Created: 10/30/1957

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible





Disputes During Stalin's 3


Marshall Plan

Link vs.


Dispute in the Post-Stalin

Consumer Goods Program -

Virgin Lands


Economic Aid to

Aid to underdeveloped

Relaxation of International Tension -

Relaxation In Eastern Europe - 9

20th Party 9

Stalinism vs. The Thaw -

Anti-Semitism and Great i

Tor jccnfii



Chun -

Tendencies of Individual Leaders





This working paper Is an attempt to determine thepredictions and policy leanings of top-lovol Soviet leaders by analysis of the part they played in variouspolicy disputes. The approachew one, and the find!ngs are pre1lalnary. /




The7 upheaval ln the Kremlin, resulting ln the fall of Molotov, Kaganovich, Malonkov and Shepilov, represented an unusually dramatic momentong series of postwarln the Kremlin. As in past climaxes, hierarchicalwas expressed ln terms of policies espoused or opposed, even though the motivating forces may have been personalrivalries or revenge. Thus, although Khrushchev's real purpose in7 may well have been the ultimateof potential rivals for power, the charges he brought against Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov and Shepilov madereference to policies which these men bad espoused. The victims, in their turn, undoubtedly had their own personal reasons for Identifying themselvesovement against Khrushchev, but they chose selected policies as tbe instruments through which to convey their opposition.

A review of those postwar turning points on which there is some fragmentary information suggests that, whatever their reasons, most of the ranking members of the Soviet hierarchy haveertain consistency ln the types of policies they espoused and ln tbe priority each seemed to assign.to various policy goals. There is little evidence of stable cliques or personal loyalties among the top leadership. The pictureis of temporary alliances among individuals whoseinterests or personal tendencies coincidedime, the composition of tbe alliances changing as the major issues changed.

eriod of years. Individuals develop patternsbasic assumptions, on which their decisions arethe Soviet leadership these patterns represent at mostln temperament and operate only within the veryof tbe common aims of the group. The question inis not "what is Communism and do we want to buildsomethingut merely "which is the best way to The existence of these differences lnrecognized ln most political systems, the labelsto the type of system or the degree ofspeaker wishes to Impute. In the West there areand radicals, conservatives and liberals, whileits dogmatists,and left-wing

devlatlonists. The Western pragmatist or moderate and tho Marxist-Leninist who has "acceptance"iven time provide the pivot points from which the ends of the spectrum are measured. All these labels change ln policy content, however, as the pivot points"liberal" position of one period mayconservative" positionears later. In the USSR tbe problem of accuracy in labels is further complicated by the Communists' own usage of tbe terms. Their insistence that

top sccnnx.

-top sect? ft.

aosition is botb infallible and stable in content, and their resulting compulsion to re-labol each time the political wind shifts, make tbe terms extremely difficultesterner to use with any consistency.

Despite tbese shifting values for political labels, there are some threads of consistency In these differences In temperament. In itsolicy position nay generally be adjudged either cautious or venturesome in the light ol* the common alms of the leadership group.

Caution dictates attention to possible losses, to risks entailed. It is wary of the new or the untried, "the time is not yet ripe" for change andird in the hand Is worth two in the bush." The venturesome are more optimistic, seeing possible gains, not possible losses. They are more impatient wltb flaws, moro self-confident in advancing new panaceas. Theyead-on attackroblem, to the maneuvering of the cautious.

Individual political leaders will not be found on the extreme ends of this spectrum, but they will generally tend toward one side more than another. They are entirely In conforming to these types, particularlyeaning toward internationalism on the one hand oron the other may cause either the cautious or theto find strange political bedfellows. The pragmatist Is usuallyoderate position between the two extremes butbasically eclectic in politicalpick up concrete boliefs or stands from either or both extremes and demonstrates his middle-of-the-road character merely by the logical inconsistency of his views.

The following study is an attempt to Identify what the Chinese Communists are pleased to call the "tone of work" of certain Soviet leaders, past and present, as reflected In the policies with which they have been identified5 it is Halted in scope to those policies on whichIs available concerning identification of individuals, and to those Individuals so Identified, and should in no way be considered an attempted survey of significant policystudy of succession in the Kremlin or postwar history of the USSR. There are gaps in the names, important indlvid-uadsb are missing and the information on those that are listed is incomplete. It is offered onlyirst approach, to be added to or corrected as additional information comes to light. Identification of individuals with policies in each case is made very tentatively, with the full recognition that andecisioniven Issue might be Influenced by

-top SfjClfFT

bis special departmental or functional responsibilities, the current personality situation in the Kremlin, or even what be had for breakfast.

Disputes During Stalin's Lifetime

There were seven major policy divergences or differences of view on which we have evidence in the postwar Stalin, some of which carry over in one form or another into the post-Stalin period:

ajor question confronting Soviet leaderswas the evaluation of the remaining enemy'sof postwar capitalism. The Hungarian economist,that there was life ln the old dog yet. Hecapitalism bad undergone mutations under the stressWar II which would enable lt toajorand to control its Inherent tendency toward In addition, be warned that these mutations hadbalances in capitalism both between classes andcolonial powers and their colonies, narrowing theopportunity for Communist revolutionary activity aimedthe existing governments. No rankingtook part publicly in7 debate on Varga'sopposition was expressed chiefly by other economists

on doctrinal grounds. However, Mikoyan is reported to haveosition7 very similar to Varga's on thestrength of capitalism. Varga himself seemed to believe that Zhdanov was behind his doctrinal critics, and Molotov is reported to have expected both an Imminent economic failure and internal strlfo between national Imperialist Interests to rend capitalism.

The evaluation of capitalist strength wasin Soviet economic policy In occupied areas. Onea postwar policy of the economic stripping ofterritories for the rebuilding of Sovietdenuding of occupied areas could only have made sensewere premised on caution ln the facetilland cohesive capitalism, and if it wero to bewithdrawal of Soviet forces to the borders of theconsolidation at home. eaning towardalso have dictated withdrawal behind tbe walls ofin preference to entanglement with foreignersHungary, Manchuria et al. Malenkov and Saburovamong the supporters of this policy, whichhave been based on articles written by Varga


top sECffrr

Opponents of the stripping policy who apparently envisioned, Instead of withdrawal, the permanent annexation of tho occupied territories reportedly Included Zhdanov, Mlkoyan, Zhukov and Voznesensky.

3. Marshall Plan Participation: The question in the spring7 of participation by the Soviet bloc in the Marshall Plan again raised the problems of evaluating the enemy's strength and of the desirability of foreign entanglements. Mlkoyan and Kaganovich reportedly favored participation. Molotov is alleged to have opposed it, expecting the failure of the plan. imilar position might be inferred for Zhdanov in view of his apparent refusal to accept Varga's warning of capitalist resilience,!

4. Voznesensky; Voznesensky and his supporters appear to have believed that both tho Soviet economic situation and tho international situation8 were sufficiently favorable to allow added emphasis In the economy on consumer goods. There is some evidence as to the names of both his supporters and his opponents, but little or none as to their reasons for adherence or opposition.

Inowevor, Voznesensky's policy of shifting Soviet economic resources to beef up consumer goods production must have appearedistinctly risky gamble to the more "cautious" Kremllnites who had accepted Varga's estimate of capitalist resilience. To the more "venturesome" whoapitalism ront internally as the only external threat, the risk must have seemed small in comparison to tbe possible gainsore balanced economy.

Voznesensky's supporters appear to have included Ostro-vityanov, G. Kozlov, Shepllov and Kosyachenko. He wasopposed by Malenkov, Saburov, Suslov and V. S. Kruzhkov.

Link vs. Brigade: The link vs. brigade controversy in early laoouestion of the size of work-teams in agriculture, the smaller link providingreator degree of personal identification for the individual worker with the total results of his labor but without the mechanization which the brigade was designed to promote. Andreev, in confessing his error in retaining the link system instead of adopting the brigade, noted that his major concern had beenautious "bird in the hand approach." His anonymous critic ln*ho may possibly have been Khrushchev, Insisted that the correct organization of labor was not only amatter, butost important "economlc-




politlcal" task. emporary decline in production coupled with increased investment was worth risking if It resultedore politically orthodox organizationaldoctrine promised would bo more efficient in theif it promoted mechanization.

Agrogoroda: The theme of impatience, acceptanceamble and belief io "bigness" ln agriculture was clearer still in the agrogorod campaign. In its full bloom the plan, clearly sparked by Khrushchev, Involved the merging of smaller adjoining collective farms and theof the farm workers In farm-cities, with apartments, shops and all the amenities of $own life, but cutting their ties with the land. The scheme involved both enormous expense and major disruption of traditionally conservative peasants, with the risk of production losses. In tbe spring1 it was attacked byeria protege, as doctrinaire and premature, and by Bagirov,eria protege, as hindering the private-plot farming of the peasants. It was againas premature duringh party congress In2 by Malenkov and Arutlnov.

East Germany: There appears to haveossible cor-relatlon in timing between the varying speeds of socialization io East Germany53 and tho shifting Kremlin estimate of Western strength. During periods when theof capitalism seemed to be accepted, as reflected ln the stripping policy, or9 emphasis on heavy industry, the pace of socialization was slow. When capitalist strength seemed to be in doubt, the pace was Increased. In addition to the cautious or venturesome approach to the problem ofWesterneaning toward internationalism or Isolationism may haveactor in any evaluation of policy for East Germany. The greater the degree ofthe greater tbe Soviet stakeand which did not even adjoin Soviet borders.

Fragmentary evidence suggests that Zhdanov may haveast socialization pace while Berla and Malenkov seemed to advocatelower pace.

Dispute in the Post-Stalin Period

3 when Stalin died, the major postwar issue of the relative strength or woakness of capitalismls the USSR had been more or less shelved, ln tbe face of the more pressing problems of rigidity ln the Soviet system. The venturesome became less expansionist in international terms and more ln-clinedto take the risks entailed in relaxing international tensions, to gamble possible short-range losses in discipline


TOP dcgrez

and "face" against possible long-range gains in dynamism. With the growth of the "camp ofuestions of allegiance to the USSR began to come to tbe fore. Problems of dogma also moved to the forefront with the removalupreme arbiter. The collective leadership which succeeded Stalinealth of prophets, four dead and at least five living ones, but no one authority to judgeiven concessioniven tactic actually contravened doctrine or wasreative application of it. The major policy divergencies or differences of view became more frequent and tbe evidence about the leanings of leaders toward one or another solution became mors plentiful. There are at least 14 policy Issues worth examining Ineriod:

8. Consumer Goods There appears to have been general agreement within the leadership groups inhat some additional emphasis must be given in the economy to the production of consumer goods. As stresses developed in the economy due to the concurrent growth of other programs, the issue became one of degree of enthusiasmiven There was some difference in phrasing, in the degree of enthusiasm shown for the consumer goods program, evident in speeches made by the leadership group overaonth period from3 when the program was announced to early5 when Malenkov resigned.

/Among the less enthusiastic speakers wore

-vorosnnov, BoIbTov, Kaganovich and, toward the end of tbeonths, Khrushchev and Shepllov. The enthusiasts appeared to Include Malenkov, Khrushchev in the early months of theand Kosygin, Saburov, Pervukhin and Mikoyan.

9. Virgin Lands Program: There were two possible approaches to the agricultural problem which the Soviet leadership faced inintensified cultivation of the traditional farming areas involving long-term Investment andradual but sure rise in production, or tbe expansion of agriculture into areas regarded as marginal land, alsoin its investmentamble on thefactor of weather, butig increase in

* Pour are grouped under theth Party Congress."


top flOTPT.

production quickly if tho scheme were successful. The latter program ln the virgin lands was clearly Khrushchev's own creation. There Is some evidence that he was supported by Mikoyan and possibly Kaganovich, and opposed by Malenkov and Molotov.

10. Mucloar Warfare: During the winter and early spring thereeries of varying formulations in public speeches by Soviet leaders which seemed to reflect their attempts to grapple with tbe implications of nuclear warfare. These variations were played on threedestructive-ness of nuclear warfare, estimates of the Imminence of war, and the slice of the economy to be devoted to defense needs. ln the "death of civilization" and the "defense needs" themes, appeared to feel tbat the destructiveness of nuclear weapons was so great as to eliminate wareasibleof foreign policy for either side. Accordingly, defense needs did not loom large in his speeches. Mikoyan explicitly stated that tbe danger of war hadosition close to Malenkov's ln its Implications for defense needs. Pospelov combined the two themes,ecrease ln the likelihood of war and congratulating Soviet scientists on not working for the "destruction of world civilization." Bulganln made an oblique and critical reference to these formulations, warning that the USSR could not count on the humaneness of thenot to use weapons of mass destruction, and three months later sounded an unprecedented warning on tbe danger of surprise attack from the US. Khrushchev and Kaganovich both cited the continuing danger of capitalist encirclement, the first such references since Stalin's death. Molotov and Voro-shilov at the opposite end of the spectrum from Malenkov appeared to be saying that nuclear destruction did nota new factor ln world politics andhird war would still mean only the "death of capitalism." Khrushchev, Bulganln and Kaganovich combined with Molotov and Toroshllov in calling for further defense expenditures. Pervukhln and Saburov had not contributed to the nuclear destruction and the imminence of war themes, but like Malenkov were notable in their lack of concern for defense expenditures.

11. China: Certain Soviet leaders seem to have been more closely and continuously Identified with Chinese affairs than otbera, and thero are faint hints that internationalist or isolationist leanings might have affected their willingness to delay achievementoal in the USSR for the greater good of fraternal China. he year of the Chinese Communist victory, Molotov, Khrushchev and Mikoyan were noted as tbe regulars at Chinese Communist embassy receptions ln Moscow, and0 Molotov and Khrushchev publicly expressedgreater enthusiasm for tbe recent Cbineso Communistthan did Malenkov, Kosygin, Suslov and Beria.


top ftrrnrz

The soul-searching by the Soviet leadership4 on tbe Implications of nuclear warfare took place six months after the Korean war had been cooled offruce,ime when shots fired in anger between communism andwere being heard only In Indochina. The United States was publicly considering entering that war to back the French, the Chinese Communists were already deeply committed to the Viet Minn in at last pushing the ten-year-old war to aconclusion. Slno-Sovlet defense treaty obligations confronted tbe Kremlin in4ery pressing need to evaluate the implicationsossible nuclear varoutward from the Communist Chinese gamble in Indochina. When read with these Far Eastern echoes, malenkov's "death of civilization" speecharning that the riskajor nuclear war was too great, Mikoyan's estimate of decreasing danger ofalming assurance that the Chinese Communist gamble would pay off andorld war would not develop, and Molotov's and Vorosbilov's "death of capitalism" theme still further assurance of backingamble which did not seen to them to risk fatal consequences.

12. Economic Aid to China: There were also faint hints in the summer4 that there were differences of degree among the Soviet leaders concerning the amount of economic aid that should be spared to Communist China. Bulganin, Khrushchev and Mikoyan were the bearers of glad tidings to the fraternalin The Soviet premier, Malenkov, and the Soviet foreign minister, Molotov, were notably absent. There bad been an unusually cool exchange of telegrams betweenandonth earlieray for warm affirmations of unity and mutual respect. And in5 Mikoyan is reported to have enlivened an official censure of Molotov with charges of past Soviet "meanness" in the economic exploitation of other socialist countries, citing an offer concerning Joint stock companies which Mao had turned down.

13. Aid to Underdeveloped Countries: Inhange was apparent in Soviet foreign aid policies. Emphasis was shifted from Eastern Europe to the Middle East and the tempo was sharply Increased. There had been sporadic reports of offers to "excolonlal countries" even before Stalin's death, but it was not until shortly after Malenkov's removal from the post of premier and the accession of the BK team to power that tho program really took shape. Since that time, Bulganin,Mikoyan and Shepilov have been most closely identified in public with the program. There are no reports on thebut on the basis of Molotov's reluctance to accept the



"new flexible" Soviet foreign policy, of wbicb tho economic aid program was an Important instrument, and his apparent economic "meanness" In Eastern Europe, lt might be Inferred that he, like Malenkov, dragged his feet on the program.

Relaxation of International The spring5 was marked by at least four moves" the -USSRto relax International tension. The Austrian treaty wasew disarmament package proposal was produced, the mountain went to Mohammed ln Belgrade, andeeting at the Summit in Geneva. According to mostard core of resistance to these moves was provided by Molotov and Vorosbilov and aided occasionally bynnamed. These two had felt that nuclear destruction did notew faetor in world politics and threatened only the death of Bulganln, Khrushchev, Mikoyan and "tbe new members of the central committee" reportedly provided the impetus for change and Shepilov and Suslov appear sporadically ln this latter group.

Relaxation ln Eastern During the summer and fallhe problem of Soviet control ln Eastern Europe, having escaped from Pandora's box ln Belgrade, arose to haunt the Kremlin. Tbe reports of justification andduring this period show Molotov and Voroshilov Justifying past Stalinist harshness and filled with forebodinguture in which the "doctrinally Impure"might Infect Eastern Europe Satellites. As ln the spring relaxation moves, the impetus for change continued to be provided by Bulganln, Khrushchev and Mikoyan. Kaganovich, Suslov and Shepilov are occasionally reported as allies of the latter group.

20th Party Congress: There was, of course, no open dls-agreement ath party congress ln There were, however, certain differences ln emphasis by individual speakers, apparently reflecting their primary interests and their mental reservations. The four major themes wore the denunciation of Stalin's practices ln his later years, the possibility of cooperation in the socialist camp despite differing views on forms of transition to socialism, theof averting war, and the possibility inransition to socialism through parliamentary means without civil war. The general effect was of enthusiasm on the part of Khrushchev and Mikoyan, obedient if uninspired support from Bulganln, spotty support from Suslov, Shvernlk and Shepilov, and foot dragging from Kaganovich, Molotov and Vorosbilov. Malenkov, depending on the subject, ranged from enthusiasm to complete disinterest.

top jccncx

17. Stalinism vs. The Byhere appear to have been three groups in the leadership, differing In the degree of confidence with which they faced the needhange from Stalinism in the satellites. Mikoyan and,to one report, Mukhitdlnov and Satyukov, who succeeded Shepilov aa editor of Pravda, led in enthusiasm, envisioning still further changes. Bulganln and Khrushcheviddle position, reportedly hedging to the Yugoslavs on the amount of independent action to be allowed in the future to European satellites, although he hadreat deal earlier, while Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov, Vorosbilov, Suslov and Pospelov viewed the liberalization alreadywith the gravest foreboding.

1th Great an and

IB. Anti-Semitism and Great Russianism: There have beenKuznetsov, Ryumin, and among the survivors, Khrushchevhave been charged with antl-semltlcAbakumov, Malenkov, Molotov, Mikoyan, Kaganovichreportedly either have Jewish ties or have shownof prejudice.

probably Khrushchev have shown greater or lesser degrees oi sympathy for national minorities.

Zhdanov has been identified Russianhile Bori



6 Con

Zhdanov Molotov



Malenkov Saburov

Zhdanov Mikoyan Zhukov Voznesensky


Molotov Zhdanov?

Mikoyan Kaganovich


ink vs.0

. German

onsumer goods4


uclear Warfare



TOr 3ccretj


Malenkov Molotov

More-Internationalist Less-Isolationist





Malenkov? Molotov?

Pro-Internationalist Con-Isolationist






Molotov Voroshilov Kaganovich? Malenkov?

Pro-Internationalist Con-Isolationist






Relaxation in Eastern5

h Party6 a. Denunciation of Stalin


Molotov Voroshilov

Bulganin Khrushchev Mikoyan Kaganovich?


Kaganovich Voroshilov

Suslov? Shepllov?





Different Roads to


Khrushchev Shepllov

With Reservations Or Ignored





top sccffcr.


Possibility of Averting War

Accepted With Reservations

Or Ignored



Kaganovich Molotov Shepllov Suslov


Khrushchev Mlkoyan


Molotov Kaganovich Malenkov Suslov


Khrushchev Molotov Bulganin Kaganovich Malenkov




iberalize- Enthusiastic Accepted Resisted tion in6

and/or Great-Russian-ism


Zhdanov Voznesensky Khrushchev Furtseva








Tendencies of Individual Loaders

19. Zhdanov: Zhdanov's policy preferences in the postwar years suggest hla as the prototype of theptimistic and confident, the prizes far outweighed the risks which ln his eyes seemed small. He saw no reason to fear serious resistance or roprisal from capitalism and the questionajor war between the two systems seemed Internal capitalist strife had already knocked out two major power centers ln Europe and Asia and had weakened others. Grave economic problems, national antagonisms, colonial strife, and class conflicts wereln tbe enemy, to be manipulated by communism as the executive of the future.

The sacrifices and dislocations caused by the unprecedented war, the victories scored over Hitler's Germany and imperialist Japan have broughtew political situation all over the world, stirred up the masses of the peoples, raised their political activity andowerful impetus to theof democracy ln allPoland, Italy, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary and Finland were cited as part of this progress, Further lt should not be forgotten that the defeat of theand the victory of tbe Labor party in Britain, like the dofeat of theand tbe victory of the bloc of Left parties ln France,onsiderable move to tbe left ln these countries.

It should be borne In mind that America herself is threatened by an economic crisis. There are weighty reasons for Marshall's gonerosity. If tbe European countries do not receive American credits, tbelr demands for American goods will diminish and this will tend to accelerate and Intensify the approaching economic The main danger to the working class at the present time stems from underestimation of its own strength and ovorestimation of tbat of the enemy.



The Cassandras who warned of lessons learned and changes accomplished ln capitalism, of the possibility of seriousfro* the enemy, spoke to deaf ears. Confidence ln the abilityynamic socialism to predict and to control the "objective" factors of its world keynoted his policyand his speeches.

Whether he was the initiator or not, Zhdanov was clearly the executor for the Ideological purity campaigns in philosophy, art, literature and music6 until his death in Art forms must be Intelligible to the masses but more Important, must be Imbued with optimism. Socialistould, of course, prevail because of Its Inherently greater worth. It was not forelgnness which was to be guarded against butost antlsocialist characteristic.

The task of Soviet literature is to help tbe state correctly to educate the youth, cater to its needs, rear the younger generation to be buoyant, confident in its cause, undaunted by difficulties, and prepared to surmount all obstacles.

Bis optimism and confidence in the ability of socialist man to control his environment by planning extended even to science, and he provided the seed, although not necessarily the savagery of tone, for tbe ideological campaigns whlcb raged ln scientific fields after his death. In7 criticism of G. F. Alexandrov's history of philosophy, he referred scathingly to tbe "Kantian subterfuges ofbourgeois atomic physicists (which) lead them toof the "free will" of the electron and to attempts to represent matter as only some combination of waves and other such nonsense."

Since he rejected Varga's warnings on the postwarof capitalism, he also opposed the stripping policy and its premised Soviet withdrawal from those areas. His original opposition to Marshall Plan participation has only been Inferred, but be was again clearly the executor for tbe Soviet riposte, the'formation of the Comlnform; and the wave of strikes ln France and Italy which followed ln the autumn7enerally associated with his influence. If the Inference of his opposition to the Marshall Plan is correct, it could only nave been due to bis expectation that lt would fall, for there is no hint ln any of his speeches or ln the part of his career covered here of any isolationism.


Tho roster of Communist leaders gathered under bis leadership In Warsaw In7 Is striking for the number of "national" Communists included. Bis speeches on nationalism suggest that his loyalties and his trust ran along class lines, regarding national boundaries as only administrative conveniences and not as divisivo in interosts.

The vise foreign policy ofas taken the Soviet Union out of isolation and has croated and solidified the bloc of peaceful nations.

Internationalism In art does not develop on the basisontraction and In impoverishment of national art. Rather, Internationalismwhere national art flovers. To forget this is to lose one's individuality anda cosmopolitanountry. It is impossible to be an internationalist in music or anything else, withouteal patriot of one's fatherland. nly the nev Russians vbo are not burdened dovn by the long series of scholastic periods of the Europe of previous centuries are able to look sclonce full in the face; they honor it and make use of its blessings, but they do so without exaggerated deference to it.

Zhdanov died before the limits of his optimism andcould beit vas evident that the Marshall Plan had "delayed" an econoalc crisis in tbe West, before the establishment of NATO underlined Varga's earning that vars between capitalist states were not inevitable,the problem of national Communism reached the boiling point of an open break with Tito andide swath of purges among the Satellite leaders in the Cominform,

Since he departed from the Soviet scene an optimistunsullied by second thoughts and forced rotreats, his name hasallying cry for the venturesome in times of stress. Be and Shcherbakov figured in the World War II rolls of honor with Bulganin and Khrushchev4e was quoted, though not by name, in tho Kommunist reprimand to Malenkov's "death of civilization" formulation In March


top scene x.

20. yoznosepsky: Voznesensky's postwar careerhort one, lasting only three years. During that time, howevor, he was quite clearly Identifiable with venturesome tendencies. One of his closest colleagues, Ostrovityanov,ritic of Varga, both Voznesensky and Ostrovityanov opposed thepolicy of retreat free, occupied territories, and both appear to have been In tbe vanguard of the movoment to complete the Five-Year Plan in four years, Voznesensky as the head of GOSPLAN and Ostrovityanov in providing the theoretical Like Zhdanov, Voznesensky appears to haveymbol of enthusiasm andoverconfldence in the eyes of tbe cautious, (it might be noted that the tie between Zhdanov and Voznesensky wastrong one. and bis fellow-victim in the Leningrad affair, A. A. Kuznetsov, were the two who accompanied Zhdanov's body when lt was sent to Moscow by train to the funeral.) Malenkov made several unkind consents on "enthusiasm" which may well have referred to Voznesensky.

Exaggerationuman fooling. There are comrades among us who suffer from this vice. These people cannot admire anything without gushing. Tbey are incapable of simultaneously appreciating an achievement at its true worth and noticing the shortcomings in order tothem,

The facts show that successes have generated in the ranks of theood ofa pretense of well-being and smugesire to rest on one's laurels and rely on past merits. No few officials have appeared who think that "wo can doeverying is child's play tothings are going well" and there is no use worryingwithisagreeable task as disclosing defects and mlstakos in the work or combating negative and unhealthy phenomena in our th party congress)

Stalin was even more pointed on the same occasion, flatlyone of Voznesensky's theses, though without naming his victim, and adding:

We, as the leading core, are Joined each year by thousands of new young cadres, fired with the desire to help us, eager to prove themselves

top occnex^

but lacking an adequate Marxist education, uninformed of many truths well known to us and thus obliged to wander ln thebey begin to imagine that tbe Soviet regime "can do anything" and "everything Is child's play tohat it can refute scientific laws and fashion new ones.

Malenkov: If Zhdanov was the prototype of tbeMalenkov appears as his complete opposite,isolationist. His stand on Varga's warnings hasbut Varga has generally been re-

garded as Mflienxovs protege, and Malenkov was identified with tbe policy corollary to Varga's estimate of capitalistthe economic stripping of occupied areas. His stand on Marshall Plan participation would have depended on whether his fear of the West was stronger than bis desire to strengthen the homeland through Its economic benefits. His part ln tho violent reaction against Voznesensky's program suggests that fear may have been uppermost in his mind at least as early as7 when he first used the formulation which was to signal priority for heavy Industry. Fear runs through his early postwar speeches ln curious contrast to Zhdanov's buoyant confidence.

In the recent period the party bad toesolute struggle against variousof an obsequious and servile attitude toward Westorn bourgeois The party had toesolute blow against several specific manifestations of thissince these manifestations represent, ln the presenterious danger to the interests of the Soviet state, Inasmuch as the agents of International reaction, ln order to weaken tbe Soviet state, seek to utilize people infectedeeling of servility toward bourgeois /Compare with Zhdanov's confidence six months later8 that Russians would know bow to use the good and discard the bad77 The survivals of these old capitalist conceptions are bolng used today by agents of American and British imperialism who spare no effort ln their attempt to find within tbe USSR support for their espionage and their anti-Soviet propaganda. The agents of foreign espionage services are bending every effort to

TOP 5ecrcx

seek out weak and vulnerable points among certain unstable sections of ourwho still bear tho stamp of the old lack of faith in their own forces and are Infected with the disease of servility to everything foreign.

onsumer goods program in addition to other demands on the economy vas too risky8ith tbe West shoving signs of resilienceoviet military re-equipment program to be undertaken, the agrogorod schemeas equally premature in Malenkov's eyes. And, like Beria, he seems to have been reluctant during these years to pushin East Germany. Bow much of this vas due merelyersonal sense ofistaste for drastic anddisruptive measures and hov muchelief that Soviet vltbdraval might some day be necessary or advisableble_ to Judge vith any degree of accuracy. According lenkov vas charged in5 wi'

agreeo to neria's proposal to allow German reunificationourgeois democracy. This may nave boen an effort by his enemies to put the worst possible face on vhat vas no more than caution. On tbe other hand Malenkov's speeches, more than those of any other leader, havetrong sense of the physical entity of Russia.

We should remember that we are sufficiently strong to defend the interests of our people. We haveictory and vant to protect our Motherland from any eventuality. We do not vant to pull the chestnuts out of the fire for others. If there are chestnuts available ve vlll use them for the good of our glorious Soviet people...

Tbe October Revolution liberated the peoples of Russia from economic and spiritualto foreign capital. Soviet power has for the first time mads ourree and Independent state. . Never in the history of our country have tho peoples inhabiting its vast expanses been so closelyever in all its history has our country had such Just, veil-ordered state frontiers as it now Neverin all Its history has our country been surrounded vith neighboring countries so friendly to our state.

top slxkex


Wo would not have achieved tho successes in peaceful construction in which we now take pride If we had permitted theof our state. If we had notour state, our army, our punitive and intelligence agencies, we sbould havo been unarmed ln the face of our enemies andby the dangerilitary defeat. Tho party turned the Soviet country Into an impregnable fortress of socialism bytbe socialist state in every way and lt is continuing to strengthen lt. arty congress) Certain officials, absorbed lnaffairs and achievements, begin tothat the capitalist encirclement still exists and that the enemies of the Soviet state are persistently trying to smuggle in their agents and utilize unstable elements ln Soviet society for their own vile ends. (Ibid) In the northwest we have newmore Just and corresponding better to the interests of the defenso of tho Today the state frontiers of tbe Soviet Union correspond best to theevolved conditions of theof the peoples of our country, (ibid)

If cautious isolationism characterizedunder Stalin, it was still more apparent under the "collective leadership." 3 it seems to have been generally agreed within the collective leadership that some relaxation ofwas needed both internationally and internally. Thegoods program at its inception does not appear to have been controversial, and lt was not until other demands on the economy in tbe shape of agricultural and defense needs and foreign aid programs became equally pressing that matters of timing and degree became grounds for differences within the group. As might have been expected, Malenkov appears to have preferred the slower but surer path of further investment ln traditional farming areas to tho admitted gamble of the virgin



During4 efforts of tho group to grapple with the implications of nuclear warfare, his attitude appears to have been that waruclear age was quite literallythe risks being too great for either side to allow war to impinge on their consciousness evenossibility. "War can and must bend backing the Chinese gamble in Indochina was no way to avert it. The defenseshould be retained at its current strength, but need not affect consumer goods priorities. Equally, foreign aidwhether within the camp to fratornml China and the satellites or to purely problematic allies in underdeveloped countries,were all very well, but not until recognizedImbalances in the consumer goods field at home had been corrected.

Khrushchev has been reported as protesting that Western commentators were misinterpreting Malenkov's fall in5 by overemphasizing the question of consumer goodsas the deciding factor. And lt is quite true that Malenkov's formulations of the consumer goods program were never so gradlose as those of Mikoyan who survived the policy shift relatively unscathed. Even here Malenkov seems to have run true to form In his cautious approachecognized need for reform, and in his apparent belief that Russian needs came first.

Malenkov's performance ath party congress was marked by guarded acceptance of de-Stallnizatlon, lack ofIn tbe progress of socialism outside of Russia, but fervent support for Khrushchev on the subject of avoiding war.

The supplanting of the capitalist systemigher social order, socialism, is When and how will this take place? What will be the forms of the transition to It is up to the people of capitalist countries to solve these problems. It is only they who can determine the fate of their states. But, one must time and again draw attention to the most Important proposition put forward in the report of Comrade Khrushchev when hothat war is not inevitable. War can and must be prevented.

Certain parallels In timing in the early post-Stalin careers of Malenkov and the Hungarian liberalization symbol, Imre Kagy, have led to speculation identifying Malenkov with early post-Stalin liberalization. Extremes in either direction,


"too rigid" political and economic controls or "too speedy" relaxation seem to have been equally distasteful to Even In the period following Voznesensky's execution with its strong emphasis on heavy industry, Beria1 and malenkov2 were publicly recognizing the need to redress imbalances In the economy by increased attention to consumer goods. In the case of satellite controls as in the consumer goods problem tbe noed for some relaxation of controls seems to have boon generally agreed upon immediately after Stalin's death, and Malenkov may well have backed Hagy's early program.

Halenkov did not appear in the roster of thoso concerned about the pace of liberalization in Eastern Europe untilhen he was reported among the cautious foot-dragging group. At this point he was able toowerful rival who had participated in his downfallonths before, to do soubject which was congenial to him, and to do so, not in suicidal isolation, but with the backing of allies equally concerned about the "risks" they foresaw.

22. Beria: Berla's few appearances in policy issues on tbe side of cautious isolationism may seem curiousan with asersonal reputation as his. It is possible, however, that his long responsibility for internal security made him aware of the hazards of arousing widespread popularin the USSR and of overextending the Soviet control system in unwilling allies. His opposition to the drastic dislocation of the peasants envisioned In the agrogorod scheme and bis respect for their ties to their private plots have already been noted, as has his reluctance to pushin East Germany.

Two years after Berla's fall, Molotov was reportedly accused of having tolerated Beria'a policy in the DDR "in solving the question of unifying the peasants, withombination of force and technical unpreparedness" had led to mass flights of farmers to the Wost.

Joseph Koevago, mayor of Budapest during the Octoberrebellion,

Beria had personally super-

vised tne repracemoTrt^orby Imre Hagy in tbo3 Hungarian liberalization program. Beria reportedlyNagy of his personal protection from reprisal by Rakosi.

in connection with Berla's fall that as *

result or -ibis struggle for power in Moscow, "Rakosi seized control again after Berla's arrest and repealed the Hagy


reforms." Kagy's program was described ashich had Indeedeynote of Berla's speech at Stalin's More far-reaching than prison reforms and amnesties, "legality" ln Kagy's and possibly Berla's programs seems to have included lessening of pressures to force the life of tbo country into the political and economic molds of communism.

The "combination of force and technical unpreparedness" Id the DDR with which Boris was charged seems to have described his policyuse of individual terror to deal with flagrant rebelliousness or unrest,eluctance to institute furthermatter how politically orthodox, efficient or desirable from the point of view of expanding economic and political system ofmight disrupt the work and living habits of large sectors of the population. Certainly, the continued existence of private plots in the Soviet economic system constituted "technical unpreparedness"oped-for transition to communism. low socialization policy ln East Germany would constituteunpreparedness" for transitionully socialist system.

23. Molotov: Molotov's postwar careerurious picture of willingness to accept risks of war in thefield but caution ln other aspects of policy. The answer to this apparent split personality may be partially in his dependence on "thenorm of caution ln following blindly tho "infallible" guidance of another, and partially in his long association with foreign affairs.

Like Zhdanov, be refused to accept Varga's postwarof capitalist strength, insisting that the Marshall Plan would fall because of the inherent weaknesses in capitalism which orthodox doctrine had foreseen. In0 be was still insisting that capitalist economic collapso had actually begun:

The American figure of minusercent (fall in industrialto tho beginning of an economic crislB in the United States and at the same time to tbe crisis which mounts ln all capitalist countries.

Mikoyan's formulation on0 made an interesting contrast in its pro forma reference to "Inevitability" but with escape clauses:


The newly Invented talisman for the struggle against crises so Inevitable under capitalism and the reassuring assertions of the ruling circles only temporarily can produce but an appearance of relief and only temporarily contain the panic and fear of the consequences of the crisis.

Molotov and Kaganovich were the only speakers ath party congress in2 who montioned the late-lamented Zhdanov and Shcberbakov. It is possible that they did so because they gave the ceremonial opening and closing speeches. On tbe other band, Zhdanov as the leadingexponent of optimism and confidenceajor opponent Of Varga's views would haveatural ally for Molotov on foreign affairs. In addition, the Zhdanov-Shcherbakov combination received heavy emphasis4 apparentlyymbol of orthodoxy ln heavy industry and defense needs and acceptance of foreign policy risks when Bulganln, Khrushchev, Molotov and Kaganovich were united in backing this policy complex.

There nave been several indirect references to Molotovbook-aan" Marxist and dogmatist. h party congress speech warned that "those who live by rote" as well as those who believe that "we can do everything" would be thrown into the discard by life. Khrushchev in bis secret speech noted that Molotov and Mikoyan had been ln danger of liquidation ln the fall The Kommunlst editorial ln5 which attacked, without naming Molotov, the latter's error of5 concerning tbe building of socialism ln tbe USSR spoke ominously of the danger oftheory from practice, of transposing formulas of the distant past to present conditions, and warned that dogmatism is especially inadmissible "ln the sphero of international life."

Marxist-Leninist doctrine said nothing about communism gambling onreportedly opposed the virgin lands program. There was no roforence in "the book" to new woapons so destructive as to makeyrrhic victory even for the inevitably victorious Sovietmore than any other leader was identified with the "death of capitalism" theme in the spring4 when Chinese Communist adventures in Indochina raised the problem of Soviet treaty obligations to China. His repetition of this theme, together with his promotion of the CPR to co-head of the camp of socialismthe offshore Islands tension lneems to have served the same purpose of assuring Soviet backing for


-TOP fifiYWX

the Chineseossible war with the US. And since war waseasible instrument of foreign policy, defense needs must be met by emphasis on heavy industry.

The5 Kommunlst reprimand of Molotov which seems to have evened all sorts of old scores, dealtharshly with Soviet economists who saw "expandedreplaced by "diminished production" and tbe "self-strangulation" of modern capitalism.

Undoubtedly the deepening of the general crisis of the capitalist system bearsto tbe further rotting of capitalism, but, as Lenin pointed out, lt wouldistake to think that the tendency to rot excludes the rapid growth of capitalism.

It warned further that such distortions of the integrity of the principles of Marxist tenets loads to conclusions at variance with objective reality and the policy of the party, and for good measure cited tbe horrible example of theeconomists who drew wrong and politically harmful conclusions in denying the need for preferential development of heavy industry. That thisar from academic matter is suggested by Mikoyan's spooch atb party congress which contained the only substantive criticism of Stalinby an authoritative figure. His criticism was directed at this same tbesls of the self-strangulation of capitalism. Molotov,clinging grimly to doctrine, appears to have been still insisting5 tbat capitalism was on tbe verge of collapse and that "in order to accomplish something we do not need these new methods of negotiations" such as the Austrian treaty, the new disarmament package proposal, the Yugoslav rapprochement, the Summit meeting, tbe aid tocountries, improved relation?with Japan, et al. Acceptance of the riskar which communism wouldwin was right and proper. But taking one stepin relaxing international tension, in order to take two forwardecommended technique only in the face of strong opposition, and bis faith ln tbe imminent crisis of capitalism was undlmmed.

In addition to being cautious and doctrinaire even to the extent of accepting grave risks of war, Molotov seems to have been strongly Isolationist. Thereuggestion of this in the Kommunist editorial which warned that tho problems of building communism ln tho USSR cannot beseparately from tbe problems connected with the camp of socialism. To this was added a



call for "tolerance on all matters touching on radical questions of principle on Marxist-Leninist Ideology and policy" and recognition of national peculiarities andin rates of transition to socialism.

Like Halenkov, his early postwar spoochesistrust of foreignness.

Of course, acquaintance with the life of other nations will certainly be ofto our people and will broaden their outlook. It is interesting, howover, that Soviet poople return home with even more ardent feelings of loyalty to their homeland and the Soviet system. Hot all of us have yet ridof obsequious worship of the West, of capitalist culture. It was not for nothing that the ruling class of old Russia were oftentate of such profound spiritual dependence on the capltalistically more highly developed countries of Unless one rids oneself of these shamoful survivals, one cannoteal Soviet citizen. That is why our Soviet people are filled with such resolute determination to put an end as quickly as possible to these survivals from the past, mercilessly to criticize all and every manifestation of obsequious worship of the West and of its capitalist culture.

This isolationifferent slant, however, from that of Halenkov who seems to have been genuinelyin progress outside Russian borders. For Molotov, possibly bocause of his foreign policy responsibility, an Increase in the size of the Soviet empire was to be hailed with rejoicing but only as an added field for exploitation for the homeland, not as an ally to be strengthened In its own right.

He may have "tolerated Berla's policy" in the DDR because internal policy in East Germany was not his directbut on tbe subject of East Germanyis tbe West, bis stand was unequivocal. On4 in an unusually explicit speech he said:

The development of the DDR has been so planned that It must become an Integral part of the socialist bloc, while at tho same timeeaceful existencearge part of Germany.

His opposition to liberalization ln tho satellites56 which had been roferrod to in the Kommunlstseemed to be based on the samesuis, J'y reste.

5 charges against Molotov concerning theof Soviet diplomats and the suggestions that Molotov was being bold responsible, at least in part, for past economic exploitation of the fraternal satellites and attempts to do so in Communist China have already been noted.

Ath party congress, Molotov was among tho more temperate speakers concerning the "great harm" caused by"abnormalities" in Stalin's later years. He apparently could not bring himself to discuss the possibility oftransition to socialism, contended that nationalhad from the beginning been retained in Eastern European construction of socialism, and he was restrained in bis comments on the possibility of averting war. He refused to accept tbe Yugoslav rapprochementontribution to socialism, presumably because, as he reportedly once charged, the Yugoslav Communist party could not be regarded as doctrl-nally pure. He went to some pains, however, to praise the successes in socialist building of the Chinese Communists whose doctrinal footwork had been more sure-footed at least

24. Kaganovich: During Stalin's lifetime, Kaganovich appeared only once ln reported alignments on postwar problems. Tbat one occasion was on the subject of participation in thePlani which he allegedly favored. This may have been because of his departmental responsibilitiesope that the cement industry could beucb-nceded boost. The other possibility is, of course, tbat the report was wrong. As late long after tho need for conformity with7 decision was past, and indeed after tho subject had been dropped by other leaders, Kaganovich was insisting that the Marshall Plan bad beenrapailure. Ho told the Czechs:

top secret.


After the war they (the Americancamo forward with the Marshall They managed to make the ruling class of certain countries dependent on them, but they failed and they will never succeed ln subjugating tbe peoples of these m sure that theirto France and to other countries not only failed to sponsor economic development but lt undermined even the normal trade relations betwoen countries.

Be may have backed the virgin lands gamble and he seemod to bo aligned with Bulganln and Khrushchev ln the discussion of the imminence of war Kaganovich and Molotov were the first leaders to warn publicly against the danger ofwith consumor goods at the expense of heavyand Kaganovich was the only leader besides Khrushchev to remind the party of the continued threat of "capitalist encirclement" Be reportedly backedn Eastern Europe, but the relaxation of international tension ln the same year seems to have been too much for him. With Molotov heosing battle against each step.

His remarks on the Marshall Plan in5 were madeime when the DSSR was reinstating various tradein Western Europe which they had canceled three to four months earlier. Tbeyuriously dour note of distrust of Western economic stability, seeming to nark back wltb nostalgia to tbe economic Isolationism of tbes and were ln strong contraat to the Khrushchev line ofcoexistence coupled with economic competition.

Despite the warning directed at Molotov in5 October Revolution spooch wasin its neglect of the "Geneva spirit" as well as its insistence on Western "contradictions which are growing more acute." "These /US economlcT crisis phenomena did not spread throughout the world, but there are no grounds at the moment for speakingeal establishment of some balance."

Onaganovich was shorn of one ofwhen the Moscow subway which bad been named forrenamed, leaving him with the faint consolation ofas his namesake. On the same day Mikoyangreetings


outranked the one Kaganovich had earlier received. In late November and early December Pravda devoted two editorials to reproof of dogmatists who soparate theory from practice and fail to appreciate the need for adjusting tactics to changed conditions. When Bulganin and Khrushchev went to India, Mikoyan appeared to be the caretaker in Moscow. /Kaganovich had officiated while Bulganin and Khrushchev were in Genevaj

Ath party congress Kaganovich, with Malenkov, Molotov, Bulganin and Shvernik, referred only to "certainin Stalin's later years which had done "great harm." Kaganovich in particular seemed reluctant to gocalling the struggle against tho cult of personality "no easy question." Whoro Bulganin omphasized the need for speod in wage roforms and revision of norms, Kaganovich asked for time and careful study of tbe question. Bedying and decayingolonial system "bursting at the seams." On tbe possibility of averting war he echoedh party congress speech. Be omitted Yugoslavia in his bow to national roads to socialism, although he cited China and "the People'snd bis acceptance of parliamentary transition to socialism was equally tepid.

Until he joined with Molotov in resistance to measures to relax international tension, Kaganovich does not appear to have exerted any great degree of personal leadership. After the winter5 he became with Molotov andymbol of efforts to hold the line in both domestic and forolgn affairs.

25. Khrushchev: During Stalin's lifetime, Khrushchev ap-peared in only two reported postwar policy questions, both in agriculture. In both cases, he was found on the side of change relying on forms of organization and bigness of operation to ensure progress in agriculture. This concern with form and size was echoed In the virgin lands program4 which not only had the advantage of the dramatic gestureossible fast payoff but also Increased the proportion of state as opposed to collective farms in the economy. There are also signs of these themes In his theses on the economicin tho USSR,endency to substitute party for minlstorial channels and in grandiosenoss of concept.

Khrushchev seems with the rest of the leadership to have accepted tbo consumer goods program Initially, although his phrasing was more restrained than that of Malenkov or Mlkoyan. During the reassessment of nuclear warfare in

top WfnTT-

Khrushchev, Bulganln and Kaganovichiddle position. Where Malenkov recoiled from the idea of nuclear warfare as unthinkable and therefore not to be prepared for and Molotov refuted the probable extent of destruction, insisting on preparation, Khrushchev seemed to be insisting onregardless of whether wareasible instrument of foreign policy or not. His estimate of the Imminence of war and his concurrent revival of the encirclement themestrongly with Mikoyan's confidence that war would not come. Whether thisore pacific appraisal by Mikoyan of Western intentions or whether itreater willingness on Khrushchev's part to contemplate theof war is not clear.

Khrushchev's pronouncements on the probability of war were not as immediately applicable to the Chinese gambit in Indochina as were the "death of civilization" and "death of capitalism" speeches. As has already been noted, however, tbe area of greatest tension and the most probable sourcelash4 and5 was the Far East. If his speeches are readar Eastern echo, they suggestiddle ground between Malenkov's revulsion from and Molotov's reaffirmation of Sino-Soviet defense treaty obligations.

By4 it was clear that the combined demands of the consumer goods program, the virgin lands program, defense needs and Chlneso Communist demands for economic aid were too great for all to receive top priority. Something bad to give, and for Khrusbcbov lt was consumer goods. He made lt quite plain, however, that thisemporary shift and that doctrine to the contrary, the proportion of eaphasis ongoods might well be Increased ln further Five-Tear Plans. One purely Internal goal was to be delayed in favor of another, that of increased agriculturalefense program which would enable the USSR tooreign policy in the direction either ofor war, and economic aid to tho fraternal Chinese. Which of these latter three factors woigbed most heavily isat this point to say. The choice of which internal goal to sacrifice was made easy forbad authored one,was closely identified with another, and Malenkovival.

With tbe change in defense priorities accomplished, Khrushchev embarkedore flexible foreign policyilitary position of strength. Unlike Molotov, his "risks" in foreign policy consisted of wooing possible allies rather than stonewalling them,ew unproductiveand risking the blurring of Ideological purity in the


hope of greater gains in Soviet influence internationally. His choice of tactics may have been dictated in partecognition that sone additional over-all relaxation of tension was desirable since the stonewalling had proved both dangerous and unproductive, and in partecision to move against another rival In an area in which the latter seemed vulnerable. Malenkov had been cut down to size; Molotov was next.

Byhrushchev had joined Malenkov In calling peaceful coexistence of the socialist and capitalist systems not only possible but necessary. There was nothingabout the new foreign policy, however, despite Itsair. Certain unproductive positions of hostility to capitalism were dropped. These involved the Austrian Treaty question, disarmament negotiations and, according to the7 charges against Molotov, the normalization of relations with Japan. The concept of struggle was by no means abandoned but merely transferred to the slightly less inflammable fields of ideas and trade. And, to balance these semlretreats, Soviet Influence was to be expanded into new areas in excolonialby an economic aid program and by judicious appeals to the established governments regardless of their political His special Interest in this program is suggested by tho fact that ath party congress Khrushchev was the only one who noted that excolonial countries can "now" draw on the achievements of the socialist camp.

Khrushchev's gambling Instincts and his fervent optimism have apparently enabled him to accept with equanimity the risks of new clashes which this expansion may entail. War is to bepossibility of doing so isif it comes let lt beew and more productive issue. Communism is after all the future.

In internationalism, too, be seems to have heldiddle ground between Malenkov's isolationism and Mikoyan's free-wheeling tolerance of foreign Influences. Khrushchev recognized the needs both economic and politico-military to the Chinese Communists; under his aegis Mikoyan launched his charges of economic exploitation of the satellites; and Khrushchev was among the first to push for liberalization of Soviet controls in tbe satellites.

If tbe Poles are to be believed, however, he showed qualms about the growth of national characteristics whicb broke with the Soviet moldime when Mikoyan was still enthusiastically calling for further liberalization.


Hla retreat from Stalinism was exactlyetreat rather than an escape. He did not denounce Stalin, even secretly, until Mikoyan had done so publicly on apoint, and his denunciation when lt came was primarily of the tragic irony of Stalin's mistaken belief that he had to destroy loyal comrades for the good of the socialist cause.

There have been somewbat caustic comments reported from the Poles that Khrushchev is no theoretician. He showed scant regard for doctrlos In his three "new possibilities" ath party congress, "creatively applying" lt in tactics as the situation seemed to him to warrant. For Khrushchev'sSukarno's overthrow by revolution and replacementommunist leadership is not immediately nocessaryittle economic aidot of personal flattery willinimum deny blm to the Westrustworthy ally. The doctrinal problem can be dealt with later of whether Sukarno and his office should be regarded as representativerand of capitalism even though Indonesian Independence from the Netherlands has been announced, or whetherative leaderewly Independent excolonial country he can be regarded as representing national Interests. In his own field of agriculture, howover, Khrushchev hasontinuing concern for orthodoxy in organizational forms, he has retained the classic concept of strife and struggle against capitalism, and he has reiterated again and again bis concern lestcoexistence be extended to Ideological coexistence. He seems willing to experiment tactically with doctrinal changes until these shifts threaten ground already gained when he reverts to orthodoxy.

26. Mlkoyan: Mlkoyan appears in the postwar years to haveider tolerance for new Ideas regardless of theirorthodoxytronger bent toward internationalism than any of the other leaders. The result combined withverging on the venturesome has mado for some very curious bedfellows for him.

During Stalin's lifetime, when the Issues turned on varying estimates of capitalist strength, Mikoyan appeared consistently to accept Varga's unorthodox estimate ofstrength. His reaction to this strengthrom Malenkov's, in the same way that their reactions to4 assessment of nuclear warfare differed. 6 Zhdanov was insisting that capitalism was relatively weak. Malenkov saw it as still relatively strong and planned tointo the fortress of the Soviet homelandtate of siege. Mlkoyan too accepted Varga's estimate of therelative strength of capitalism but proposed toastion of socialism in the occupied territories to meet the capitalist enemy.

In the spring4 when Halenkov seemed to be arguing that nuclear warfare made the Chinese Communist gamble Inand, indeed, any war too risky to contemplate, andwas retorting that the destruction entailed In nuclear warfare would not be greater than the Soviet Union could afford, Mikoyan seemed to be reassuring them both that lt would not come to warajor scale. He made his thesis explicit two years later ath party congress where he stated that thewere restrained from launching World War III by Soviet possession of the atomic and hydrogen bombs and to deliver them.

If participation in the new-fangled gadget of the Marshall Plan (which would not collapse, despite Molotov's direfulcould be turned to the advantage of socialism, well and good. There was nothing in foreignness to daunt an Armenian workingussian government to build an internationalsystem in polyglot Eastern Europe.

When Stalin died and the need for added emphasis ongoods was generally recognized, lt was Mlkoyan, ever receptive to change, who went further than any other speaker In hailingew stage" In the development of the Soviet economy which wouldorced pace for the production of consumer goods.

4 Mlkoyan had little or nothing to say on the subject of defense needs, although6 claims for the deterrent power of Soviet military strength suggest that be may have been concerned earlier. He was clearly identified with economic aid to China In the fall4 and he seems at the same time to have backed Khrushchev in tbe virgin lands program. As In the case of Khrushchev, lt is difficult at this point to determine which of the latter three priority claims weighed more in Mikoyan's mind in dropping or delaying the consumer goods program.

Mlkoyan was reported among the leaders who showedinterest in China, he made reassuring noises duringEastern tension ofe accompaniedKhrushchev on their gift-bearing Junket in the fallyear, he was identified with an interest In economicEgypt as early ase has beenthe Yugoslav rapprochement

and with the ensuing uneraxxzation in Eastern Europe, and he toured Southeast Asia In6 bearing gifts and offers of economic aid. In the Eastern European liberalization he has been reported aseading role In criticism of

past Soviet economic policies asn Septemberappeared to be having qualms concerning thetendencies in the satellites, reportedlythat the CPSU must naturally maintain primacy andparties must continue to look to it forwarning him of the dangers to communism Inherent lncollaboration with the



oups in theStalinists led by Molotov, Khrushchev's "thaw" grouproup led by Mikoyan advocating far-reaching democratization exceeding anything envisioned by the middle ground of the "thaw" group.

h party congress speech was characteristic of his internationalism and his confident acceptance of now ideas. He was the only one publicly to criticize Stalinubstantive issue. He alone praised the liquidation of military bases in China and Finland, liquidation of "tbe isolation of Soviet public and state organizations from the outer world. The time is past when the Soviet land of socialism was isolated and when we were an oasis in tbe capitalist encirclement. Now there is no question of lt." He complained that tbe USSR was seriously lagging behind in its study of contemporaryand lamented the abolition of research Institutes both in this field and ln oriental studios.

A State Department study ofh party congressof the wage problem concluded tbat he was more egalitarian ln his approach than any of the other speakers. Only Mikoyan

TOP jccnfiet

and Saburov cited the split of GOSPLAN into long and short-range planning groupsajor achievement, and Mikoyan followed this uplea for Improved statistical work in the USSR, again showing an interest in Ideas, not rules.

I Zhukov was said to be isolating

ctjo auviBTr-aray-rrom Interference or involvement in current questions. That he wished toepetition ofiscussions of who contributed most to victory in World War II is quite probable. |

that Zhukov was opposing koxossovskis eiioris

Zhukov's example" ln Poland by attempting to get rid of Wlta-zewskl's political management of tbe Polish armed forces.

The Soviet army's natural preference for maximum Soviet controls,both political and military, over the Polish armed forces on its doorstep would align Zhukov willy-nilly with either Khrushchev's "thaw group" or possibly even the Molotov Stalinists on this particular question. His waiting game may have consisted of refusing Involvement ln other questions in which tbe army did notlear professional stake.

The fleeting glimpse gained hereiddle-of-the-roader somewhat like Khrushchev's past performances. In addition to his canny balancing ability, however, Khrushchev likes gambles and drama. Whether Zhukov shares thesewith him is not yet clear.

27. Zhukov: Zhukov's appearance in policy questions have been rare. He is reported to have opposed the stripping policy in the early postwar years. Opposition to withdrawal from territories won in war is not surprisingilitary leader. Thereuggestion that be may have been discussing the "death of civilization" problem ln the late springut by this time Khrushchev had joined malenkov ln insisting that war can and must be prevented, and only Molotov, Voroshllov and possibly Kaganovich were opposing efforts to relaxtension. In the summer5 both Tito and Kardelj stated tbat Zhukov was personally responsible for proposing the Soviet-Yugoslav talks leadingapprochement.

28. Other Ranks: In addition to the major figures seen In the preceding pages, there have been fragmentary glimpses of minor members of the leadership group, some Junior in age and rank, others like Bulganin and Voroshilov senior in age and rank but junior in tbe force of the leadership they seem to exert.

Bulganin, despite his position, has not emerged as much more than an echo for Khrusbchev in the initiation of policies. His phrasing in tbe early months of the consumer goods program was correct but not enthusiastic. He did not appear at all In tbe agricultural problem. Inhrushchev cited the continuing danger of capitalist encirclement in urging the cause of defense expenditures. Mlkoyan In4 contended that the danger of war had decreased. Bulganin in the same month warned:

We cannot assume that the imperialists are spending vast sums on armaments merely to frighten us. Ror can me reckon on the humaneness of thewho, as life has shown, are capable of using any weapons of mass destruction.

In4 he repeated this theme:

It is obvious that until the DSthe use of atomic and hydrogen weapons the Soviet Union is forced to possess these weapons so as not to be left without weapons in case of surprise.

With Molotov, Mikoyan and Khrushchev, he was Identified with early recognition of China and he accompanied tbe latter two on their economic aid trip to China in ths fallrom5 onward, the Bulganin and Khrushchev team assumed the aspect of Siamese twins. h party congress speech provided correct if uninspired support for Khrushchev's three "new possibilities" and be reserved bis real forceomewhat specializedof "an unscientific theory to the effect that there is no moral depreciation of machinery under socialism."

Voroshilov in3 described the consumer goods and agricultural programs together in restrained and undra-aatic terms. With Molotov he insisted lh4 that World War III would mean the "death of capitalism" in contrast


to Malenkov's 'destruction of world civilization" speech; with Molotov hetep-by-step resistance to the measures to relax international tension in the spring5 and to liberalization in Eastern Europe in the same year. Ath party congress he lauded the principle of collective leadership but made no reference to any"irregularities." Khrushchev in his secret speech called upon Voroshilov by name to cast aside his inhibitions and admit the existence of Stalin's faults. Like Molotov, he seems in the post-Stalin years to havo been among those who saw no need for new methods since the old ones bad served

well .

Suslov's first appearance in policy Issues was in the fall2 when his own record was apparently sufficiently clean for blm to reprimand Shepllov for the letter'swith Voznesensky 0 ho was, with Malenkov, Kosygin and Beria, among the less enthusiastic In greeting the birth of tho CPR. He is reported to have accepted the need for the relaxation measuresoth In thefield and in Eastern Europe. Ath party congress he was among the most vigorous in indirectof Stalin's later practices, but he vas tepid in bis acceptance of Khrushchev's three "nev possibilities." He echoed Khrushchev's criticism of the benighted economists who had advocated slowing the growth of heavy industry, and he repeated Bulganin'a criticism of some economists on the non-obsolescence of machinery. As had been foreshadowed by his restraint at the congress, Suslov appears to have been an active member of the "Stalinist" group6 in emphasizing the monolithic character of international communism, demanding controls to counteract the centrifugal force of national

Shepllov appears to have begunoznesenskygravitating naturally from there to the optimistic and venturesome Khrushchev. h party congress speech shoved one curious omission vhlch may have foreshadowed bis appearance vith Molotov in the "antlparty group" ofespite the fact that be vas to be assigned less than six months later to foreign affairs, he failed to makero forma reference to Khrushchev's "nev possibility" ofvar or to the possibility of coexistence.

Saburov's sporadic appearances in policy issues seem to have followed Malenkov's lead, in the stripping problem, in the Voznesensky issue, in the consumor goods program, and in

top sccncr-

4 dispute over defense needs. He continued to omit any reference to defense needs ln his speeches as late as

1. I

Ath party congress ho repeated Mikoyan's praise of the reorganization of GOSPLAN into long and short-range planning groups and urged the "obvious need" to grant tbe Councils of Minlstors of the union republics wider control ovor the development of the entire economy of their territories. He noted tbat the right of ministries and beads of departments had already been extended, charging that some ministriestaking advantage of these extensions) werearrow departmental approach and demanding increases inand wage funds.

Pervukhln's name does not appear in reports on policy issues until after Stalin's death when with Malenkov andhe seemed among the more enthusiastic proponents of the consumer goods program. Like Malenkov and Saburov, ho omitted tbe subject of defense needs from his eloction speech lnut when Malenkov retracted on the "death ofinervukhln added his voice to tbe call for strengthening the armed forces. Like Saburov, heconcern In5 over indecision on economicand tbe possibility of serious repercussionsailure at the summit conference. Ath party congress, foreshadowing the6 plenum decisions, Pervukhln criticized the dispersion of capital Investment on largeof items for lengthy periods of construction asexpenditure of state funds. He charged that the Ministry of Finance was delaying ln broadening the powers of directors of enterprises, and crlticzed tbe Ministry of State Control for reporting voluminouslyide range of questions without effectively checking on the implementation ofand central committee instructions.

top (jfiCfiTT.

Original document.

Comment about this article or add new information about this topic: