CIA COMMENTS ON PROPOSED HANDLING OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE REPORT TO THE P

Created: 1/25/1957

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Comments on Proposed Eendllng of the Recommendations

of the Report to the President by tbe President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities dated6

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Herewith are the CIA comments, subject as above, as requested In your memorandum of

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CIA COMMENTSHANDLING OP THE RECOMMENDATIONS OPTO THE PRESIDENT BY TEE PRESIDENT'SCONSULTANTS ON FOREIGN6

1. We do not believe that drastic changes in the structure of our national intelligence organization ere required to rake progress toward seme of the objectives ve outline below. We do suggest that the Director of Central Intelligence be encouraged toore comprehensive and positive coordinating responsibility and we feel that he can do this within tbe intent of existing laws. If directed and supported by you in discharging this responsibility, the Director of Central Intelligence can accomplish much in the direction of integration, reduction of duplication, and coordination within the satlocal intelligence effort without change in present statute or organization.

Suggeated handling: Approve, and refer to the Director of Central Intelligence for acton.

CIA Comment: Concur.

2. To insure tbe proper functioning of tbe Intelligence Community and to guarantee proper coordination with the military ia times of war, we suggestealistic appraisal of the Community's organization and responsibilities be undertaken at once. This should be undertaken directly by the Director of Central Intelligence, and he should report his appraisal and recommendations to the Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities.

Suggested handling: Approve, and rerer to the Director of Central "Intelligence for action.

CIA Comment: In concurring it is our understanding that the entire

paragraph relates to the functioning of the intelligence

community ia times of war. In preparing the above-mentioned

report the Director of Central Intelligence vould as a

matter of course consult with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and

the heads of the service intelligence agencies.

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We urge that action be expedited to bring the National Intelligence War Plans to tbe highest feasible state of readiness andealistic war-gaming of them begin as scon as practicable.

Suggested handling: Approve, and refer to tbe Intelligence Advisory Canalttee for action.

CIA Comment:It is our understanding that the term "National Intelligence

War Plans" refers to "planning for intelligence activities in time

of war" and we suggest this change be made.

We also suggest that the proposed handling be changed to: "Approve, and refer to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of Central Intelligence for action."

This revised suggested handling is proposed since we believe that it is the responsibility of the Joint Chiefs of Staff aad the Director of Central Intelligence to plan for intelligence activities ln time of war; this planning may differ depending upon vbetber these activities are carried out in or outside of theaters in which American Forces are engaged in active cccbat operations. For example, we consider that:

over-all Intelligence planning should be conducted by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation vita the Joint Chiefs of Staff;

Intelligence requirements for support to Military War Planners by CIA should be developed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff ln consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence;

planning for those intelligence activities to be conducted by Military elements should be the function of the Joint Chiefs of Staff;

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d) planning for those intelligence activities conducted

by Central Intelligence Agency elements, whether or not in or

through theaters of var, should be the function of the Director

of Central Intelligence and coordinated with the Joint Chiefs of

Staff as appropriate.

ej war-gaaiag of activities planned under both b) and c)

above should be conducted under the direction of tbe Joint Chiefs

of Staff in consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence.

U. With regard to the integration of the Intelligence Community, we are

convincedtrong centralized direction, under which tbe resources of the various elements would be brought closer together, vould do much to strengthen our national intelligence effort and to contain its cost. We therefore recommend that action be taken toward this end, both through the National Security Council and the Director of Central Intelligence.

Suggested handling: Approve, and refer to the Director of Central Intelligence for action togetherbove.

CIA Comment: Concur.

5. With regard to clandestine operations, we urge that present practices be regularized to insure that in all appropriate instances these projects (l) receive the benefit of proper Joint staffing and formalized approval,hat both the State and Defense Departments bo kept abreast of the developments of these projectseed-to-know basis and, of course, under tightly guarded security procedures.

Suggested handling: flefer to the representatives designated under BSCfor study, consulting with their principals, and report thereon to the President.

CIA Comment: Concur.

TICKET

We feelefinite need exists for the coordination of the "unattributed" progress of the United States Information Agency and of the Central Intelligence Agency, particularly in tbe field of propaganda, and we urge that action toward this end be initiated at once. It is our opinion that such action could well begineview of the actual practices which have grown up under the "Principles to Assure Coordination of Gray Activities" enumerated by the Operations Coordinating Board on 2ft

Suggested handling: Refer to the Director, United States Information Agency, and the Director of Central Intelligence for study end report thereon to the National Security Council.

CIA Comment: Concur.

7. To give proper high-level direction to Communications Intelligence Activities and to insure that their tremendous capabilities can be exploited to tbe fullest, we believe that they should have the direct management attentioningle Assistant Secretary of Defense. Ve therefore suggest that one be designated for that purpose.

Suggested handling: Refer to the Secretary of Defense as Executive

Agent and the Director of Central Intelligence aa Chairman, USCIB, under NSCXD No.or study and report thereon to the President.

CIA Cement: Concur.

We suggesttba^youlendyourprestlge to the recruitment of personnelHHb^HHprcgris, your request, might possibly be managed by the Science Advisory Committee of the Office of Defense Mobilization; or by the Weapons System Evaluation Group of the Department of Defense.

gested handling^: Refer to bhscctcr of Central Intelligence as Cha^man^JSCIB, to prepare, icr consideration by. cf Stateefense) inwith the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization, and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, recommendations to the President as to the best channel and method for recruiting such personnel.

CIA Comment: As we understand it, there are two points to this

recommendation;uccessful mobilization ofHHb^H

and second, to use this talent to search out tbe most promising lines of research and development. In view of the

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fact that tbe Depertaent of Defense is Executive Agent of tbe Government for the production of CCMEiT information (NSCTDnd that tbe National Security Agency vlth the approval of USCT3 has beenrogram for dealing vlth

[problem referred to In. above, ve suggest that the handling be as follows: "Refer to the Secretary of Defense ln consultation with the Secretary of State, tbe Chairman of USCTB, the Director of the National Security Agency and the Director, Office of Defease Mobilization for report promptly to the President. This report should deal with tbe two reccesendations required; namely, (l) who should be recruited and bow;hat body la the executive branch should supervise the development of tbe most promising lines of research and development-"

3-b. We strongly support efforts now undertaken by tbe Department of Defease to develop|

Suggested handling: Approve, end refer to tbe Secretary of Defense for action.

CIA Cccraent: We concur, but suggest tbe substitution of tbe word "material" for "informetloa".

9- We recommend that the National Security Council review theirDirectives andore coherent, consolidated Directive or set of Directives for the conduct of our intelligence activities under today's conditions.

Suggested handling: Approve, and refer to the Intelligence Advisory Ittee for review of all NSCID's and for early submission to the National Security Council (through the NSC Planning Board) cf recommended revisions.

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CIA Comment: We concur ln the reference to the Intelligence Advisory

Committee for review of all NSCID's, and recommend that the revised

be submitted by tbe Director of Central Intelligence to

National Security Council.

10. To relic ve the Director of Central Intelligence of the cany management responsibilities he is presently called upon to discharge as Head of tbe Central Intelligence Agency, we suggest that be be providedhief of Staff or Executive Director who would act as his "Executive Vice President". This assistance would thereby enable him to direct his efforts core toward the integration, reduction of duplication, and coordination that is necessary within the national intelligence

effort.

Sussested handling: Refer to tbe Director of Central Intelligence for recommer-datlon to tbe President as to the best method of accomplishing the purpose of this recommendation.

CIA Comment: Concur.

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