CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASEAS SANITIZED
7
SPECIAL
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE CONCERNING SOVIET ICBM FLIGHT TESTS
Submitted by thc DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The following Intelligence organizations participated in theof this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, The Joint Staff, and the Atomic Energy Commission.
Concurred ln by the
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
ononcurring were the Special Assistant,Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff,Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence; tho Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff; and the Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the IAC. The Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of hia
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Copy No.f
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EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE CONCERNING SOVIET ICBM FLIGHT TESTS
CONCLUSIONS
USSR has probably night-tested twoballistic missile (ICBM) vehicles, the firstnd the second
believe the USSR has the capability to perform
supports the Soviet statements concerning ICBM flight tests. We have no evidence as to the range, accuracy, or character oi the vehicles fired, apart from that in the Soviet statements and that which may be inferred fromaulical-mile length of the test range.
DISCUSSION
3. The USSR is known to have flight-tested atallistic missiles to ranges ofautical miles on the Kapustin Yar range sincencluding seven testsange ofautical miles sincend two probable multistage tests ln The USSR has acquired considerable ballisticexperience from this extensive test program, and probably has flight-tested ICBM components. This base of acquiredknowledge and the high probability that the USSR hasa very high priority to the ICBM leads us to estimate that the USSR is now capable of initiating an ICBM flight-test program.
4. Construction activity began inewmissile test range ofautical miles length
between Tyura Tam and Klyuchi (see
this range was approaching ope rational "readiness in the springnd we believe that by7 it could have supported limited missile flight testing.
ince the late springoth Tyura Tam and Klyuchi have been involvedctivity.
_/
ac*
'tivity detected on thc new range was sufficlehtTo indicate that missile flight tests could have occurred-
nhe official Soviet news agency, TASS, stated thatuper long-distance intercontinental multistage ballistic rocket wasew days ago. The
tests of the rocket wereThe rocket flew at a
very high, unprecedented altitude,uge distance
The rocket landed in the targethrushchev told Edouard Daladler in Yalta thateptember he had personally witnessed the second successful trial of an intercontinental missile. While the TASS announcement may have been timed for maximum propaganda effect, past Soviet statements of this type have generally been based on actual performance or assured capability.
Original document.
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