FROM THE JULY PLENUM (1955) TO THE 2OTH PARTY CONGRESS - ANTECEDENTS AND AFTERM

Created: 6/19/1958

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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IV. The New Leading Party Organs

Continuity and Change in the Central Committee

and Central Auditing

Khrushchev's Strength in Central Party

Occupational

The Party

Khrushchev's Secretariat and the RSFSR

FROM THE JULY) TOH PARTYNTECEDENTS AND AFTERMATH OF MALENKOV'S RESIGNATION FROM THE PREMIERSHIP

Introduction

With tbe defeat of Malenkov lohrushchev became unquestionably "number oae" la tbe Soviet "collective leadership" but he did not thereby cosnaand full and continuing support fron all the other Heathers of the party presidium. "Old Bolsheviks" Molotov and Kaganovich, who must have Initially welcosied and probably assisted Khrushchev to victory over Stalin's first successor, were almost certain to view with alarm both tbe rapidity with which he, as the second successor, put into action new policies and tactics and the direction those policies and tactics were taking. The5 plenum of tbe party central committee, by its censure of Molotov for not acceptingthe rapprochement with Tito,owerful brake on any ambitions Molotovhadtronger voice ln Soviet policy; and at tbe sane time, in its resolution on Bulganin's exposition of problems and policies in the field of industry, it put the public stamp of high party approval on an approach to industrial problems which Kaganovich was to view withapprehension.

Khrushchev's increasing role ln Soviet policy formulation and implementation and tbe consequent loss of influence by Malenkov and Molotov meant essentially tbat the circle of top leaders bad been reduced, and lt was doubtful if tbe addition of Kirichenko and Suslov to tbe presidium by the July plenum would serve to enlarge that circle. But though the voices of Malenkov and Molotov had been diminished they were still members of tbe presidium and potentially could challenge Khrushchev's continuing leadership.

Having eschewed police terror as the cornerstone ofboth of the regime over the populace and of himself over the presidium, Khrushchev was far more vulnerable to political machinations and policy failures than Stalin had been for many years. Be had, lt is true, already shown considerable skill at political maneuvering, but his new policies had yet to be fully implemented and proven ln practice.

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I. POLICY ISSUES AND RELATIONS AMONG THE TOP LEADERS

The July Plenum andh Party Congress

Tbo last item on tbe agenda of the central committee plenum, heldoas tbe calling ofb party congress to meet onust three years and four months afterh congress had finished its work. There was no announcement of the reason for calling the congressOctoberoutside date for holding the next congress under the party rule adopted2 which established that "regular congresses of the party are called not less than once every four years." Theowever, ended the Fifth Flve-Year Plan period, and the necessity to consider party directivesow plan for therobably accounted for holding the congress as early as possiblehe motivation for so much advance notice of the time and agenda of thesix weeks' notice was given innot so evident. Itonceivable that Khrushchev, clearly in the ascendancy inntanded to use theropaganda peg for his policies and for securing increased productivity in "honor of the congress" by typically Soviet storm tactics. However,ropaganda campaign did not materialize;rief poriod of publicity, mention of the congress became increasingly rare in the Soviet press. Byailure of Soviet media recently to mention the date of the opening of the congress led to reports that it might

be postponed.

Tbo resolution callingh congress was similar to tbe one Issued2 forh congress. The agendafor the report of the central committee to be delivered by Khrushchev, the auditing commission report by chairman of the commission P. G. Moskatov, presentation of tbe draftfor the Sixth Five-Year Plan by Bulganin, and election of the central party bodies. No major revision of the party rules such as occurred2 was apparently contemplated. Delegates to tbe congress wero to be elected according to the samevoting delegate forarty members and one nonvoting delegate forandidateand in the same manner. Tbe only innovationrovision for members of party organizations in Soviet Army and Navy units abroad to elect delegates at party conferences In their military units. Military personnel abroad had long been providedin the USSR Supremo Soviet on the basis of deputies elected in special military electoral districts. The extension of this privilege to the election of delegates to the party congress was another of the many gestures to the military which were made after Stalin's death.

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The resolution also called for the holding of oblast and kray party conferences and republic party congressesnd the first half of6 in preparation forh congress. Within the next several weeks party plenums in the union republics dutifully set dates for their congresses. Three republics, for reasons unknown, called them to meet in tbe latter half of January instead of tbe first half asby tbe July plenum's resolution: the Ukraine,anuary, Byelorussia,anuary, and Uzbekistan,anuary.

Delay in Drafting the Sixth Five-Year Plan

As it turned out, nearly all republics held their congresses in the latter half of the month, for reasons apparently related to the completion of the draft directives for the Sixth Five-Year Plan. The latter were not available untilanuary. All republic party congresses which were to meet beforeh were rescheduled to meet after that date; the four congresses which were to meet onh and later, met as scheduled.

The delay in preparation of the plan may have been due to little more than ahow long lt would actually take to develop the directives. Tt is alsothat Soviet planners and political leaders ran intodifficulties involving differences over aspects of economic policy. Tbe apparent divergence of views expressed ath party congress in February by Deputy Premiers and party presidium members M. Z. Saburov and U. G. Pervukhin on tbe one hand, and Minister of Coal Industry A. N. Zademidko and Minister of Ferrous Metallurgy A. G. Sheremetyev on the other, probablyehind-the-scenes battle in the formulation of tho draft Sixth Five-Year Plan directives. The disagreement was over tbe chances of the two ministries' fulfilling the production goals assigned them, but behind the specific issue were basicbetween regime objectives and the Interests and propensities of tbe economic bureaucracy that exists to translate thoseintoconflict of interest between those at the apex of the regime and the lower echelons concerning the tempo of Industrial growth and the balance between objectives and means.

One of the aspects of Soviet life that is almost universally resented is tho frenetic tempo of economic activity, the pressure on the individual, which is engendered by the regime's efforts to maximize growth and with which the concomitant and inevitable shortages of bousing and consumer goods Is associated. While lt is probably not correct to conclude, as Barrlngton Moore does,

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that resentment of tbe tenpo In bo great that the Soviet economy would stagnate if the dynamic forces emanating from tbe top leadership were removed, there is considerable evidence tothe belief that if the lower echelons of the Soviet were making the decision, the rate of growth would bo much lower. The principal evidence for foot dragging at levels not far removed from the top leadership is found in the public statements of the leaders themselves and hence must be presumed to bemall sample of the foot-dragging attemptedthe system.

Inmid complaints that several majorproposed very moderate expansion ln their activities,growth of industrial production5 was set atInstead of the usualoercent. The Sovietproceeded to tighten the screws and an Increase ofpercent resulted. Scattered evidence indicates that whencame to draft the Sixth Five-Year Plan directives theministries again proposed only moderate increases. speech toh party congress, Saburov noted, as antbat tbe Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy hadproduction incrementsons andof rolled steel below the increments6 plan.* It seems clear that if left to theirthe bureaucrats and engineers who run the Sovietthe ministries down to the plant would settle for growthlevel well below that demanded by the

The conservative production goals submitted by theministries did not derive only from opposition to the tenpo. Very important was the managers' desire toushion, toertain amount of "fat" to protect them from theexigencies of tbe system and the insatiable demands of the top leadership. The general attitude of the lower echelons was to ask for more than they needed and propose to do less tban they could and this attitude was countered by the people at the apex of the pyramid by setting production goals high andon the producing ministries to make up the difference out of "unutilized internal reserves." "Internal reserves" refers to any improvement in tbe use of resources which willreater output with no increase in inputs. "Unutilized" simply

Another example was the nore than doubling of0 goal for the production of blister copper in Kazakhstan over tbe figure which the Kazakh leaders as late as5 seemed to consider proper. An article on that date in the Kazakh Republic newspaper, Kazakhs tanskaya Pravda, gave the0 goal as anofercent5 production. The plan directives, published in January, called for an increase ofercent. Since Kazakhstan produces almost half of total USSR blister copper thisubstantial change.

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means that owingombination of lack of imagination and conscious decision to hoard and to keep some "fat" available, the responsible managers, at whatever level, have not taken the necessary steps to realize potential economies. The point of view of the top leaders was well expressed by both Saburov and Pervukhln at the congress. Saburov noted that:

The directors of certain ministries andincorrectly understand their tasks In the sphere of planning and directing tbe economy; they direct the efforts of their apparat toward drawing up and implementing plansanner designed to extract excessive means and resources from the state, rather than striving to expose and utilize existing internal reserves and thusthe agreed-to plans with the maximumin the use of state resources.

Pervukhln approached the problemomewhat different angle but in the same spirit andimilar conclusion. After berating the oil and chemical industry ministries fornatural gas as an excellent cheap fuel andaluable raw material for the chemical industry, Pervukhln said:

arrow departmental approach to inter-sector problemserious deficiency of many ministries and Institutions. Certain Conauinlsts--directors of ministries, economic organizations, andso bound up with narrowinterests that they cannot see beyond tbe end of their noses, and therefore theyarrow, utilitarian attitude ratherroad state attitude to tbe solution of tbe most important intersector Questions.

He then berated the ministries for purposely overestimatingcosts, stating that the ministerial cost estimates for the Sixth Five-Year Plan investment program had been scaled downillion rubles, fromillion rubles toillion programmed in tbe directives, and arguing that:

By strictlyegime of economy and by correctly distributing the resourcesto capital construction, all the investment projects for the Sixth Five-Year

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Plan for developing the various branches of the national economy, the construction of housing and social-cultural institutions, can be unconditionally fulfilled without supplementary capital investment.

The case for the opposition mas presented by Zademidko and Sheremetyev. Zadcmldko's position was simply stated. Tea, there had been "internal reserves" in the coalonsiderable lag in now mine construction the industry had overfulfilled the Fifth Five-Year Plan goals. But the over-fulfillment had exhausted all the "unutilized internalhere was no "fat' left, not even sufficient reserve capacity to permit the minimum necessary repair and maintenance work. concluded by stating flatly that the investmentto the coal Industry for the Sixth Five-Year Plan were not sufficient and that Gosplan would have to re-examine the matter and Increase allocations.

Sheremetyevimilar case. The "internal reserves" in bis industry had also been largely exhausted, tbe iron ore situation waa unsatisfactory, and tbe prospects for Improvement were dim owing to the unsatisfactory progress of new ore mines. Although Sheremetyev did not say that the Investment allocations were insufficient, he did say that0 goals for ferrous metals could not be reached if tbe construction of new mines, blast furnaces, rolling mills, and other new plants fell short as had happened ineriod.

Tbe conflicts of interest illustrated in these differing assessments of production capabilities are, of course, inherent in the Soviet economic and political system and haveole in the preparation of all state economic plans beginning with the first What may have exacerbated the situation In5 and stiffened lower level resistance to the changesby the top planners was the fact that in severalferrous metals, cemont, and possiblythe pressure for production, coupledailure to provide sufficient new plants in tbe past, had squeezed out most if not all of the "unutilized Internal reserves" and left the ministries concerned dependent on new capital construction to meet the high production goals assigned them. Neither Pervukhin nor Saburov, nor for that matter, apparently, any of the other top leaders, appeared willing to consider the possibility that not all of the ministries were asking for more than they really needed, and that there was an element of Increasing urgency in the requests of all.

The regime vas veil aware that the economy mas facing some potentially serious problems. For example, it recognized that outmoded machinery and equipmont and industrial processesa major drag on improving the quantity and quality of production, and that labor could no longer be transferred from the agricultural to the industrial sector to meet industrial production goals without sacrificing necessary agricultural production. This realization increased tbe attractiveness of some demobilization which, in the regime's view, depended lo turn on easing international tension, and it was clear that the required increase in labor productivity wasertain extent, at least, dependent on improving incentives--rationalizlng the wage structure and increasing the availability of housing and consumer goods.

The regime was also aware that the system of industrial organization was too centralized to make effective use oftalent, both managerial and technical, or to develop talent and initiative at lower echelons. Moreover, there vas aimbalance between tho growth of the basic materials and fuel industries on the one hand and the fabricating industries on the other, vith, as indicated above, warnings of impending trouble in at least two of the key basic materials industries becauso of insufficient new Investment and delays in theof new construction. But the dominant Soviet leaders vere apparently blissfully confident that these problems vere either not really urgent or else could be overcome by ad hoc measures vithln the traditional framework of Soviet "political" planning. If any members of the collective leadership disagreed vith this viev, they vere careful not to press the issue.

Another possible reason for the failure to complete tbe plan directives as early as had been anticipated was theredrafting of plan submissions from lower echelons in the industrial hierarchy in September in accordance vith an August letter from the party central committee. The letter was probably decreeointly issued by the central committee and the USSR Council of Ministers. It vas entitled "On Letters to Directors, Secretaries of Partyand Chairmen of Trade-Union Committees in Connection With Draving Up the Draft of the Sixth Five-Year Plan for the Development of the National Economy" and dealt vith procedures for draving up of the draft plan and apparently emphasizedlabor productivity, lowering costs, and increasing the

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output of Industrial products.* Aside from tbe naturalof enterprise officials to ask for more resources than they needed and to propose to produce less than they could, there were at least two recent developments that right havea redrafting of the plan submissions made earlier.**

The first of these was the increased attention toln the creation in late May ofState Committee for New Technology under theof Deputy Premier V. A. Malyshev and the emphasison technological improvements in his speech to thecommittee plenum. The other development was thethe regime's efforts toward achieving Internationalby tbe summit conference and the "Genevaclose connection of the latter with problems of economicwas frankly asserted by Saburov in early JulySaburov, describing his special

worries-as "planning chleT, insisted again and againessen-ing of tension must take place at Geneva because the Kremlin must put an end to indecision in economic directives, that is, must settle tbe question of the relative share of resources to beto defense, investment, and consumption.

Summit and After

Onay, the day Khrushchev, Bulganln, Mikoyan, and Shepilov traveled to Belgrade for tho historic rapprochement with Tito, the Soviet Government, in notes to Great Britain, Prance, and the United States, formally accepted theour-power, heads of government (summit) conference Another step was thus taken toward realizing what had been agoal of the post-Stalinrelaxation oftensions that would enable the Soviet Union tomilitary expenditures and devote more attention to domestic economic problems. One of the clear differences between the Malenkov and post-Ualenkov regimes was that tbe former,revious study in this series, had "attempted to enjoy the fruits of detente before detente had been assured."

* Decree No.2 was mentioned and partially describedoint decree6 published in Snravochnik Partlynogo Rabotnika. .

One trust had submitted its draft as early as May,une deadline for auch submissionseasonable assumption.

The Khrushchev-Bulganin regime sought to remedy this by increasing its efforts to secure agreementet of general principles of peace, security, and coexistence. Where the Halenkov government had been hesitant, defensive, and perhaps somewhat fearful in pursuit of its foreign policy, Khrushchev's regime vas confident, bold, and imaginative. The Austrian treaty and the improvement of relations vith Belgrade vere followed by the summit conference in July, an announcement of armed forces reduction In August, establishment of diplomatic relations with West Germany in September, the foreign ministers conference in ber,rip to South Asia by Bulganin and Khrushchev in Octo-November-December. All this activity vas marked by increasing evidencesev face of amiability and reasonableness inrounds of visits and cocktail parties vith tho Soviet leaders and among Soviet diplomats abroad.

Bulganin, as premier, was Soviet head of government, and therefore certain to be head of the Soviet delegation to the summit conference, but there vas some skepticism in Western circles concerning the conclusiveness of his authority. estern newsman asked Khrushchev in early May if it vere true that he vas "the pover behind the throne in Russia and if, in that case, it vas necessary (for him) to attend such talkshrushchev's replyf Bulganino not have to go to look over his shoulder" seemed to ansver the question of Khrushchev's participation but did not relieve the doubt about Bulganin's authority. President Eisenhover in his pressonune voiced this doubt when he queried vhether the Soviet leader at Geneva vould be able to make decisions binding on the other leaders. The press gave unusual coverage to the President's query, and the regime announced that the delegation vould Include Khrushchev, despite his earlier disavowal of any necessity to go, as reassurance to the West that the Sovietvould be able to make binding "on the spot" decisions at Geneva, and that the Soviet leaders vereenuine effort toetente. ress conference onuly, Bulganin emphasized this last point by stating that the Soviet delegation sincerelyeaceful resolution of the vorld's problems and vas going to Geneva vith every intention of cooperating in the search for peace.

Khrushchev, the principal architect of the regime's new "activist" approach in foreign relations, vas certainlyeluctant participant in the conference, and to have to sit at home while one of the major steps in this approach vas being taken might veil have galled the self-confident and Impatient first secretary. Foreign Minister Molotov vas the only other member of the top leadership included, the remaining members

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of the five-man delegation being Defense Minister G. K. Zhukov and First Deputy Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko. Zhukov, of course, vas included in order to capitalize on the wartimeof friendship and respect established vith Eisenhower, while Gromyko vas to supply technical advice.

At the time of the summit conference Molotov's role in the Soviet top leadership and the extent of his influence vas not clear. Mis censure by tbe central committee at the July plenum for continuing to oppose the reconciliation vith Yugoslavia after the decision had been taken in the presidium and affirmed by the central committee, showed, of course, that he hada severe loss of political power, but he had not been removed from the presidium nor relieved as foreign minister and so presumably retained some voice ln Soviet foreign policy. The party censure may veil have softened Molotov's voice but he wasough nut to crack and it is entirely conceivable that he continued to express his dissatisfaction vith various of Khrushchev's policy proposals.

The summit conference itself appeared to provide fev grounds for additional disagreements arising betveen Molotov and the others, either in regard to Soviet objectives or tbe mechanism of tbe conference. Molotov may have been somevhat apprehensive, hovever, about hov far the attempt topirit of conciliation might carry Bulganln and Khrushchev tovard making substantive concessions, and he vould most likely have been more comfortable without Khrushchev's presence.

As events transpired, Molotov need not have been overly concerned about concessions, and Khrushchev, so far as is knovn, neither usurped Bulganln's role as head of the delegation nor interfered in Molotov's job of drafting, in conjunction vith the foreign ministers of the other three powers, the communique or directive vhich represented the substantive results of the conference. This vas tbe difficult task of diplomaticthe painstaking formulation, word by vord and comma by comma, of what the parties to the conference could agree on. It was Molotov's responsibility as foreign ministerob he was comfortable doing. In the round of luncheons, dinners, and cocktail parties, however, heack seat to Khrushchev and Bulgahin in propagating the spirit of cooperativeness, amiability, and general good"Genevavhich was the main Soviet objective at the conference.

The contrast between the early part of the conference, vhen Khrushchev and Bulganln were intent on creating this cordial atmosphere, and the later stages of the conference, vhen Molotov and Gromyko vere bardheadedly negotiating the conference agreement,

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led some observers to conclude that Molotovtumbling block to conciliation, and that so long as be remained foreign minister little real progress could be registered toward tbe settlement of outstanding issues. Bulganin, in apparent agreement with tbls view, remarked at Geneva, according to one report, that it might be necessary to get rid of Molotov as foreign minister before the foreign ministers' conference, which the four powers had agreed to hold in October.

The context within which the remark was allegedly made was not stated, but it is likely that Bulganin vas responding to criticism of vhat one observer described as Molotov's "tactics of trickery and devlousness." Bulganin, therefore, wasseeking to dispel any feeling that tbe regime vas not sincere in its talk of peace and relaxation of tensions, rather than indicating any imminent move to remove Molotov. The remark did appear to show, hovever, that Molotov's future was still in

question.

In tbe weeks following the summit conference, Molotov's status appeared unchanged. He vas present vith the other Soviet leaders at the Supreme Soviet session In early August at vhlch Bulganin reported on tbe summit talks, and he participated in the campaign for affability at Bulganin's unprecedented partyugust for tbe chiefs of foreign missions accredited to Moscov, vith their wives and children, an afternoon of walking, roving, refreshment, and exchange of pleasantries. Moreover, he vas among the presidium members vho delivered reports on the July central committee plenum to local party meetings in Moscov, his beingarty meeting in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Khrushchev and Bulganin continued, hovever, to play theroles in relations vith foreign states. They stopped off in Berlin on their return from Geneva to reassure tho East German regime concerning Soviet intentionsis theissue and probably to discuss their tactics into the forthcoming talks vith Adenauer and negotiations for establishing diplomatic relations with West Germany; and they took the lead at receptions and talks vith foreigners in Moscov In the program to "humanize" the Soviet regime.

Further Moves Against Molotov

What vas either evidenceurther deterioration In Molotov's positionramatic rendatlon of tho low estate to vblcb he had fallen vas apparent during the talks with Chancellor3 September. The Soviet policy of seeking detente on the basis of the existing pover positions in Europe involved the immediate objective of vlnnlng general recognition of the

existence of two German states. Th*as for aof Soviet relations withiflSS and steps to that end had been initiateduring ?he four days of the sometimes bitterresulted in tbell-sat in the second row at the conference table and did not par.

ticipate ln the exchange of views. 1

appearance waa

epressing, and at tikes' pitiable." "At times he was theand at others, heomantic of the old dayslonger knew how to conduct himself." Both Khrushchev andapparently went out of their way to treat him ln amanner. When ideas were agreed to or decisionscontinually used the expression "let Molotov work thishimecretary.

[

berated Moruiuv ai one" pointbiuTement he had worked out with the German state "You are not to make agreements with anyone'. that isand not yours. Your sole task is to draw up the Tou are our editor." Chancellor Adenauershocked at the manner in

wnich-the Ru^ians-treated Molotov. He related how Khrushchev and Bulganln Jokod over someone's comment that Molotov'sportrayed him looking duller than reality. Khrushchev laughed, nudged Bulganin and inquired if he noticed anyin real life.

The whole episodeery bad impression on the West Germans, so it is difficult to see what provoked both Bulganln and Khrushchev into this demonstration of Molotov'sinfluence and power. ossible clue is provided by issue numberf Kommunist, approved for publication oneptember, which carried Molotov's forced admission of havingtheoretically mistaken and politically harmful" declaration about the achievement of socialism ln the USSR. Molotovresisted this additional move against him with all the strength he could muster, so it is conceivable that the writing of the letter, datedeptember, the day before he left for the UN General Assembly, followed an acrimoniouswithin the presidium which carried over into Khrushchev's and Bulganln's treatment of him during the negotiations with West Germany.

The ideological "mistake" which was the basis of Molotov's public penance wasseudo issue. It is highlythat anyone could seriously have been misled by Molotov's faux pas, which occurred in the courseong speech to the Supreme Soviet5 devoted entirely to foreign

policy:

Along with the Soviet Union, where the foundationsocialist society have already been "built, there are also such countries of people's democracy as havo made only the first, but highlysteps in the direction of socialism. (Italics added)

The phrase vas clearly at variance vith official dogma vhlch,ad stated that socialism has been achieved in tbe main and that the Soviet state is now on the path to communism. But thislip in terminology rather than an attempt to contradict official doctrine since Just five paragraphs earlier in the same speech be had "correctly" stated that "socialism had already triumphed in our country in the period before the second World War."

The lead editorial In tho same issue of Kommunist thatthe letter used Molotov's "error"pringboardroad exposition of party propaganda on both external and Internal affairs. The main stress of the editorial vas on tho needcreative" ratherdogmatic" application of Marxist theory:

Marxist theory illuminates the path of practice tovard great alms. Buttheory only proves capable of this by virtue of always sensitively heeding the demands of The isolation of theory from life, attempts to cling fast to dogma, are particularly impermissible.

The editorialointed warning, certainly to Molotov, but possibly also to other high-ranking members of the Soviet hierarchy, to cease opposition or foot-dragging against the nev policies of the Khrushchev-Bulganin regime:

Guided by the revolutionary dialectic, the party analyzes tbe phenomena of life from the angle of the struggle of the nev vith the old, in every way supports vhat isand eradicates vhat Is negative, takes the necessary measures for removing from our path the obstacles imped*!ng the unfolding of the creative forces of the Soviet people. The party is intolerant of the complacency, the conceit of certain leaders, oT instances of their isolation from the masses. (Italics added)

Both domestic and foreign relations problems were mentioned in this connection, making it clear that the editorial wasagainst general inflexibility and obstructionism and not exclusivelyogmatic approach in foreign policy.

A central committee censure such as that given Uolotov in July would probably have been sufficient to bring mostofficials into line, but Uolotov was not so easily broken. There is moreint of continued intransigence in ahe is reported to have made to one

in

ollcy,

early September. Referring to thee said in obvious disgruntlement, "In order to accomplishwe do not need new methods of negotiation." Thoughsomewhat subdued, he may have continued to carryear-guard action against Khrushchev's program thus giving the aid and comfort of an Old Bolshevik, widely respected throughout the Soviet Union, to those Soviet officials who for one reason or another were opposed to any aspect of the new policies.

The familiar Bolshevik ritual of public penance for past mistakes may, therefore, have been resorted toeans of dramatically illustrating the strength of the Khrushchev faction and the extent of Molotov's political bankruptcy in order tothe futility of continued opposition and thewith which such opposition or foot-dragging would be viewed. If this were the sole reason for the letter of recantation, it would suggest that Khrushchev was having more difficulty putting his program into effect than is readily apparent from other Outwardly, at least, the policies espoused appeared

* ehind-the-scenes controversy over agricultural policy,involving the introduction of ideas gleaned from USpractice, however, might have been going on at this time. Tbe post of minister of agriculture, which had been vacantas filled by the appointment of Khrushchev's protege V. V. Matskevich onctober, just six days after Kommunist No.as distributed. Matskevich, who was the act-lng minister, hadoviet agricultural delegation to the Unitedugust) and was apparently very much impressed with some aspects of American agriculture, particularly the relatively few laborers required to farm America's acres. In earlyetter was sent out by the party central committee calling attention to "serious deficiencies" inwork. The principal deficiencies listed were the low productivity of labor on the kolkhozy, the poor use ofmachinery, and the poor efficiency in farming. As anof efficient employment of labor, reference was made to the USA, where only one man was needed to farm one thousand hectares of corn. The letter also cited the successes of US farming in corn harvesting, silaging, hay harvesting, and other activities.

the schedule set in the Fifth Five-Year Plan.* In an effort to fulfill its production goals the government was forced to resort to the expedient of increasing the labor force beyond its intentions..

Tbe problem was complicated by the fact that thegoods goals were not fully met, largelyufficient increase in agricultural output did notand, consequently, purchasing power ran ahead ofsupply. The effect of the government's policies was thus to increase demand before it was able to provide the consumer goods to meet it and, thgreforp. to vltlat* tho

incentive element in its program.

cnrusncnov

rtourinuiy criticized Malenkov directly on This score,that he had "created demands in the soviet people

without having created the capacity for satisfying them."

Much the same point was made by Kaganovich, who remarked!

Ithat "itistake to raise the svauuuru ui living too quickly as this producedand lack of discipline among the population." But, though it had failed to meet its goals, the program hadhad the further undesirable effect ofrain on stateondition which Bulganin, in his first speech as premier, said could not be allowed.

Confusion in the Ranks

Towards the endpparently, there was aof perplexity as to the regime's aims andhaseet-

ing of ideologists and economists which he attended inln "When the subject of relative stress on light and heavy industry came up fore says, "thereituation amounting to 'bourgeois* with every man expressing his own interpretation of the party position. It was comolete disorder and the first

to Soviet statistics, labor productivity increased onlyercent foreriod, whereas realercent. From the point of view of the Sovietelatioa between these rates of growth isunfavorable, because it tends to constrict the surplusfor Investment and hence the rate of growth of tho Soviet economy.

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on disarmament on theay proposals already rejected by the Westernother words to stand pat on all three items on tbe conference agenda--it is doubtful that the letter had any adverse effect on the negotiations. Molotov ably upheld the Soviet position on all issues and managed at the same time to convey the idea that the failure of the conference to reach agreement on any of the main issues did not end the Geneva spirit or herald' the return of the cold war. Though bereft of much of his old power and influence he continued toseful member of the presidium for his experience and skill at diplomatic negotiation.

The Decline of Kaganovleh

Molotov's difficulties in adapting to the new foreign policy line and to Khrushchev's dynamic and sometimes unorthodox tactics were apparently in some measure shared by Kaganovich. In his four public speeches since Stalin's death. Kaganovleh hadontinuing orientation toward- olshevik style of thought and reverence forather reluctant endorsement of the post-Stalin "newendency toough foreign policy. He was undoubtedly one of Khrushchev's staunch, allies in the heavy vs. light industry controversy and healso supported him in his efforts tore-establish the supremacy of the party andore militant spirit in party members.*

Onay, Kaganovich had been appointed chairman of the newly organized state committee for labor and wages in what appeared to be another of the trouble-shooting assignments for which he was Justly famous. The formation of thisody was partroad program for increasing labor productivity which, in view of the smaller additions to the labor force likely to be available,ajor requirement for continuing the high rates of Industrial growth desired by the regime. The committee was given responsibility forand overseeing the work of ministries andin the handling of labor resources, for regulatingand interregional wage differentials, the Industrial and geographical distribution of the labor force, workand safety, construction of dwellings and otherdesigned for worker use, and socialshort, general supervision of all government activities in the labor field. The job of chairman was, therefore, one of primeand not likely to be given anyone felt to be out of sympathy with the alms of the regime.

* He was, lor example, the first presidium member to come out publiclyor Khrushchev when the latter began his climb to the top in the collective leadership.

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Other signs that Kaganovich ranked high in the leadership were noted well into the fall: the photograph in theuly Pravda showing the return of Bulganin and Khrushchev from the summit conference has Kaganovich looming in the foreground as the most prominent of the greeters, and he was chosen tothe October revolution anniversary address, traditionally the most comprehensive and authoritative policy statement of the year.

The speech he deliveredurious mixture of expressions and concepts of revolutionary Marxism, affirmation of the virtues of coexistence, and praise, albeitor the West. ajor emphasis of the speech was on classical Marxist-Leninist revolutionaryreoccupation unparalleled In October revolution spseches since the war. In this emphasis the speech was in line with the Kommunist editorial that accompaniedapology for ideological error. But whereas tbe Kommunist editorial Inveighed against the "isolation of theory from prac-tice, attempts to cling to dogma" and appealed for flexibility, Kaganovich stressed "devotion to principles" and the lessons of7 revolution. He seemed to be trying to show that current Soviet policy with its innovating flexibility was part of the world revolutionary stream andtruly Marxistut his militant doctrinaire orthodoxy so overshadowed the whole effort that the speech stands out as the major discordant note in the Soviet new look between the July plenum andh party congress.

Twoalf weeks later, onovember, ths Hoscow subway, which had borne Kaganovich's namesnamed for Lenin. The subway may have been renamed inof the newly completed Leningrad subway, named for Lenin onovember, and to ensureesser subway would notreater name, but it was the first time that the nameoviet leader had been removedajor Sovietexcept when such leaders were purged or otherwise disgraced, and so waslow at Kaganovich's prestigeign that he had slipped somewhat in power and influence. However, there was nothing in the subway incident to suggest that lt was part of an attack onwas no mention, for example, that it had ever borne his name and one of the stations was immediately redesignated with bis name.

Possibly Kaganovich had begun to slip even beforeovember speech. There is some evidence, at any rats, tothat M. G. Pervukhin had gained in prestige and Influence at Kaganovich's expense. Both men were first deputy premiers but Kaganovich was senior to Pervukhin, havingirst

deputy premier sincehile the latter was notirst deputy premier until Onnd again onervukhln signed decrees of the USSR Council of Ministers, presumably as acting chairman since decrees (postanoylenlya) are signed by the chairman (or person assigned to act ln hla atead) and by the administrator of affairs. Pervukhln, therefore, would seen to have hadover Kaganovich, vbo was apparently in Moscow during the period covered by these decrees.* Pervukhln had apparently earlier been nade chairmanCommission of the Presidium of tbe USSR Council of Ministers for Current Affairs" which had been created "to examine and decide all currant questions" relating to areas of responsibility of more than one first deputy premier or deputy premier, in other words, to decide Issues between deputy premiers. This would appear toob of considerable power and influence, but none of the problems with which theis known to have concerned itself appear particularly significant so it is possible that its power did not extendrelatively minor administrative disagreements. Even so, the Job was an important one and served to enhance Pervukhin's position.

Following the ouster in7 of the "anti-party group" (malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich, and Shepilov "who joined'aganovich was charged in Sotsialistichesky Trud, journal of the State Committee on Labor and Wages, with having sabotaged tbe work of the committee while he was chairman:

Kaganovich deflected lt fron solving the fundamental, pressing tasks of setting in order organization of work and quota-setting, improving working conditions, and consistently applying the socialist principle of payment and through stimulation of higher labor the only thing ln whichshowed persistence was the policy of

Premier Bulganln did not leave on bis vacationut nay have been so busy byh with diplomatic functions and last-nlnute preparations for the trip that he had already appointed Pervukhln to act for hin. Of tbe other first deputy premiers, Mikoyan was absent fron Moscow on vacation throughout the period; Molotov, who was away ln September, had returned beforectober but was not likely to rate the acting chair-nan's Job; Saburov like Kaganovich was present throughout the period and was apparently therefore also outranked by Pervukhln.

liquidating (the committee). Sensing that there would be inevitable exposure of his inactivity in carrying outh party congress decisions on putting in order the organization, quotas, and payment of labor, Kaganovich tried to putecision to disband the committee and thereby evade

There is, ofuspicion of prevarication in suchcriticism but the committee did make little observable progress during the period of Kaganovich's chairmanship, and the pace of the wage reform was stepped up considerably in the fall6 after he was relieved. The main emphasis of Sotsiallstichesky Trud's criticism was on the period followingh party congress, so theretrong possibility that Kaganovich's opposition developed slowly through the fall and winterut did not become really active until after the denigration of Stalin ath party congress.

It seems improbable that Kaganovich was opposed to wage reform as such. More likely, he became generally disillusioned with the trend away from the tried and true practices of the past associated with Khrushchev's post-Malenkov policies. With his general ideological orientation it is certainly conceivable that he evaluated the results of the summit conference negatively, on the grounds that capitalists can't be trusted, and opposed any reduction in the share of national Income to be devoted toin the coming five-year plan period. He may also have opposed even the very limited steps toward decentralizing Soviet industrial administration that followed Bulganin's July plenum speech, probably fearing that the regime would weaken itsof the industrial process. And he probably had strong reservations about the value of wage reform in increasing labor productivity, an issue more directly related to the work of his State Committee on Labor and Wages. Hovever, despite thethat he was less than enthusiastic for some ofpolicies, there was no public attack on him, suggesting that he was careful not to object too strongly.

Personal Diplomacy

Tbe Soviet role in the impasse at Geneva suggested that the Soviet leaders hadimited appreciation for formalnegotiations, while the vigor with which they wereinformal and bilateral nonbloc contacts reflectedfaith in personal persuasion. Mlkoyan "vacationed" in

Yugoslavia fromeptemberctober, continuing the wooing of Tito and other Yugoslav party officials on an informal,plane, and during the summer and fall an unprecedented series of visits to Moscow by non-Communist leaders andwerearge number of which were accepted. Following the visit of Adenauer, there were visits by Finnish President T. K. Paasikivi in September, Canadian Minister of External Affairs Lester Pearson, New Zealand Deputy Premier Keith Holyoake, and Burmeseu in October, followed by one by Norwegian Premier E. Gerhardsen in November. Some of these came at the head of official delegations for negotiations with the Soviet leaders, others were Just friendly visits.

Another type of contact which was fostered was the visit of parliamentary delegations. These visits had developed rapidly after the USSR hadarliamentary group onune and decided to join the Interparliamentary Union. Visits of parliamentary delegations from Syria, Yugoslavia, Japan, France, Belgium, Austria, Luxembourg, and others followed in rapid succession. The Soviet groupit slow on returning the visits but did visit Yugoslavia and Finland. More specialized contacts were also sought, such asonstructionheaded by Deputy Premier V. A. Kucherenko to Britain, France, and Italy; exchanging naval visits with Britain,Austria, and Sweden; and receiving such groups as an Austrian delegation of journalists, severalelegation from the London County Council and such individuals as US Supreme Court Justice Williamouglas.

During the negotiations with or receptions for these foreigners, Bulganln and Khrushchev played the principal roles; and tbey were the stellar attractions, for the first timeby other top leaders, in the most ambitious and dramatic of their post-summit efforts at personalthe month-long tour of India, Burma, and Afghanistan which began onovember.

From the outset it was apparent that the Soviet Unionthe trip to be more thanriendly visit and that Khrushchev and Bulganln expected to use itpringboard forajor propaganda and policy bid to line up Asian "neutralism" behiod Soviet "peaceful coexistence." The two appeared to work welleam. actic repeated with considerable effect, Bulganln as premier made the expected friendly, noncontroversial speech and Khrushchev followeditriolic, rabble-rousing speech taking considerable liberty with historical developments and seeking to stir up hate for past colonial masters. Except in Afghanistan, the two made special efforts to break awayIP, conducted-tour routine

and meet the people. They strived to create an informaldonned national costumes, tasted local foods, and gave special attention to little children.

So far as relations between the two were concerned, the trip served to demonstrate tbe relative superiority of Khrushchev over Bulganln. Though Khrushchev had certainly been the more vocal in proclaiming the pust-Malenkov new course, tbe Vest Germans had come away in September with tbe impression that the two were equal, neither apparentlyecision without consulting the other. Adenauer even entertained the idea that Bulganln might be the more important man. During the South-East Asia trip, however, Khrushchev quite obviously took the initiative on several occasions without prior consultation vith Bulganln.* It was Khrushchev vho announced tbe Soviet explosionulti-megaton device, vho gave approval forroup ofstudents and scholars to vork in Indian educationaland vho took the lead in pursuing Informal contacts.

That Khrushchev and Bulganln should have felt free to trundle around South Asia for over four vooks and to take vith them tbe chief of the secret police, Serov, vas convincing proof of the confidence vith vhich they vieved the stability of their positions and the serenity of the political scene at home. vho had accompanied thea to China4 and Yugoslavia5 but vbo had been left at home "to run the fare" vhen the tvo vent to Geneva for the summit meeting ln July, vas apparently again left ln charge during the Asia junket.

* Khrushchev's primacy In the presidium had already been more or less publicly acknowledged. Onctober, Pravda published his remarks at the presentation of the Order of the Red Banner of Labor to the City of Sevastopol onctober In which, though Voroshllov had made the major speech in presenting the award, Khrushchev undertook to speak "on behalf of the centraland the presidium. ovember, Pravda publishedchange orelegram from Deputy Prime Minister Holyoake of New Zealand, mistakenly addressing Khrushchev by the old title of supremo leadership, "General Secretary of the CPSU."

Toward the last of December, both Khrushchev and Bulganln gave reports on their trip to the Supreme Soviet, emulating the example set it in August vhen Bulganln reported on the summit conference. Bulganin's December report vasoutine account of tbe trip while Khrushchev's remarkshole range of international problems. Both expressed confidence that the trip had enhanced Soviet prestige and influence among the so-called "uncommitted" nations of Southeast Asia. Tbe speakers in the ensuing "discussion" praised their activities and the Supreme Soviet formally commended them and expressed complete satisfaction with the results of the trip.

II. PERSONNEL APPOINTMENTS IN PREPARATION FOR THE TWENTIETH PARTY CONGRESS

Proootions to the m and Secretariat

In his struggle to reach the commanding place in theKhrushchev, perhaps mindful of the reaction against Bcriya. had apparently used vith restraint and soae hesitancy whatever povers he possessed in the manipulation of personnel assignments and packing of party and government bodies. Whether this vas by choice or because heree hand in this field Isunimportant. The point is that the struggle took place primarilyifferent arena. Both Malenkov and Molotov vere bested in policy disputes and, though they received theirand rebuke at the hands of the central committee, this action vas largely pro forma following the victory ofpoint of viev in the presidium.

The July plenum appears tolight change inapproach; he seems to become somewhat less restrained in securing personnel changes clearly in his political interest. It is difficult, for example, to see "collective leadership" at vork in the selection of the nev members added to the all-important presidium and secretariat at the plenum, the first to either body slnco the reorganizations follovlng Stalin's death. Beriya's old position on the central committee vas taken by Marshal Zhukov inut no successor had been named to Beriya's place on the presidium and no replacement on the secretariat had been made for S. D. in3 for complicity in the DoctorsN. N. transferred to Prlmorye Kray in5 following Malenkov's demotion.

A. I. Kirichenko, elected to the presidium, was Khrushchev's protege" and political steward in the Ukraine. Two of the nev secretaries, N. I. Belyayev, party boss in the Altay Kray and an agricultural expert, and Pravda editor D. T. Shepllov shoved evidences of being Khrushchev men. Belyayev hadan aggressive virgin lands agricultural program in Altay Kray in3 in apparent anticipation of Khrushchev's "new lands" program presented to the central committee Shepllov accompanied Khrushchev to Pelping in4 for the fifth anniversary celebration of the Chinese People's Republic and to Belgrade in5 for the rapprochement with Tito. Khrushchev's outraged description of Shepllov in7shameless, double-dealing individual" supports the view that earlier, at least, he had been onteam.

Suslov, the other addition to the presidium, badentral party secretary two years before Khrushchev. And though they wero together on the secretariat for fouralf years there is no evidence to Indicate moreorking relationship. Suslov, therefore, may have been sponsored by some other member or members of the presidium. The same can be said concerning the sponsorship of Arlstov, transferred from the first secretary's post in Khabarovsk Kray to become the third additional central party secretary. It is difficult, however, to see who their sponsors might be. Neither Suslov nor Arlstov had any special discernible ties with other members of theand in any event their appointment hardly seems anquid pro quo for the appointment of Kirichenko, Belyayev, and Shepilov. Moreover, Suslov's speech ath partyin6 was the most frankly laudatory ofof anyop leader, and Arlstov promptly took over responsibility for party organizational and personnel work,acting ln Khrushchev's interests for an increasing number of high-level appointments began to boar the stamp of Khrushchev's hand.

Control of Personnel Selection andhe Secretariat And Appara't'uVi

Concentration of control over personnel assignments ln all fields of Soviet life ln the party secretariat and its executive staff, the apparatus, was one of the Important, If not the most important, factors ln Stalin's rise to supreme dictatorial power. If this power remained concentrated in tbe secretariat afterhen Khrushchev, from3 the top-ranking secretary and in September named first was from the very beginning in the most powerful political position, and lt could beatter of time before he had established hla own one-man rule as Stalin's true successor. That Khrushchev seems well on his wayosition of absolute political supremacy, however, is not proof tbat what vas true for Stalin vas true for Khrushchev. Khrushchevime at least may have had to rely on other means.

What Is not clear in this connection is the extent to which the presidium in the months Immediately following Stalin's deathirect Interest in and control over the secretariat and apparatus in the personnel field. Ultimate control overselection and appointment, as in all substantive policy fields, was presumably intended to be exercised by the prosldlum, actingody. But this did not prevent Beriya frommaking personnel changesid for supremo power.

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It is doubtful, however, even if presidium control wereime somewhat lax, if Khrushchev would haveree hand within the secretariat. The maneuver in March which cost Malenkov his place on the secretariat left there one of his proteges, K. N. Shatalin, where he could report to his patron and possibly check any unilateral moves Khrushchev might make. The role of Suslov, who had become the ranking secretary in terms of tenure, and who presumably had ample opportunity in his six years of intimate day-to-day work with the professional party machine to learn the political ropes andollowing through personal relationships and patronage, is still somethingystery. His political ties with members of the post-Stalin presidium are not clear, and it is extremely difficult to see his hand in moreew of the personnel changes betweenhh party congresses. Pospelov seems to have been even less involved in political machinations. With the downfall of Malenkov and the consequent removal of Shatalin from theKhrushchev's freedom of action within the secretariat and apparatus was perceptibly Increased.

The Centralrganization and Personnel

The value of the apparatus as an instrument of influence and power lies principally in its two major functions. It serves not onlyeans of centralized control over personnelbut also as an important source of information and advice for the top leaders. Reports, memos, and staff studiesfrom the apparatus undoubtedly influence policy-making. Put to partisan purposes, such reports might be decisive in effecting policy decisions desired by Khrushchev.

Organizationally, the main developments in the apparatus In the two years following Stalin's deatheversal of most of the departmental mergers which occurred shortly afterh party congress innd an organizational innovation associated withdivision of theof agriculture and of party organs along territorial lines. Responsibility for the Russian Republic was given to the departments of "Agriculture for the RSFSR" and "Party Organs for thehile the otherepublics were served by the departments of "Agriculture for the Union Republics" and "Party organs for the Union Republics." In his speech to the central committee inhrushchev related the creation of the new departments "for the RSFSR" to deficiencies in the work of state and party organs connected within the Russian federation.

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A general restafflng of leading posts was also carried out within the apparatus. The old corps of leading apparatchiks, developed for the most part during the period when Malenkov's influence within the apparatus was especially strong, had been largely replaced with new directing personnel, several of whom had had prior associations with Khrushchev,

In the months precedingh party congress Khrushchev made additional appointments,eorganization of several departments and related personnel changes ledompletely new leadership supervising the party's activities in theagitation, education, science, and cultural fields. V. U. Churayev, .party first secretary for six years in theKharkov Oblast In the Ukraine when Khrushchev was Ukrainian party boss, was appointed bead of the department of par.tyorgans for the RSFSR. To head the agriculture department for the union republics, Khrushchev picked P. Ye. Doroshenko who had risen in the Ukrainian party organization to serve as head of the agriculture department in the Ukrainian partyand then first secretary in Vinnitsa Oblast.

The Department of Propaganda and Agitation was divided, apparently in October or November,epartment "for the union republics"epartment "for the BSFSR" along the lines of the departments of party organs and agriculture, earlier. F. V; Konstantinov, rector of the Academy of Social Sciences under the central committee sinceecame head of the "union republics" department, and V. P. Hoskovsky, until5 editor in chief of the Defense Ministry's pewspaper, Krasnaya Zvezda, was assigned to head the "RSFSR" department. It is not clear whether Konstantinov replaced V. S. Kruzhkov as head of the Department of Propaganda and Agitation, earlier, in order to carry out the reorganization or came in just as the division took place. In any event, Kruzhkov, whose article in4 was unquestionably on tbe right side of the light vs. heavy industry controversy, had been rdpiaced by Konstantinov whose corresponding articleto. be just as unquestionably on the wrong side. (Seep. The subsequent disappearance of Kruzhkov, who was last identified on5 as head of the Department of Propaganda and Agitation, has only served to deepen the mystery.

Sometime during the fall5 the Department of Science and Culture was broken up and A. M. Rumyantsev, who had been its head since its formationas named editor in chief of the party's theoretical Journal, Kommunist, replacing S. M. Abalin who became editor in chief of the party's organizational

journal, Partiynaya Zhlzn. Abalin's predecessor on Partiynaya Zhlzn is not known. Out of "science and culture" cane aofepartment of Culture, and,though not specifically identified,epartment of Science.

N. D. Kazmln was transferred from third secretary of the Leningrad Oblast committee to head the new schools department. His background Indicates that he wasime, atrotege of Malenkov's. He was headector, presumably schools, of tbe Department of Propaganda and Agitationnd was transferred to Leningrad Oblast as thirdin9ime when Malenkov appeared to betho replacement of Zhdanovites in the Leningrad party organization. He remained in the third secretary's post until3 when the assignment of N. G- Ignatov as secondmoved him down one slot. In3 he regained the third secretary's post in the shake-up, apparently engineered by Khrushchev, which marked the removal of V. M. Andrianov as Leningrad party boss and the end of Malenkov's control of the Leningrad party organization. Khrushchev's interest in andwith Leningrad affairs and the subsequent careers of suchs Kazmln and F. R. Kozlov and the curious career of K. G. Ignatov strongly suggest that the Leningrad party organization fell under Khrushchev's Influence3 andwitch in the political allegiance of Kazmln and Kozlov was an important factor in Khrushchev's victory. (See below)

The head of tbe new Department of Culture, D. A. Polikarpov, badather checkered career marked by noarly completeeclipse6 He lost his Job asof the Union of Soviet Writers6 In tbe reorganization of the union which accompanied the campaign for strict doctrinal orthodoxy in literature and theolicy associated with A. A. Zhdanov. 3 he emerged from obscurity in the position of Director of the Moscow State Pedagogical Institute,ecretary in the Moscow City party committee in4 and in December againecretary of the writers' union, transferring to the Culture Department Job in His assignment in the Moacow party organization suggestsand in his rehabilitation.

If as seemsepartment of Science existed, there is reason to suppose that V. A. Kirillin was its head. Kirillin hadeacher and deputy director in tbe Moscow Energetics Institute, named for Molotov. He became USSR deputy minister of higher education innd soon after the Statefor New Te chics (Gostekhnika) was croated ine was named deputy chairman. He was last identified in this

post in September and was not identified in the central party apparatus untils head of the Department of Science, Higher Educational Institutions, and Schools, theof a. reorganization6 involving the departments of culture, schools, and science. His election to the presidium ofh Armenian party congress in6 and the fact that he was not elected to the Armenian central committeethat he was at the congressepresentative of the central party apparatus and hence may already have been head of some department, mostepartment of Science.

In early5 the editorship of Literaturnaya Gazeta was transferred from B. S. Ryurikov, who had succeeded K. fa. Slnomov in the posto V. A. Kochetov. Kochetov had been general secretary of the Leningrad branch of the Union of Soviet Writers; Ryurikov became deputy head of the Department of Culture.

The reason behind these moves is not yet clear. It has not been possible to find in the appointments evidences ofover policy but it may be observed that the organizational changes would probably aid in increasing flexibility in the party's operations in these fields, and that the personnel shifts would bring new blood to the solution of problems. What the regime may have intended was to prepareresh approach to solving the dilemma which had plagued it since Stalin's death: how to stimulate creativity and at the same time maintainconformity.

The bid of writers and other creative artists for aof political controls over the arts which was made in the "thaw" of3 and4 had been rebuffed, but total repression was not revived; and discussion at the second writers' congress inhough steering clear of tho basic issue of political control, frequently called for greater aesthetic latitude and more imaginative approach. The status quo had its defenders but the regime failed to speak and the congress ended on an inconclusive note.

By the end5 no clear, unequivocal line bad yet been evolved by the regime. Apparently authoritative articles in Pravda and Literaturnaya Gazeta in November on h anniversary of the publication of Lenin's work on Bolshevik Literature, strongly affirmed the propagandists function ofliterature and asserted that the militant Zhdanov decrees on culture would remain the basis of party policyong time to come. In December, an equally authoritative editorial inrepublished in the regional press, carried the claims for

aesthetic flexibility further than anything that had appeared in the party press since the end oforld War II, but the validity of the Zhdanovas again stressed in January by A. I. Kirichenko at the Ukrainian party congress. There was thus an evident need for clarification of the party lineuggestion in the Konnunist article, at least, that tbe regine night be tempted to make United concessions in order to release the well-springs of creativity. The emphasis on the Zhdanov decrees, bow-ever, served notice that Soviet creative artists must stay within party-defined limits.

h party congress in February would have been anplace for the concessions to be explained and tbe limits defined. Instead, Khrushchev made it clear that, with an extension of cultural contacts with the West, the party nust guardelaxation of ideological discipline and theof "alien" influences. The congress, it is true, stimulated culturalotesult of any newly defined policy in the cultural field, but of the iconoclastic destruction of the Stalin nyth.

Changes in Republic Leadership

Changes ln the leadership ln Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan had the effect of preparing the way for the promotion of two of Khrushchev's protegen to the presidium ath party congress in February. L. I. Brezhnev, the new party first secretary ln Kazakhstan, bad servedolitical officer with the Soviet armed forces duringn the Ukraine. He remained in the Ukraine after the war as first secretary of the industrially important Zaporozhye and Dnepropetrovsk Oblasts under the close supervision of Khrushchev, then Ukrainian party boss. Inhortly after Khrushchev had returned to Moscowember of tbe central party secretariat and asspokesman for the regime, Brezhnev was appointed first secretary of tbe Moldavian Republic then plagued withdifficulties. He was elected to the expanded partyath congressandidate member and to the party secretariat. Removed after Stalin's death, he returned to nilltary political work directing the political directorate of the navy. In4 he was sent to Kazakhstan as second secretary. P. K.andidate nenber of the party presidiun, was appointed first secretary at tbe sane tine.

The first secretary's post ln Kazakhstan became vacant, ln effect,when Ponomarenko was appointed ambassador to Poland5 and its duties were performed by Brezhnev. ugust, Ponomarenko was officially relieved and Brezhnev named

first secretary. The reason for the delay In replacingis obscure. In the fe* months immediately following Malenkov's demotion there were other delays in completingshifts: G- F. Aleksandrov, removed as minister ofonarch, was not replaced untilarch; the post of ambassador to Poland, vacated by Aleksandrov's replacement, N. A. Mikhaylov, was not filled until, as notedalenkov protege, was an obvious target after his patron's demotion, but the ensuing delay in completing the chain of transfersomplicated political aaneuvorictim andeneficiary.

i. D- Yakovlev was named to assist Brezhnev as secondand even then may have been thought of as heir apparent. He became first secretary inrezhnev having been transferred to Moscowember of the central party secretariatandidate member of the presidium byh party congress. Yakovlev had bad many years of service in the agriculturallyNovosibirsk Oblast, inortion of the "new lands" is located, as second secretary, and then,s first secretary. Ue was succeeded In Novosibirsk by B. I. Deryugln, the second secretary, who appears to have had an Industrial background.

Onecember, N. A. Mukhitdlnov replaced A. I. Niyazov as first secretary in Uzbekistan, the cotton basket of the USSR. Mukhitdlnov had been republic premier. The shift cameay after Khrushchev and Bulganin, who had stopped off in Tashkentepublic agricultural conference, on their return from the tour of South-East Asia, had departed for Moscow. Niyazov, Uzbek party bossas charged by the republic party plenum with responsibility for shortcomings in the Uzbek cotton industry, for neglecting ideological and cultural work, failure to support the press, persecution of Innocent workers, and for serious errors in selection and training of cadres. The circumstancesMukhitdlnov's promotion were reminiscent of thoseear before when he had received promotionesult of Khrushchev's intervention. Onukhitdlnov,irst deputy premier, was appointed premier of Uzbekistan to succeed Usman Yusupov. The action camelenum of the Uzbek central committee. Subsequent press reporting Indicated that the criticism Khrushchev had leveled in November against Yusupovotton growing conference in Tashkent had figured heavily in tbe decision to oust him.

Mukhitdlnov has had an almost meteoric rise. An obscure central Asian oblast propaganda secretarye became Samarkand Oblast first secretaryepublic secretaryew monthsashkent Oblast first secretarynd republic premier The postwar crisis in cotton

production appears to bave given hln tbe opportunity for rapid advancement. Id tbe government reorganizations which took place after Stalin's death, be had relinquished the premier's post to Yusupov, former Uzbek premier and,SSR minister of cotton growing. In6 at the age ofe became the youngest member (candidate) of the presidium and the first Uzbek elected toigh party position. S. K. Kaaalov, Uzbek third secretaryas promoted over tbe bead of tbe perennial second secretary, R. Ye. Melnikov, to succeed Mukhltdinov as

Onugust the party leadership in the Karelo-Finnlsh Republic was shaken up. A. N. Yegorov, removed as firstwas charged with Inefficient leadership of industry,the principle of collective leadership, and suppressing criticism in party affairs. That Yegorov was held responsible for tbe backward state of the Karelo-Finnlsh timber industry seems clear. oint decree of the CPSU central committee and USSR Council of Ministers, issuedugust justays before Yegorov's dismissal, bad called attention to the inadequate state of affairs ln tbe Soviet timber industry and outlined measures for its radical improvement. Two months later the plenum of tbe Karelo-Finnlsh central committeeajor discussion on tbe republic's timber Industry in which most of the noted were charged to Inadequate party leadership. Neither P. S. Prokonnen, the republic's premier, nor. Kuuslnen, the chairman of the Karelo-Finnlsh supremo sovietwho was to beull member of tbe central party presidium in7 when Khrushchev won bis victory overMolotov, and Kaganovich, seemed to be affected by the purge, though it would seem that Prokonnen would bear somefor the state of affairs in the Karelo-Finnlsh Ministry of Timber Industry.

Be that aa it may, in the charges against Yegorov there were political overtones which suggested that more was Involved than just deficiencies in tbe timber Industry, serious as they may have been. It is not clear whether "ignoring the principle of collective leadership and suppressing criticism ln party affairs" was an accurate description of Yegorov's guiltuphemism for being on the wrong sideolicy dispute or struggle for power. He does not seem to have had any particular interest ln any of the identifiable policy disputes Involving tbe central party leadership, nor is It possible to connect him, politically, with any of the top Soviet leaders. Yegorov's replacement was L. I.arty worker in Belorussia since themost recently first secretary of Minsk.

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Quiast Shake-ups

A series of provincial personnel shifts, many of the musical chairs variety, took place in the latter half5 and at tbe oblast and kray party conferences in December and January. By the time tbo process was completed the party bosses in morehird of the major territorial divisions of the Russian(RSFSR) and three oblast* In tbe Ukraine had been changed. Nine secretaries were simply shifted from one oblast or kray to another; Belyayev and Arlstov became CPSU secretaries andbecame Kazakh party secretary, as noted above; I. T. Grishln eas transferred from Stalingrad to Prague.and A. A. Yeplshev was transferred from Odessa to Bucharest as Soviet ambassadors in those satellite capitals; and A. N. Kldln left Vladimir to work in tbe party apparatus In Moscow. Kldln apparentlylight loss in party standing but none of the others mentioned lost status.

Fourteen secretaries, however, were not so fortunate; for them the shake-up in provincial leadership meant exclusion from high party circles. While it is clear that the shake-up was carried out in preparation forb party congress, scheduled to meet in February, the exact political motivation is somethingystery. Only Malenkov protege* N. N. Shatalin, removed from the top post in Primorye Kray, had clearly discernible ties with any of the top leaders (see8, although D. G. Smirnov, replaced in Gorky, may haveolitical tie with Malenkov stemming from work in the central party apparatus during the war. N. I. Gusarov, however, who was relieved as first secretary in Tula Oblastsubsequently disappeared, may haveictim of malevolence on Khrushchev's part for reasons not directly connected with current political Inusarov, temporarily an inspector of the central committee, had presentedreport on "Personnel Work in the Ukrainian Partyharply critical of the Ukralnlftn central committee bossed by Khrushchev. It is quite likely that the Gusnrov report was responsible, in part at least, for the assignment in7 of Kaganovich asreplacement. Khrushchev apparently took the firstto get back at Gusarov. Having repaired tbe damage done bis political career andransfer to Moscow as central party secretary and agricultural spokesman for tho regime, he presumably engineered Gusarov's ouster as Belorusulan party boss in0 on charges of deficiencies inwork. This was the post Guasrov had received in7eward for his attack on Khrushchev. Gusarovfell into political oblivion until resurrectedo replaceossible Malenkov protege-fts party first secretary in Tula Oblast. Gusarov's patron at ii..it time is not known.

top ddcrlx

Whatever may have been the full behind-the-scenes reasons for the personnel sblfts in the oblasts (where any criticism was published in connection with them, leadership faults werehrushchev did take the opportunity toew of bis political supporters. All-in-all, tbe provincial shake-up provided important jobs forew people, six of whom showof being in Khrushchev's camp: V. S. Markov (appointed Orel Oblast first. M. Stakhursky (Khabarovsk. I. Kirilenko. I. Naydeknd V. G. Komyakhov (Crimea) had developed their careers in Khrushchev's political fiefdom, the Ukraine. None of the others badties with any of the top leaders.

III. H PARTY CONGRESS AND THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP

The Top Leaders on the Eve of the Congress

As tho delegates from all over the Soviet Union to the first post-Stalin party congress were gathering in Moscow, Khrushchev appeared unquestionably the most prominent member of the party presidium. His pre-eminence was reflected by the obvious influence he exercised in personnel appointments, by the adoption andof major policies associated with him, and by the gradually Increasing deference accorded him by lesseroreover, there was no evidence of strong opposition to hiswithin the presidium. Bulganln, whom Khrushchev hadfor premier, seemed content toupporting role, and Mikoyan, who apparently "ran the farm" during the Khrushchev-Bulganin trip to South Asia, appeared to approve fully of the state of affairs. Kaganovich seemed to have slipped but he had endorsed the policies of the regime, though reluctantly, ln his speech at the revolution anniversary celebrationovember and still appeared toey economic expert. Halenkov'shad all but silenced his once powerful voice, anddeclining Influence on Soviet foreign policy and hlspubllc admission of ideological deviation indicated that his star was waning. The exclusion of both discredited leaders from the party

For' example, Ukrainian party secretary I. D. Nazarenko, at his republic's party congress onanuary, said that the CPSU was "consolidated around its central committee and its presidium, headed by Comradend onanuary the eighthof the Kazakh party elected an honorary presidiumof "members of the presidium of the central committee of the CPSU headed by the first secretary of the central committee of the CPSU, comrade N. S. Khrushchev."

presidium at the forthcoming congress appeared well within the realm of possibility and none of the other presidium members seemed to have either the means or inclination toerious challenge to Khrushchev's leadership.

However, Khrushchev's leadership was still expressed "in committee" and there was little indication that he was movingersonal dictatorship. The lead article in the February Kommunist, issued just before the congress opened, stronglythe principle of collective leadership, condemned the "cult ofnd stressed the leading role of the central committee.

Report of the Centralhrushchev's Speech

In his six-hour central committee report, Khrushchev set the tone for the entire "open" part of the congress. He reaffirmed the correctness of the regime's policies as they had evolved up to that time; he expressed enthusiastic confidence in the strength of tbe regime, the USSR, and the Communist world; and he showed unequivocal faith in the inevitable triumph of the Communist world over capitalism:

ur party is correctly estimating thethat have arisen in both domestic and foreign policy and is working out timely measures to meet these requirements; This graphically demonstrates our party's close, indissoluble ties with the people, the wisdom of its Leninist collective leadership and the all-conquering power of the Marxist-Leninist teaching on which the work of the party is based.

The Soviet state is growing and It towersowerfulshowing all humanity the road to aour cause isis ours.

In -varying, degree most of the other leaders agreed with this unguarded optimism.

The congress had convened, as scheduled, on6 and was dominated by Khrushchev from the very beginning. He opened thethe past some comrade other than the rapporteur of the central committee had been selected for thea much larger number of his friends and proteges

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were elected to the governing bodies of the congress than those of tbe other leaders. In his opening remarks Khrushchev noted the death of Stalin, but unlike Molotov's warn eulogy of dead Soviet leaders Shcherbakov, Kalinin, and Zhdanov ln openingh congress, Khrushchev's statement was cold and abrupt:

In the period betweenhh congresses, we have lost outstanding leaders of tbe communistVissarlno-vlcb Stalin, Klement Gottwald and Kyuchi Tokuda. sk everyone to honor their memory by standing.

The slight to Stalin ln such faint, praise was unmistakable and was in sharp contrast to the publicity accorded him Id December when his birthday was observed with unusual press and radio treatment equaling that attendingh birthdayhrushchev thus took the leadew assault on tbe Stalin symbol.

Khrushchev took great pains in his central committee report to make clear that collective leadershipasic partyand that its practiceajor reason for the party's victories and the correctness of Its policies. Tbe main burden of bis discussion of tbese points was to demonstrate that the Stalinist systemhing of the past:

It was necessary to restore the norms of party life worked out by Lenin, which had often been violated ln tbe past. It was of cardinalto restore and strengthen in every way Lenin's principle of collective leadership.

He described the collectivebusinesslike group of leaders whose relations are basedoundation of principled ideas which permit neither mutual forgiveness nor personalhile this formulation was probably Intended to remove the onus of power struggle from the demotion of Malenkov and discrediting of Molotov, lt could also be readarning against further opposition to Khrushchev's policies. It was clear thatconsidered himself tbe true successor to the leader's mantle. But lt was also clear that he wanted everyone tothat lt was his intention to exercise that leadershipifferent way than had Stalin.

Judging from his speech, there was no doubt at all ln Khrushchev's mind tbat tbe economic policies being followed by the regime, particularly those most closely associated with his

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"New Lands" and corn programs In agriculture, and emphasis on tbe priority of heavy industry in the industrialcorrect and that tbey had already proven theaselves:

From the results of our work in planting virgin lands, one can draw the indisputable conclusion that the party line ofthe new lands is correct.-Did tbe party central committeeistake in recommendinguccessfully grown in the south, for the entire Soviet Union? No, comrades, it washedevelopment of heavy industry) is the general line of ourline tried and tested by the whole development of the Soviet state and corresponding to the vital Interests of the people.

In parts of his discussion, however, heit overly defensive and this suggested that some criticism of thesestill continued. Mikoyan, for example, may have been more pessimistic concerning the value of the new lands program than suited Khrushchev. peechn the occasion of awarding an Order of Lenin to the Komsomol,revealed that Mikoyan had earlier disagreed with him on the amount of grain that would be produced in Kazakhstan* But whatever reservations Khrushchev's presidium colleagues may have had, they were careful not to air them to the congress.

Khrushchev's speech, however, waa more.than an optimistic reaffirmation of policies that were already in effect. Be also Introduced modifications which, though generally consistent with the main objectives of the post-Stalin leadership, wereagnitude sufficient toew phase in tbe regime's pursuit of Its goals. Not only was the studied slight to Stalin in bis opening remarks carried over into his major speech, but he undertook tbe task of making revisions in Communist dogma. The motivations for both the downgrading of Stalin and the mod-lflcationsof Ideology were essentially thefree the

1 old (Mlkoyan) that Kazakhstan wouldillion poods of graine didn'tord. aid to him: 'Why are you silent?' Be replied: 'I'm not arguing,on't quiteillion. nstead ofnder the plan,illion?'"

reglne of the more repugnant and counterproductive aspects oferase the stultifying effects of terror frost the domestic scene, to make tbe Soviet system more appealingand to secure alliesominant place in world affairs.

Khrushchev linked tbe repudiation of Lenin's dogma that war between capitalist and communist states was "fatalisticallyto the Soviet Union's "peaceful coexistence" campaign:

When we say that the socialist system will win in the competition between the twocapitalist and thethis by no means signifies that Itswill be acbleved through armedby the socialist countries in the internal affairs of capitalistar isatalistic inevitability.

Khrushchev's other major doctrinalassertion that Communists might win political power in capitalist countries through peaceful parliamentaryalso part of the cloak of "peace and sweet reasonableness" with which the Soviet leaders were seeking to clothe their pursuit of international objectives. Neither change seemed immediately dangerous to the regime but doctrinal revisions are always risky and not lightly undertaken. Khrushchev's willingness to Inaugurate these changes, and thereby associate his name with them (particularly in revising aprecept) is further indication of the confidence with which be viewed bis strength within the leadership and tbe ability of the regime to surmount difficulties that might arise.

Assault and Khrushchev's Secret Speech

Judging from the speeches at the congress Mikoyan was the only Soviet leader who seemed to consider himself anything likear with Khrushchev.* His range of subjects was nearly as great as Khrushchev's; his language and means of expression were harder hitting; andumber of points be went farther than Khrushchev in dotting the l's and crossing the t's of regime policy. There was in none of this, however, any sign of serious disagreement with Khrushchev. If the two did not see completely eye to eye, their differences were over how strong and clearshould be stated rather than over the substance of those policies.

*f course, that each of the speakers at thewas relatively free to fashion his speech as he saw fit.

In one respect tbis possible difference had serious Khrushchev had chosen to damn Stalin with faint praise and vague references to "norms of party life worked out by Lenin, which had often been violated in the past" and to-restore "Lenin's principle of collective leadership." Mlkoyan chose to assault the dead dictator more directly. On tbe first occasionoviet leader's taking issue with Stalin by name, he said:

Stalin's well-known pronouncement in "Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR" to the effect that after the world market had been split up "the volume of production in (the USA, Britain and France) will contract" can hardly helpnd is hardly correct.

Mikoyan, moreover, made clear reference to Stalin's errors in leadership. "For aboutears we had in fact no collectivend this could not fail to have annd he topped his irreverent treatmentarcastic reference to Stalin's "We swear to thee, Comrade Lenin" funeral speech

How Lenin would rejoice if, afterears he couldhat we not only swear by Lenin's name but are exerting all our efforts to put Lenin's ideas into practice.

None of the other leaders mentionedlthough they were in general agreement in condemning the "cult of personality" and deploring the arbitrary rule of the previous period. The decision to downgrade Stalin was presumably taken by the entire leadership, however, it being doubtful that Khrushchev and Mlkoyan, despite their obvious self-confidence, would have taken the momentous step on their own. Moreover, there were signs that some such decision had been reached before the congress met. The Stalin symbol had been used in routine fashion throughout January; his name was invoked frequently,atter of course, in the press and on the radio, and in speeches at the republican party congresses in the latter half of the*month. ebruary,hange appeared when Voroshilov was. greeted onh birthday as "Lenin's faithful pupil" without reference to Stalin.* Soviet newspapers Ignored Stalin in their editorials leading up to the congress, and Pravda'sebruaryalf-page portrait honoring Lenin but no picture and no mention of Stalin.

* As recently asn tbe occasion ofh birthday, the usual phrase of "Lenin's faithful pupil and Stalin's comrade-in-arms" was still being used in such greetings.

The decision that had thus bees made was certainly to de-Stallnlze; whether lt also included the denigration of Stalin's name nay be open to some question. There wae no hint in the published speeches, even in Mikoyan's disrespectful criticisms,ecision to charge Stalin with mass murder, megalomania, and military incompetence. Vhen, then, was tbe decision for Khrushchev's secret speech made and what lay behind that decision?

It Is conceivable that the collective had not planned to carry the public attack on Stalin beyond Mikoyan's irreverent statements, but that lt expected touller explanation to the congress delegates as an aid to them ln guiding the de-Stallnlzation campaign in their respective bailiwicks. Thein Kbrusbchev's secret speech and the way in which its points dovetail with and support general Soviet policy and theoretical statements suggest that it waspur-of-the-moment creation. However, if tho secret speech had been planned ln advance as one step ln the timetable of de-Stallnlzatlon, it is difficult to understand why lt was not given earlier ln the congress when lt bad become apparentew policy in regard to Stalin was beingnot following Khrushchev's speech, then immediately following Mikoyan's. Moreover, ln view of the facilities available in the party secretariat and its apparatus and in thoInstitute lt would appear that the secret speech could have been prepared in two or three days. There is, therefore, some reason to suppose that, though an anti-Stalin campaign had been planned before theKhrushchev's secret speech had not.

There has been some speculation that Khrushchev decided to blast Stalin after be hadery favorable response of the congress delegates to Mikoyan's more extreme statements.*

Some publicists . llyron Rush, The Rise of Khrushchev, Washington, D. C. : Public Affairs) have taken tbe view that Mikoyan's incidental reference ln the course of his discussion on the needevision of history to Kossior, Khrushchev's predecessor ln tbe Ukraine, was an attack on Khrushchev. Such an argument appears to be poorly conceived for it assumes either tbat Khrushchev waa directly responsible for Kosslor's purge and thatact was generally known by at least high party people; or, as Rush asserts, thatprofited so greatly from Kosslor's downfall that the mere mention of Kosslor's name conjured up visions of Khrushcheverroristic tyrant. There is no evidence to support the first premise; even Rush is constrained to throw Khrushchev'sfor the purge of Kossior into question. As for Rush's own argument, the Ukrainian party post, hundreds of miles from Moscow, was not likely to appearolitical plum for the party boss of the combined Moscow oblast and city partyKhrushchev's Job before the transfer to Kiev, as to give Mikoyan's remark ln6 tho meaning Rush alleges it bad.

Khrushchev, with his penchant for monopolizing the initiative and the public spotlight, it is argued, was piqued by the success of Hikoyan's approach and decided to do him one better with an all-out cataloging of Stalin's sins. It is true that Mikoyan's speech, according to the published versions, was more frequently interrupted by applause than that of any other leader and that the parenthetical notations at the end indicated audience response exceeded only by Khrushchev's and Bulganin's speeches, but it may be questioned whether Khrushchev would be apt to react so childishly inotentially serious matter. While undoubtedly underestimating the effect his speech would have, he must certainly have been aware that the exposition of Stalin's crimes would Jolt the faithful and create confusion and consternation throughout the Communist world, and henceecision not lightly made. The reception given Hikoyan's speech would hardly seem so dangerous to Khrushchev's position or damaging to his ego to warrant his taking the risk of adecision on the conduct of the anti-Stalin campaign. Moreover, if Khrushchev were seeking to undercut Mikoyan, it is curious that he not only treated him respectfully in the speech but in fact credited him with standing up to Stalin:

On one occasion after the war,eeting of Stalin with members of the politburo, Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan mentioned that Khrushchev must have been right when he telephoned concerning the Kharkov operation and that it wasthat his suggestion had not been accepted. You should have seen Stalin's

Mikoyan was tne only top leader, other than Khrushchev and Marshal Zhukov,andidate member of thetwo days later, to emerge from the speech with creditable virtues in his relations with Stalin. Most were treated as passive actorsad drama; Malenkov, however, was specially treated as Stalin's spokesman.

Thus it was mostollective decision in response to pressures generated at the congress that Khrushchev delivered his speech in denigration of Stalin. Several reports

tne delegates to tne congress, surpnsea oy tne open criticisms of Stalin in Khrushchev's and Mikoyan's speeches and not satisfied with their explanations, either insisted that

the Soviet leaders justify the attack; or the Soviet leaders, seeing the confusion created by the speeches at the congress, decided touller expose of what transpired under Stalin's

rehabilitation prior to

the couki-wssumuur ui individuals purged by Stalinole in creating confusion and questioning among the delegates. On the face of it, this is more apt to have been the delegate's reaction than the spontaneously enthusiastic supportharp attack on Stalin suggested by the applause notations in theversions of Mikoyan's speech.

PoliticalSpeeches of Bulganin, and

If range of subjects covered, doctrinalmportant policies inaugurated in congress speeches are measures of personal influence in the presidium, then it would appear that Bulganiness important figure than Mlkoyan. Bulganin delivered the report on the Sixth Five-Year; as chairman of the Council of Ministers it was his responsibility and he did an adequate, if uninspired, job of lt, but the report wasestatement of well-known economic themesather heavy, unimaginative -of the directives for the new plan. There wereno indications of individuality; only once did he venture tohange inthe traditionaleconomic doctrine that "obsolescence of machineshenomenon Inherent in the capitalist economy alone, and that in the socialist economy the development of technology does not give rise tond castigating "some" Sovietfor holding that view.

The speecbes of Kaganovich and Pervukhin cast somelight on their respective positions and degree of Influence which reinforced the view that Kaganovich had slipped and that Pervukhin had inherited at least some of Kaganovich's former sphere of responsibility.

Kaganovich's speechather superficialabounding with Stalinist phrases and formulations of problems and policies In what were apparently his primary fields of labor, and wages. Theusages could have been simply an unconscious use of language that came most easily to him; but that be still held to his previous conservative bent of mind was clear in tbe obvious reservations with which he endorsed the new doctrines enunciated at the congress. He declared, for example, that struggle against the cult of the individual was "not an easynd in

slcrez.

agreeing with Khrushchev that theory should not be divorced from practice, he emphasized the value of theory whereashad boon emphasizing the value of practice.

Judging from Pervukhin's preoccupation with the heavysector of the Soviet economy ln bis speech to thehe had most likely succeeded to Kaganovicb's former responsibility of supervising the heavy industrynd this would bring with it at least some increase in his influence on Soviet industrial policy. There was nothing in his speech, however, to suggest that he disagreed with any of the economic policies enunciated by Khrushchev or with the Five-Year Plan directives presented by Bulganin. That he was in generalwith regime policies is virtually certain in view of his rising stature as an industrial administrator.

Halenkov's speech was apparently intended toessage of complete capitulation to Khrushchev's leadership and willingness to serveunior member of the presidium. The bulk of his speech was devoted to the electric powerwhich was his field of direct administrativebut he reserved substantial space for indicating his complete agreement with major regime policies and makingalmost sycophantic references to Khrushchev:

Comrade N. S. Khrushchev summed up in the central committee's report the greatwork the Soviet people have carried outComrade N. S. Khrushchev was fully justified in noting in his report that in the period under review the party central committee's leadership was at tbe necessary hight is essential to draw attention again and again to thethesis put forward by Comrade N. S. Khrushchev in his report asfor the assertion that war is note want to hope, as Comrade N. S. Khrushchev said, that our peaceful aspirations will be more correctlyin the USA.

Molotov, too, made generous references to Khrushchev and, in contrast to the dogged conservatism and inflexibility he had earlier exhibited in the foreign relations field, he appeared to accept the fact that conditions had changed and that the policies and tactics of Stalin's day were notin the atomic age:

TOt^SEGREZ

We still suffer frequently from anof the new possibilities which haveoperedup before us in the postwar period. This shortcoming has alsoin the work of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which was pointed out in good time by our party centralmust stop underestimating the enormous opportunities we possess for defending peace and the security of peoples.

This was the extent of Molotov's self-criticism but his speech was sprinkled with phrases and formulations that had appeared in the lead editorial of Kommunist Numbern September,that he had been impressed with the editorial's message, and he was careful to approve the Austrian peace treaty and the rapprochement with Tito and to refer several times to the USSRocialist state.

IV. THE NEW LEADING PARTY ORGANS

In the three years and four months which lay betweenh party congress in2 andh congress inarge number of shifts in personnelaffecting high level party and government officials (members of the central partycommittee and central auditinginook place. By the time ofh congress, justfembers of the central party organs* had lost the party and government posts which presumably entitled them to central organs status, ourse, were dead. Whether

* In the analysis that follows, both full and candidateof the central committee and members of the centralcommission are lumped together despite the fact that they represent three different protocol and prestige levels. This is justified on the grounds that the only known timehen any of these groups was called on to exercise real power of decision, the combined membership participated.

the others had been formally replaced on the central committee or auditing commission is notpromotions fromto full member of the central committee of N. N. Shatalin

Central Party, Continuity and Change

Members2 dropped in

Members2 re-elected6

New in

in3 and G. K. Zhukov in3 are the only changes in the composition of those bodies mentioned in Soviet sources. But whether formally replaced or not, it is virtually certain that they were no longer functioning as members of the central party bodies.

It would appear that the men and women selected to replace the purged and demoted as government officials and republic aod oblast secretaries and the like had, by virtue of their assignments, achieved the central party status once enjoyed by their predecessors. If this did not involve formal election to the central committee and auditing commission at the time, it may well have carried the right of informal participation and, if the new appointees successfully retained their jobs, should have assured election to the central party organs ath party congress.

The congress elected tbe new central committee andcommission presumably at the closed session on the nightebruary at which Khrushchev delivered his secret speech. Available information provides .few clues to the method of election other than the statement in the officialreport of the congress that the members of the central bodies were elected by the "delegates with deciding vote" by secret ballot. In view of past practice it may be assumed tbat the delegates were simply called on tolateprepared by the Soviet leaders. This was the method used by the congress in "electing" its presidium, secretariat, credentials commission,nd it is the method used by each new convocation of the Supreme Soviet in "electing" its Presidium and the Council of Ministers. However, the belated inclusion of L. A. Govorov on the central committeeheck has shown that Comrade L. A. Govorov actually wasandidate member of the centralaid the announcement in Pravda,signed by the central committeetaken at face value, would suggest that the

delegates voted on each name individually, and that there were more names considered than the actual number elected. day delay in "discovering" the error which had kept Govorov off the central committee was surely excessive, however, and makes it difficult to accept the Pravda notice at face value. Moreover, there is little evidence of serious competition for delegate votes either before or at the congress. The newparty organs, then, were most likely preselected by the party presidium, which had to decide on the size of the central committee and auditing commission and make the final selection of names.

Actually, the composition of the new central bodies was already pretty well established, the more important party and state jobs apparently carrying withlot on the central committee or auditing commission. Perhaps as much asercent of the composition of these bodies was determined in this way, though in some cases the question of whether tbe slotull or candidate member of the central committee or, at the third level of importance, the central auditing commission, probably dependedeparate decision of the party presidium. The otherercent, the slots for about two thirds of which were created by the decision to expand the central party bodies, were probably the subject of negotiation among the top leaders at Or shortly before the congress.

The new central party bodies should, therefore, reflect the political relationships established earlieresult of Khrushchev's rise. In this connection, the single mostfeature of the new central committee and auditingis the degree to which their membership was carried over from the bodies elected ath party congress in Sixty-five percent of the membership of2 central party organs was carried overithercent of the more important full (voting) members of the central committee being retained. These percentages are larger than at any time

Members of Central Party Organs Re-clcctcd at Party Congressesercentage of the Members Elected at the Preceding Congress

15th

16th

17th

19th

20th

sinceh party congress4 whenercent of theof0 centrali committee and central auditing commission was carried over.

There is do measure of "normal" turnover available so it is difficult to evaluate the full significance of this degree of continuity with2 centralt may be noted, however, tbat the rate of attrition26er month basis was exceeded in tbe lastears only by the period of the great. Rate of attrition may, therefore,etter indicator of the significance of high-level personnel actions in tbe political maneuvering following

Rate of Attrition in the Membership of the Central Party Organs Between Succeeding Party Congresses

Members of the Central Party Organs Not Re-elected

27

Number of Months Between Congresses

10

Rate of Attrition

er mon

oasis of comparison between Stalin's last years and the period betweenhh party congresses in rate of turnover; is afforded by the republic central committees. An average of forty-five percent of the membership of the republic party bodies elected at the republic congresses in8 and9 was carried over in2 republic bodies as compared with fifty-two percent of2 bodies re-elected

or example, Merle Fainsod: "The Party in the Post-Stallnroblems of Communism, Vol. VII, No. pp..

Stalin's death. Even so, the conclusion seems inescapable that remarkably few of the politically more Important Individuals in the Soviet Union in2 were purged oresult of the death of Stalin, the arrest andof the number two man in the post-Stalin collective leadership, the disgrace and demotion of the number one man, the censure and public humiliation of the number three man, and tbe rise of Khrushchev from the fifth-ranking position in3 to that of unchallenged "first among equals" In That such cataclysmic changes in tbe Soviet top party leadership could occur inhort period of timereater turnover in the secondary leadershipealto Khrushchev's political finesse, and it brlngsintothe commonly accepted view that he "packed" the central committee with bis supporters.**

hird of the new members of the central party bodies elected in6 received the Job assignments tbatcentral organs status on them before the Juneuring most of this period, group rule appeared toeality and this no doubt entailed some compromise and diffusion of

Number of New Members of Central Party Organs Elected6 Who Received Job Assignments That Conferred Central "Organs Status

On Them in Periods Indicated

19th Party Congresso June) to July Plenum

July) h Party Congress at the

Total TiS

* There were actuallyore positions but three are accounted forrevious multiplication of jobs probablylot on the central party organs.

influence among the top leaders on personoel assignments. (See above) Khrushchev, it is true, was more successful than any of the other members of the collective leadership In getting his friends and proteges placed in strategic posts, but this waselative advantage. ossibly as manyf the new appointees appeared to be in his interest, two suggested Mikoyan's influence, and one may have beenby Kaganovich. The other appointments, perhaps as manyre difficult to ascribe to the influence of any one of the top leaders and they may best be thoughtof asor neutral in nature.

In the nextperiod between the June4 and the Julyharp drop in tbe number of assignments of new personnel to jobs conferring central organs status. Khrushchev apparently profited from three* such appointments, Kaganovich may have been instrumental in two, and Mikoyan in one. The other eight appear to have been neutral or compromise candidates. The fact that so few personnel shifts affecting central organs status were made in the seven months preceding and five months succeeding Halenkov's demotionthe view expressed above that Khrushchevmore on personal influence than on "packing" party bodies with his proteges. Even in the seven-month period immediately precedingh party congress, when he was clearly themember of the presidium and when an increasing number of

personnel assignments show his hand, less than half of the new appointees seem to have had prior political connections with him, and tbe same Is true concerning those whose appointment to the central committee or auditing commission was made possible by the decision to enlarge those party bodies. In all, onlyhird of the new members of the central committee or auditing commission had discernible ties withhardly evidence of "packing" in the usual sense of tho term.

Khrushchev's Strength in Central Party Bodies

It may be assumed that any individual coming from tbe Ukrainian party organization is pretty apt to be favorablytoward Khrushchev. This assumption would probably hold whether he had actuallyigh-level official in the Ukrainian organisation during the time when Khrushchev waso9 (exceptew souths inhad developed later under L. G. Melnlkov and A. X. Kirichenko, since Khrushchev's successors in the Ukraineacted as his political stewards. Moreover, the Ukraine has certainly profited from Khrushchev's rise. Its territorial was Increased by the transfer of the Crimea from the Russian Republic, andth anniversary of its union with siawas celebrated with great fanfare, andore practical Rus-veln, many of the officials developed in its party organization and government service have been transferred to more important jobs elsewhere.

During Khrushchev's three years as Moscow oblast party boss be presumably developed another group of officials on whom he could depend, but there is somewhat less certainty in placing Moscow officials in his camp than those whose careers werein the Ukraine. The fact that all the top leaders worked in Moscow andital interest in the partyof the area makes it rather difficult to distinguish their respective spheres of influence.

Khrushchev's rather obvious interest in Leningrad and the "Leningrad Case" and the subsequent careers of some of the men associated with the changes in leadership in tbe oblast and city3 suggest that the Leningrad party organization (the third largest In'the USSR, after the Ukraine and Moscow) had come under his control by On Stalin's death, it was announced that N. G.ecretary and candidate member of the short-lived enlarged presidium elected inould be "transferredeading post in tho USSRof Ministers." He was never identified there; Instead, he was elected3 as first secretary in Leningrad city

TOr* 3ccrex.

and second secretary in Leningrad oblast. During the ensuing months he seemed to supersede Malenkov's prolego V. H. Andrlanov, the oblast first secretary, in party activities in the area. In late Novemberoint plenum of tbe oblast and city party committees supervised by Khrushchev, Andrlanov was removed under fire and replaced by F. R. Kozlov, the former second secretary who had given way to Ignatov in April. Ignatov, his Leningrad assignment apparently successfully completed, was "transferred to duties in the central committee apparatus" and replaced by I. K. Zamchevsky as city party boss.

The election of Kozlov and Ignatov to tbe party presidium7 appears in part at least to haveeward for loyal service and suggests that Ignatov may have been despatched to Leningrad by Khrushchev to undermine Halenkov's authority and that Kozlov used his influence to put the Leningradln Khrushchev's camp.

For the most part, however, Khrushchev's rise in influence and power developed primarily, it would appear, from his ability to Impress others with the Tightness of his views and tothem with his inexhaustible energy, dynamism, and powers of persuasion. Voroshilov, apparently impressed, emphasized these traits when he nominated Khrushchev for premier in

With tirelesshe cause In all this greatworkan outstanding role hasby our dear comrade Nikita- by his unfailing creativetruly unending and inexhaustibleadded)

Of all Stalin's lieutenants, Khrushchev had most clearlythe characteristics of the leader personality.

These personality characteristics and bis dynamic policies, particularly his efforts to invigorate tbe party, undoubtedly Impressed others. The maneuver which secured for him the title of first secretary in3 gave him an important psycho logical advantage. Not only could be matcn nis "first" against Malenkov's first ln"presidium listings,'butV for party officials at least, Khrushchev probably suggested the more traditional seat of authority. When alphabetic listing of presidium members was instituted inalenkov's principal symbol of leadership was destroyed. Furthermore there apparently was an almost complete absense of

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countermoves od the part Of his opponents. With eachof Khrushchev's Influence, authority, and capability, more and more members of the central committee and auditingandew of the presidium probably began to follow his leadership, so that by the timeh party congress rolled around, Khrushchev could probably count as hisood many more than is suggested on the basis of past associations. Unfortunately there is very little information available which will serve to indicate which members of the new central party organs bad earlier Jumped on Khrushchev's band wagon, andnone at all to indicate the degree of their loyalty. Moreover, the mere fact of some past association oratron-protege* relationship is no reliable guide to loyalty or continued reliability, as is clear, for example, in the case or Shepllov "who joined them."

For these reasons any listing of Khrushchev adherents, as opposed to those of Mikoyan, Suslov, Bulganin, Molotov, Malenkov, or other top leaders, exceptairly small number of cases where the evidence for continued close association and loyalty is especially strong, is apt to be more misleading than Whatever may have been the individual (personal) reasons--loyalty from past associations or favors granted, fear andbureaucratic caroernindedness, or genuine belief in the value of Khrushchev'sthe showdown came inho combined central committee and auditingvoted in favor of Khrushchev and against what wasajority of the presidium. If the figures given by F. R. Kozlovpeech in Leningrad following the ouster of tbe "antiparty group" can be taken at face value, nearlyercent of the members of the central party organs signed up forbefore tbe plenum had got fairly under way.

Occupational Representation

the proportion of party officials and governmenton the new central party organs was approximately tbe same as2 but among tho government representatives therehift from the police and military to other functionaries. However, several of the party officials elected to the central committee and auditing commission2 had transferred to work on the government side of things during the three years and four months between the congresses,umber of therepresentatives that were new to tbe central party organs6 had recently been transferred from, party to government work.

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Central Partyy Kajor Occupational Categories

Party officials Government officials of which: military police diplomatic other

Miscellaneous

Total

0

144

131

17

7 65

*

listed in both Party and Government - Miscellaneous "

- Government and Miscellaneous "

9 listed ln both Party and Government categories

! Miscellaneous

1 Government and Miscellaneous "

infiltration of party functionaries into theadministrationeflection of Khrushchev's canpaigo to reinvigorate the party and reassert its primacy in fact as well as in theory, but there is little evidence of any attempt tothe engineer-administrator with the party man. Theof engineer-administrators in the central party bodies6 was about the same as2 and these were divided approximatelyercent re-elected andercent new. Thereint in Khrushchev's congress report, however, that he may have been somewhat dissatisfied with this reliance on technicians Castigating party leaders for considering "party work one thing and economic and state worke insisted that party officials should study technology, agronomy, and production.

il e

The reduction in police representation from ten to four was ln line with the reduced political role of the police ia the post-Stalin period, and tended to show that the promotion in5 of KGB chief I. A. Serov to the rank of Army General and Khrushchev's remarks to the congress cautioning against showing distrust of workers of the state security agencies, did not portend any resurgence of police power. The replacement of police careerist S. N. Kruglov as MVD head by party apparatchik N. P. Dudorov in January also seemed inith the policy of maintaining strict party control over the police. However, this brought both police agencies, KGB and MVD, under tbe administrative direction of men indebted to Khrushchev for their career development, further strengthening the first secretary's control of the instruments of political power.

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-Sa-

The cut In total military representation fromoit puzzling ln view of the post-Stalin policy of increasing the prestige of the military and, in general, repairing the slights and other evidences of distrust which characterized Stalin's treatment of thea. However, the effect of tbe cut was somewhat offsetet gain of two professional soldiers among the full members of the central committee and the election of Zhukovandidate member of the party presidium where be was probably able to exercise increased personal influence onpolicy.

The greatest cut was in the naval representation,o one ertain extent this reflectsSoviet estimate of the relative value of tbe navyore immediate reason for the cut may be seensinking of the battleship Novorossiysk lnoss of life afterine in the Black Sea An investigation of the naval forces byZhukov following the incident uncovered Berlousin combat and political training and confirmedthat discipline was poor. the

party central committeeetter to iu pan; miu Eon-somol members of the armed forces condemning tbe extremely poor state of discipline ln naval units and stating that Admiral Kuznetsov had been relieved as commander in cbief of the naval forces, reduced one rank, and retired, and that the commander of the Black Sea Fleet had been removed from bis post andone rank. Other naval officers were also disciplined.

The beads of the political directorates of both theof War and tbe Ministry of Navy were on tbeut there were no representatives from the Chief Political Directorate of the combined Ministry of Defenseespite the fact that A. S. Zheltov, head ofartime collaborator on the Stalingradcouncil with Khrushchev. This would seem to haveop to Zhukov and the professional soldiers who resented the interference of political officers ln military affairs.

There werembassadors on tbe new central party organs, nine more than arge number of these were former party careerists turned diplomat since Stalin's death andto posts within the Sino-Soviet bloc. The totalIn diplomatic representation from nineowever, probably reflects the change ln emphasis in foreign relatione from intransigent obstructionism to active diplomacy.

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success stultifying effects o

ors, becoming increasingly aware of thextreme centralization, sought to amoli rate the situation by some decentralization of decision-making and encouragement of greater initiative at lower levels in the administrative chain of command. This policy found expression

Party Organs,

By AdaiinTstrative Level of Major Occupation

Government Miscellaneous

47

3

152

41

107

T62d

152

Officials of which: Party

Government Miscellaneous

1

42

Se

Level Officials

Of which: Party

Government Miscellaneous

Total

79

273

U3

109

318

^Includes: dIncludes:

eIncludes:

II

K

Government and Party and Government

iscellaneous Government and "

in the representation on tbe new central committee and auditing commission of more republic and lower level officials than was the case The increase in numbers of these officials coincides with the increase in size of the central party bodies, suggesting that the addition of these officials was one reason, at least, for the expansion. Most of those thus added were party officials, but the presence of two industrial enterprisethree industrial workers, and two kolkhoz chairman helped

TOf^rfrOUO.

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to inflate tbe political prestige of production work in line with Ehrushcbev's complaint to the congress thatubstantialof Communists are engaged in work not directly connected with the decisive sectors of production."

The Party Presidium

Onebruaryull (voting) Bombers of the central committee met ln plenary session and "elected" the partywhich, according to the party rules, "directs the work of the central committee between plenary sessions" and thewhich "directs current work, chiefly as concernsof the fulfillment of party decisions and selection of cadres." They also organized the party controlort of investigative agency and trials board on questions of party discipline, and the Russian Republic bureau, called for by Khrushchev ln his central committee speech.

All full members of the presidium were re-elected. In view of the evidences of Khrushchev's primacy ln the presidium and the very strong position he occupied in tbe central committee, Malenkov and Molotov, and possibly Kaganovich, would seem to have been retained at his sufferance. He may have become so confident of his ability to deal with these men and any threat that they might pose to his power or program tbat be saw little to be gained at the time by further actions against them. On tbe contrary, there would probably be some adverse reactions. Malenkov still enjoyed considerable popularity among thefor his championing of consumer goods production, and Molotov was widely respected as an old Bolshevik who had given years of valuable service to the party and state. Moreover, the ouster of any of the top leaders, even though their shields were somewhat tarnished, would almost certainly have raised the specter of mass purges and arrests andong way toward destroying rising public confidence in the sincerity of the regime's disavowal of organized repression and its intention to maintain "socialist legality"asic cornerstone of post-Stalin policy.

Khrushchev, too, may have been reluctant to part with the knowledge and experience these men could contribute to policy formulation. Conservation of scarce leadership talent andthough tbe individuals embodying them might beunreliabletrictly political point of view, was one of the important departures of the new regime from Stalin's methods of ruleolicy with which Khrushchev appears to have agreed. It has already been noted that ln thehh congresses the secondary leadership in

the USSR was remarkably stable despite the somewhat radical changes at the top. Moreover, of those who for one reason or another were excluded from the contral party organs, over half havo been assigned to other responsible work.

There is, of course, the possibility that Khrushchev wished to rid himself of Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich but that his influence and power was not quite strong enough.* Mlkoyan,Voroshilov, and others, though generally satisfied with Khrushchev's leadership and agreeing with him in the matters of Malenkov's demotion and Molotov's censure, may havo balked at actually removing them from thefeeling that their exclusion might weaken the mechanism of collectiveand expose themselves to the danger of increasinglydomination by Khrushchev.

Whatever limitations, external or self-imposed, may have figured in the selection of the full members of the presidium. Khrushchev was not restrained when it came to the candidate members. Five new candidates were added: Minister of Defense G. K. Zhukov, Kazakh party boss L. X. Brezhnev, Uzbek party boss K. A. Mukhitdinov, Pravda editor in chief D. T. Shepllov, and Moscow City party boss Ye. A. Furtseva. At least three of these were pretty clearly Khrushchev'(see aboveukhitdinov (see pp. nd Furtseva. Shepllov, too,committed to Khrushchev's camp, while Marshal Zhukov, who, in view of his personality, military standing, and personal popularity may have held himself aloof from the usual patron-protege* relationships, was probably closer to Khrushchev than he was to any other member of the top leadership.

Madame Furtseva, the first woman in the Soviet Union to enter the circle of top leaders, had begun her party career in Kursk Oblast, but6 on she was associated with tbe Moscow party organization. Although she had risen to first secretary of the capital's Frunze Rayoner first big boost came inhortly after Khrushchev's return to Moscow as oblast first secretary, when she was named second secretary in Moscow dity. This position, which traditionallylot on tbe central committee, was responsible for hor electionandidate member of the central committee ath party congress In4 she succeeded

The public admission of ideological error extracted from Molotov in5 certainly appeared Intended tohis prestige and popularity in preparation for demotion.

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Tor ULUiL-U

I. V. Kapitonov, who became oblast first secretary, as party Chief in the Soviet capital. Khrushchev's continued interest ln her career was underscored when he singled her out for honors at public fetes and receptions at various times

Tbe elevation of Madame Furtseva to the party presidium in6 gaveigher party status than that of Moscow Oblast first secretary Kapitonov, thus marking the independence of the Moscow City party organization from its previousto the oblast leadership. Her promotion also made it appear that Khrushchev's lament to the congress,

One cannot overlook the fact that many party and Soviet bodies exhibit timidity aboutwomen to executive posts. Very few women hold leading party and Soviet

was intended toractical application. There had been little improvement ln this regard for many years: women, for example,2 percent of total party membershiput3 percent of the delegates toh party congress were women, while the percentage of women on the central party bodies elected at the congress wasercent. The corresponding figures66 percent,2 percent,ercent.

Shepilov, who had entered the secretariat lnad had an interesting careeroviet publicist, propagandaand editor. Before andhort period after the war he wrote on agricultural subjects. He servedolitical officer during the war,ime on the First Ukrainian Front where Khrushchev was the top political officer on the military council. 7 he was assigned to the central party apparatus as deputy to M. A. Suslov, tbe new head of the Propaganda and Agitation Administration who succeeded Malenkov's protege1 G. F. Aleksandrovhake-up in the administration. When thewas reorganizedepartment lnhepilov became its head. He was criticized in9 for failing to exercise control over the journal Bolshevik and for permitting N. A. Voznesensky's book on the USSR's economythe war to be recommended by Agitpropextbook. esult of this criticism he was removed ashead and assigned to undisclosed work as an inspector of the central committee. Ath party congress he wasember of the central committee, possiblyhis assignment in early November as editor ln chief of Pravda, replacing L. F. Ilichev.

Marshal Zhukov rose through the ranks to become the Soviet Union's chief professional soldier. He had achieved great per- onal popularity during World War IIilitary strategist and trouble shooter but was relegated by Stalin to positions of secondary importance for several years after the war, andfrom candidate membership in the central committee. In his secret speech, Khrushchev praised Zhukov asood generalood military leader" and described Stalin's motives thusly

fter our great victory over the enemy

Stalin began to downgrade many of thewho had contributed so much to the victory over the enemy, because Stalinevery possibility that services rendered at tbe front should be credited to anyone but himself.*

Zhukov was quietly returned to responsible military work0robably as commander in chief of the ground forces and, possibly, deputy minister of defense, andentral committee candidate ath party congress. He did not publicly return to full favor until Stalin' death, however, at which time he was promoted to first deputy defense minister. Presumablyeward for support against Beriya he wasull member of the central committee inand when Malenkov was demoted ine succeeded Bulganin as defense minister. Zhukov was listed first among the presidium candidates elected followingh party congress so was presumably next in line toull member of the presidium.

N. M. Shvernik, former chairman of the Supreme Sovietand, since Stalin's death, head of the Soviet trade unions, was re-elected. He hadandidate member of the Politburo presidium sinceand seemed destined never to be acceptedull member. The central committee,also appointed him chairman of the Party Controlwhich, from the political standpoint,ore important post than trade union head.

* Inowever, when Zhukov was no longer infavor,6 demotion was attributed by implication to his falling to understand correctly the requirements and policy of the party in the leadership of the army and navy and in party political education of armed forces personnel.

The only casualty was P. K. Ponomaronko, whose assignment as anbassador to Poland ln5 hadatherpostresidium candidate. He apparentlyhis position on the presidium, however, at least formally, until the party congress, for ln the Pravda report of theat the Bolshol Theater onebruary dedicated toh party congress, Ponomarenko was listed ln the appropriate place of presidiumall full members and before tbe party secretaries. The exact reasons for Ponomarenko's fall from favor are not known but he bad had close politicalwith Malenkov. bavlDg served under him8 ln the central party apparatus and collaborated with him4 ln administering the program to restore the national economy ln liberated territories. Ponomarenko, moreover, was appointed to the party secretariat8 at about tbe time of Malenkov's return to favor after an apparent interlude ofear. Continuing economic difficulties in Kazakhstan, where he was party secretary for, suggest that he may also have been held responsible for tbe way Khrushchev's agricultural program was carried out there.

Khrushchev's Secretariat and the RSFSR Bureau

The six members of the old secretariat were re-elected and Brezhnev and Furtseva added. With five of tbe eight secretaries also on the presidium (two as full members and threeomewhat greater voice in policy-making had been granted the officials responsible for tbe party'sadministration. Since these officials were responsive to Khrushchev's influence, tbe move had the effect of strengthening bis hand ln top party councils. (See chart on) The added secretaries could also relieve Khrushchev of some of the burdens of party administration and enable bin to devote more time to critical policy problems and political activities.

In the short spaceear, Khrushchev bad built the secretariat from three ln5 (after Shatalin'sto eight in This was tbe largest tbe secretariat had ever been except for the short-lived expanded secretariat elected ath party congress. The executive duties of the secretariat appeared to be divided among tbe old members as follows: Khrushchev, of course, had generalfor the entire secretariat; Suslov, the second in command, had for several years had responsibility for relations with the satellite and other Communist parties and, judging from thoon party organizational matters in his speech at themay have had some responsibility for internal party

The only casualty was P. K. Ponomarenko, whose assignment as ambassador to Poland in5 hadatherpostresidium candidate. He apparentlyhis position on the presidium, however, at least formally, until the party congress, for in the Pravda report of theat the Bolshoi Theater onebruary dedicated toh party congress, Ponomarenko was listed in the appropriate place of presidiumall full members and before the party secretaries. The exact reasons for Ponomarenko's fall from favor are not known but he had had close politicalwith Malenkov, having served under him8 in the central party apparatus and collaborated with him4 in administering the program to restore the national economy in liberated territories. Ponomarenko, moreover, was appointed to the party secretariat8 at about the time of Malenkov's return to favor after an apparent interlude ofear. Continuing economic difficulties In Kazakhstan, where he was party secretary for, suggest that he may also have been held responsible for the way Khrushchev's agricultural program was carried out there.

Khrushchev's Secretariat and the RSFSR Bureau

The six members of the old secretariat were re-elected and Brezhnev and Furtseva added. With five of the eight secretaries also on the presidium (two as full members and threeomewhat greater voice in policy-making had been granted the officials responsible for the party'sadministration. Since these officials were responsive to Khrushchev's influence, the move had the effect of strengthening his hand in top party councils. (See chart) The added secretaries could also relieve Khrushchev of some of the burdens of party administration and enable him to devote more time to critical policy problems and political activities.

In the short spaceear, Khrushchev had built the secretariat from three in5 (after Shatalin'sto eight in This was the largest the secretariat had ever been except for the short-lived expanded secretariat elected ath party congress. The executive duties of the secretariat appeared to be divided among the old members as follows: Khrushchev, of course, had generalfor the entire secretariat; Suslov, the second in command, had for several years had responsibility for relations with the satellite and other Communist parties and, judging from theon party organizational matters in his speech at themay have had some responsibility for internal party

matters.* Pospelov supervised propaganda and agitationand the party schools and academies for political andresearch and training. Of the three secretaries added inrlstov had been assigned responsibility for party organizational and personnel natters, and Belyayev forbut lt is not clear what Shepilov's functions were. He had acted as special emissary to Nasir in July which suggests some involvement with foreign affairs, but this might not have been his special field of responsibility. All the secretaries

* Suslov may have had responsibility for this last fieldhile prior to the addition of Arlstov to the secretariat in5 and he may have emphasized it at the congress because Arlstov was otherwise occupied with the report ofcredentials commission.

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participated in protocol duties at diplonatlc and state functions and, at one tine or another, most had represented the regime in visits to foreign countries.

UfltHH. ins lullinlu

tatouhi

( .li.nl-.

There were obviously other fields than those mentioned, and responsibility for then was presumably exercised by one orof the existing secretaries. Arlstov, for example, nay have bad responsibility for trade and finance bodies and the nls-cellany encompassed by the administrative department of tbepartypublic prosecutor's office, organs of state control, tbe police and security forces, and health, social welfare, and physical culture organs. With the addition of Brezhnev and Furtseva inome redistribution of responsibility was almost certainly contemplated. Brezhnev appeared fitted byand experience for secretarial supervisionariety ofagriculture, partyeven industryhis wartine oliticaland bis post-Stalin assignmentopin the ChiefDirectorate of the Ministry of Defense made hin peculiarly qualified to supervise partyand politicalln the armed forces. Unfortunately,ublicized activitiesecretary have not served tothis or any other as his specific fields of responsibility. Furtseva retained her post asCity first secretary

so she was able to devote only part tine to central secretarial work. Her duties appear to have encompassed youth and women's affairs.

The central committee's "Bureau for tbehichtold tbe congress should be organized to "provide moreand effective leadership of oblasts, krays, and autonomous republics of the Russianogical extension of

the organizational principle first employed in the creation4 of departments of agriculture and of party organs for the RSFSR in the central committee apparatus. The new bureausomewhat to the party bureaus already existing in the otherepublics (called "presidium" in the Ukraine) butIn the method of itst was elected by the all-Union central committee insteadepublic central committee. The RSFSR bureau was presumably intended to actunior presidium, making republic-level policy decisions for the Soviet Union's largest republic, and thus lightening tbe load on tbe all-Union party presidium, which had previously bad the task of dealing directly with each of the RSFSR'sblasts, krays, and autonomous republics as well as with the otherepublics.

Political factors also played an important part in the creation of the bureau. From the very beginning it wasby Khrushchev. Not only was he made its chairman and one of his proteges its deputy chairman, but with the possible exception of Puzanov, all the members were his friends and proteges. He thus strengthened his control of party affairs in the RSFSR,asis for direct intervention in tbe government of the republic, and assumod still another symbol of leadership.

CONCLUSION

There seemed little doubt by the end of the congress that Khrushchev's position had been greatly strengthened. Malenkov and Molotov and, to ascertain extent, Kaganovich had had to eat crow before the assembled representatives of partythroughout the Soviet Union; Khrushchev had strengthened his command of the party machine by packing the secretariat with friends and proteges; he had increased the voice of tbe party professional in top party counsels by adding four of his men from the party machine to the presidium as candidate members; and his policies had been gben the authoritative stxmpof approvalarty With good reason, lt would appear, Khrushchev wasself-confident, and seemingly secure in tbe knowledge of his power and influence.

Tbe congress was thus an additional Khrushchev victory and an important step in his quest for dominion within the regime. At the same time, however, seeds of difficulty were sown for the first secretary. Those, in the order in which tbey sprouted, were his secret "denlgration-of-Stalin" speech, the adoptionive-year plan which failed to recognize the seriousnessumber of economic problems or to provide sufficientfor tbe economy to adapt quickly to changed conditions, and the retention on tbe party presidium of Malenkov, Molotov, andwith adequate reason to hate him and fear the consequences of his leadership. Subsequent papers in this series will explore the development of the crises which stemmed from these acts and the changes in power relationships which accompanied the process.

Original document.

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