SNIE" January 7
OCCRCT
194
SPECIAL
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUM3ER
SOVIET GROSS CAPABILITIES FOR ATTACK ON THE CONTINENTAL US IN
mttmltted by
irIHU IMELIJGKNCE
by the
The lolioumaee oraami*aitan$e piepaiatum of Ihu eMmata; Tht Centtal intelligence Ageney and Ihe Intelligence irganiialuim of Vie Dvpaitmtnts ol Stale. Ihe Army th*v. tie Airhm Joint Stat!
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m[ ADVISORY COHHFIIMI un li7 I'otuurriHg mmt Mrtaat. InteO-^enee. Depart mi ml elitutatt Chief ot Staff. Inteotaantt.o< the A'->, the Director ol
KaiaJrll.ge: e the
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
THE
I. GENERAL
Soviel
Implications of Soviet Efforts to Achieve Surprise
MAJOR FACTORS AFFECTING SOVIET CAPABILITIES
AGAINST THE CONTINENTAL
II. AVAILABILITY OF MASS DESTRUCTION
Nuclear
Radiological
Biological
Chemical
DELIVERY SYSTEMSAIRCRAFT
Soviet Long-Range
Inflight
Base
Other Factors Affecting Soviet Air
Weather
Navigation
Electronic
Evasion of US
Crew Training and
Bombing
DELIVERY SYSTEMSGUIDED MISSILES
Submarine-Launched
Intercontinental Ballistic
Air-Launched
-
t B
I
Page
V. WEAPONS DELIVERY SYSTEMSOTHER FORCES
Airborne.and Amphibious
Naval
PROBABLE SOVIET GROSS CAPABILITIES
AGAINST THE CONTINENTAL
Methods of
VI. ATTACKS BY
Base Areas .
Scale of Pre-strike
Assumptions Underlying Estimated Intercontinental
Striking
Maximum Strike Forces for Air Attack in
Allocation to ECM and Diversionary Tasks
VII ATTACKS BY GUIDED
Submarine-Launched
Intercontinental Ballistic
Air-Launched
Vm. CLANDESTINE
Clandestine Delivery of Nuclear
Clandestine Use of BW and CW
Conventional
Annex A: Base Areas Suitable for Long-Range Bomber Operations
B: Maps and Summary
C: Estimated Performance Characteristics of Soviet Long-
Range
D: Estimated Base Capacity for Staging Long-Range
Bombers (Limited Distribution Under Separate Cover)
APPROVED FOR RELEASE CIAHISTOWCia-nEVIEWrlWGRW
SOVIET GROSS CAPABILITIES FOR ATTACK ON THE CONTINENTAL US IN
THE PROBLEM
To estimate Soviet gross capabilities for attack on the continental United States as of
SCOPE
This estimate is madepecial, limited purpose,irect contributiontudy of Soviet net capabilities to attack the continental United States during the initial, nuclear phaseeneral war occurring inor this purpose. Sov-.et initiation of general waruclear attack on the continental US isMoreover, this estimate does not set forth the maximum capabilities which the USSR could acquire if itate for attack well in advance and determined to maximize its capabilities for such an attack. The estimate is not intended toall the aspectseneral war. In particular, it does not estimate the extent to which the scale of attack on the continental US would be reduced by theof Soviet resources to attack on targets in other areas. Similarly, although reference is made to thc suitability of various methods of attack in relation to the achievement of surprise, no estimate Is made of thc precise extent to which the scale of attack might be reduced if the USSR attempted to achieve surprise.5
Because of its limited scope and special purpose, this estimate ispecial National Intelligence Estimate for specially limited distribution.
FOREWORD
The problem of estimating Soviet capabilities three years or more in the future cannot be treated exclusively in terms of present indications of how theseare developing. Current evidence is incomplete and sometimes even fragmen-
term "iron capabilities" aa used Ln thu estimate means the maximum scale of alloc* by lhe forces estimated to be available in mld-lDCO. taklne; Inlo account operational factor* but notcombat attrition. This estimate does not set forUi the maximum capabilities which the USSR could acquire If Itale for attack well in advance and determined to maxJmite IU capabilities for auch an attack.
discussion oi considerations bearing on the achievement of surprise, see. and the forthcoming. -Probable Intelligence Warnlncoviel Attack on the US through
Moreover, this estimate is more than usually difficult in that its terminal date approximates the estimated date of emergenceajor Soviet threat in the guided missile field. For these reasons, we are obliged to make our estimate ofcapabilities not only on the evidence at hand but also on the basis of judgments of how Soviet leaders may assess their future general requirements.
The judgments which underlie our estimate of Soviet gross capabilities inre; (a) that throughout the period of this estimate thc Soviet rulers will regard it as mandatory to strengthen their capabilities to attack the continental US, but that they will not do so with the intention deliberately to initiate general war at any specific date, (b) that while the Soviet rulers will consider that they will acquire increasing guided missile capabilities throughout the period, they must rely primarily on aircraft carrying nuclear weapons for long range attacks; and,(c) that the Soviet rulers willubstantial effort to the production ol heavy bombers. *
Special Assistant, Intelligence. Department or State, the Assistant Chief of Suit. Intelligence, Department ot the Army, the Deputy Director (or Intelligence. The Joint Staff, and the Director of Naval Intelligence, believe the following paragraph should be added to the FOREWORD:
While we believe these judgments provide the best bails for estimating Soviet gnus capabilities in mid-lSM. the USSR might decide to devote less effort to its heavy bomber program than we have estimated Hence, we feel ft necessary to emphasise that the -rou capabilities described in this paper are those which the USSR would have with the force; which we believeikely to acquire bybutcannoi say with confidence that these arr the capabilities which It Kill have at that date.
CONCLUSIONS
Capabilities for Air Attack. Wethat inhe USSR would place chief reliance in attacks on theUS upon aircraft carryingweapons. Inhe USSR will probably haveong-range bombers In operational units, includingADGER Jet mediumISON Jet heavy bombers,EAR turboprop heavyt will probably haveubstantial inflight refueling capability. Its most powerful nuclear bombs could have yields
Assistant Chief of Start. lutclllecnc*.of the Army, believes ll unlikelyore* ol Uils magnitude and composition will be developed. Set his footnotes tof the DISCUSSION.
of at leastT. Moreover, byhe capacity of the forward base areas could have been increasedto stage simultaneously the entire long-range bomber and tanker forcefor that date. (Paras.
B. Maximum Air Strikender the circumstances outlined above, the USSR inould launch from its forward basesissionin an initial attack,ISONSEARS on two-way un-
The AssHtanl Chief of Stall. Intelligence. De-paVtlMBl or the Army, does not concur In thcstrike capabilities estimated inB and C. See his footnotes to paragraphsf the DISCUSSION.
SRCR-B*
ISONS on two-way refueled missions,on one-way missions. Of these aircraft,ould arrive inareas, not considering combat losses.)
the USSR elect toheavy bombers in an initialforward bases,ouldof whichouldin target areas. If heavylaunched from home bases, thelaunched and arriving incould be,
Missile Attack.from submarinesbe used in coordination withstrikes by aircraft. InUSSR may have available aboutequipped to launchincluding about eightsubmarines. Their missilescarry high-yield nuclearat supersonic speeds to. We believe that thedate by which the USSRa limited number of intercontinental
ballistic missiles (ICBM) available for operational use isf available, ICBMs would almost certainly be used to augment attacks by manned aircraft. Mission aircraft could employ supersonic air-to-surface missiles of. range to deliver high-yield nuclear warheads against selected targets.)
E. Clandestine Attack. The clandestine delivery of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction might also bebut we estimate that this form ofwould probably be employed onlyew selected targets. Sabotage of certain key installations might occur concurrently with or immediatelythe initial Soviet attacks.)
P. The Surprise Factor. The USSR would have to consider the advantages of the maximum chance of surprise as against the maximum weight of attack. An all-out effort to maximize the chance ofsurprise would force the USSR to limit the size and type of effort it employed in initial attacks. (Paras.
DISCUSSION
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS Soviet Objectives
n conducting attacks against theUS. the USSR would probably have the following major military objectives:
a. To destroy or neutralize US capabilities for nuclear retaliation;O deliver attacks on US militaryforces, and communications in order to prevent effective operational deployment of US military forces; and
c. To deliver attacks on urban, industrial, political, and psychological targets in the US In order to reduce to the maximum extent practicable the mobilization of US military and industrial strengths.
Implications of Soviel Efforts to Achieve Surprise
aximum Soviet attack on theUS, involving utilization of all or most of the capabilities discussed in this estimate.
would require such substantial preparations as almost certainly to result In the loss of surprise. If, however, the USSR attempted to attack without warning It would probably be forced to accept major restrictions with respect to substantial mobilization,or unusual movement of Soviethus, the USSR would have to consider the advantages of the maximum chance ofas against the maximum weight of attack.
n planning initial attacks on continental US targets, the timing and strength of the Soviet effort would be determined largely by recognition of the need for neutralizing thc most immediate threat to Soviet securitya nuclear attack by US forces and Allied forces, wherever disposed. The Soviet timetable
would almost certainly call for virtuallyassaults on other target systems.ince Soviet attacks on the continental US would be tantamount to general war, the USSR would have to prepare at the same time to commit military forces againsiand areas overseas. While Sovietfor attacking overseas bases, forces, and areas are outside the scope of thisit is pertinent that Soviet requirements for such attacks would not only affect the size and weight of the forces the USSR would actually commit against the continental US, but also the degree to which surprise could be achieved In attacking the continental US. In mid-IS so. the USSR probably could not count upon being able to achieve surprise against both the continental US and US and Allied bases and forces elsewhere.
MAJOR FACTORS AFFECTING SOVIET CAPABILITIES AGAINST THE CONTINENTAL US
AVAILABILITY OF MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS
Nuclear Weapons*
USSR is continuing to give highto the development and productionweapons. We estimate that thenow have nuclear bombsT toT. We alsothat, the USSR couldthe yield of its most powerfulto at leastT. and byfurther increase the economy of usematerials in these very In addition, warheads with yields
2Jcould be provided for use In submarine-launched surface-to-surface missiles and in air-to-surface missiles, and for use In ICBMs as they become available. (For the yields of
evidence is inadequate tocalculation of the probable Sovietnuclear weapons of various types and yields.
Within the limits of nuclear weaponsand of fissionable materialsthe actual stockpile developed during the period of this estimate will be determined by Soviet military requirements, as currently visualized by Soviet planners and as revised during the period.'
adiological Warfare. During the period of this estimate, It is most unlikely that the USSR will be able to stockpile militarilyquantities of radioactive materials for use In radiological warfare weapons.the USSR will possess nuclear weapons
'For extended discussion of the problem ofsurprise, see NIEProbableWarning of Soviel Attack on the USS. ThU paper will be superseded bv the forthcoming. covering the period through
' For details, see NIE"Thc Soviet Atomic Energy4 <Umltedhis paper will be superseded ln earlyby
'Arbitrary fuiure stockpiles based on various assumptions arc presented In.
capable of producing widespread radioactive [all-out. and these weapons could be usedfor that purpose.
Biological Warfare
elatively little is known "about the nature and magnitude of the Soviet BW program, particularly its offensive aspects. However, accumulated evidence shows that the USSR almost certainly has an active BW research and development program encompassingantllivestock, and possibly anti-crop agents. The causative organisms of at least four human diseases (anthrax,plague, brucellosis) and of two animal diseases (foot-and-mouth disease,are believed to be under consideration as BW agents.
9 Basedeneral appreciation of Soviet capabilities in this field, we estimate that inhe USSR could be prepared toBW agents both covertly andThe USSR already has the capability for clandestine BW attack against personnel in buildings or concentrated in relatively small areas, and for such attack against livestock and certain crops. The small amounts of BW agents required could be introduced into the US clandestinely or. In some cases, produced near thc sites of their planned employment. They could be employed by saboteurside variety of disseminating devices, some of which could be procured locally. Wc believe covert BW attack could be highly effective against livestock and moderately effective against humans and crops With regard to overt delivery, relatively large quantities of BW agents would probably be required.capabilities for this means of attack would therefore be limited by the Infeasibility of stockpiling large quantities of most BW agents in prolonged storage.
Chemical Warfare
he USSRell-established CWand development program, which we believe emphasizes the development or nerve agents In addition to agents of thc tabun and sarin types, the USSR is believed to be working on the more persistent, extremely
lethal nerve agents of the "V" series as well as agents having psychogeniche Soviet stockpile of standard CW agents, in bulk and in munitions, isto haveetric tons at the end of World War II. Although there is no direct evidence that the USSR Isengaged in large-scale production of CWtockpileimilar magnitude probably represents the minimum which the USSR maintains In peacetime. Losses caused by deterioration and in reloading into newer munitlons in the intervening period havebeen made up with nerve gases.he Soviet CW stockpile will probably consist mainly of nerve gases. Including limitedofgents.
e have no firm evidence of Soviet CW munitions development since World War II. when the USSR had munitions suitable for delivery by both ground weapons and aircraft flying at speeds up tonots. Thc USSR Is probably developing spray tanks, bombs, and unfuzed containers for use by higher speed aircraft. We believe the USSR Is technically capable of modifying its present bomb and warhead designs to permit the delivery of CW agents by Jet aircraft and by certain guided missiles.
III. WEAPONS DELIVERY SYSTEAAS-AIRCRAFT
Soviet Long-Rangesoviet Long-Range Aviation is estimated to hive been composed ofomber regiments with an actual strengthomber aircraft inunits:ULL pistonADGER Jet medium bombers.et heavy bombers, andEAR turbo-piop heavy bombers.* We have no evidence
-Tlie Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence.of the Army, dots not believe that the urailable evidence warrants the above estimate ol the number of DULL, the total number of. or the num-bti of regiments <SU. in Soviet Lonc-nange Aviation.
or any tanker aircraft in operational units at present.'" AH Long-Range Aviation units are based in the European USSR except the Third Long-Range Air Army, which is in the Soviet Far East and has an estimated actual strengthULLS andADGERS.
We estimate that inoviet Long-Range Aviation will probably compriseomber regimentsanker force possibly equivalent toegiments."The bomber force will probably consist ofISONS,vidence in support of this estimate is found in: (a) the rapidIn the number of Long-Range Aviation regiments fromn6 tonb) the trend towardof BULLS by more modern aircraftc) the apparent intent to buildeavy bomber force implicit in theof BISON and BEAR aircraft and their introduction into operational units, now in an early stage; and (d) current indications of the development of an inflight refueling capability.
The foregoing estimate of the size and composition of Soviet Long-Range Aviation
iscussion or tanker strength will be found In.
"The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence. Dc-par.ment of the Army, does not concur In the numbers of regiments shown In this sentence. While some tanker regiments or their equivalent in smaller units will probably be Included In Soviet Long-Range Aviation byhere ispinion no adequate evidence tothat the total of bomber and tanker regiments will be In excess of previouslybomber regiments. Some or all of the bomber regiments which may have been formed in addition to theeld asay be desUncd to become tanker regiments. In this case, many of the tanker regiments estimated to be In existence Inould be included6 regiment level. It would not seem justifiable Io estimate an additional J5 regiments, over and above recent increases which may represent the Initial phases of tbe formation of tanker regiments.
"The Assistant Chiel of Staff. Intelligence.of the Army, floes not concurhc estimate of theeavy bomber0 BISONEAR) presented In this
is subject to all the uncertainties implicitny estimateituation to be expected three years in the future. However, it isnot only with the considerationsIn the preceding paragraph, but also with estimated Soviet strategic requirements for high-performance, long-range bombers In the event of general war, includingfor nuclear air attack on thcUS. It is also within estimated Sovietproduction capabilities, although the proportion of aircraft production facilitiesto heavy bomber production would have to be increased. We believe It unlikely that the USSR will curtail its heavy bomber force at least until it has achieved aoperational capability with anballistic missile. apability almost certainly will not be achieved during the period of this estimate.
oviet Long-Range Aviation will probably continue with Its present aircraft types throughout the period. An improved model of the BISON is probably now becomingand Improved versions of both the BEAR
sentence. The presently6 force level ofISON would have to be increased at an average rate of more thaner month to achieve this level while present evidence indicates thai production is continuing at about two to three ptrate which has remained roughly constant for some time. Achievement of the above force level would require that additional facilities presentlyoUicr aircraft would have to be devoted to BISON production in the near future and that all factories achieve optimum or near optimum production rates. An increase In therate of BEAR aircraft would alia have to be achieved sinco continuaUon of the present production rale would not achieve this rorce level. While it is possible that some increase in production may be planned andore realistic estimate of theeavy bomber force level should be somewhat lower. To properly rencct thc uncertainties inherent in this estimate Heavy bomber slrencth should be statedracket betweenenceontinuation or present production would achieve and the optimum force level shown inracket would indicate the followingeavy bomber force level:
BISON:
BEAR : 0
fO P
the BADGER will probably appear" At current rates of introduction into operational units. Long-Range Aviation will have achieved its full estimated complement of BADGERS byontinuedat present rates could provide anreserve of BADGERS by the end of the period. BULLS will probably have beenphased out of long-range bomber units byerviceable BULLS surplus to the needs of Long-Range Aviation will be available for some timeariety of uses.
Inflight Refueling
e now have good evidence that the USSR is developing an inflight refueling system, and wc believe that during the period of thisit willubstantial Inflightcapability. Soviet planners have al-most certainly recognized the potentiality of Inflight refueling to overcome to some extent the geographic disadvantage they face in the application of their strategic air power against the continental US. On the basis ofspeed and altitude capabilities of Soviet long-range aircraft, and of their comparative capabilities to reach US targets on refueled and unrefueled missions from Soviet bases, we believe Soviet planners will seek toefueling capability primarily for BISONOne refuelingompatibleu could approximately double the area of the continental US that could be reached by an improved BISONwo-way mission from Chukotski. The BEAR'S greater combat radius would make rerueling less essential to its operations, although its capabilities to reach targets in continental US from interior Soviet bases could be increased substantially by this means. Refueling would increase BADGER capabilities to reach targets in the
"For estimated performance charaetertsUe oflong-ranee bombers, see Annex C.
used in this estimate, "compatible" means having characteristics of speed and altitude suitable to the bomber employed,ransfer capability sufficient to addercent to the ranee of the rerueted bomber.
"For refueled ond unrefueled coverage otUS. sec Anne*aps and Summary Charts.
continental US, but against most targets would still not make two-way
We therefore believe that during the period of this estimate the USSR's chieffor tanker aircraft would stem from the desirability of refueling anumber of its BISONS. To provideflexible supportorceISON bombers,ompatiblewould be required. To meet thisthe USSR could employ one or aof the following alternatives:ISON tankers; (b) produce BEAR(c) develop andew heavydesigned specificallyanker.and BEARS could be used astanker-bombers by employing bomb-bay tanks, but such tankers would not be fully compatible insofar as range extension is
We know of no tanker production orin operational units in the USSR atByhe USSR couldeavy tankers as weltomber force of the size estimated inin order to do so. it would In the near future have either to increase production rates at faculties which we estimate will be in the heavy bomber program, or to open additional production facilities. We doubt that the USSR will produce as' manyeavy tankers during the period of thisin view of the probability that the bomber program will have priority over the tanker program, and the fact that to produce the estimated number of heavy bombers will itself require an early increase In theallocated to the heavy bomber production program (see
"The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence.of the Army, considers that aircraft producUon program* In the USSR are probably geared lo the achievement of an Inflightcapability compaUble wiUi Its bomber forcend lhat the requirement for lanlcers is oneumber of factors which would militate asaiiKt Ihe productionomber forceISONSEARS asIn pai-ag'-iph '* The size of the lanV.er force, therefore, is subject lo the same elements o( uncertainly which attend bomber strength isee Ills footnote to paragraph Ml.
for
we estimate that inUSSR will be building toward, butnot haveorce oftankers. We believe that, withoutwith currently estimatedproduction programs, theorce ofThis could be accomplished bythe production of BEAR typeexisting facilities."
(See footnote,
USSR couldADGERforce as an interim measure, for theof Increasing the range of somefor which compatible tankersavailable. RefuelingADGERcould increase the radiusnd the range by somealthough the net gain inany particular operation would bethe route flown and refueling pointIn addition, BADGER tankersemployed as compatible tankers forbombers.
Base Areas
estimate that there areairfields in the Sino-Soviet Blocsurfaced runwayseet They are distributed as follows:
(Minimum Runway Length (feet)
Total
USSR 9
2
Commu-
Countries
iven standardc estimate take-off distances for Soviet long-rangeas follows:
"Normal take-off technique and take-off engine power, no wind, sea level elevaUon. temperatureegreespermanent surfaced runway.round run requirements forof let bombers would be aboutercent less than under standard conditions. Ground run requlremenU for propeller-driven bombers would also be reduced, but the difference would not be as great as for Jet bombers.
Take-off WelEht Type (lbs.)
Run (ft.)
Run lo. Obstacle (ft.)
(modified)
(Improved) 3flS,CO0
(Improved)
data available
are approximatelyirfields In the USSR believed to be home bases forLong-Range Aviation bomber units, three In the Far East, and the remainder in the European USSR. Inumber of airfields associated with command and/or training units, factory production andand testing and development are In effect an integral part of the base structure of Soviet Long-Range Aviation. As Indicated by the table inany other airfields in the Sino-Soviet Bloc have runways suitable for medium bomber operations and some have runways suitable for heavy bombers. These airfields could be used as auxiliary airfields to Insure maximum aircraft dispersal away from home bases, but the actual designation of such auxiliary fields within the Soviet Long-Range Aviation base structure cannot bePhysical limitations on dispersal, and probable requirements for limiting ground stayinimum, would make dispersal and revetment at forward staging bases in the Arctic unlikely.
We estimate that Soviet planners are now developing air facilities to meet theirrequirements for the nextears or more. Progressive extension of runways at Long-Range Aviation home basesoot lengthseet or more is believed to be under way. In the case of new runway construction at bases, it isthat weight-bearing capacities aremade adequate for heavy bombers of all types programmed, and that runway lengths will generally0 feet.
9
of the range limitations ofSoviet bombers, the launching ofthe continental US at presentinvolve staging through one orfive base areas within the USSRthePeninsula, the KamchatkaCentral Arctic area, the Kolathc Leningrad area. (If overflightwere to be avoided in anfromog-leg routeKola area would beorof this estimate, these fiveareas are designated "forward"In each of these areas, airfieldsfor long-range bombers exist,Leningrad area Is the only one ofnow occupied by units ofBases in East Germany andalso be used, but because of thethat surprise would be sacrificed byof overflying West Europe, asthe lower security of preparations inand vulnerability to NATOarea would notikely choice forinitial strikes against thc continental US.
base development over the pastin the forward base areas hascapability of these areas forbomber staging operations.Kamchatka, Kola, Chukotski, andareas, there are nowirfieldslong enough tonformation isconcerning load-bearing capacity,servicing, maintenance, storage, andfacilities at almost all of thesewc estimate thatould stageor heavy bombers, andtage medium bombers. Inare at leastirfields Ln thecapable of staging medium bombers,three are present home bases ofAviation, capable of staging In summary, we estimate that, for
*the latter in limitedunder separate coverl cover air facilities, weather conditions, and airfield capacities in these base areas.
"In addition, there are eight airfields whosecharacteristicsarginalfor long-range bomber operations.
purposes of Long-Range Aviation operations against the continental US, there arein the five forward base areasirfields capable of staging medium bombers, of whichre also capable of staging heavy bombers.
There are indications that airfieldIn the forward base areas isand it is within Soviet capabilities to have developed adequate facilities forlong-range bomber operations in any of these arease believe thatare being developed with length,and weight-bearing standards similar to those at Soviet Long-Range Aviation home bases. We estimate thatith the construction facilities and personnel now in the area concerned, three new airfieldsfor heavy bomber staging operations could be developed in the Kola area, three in the Leningrad area, and two each in theCentral Arctic, and Kamchatka areas. Improvement of support facilities at existing potential staging bases in these areas could be carried out concurrently without major interference with the construction effort.
In each of the forward areas there are bases, in addition to those consideredfor staging long-range bombers, which could be utilized for the fighter aircraft which the USSR would also require In anyconducted from these areas. In certain forward areas there areew suchbases at present. If necessary, byhe USSR could provide additionalfor fighter protection of its long-range bomber staging bases, and for surface-to-air missile defenses.
Olher Foctors Affecting Soviet Air Operations
The USSR is nothave developed long-rangeas such. It is possible thatinterval between now andmploying existing long-rangemight buildattern ofthe early warning lines of thccontinent, not only tolocation, capabilities, andbut also to increase the problem of rccog-
T-or t
nizing thc approach of an actual attack. It is unlikely that the USSR would jeopardize surprise by unusual reconnaissance activity immediately preceding an actual attack.
Weather Forecasting. The USSR has for years devoted considerable effort,igh degree of success, to both short-period and long-period meteorological forecasting. We believe that It has the forecasting capability to support long-range air operations. This capability plus extensive experience inresearch in the extreme northern latitudes, weather reporting facilities inand on ice floes In the Central Arctic basin, and constant access to regularlyNorth American weather reports and forecasts should enable the USSR to predict both route and target weather with reasonable accuracy.
Navigation Aids. The USSR has available through open sources virtually completeand navigation data on North America and its approach routes. It is probable that In the eventurprise attack certainelectronic navigational aids would be available during at least part of the flight. For example, meteorological reports arebroadcast In the United States andIt is also possible that clandestinely-placed navigational beacons might be used for aircraft homing. We estimate that Soviet navigational radar equipment is capable of better performance than the US Worldquipment which the USSR acquired.
Electronic Countermeasures (ECM)
a. Soviet Offensive Capabilities. Soviet ECM development is rapidly approaching, If it has not already reached, the point at which ECM willajor threat to US air defense capabilities. Within the past year or so the USSR has entered actively Intotechniques for the tactical employment ot CHAFF. We have evidence that CHAFF has been used In training exercises against Soviet ground-based radars, and we estimate that CHAFF would be widely usedoviet air attack. In addition; we estimate that Soviet capabilities for.airborne jamming of both communications facilities and radar will materially increase during the period. The
USSR has conducted some jamming training exercises against Its own airborne radars, and we believe that active airborne jamming would be used against US radar, communications, and navigation facilities in the event of Soviet attacks inowever, even0 Soviet active airborne jammers for use against radars at frequencies aboveand wUI probably be limited In quantity. We have no evidence of Soviet use of decoys, or of the modification of aircraft specifically for ECM use, although we consider both to be within Soviet capabilities.
b. Vulnerabilities. The concentration of all known Soviet blind-bombing and AI radars in the narrow frequencyncreases the vulnerability of thisto ECM. The circuits of the only Soviet microwave radar studied In detail, the ship-borne NEPTUNE, indicate that It is vulnerable to ECM and Interference. Although suchmay not extend to all airborne radars, it probably applies to at least some earlier sets, especially the MUSHROOM.ECM receivers and radiation control are probably in use as antl-ECM techniques at present, but we believe the vulnerabilitiesabove will continue to exist for some time. However, Soviet airborne radar will eventually employ greater frequencyand antijamming techniques employing the switch-tuning of magnetrons andto effect rapid changes in frequency may be under development.
Evasion of US Radar. The USSR almost certainly knows at least the generalof US early warning radar equipment, coverage provided by the network, and weak and strong points of the system. With such knowledge it might expect that properly planned attacks could reduce the chance of detection by US radar. However, the use of some evasion techniques, particularly low altitude penetration, would require acceptance of reduced range or bomb load.
Crew Training and Proficiency. Flight training for Long-Range Aviation crews has increased In both intensity and scope during the past five years, especiallyhen jet bombers began to be Introduced into the
OT-
bomber force. At present, wethat long-range bomber crews average atours of flying time per month. The regular training program emphasizes the attainment of navigational and bombingduring the hours of darkness and In bad5 manuai for SovietIndicates that they areto achieve proficiency in the use of magnetic compass, pilotage, radio, celestial, and radar navigation techniques. They also probably receive extensive training ln theof ground-based electronic navigation aids, such as Shoran, dlrecUon-fuiding and distance-measuring equipment, andnavigation systems. We estimate that the capabilities of Long-Range Aviation crews for landing and take-off under instrument flight conditions compare favorably with those achieved in the USAF.
The current trend in Long-Range Aviation training is believed to be toward larger-scale operations and longer-range flights out of home base areas, Including bomber operations Inlo and over the Arctic areas as well asatlacks on major Soviet cities. Lastarge-scale temporary deployment of medium and heavy bombers wasconducted into the Satellites, probably to test the capabilities of the units involved lo slage into and operate from forward areas. Considerable over-water flying has beenduring the past five years.
The current state of training in Soviet Long-Range Aviation leads us to estimate that at present the mounting of an initial attack against the continental US utilizing the bulk of the long-range bomber force would require several months of intensivetraining.educed scale of attack, still sufficient toevastating blow upon the US, could currently be mountedinimum of pro-strike preparatory activity. The current training program points to continuing improvement in air crewMoreover, past Soviet personnel practices, which insure relatively littlein personnel over the years, indicate that Improvements In proficiency will beduring the period ol this estimate.
Therefore, the over-ail proficiency of Long-Range Aviation crews will almost certainly be much higher by
ombing Accuracy, Byosl Soviet long-range bomber crews will probably have achieved the following levels of bombing proficiency:
AlUtude (IU
Bombing
CF-P
fft.1
Bombing CEP (ft.)
targets
-denned target*
IV. WEAPONS DELIVERY SYSTEMS -GUIDED MISSILES :i
e have no firm evidence that the USSR now has any offensive guided missilesfor operational employment against the continental US, although we believe thatof missiles launched from aircraft or submarines is within present SovietWe estimate that for some timearticular missile system becomesits system reliability" will probably beercent.0 theof earlier Soviet missile systems willcertainly have been unproved. Inhe USSR will probably have operational stockpiles of several types of missiles with nuclear warheads suitable for launching from submarines or aircraft In an attack on the continental US.
etailed study lee the forthcoming. "Soviet Guided Missile Capabilities and Probable Programs "
reUabiUty refers to the percentage of missiles which will function according lo specl-ncaUons from the launching area to detonaUon In Ihe target area.
12
Missiles
estimate that any ol the presentsubmarine types could becarry one to two guided missiles inThe USSR could constructsubmarines orabout the slie of the presentto accommodate internally fourof the size and weight of the Regulus I.
estimate that Soviet turbojettheype could have beenfor launching from submarinesThese missiles could haveigh subsonicupersonic version Low-yield nuclearbe employed at present andbeginning. Atwith radar trade-radio commanda CEP. could be achieveda guidance submarine withinof the target,EPachieveduidance submarine upn.m. from the target, assumingof the submarine. EP. couldat maximum missile range byan inertial guidance systemby radar map-matching. Dythe USSR could have. turbojet missiles to equipof missile-launching submarinesin We do notthe USSR is capable of developingadvanced submarine-launchedsystems, such as aduring the period of this estimate.
Intercontinental Ballistic Missilese estimate that at some time In thehe USSR could achieve an initial operational capability with an ICBM. maximumigh-yield nuclear warhead,EPe believe that the high priority the USSR would almost certainly assign to this missile system would dictate equipping the firstunit with prototype weaponswith the decision to Initiate series production. If the USSR succeeded in achiev-
ing an initial operational capability at the earliest timehe beginning ofimendinitialed series production, we believe that Int couldtockpile of up toCBMs.
Air-Launched Missiles
he USSR is now technically capable of attacking targets with rocket-propelled glide bombs of. maximum range, launched from long-range aircraft and fitted with low-yield nuclear warheads. We estimate that alr-to-surface missUes capable of carrying nuclear warheadsaximum range of. could be placed In operation asubsonic interim versionupersonic version This missile would probably be equipped with semiacttve homing guidance, andEP ofeet against ships or other well-defined radar targets. Beginning. high-yield nuclear warheads could be employed. Byhe USSR couldufficient number of supersonic alr-to-surface missiles of. range to meet the requirements of the attack described In
V. WEAPONS DELIVERY SYSTEMSOTHER FORCES
Airborne and Amphibious Forces
USSR has considerable airborneforces which could be usedcertain US overseas bases andcapabilities for both these types ofare Insufficient to make them acontinental US.
Naval Forces
USSR's large surface navalaircraft carriers. Is unsultednaval operations on anyscale. On the other hand, theincreasing Soviet submarine force Isof carrying out large-scale operationsUS coasts. However, only thosecapable of launching guidedattack targets within the Although the evidence pointing to the
13
ol Soviet guided missile submarines Ls not conclusive, we believe that the USSR intends to produce submarines of this type during the period. However, we have noto indicate how many it plans toor convert bye estimate that the USSR could now have aboutuided missile submarines, all of which would probably be converted boats with topsideWe believe that byhe USSR may have an additionaluided missile submarines with internal stowage, of which about eight could be nuclear-powered.
lthough we have no firm evidence that the USSRuclear-powered submarine, there is reason to believerogram for development ofubmarine has reached an advanced stage. The state of power reactor developments in the USSR is such that an atomic submarine could be in operation welle estimate that byhe USSR could have up totomic reactors installed in submarines if it is willing toelatively simple, standardized design. If
emphasis were placed on Improving designs, it is probable that no more than five atomic reactors for submarines would be builtthe period. Nuclear-powered submarines would probably be capable of surfaced and submerged speeds of aboutndnots respectively, submerged endurance ofays or more, and cruising ranges at full speed in excess0 nautical miles.
he capability of the Soviet submarine force will probably be improvedimited modernization of older types. Including the installation of snorkel- Intelligenceumber of other factors essential to the development of an effective submarine force, such as mobile and permanent logistical support and the operating efficiency of the force, which Ls probably still inferior to that of US and German forces in World War II. There is, however, evidence of Increased long-range patrolling activity, and intensified training of this and other types will probably raise performance standards during the period of this estimate.
PROBABLE SOVIET GROSS CAPABILITIES AGAINST THE CONTINENTAL US
of Attack
e believe that inhe USSR would place chief reliance in attacks on the continental US upon aircraft carrying nuclear weapons. ICBMs, if available inould almost certainly be used to augment attacks by manned aircraft, but not to replace any mission aircraft. Missiles launched from Submarines probably would be used Inwith nuclear strikes by aircraft.delivery of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction might also be attempted, but we estimate that this form of attack would probably be employed onlyew selected targets. Sabotage of certain key installations might occur concurrently with or immediately following the initial attacks.
VI. ATTACKS BY AIRCRAFT
resent Soviet capabilities for air attack on the continental US are restricted by the relatively small numbers of operational heavy bombers, the limited availability of megaton-ykld nuclear weapons, the status of support facilities at Arctic bases, and thc probable lackubstantial inflight refuelingImproved aircrew proficiency, further Improvement of Arctic bases, developmentubstantial operational inflight refueling capability, and production of larger numbers of megaton-yield weapons and heavy bombers, all of which we believe will be realized, would resultonsiderable Increase In Soviet capabilities for attack on the continental US by
14
the early part ot the period of this estimate, the BULL and the BADGER would be the principal aircraft available for attack on the continental US. In the latter part of the period, the USSR would almost certainly place chief reliance on the BISON and the BEAR for such attacks, with the BADGERecondary role.
Without inflight refueling the BULL) would be unable to reachin the US on two-way missions even from forward bases unless it were modified,a* in which case it could reach the Seattle area. The modified BULL could, without inflightreach all of the USne-wayfrom Chukotski. The current BADGER would require inflight refueling in order to cover most of the important target areas in the US, even on one-way missions frombases, but an improved BADGER (seehich we estimate willould carry out these one-way missions without inflight refueling. Two-way BADGER operations would be limited to northwestern US targets, even withIn order to reach all targets in the US with the BISON (see, the USSR would have to employ one-wayHowever, on two-way refueledfrom forward bases, the improved BISON could reach targets in much of the western and northern portions of the US. The BEAR (see, if launched from the Chukotski Peninsula, could reach almost all of the US on two-way unrefueledbut from interior bases could reachmall portion of the US. On two-way refueled missions, thc BEAR could cover thc entire US from forward bases and most of the US from interior bases.
Base Areas
estimate that there aren the forward base areas capablelong-range bombers, and thatwill continue to improve itsstructure during the period of thisByhe capacity of thebase areas could have beento stage simultaneously the entire
long-range bomber and tanker force estimated for that date.
Staging.hour flight would be required to move BULL aircraft from Far East home bases to Chukotski area bases, and about three to five hours from Western USSR bases to the Kola Peninsula. Plying times for BADGER, BISON, and BEAR aircraft would be about half as long. The USSR is fully capable of developing servicing and fuel storage and transfer faculties at Its forward bases, if these facilities are not alreadyFor example, we believe the USSRuel truckapacityallonsumping rateallons per minute. We estimate that, when BISON and BEAR bombers appear in service In large numbers, the USSR will have ground refuelingmore compatible with the requirements of these aircraft. In order to service large numbers of long-range bomber aircraft at staging bases In forward areas, it wouldbe necessary to increase present stocks of POL and servicing equipment and toor increase weapons stockpiles at these bases.
Weather. Weather and climaticin the far northern staging areas wouldonsiderable impact on the timing and magnitude of attacks on theuring cold weather, requirements for high-speed refueling and heated shelter space forare among the critical problems which would be magnified as the numbers and size of aircraft increased. Moreover, thelaunchingarge-scale strike force comprising elements from widely separated base areas would probably be furtherby varying weather conditions at the different bases. Cold weather problems would, however, be less critical with Jet than with piston aircraft.
"The maps and summary charts inhow ranees ol which the various SovietoperaUne from various bases would be capable In attacks against conUncntaltripped and altered for longer range In
a manner similar to theB. "Seeor an account of weatherIn the various base areas.
OEOnDT
USSR has demonstrated that it can effectively, operate aircraft under extreme cold weather conditions. In addition, aircraftis improved by low groundIn Arctic areas, since the higherof cold air Increases engine thrust and airfoil lift so that take-off distance may be reduced or maximum gross take-off weights increased. For example,egrees F. the ground run requirement for take-off of jet bombers would be aboutercent less than under standard conditions (see. Ground run requirements for the BULL and the BEAR would also be reduced, but the difference would not be as great as for jet bombers.
The low temperatures of the Arctic region pose some special problems In the handling of nuclear weapons. However, virtually all of the components of nuclear weapons are better able to resist the effects of cold weather than are the delivery aircraft, and provision ofshelters and equipment to overcome the undesirable effects of cold weather on the bombsuch simpler problem. Wethat the USSR can successfully store and assemble nuclear weapons for use at Arctic bases under any weather conditions which will permit the operation of bombers.
Scate of pre-strike preparations. Atthe preparations necessary foraximum-scale attack from likely staging areas would probably require several months. We estimate that the USSR will continue to improve Its base facilities and the training, logistics, and equipment of Its Long-Range Aviation throughout this period, so that the time, required for preparations for attack would be considerably reduced.
Assumptions Underlying Estimated Intercontinenlal Striking Forces
the variety in methods ofand attack patterns open tomakes it difficult to estimate whichthc USSR might employ in ansufficient intelligence is availablea logical selection as to which ofairfields will be most suitablebomber operations. Therefore, we be-
lieve that the most likely Soviet choices of base areas for an Initial air attack against theUS would be the Chukotski,Central Arctic, Kola, and Leningrad areas. In addition, some BEAR aircraft could be launched from interior bases.
In order to determine the general order of magnitude of Soviet capabilities for an initial attack against the US Ine have considered the available intelligence on runway lengths, POL, maintenance, other base facilities, and accessibility for supply purposes, and have arrived at an estimaterobable maximum capacity of each of the forward bases for staging bomber aircraft. All bases that we have selected for the staging of heavy bombers have runway lengths of ateet and are considered to have an average maximum staging capacity ofeavy oredium bombers. Those selected for staging medium bombers only havefewer base facilities, but have runways estimated to be ateet in length. Their maximum staging capacities areas varying fromoediumdepending on the facilities at each base.Although usable on the basis of estimated aircraft performance figures, existing runways at many of these airfields are considerably below the standards normally associated with Soviet long-range bomber bases.
The following planning factors, based on US experience and estimated Soviethave been assumed:
o.ercent of aircraft at home base in commission after stand-down;
percent of those aircraftbases can be launched from(Includes attrition enroute to andstaging bases);
percent of those bomberon unfueled missions will arrivearea (excluding combat attrition);
percent of those bomberon missions utilizing Inflightwill arrive In target areasnd
-For estimated staging capacities of Individual bases In each ol the forward areas, seelimited distribution under separate cover).
-
An allowance of one tanker aircraftfor each bomber refueled In flighttanker assumed).
We have assumed the following method of employment:
Maximum Strike Forces
m
for Air Attack
or the purposes of this estimate, the only factors used in determining the maximum bomber force the USSR could launch against the continental US inre thestrength of Soviet Long-Rangethe estimated capacity of the forward staging areas, and the operational planning factors given inmong the factors specifically excluded from theare Soviet requirements for attack on areas outside the continental US, and for re-attack after the initial strikes. These factors would reduce the number of bombers actually committed to an initial attack on theUS.
e estimate that inoviet Long-Range Aviation will Include an Increased number of bomberreaterot heavy bombers,anker fleet adequate toortion of its heavy bomber force. By that date, thc capacity of the forward staging areas could have beento permit the launching of the entire bomber forcecoribination of refueled and unrefueled missions. Under theseand assuming that all aircraft were launched from staging bases rather than home bases, the maximumoviet strike capability would be as follows:
After -Stand-down
from Staging
In Target Areas
D
Not considering combat losses. 'These figures assume that all tankers employed will be heavy tanlters compaUblc with the BISON. Thii does not take Into account thc fact that BADGER tankers could be employed as anmeasure to refuel BISONS or other BADG-(See)
115
535
BADGER BISON BEAR Total
the USSR attempted to achieveIt could employ severalof attack against thet the cost of reducing theatUck:
a. The USSR could elect to employ only heavy bombers in an Initial attack, launching them from the forward staging bases. In this case, as indicated in the tableould be launchedombination of refueled and unrefueled two-way missions,ould arrive in targets areas, not consideringlosses.
t could elect to employ only heavylaunching them from home bases. In thisould be launchedouldIn target areas, not considering combat losses. This alternative would require that all the BISONS be employed on one-wayand that almost nil the BEARS beIf they were to be employed on two-way missions.
c. It could elect to employ medium as well as heavy bombers in various combinations designed to achieve the maximum weight of attack possible without Jeopardizing surprise.
to ECM and Diversionaryattacking bombers would probablysome ECM capability Intpossible that some portion of thethe atucking force would be assignedas specialized ECM aircraft forwhich might include diversion anduse. Such aircraft would probablyto assist bombers in carrying out
"The Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence.of thc Army, does not concur In the maximumoviet strike capablllUes as estimated In paragraphsSee Ms footnote to
GEO
17
against extremely important targets, particularly those which would be involved in US retaliatory action.
VII. ATTACKS BY GUIDED MISSILES Submarine-Launched Missiles1"
We believe that Inubmarine-launched missiles probably would be used ln coordination with nuclear strikes by aircraft In any Soviet plan of attack against theUS. Inhe USSR may have available aboutubmarine equipped to launch guided missiles. If thc USSRto achieve surprise in an initialIne believe that it would consider that the deploymentelatively small number of guided missile submarines could be accomplished without jeopardizing surprise. This risk would be minimal in the case of nuclear-powered guided missilebut no more than eight of these are likely to be operational in
Since the submarine must necessarilyand remain surfaced for about five toinutes toissile, it would beto radar detection during that time. If the submarine were operating at periscope depth while activelyissile It would be vulnerable to both active radar andelectronic intercept detection. Nuclear-powered submarines are likely to be large and would be Just as vulnerable to active sonar detection as conventional submarines ofsize. Any antisonar coatingsto the USSR would be difficult and costly to apply, wouldelatively shortlife, and would be ineffective at deepbecause of distortion of the material under hydrostatic pressure. Based on USa submerged nuclear-powered boat can be expected to be less noisynor-keling diesel submarine at speeds belownots, and thus less susceptible to detection by passive underwater intercept. However, at speeds abovenots the nuclear-powered boat would be at least as detectable. Atspeeds below nine knots, thc nucloar-powcrcd boat would be virtually undetectable
"for estimated range coverage of continental US. seennex B.
by LOFAR, and might even go undetected at submerged speed as high asnots.
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM)
indicated inethat inhe USSRew, if any, ICBMs againstUS. Because the systemaccuracy, and nuclear warheadthe ICBM are estimated to bethan those of manned bombers inwe believe that any ICBMs availableUSSR at that date would be used tobomber attacks, rather than tomission aircraft.
Air-Launched Missiles
supersonic air-to-surface missile ofrange could to some extent Improveof Soviet medium andto attack heavily-defended USHowever, their warheads wouldyields than available nucleartheir guidance radar would restrictto well-defined targets.
VIII. CLANDESTINE ATTACK
Clandestine Delivery of Nuclear Weapons
e have no evidence as to any Soviet plans or preparations for clandestine delivery of nuclear weapons against the US.during the period of this estimate the USSR will be capable of producing nuclear weapons which could be smuggled into the US either as complete assemblies or asparts of subassemblies. These could range from small-yield weapons
3 up to the highest-yield device the USSR was capable ofAll of these weapons or devices could be designed to break down into transportable components. Those designed to give alow yield would not require much labor or technical training for assembly.more labor and training would be required to assemble weapons designed to give high yields, and, once assembled, they would
cH-TV
be more difficult to transport. The size and weight of any multimegaton device would tend to limit Its use other thanixedIn the holderchant vessel,ruck-trailer, or in premises with diplomatic immunity.
Considering the known limitations of the means of physical detection, the USSR could probably introduce into the US and detonate inonsiderable number of nuclear weapons by clandestineariety of methods of clandestine delivery suggestAssembled weapons could be dropped by apparently friendly aircraft, detonated In the holderchant ship, or sown asmines by submarines and possibly by merchant ships. Either components orweapons could be brought In under diplomatic immunity, smuggled across land or sea frontiers, introduced through normalchannels, or brought In as bondedawaiting transshipment.
In Introducing nuclear weaponsinto the US. the USSR would have to take Into account not only the estimated chances of detection but also theof detection, including the loss of surprise in any intended overt attack and the possible provocation of US military action. As the number of weapons clandestinelywas increased, the risk ofwould grow. This increased risk would beunction of the physical means of detection (the effectiveness of which lslimited) than of the possibilities of US penetration of the Communist apparatus, of the defectionrusted agent, or of sheer accident. The USSR could not be confident that none of these mischances would occur. We conclude that, although clandestinewith nuclear weapons might be made against specially selected targets, as ato overt attacks, the use of large numbers of such weapons would probably be precluded by security considerations.
Clandostino Use of BW and CW Weapons
estimate that the USSR has afor the clandestine delivery ol BW
agents against targets in the continental US. Most BW agents are peculiarly adaptable to clandestine utilization, since detection of their intended use would be difficult. Even small-scale employment of BW agents againstcould be highly effective. BW attacks against personnel concentrated in selected buildings could also be effective. An tier op BW operations could be carried outwith possible damaging effects under proper environmental conditions.
agents are not as suitable tooperations as BW agents. The effectsreadily identifiableuchwould be necessary to deliverfor lethal concentrations overAllhough it probably would notto accumulate CW agents ordevices for more than limitedpopulation centers in the US, CWagainst personnel ln buildingseffective. In this connection,agents could be employedpersonnel in buildings or selectsmall
Conventional Sabotage
USSR Is capable of subversion,and widespread sabotage in thethe use of existing subversiveand the placement of fQrelgncould not be undertaken on aprior to air attack withoutAttempts to sabotage USIndustrial, andas well as militarybe expected concurrent with andfollowing surprise attack byCommunist Party members andare capable of organizingof varying sizes and equippedarms and other suitable material,strike at specially selected andtargets simultaneously andwarning. Whether these attackstimedurprise military attackout alter thc initial attack wouldupon the Soviet appraisal ofadvantages of such action.
TOP OGCnB?
ANNEX A
BASE AREAS SUITABLE FOR LONG-RANGE BOMBER OPERATIONS
Chukottkt Peninsula. As the result ofconstruction believed to have beenout at several airfields within the past three years, we believe that at least sixprobably now have runways long enough for staging medium bombers and that at least five of these are suitable for heavy bomber operations. Three other airfields havewhose characteristics indicate acapability for medium bomberMilitary air units are based on some airfields in the Chukotski area, but none are subordinate to Long-Range Aviation.
Air operations In this area are madeby several factors. Recent construction of long, surfaced runways indicates thatand logistical difficulties of this area are being overcome. However, ice andsnow runways are also still In use. There are some indications that the USSR ls steadily Improving Its operational potential through installation of modem radiofacilities. In addition, the USSR has an ever-Increasing fund of Arctic experience which can be applied to staging operations In this area.
Cold, wind, snow, and fog. which arethroughout the area, tend to makedifficult and hazardous. The mostweather conditions occur during November throughhe mostconditions occur at all stations during the spring and early summer. Weather In
' In order to estimate the seasonal suitability ol overage weather conditions In potenUal staging areas, the percentage frequency ot occurrence of those conditions which would handicap the mass movement of aircraft into or out of staging areas was computed. Two conditions were selectedasis foreiling/visibility lesseet/oneemperature belowF. although with adequate preparations staging operstlons could be carried outtn temperatures* F.
the Interior is highly favorable during the summer months. Only those areas adjacent to the Chuckchee Sea or which lie along the Bering Sea coastelatively highot unfavorable conditions during the midsummer months.
The status of base logistical supportrequired to stage long-range strikefrom the Chukotski area is unknown. The area Is accessible only by air and by sea during the ice-free season, and supplywould be difficult. However, the USSR is considered capable of stockpiling thesupplies- Moreover, the area'spotential could be markedly Increasedy using construction elements already available in the area thc USSR could build two additional concrete surfaced runways suitable for staging heavy bombers
Kola Peninsuia. Thc Kola Peninsula has at leastases with runways long enough for staging medium bombers. At least one of these airfields would be suitable for heavy bombers. Permanent-surfaced runways can be constructed throughout the area without difficulty as it is relatively free of permafrost.
Prevailing climatic conditions, while afactor on air operations, aremore favorable than in other regions of the Soviet Far North. In general, the most favorable conditions occur In the late spring and early summer. In late summer and early autumn, conditions are favorable except at bases adjacent to the cold waters of the White Sea However, during May through October conditions are favorable at all locations overercent of the time. In winter, conditions arc less favorable due to the more frequent occurrence of low ceilings and poorExtremely cold temperatures areinfrequent, and occur lessf the time at any base.
tot accRB^
status of base logistical supportrequired to conduct long-range bomber strikes from airfields in this area ls unknown, but it is considered that logistics would not be an important limiting factor. Supply routes by rail and road are open to the Kola Peninsulaear-round basis, although logistical support of large-scale air operations would still pose difficulties under extreme weather conditions. Moreover, the staging potential of the area could be readilyWith construction elements already in the area, three additional concrete-surfaced runways suitable for heavy bombers could be constructed
Central Arctic. An airfield construction and development program in this area has been in progress sinceheprogram was carried out for Polar Av'-atlon of the Northern Sea Routebut at least seven airfields now inprobably have runways of sufficient length to handle the staging of mediumOf these, three are probably suitable for the staging of heavy bombers. Two otherin this area have runways with marginal capabilities for medium bomber operations. However, logistical support would be difficult, probably requiring heavy stockpiling.elements In the area could build two additional runways suitable for heavy bombers by
The major handicap to air operations ln this area arises from the frequency andof extremely low temperatures. For example, at Tiksl overercent of allduring January record temperatures lower thanF. Jet engines, however, are less adversely affected by low temperatures than piston engines and Jet take-offare considerably reduced. The summer months are not very favorable due to the high frequency of fog in the coastal belt.
This area contains athome bases of Long-Rangeequipped with BULL and BADGERThese bases probably havesufficient length for heavy bomberThree additional runways suitablebombers could be constructed by mld-
y employing airfield construction units now In the area. Improvement of existing airfields would requireinimum of additional construction, as there are alreadyther airfields in the Leningrad area with concrete runways long enough for medium bomber operations. None of these additional bases, however, are known to be associated currently with Long-Range AviationOperations from this area by long-range aircraft would offer the advantageemperate climate and good logistical support.
The bases in this area have the mostweather during the late spring andwhen aboutoercent of the time is favorable for operations. Even during autumn and winteroercent of the weather is favorable at all bases, Thereto be little difference betweenand daytime weather except duringOctober, and November. During these months, reduced visibility sometimes occurs during the early morning hours.belowF. occur less than fiveof the time at all bases.
Kamchatka-Sea of Okhotsk Area. Only two airfields In this area are consideredfor medium bombers, and only one of these is considered suitable for heavyThree other airfields have runways with marginal capabilities for medium bomberLong-range staging capabilities from this area arc therefore estimated to be extremely limited, bul two additionalcould be constructed to accommodate heavy bombers
Tlie weather in this area Is relatively favorable for air operations. Throughout the year the weather on the east coast ofPeninsula Is the most favorable in the entire area. In the Magadan area the best weather occurs during the early spring and autumn.
Baltic-East Cermany. Poland and theZone of Oermanyotal of at leastirfields from which medium and heavy bomber operations could be mounted against the US and US bases in Western Europe.isadvantage of this areaase for air attacks on North America is that
21
Circle routes pass over nationsto the US. In addition. It would be more difficult than in other forward base areas to maintain security of preparations, and the area is more vulnerable to NATO attack. However, climatic conditions are mostand there would be relatively fewproblems. This base complex is served adeqiintcly by all types of transportation.
he bases located in the Baltic coastal area are most suitable for air operations dur-
ing April through August, when favorable conditions occur aboutercent of the time, both day and night The least favorable period Is December through March, whenof favorable conditions drops to aboutercent. However, the unfavorableoccur most often during the night and early morning hours. The mid-day hours are favorable for operations aboutercent of the time. Very low temperatures are rare in this area.
APS AND SUMMARY CHARTS
The following maps show estimated Soviet long-range aircraft and submarine launched guided missile radius/range capabilities under selected conditions against thc continental US throughhe maps depicting the capabilities of the BISONnd BADGER) are based on estimated performance characteristics of improvedof these aircraft estimated to beinndespectively. The estimated capabilities of the standard versions of these two aircraft types are shown in boxes included on the appropriate maps. The estimated capabilities of the modified BULL and improved BEAR are shown In boxes on the maps dealing with the standardof these aircraft.
Estimated range coverage under refueled conditions is particularly difficult to depict since many different routes and refuel points could be used by Soviet strike forces.it should be noted that this coverage assumes certain routes and refuel points, and under different assumptions the indicated coverage would be somewhat altered.
COMPUTATION
In all cases the estimated coverage is based on ranges calculated in accordance with
standard US military mission profiles. For estimating ranges under unrefueledconditions it has been assumed that Great Circle routes would be flown, although such flights would have to transit major Western warning and defense positions. For refueled flights,routes indicated show possibleintended to avoid overflight of majordefense and warning systems. Total ranges indicatedoviet refueling capabilityange extension of approximatelyercent
MAP
The base used for all mapsimplified versionS target system which Soviet planners might seek to attack. It is intended only to indicate the general geographicalof possible US targets, and should not be consideredefinitive picture of the US target complex Moreover, it does not reflect programmed changes or other changes likely to occur between now and
CHARTS
These charts are Included for convenience ln comparing the radius/range capabilities of all Soviet long-range bombers, if launched from the Chukotski. Kola, or Moscow areas. They are based on the same calculations and assumptions used in preparing the maps.
1
ANNEX C
TABLE I
ESTIMATED PERFORMANCE OF SOVIET LONO-RANQE AIRCRAFT (Calculated In accordance withSpec)>
Combat Radius/ Range (ntn.l
MocUflad'
1 BADOEIt (IW7)
* Bear
" )
. bomb load one refuel *
one refuel *
b. bomb load one refuel
Speed/Altitude iknJt'.)
speedalt.
alt.
Combat Celling (ft.)
0
0
0
D/SSOO
:
0
W00
0
0
0
estimates based upon use of compatible tankers which will provide approximatelyercent Increase In radius/range. 'Stripped and altered for longer rangeanner similar to theB.
Improvements include the replacement oflb. thrust engines with thosehrust0 lbs. 'Based on Installation of engines with Improved altitnde rating.
TOP OBOaUT'
TAHLS II
ESTIMATED SOVIET LONO-RANOE AIRCIIAFT PERFORMANCE UNDER AN OPTIMUM MISSION PROFILE
(Calculated In accordance with USIA Spec except that fuel reserves are reduced toaximum ofinutes loiter at sea level, and aircraft operate at altitudes permitting maximum radius/range)
BULL
S71
Improved'M>
)
Radius/ Range (nm.)
O
O
ra
bombrefuel'
SMO
bombrefuel"
b. bomb load one refuel
zoo/wo
3JS0/BIM
Speed/AlUluO fxnVf.i
speedalt.
alt.
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
m&frm
0 0 0 0 0 0
Celling (ft.)
Altitude (ft.)1
bomb
omb iCO
"Refueling esUmatea baaed upon use of compatible tankers which will provide approximatelyercent Increase In radius/range. 'Service celling at maximum power with one hour fuel reserves plus bomb load aboard. No range figure Is associated with this aUHude. 'Stripped and altered for longer rangeanner similar to theB.
" Improvements Include the replacement otlb. thrust engines with thosehrust0ased on InstallaUon of engines with Improved altitude rating.
rpOP OBOTtng'
8EST COPY AVAIlULf
CHART 1
ull (Mod.)tADGCaJSONSC 'VrP.;
REFUELED
BUllBULLADGf ftISONmp.)
MM
AIRCRAFT RADIUS/RANGE CAPABILITIES SUMMARY From the Chukotski Area
APPROXIMATE AREA OF US COVERED
100
C*otp. I, J. J,
AT hMIM
CHART 2
SOVIET AIRCRAFT RADIUS/RANGE CAPABILITIES SUMMARY
From the Kola Area
BULLULL (Mod) BAGGED (Sid) BADGERISONISONEAR
REFUELED BununADGERADGERISON'SON (Inp J
BEAR
rc
60
APPROXIMATE AREA OF USlpi., IO, It, Im, lb)
TtfO-WAr* IM:m
best copy
CHART 3
SOVIET AIRCRAFT RADIUS/RANGE CAPABILITIES SUMMARY
From the Moscow Area
UNREFUELED tun (MJ BUU (Mod) BAOCIt *Mp I
uson
BEAD
AREA OF US COVERED 'In paw.it ol total:mmpso 2Q>
10 20 X 40 W> 60 70
CAPABILITY OF BEAR, UNREFUELED
From ihe Kola Atej
Original document.
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