for employment against single ships or other isolated and weU-deflned radar targets.

Soviet military planners may also have consideredequirement existed tocertain missiles for specific functions in thc field of countermeasures against Western air defense systems.equirement could Include surface-to-surface cruise-type rnissUes andurface missiles, equipped with ECM gear, to be employed as decoys toair defense radar and control systems. In addition, It could include air-to-surfacecapable of horning on and destroying ground radar installations.

Soviet Evaluation of Missiles Versus Other Weapons Systems

military planners, havinggeneralized operationalwhich guided missile systems couldwould probably then haveeffectiveness of missiles versus othersystems to perform the missions oftactical support, peripheralintercontinental attack. Based inthe limited Intelligence available onSoviet military programs. Including the

7

program, we believe that the Soviet evaluation was as follows:

defense. The most immediateSoviet military concern Is theof key Soviet strengths andof control. In the face of thefrom Western, especially US,forces In being and programmed,defense kill probabilities must bea much higher levelery earlyantiaircraft artillery is asystem of negligible value againsthigh altitude bombardmentalthough this system will continuefor atew years againstaircraft at lower altitudes. Fighterwith conventional armament willto be effectiveew yearsof the likely forms of air attack cr.but can achieve maximumagainst high-performance, highonly if fitted with air-to-airAs the period advances,of both defending andand of attacking cruise-typedictate more exacting operationalfor alr-to-nir missiles. Whencruise-type or ballistic missilesthe major threat, the operationalfor air-to-air missiles will tend toGuided missile systems offer theof raising the effectiveness ofdefenses to an acceptable leveL

support. The Sovietforces have been reorganized andsince thc end of World War II.the past three years their unithas been undergoing further changesthe requirements of modernor non-nuclear. Current Sovietdoctrine emphasizes allocation offor use against enemy defensiveair facilities, reserves, nuclearand encircled enemy units. Thisenvisages the use of artillery,and tactical aircraft as nuclearmeans. Most Soviet requirementssupport of line divisions can cowsatisfactorily with field artillery,rocket artillery, and aircraft.guided missiles offer certain advantages

over tactical aircraft, and should beto augment and to some extent replace the latter.

attack. Among thein Soviet strategy foreneral war are theneutralization of Western nuclearwherever deployed, destruction offorces, prevention of NATO's fulland isolation of the Europeanby interdicting US reinforcement offorces. Soviet tactical and navalaugmented by units of long-rangewill be suitable for some time forout attacks on the Eurasiansubmarine-launched guided missilean important weapon system for thisAlthough conventional air attackeffective for some time, acapability could be attainedmissiles. For peripheraland base neutralization inballistic missiles carrying nuclearby imposing maximum surpriseof interception, coulda greater threat to Westernany other Soviet weapons system.

attack. To deterfrom initiating general war againstand to fightarit occur, the USSR requires aintercontinental nuclear strikingforce should be capable ofnuclear delivery capabilities at Cheof inflicting damageecisiveother continental US targets. Therea period of years during which thewill rely principally on thcfor adequate coverage of targetscontinental US, although the Sovietdisadvantage, as well as existingdefenses and foreseeablecontinue to handicap mannedthe execution of theecrease in theattacking aircraft can be effected bythem with air-to-surface missiles.missiles could be anweapon system for attacks againsttargets in the US. Nevertheless, inrun, improving US early warning and

-TOP -ggCRBT-

capabilities could render even these attack capabilities Insufficient. Theballistic missileowever, could enable thc USSR to present an entirely new type of threat, against which adequate defense, while scientifically possible, would be most difficult.

Priorities within the Soviot Guided Missile Program

n determining priorities for its program of missile development and production the USSR would have taken into account themain factors: (n) priority of missions to be carried outirst priority to air defense, second to peripheral andattack, third to tactical support);

comparative value of missiles versus other weapons systems, and of one missile type versus another, in carrying out these missions;

feasibility ofarticularor missile system In time to meet(d) availability of resources to develop and produce various typesassociated equipment and warheads.these factors Into consideration, wethat at some time in the past Soviet military planners established prioritiestheir guided missile program generally as Indicated below. While we believe thatystem of priorities is probably governing the Soviet guided missile program at thetime, wc recognize that It wilt be subject to continuing revision as Sovietor the development of missiles and othersystems advance, and as the USSRIts mUltary requirements.

High Priority

which can be developed intime:

Surface-to-air. HE

Air-to-air. HE

which can be developed lntune:

Surface-to-surface, peripheralnuclear

Surface-to-air, improved, nuclear/ HE

Air-tc-surface, land targets, nuclear

c. Missiles which can be developedery long time:

Surface-to-surface, intercontinental attack, nuclear

Surface-to-air, antimissile missile, nuclear

Lower Priority

which can be developed intime:

Surface-to-surface, tactical support, nuclear/HE/CW

Surface-to-surface, submarine launched, nuclear

Air-to-surface, ship targets, nuclear/ HE

which can be developed intime:

Air-to-air, improved, nuclear

Air-to-surface, Improved, shipnuclear

In addition, an earth satellite with limited instrumentation for scientific purposes has probably beenigh priority for developmenthortatellitepossessing reconnaissance capabilities of military value has probably beenower priority for developmentery long time,

II. FACTORS AFFECTING SOVIET GUIDED MISSILE CAPABIUTIES

Scientific and Technicaln the basis of considerable evidence, we are confident that the Soviet missile research and development program Is extensive andery high priority. Although the USSR had no known guided missileprogram during World War n.rogram at the close of thc warhorough and systematic exploitation of German missileativeprogram has advanced rapidly sincend at present it embraces high quality research institutes, design bureaus, and plants, including some of the bestand equipment available in the USSR. These resources are adequate to continue and to expand the missile program. We believe

TOP ODOKHT

the USSR need not in thc future depend to any major extent upon Satellite support, except possibly in certain narrow fields such as precision optics and electronic instruments,*

large number of Soviet activitieswith missile development, as wellknown to have been achieved toclear evidence of the Intensity ofbut there is relatively littleon Its details. Our assessment ofand technical capabilities tocomponents (presented in thisto develop complete missile systemsin Section III) is based whereveron the limited intelligence available.information obtained frommissile specialists. However, werelied in large measure on known orSoviet capabilities in relevantfields, and on US guided missile experience.

Missile Guidance and Control

foundation for current SovietIn missile guidance is largelyof German personnel,and documents. Thedesign improvement, and. In someof German equipment by GermanIn the USSR covered almost theof guidance concepts In themissile category. Includingcontrol, beam riding,celestial guidance systems. In thecategory, the USSRGerman knowledge and equipmentthe Rheintochter,Waster/all missiles, each of whichan optical track-radio commandAn air-to-air guidance system formissile, utilizing the sameadvocated by the Germans In theelectronic analogue computer of thcsystem was subjected to furtherstudies and design improvements.alsourface-to-airdesignated. The guidance

'Detailed Information on Soviet selenUOe and technical resources for guided missileincluding the availability of technicallioai foreign sources. Is presented ln Annex B.

proposed for this systemwo-radar, ground based, command control type, capable* coverage in azimuth. One radar was to acquire and track the target, andfrom this radar was to be fedomputer to the second radar which was used to track and position theemi-active radar homing head, also worked on by German scientists, appears to have beenfor useasser/allype missile. The USSR exploited German Worldnfrared developments,issile horning head called Juno. In the air-to-surface category, the Germans workeduidance system designated Komet* whichombination beam rider and semi active homing system. Beginning inhe USSR apparently reached the point where It could largely dispense with Germanexcept in the missile guidance field. We have no information on German activities In the USSR subsequent

irm evidence has not been obtained to Indicate which of the many guidance systems are being utilized in Soviet missiles. In the surface-to-air and air-to-surface categories, however, there are some fragmentary data:

air defense launchingnique guidance systemSoviet design. This systemthc ability to track multiple targetsfor new targets. It alsoan ability simultaneously to controlmissiles against multiple targets.indicatesommandsystem may be employed.ombinationhas not been ruled out.emiactlve surface-to-airperformederman group,been intended to complement thesystem associated with the

the air-to-surface category, thereevidence that the USSR continuedof an antishipping guidance sys-

purposes of identtneaUon In US lnlelUgeuce. the designation Komtt refers not only to this guidance system, but also to the compute mls-system employing It.

SE GRRT-

closely resembling the German Komet. Electronic signals emanating from the Black Sea region were intercepted on5 and again inhese signals were quite similar in many technical characteristics to thcomet system might have radiated.

n addition to the fragmentarypresentedtrong inferential measure of Soviet success In the guidance and control area is the large-scale ballistictest program which has been under way at Kapustinonsidering the abovein conjunction with demonstratedcapabilities in other electronicswe conclude that the USSR possesses the necessary scientific knowledge andskills to develop advanced guidance and control systems for all categories of guided missiles.

Missile Propulsion

s in the missile guidance area, the USSR took energetic measures after World War II to Improve its knowledge of propulsionfor guided missiles. Only in the field of solid propellants, where the USSR hadosition of world leadership during World War II, was its interest in German work limited. The USSR acquired large quantities of pulsejet and rocket engine parts,and production tooling from Germany. Both standard and improved versionsngines were produced undersupervision. Some reports indicate that as manyotors ofons thrust* were completed during the. The Germans also developed annginehrust ofons. This motor was placed in production in8ad reportedlyt Soviet direction, two groups of Germans also worked on designs for twoon thrust motors, one of which was to be gimballed for missile directional control. Other evidence indicates-

details of Soviet ballistic missile test niliiu activities, seeLimited distribution under separate cover).

'Metric ions are used throughout thii eiUm&le.

ton thrust motor could have been ready for static testhis would represent an outstanding achievement in advancedIn the surface-to-air category,improvements were made on the Wasser-Jall motor to increase its thrust0 pounds to0 pounds. We have some evidence of Soviet work in ramjet engines, but we know of no Soviet application of such engines to guided missUes.

Soviet achievements Inin both solid and liquid rocket motorsthat the USSR is weU advancedsystems applicable to guidedEvidence Indicating the applicationto missile propulsion Is lacking.

Aerodynamics and Structure

have no information onin the USSR which can bedirectly with the missUe programMost of the German work dealtmissUes Many structuralofere made,weight structure and pressurized,fuel tanks. One structural designballistic missile) difleredtong cone-shapedno aerodynamic control surfaces;providedimballed motor.designs were also provided by theIn the surface-to-airissue. which was longerthan the Wasserfatt and hadand three tail surfaces instead ofconfiguration.

We do not know that any Germanhave been developed fuUy by the USSR. Native Soviet activity in the design field is indicatedingle German reportoviet designubsonic alr-to-surface Komet missile.

The USSR is known toumber of the world's outstanding aerodynamlcists.in the field of theoretical areody-namlcs. supported by extensive researchDespite the dearth of information on native Soviet missile air-frame design, wethat the USSR has the knowledge ot

1 i

aerodynamics, as well as the personnel and facilities, lorogram forof guided missiles of transonic and supersonic speeds.

Warheads and Fuzes

The USSR did not intensively exploitWorld War II explosivesigh level of nativein explosive and fuze technology had already been achieved.imited extent, however, the USSR did acquire information on German fuzing techniques, equipment, and data, exhibiting interest Inuzing system and in electromagnetic fuzes forwarhead application. We have extremely limited knowledge concerning the nativeprogram of warheads and fuzes. Impact, time-delay, or proximity fuzing techniques would not present any Insurmountableprobtems to the USSR.

Although we have some evidence on the details of the Soviet chemical warfare (CW) program, there is no evidence of theof CW materials to guided missiles. We estimate, however, that the USSR is currently capable of providing CW warheads for any missile Intended for antipersonnel attacks. Our estimate of Sovietto develop and produce nerve agents and an examination of the problems Involved in the dissemination of agents in missileleads us to believe that the USSR could have had tabun (GA) warheadsnd sarin (GB) warheadse estimate that the USSR could probably develop and"V" agents, more toxic than the "G" series, inssueshis date is predicated on Soviet solution of theofroper aerosol forof the "V" agent.

As in the case of CW, we haveoviet biological warfare (BW) capability but no evidence of Sovietof BW materials to guided missiles. We estimate, however, that the USSR is capable

'Detailed esUmates en Soviet capablUCea and requirements for warheads are presented Inthr latter tn limitedundor separate cover!.

of providing BW agents for antipersonnel, anticrop. or anUlivestock use as soon asmissiles are available.

estimate that the USSR couldnuclear warheads for Incorporationtypes of guided missiles.

Geodesy and Cartography

The accuracies of Soviet long-range guided missiles will depend in part upon the USSR's capabilities In geodesy andThe large, modem geodetic andorganization created by the USSR since the days of Lenin Is already notable for its achievements. It hasew ellipsoid, resurvcyed and greatly extended the first-order trlangulatlon net, and completely readjusted the Soviet survey systemingle datum. Such achievement ts possible only by maintenance of very high standards ofMost of the USSR ls now covered by maps at the scalend maps of largerr larger) are nowemphasized. The new Soviet geodesy specifications emphasize the pursuit of still greater refinement and accuracy.

We estimate that the USSR can achieve geodetic location of targets In the US relative to launching sites in the USSR with errorseet, provided, as weie has already been made covertly betweenand North American trlangulation across the Bering Strait. If this connection has not been made, the probable error in targetwould bedo feet. The location' error for European targets is estimatedeet. Wo estimate that5 these errors can be reduced by about half through extension of the Soviet geodetic and mapping system into Satellite areas and through the use of Improved Intercontinental ties with Europe and North America. The USSR is also working energetically In the study ofgravimetry. wherein gravity measures arc used to reduce the error In calculating the relationship of two points on the earth'sThe high competence of Soviet gravim-etrists and their energetic data collection program, especially in the Arctic, may also enable the USSR to make early advances in

the study of the extent to which surface gravity variationsallisticduring flight. There is evidence that the USSR is engaged in thc study of thc vertical gradient, but information is not available on the details and extent of such work.

Soviet Industrial Capability to Produce Gutded Missiles

We estimate that the USSR has thebase and related industrial experience to adapt and series produce developedmissile systems of all types. However, we believe that in view of competing demands, thc limited availability of electronicwill seriously restrict the extent and variety of Soviet guided missile production untilhereafter, expanding electronics production will probably make this restriction much less severe.

We estimate that approximately two-thirds of the current output of Sovietproduction (In value terms) isto military programs, and that the remainder is shared approximately equally by essential domestic telecommunicationand civilian consumer goods. Both the announced plans for the Soviet economy and our estimate of over-all Soviet militaryindicate an increasing demand for electronics production during thc next fivehe Soviet Sixth Five-Yearalls for expansion of electronics production0 to three times the value5 production. This increase is one of the largest plannedajor industrial sector, but we estimate that the USSR is capable of realizing this ambitious goal.

Other military demands upon electronics output, as well as essential nonmilitarywill probably restrict the rapidof missile production until new investment in the electronics industry scheduled under the Sixth Five-Year Plan makes additional output available. We estimate thatportions of the additional electronics plant capacity will not be available until about

"Sec also, Soviet CapabillUes and Probable Courses of Action, Sections III-IV.

n Hie interim, the USSR could divert electronics output to missiles from theresidual of nonmilitary electronicsor from other military electronicsbut it probably would not be willing to accept the adverse consequences ofeallocation. However, wc estimate that the Soviet program for expanding electronics production will create by thc later years of the Sixth Five-Year Plan an industrialto support an extensive and varied guided missile production program as partalanced over-all military program.

potential bottleneck in theof guided missiles is the amountnecessary to train productionto adapt prototype mechanisms toThis problem isin the production of precisionfor missile system components, suchstable platforms, mechanicaland certain valves. However, wethe USSR has the engineering abilitythis potential bottleneck, andshould be able to produce precisionin sufficient quantity to support anmissile production program.

OVIET GUIDED MISSILE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM11

intelligence on the specificactually under development inis almost nonexistent, except in ainstances. In thc succeedingwe assess Soviet technicalto develop specific missiles typesthe vast number of types thedevelop, seem to us most likely togeneral requirements outlined inabove. There is intelligence tocertain missiles are under development

While we consider thc development programhole to be probable theogical growth or developmental patternarticular family of missile systems. We have high confidence In ouron certain missiles cuirently in various stages of development, test, oc operaUonalHowever, In the light of inadequate evidence pertaining to other missile systems, our estimates of detailed characteristics for such systems are less certain,

13

in operation. In most instances, however, and especially for those types estimated for late ln the period, our chief guide is ourof Soviet requirements and development priorities. Within each broad categoryc have presented what we believeogical, step-by-stepprogram toward the more advanced types.

This assessment of Soviet capabilities to develop specific missile types Is predicatedour estimate that concerted andnative Soviet research and development in the guided missile field beganhe date given as the estimated Sovietcapability for each missile type Is the earliest probable time at which one or more series produced missiles could have been placed in the hands of trainedn one operational unit, thusimited capability for operational employment. We estimate that the time interval between the Soviet decision to produce in series and the attainment of first operational capability is probably between six andonths, under average conditions. For convenience, in the succeeding paragraphs we assume that inoviet decision to produce amissile in series has preceded theoperational date by an average time of one year. However, in instances of very high priority, the USSR could probably reduce this time interval to zero if tho first operational unit were equipped with prototype weapons and if personnel training were begun early enough. These instances are specifically noted in the case of the surface-to-air missilend the ICBM.

Based on our current knowledge of the state of the guided missile art and ourof Soviet capabilities tn parallel fields, we estimate thatarticular missile system first becomes operational its system reliability will

Despite the obvious difficulties orindividual weapons types to be developederiod reachingears Into the future, we have sufficient confidence in the estimates made in this section of the paper to characterize the development program In

thc aggregate ashere arefactors which contribute to this confid-dence, Including: (a) sufficient intelligence to indicate at least the general nature of some current Soviet missile programs, notably the surface-to-surface and surface-to-air(b) foreseeable developments in US offensive and defensive capabilities which the USSR can ascertain and must attempt to counter; (c) the probability that the ultimate goal of the Soviet development program in the surface-to-surface category is an ICBM, and in the surface-to-air category an antl-ICBM; and (d) the probability that anyprogram will be limited bystates of the art and will advance through logical steps. In addition, sufficient technical differences exist between the specific missiles in this development program so thatof one or several of thc projectswould not appreciably advance thedates of others.

we recognize that Sovietand priorities could changeprogram significantly as theadvances, ond new goals, either moreor more restricted, may be set.be particularly likely In the event oftechnological breakthrough.

Warhead Selection

a critical portion of our estimateSoviet guided missile developmentwe have considered Sovietdevelop warheads for specific missileestimate that the USSR hasvarious sizes of nuclear. HE, and CWand has the capability to developtime scales consistent with the missilesthey would be employed. Ourof appropriate warheads for various mis-

ilitary personnel or civilian scientists and technicians.

""System reliability" In this context means the percentage al missiles which function according to specifications Irom missile tafceoft toin the target area. MalfuncUons prior to launching are not Included In this definition of system reU ability.

details, seethc latter In limited distribution under separate cover).

types, presented inollowingIII, is based on estimated Soviet warhead design technology and on consideration of the CEP's, payload weights and probableof the various missiles. In general, we believe nuclear warheads would be preferable in most missile types and mandatory in some. The USSR would probably consider CWdesirable in some missiles for certain specific missions. HE warheads would bein some missiles with relatively small CEP's. We do not believe the USSR would develop and produce BW warheads for guided missiles, since BW could be disseminated more effectivelyide variety of other means, including clandestine delivery.

Surface-to-Air Missile Systems

, the USSR exploited inall the important German surface-to-air missiles under development, including Wasserfalt, Schmetterling, and Rheintochter, andew design Fluse, to beAfter their transfer to thc USSR, thc Germans continued work on these missiles, with the exception of the Fluse. Some work was probably done1 toemi-active homing head for the Wasserjall, and four models are believed to have beenand taken over by the USSR inonsiderable interest was alsoby the USSR in improving theof the Wasserfall computer.roup of Germans were ordered totudy on an advanced surface-to-air missile, designated. Some of thefeatures, such as the propulsion system, were to be retained and improved, while other components, notably the airframe, were to be redesigned. Operationally,as to be effective at altitudes of00 feet. slant range and avelocity of more than Machhespecifications forere rigorous and more closely supervised than were those of other German design projects. Thedesign study for this missile wasto the Russiansut itsis not known.

The most significant current inielligence in the surface-to-air category deals with guided missile installations around Moscow. Sightings of these installations have been made sincehere have alsoew reports of similar sites being constructed around Leningrad5

In thc Moscow area,ites have been located with sufficient accuracy to indicate their arrangement ln two concentric rings with radii or approximatelyndm. from the center of the city. Thedistance between thc sites is. on the outer ring and. on the inner ring. Observation in allaround Moscow has not been possible, but we calculate that the inner ring containsites and the outer ringites,otal ofypical site measuresone mile by one-half mile, with three longitudinal and aboutransverse concrete roads andositions. Associated building complexes are of sufficient size to houseersonnel at each site. The dimensions,disposition, and quality ofof these installations indicate that theytatic guided missile airsystem.18

Certain unique equipment, designated in US intelligence ass locatedone mile from each operational site, on the Moscow side, and Is generally aligned with the center longitudinal road. YOYOadar for use in the surface-to-air missile guidanceecent report Indicates that ln testshis radar was employed toargets simultaneously, and that it may be intended to track as many asargets simultaneously. Based on thisand on the fact that provision has apparently been made for thc simultaneous launching of an undetermined number of missiles from each site, we estimate that this systemigh traffic-handling capability.

Missile-like objects were observed innumbers at one Moscow sitehey are estimated to be abouteet in diameter andoeet In length.

"Set map and diagrams on following pages.

R-fi-r-

SECRET-

Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Sites in the Moscow Area

e believe that some sites in the surface-to-air missile defense system around Moscow have been operational sincend that all sites are probably now operational. Based on the size and configuration of the missile-like objects observed, and on technical assessment of the capabilities of the YOYO, we estimate that at present this systememploys missiles capable oround payload0 feet,aximumrange ofts guidance system is probably of the command type,EP at maximum range ofeet, orommand and semiactive seekerEP of abouteet. We believe that in thisthe high priority requirement forair defense capabilities probablythe equipping of the first operational unit with prototype missiles simultaneously with the decision to begin series production.

M, The USSR has an excellent capability for the development of more advanced surfacc-to-air systems,igh priority will almost certainly continue to be given to this program. It is probable that the currently operational surrace-to-air missUe system can and will be improved. We estimate that7 aguidance system capable oftraverse could be available for employment with Moscow-type missiles, but thatystem wouldower traffic-handling capability than the current Moscow system.

he current Moscow system will probably continue to have only limited effectiveness at very low altitudes. To overcome thisit is probable that the USSR willand could have in operationurface-to-air system for low altitudeeffectiveaximum0 feetand. range. This system could

"Payload Includes the explosive device and its associated fuzing and firing mechanism. For thc estimated yields ol nuclear payloads which could be employed In these and other missiles secLimited distribution under separate cover).

"This range represents our esUmate of Soviet capabilities to extend the maximum horizontal range of the system. It probablyaximum horizontal range or. when It nm became operational

probably employ missilesound payloads, andEP of abouteet with semiactive homing guidance.18

It is also probable that the USSR willand could have in operationurface-to-air system capable ofound payloadaximum0 feet altitude and. range. Its guidance would probably be of the command typeommand-seeker combination. The former could probablyEP ofeet, the lattereet.

Although we have no firm evidence ofinterest in surface-to-air missiles fordefense, weequirement for such missiles exists. We estimate that the USSR could probably0. missile system In operationnd0. missile system in operatione also estimate that the USSR could modify either or both of these missiles so as to make them suitable for dual purpose use as surface-to-surface missiles innaval roles. Recognizingigh degree of accuracy would be dependent upon the ability of the launching ship to acquire targets by radar, we estimate that theeffective range of0. system against surface targets would be.

For improved range capabilities in defense of critical areas, it is probable that the USSR will develop and could have In operation1 one of two missile systems: (a) apropelled missile capable ofound payloadaximum altitudeeetaximum.issile wouldpeed of aboutEPeet with terminal homingeet with command guidance;ocket-propelled missile capable of the

"It Is the view of the Director of Intelligence, USAF. that the USSR would be unlikely to hove an enecuve all-weather land based low alUtude surface-to-alr missile system In operational use prior. There Is no evidence ofInterest ln, or development programs forystem. Further, the advanced radar techniques required for an operational guidance and homing system forissile arcbeyond the capability of Soviet electronic technology prior.

T

TOP

payload capacity, accuracy, and range, but with an altitude up0 feetpeed of about Machc estimate that the latter would probably be the USSR's selection, although the development ofystem would present more complex problems than the developmentamjet missile system.

The required performance characteristicsurface-to-air missile system which could effectively engage both supersonic cruise-type missiles and ICBMs arc not fully known.engagement characteristics areas. horizontal rangeeet altitude to oppose the ICBM,. horizontal range0 feet altitude to oppose cruise-type missiles. We do nota single system effective against both these targets at maximum range andaltitudes could be developed by the USSR during the period of this estimate.

Weestimatethatantl-ICBMdefensewould receive the higher priority, and that the USSR could probablyissile system of some capability against the ICBM for first operational use during the. We are unable to estimate with confidence the characteristics ofystem. It mightound payloadorizontal distance ot about. and an altitude ofeet. An extension of these range and altitudo capabilities would require advances In radar design which we believe arc not within Soviet capabilities during this period. Such an anti-ICBM system might be modified for use against aircraft and cruise-type missiles up to altitudes ofeet and to ranges off antimissile defense systems willbe continued beyond the period of this estimate.

Air-to-Air Missile Systems'*

56 the USSRGerman alr-to-alr missiles andduring this period Germanthe USSR successfully applied Sovietto German unguided rockets, we

"Ungiilded rocheU are not included In this

know of only one instance in which theworkeduided missiie employing these propellants. This design was theFalke, later given the Soviet designation Sokol. The Sokol was designed toolid-propellant rocket motorounds thrust, an optical track-radio commandsystem, and an HE warheadounds, to be detonated by either radio or acoustic proximity fuzing. Thc design study, excluding guidance, was completed by the Germanse have no evidence that the USSR pursued any of thc German work to completion, but theremall amount of evidence to Indicate that the USSR now has an alr-tc-alr missile development program.

Despite the lack of significant Intelligence in this field, we believe that Soviet air defense requirements would have dictated that the development of air-to-air missUes be given an initial high priority. This estimate isby some indirect evidence, including Soviet interest in infrared homing devices and the fact that the airborne intercept radar which has been developed for thefighter could be used in conjunction with air-to-air missiles We therefore believe that the USSR continued development wcrknd that5 it could probably have had inolid-propeUant air-to-air missile capable ofpound payloadangeEP ofeet. However, thc passive infrared homing system probably employed in this mis-sUe would limit its use to tall-cone attacks under conditions of good weather at thealtitude.

The probable limitations of the above mls-sUe would have dictated high-priority efforts to develop an all-weather air-to-air missUe, and we believe that8 the USSR could probably haveissUe in operational use,emlactivc homing system and capable ofpound payloadangeEP ofeet. In addition, the USSR will probablyonger range all-weather missile, and could probably have In operationissile capable ofound payloadangef launchedltitude. This missile could probably achieve

CEP of SO feet, employing semiactiveguidance, or Infrared homing for tail-cone attacks.

Air-to-Surfoce Missile Systems

Complete design data on all German air-to-surface missiles were acquired by thc USSR, as were many completed GermanThe USSR also obtained Information on German air launchings of. One German group at Design Bureauoscow, engaged in research and development work71uidance systemoviet-designed antiship missile designated Komet. Details are not available on theof its warhead, airframe, and propulsion system, although from information provided by the Germans who worked on the guidance system we have deduces general information concerning the over-all system performance. TheBULL) was designated as the launching platform, and release of thewas to be accomplished at0 feet altitudeaximum range of. from the target. The missile speed wasto beadar in the launching aircraft was to provide for beam-riding during the first two-thirds of theflight, and to illuminate the target for radar homing during thc remainder of the flight. We believeissile system of the Komet type, or other air-to-surfacewith similar performance characteristics, has reached at least final flight test stage.10

We therefore estimateubsonic air-to-surface missUe, capable ofound payloadange of, from the launching aircraft, could probably be in operational use in the USSR. This missUe, possibly employing beam-riding with semlactivc terminal homing guidance, couldEPeet against ships or other isolated and well-defined radarupersonic missUe to fulfill thiscould probably be operaUonal

Although we have no evidence on other Soviet activities in thc air-to-surface field, our estimate of Soviet mUitary requirements

"SeeLimited distribution undercover).

leads us to believe that the USSR hasalsohorter-range missUe for employment against ships. It probably could have had in operation5 aalr-to-surface missile capableound payloadange ofuidance system using televisionadio command Unk could probablyEPeet, butystem could be employed only in good weather.

is also probable that, In order toits long-range bomber attackagainst heavily defended land targetsnaval concentrations, the USSR wUIand could have in operationir-to-surface missUeaund payloadangen.m. The CEP ofissilewith the type of guidancefrom. with homingclandestine beacon. with(assuming in the latter caselaunching aircraft could determineposition.

Surface-to-Surfaco Missile Systems Ballistic MissUes

After World War II, the USSR acquired fromumber ofallistic missUes, as weU as component parts and production's were test-fired at Kapustin Yar as early as the falluring the period up untileveral different groups of German missile specialists and engineers in the USSR devoted considerable effort to improveincreasing the thrust of its motor fromoons, and improving its accuracy. At the sameoviet team attempted to increase its maximum range of. to.

German experts under Soviet direction also performed preliminary design studies for other ballistic missiles. In8 theyesign studyissileoton thrust motor and designed toound payloadangehis study actually represented the consolidationumber of proposals for further Improvement

H-fVP

. Beginning in the springhey worked on detailed designsissilehich was toingle-stage missile, toon thrustand toound warhead toeries of feasibility studies was made for2 missile, totaged missileound warhead toiles. The Soviet utilization of these studies is not known.

We believe that exploitation of thetogether with parallel and subsequent native efforts, enabled the USSR to makeprogress in the development ofmissiles of short and medium rangesn addition toton thrust rocket motors which were available at that time, we believeon thrustwas successfully developeds Indicated in Section II, we also believe the USSR has high capabilities for development of guidance systems, warheads, and probablyfor ballistic missiles. These estimates are supported by the extensive Sovietmissile testing program which has been under way at Kapustln Yar'1

Based on the evidence cited above and in Annex C, we believe that the USSR hasthe development of several surface-to-surface ballistic missileissile. maximum range has been developed and could probably havet Is probable thatton thrust motor and couldoundsing aof radar track-radio command and inertialEP. could probably be achieved, and this could probably be Improved toeetEP. could probably be achieved

"Foe further details, seeLimitedunder eparau cover).

ound payload weights given for the,. ballistic missilesIn paragraphsndepresent our basic esUmales. However, wc beUeve that If lhc USSR Incorporated certain technically feasible rennrmenc In structural design, theseould carry lo their maximum ranges payloads welchingimes as much as thoseWe have no evidence of such Soviet developmenls.

ure Inertial guidance system.

Inissile of. maximum range has been developed andcould also have been operationalt is probable that this missileton thrust motor and couldounduidance system similar to that ofm. missile, this missile could probablyEPhich could be improvedeetEP. could probably be achievedure Inertial guidance system.

Development work has also beenissile of. maximum range, which could probably havet Is probable thaton thrust motor and couldounduidancesimilar to those of the first two ballistic missiles described could probablyEPmprovable.EP. could probably bo achievedure inertial system.

We have no firm evidence of Sovietof any ballistic missile of shorter range. We believe that aexistsissile with. maximum range for tactical support of ground forces, and for neutralizing certain additional targets, and that its relative ease ofwould probably have led Sovietto Include it In their program. Wethatissile could probably have been in operationton thrust motor, It could probablyoundndEPeet,ombination of radar track-radio command and Inertial guidance. This CEP could probably be achievedure inertia! system.

Estimated Soviet requirements forattack capabilities against peripheral Eurasian targets and against the continental US lead us to believe that intermediate range and Intercontinental ballistic missiles are probably under high priority development.

top a

missiles are lhe logical goals of thc step-by-step Sonet ballistic missileprogram which was clearly under way4 studies ordered by the USSR ins well asonfirm an early Soviet interest in at least the IRBM. The significance of4 studies is further increased by recent USwhich indicates the feasibility of achieving ranges up.on thrust rocket motor. In view ofSoviet requirements and the progress of the Soviet program to date, we estimate that the USSR is probably developing and could probably have in operationingle-stage IRBM. capable ofound payloadaximum rangeEP. could probably be achievedombination of radar track-radio command and inertial. In an additional one to two years, or in an additional three yearsure inertial systom.

In view of thc potential capabilities of an IRBM against the continental US as well ax overseas targets, if launched from awe believe the USSR may attempt to develop an IRBM for submarine employment. However, the formidable problems Involved (including the development of pure inertial guidance, precise navigational equipment, and specially configured submarines with thehandling, fueling, and launchinglead us to estimate that with aprogram tho USSR might achieve ansubmarine-launched IRBM system some time during the.

There is no direct evidence that the USSR is developing an ICBM. but lis development has probablyigh priority goal of thc Soviet ballistic missile program. We estimate that the USSR now possesses, or is rapidly acquiring, the necessary data for attacking thc aerodynamic, structural, and guidance problems of an ICBM. The solution of many problems, including the re-entry problem, has already been aided to some extent by. ballistic missile development program, and should be further advanced by work on IRBM and earth satellite programs. It Is

therefore probable that thc USSR could have ready for operational useICBM capable ofound payloadaximum range. The high priority requirement for an operational ICBM would probably dictate the equipping of the first operational unit with prototype ICBMs.issile wouldemployon thrust motors for first-stage propulsion andton motor for second-stage propulsion. With aof radar track-radio commandEP ofould probably be achieved, but an additional two years would probably be required to achieve this CEPure inertial system.

Cruise-Type Missiles

anyomponent parts and considerable manufacturing equipment were shipped lo the USSR after World War II.on the numberissilesin thc USSR range fromo several hundred.xperts were exploited untilheir work includedto Improve's guidance system and its pulsejet engine. Thc Germans reported that Soviet scientists experimented withype missiles8erman groupreliminary design studyamjet cruise-type missilehich was to. missile boosted to operating altitude and speed. However, no German ramjet experts were Involved and there was no evidence of any Soviet Interest in thisafter the completion of the design study Ul

SC. The postwar work on pulsejet missiles, while far less extensive than work in other guided missile fields, could have permitted the USSR to haveype missiles in operational useowever, because of the apparent lack of Soviet interest and the limited speed and altitudend high fuel consumption of pulsejet motors, we believe that the USSR probably did not carry development of such missiles to completion.

he potential military value ofsurface-to-surface missiles, to-

P

with the difficulty of employingmissiles with submarines, would probably have led thc USSR to develop cruiac-typeInitially. There is some evidence, as yet inconclusive, of the existence of Sovietequipped to carry such missiles. Based on estimated Soviet requirements andwe believe that the USSR has probably developed and probably could have had In operationubmarine-launchedmissile capable ofound payload at high subsonic speeds to arange. The accuracy of this missile would probably varyoepending upon the guidance system employed and the accuracy with which the guidance submarine could fix Its position.

upersonic missile to fulfill thiscould probably be in operationuidance could probably be improved toa CEP. at maximum missile rangesing an inertial guidancemonitored by radar map-matching.

requirement forwill probably lead the USSR toa longer range cruise-type system.missile capable of carrying apayloadaximum range ofcould probably be operational inwithm. missile, CEP'sconsiderably with the type of

Earth Satellite

he USSR announcedof the Permanent Interagencyfor InterplanetaryIs other evidence indicating theof this commission at least as earlyfallhe publicthe first official indication that theactively engaged on problemsthe launching and orbiting of earthvehicles. The six commissionare among the leading Soviettheir competence In such fields asand nuclear research IsOne of thc first tasks of this com-

mission was stated to be the organization of work for the creation of an "automatic"for scientific research of outer space. Sinceumerous unofficialhave been attributed to Sovietconcerning Soviet Intentions to launch satellites during the InternationalYear7 to. Inhe Soviet TGY Committee announced its intention to participate in the IGY rocket and earth satellite programs. No detailed program was submitted, however.

USSR will probably make ato be the first country to orbit anOn thc basis of estimatedmissile capabilities, we believeUSSR possesses the basic technicalskills, and other resourcesdevelop, build, and orbit anvehicle. Thc successful orbitingsatellite, vehicle requires solutions forthe scientific and technicalin the development ofballistic missiles, except for theand with the added requirementsmall, long-life power supply. Wethc USSR has the capabilityatellite vehicle which couldinformation and data ofatellite vehicle possessingreconnaissance capabilities ofcould probably be orbited in the

Specialized Missiles

consider that, during the periodestimate. It will be within Sovietto develop specialized missiles foras decoys and antiradarhave not estimated specific Sovietamong the wide range ofthese fields. However, we believe thatthe alr-to-surface missiles described inparagraphs could be modifiedon ground radars, andortionair-to-surface missileight comprise these

HE*

TABLE I

FirstData'

SOVIET GUIDED MISSILE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

Maximum Altitude

Matl-mum Sliced (Marli

No)

Accuracy (CSP ln ft)

Payload' (lbs. and

am

SURPACE-TO-AIllYSTEMS

Para hefer

Gusdastcc

Remarks

tlon'

0 round-Leunehed

Maximum Horiionlal

: 1

BO

nuclear or HE

Command type (IWnld-course command with terminal homing. proiauly" CEP).

First operaUonal capability simultaneous with declilor. to series produce. Charac-ttrlsUcs are those estimated foror low altitude defense.

(nm.)

A-3

0

50

24

to

B

uclear or

nuclear or HE

LOCO nuclear

am

Semiaetlve homing

Alternate system alsoSee

Command type command with CEP).

SO.COO

r

SA-i

SA-5

(Antl-ICDM System M

(Characteristics estimated areo considerable crrcr.

(Modlocation for use against aircraft and cruise-type

Commandommand wltnEP).

Command type

diss

ic:

IH

LWI nuclear

81

IMS

ISO HE

l

SA-7

(Could be modified for dual-purpose use as surlaee-lo-(surfaee missiles Innaval roles.

7.0 Command with homing

H0-MI or HE

eam riding and/cr semi-active homing.

ommandommand with homing (lOCr CEP).

'We evaluate this program asith varying degrees ot confidence concerning detailed characteristics -See footnote to title of. Those missile types for which our estimates are supported by significant current intelligence are Indicated by an asterisk following the missile

'These art arbitrary designations for convenience of reference. The same designations are used In Table II followingf Annexor definition, see

' Payload Includes the explosive device and Its associated razing and firing mechanism. Warhead capabilities and requirements are discussed inthe latter In limited dlstrtbuUon under separateee Director of Intelligence, USAF. footnote to

Cont'd)

SOVIETKVK1.QPMENT PROGRAM8

AIR-TO-AIR MISStLK SYST2MS

tlon*A-3

Date'

0

t.

t.

Capa- Maximum blutr Rar.ee Accuracy [nm.l (CEP)

: i

r launched at eO.Oil')'

nas Weight

115

MnkMQI Apprcx. Spud' On (Mach

No)

u

Passive Infrared homing.

Semlactlve homing.

Semlactlve homing orhoming.

rer.

70

Hfir.aiks

Tall-cone attack In good weather. All-we nth nr.

All-weather or tall-cone attack.

MCIYSTEMS

Designs lion'

Capa- Maximum blllty Range Date- (nm)

Accuracy (lbs. and (CEP) type)

Speed (Mach NO )

Gross Weigh; Cbs.i

ft.

nuclear or HE

with radio command Unk.

use In good weather.

ft

nuclear or HE

riding *lthterminal homing.

use against ships or other well-defined radar targets.

ft.

or HE

riding with seml-actlve terminal homing.

0

n.m.

nuclear

max.

type, radar map-matchlng, or homing on clandestine beacon (CEPsith Inertialm. CEP as-sumlng launching aircraft can flx own position5 run.

use against heavily-defended land targets or large naval

Doeslude speed of launching aircraft.

c

si

143

h

2k

s

llijfj!!

C! a

it

i

rfaflS

ill!

iia

i

HI

IS

!!

S3 Sg

it n

ii

an

a5

rig-It g

||

|1

3-.

ij if

Big!

52

5

<A .A

1' 0

ANNEX A

A POSSIBLE SOVIET GUIDED MISSILE OPERATIONAL AND PRODUCTION PROGRAM

The program outlined in this Annexbe taken as the most likely or theSoviet program. We present it asossible program, but one which ls both feasible and reasonable.1

POSSIBLE PROGRAM

We have direct evidence of the seriesand operational deployment of only one of theissile types discussed in Scc-

'It Is the view of thc Director of Intelligence, USAF, that the number of certain shorter range surface-to-surface and shorter rangemissiles projected In this estimate Is Inof any reasonable production In light of the limited availability of nuclear warheads and the limited requirement for HB and CW warheads. Trie number of missiles In these categories as shown Inas been predicated mainly on the assumption that, although the Soviets recognize the desirability ofighof nuclear warheadsaragraphsndf Annex A> they would:

Produce far more of these missiles than the number tor which they could provide any significant percentage of nuclear warheads (paragraphfndnnex A>

Produce and use HE or CW warheads for the bulk of this large number of missilesaragraphsndf Annex A)

(c> Plan for and be willing to accept the high cost and relative Ineffectiveness ofissile lo deliver HE or CW on manymissions foruclear warhead Is highly desirable. If missiles are to produce the effects desired. The Director of Intelligence. USAF. agrees that the USSR would Indeed satisfy Its requirements (or missiles with HE and CW warheads.reserve stocks, but believeshortage of nuclear materials would then limit theproduction of missiles In these categories to the number for which nuclear warheads could be provided.

tion ni of the DISCUSSION. We have no knowledge of the actual Soviet program for production and employment of missiles during the nextears, and we could reasonablylittle direct evidence bearing on theThe range of possibilities is wide. Into narrow this range, and to arriveetter-defined judgment of theof the Soviet missile threat which will confront the US during the decade, weas follows: First, we estimated Soviet military requirements for numbers of missiles by type, making this estimate consistent with the date at which we believe each type could be available. These numbers were thenIn thc light of: (a) the estimatedof nuclear materials for warheads; (b) the estimated limitations of thc Sovietf thc electronics andIndustries; and (c) an assumeddesire toeasonably economical program involving efficient production and an expenditure curve which would not move too sharply or irregularly and thus severely affect expenditures for other military programs.

n considering the numbers of missiles to be stockpiled, we have been unable to make definitive estimates of thc Soviet view as to the effectiveness of missiles versus othersystems. We have, however, exercised judgment along the general lines Indicated Int the DISCUSSION as to theweight Soviet planners would give tomissile types versus other available weapons to perform various missions. We do not believe that Soviet planners would atbe capable of realistically evaluating the effectiveness of their own as-yet undeveloped weapons systems. When such evaluations can be made, various aspects of any currently visualiged Soviet program will be modified.

This analysis ls predicated upon our basic estimate that, barring unpredictableor political changes, there will be no specific war readiness target-date in Soviet military programs through this period. Wo have therefore not attempted to postulate what Soviet military planners would Judge necessary to meet their full requirements for wax readiness. We assume that the USSR willissile force in-being consistent with Soviet judgments as to the effectiveness of missiles versus other weapons systems, that it will apportion its efforts according to the priorities of thc various missions, and that It will stress the development and maintenance of production skills, experience, and facilities that can be expanded rapidly if necessary. We have not attempted to define the force In-being as optimum, maximum, or minimum, nor have we attempted to arrive at precise percentage requirements for air defenseor precise numbers of targets to be attacked by missiles.

Clearly tho following paragraphs cannot be regarded as defining thc most probable Soviet accomplishment overears. There are far too many doubtful factors entering into the calculations; moreover, it is certain thatyear program of missileenvisaged now, whether by the USSR or by ourselves, will be subject to extensive change as the years go by. Wc believe,that these paragraphs set forth awhich. ln the light of our uncertain knowledge at the present time, is not only possible but Is also feasible and reasonable.

Warheads5

have not attempted to estimatewhat proportion of the stockpilesmissiles would be provided withHE, or CW warheads where suchwould be feasible. We recognize,that thc availability of nuclearimpose limitations on the extent ofwarhead production during thethis estimate. In those cases where CEP's

'See Section II ef this Annex, andthe latter in limited disttiDution under sepanu cover!.

and payloads make HE or CW warheadswe believe the USSR would produce such warheads In sufficient quantity to meet Its requirements for certain specific missions, without regard to the availability of nuclear materials. However, we are unable towhether shortages of nuclear materials would in fact result in the production of fewer missiles of certain types than estimatedor in the production of additional HE or CW warheads, or both.

Surface-to-Air Program Ground-Launched

We estimate that the high priority almost certainly assigned to air defenses generally, together with the necessity for air defense weapons compatible with the requirements for defense against high-performance aircraft and missiles, probably gives surface-to-airdefenses one of the highest priorities among current Soviet military programs.of construction of the first of an estimatedaunching sites around Moscowome live years after the Initiationative missile program, tends to confirm this estimate. Construction of the Moscow launching sitesajor effort during the. On the basis of an estimatedaunchers per site, and on allocation of four missiles per launcher, the missile stockpile requirement for the entire Moscow system would beur estimate that large-scaleof these missiles is under way Isby observations56 of four and possibly as many as six factory-type facilities near the city. These unique and almost identical facilities, at present mstages of completion, appear to befabrication and final assembly plants for surface-to-air missiles. At one of them, moreissile-like objects were observed tn

Aside from thc information presented above, plus some evidence that launching sites may be under construction near Leningrad, we have no Intelligence on Soviet programs for the operaUonal employment orof surface-to-air missiles. We believe,

t

TOP

that the surface-to-air program will continue to enjoy high priority. We believe that each surface-to-air system developed by the USSR will, with relatively minorpossess combat utility for some five to seven years following the introduction of the succeeding system. In this manner,systems can either supplement olderor permit their allocation to lessstatic targets or to mobile units forof field forces.

military planners undoubtedlydefense of Moscow as being of veryand of critical importance.recognize that the currentsystem will satisfy theirforew years. AvailableIndicates that although thehas the advantageery highfire, it imposes limitations on theby Individual sites to abouta large number of sites are requiredadequate all-around coverage.of these limitations and the greatof the current Installation In fixedwe believe the surface-to-air missileas observed around Moscow to be acase dictated by the specialMoscow to the USSR. We believe thatsurface-to-air defenses asand in terms of the level ofwould not be deployed In anyareas, except possibly Leningrad.

provide surfacc-tc-air missileother critical areas, severalopen to Soviet planners. For example,ring of sites, comparable to thering ofites, could provide ahigh level of defense at mostWith the present YOYO guidancewe believe thatites would* coverage with acceptablethe other hand, we estimate that incurrent system could probably betouidanceraverse.ystem wouldlower traffic handling capability, buthave the advantage of permittingof thc large fire-unitsmallerach with its own

We have no Intelligence to indicatethe USSR will elect loew critical areasigh level of defensearger number of areasower level of defense. In any case, we estimateogical program for0jn.might involve the activationnitshis wouldtockpile of0 missiles, to be produced In the

The low altitude capability estimated for0. system which could probably become availableB* would makealuable weapon for augmenting the defenses of both critical areas and field forces. This low-altitude coverage wouldbe required to supplement the later, more advanced high-altitude systems as well as the0. system. The USSR might thustockpile of0 of these missiles in the, and activatenits for theirA portion would probably be assigned to critical static target areas and theemploying mobile launchers, to field forces.

It is probable that the USSR would desire toelatively large number of critical military installations and industrial areas with surface-to-air systems of0.0xn. types. The improved characteristics of these systems wouldeduction In the number of units assigned to the defense of any given critical area. We estimateotalof0 missiles of these two types might be produced9ndotal ofnits might beeginning inissiles of0. type would probably

Calculation based onaunchers per unit, four

missiles per launcher. 'See DlreeU! ol Intelligence. USAP. footnote to

paragraphf the DISCUSSION.based onaunchers per unit.

four missiles per launcher, with an allocation

of ISO units to static defense and TOO units to

field forces.

"Calculation based onaunchers per unit, four missiles per launcher.

phased out of the defenses of critical areas and be redeployed to less critical areas and field force units.

numbers of interim antl-ICBMand unils which the USSRs conjectural. The USSR mightstockpile several thousand as anthe exact number dependingits estimate of the number of USbe countered; (b) its estimate as to theof the system againstthe number of nuclear warheadsfor use In the anti-ICBM role; andf the effectiveness of thismodified, against high performanceand cruise-type missiles. Theas to wheneapon mightlo first operational useconfident numerical estimates.tentative basis, we estimate that anumber of missiles producedmightor use In theand the number of units

Shipborne

the defense of naval surfaceprobablyower priority thanof key land targets, Sovietalmost certainly recognize thatsurface-to-air missiles couldprotection for the Soviet surfacedecrease Its dependence onConsidering these factorsthe economic cost of such abelieve the USSR might seek duringof this estimate to equip aboutof Its cruisers and about one-sixthdestroyer types with surface-to-airthe basis of estimatednd assuming aforce after that date,ndestroyer types might thuswith surface-to-air missiles bylogical program might be asequip six cruisers and0un. shipborne mis-

*AU calculations based on four launchers per cruiser and two launchers per destroyer type, with an allowance ofini!ai per launchermall aUowance for reserve.

silcs,tockpile61 (b) later, equipruisers, Including the six above,. shipbornetockpileuchc) equip an additionalestroyers with0Including those withdrawn from the original sixhe conversion of these destroyers and production of anissiles to be accomplished

Warheads. Nuclear warheads could be employed In any of the surface-to-air missile types estimated for the period except0um. types. While the small CEP's of roost surface-to-air missile types would make HE warheads satisfactory, we estimate that the USSR would Include nuclear warheads in some of these missiles. Suchwould be mandatory for antl-ICBMs.

Cost. The ground-launched surface-to-air programs, involving thc activation oftatic and mobile unitstockpile ofissiles, would cost an estimated5 dollars in investment and operating expenditureshis represents about one-half of the dollar cost of the over-all missileset forth in this Annex, and Its dollar allocation Is more than three times that of any other single category of rnlasiles. The shipborne surface-to-air programs wouldinvestment and operating coststo seven billion dollars, orf the over-all missile program.'

Air-lo-Air Program

have no evidence of any Sovietfor the operational employment orof air-to-air missiles, butrogram has probably enjoyedinitial priority as part of theair defense effort. The Sovietmissiles which we estimate willavailable during the first half of theseveral advantages which tend totheir guidance and payload limitations.

'For details of the esUmated costs of the entire missile program, see Section IU of this Annex. AU dollar costs presented in this estimate are8 dollars.

29

include: (a) their relatively cheap unit cost; (b) the availability of large numbers of fighter aircraft as carriers; and (c) theirto improve lighter kill capabilities.surface-to-air and air-to-air programs are justified during much of the periodof their complementary relationships. We believe, however, that late in the period the contribution of air-to-air missiles to the over-all Soviet air defense effort will probably decrease as the nature of the threat evolves.

We estimate that the USSR will continue to maintainighter aircraft in operational units through atan initial program to equip about one-fourth of these fighters with the currentlygood-weather air-to-airtockpile of0 missiles might be produced' Soviet planners would probably consider this air-to-airas an interim measure only, to bebyall-weather air-to-air system which we estimate could probably be availableoviet program for this missile might involve full equipment ofoviet all-weather fighters estimatedtockpile of0 such missiles might be produced8

Soviet production of. air-to-air missile, which could probably first be availableould probably be limited by the actual or impending threat of attack by cruise-type and ballistic missiles.since. missile couldound payload, three times that of. air-to-air missile and capable ofnuclear as well as HE warheads, we believe some production would probably be undertaken.entative figure only, we estimate thatuch missiles might be produced0

Cost. The air-to-air programs described would entail an Investment and operating cost amounting to about seven billion dollars, or 10

based on four rnlaalles per aircraft per aortic, withjn. missilesfor two sorties per aircraft and. missile* for three sorties per aircraft.

percent of the total cost. The entire airmissUe program, including surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles of all types,approximatelyercent of the dollar cost of the over-all Soviet missile program set forth In this Annex.

Air-lo-Surface Program

While there Is considerable evidence toSoviet interest in air-to-surf ace missiles and we believe that one type has reached at least final flight test stage, there is noof Soviet series production In thiscategory. Our belief thatrogram would probably be undertaken rests primarily on two factors: (a) Soviet planners probably estimate that theyerious threat from US and Allied carrier task forces and that the capabilities of these task forces to defend themselves against close-in attacks byare already high and will continue to improve; and (b) they probably estimate that as the period advances, the capabilities of their own bombers to penetrate the defenses of key Western land targets will materially decrease.

he air-to-surface missiles available to the USSR will probably be those designed primarily as antishipoviet program for these missiles might be as follows: (a) on an interim basis, producetockpile ofubsonic air-to surface missiles, of which the majority might be. missiles0 pounds gross weight,ortion might be. missUesounds gross weight; (b) replace this stockpUe with the supersonicjn. missiles which could probably be availabletockpUe1rogram couldair-to-surface missiles for employmentr more aircraft,'1 most of which would be of medium bomber or larger types. Some. missiles could be employed against

" The Director of Intelligence. USAP, believes that the numbers of shorter range alr-to-surface missiles shown here are excessive. See histof this Annex.

"Calculation based on one missile per alrcralt per sortie, with sufficient missiles for three sorties per aircraft,

30

targets, although the guidance system estimated lor these missiles would limit their employment to isolated and well-denned radar targets and the short range would also limit their utilization. HB warheads wouldbe satisfactory for employment against single ships, but nuclear warheads would be employed against land targets and ship

. missile ofgross weight, which couldavailableould Increase theof manned heavy bombers toland targets, and couldvulnerability of these aircraft. Afor these missiles mighttockpUe ofyof their CEP'3 payloads andemployment, these missiles wouldwarheads.

Surfaco-to-Surface Programumefied

Information from returned Germanas weU as the large-scale testing of ballistic mlssues in the USSR, indicate that at least experimental or pilot-line production has been under way for six to eight years, and that there must be at least one major assembly faculty committed to suchOther than this circumstantialwe have no knowledge of any Soviet program for the production or operational employment of ground-launched surface-to-surface missiles.

In estimating possible Soviet stockpiles for ground-launched surface-to-surfacewe have considered thc differentthc USSR would probably assign tofor augmenting or replacing othersystems in the tactical support, peripheral attack, and intercontinental attack roles.and weighed these priorities against thefor economy in expenditure and In utilization of nuclear materials. While we have generally equated the stockpiles ofmissiles to numbers of operational units

" SetLimited dlstrltmUon undercoven.

-Aa set forthf the DISCUSSION.

and targets to be attacked, the stockpiles themselves were not derived by any precise calculation of these factors. The stockpUesime-phased program designed toeasonable degree of readiness and an expandable production capability. This we have done in the belief that Soviet planners must make contingent decisions when technology and doctrine are changing rapidly and comparative evaluation ofweapons systems is not clear-cut.

hort-Range Ballistic Missiles (up. range)

of its relatively lowthe missUeroductionfor. ballistic missiles wouldbe phasedairly long period.ofuch missUesproduced4on mamtatnlng an expandablecapability. This stockpUeissUesheCEP of this missile wouldof nuclear, HE. or CW warheadstargets.

the sametockpUe ofballistic missilese produced4 andstockpile could supportasic requirement exists for nuclearThe4 CEPprobably preclude the use of HECW warheads, and would limitof these missUes lo static targets.CEP Improvedeet byuse of HE would be feasible for

provide an improved capabilityagainst NATO or other forces,might haveallistic missiles4his stockpileabouthe same warhead

"The Director of Intelligence. USAF. believes that thc numbers of short range surface-to-surface missiles shown here are excessive. See histor this Annex.

"Calculation basedissiles per unit. Units assumed io have four launchers each.

" Calculation based onissiles per unit. Units assumed to have two launchers each.

SKCKET

target limitations would apply as in. missile, except that thc use of HE would not be practicable.

Ballistic Missiles.anges. Ballistic missiles. range could reach much of the Eurasian land masa. Japan, Alaska,ortion of the UK from launching sites within the Sino-Soviet Bloc. IRBMs. range could cover these same targets from more secure launching sites and could extend thc coverage to include more distant target areas. While we have not fully assessed the number ofthc USSR might elect to attack by this means rather than by other weapons systems, we estimate that the USSR might stockpilef these missiles. We havethat the advantages the USSR could gain byissile capability ln-being for attack on Western Europe would probably lead it to produce the stockpile fairly rapidly. We have thus allocated the larger portion of the stockpile lo. missile because of IU earlier availability, and on this basis we havetockpileallistic missiles. range produced60tockpileRBMs produced9ehowever, that the earlier program might be cut back to allow some increasedof IRBMs The CEP's, payload weights, and probable employment of both. missile and the LRBM would require nuclear warheads, although we do not exclude the possibility of CW use withor occasional special missions.

intercontinental Ballistic.e believe that the USSR will seek toonsiderable number of ICBMs with nuclear warheads as rapidly as possible. In reaching this conclusion we have considered: (a) the great potential military value of the ICBM as compared to competing Soviet weapons systems, particularly foratuck; (b) the military advantage the USSR could gain if it could acquire aICBM capability before the US hadadequate counter-measures or similar forces in-being; (c) the potential economy of the ICBM system as compared toweapons systems; and (d) thc probable

low initial system reliability and accuracy of thc ICBM. On theseoviet ICBM program might Include production of aofissiles0To provide security and permit rapid rates of fire, but at the same time to conserve Investment in facilities, the USSRidely dispersed ICBMsites, each withissiles and two launching pads, although many olher methods of deployment would be possible.

Shipborne

Any of the present Soviet submarine types could be equipped to carry one or two cruise-type missiles In topside stowage, andor nuclear-powered boats about the size of the "Z" class could be converted or constructed to accommodate four missiles each in Internal stowage. While there ls no evidence to Indicate how many guided missile submarines the USSR intends to convert or construct, we estimate that it could now have aboutubmarines equipped to carryin topside stowage. Its future program might call for the construction or conversion of aboutubmarines with Internal stowage by

We estimate that production of surface-to-surface cruisc-typc missiles is probablyway, andoviet productionmight be as follows: (a) to acquire an initial capability rapidly,tockpileissiles5 andtockpileissilesupersonic capabilities In the; (c)tockpileissilessupersonlc capabilities in the, In part to replace themissiles and ln part to equip submarines converted or constructedhe CEP's, payload weights, and probableof these missiles would require nuclear warheads.

"These dales assume first operaUonal capability of the ICBM at the earliest probable datethe beginning ofithin range of our estimate,oviet ICBM might not be operaUonaliy available until the end

GH-&T-

The USSR might alao0un. shipborne surface-tc-abr missiles totheir alternative use against surfaceIn appropriate naval roles. The basic numerical requirement for such missiles isIn the shipborne surface-to-air(paragraphf this Annex).

Cost. The estimated investment andcost of the entire surface-to-surface program is aboutillion dollars,ercent of thc dollar cost of the over-all missile program. The included ICBM program represents about eight percent of thc over-all program.

Table II, summarizing/ thisbegins on

II. WARHEAD CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING POSSIBLE PROGRAM

Nuclear Warheads

The production and operational program for guided missiles described inf this Annex has been assessed in the light of the estimated availability of nuclear materials to the USSR during thc period. Theol the assessment is necessarily limited by the element of uncertainty in our estimates of past and future Soviet productiont Is further limited by our inability to determine with any validity thc planned Soviet allocation of fissionableavailable lor weapons.

From thc standpoint of destructive effectrobable Soviet objective would be to allocate nuclear warheadsargeof all those missiles for which lt ls tech-nlcaUy possible to design such warheads. It is highly unlikely that sufficient nuclear mate-

"Seeoviet Atomic Energys0 (Limitedhis estimate will be superseded by the forthcoming.

"The uncertainty in our estimate of cumulative Soviet productionp to the present probably does not exceed plus or minus SOof the estimated value and plutonlura plus or minusercent. Tho error tn our estimates of future production Is lesa predictable.

rials will be available during the period of this estimate to permit such an allocation.

have not made an estimate ofof fissionable material whichwould allocate to guided missilehave we estimated the percentageof nuclear warheads to all theHowever, In order to assess thcimposed by thc availability ofwe have selected thosebecause of their probableCEP's, we believe would beentirely with nuclear warheads,assumed that they wouldequipped:

submarine-launchedmissiles

. ballistic missiles,ICBMs

surface-to-air missiles

. air-to-surface missiles

Calculations based on Soviet weaponsshow that the USSR could equip all of these missUes with nuclear warheads, by allocating tothe missUe programfnd aboutercent of the plutonium which has been estimated Ino be available for weaponsumulative basis"

is clear that If during this periodequipped with nuclear warheadssurface-to-surface ballisticmissUes, antt-ICBMs,air-to-surface missUesthis Annex, it would have to equip the large

Tlie Director of Naval Intelligence did notwith the figures inor thcproducUon. and for theproduction of plutoniumhich were usedasis for the calculations In this estimate. The Director of Naval Intelligence believes the figures to be too high, and that for planningore practical magnitude of cumulative quanUtlesould beange below that of Uie minusercent lower limit of the estimates in.

"For further details, seeLimitedunder separate cove:).

aoviet quided missilep phoductiow prop ram throuoh itaa

Tba program outlined Id this table cannot be taken as the most Likely or the probable Soviet program.present It asosslblt program, but one which Ii both feasible and reasonable.'

of Stockpile at Eod of Yearss7 ibss mt imo ioni ism ioei it

OO0 cO

icoo isoo ii.twiooo

ISO ur.lU ar.ll- Static defense Ol vaUd ISlS-an critical areas.

lor low alt'Udt defense

SO lot italicnd IW lor defense of

rr. (

IWJ-oo Interim nti. ICBM

KtplircsIS na. system Ir. critical areas and de fends addillGr.-al such ait si. Earlier system transferred to less critical areas and flald forces.

Stockpile afigure only. Production might begin ut late as Ml

Director of intelligence USAF, footnote to Anne* A. paragraph 1

art arbitrary designations [or convenience of reference. The same designations were uitd inallowing Section IU af the DISCUSSION 'For definition, h* paragraphf the DISCUSSION. 'For further details, ice Section III of the DISCUSSION.

'These Sgnrta do not Include tnlsilles produced for testing and training. Stockpile goal, once reached, ti ir. general maintained throughout tht period. 'See Director cf Intelligence. USAF. footnote tof the DISCUSSION

8

y is

Cont'd!

A POSSIBLE SOVIET QUID ED MISSILE OPERATIONAL ANP PRODUCTION PROGRAM THROUGH lWfl

The program outlined In Ibis table cannot be taken as lhe moat likely or the probable Soviet program. We present lt aiossible program, but one which Is both feasible and reasonable.*

Slcck-plle on!

Status of Stockpile at End of Yea: IS5S 9 iaeo i im ibbj isai

Am-TQ.SURFACE

AS-2 xjnj O0'

150 ttf>

subsonic

AB-3 3 m./' super-tank

A

. I

ss-i

SORPACS-TO-SURFACS. GROUND-LAUNCHED IBALLISTICl

SS-3

300

i.ioo

' nm.

600 O0

Bamarka

edium bomber or *ntl-ahlppicg

Production might not beginortion of stockpile mightAS-l> which could have been available

Replacesvcstcm.

adlum bwnber or antl-shippingair-cratt, noi In addition to those above.

eavy bombers. For strategic against

ill-defended larfets. -

S3 missile units.

For tacticalof ground forces, and for neutralizingQtber tar-gels.

mLuii: units. Ditto

Director of Intelligence. USAF. footnote to Annex A. paragrapha

'The Director of Intelligence. USAF, believe* that the numbers ofS-t,ndissiles shown In this table are excessive. See his footnote to Annex A, paragraph 1.

of its other missiles with non-nuclear warheads. However, it would be highlyand most probable that some percentage of other missiles, particularly surfacc-to-air and shorter range air-to-surface and surface-to-surface missiles, would be provided withwarheads. We are unable to postulate valid percentage allocations, and present thc following only for illustration: ifercent of the fissionable6 were allocated to these other missiles categories,ir-to-surface and surface-to-surface missile warheads could be provided. The desirability of providing larger numbers of these missiles with nuclear warheads is equally apparent, but their competingcould not be met without reducing the amount of fissionable materials allocated to some other part of the program. For example, the scale of the surface-to-air missile program postulated in this Annex Is such that the USSR could notajor portion of these missiles with nuclear warheads, even byall the fissionable material available for weapons.

here are certain factors, however, which tend to offset the stringency of nuclear

USSR could gain some flexibilityby developing Interchangeablecomponents for certain weaponsthese components.

technical advances afterwill probably Increase theiven weight ofand the economy of use ofin Individual weapons.

missile types could be effectivethan nuclear warheads. Moreover,missiles for which we have assumednuclear warheads might formissions achieve acceptableother types of warheads, or couldwarheads of lower yields thanhave assumed for the assessment in

thc possibility cannot bethat the USSR would deliberatelyrestrict Its wartime employment of nuclear

weapons under certain circumstances and in certain areas which it planned to occupy or exploit, In order to cause the minimum amount of physical damage.

Nevertheless, thc USSR would face many difficulties in the allocation of fissionableto Its various weapons systems during this period. It could mitigate theseby phasing the equipping of certainwith nuclear warheadsonger period of time, by producing smallerof certain missiles during the period of the estimate, or by deliberately planning on the extensive use of non-nuclear warheads. We cannot estimate with confidence what the USSR will do in this respect, but we believe It might adopt some combination of these three courses of action.

We have not undertaken to estimate the probable basic Soviet allocation of nuclear materials as between the guided missileand other uses. However, we believe thatlausible basic allocationin this estimate as aboutercent for the missile programthe USSR would be able to equip with nuclear warheads:ery high proportion of the postulatedof missiles for which nuclear warheads would be regarded as essentialhose types named in paragraphf thisnduch smaller proportion of theproduction of selected other missile types.

Chemical Warheads

is no evidence of Sovietof CW warheads for guidedour estimate of Sovietdevelop and produce agents and toproblems of dissemination by guidedleads us to believe that the USSRhad tabun (GA) warheadsave had sarin (GO) warheads bySoviet military interest in CW Isthe extent of their CW organization,issue of chemical defensivethe extent of their trainingfor CW defense, ond the statementslenders. The USSR wouldCW warheads desirable for certain

3tf

purposes: for attack on personnel in the open; for employment against personnel In areas where thc USSR would wish to hold physical destructioninimum; andfor psychological effect.

Warhead Ciajs

b.

Area

q.q. ml.

n the basis of our estimates of Soviet CW agents available, missile warhead weights, and Soviet capability to develop the necessary munitions, we believe the USSR could achieve with OB0 percent casualty effect against unprotected personnel in the open over thc following areas: M

Radius of Effects

t.

estimate that the USSR coulddevelop and employ "V" agentshis date is predicatedsolution of the problem ofproper aerosol for dispersal of thentelligence Indicates that themade substantial progress inalthough no evidence isindicate its application to theof CW agents by guided missiles. Useagents, far more toxic than thenable the USSR to obtain areaapproximately three times as greatshown for the "G" series.

Biological Warheads

We estimate that antipersonnel BW agents which could now be available to the USSR arc brucella, tularense, anthracis, and pestls. The means employed for CW dispersal by guided missiles could also be used lor BW,

Thc use Ol antipersonnel BW agents would be profitable only in situations where delayed casualties are acceptable. Other than this, the advantages of using these agents in guided missile warheads would be generally similar to those of CW. However, greater

quantities of BW agents could beover even wider areas by clandestine delivery and other means than by guided missiles.

estimate that the USSR couldcertain antlcrop and antllivestockcould be used In guided missiles.

III. ECONOMIC IMPUCATIONS OF POSSIBLE PROGRAM

Costing Methods and Limitations

The problem of estimating the costsoviet guided missile programeriod extendingears into the future has many limitations. Because neither the US nor the USSR has had sufficient experience In the production of these new weapons systems, costs calculated at present cannot beas accurate estimates of the actual future costs of producing and operating the guided missile systems postulated. They are, however, adequate for dlstingubhing the economic differences between one missileproposal and another. They are the type of estimates used by the US Inits future missile programs and arein nature and reliability to those which might be used by Soviet planners in making decisions about their own future programs.

In the absence of firm data on Sovietcharacteristics, production methods, and cost of component parts, the program has been costed in dollars, using known orproduction costs for the nearest US counterparts of thc missile systems underAlmost all the data employedplanning costs supplied by the USservices responsible for the various US counterpart missiles. These data have been applied to the stockpile levels and timestipulated Inf this Annex, using analytical procedures consistent with standard weapons systems cost analyses. Ruble costs have baen derived by applying known or estimated ruble-dollar ratios."

determining area coverage, favorabletor agent dissemination are assumed. Soviet GA would be slightly less effective than GB.

"For purposes of analytical convenience, allcosts used ln this estimate are calculated5 dollars: all ruble costs are1 rubles.

39

Because it ts necessary to know theof any bios in the estimated costs of the program, lt was decided that where therehoice of militarily acceptable approaches with differing costs, the one with thc lower cost would be used. This type of choice was made on economic grounds, without further consideration of the relative militaryor vulnerability of the coated system as opposed to others. Other decisions also made the estimated costs somewhat lower than they might actually be. Certain items necessary to the operation of the various guided missile systems have not been included in the cost calculations because they were notexclusively guided missile Items. Among these exclusions are the costs of earlyand ground control intercept systems and the costs of aircraft and naval vessels which carry missiles. The costs of nuclear warheads were not included. Also specifically excluded from the estimated totals are investment in plants and industrial equipment to produce missiles, and expenditures on research and development. All these factors tend to give the over-all estimate of the cost of themissileevere downward bias, and it should be consideredinimum Our best Judgment of the degree of downward bias for Uie Items which werein the costs is that it is not greater thanercent and more likely falls between five andercent.

Cost of Program

he program for the production andemployment of guided missiles, as described in this Annex, wouldarge and costly one. Wc estimate, however, thatrogram is within the economicof the USSR, although it wouldan Increasingly heavy economic alloca-tion through athc program would incur an aggregate cost of about) dollars, or) rubies, duringyear period3he aggregate dollarfor this program is apportioned among broad categories of missiles approximately as follows: total air defense program (including all surface-to-air and air-to-air0

percent; total ground-launchedprogram,ercent; air-to-surfacc2 percent; submarine-launched surface-to-surfaceercent. The ground-launched surface-to-air program would incur by far the largest dollar outlay of any single category, comprising aboutercent of thc total. The ICBM program would comprise about eight percent of the total dollar outlay. (Sec

For purposes of analysis, the aggregate costs of the program have been broken down into broad areas termed "initial investment costs" and "annual operating* InInvestment costs through the periodaboutercent of the aggregate cost of the program, with operating costsaboutercent. (See

The postulated program results in asmooth but rapidly rising cost curve.outlays in dollars riseillion4illionnd then rise sharply toillionith annual expenditures rangingillion for the remainder of the period. Considering thc entire period,f the total dollar outlay would9 and aboutercent0he nature of the economic burden also shifts drastically from investment to operating costs as the period progresses.early seven billionper year are required to operate andthe missile systems which have beenand produced during the period. (See

""initial investment costs" are those one-time costs incurred in producing andarticular missile system. Including mtulles. tn-stallaUona. guidance and special equipment, or-ganlxaUonal equipment. Initial personneland transportation. "Annual operating costs'* are those additional recurring expenses Incurred In the operation and maintenance of the equipment and personnel. Includingof installations and equipment, missiles fired for proficiency and tests, personnel pay. allowances and subsistence, and supportNeither -lniual Investment coils" nor "annual operatlnc co*U" take Into account those excluded costs factors described In paragrapht IHln Annex.

&r-

'id

cost of the missiles themselves Isartial measure of the economicof the missile program. Missiles and spare parts would account forof the dollar outlay for each missilewhile the major part of the outlay would be for associated equipment, facilities, and personnel. Therefore, changes in thestructure and method of deployment described inf this Annex wouldroportionally greater eflect on the total cost of the program than would changes in the size of the missile stockpiles to beThe ICBM program provides aexample of this phenomenon. We havetockpileerowever, if the same stockpile were deployed on the basis of one ICBM per site, the presently estimated cost would be increasedactor of

In conjunction with earlier estimates of Soviet military expendituresresented inf NIEthe effects of thc possible missile program on total Soviet defense spending can be roughly determined. Assuming that the totalexpenditures estimated inould not change, the missile program's share would rise from some two percent4 to aboutercentnd would require some reduction in the nonmissileIf, however, the nonmissileremained as estimated, the addition of this missile program would require Increases in over-all military expenditures, reaching as much asercent

Impact on Electronics industry

the demands of the missilethe Soviet electronics Industry wouldheavy, we estimate that the program is

within the growing capabilities of thatAs indicated in the DISCUSSION, the estimated capacity of the Sovietindustry will probably limit its ability toaried and extensive missileand also meet the competing demands of other Soviet military and essential non-military programs untilheprogram described in this Annex places its heaviest demands upon the electronics industry in the yearsercent of the estimated dollar value of Soviet electronics output would have had to be allocated to the5 andhis allocation would rise toercenthese percentages take into account the large increase in the total value of electronicscalled for in the Sixth Five-Year Plan. Assuming that approximately two-thirds of the dollar value of annual electronics output continues to be allocated to militarythe missile program would require somewhat over half the military electronics allocation

Research and Development Costs

imited data, based on US experience,some measure of the research andcosts which would be Incurredational missile program of the magnitude estimated inf the DISCUSSION. We have not included such costs in ourfigures for the period because we have no basis foroststo the development of those missilewhich would not materialize untils an indication ofosts in the early years, wc estimate that such costs would have climbed from about one billion dollars3eak ofillion

41

PIG DUE 1

Tata! Cos: of Possible M'-ssileH

Dy category of Miasm

Of19S5

1 liubles

-ound-Launched

Shipborne Alr-to-Alr

Sc, Ground-Launched (up toun.)

133

-to-Surf ace, Submarine -Launched

FIGURE 2

Total Investment and Opera Usg Costs of Possible Missiley Category of Missiles

Costs

InitialCosts

(Billions ofollars)

Surface-to-Air,

round-Launched

ur tace-to-Al r.

to and includ-

un.)

acc-to-Surface,

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ANNEX &

SOVIET SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL RESOURCES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF GUIDED MISSILES

BASIC SCIENTIFIC CAPABILITIES

Scientific and Technical Personnel1

J. Tbe rising general level of Soviet technical ability and thc rapidly increasing number of Soviet scientists and engineers provide Uie manpower potential necessary toery extensive guided missile program. Although total Soviet scientific resources remain smaller than those of the US. and assets of the Sino-Soviet Bloc far smaller than those of Uie West, thc USSR has been able to achieve near parity with the US in ureas of critical military and industrial significance. We estimate that tbe USSR as ofadniversity graduates in scientific andfields, of whichereemployed in the physical sciences andIf present trends continue,1 Uie USSR couldraduates employed In Uie physical sciences andWhile we know that in general Uie Soviet scientific effort has been focussedon the buildingtrongbase and the development of modem weapons, to the relative neglect of other fields, we have no firm evidence of the number of Soviet scientists and technicianshc guided missile program.

he quality of Soviet scientific andpersonnel can be measured in Melds other than guided missiles by evidencestriking progress over Uie past lew years In such important fields as nucleargeophysics, high-speed digital computers, high-temperature alloys, and tho theory of automation. In basic research inand in many fields of physics and chemistry, the quality of the Soviet work is Judged to be about equal to that of the US.

'SeeSfl, CftpablUUes and Trends ofScience and

In the missile field Itself, the quality of Soviet personnel is revealed not only by known Soviet successes in developing surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles, but also by indications that8 they were beginning to proceed with native development of missileindependent of German missile experts.

Research Equipment. Although complex research instruments throughout Uie Soviet scientific program are probably in shorterttwa in the US. research and development programs of major importance, such as guided missiles, will probably be hampered only slightly by shortages or nonavailability ofinstruments and equipment.Soviet advances1 in electronics, which Is basic to instrumentation, willpermit the USSR to achieve near equality with the US in research instruments at that time.

Materials. We know of no shortage of basic materials required by the missile development program described In this estimate. Even though our information is practicallyregarding specific application ofto the guided missile program, Uie ability demonstrated by the USSR inunique materials for special application in other programs of complex nature leads us to conclude that materials for missiles willcertainly not be unduly restrictive.

II. AVAILABILITY OF TECHNICALFROM FOREIGN SOURCES

of the Cerman MissileAt the close of World War II thca thorough and systematicof German guided missile personnel,and equipment. They obtainedresults: (a) Uie acquisition ofand prototype nussiles. researchfacilities and equipment, and ap-

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onarn-

erman missile specialists; (b) completed studies of Germanpriorc) che familiarization of Soviet personnel with German techniques of research, development, testing, andof missiles and components; andechnical studies and limited hardware development performed by German scientists. We believe that the Soviet exploitationwas an effort to acquire equipment and techniques in which the USSR had little or no experience.esult of the foregoing exploitation, the Soviet personnel apparentlyhorough and valuable familiarity with the German program, and we believe that8 the USSR had raised the level of its guided missile knowledge to that which had existed in Germany at the close of World War II. The repatriation of thc Germanspecialists began0 and continuedith the exception ofuidance and control specialists, some of whom have recently been repatriated. We believe, because cf the deliberate separation of the Germans from the Soviet nativeprogram, that the German exploitation was utilized primarily for training,comparison, and supplementary

vailability of VSignificant amount of potentially valuable knowledge on guided missiles and earth satellites has been, and is continuing to be, made available to the USSR in the form of unclassified Westernefinitive assessment of its value to the Soviet research and development program cannot be made. We do know,that enough unclassified Information ls available to provide the USSR with aclear and accurate picture of the nature and extent of the US guided missile program. Including relative priorities of systems and categories, developmental status, certaincharacteristics, and time schedules. While we cannot determine the degree ofsuccess in covert collection ofon foreign guided missile developments, we know of numerous instances during the past two years where the USSR has indicated through covert activities an Interest Indata on US missiles, particularly on

air-to-air missiles, and missile electronics. There are no known instances of Sovietcollection systems being specificallyat, or developed for use against, US guided missile installations or facilities,we believe that such surveillance ls well within Soviet capabilities. Soviet Interest In foreign missile programs is further attested by the fact that, in addition to their normal scientific translation and disseminationthe USSR0 began publication of the Journal, "Problems of Rockethis journal, publication of which hasat least toontainsof non-Soviet articles on guided missiles, earth satellites, and related subjects.

III. ORGANIZATION AND CONTROL OF THE SOVIET GUIDED MISSILE PROGRAM

Over-All Coordination and Control

he Soviet missile research andprogram is conducted within theframework of ministerial functions and responsibilities.ver-all supervision and administration of the program wasreported to have been vested in aCommittee of the Council of Ministers, which made policy and planning decisions. There is insufficient evidence to determine whether this Special Committee has been continued to the present. Incientific and Technical Council (NTS) was describedeturned German scientist as the highest technical authority on guidedwith power to review Soviet-Initiated German missile design proposals and towhether they should be continued into the development stage. The membership of the NTS was composed of military personnel, civilian research and development personnel, and scientific personnel from the Academy of Sciences, and was chaired by the Director ofhe principal known guided missile Installation under the Ministry of Defense Industry. Whether the NTS was sat upto direct the German activity or whether it also had an active part in the nativeis not known. Information on theof thc NTS does not exist later

I'

the lack of current intelligenceop authority for the entiremissile program, worogram of such magnitude and complexity would require high-level centralized control. Soviethave speculated that any high-level Soviet missile authority would Includeof the military, the government, and the Party. Thus, such an authority might include representatives of the Ministry ofthe Council of Ministers (including its Academy ofnd the militaryof the Party's Central Committee.this speculation appears reasonable, wc have no direct evidence of the existence of such an authority.

We believe that within those ministriesIn the missile program, coordinating and control groups probably exist at various levels. Por example. It was reliably reported that at least untileventh Chief Directorate existed in the Ministry of Defense Industry, with over-all responsibility forand surface-to-air missile

Organizations, Installations, and Facilities

following summary Includesorganizations, installations, andknown or estimated to be involved Inguided rnissile research andprogram, together with brieftheir known or estimated contributionsprogram:

Council af Ministers

Committee for Guided MissileA knowledgeable Soviet defectoronommittee as It existedA high-level German returnee hasthe existence of such ainformation concerning itss available.

Minfjfry of Defense Industry

Directorate for Guided MissileA high-level German returneehief Directorate existedconcerned with research ond development

of surface-tc-surface and surface-tc-alrNo information existsut the continued existence ofhiefwithin the Ministry of Defenseto control its missile research,and production activity is considered most likely.

Scientific Technical Council (NTS) for Guided MissUe Research and Development: The existencef an NTSwith missile design projects worked on at Scientific Research Institute (Nil)as been reported by German returnees. The known Soviet practice of employing similar technical councils at various levelsDirectorate. Plant, Institute) forin other military fieldsthe beliefissile NTS for theof Defense Industry probably still exists.

The SSaliningrad.lantesearch institute, is believed toajor center for surface-to-surface ballistic missile research and development, an activity in which it was engaged6 to aturface-to-air missile research and development was also conducted at this installation6 to at

f Scientific Research Institute {Nil) 8S, Ostoshkov: This large, well-equipped installation was the major center forof some German guided missilewho were repatriatedfforts were concerned with designof surface-to-surface and surface-to-air mlsslles. Certain key facilities, especially for liquid rocket propulsion research, arc believed to be still engaged in the guided missileand development program.

Planthimki: Center for research and development of large, liquid-fuel rocket engines, staffed in part by Germansesign worke trie-ton thrust engine was conducted here, as well as workmetric-ton thrust engines. This installation Is still active in thc research and development program.

Central Artillery Design Bureau,This Installation is probably theSoviet design bureau for new artillery

W-

IB

In addition to its role inconventional artillery, it Is believed toentral role in thc design of surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles.

IB. Navel Artillery Central Design Bureau, Leningrad: Personnel of this organization were active in the reconstruction of German surface-to-air missiles in Germany. We believe this bureau would be the focal point of any Soviet naval work In missile developments.

Design Bureau {KB)oscow: German technicians were involved in the development of an air-to-surface missile guidance system6 tooviet continuation of this project ats indicated to at leasteginningne group of German specialists worked on aSovie'- project toew triaxial stabilizing system, probablyurface-to-surface missile, and this system was flight tested.0 complete systems wereInnother German group was assignedurface-to-air missile guidance project. Information on thework on this project correlates with the characteristics of the Moscow surface-to-air missile system. German work on this and all classified projects was terminated by thc endhile working atheassisted Soviet work on an air-to-air missile project, and reportedly discussed with Sovieturface-to-surface (shore-tc-ship) missile project.

utilovo: Research andof an air-to-air guided missile (Sokol) was conducted here by German specialists. Unguided solid rocket air-to-air and surface-to-air research andhas also been reported. Thisbelieved still to be active in the guided missile program, is closely associated with thc Sofrino test range which adjoins it.

"DyatloVs"oscow: This Installation Is reported to have conducted native Soviet development of air-to-air missile designs parallel to the German activity atyatloVs Institute is possiblywith

, Krasnogorzk: Research and development activities here have included work on thc German infrared missile homing system, Juno. This Installation has alsoa capability for the repair of clne-thcodolitcs. essential to test range

"KonopleVseningrad: Ain Leningrad, associatedcientist named Konoplev, has reportedly conducted development work on ballistic missilesystems. Konoplev attended NTSat thcomplex. Kaliningrad,, whenO design proposals were reviewed. Konoplev wa3 concerned0 guidance matters.

Niloscow: Numerous awards toof the staff of this instituteapabilily for research and development in the field of solid propellants for rockets and/ or guidedoviet scientist fromemberommission of the Academy of Artillery Sciences which wasto evolve better collotdal gunpowders for rocket artillery.

, Moscow:ermansVuzes at this plant. The equipment used was then shipped to "Pishch-ik'seningrad,apability for continued missile fuze development Is believed still to exist at.

"PishchtM'seningrad:uze assembly equipment was shipped fromo an Installation inassociated with an engineer named Pishchlk. Supplementary Informationthat this installation may be eitherranch of Centralpossibly. Centralndera active In fuzeand development during World War II.

eningrad: Numerous awards to and publications by members of the staff of this instituteapability for research and development in metallurgy applicable to heat transfer problems in combustionor ta warhead re-entry problems. This institute is specifically concerned withresearch, notably In the fields of heat treatment of metals and nonferrous alloys.

OfrB-**

Ministry of Defense

Chtel Artillery Directorate. Moscow: This organization is responsible (or the over-all supervision and coordination of research,and manufacture of artillery and antiaircraft weapons systems for the Soviet armed forces. In its role as polnt-of-contact between the Industrial ministries and theof Defense, the directorate probably serves as the key organization coordinating military requirements and acceptance testing with guided missile research.and development.

Academy of Artillery Sciences, Moscow: The academy was established6 toand promote artillery and ordnanceand development. Its organization Is similar to that of the Academy of Sciences, USSR, and It has an unknown number of associated research institutes. We believe the academy has an advisory role In theof military requirements for guided

Artillery Institute, Bolshevo: Thispossibly subordinate to the Academy of Artillery Sciences, is known to have been concerned with missile guidance and control research and development ineriod. During that period, the institute was associated wtth both Nilnd.

Nil of the Air Forces, Shchelkovo: This Institute is responsible for acceptance testing of all newigh-level defector hasirectorate of this Institute which was responsible for alr-to-alr rockets and. presumably, missiles. In addition, there are indications that the institute hasdevelopmental work on various airborne weapons systems.

Aviation Technical Commission of the Air Forces, Moscow: This commission directs all scientific matters of concern to Soviet air forces research establishments under the Chief Engineer of the air forces. In its role asadviser to the air forces, lt examines all new projects and indicates lines of research on outstanding aeronautical problems. We believe, therefore, that this commissionin the planning of research andfor thoae guided missiles to be used by the air forces.

Forces Engineering Academy im.Moscow: This academy ls thccenter for the training ofengineers in the USSR Severalof the staff have been definitelyguided missile research andnot necessarily in their role asat thc academy.

Academy of Sciences

Interagency Commission forCommunications: This cornmisslon isto be the focal point for research and development pertinent to the Soviet earth satellite program. Key members of the staff arc world-recognized authorities In scientific fields essential to such an activity.

Institute of Automatics andMoscow: This Institute is the Sovietfor fundamental and applied research In the fields of automatic regulation, remotetelemetry, and nonlinear mechanics, and for the development of pneumatic, hydraulic, and electrical servo systems. It has been directly associated with missileevelopment activity atf

Institute of Precision Mechanics andEngineering, Moscow: This instituteenter for theoretical investigation andof electronic digital and analogue computers, and has performed research and development on electrical and mechanicaland network and differentialIn addition, the Institute isfor general theoretical problems ofmechanical and electrical systems.

Institute of Chemical Physics, Moscow: This institute, the center for combustionin the USSR, has conducted much basic research directly applicable to theof both liquid and solid rocketOther work, as Indicated by openpublications, could have been in the theory and development of techniques of shock-tube (hypersonic) experimentation.

nstitute of General and InorganicMoscow: This institute has conducted research in metallurgy, specifically in heat-resistant alloys, applicable to both rocket en-

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TOP SHilCRW

components and warhead materials. Other research has been on oxidants and fuels, particularly on nlttogen-contalning

Institute of Mathematics im. Steklov.This institute ls responsible forresearch in mathematics. It hasproblems In the statistical theory ofMow, which is directly applicable to the development of hypersonic configurations.

Institute of Physics im. Lebedev, Moscow: This institute, in addition to Its work lnand dielectrics, has given particularto the study of the diffusion ofradiation.

Ministry of Aviation Industry

rohydrodynamics Instituteamenskoye: This is the primary Soviet center for aerodynamic research. This institutenown participant in the Soviet guided missile research and developmentSpecifically, it has conducted wind tunnel experiments for

Niloscow: Numerous scientists and engineers who were on the staff of this ins'i-tutc5 have since appeared in keyin guided missile research andcenters. Research and development ln tho field of gas dynamics is believed to be the major activity of the institute.

Flight Test Institute, Ramenskoye: This installation is responsible for all Ministry of Aviation Industry research and development which requires flight testing. It ts believed that the Institute conducts teste of allguided missile weapons systems prior to their submission to the Ministry of Defense

for acceptance testing.

Planterman exploitation centeresearch and development onand possibly surface-to-airwas conducted. In addition, thissupplied NTXith cigar-shapedwings, accelerometers, altimeters,equipment.

Special Designf Plantuy-byshev: Germans at this installationresearch and development on automatic pilots, triaxial gyroscopes,teering mechanisms.ontrol systems were reportedly

Central Scientific Research Institute of Aviation Enginesoscow: Thisis concerned with research andof aircraft engines. ReportedInclude four rocket engine test stands and sections dealing with new engineSupport could be provided ln thcand development of ramjet and pulse-Jet engines.

Central Scientific Research Institute of Aviation Fuels and Lubricantsoscow: We believe this institute wouldto the development of special fuels for cruise-type missiles and also to theof special lubricants and hydraulicfor all types of missiles.

Ministry of Radio-Technical Industry

SSS, Novaya: At this installation.worked on the reconstructionround guidance system,measuring system andequipment for. Aat Monino worked0 onhead project for amissile. Both Soviet and Germanfromere at

oscow: German specialists who visited this installation ineriod have reported that the Tonne televisionguidance system was underefector report covering the8 to9 indicates that the installation may have been moved to Kuntsevo, southwest of Moscow, and transferred to the Ministry of Defense Industry.

Nileningrad: Thiserman exploitation center8he instaUatlon is thc primary Soviet television developmentecret department at Lesnoy reportedly devoted considerable effort

HP-

the development of the Tonne television guidance system (or air-to-sur face missiles.

Unidentified Installation, Odessa: Military personnel from an unidentified Installation in Odessa frequently visited the Secretof Nil 3fl. The Odessa Installationhad received one set of the Tonne equipment. Subordination of thisto the Ministry of Radio Technicalis conjectural.

, Moscow: This installation isto be the major Soviet center for the research and development of radarOn this basis alone, we believe it is possibly involved In the development of radar for missile guidance systems. Theof this installation has not been

, Pryazine: This installation isto be the major Soviet electron tube design center. As such, it is probably involved in the development of missile electronicequipment.

Ministry of Chemical Industry

State Institute of Applied Chemistryeningrad: This installation has conducted research on propellanLs, withon amine compounds for use in hyper-golic fuels. Research on ignition properties of liquid propellants has also been reported. The activities of this installation havethose of tho Karpov Institute.

Physico-Chemical Institute im. Karpov, Moscow: Germans at this installation68 worked on hypergollc rocket fuels and hydrogen peroxide oxidizers. This installation Is believed to be part of aincluding the State Institute of Applied Chemistry,nd the OKA Chemical Plant, all of which have conducted rocket fuel research.

OKA Chemical Plant, Dserzhlnsk:from thc Karpov Institute wereto this Installation8 lo continue their propellantilot plant for hypergolic fuels, developed at the Karpovwas sent to OKA. Certain specialists

employed here were reportedly subordinate to

oscow: Hypergolic fuelsat the Karpov Institute were senttesting. In addition, certain arninesat the Karpov Institute wereput into pilot production here.

Ministry of Machine and Instrument Building

Plant, Moscow:were at this installationhe developmentypeequipment.

Ministry of Heavy Machine Building

Plant, Moscow: Itransporters were underhere. This installation Isto develop such transporters.

Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry

eningrad: This installation has been engaged in the design and limitedof control devices, computers,electronic test equipment, radar, and high-frequency apparatus. Germanworking here developed computers for surface-to-air missiles and worked on gyro-stabilized platforms for inertial guidanceWasserfall computers developed here were tested, possibly at Kapustin Yar,his installation may have become one of the largest Soviet design institutes when It was enlarged

Kuznetsov's Gyroscope Institute, Moscow: This installation appears toentra]for gyroscope research and development. The director, Kuznetsov, was in Germanynd at Kapustin Yarhere was close liaison between this installation and.

Ministry of Higher Education

installations subordinate toalthough properly educationalare believed to conduct limitedresearch at the graduate level.important guided missile specialistsat key installations in the program have

P-

been identified, with thc staffs of certain of these educational Institutions.

Higher Technical School im. Bauman. Moscow: This Institution Is believed to be the "MTT" of the Sovieturbinefort*trie-ton thrust engineatas reportedly sent here for testing

Power Engineering Institute im, Molotov. Moscow: Another large engineering school, this Institution possesses several faculties for subjects pertinent to guided missile research and development.0 conference,presented to the Instrument Building Section of the school were all of possibleinterest. Particularly, thc. Tkachev appeared tolassified version of9 publication on an inertial system for missile guidance based onminute pendulum principle.

State University im, Lomonosov. Moscow: Although there is no direct evidence of guided missile activity at this Institution, several key scientists and engineers of the guided missiie program have been Identified on the faculty.

Known Test Facilities 1

Yar Guided Missileissile testYar is the only Identifiedmissile test range In the USSR.now known to be actively engaged inof surface-to-surface ballisticscale of effort Involved indicates thatYarost Important facility inprogram.

Suspect: Test Facilities *

Test Rangehisadjacent to Design Bureaus known

to have actively supported tho bureau In the past. On thc basis of Its limited size and general location, wc believe the range may be concerned with the developmental testing of surface-to-air guided missiles only.

Barents Sea: There Is some Inconclusive evidence to indicate missile firings in this area. The locationange in this area would be suitable for the shipboard testing of all types of guided missiles assigned to the Soviet Navy and for both environmental and operational testing of other missile types.

acility at Otganown to have received specimens of German naval alr-to-surface missiles following World War6 reportsestricted coastal area in thc Riga vicinity, there is no indication of present missile testing.

Zagorsk: German engineers attatic test facility for large liquid rocket engines andite in this area for its construction. No confirmation of its existence ts available.

Crimea (Blackignals intercepted from the Crimea (Black Sea) area betweenG and6 and In October

re similar to guidance signals of an air-to-surface missile guidance system (Komet) designed at Design Bureauoscow. This comparison appears valid when considered with the report that Germans fromtests of this system in the Crimea at the endesting of surface-to-air missiles ir. the Crimea has also been Indicated by the recent report that the surface-to-air

missile project worked on atas taken

to the Crimea for tests beguinlng In November

further Information, leeLimited distribution under separate cover).

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